is

The Diabetes Attitudes, Wishes and Needs Second Study

Martha M. Funnell
Jan 1, 2015; 33:32-36
Translating Research to Practice




is

Diabetes and Back Pain: Markers of Diabetes Disease Progression Are Associated With Chronic Back Pain

Lorenzo Rinaldo
Jul 1, 2017; 35:126-131
Feature Articles




is

The Potential of Group Visits in Diabetes Care

Andrew M. Davis
Apr 1, 2008; 26:58-62
Feature Articles




is

Therapeutic Inertia is a Problem for All of Us

Stephen Brunton
Apr 1, 2019; 37:105-106
Editorials




is

SGLT-2 Inhibitors: A New Mechanism for Glycemic Control

Edward C. Chao
Jan 1, 2014; 32:4-11
Feature Articles




is

PROactive: A Sad Tale of Inappropriate Analysis and Unjustified Interpretation

Jay S. Skyler
Apr 1, 2006; 24:63-65
Commentary




is

Persistence of Continuous Glucose Monitoring Use in a Community Setting 1 Year After Purchase

James Chamberlain
Jul 1, 2013; 31:106-109
Feature Articles




is

Interdisciplinary Team Care for Diabetic Patients by Primary Care Physicians, Advanced Practice Nurses, and Clinical Pharmacists

David Willens
Apr 1, 2011; 29:60-68
Feature Articles




is

Diabetes Management Issues for Patients With Chronic Kidney Disease

Kerri L. Cavanaugh
Jul 1, 2007; 25:90-97
Feature Articles




is

Perspectives in Gestational Diabetes Mellitus: A Review of Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment

Jennifer M. Perkins
Apr 1, 2007; 25:57-62
Feature Articles




is

The Disparate Impact of Diabetes on Racial/Ethnic Minority Populations

Edward A. Chow
Jul 1, 2012; 30:130-133
Diabetes Advocacy




is

What's So Tough About Taking Insulin? Addressing the Problem of Psychological Insulin Resistance in Type 2 Diabetes

William H. Polonsky
Jul 1, 2004; 22:147-150
Practical Pointers




is

Heroic Consciousness: What it is and How to Acquire it

By Scott T. Allison This blog post is excerpted from: Allison, S. T. (2019). Heroic consciousness. Heroism Science, 4, 1-43.   The philosopher Yuval Noah Harari (2018) recently described consciousness as “the greatest mystery in the universe”. What exactly is heroic consciousness? It is a way of seeing the world, perceiving reality, and making decisions … Continue reading Heroic Consciousness: What it is and How to Acquire it




is

COVID-19 Pandemic Turns Heroism Upside-Down

By Scott T. Allison William James, who authored the first psychology texbook, was taken and moved by the quiet heroism in everyday working people. He noticed “the great fields of heroism lying round about” him. He was mesmerized by small, seemingly inconsequential everyday acts that, in effect, exemplified unsung heroism in everyone. Before the COVID-19 … Continue reading COVID-19 Pandemic Turns Heroism Upside-Down



  • Commentary and Analysis

is

10 Examples of Heroism Arising From the COVID-19 Pandemic

By Scott T. Allison In any tragedy or crisis, you will see many people standing out and stepping up to save lives and make the world a better place. These heroic individuals can range from leaders of nations to ordinary citizens who rise to the occasion to help others in need. During this COVID-19 pandemic, … Continue reading 10 Examples of Heroism Arising From the COVID-19 Pandemic




is

The Miniseries ‘Devs’ Delivers a Delicious Dose of Heroism and Villainy

By Scott T. Allison Devs is the ideal TV mini-series for people to sink their teeth into, for many reasons: (1) It’s both science and science-fiction; (2) it’s brilliant mix of psychology, philosophy, religion, and technology; (3) it tantalizes us with the mysteries of love, life, death, time, and space; and (4) it features a … Continue reading The Miniseries ‘Devs’ Delivers a Delicious Dose of Heroism and Villainy



  • Commentary and Analysis

is

Heroism Science: Call for Papers, Special Issue: The Heroism of Whistleblowers

Heroism Science: Call for Papers, Special Issue The Heroism of Whistleblowers Edited by Ari Kohen, Brian Riches, and Matt Langdon Whistleblowers speak up with “concerns or information about wrongdoing inside organizations and institutions.” As such, whistleblowing “can be one of the most important and difficult forms of heroism in modern society” (Brown, 2016 p. 1). … Continue reading Heroism Science: Call for Papers, Special Issue: The Heroism of Whistleblowers




is

No-Failure Design and Disaster Recovery: Lessons from Fukushima

One of the striking aspects of the early stages of the nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi last March was the nearly total absence of disaster recovery capability. For instance, while Japan is a super-power of robotic technology, the nuclear authorities had to import robots from France for probing the damaged nuclear plants. Fukushima can teach us an important lesson about technology.

The failure of critical technologies can be disastrous. The crash of a civilian airliner can cause hundreds of deaths. The meltdown of a nuclear reactor can release highly toxic isotopes. Failure of flood protection systems can result in vast death and damage. Society therefore insists that critical technologies be designed, operated and maintained to extremely high levels of reliability. We benefit from technology, but we also insist that the designers and operators "do their best" to protect us from their dangers.

Industries and government agencies who provide critical technologies almost invariably act in good faith for a range of reasons. Morality dictates responsible behavior, liability legislation establishes sanctions for irresponsible behavior, and economic or political self-interest makes continuous safe operation desirable.

The language of performance-optimization  not only doing our best, but also achieving the best  may tend to undermine the successful management of technological danger. A probability of severe failure of one in a million per device per year is exceedingly  and very reassuringly  small. When we honestly believe that we have designed and implemented a technology to have vanishingly small probability of catastrophe, we can honestly ignore the need for disaster recovery.

Or can we?

Let's contrast this with an ethos that is consistent with a thorough awareness of the potential for adverse surprise. We now acknowledge that our predictions are uncertain, perhaps highly uncertain on some specific points. We attempt to achieve very demanding outcomes  for instance vanishingly small probabilities of catastrophe  but we recognize that our ability to reliably calculate such small probabilities is compromised by the deficiency of our knowledge and understanding. We robustify ourselves against those deficiencies by choosing a design which would be acceptable over a wide range of deviations from our current best understanding. (This is called "robust-satisficing".) Not only does "vanishingly small probability of failure" still entail the possibility of failure, but our predictions of that probability may err.

Acknowledging the need for disaster recovery capability (DRC) is awkward and uncomfortable for designers and advocates of a technology. We would much rather believe that DRC is not needed, that we have in fact made catastrophe negligible. But let's not conflate good-faith attempts to deal with complex uncertainties, with guaranteed outcomes based on full knowledge. Our best models are in part wrong, so we robustify against the designer's bounded rationality. But robustness cannot guarantee success. The design and implementation of DRC is a necessary part of the design of any critical technology, and is consistent with the strategy of robust satisficing.

One final point: moral hazard and its dilemma. The design of any critical technology entails two distinct and essential elements: failure prevention and disaster recovery. What economists call a `moral hazard' exists since the failure prevention team might rely on the disaster-recovery team, and vice versa. Each team might, at least implicitly, depend on the capabilities of the other team, and thereby relinquish some of its own responsibility. Institutional provisions are needed to manage this conflict.

The alleviation of this moral hazard entails a dilemma. Considerations of failure prevention and disaster recovery must be combined in the design process. The design teams must be aware of each other, and even collaborate, because a single coherent system must emerge. But we don't want either team to relinquish any responsibility. On the one hand we want the failure prevention team to work as though there is no disaster recovery, and the disaster recovery team should presume that failures will occur. On the other hand, we want these teams to collaborate on the design.

This moral hazard and its dilemma do not obviate the need for both elements of the design. Fukushima has taught us an important lesson by highlighting the special challenge of high-risk critical technologies: design so failure cannot occur, and prepare to respond to the unanticipated.




is

(Even) God is a Satisficer

To 'satisfice' means "To decide on and pursue a course of action that will satisfy the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a particular goal." (Oxford English Dictionary). Herbert Simon (1978 Nobel Prize in Economics) was the first to use the term in this technical sense, which is an old alteration of the ordinary English word "satisfy". Simon wrote (Psychological Review, 63(2), 129-138 (1956)) "Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to 'satisfice'; they do not, in general, 'optimize'." Agents satisfice, according to Simon, due to limitation of their information, understanding, and cognitive or computational ability. These limitations, which Simon called "bounded rationality", force agents to look for solutions which are good enough, though not necessarily optimal. The optimum may exist but it cannot be known by the resource- and information-limited agent.

There is a deep psychological motivation for satisficing, as Barry Schwartz discusses in Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. "When people have no choice, life is almost unbearable." But as the number and variety of choices grows, the challenge of deciding "no longer liberates, but debilitates. It might even be said to tyrannize." (p.2) "It is maximizers who suffer most in a culture that provides too many choices" (p.225) because their expectations cannot be met, they regret missed opportunities, worry about social comparison, and so on. Maximizers may acquire or achieve more than satisficers, but satisficers will tend to be happier.

Psychology is not the only realm in which satisficing finds its roots. Satisficing - as a decision strategy - has systemic or structural advantages that suggest its prevalence even in situations where the complexity of the human psyche is irrelevant. We will discuss an example from the behavior of animals.

Several years ago an ecological colleague of mine at the Technion, Prof. Yohay Carmel, posed the following question: Why do foraging animals move from one feeding site to another later than would seem to be suggested by strategies aimed at maximizing caloric intake? Of course, animals have many goals in addition to foraging. They must keep warm (or cool), evade predators, rest, reproduce, and so on. Many mathematical models of foraging by animals attempt to predict "patch residence times" (PRTs): how long the animal stays at one feeding patch before moving to the next one. A common conclusion is that patch residence times are under-predicted when the model assumes that the animal tries to maximize caloric intake. Models do exist which "patch up" the PRT paradox, but the quandary still exists.

Yohay and I wrote a paper in which we explored a satisficing - rather than maximizing - model for patch residence time. Here's the idea. The animal needs a critical amount of energy to survive until the next foraging session. More food might be nice, but it's not necessary for survival. The animal's foraging strategy must maximize the confidence in achieving the critical caloric intake. So maximization is taking place, but not maximization of the substantive "good" (calories) but rather maximization of the confidence (or reliability, or likelihood, but these are more technical terms) of meeting the survival requirement. We developed a very simple foraging model based on info-gap theory. The model predicts that PRTs for a large number of species - including invertebrates, birds and mammals - tended to be longer (and thus more realistic) than predicted by energy-maximizing models.

This conclusion - that satisficing predicts observed foraging times better than maximizing - is tentative and preliminary (like most scientific conclusions). Nonetheless, it seems to hold a grain of truth, and it suggests an interesting idea. Consider the following syllogism.

1. Evolution selects those traits that enhance the chance of survival.

2. Animals seem to have evolved strategies for foraging which satisfice (rather than maximize) the energy intake.

3. Hence satisficing seems to be competitively advantageous. Satisficing seems to be a better bet than maximizing.

Unlike my psychologist colleague Barry Schwartz, we are not talking about happiness or emotional satisfaction. We're talking about survival of dung flies or blue jays. It seems that aiming to do good enough, but not necessarily the best possible, is the way the world is made.

And this brings me to the suggestion that (even) God is a satisficer. The word "good" appears quite early in the Bible: in the 4th verse of the 1st chapter of Genesis, the very first book: "And God saw the light [that had just been created] that it was good...". At this point, when the world is just emerging out of tohu v'vohu (chaos), we should probably understand the word "good" as a binary category, as distinct from "bad" or "chaos". The meaning of "good" is subsequently refined through examples in the coming verses. God creates dry land and oceans and sees that it is good (1:10). Grass and fruit trees are seen to be good (1:12). The sun and moon are good (1:16-18). Swarming sea creatures, birds, and beasts are good (1:20-21, 25).

And now comes a real innovation. God reviews the entire creation and sees that it is very good (1:31). It turns out that goodness comes in degrees; it's not simply binary: good or bad. "Good" requires judgment; ethics is born. But what particularly interests me here is that God's handiwork isn't excellent. Shouldn't we expect the very best? I'll leave this question to the theologians, but it seems to me that God is a satisficer.




is

Baseball and Linguistic Uncertainty

In my youth I played an inordinate amount of baseball, collected baseball cards, and idolized baseball players. I've outgrown all that but when I'm in the States during baseball season I do enjoy watching a few innings on the TV.

So I was watching a baseball game recently and the commentator was talking about the art of pitching. Throwing a baseball, he said, is like shooting a shotgun. You get a spray. As a pitcher, you have to know your spray. You learn to control it, but you know that it is there. The ball won't always go where you want it. And furthermore, where you want the ball depends on the batter's style and strategy, which vary from pitch to pitch for every batter.

That's baseball talk, but it stuck in my mind. Baseball pitchers must manage uncertainty! And it is not enough to reduce it and hope for the best. Suppose you want to throw a strike. It's not a good strategy to aim directly at, say, the lower outside corner of the strike zone, because of the spray of the ball's path and because the batter's stance can shift. Especially if the spray is skewed down and out, you'll want to move up and in a bit.

This is all very similar to the ambiguity of human speech when we pitch words at each other. Words don't have precise meanings; meanings spread out like the pitcher's spray. If we want to communicate precisely we need to be aware of this uncertainty, and manage it, taking account of the listener's propensities.

Take the word "liberal" as it is used in political discussion.

For many decades, "liberals" have tended to support high taxes to provide generous welfare, public medical insurance, and low-cost housing. They advocate liberal (meaning magnanimous or abundant) government involvement for the citizens' benefit.

A "liberal" might also be someone who is open-minded and tolerant, who is not strict in applying rules to other people, or even to him or herself. Such a person might be called "liberal" (meaning advocating individual rights) for opposing extensive government involvement in private decisions. For instance, liberals (in this second sense) might oppose high taxes since they reduce individuals' ability to make independent choices. As another example, John Stuart Mill opposed laws which restricted the rights of women to work (at night, for instance), even though these laws were intended to promote the welfare of women. Women, insisted Mill, are intelligent adults and can judge for themselves what is good for them.

Returning to the first meaning of "liberal" mentioned above, people of that strain may support restrictions of trade to countries which ignore the health and safety of workers. The other type of "liberal" might tend to support unrestricted trade.

Sending out words and pitching baseballs are both like shooting a shotgun: meanings (and baseballs) spray out. You must know what meaning you wish to convey, and what other meanings the word can have. The choice of the word, and the crafting of its context, must manage the uncertainty of where the word will land in the listener's mind.


Let's go back to baseball again.

If there were no uncertainty in the pitcher's pitch and the batter's swing, then baseball would be a dreadfully boring game. If the batter knows exactly where and when the ball will arrive, and can completely control the bat, then every swing will be a homer. Or conversely, if the pitcher always knows exactly how the batter will swing, and if each throw is perfectly controlled, then every batter will strike out. But which is it? Whose certainty dominates? The batter's or the pitcher's? It can't be both. There is some deep philosophical problem here. Clearly there cannot be complete certainty in a world which has some element of free will, or surprise, or discovery. This is not just a tautology, a necessary result of what we mean by "uncertainty" and "surprise". It is an implication of limited human knowledge. Uncertainty - which makes baseball and life interesting - is inevitable in the human world.

How does this carry over to human speech?

It is said of the Wright brothers that they thought so synergistically that one brother could finish an idea or sentence begun by the other. If there is no uncertainty in what I am going to say, then you will be bored with my conversation, or at least, you won't learn anything from me. It is because you don't know what I mean by, for instance, "robustness", that my speech on this topic is enlightening (and maybe interesting). And it is because you disagree with me about what robustness means (and you tell me so), that I can perhaps extend my own understanding.

So, uncertainty is inevitable in a world that is rich enough to have surprise or free will. Furthermore, this uncertainty leads to a process - through speech - of discovery and new understanding. Uncertainty, and the use of language, leads to discovery.

Isn't baseball an interesting game?




is

Can We Replay History?


After the kids' party games and the birthday cake came the action-packed Steve McQueen movie. My friend's parents had rented a movie projector. They hooked up the reel and let it roll. But the high point came later when they ran the movie backwards. Bullets streamed back into guns, blows were retracted and fallen protagonists recoiled into action. The mechanism that pulls the celluloid film forward for normal showing, can pull the film in the reverse direction, rolling it back onto the feeder reel and showing the movie in reverse.

If you chuck a round pebble off a cliff it will fall in a graceful parabolic arch, gradually increasing its speed until it hits the ground. The same pebble, if shot from the point of impact, at the terminating angle and speed, will gracefully and obligingly retrace its path. (I'm ignoring wind and air friction that make things a bit more complicated.)

Deterministic mechanisms, like the movie reel mechanism or the law of gravity, are reversible.

History is different. Peoples' behavior is influenced by what they know. You pack an umbrella on a trip to the UK. Google develops search algorithms not search parties because their knowledge base is information technology not mountain trekking. Knowledge is powerful because it enables rational behavior: matching actions to goals. Knowledge transforms futile fumbling into intelligent behavior.

Knowledge underlies intelligent behavior, but knowledge is continually expanding. We discover new facts and relationships. We discover that things have changed. Therefore tomorrow's knowledge-based behavior will, to some extent, be unpredictable today because tomorrow's discoveries cannot be known today. Human behavior has an inherent element of indeterminism. Intelligent learning behavior cannot be completely predicted.

Personal and collective history does not unfold like a pre-woven rug. Human history is fundamentally different from the trajectory of a pebble tossed from a cliff. History is the process of uncovering the unknown and responding to this new knowledge. The existence of the unknown creates the possibility of free will. The discovery of new knowledge introduces indeterminism and irreversibility into history, as explained by the philosophers G.L.S. Shackle and Karl Popper.

Nonetheless history is not erratic because each increment of new knowledge adds to the store of what was learned before. Memory is not perfect, either of individuals or groups, but it is powerful. History happens in historical context. For instance, one cannot understand the recent revolutions and upheavals in the Arab world from the perspective of 18th century European revolutions; the historical backgrounds are too different, and the outcomes in the Middle East will be different as well. Innovation, even revolution, is spurred by new knowledge laid over the old. A female municipal official slapped a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi. That slap crystalized Mr Bouazizi's knowledge of his helpless social impotence and lit the match with which he immolated himself and initiated conflagrations around the Mideast. New knowledge acts like thruster engines on the inertial body of memory. What is emerging in the Mideast is Middle Eastern, not European. What is emerging is the result of new knowledge: of the power of networking, of the mortality of dictators, of the limits of coercion, of the power of new knowledge itself and the possibilities embedded in tomorrow's unknowns.

Mistakes are made, even with the best intentions and the best possible knowledge. Even if analysts knew and understood all the actions of all actors on the stage of history, they still cannot know what those people will learn tomorrow and how that new knowledge will alter their behavior. Mistakes are made because history does not unwind like a celluloid reel.

That's not to say that analysts are never ignorant, negligent, stupid or malicious. It's to say that all actions are, in a sense, mistakes. Or, the biggest mistake of all is to think that we can know the full import of our actions. We cannot, because actions are tossed, like pebbles, into the dark pit of unknown possible futures. One cannot know all possible echoes, or whether some echo might be glass-shatteringly cataclysmic.

Mistakes can sometimes be corrected, but never undone. History cannot be run backwards, and you never get a second chance. Conversely, every instant is a new opportunity because the future is always uncertain. Uncertainty is the freedom to err, and the opportunity to create and discover. 




is

Picking a Theory is Like Building a Boat at Sea


"We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship
 but are never able to start afresh from the bottom." 
Otto Neurath's analogy in the words of Willard V. Quine

Engineers, economists, social planners, security strategists, and others base their plans and decisions on theories. They often argue long and hard over which theory to use. Is it ever right to use a theory that we know is empirically wrong, especially if a true (or truer) theory is available? Why is it so difficult to pick a theory?

Let's consider two introductory examples.

You are an engineer designing a robot. You must calculate the forces needed to achieve specified motions of the robotic arms. You can base these calculations on either of two theories. One theory assumes that an object comes to rest unless a force acts upon it. Let's call this axiom A. The other theory assumes that an object moves at constant speed unless a force acts upon it. Let's call this axiom G. Axiom A agrees with observation: Nothing moves continuously without the exertion of force; an object will come to rest unless you keep pushing it. Axiom G contradicts all observation; no experiment illustrates the perpetual motion postulated by the axiom. If all else is the same, which theory should you choose?

Axiom A is Aristotle's law of inertia, which contributed little to the development of mechanical dynamics. Axiom G is Galileo's law of inertia: one of the most fruitful scientific ideas of all time. Why is an undemonstrable assertion - axiom G - a good starting point for a theory?

Consider another example.

You are an economist designing a market-based policy to induce firms to reduce pollution. You will use an economic theory to choose between policies. One theory assumes that firms face pure competition, meaning that no single firm can influence market prices. Another theory provides agent-based game-theoretic characterization of how firms interact (without colluding) by observing and responding to price behavior of other firms and of consumers.

Pure competition is a stylized idealization (like axiom G). Game theory is much more realistic (like axiom A), but may obscure essential patterns in its massive detail. Which theory should you use?

We will not address the question of how to choose a theory upon which to base a decision. We will focus on the question: why is theory selection so difficult? We will discuss four trade offs.

"Thanks to the negation sign, there are as many truths as falsehoods;
we just can't always be sure which are which." Willard V. Quine

The tension between right and right. The number of possible theories is infinite, and sometimes it's hard to separate the wheat from the chaff, as suggested by the quote from Quine. As an example, I have a book called A Modern Guide to Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Competing Schools of Thought by Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk. It's a wonderful overview of about a dozen theories developed by leading economic scholars, many of them Nobel Prize Laureates. The theories are all fundamentally different. They use different axioms and concepts and they compete for adoption by economists. These theories have been studied and tested upside down and backwards. However, economic processes are very complex and variable, and the various theories succeed in different ways or in different situations, so the jury is still out. The choice of a theory is no simple matter because many different theories can all seem right in one way or another.

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Archilochus

The fox-hedgehog tension. This aphorism by Archilochus metaphorically describes two types of theories (and two types of people). Fox-like theories are comprehensive and include all relevant aspects of the problem. Hedgehog-like theories, in contrast, skip the details and focus on essentials. Axiom A is fox-like because the complications of friction are acknowledged from the start. Axiom G is hedgehog-like because inertial resistance to change is acknowledged but the complications of friction are left for later. It is difficult to choose between these types of theories because it is difficult to balance comprehensiveness against essentialism. On the one hand, all relevant aspects of the problem should be considered. On the other hand, don't get bogged down in endless details. This fox-hedgehog tension can be managed by weighing the context, goals and implications of the decision. We won't expand on this idea since we're not considering how to choose a theory; we're only examining why it's a difficult choice. However, the idea of resolving this tension by goal-directed choice motivates the third tension.

"Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false
lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant." John Dewey

The truth-meaning tension. Theories are collections of statements like axioms A and G in our first example. Statements carry meaning, and statements can be either true or false. Truth and meaning are different. For instance, "Archilochus was a Japanese belly dancer" has meaning, but is not true. The quote from Dewey expresses the idea that "meaning" is a broader description of statements than "truth". All true statements mean something, but not all meaningful statements are true. That does not imply, however, that all untrue meaningful statements are false, as we will see.

We know the meanings of words and sentences from experience with language and life. A child learns the meanings of words - chair, mom, love, good, bad - by experience. Meanings are learned by pointing - this is a chair - and also by experiencing what it means to love or to be good or bad.

Truth is a different concept. John Dewey wrote that

"truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning."

A true statement, in Dewey's sense, is one that can be confirmed by experience. Many statements are meaningful, even important and useful, but neither true nor false in this experimental sense. Axiom G is an example.

Our quest is to understand why the selection of a theory is difficult. Part of the challenge derives from the tension between meaning and truth. We select a theory for use in formulating and evaluating a plan or decision. The decision has implications: what would it mean to do this rather than that? Hence it is important that the meaning of the theory fit the context of the decision. Indeed, hedgehogs would say that getting the meaning and implication right is the essence of good decision making.

But what if a relevantly meaningful theory is unprovable or even false? Should we use a theory that is meaningful but not verifiable by experience? Should we use a meaningful theory that is even wrong? This quandary is related to the fox-hedgehog tension because the fox's theory is so full of true statements that its meaning may be obscured, while the hedgehog's bare-bones theory has clear relevance to the decision to be made, but may be either false or too idealized to be tested.

Galileo's axiom of inertia is an idealization that is unsupported by experience because friction can never be avoided. Axiom G assumes conditions that cannot be realized so the axiom can never be tested. Likewise, pure competition is an idealization that is rarely if ever encountered in practice. But these theories capture the essence of many situations. In practical terms, what it means to get the robotic arm from here to there is to apply net forces that overcome Galilean inertia. But actually designing a robot requires considering details of dissipative forces like friction. What it means to be a small business is that the market price of your product is beyond your control. But actually running a business requires following and reacting to prices in the store next door.

It is difficult to choose between a relevantly meaningful but unverifiable theory, and a true theory that is perhaps not quite what we mean.

The knowledge-ignorance tension. Recall that we are discussing theories in the service of decision-making by engineers, social scientists and others. A theory should facilitate the use of our knowledge and understanding. However, in some situations our ignorance is vast and our knowledge will grow. Hence a theory should also account for ignorance and be able to accommodate new knowledge.

Let's take an example from theories of decision. The independence axiom is fundamental in various decision theories, for instance in von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. It says that one's choices should be independent of irrelevant alternatives. Suppose you are offered the dinner choice between chicken and fish, and you choose chicken. The server returns a few minutes later saying that beef is also available. If you switch your choice from chicken to fish you are violating the independence axiom. You prefer beef less than both chicken and fish, so the beef option shouldn't alter the fish-chicken preference.

But let's suppose that when the server returned and mentioned beef, your physician advised you to reduce your cholesterol intake (so your preference for beef is lowest) which prompted your wife to say that you should eat fish at least twice a week because of vitamins in the oil. So you switch from chicken to fish. Beef is not chosen, but new information that resulted from introducing the irrelevant alternative has altered the chicken-fish preference.

One could argue for the independence axiom by saying that it applies only when all relevant information (like considerations of cholesterol and fish oil) are taken into account. On the other hand, one can argue against the independence axiom by saying that new relevant information quite often surfaces unexpectedly. The difficulty is to judge the extent to which ignorance and the emergence of new knowledge should be central in a decision theory.

Wrapping up. Theories express our knowledge and understanding about the unknown and confusing world. Knowledge begets knowledge. We use knowledge and understanding - that is, theory - in choosing a theory. The process is difficult because it's like building a boat on the open sea as Otto Neurath once said. 




is

Genesis for Engineers

Technology has come a long way since Australopithecus first bruised their fingers chipping flint to make knives and scrapers. We are blessed to fruitfully multiply, to fill the world and to master it (Genesis 1:28). And indeed the trend of technological history is towards increasing mastery over our world. Inventors deliberately invent, but many inventions are useless or even harmful. Why is there progress and how certain is the process? Part of the answer is that good ideas catch on and bad ones get weeded out. Reality, however, is more complicated: what is 'good' or 'bad' is not always clear; unintended consequences cannot be predicted; and some ideas get lost while others get entrenched. Mastering the darkness and chaos of creation is a huge engineering challenge. But more than that, progress is painful and uncertain and the challenge is not only technological.

An example of the weeding-out process, by which our mastery improves, comes to us in Hammurabi's code of law from 38 centuries ago:

"If a builder build a house for some one, and does not construct it properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death. If it kill the son of the owner the son of that builder shall be put to death." (Articles 229-230)

Builders who use inferior techniques, or who act irresponsibly, will be ruthlessly removed. Hammurabi's law doesn't say what techniques to use; it is a mechanism for selecting among techniques. As the level of competence rises and the rate of building collapse decreases, the law remains the same, implicitly demanding better performance after each improvement.

Hammurabi's law establishes negative incentives that weed out faulty technologies. In contrast, positive incentives can induce beneficial invention. John Harrison (1693-1776) worked for years developing a clock for accurate navigation at sea, motivated by the Royal Society's 20,000 pound prize.

Organizations, mores, laws and other institutions explain a major part of how good ideas catch on and how bad ones are abandoned. But good ideas can get lost as well. Jared Diamond relates that bow and arrow technologies emerged and then disappeared from pre-historic Australian cultures. Aboriginal mastery of the environment went up and then down. The mechanisms or institutions for selecting better tools do not always exist or operate.

Valuable technologies can be "side-lined" as well, despite apparent advantages. The CANDU nuclear reactor technology, for instance, uses natural Uranium. No isotope enrichment is needed, so its fuel cycle is disconnected from Uranium enrichment for military applications (atom bombs use highly enriched Uranium or Plutonium). CANDU's two main technological competitors - pressurized and boiling water reactors - use isotope-enriched fuel. Nuclear experts argue long (and loud) about the merits of various technologies, but no "major" or "serious" accidents (INES levels 6 or 7) have occurred with CANDU reactors but have with PWRs or BWRs. Nonetheless, the CANDU is a minor contributor to world nuclear power.

The long-run improvement of technology depends on incentives created by attitudes, organizations and institutions, like the Royal Society and the law. Technology modifies those attitudes and institutions, creating an interactive process whereby society influences technological development, and technology alters society. The main uncertainty in technological progress arises from unintended impacts of technology on mores, values and society as a whole. An example will make the point.

Early mechanical clocks summoned the faithful to prayer in medieval monasteries. But technological innovations may be used for generations without anyone realizing their full implications, and so it was with the clock. The long-range influence of the mechanical clock on western civilization was the idea of "time discipline as opposed to time obedience. One can ... use public clocks to summon people for one purpose or another; but that is not punctuality. Punctuality comes from within, not from without. It is the mechanical clock that made possible, for better or for worse, a civilization attentive to the passage of time, hence to productivity and performance." (Landes, p.7)

Unintended consequences of technology - what economists called "externalities" - can be beneficial or harmful. The unintended internalization of punctuality is beneficial (maybe). The clock example illustrates how our values gradually and unexpectedly change as a result of technological innovation. Environmental pollution and adverse climate change are harmful, even when they result from manufacturing beneficial consumer goods. Attitudes towards technological progress are beginning to change in response to perceptions of technologically-induced climate change. Pollution and climate change may someday seriously disrupt the technology-using societies that produced them. This disruption may occur either by altering social values, or by adverse material impacts, or both.

Progress occurs in historical and institutional context. Hammurabi's Code created incentives for technological change; monastic life created needs for technological solutions. Progress is uncertain because we cannot know what will be invented, and whether it will be beneficial or harmful. Moreover, inventions will change our attitudes and institutions, and thus change the process of invention itself, in ways that we cannot anticipate. The scientific engineer must dispel the "darkness over the deep" (Genesis 1:2) because mastery comes from enlightenment. But in doing so we change both the world and ourselves. The unknown is not only over "the waters" but also in ourselves.




is

We're Just Getting Started: A Glimpse at the History of Uncertainty


We've had our cerebral cortex for several tens of thousands of years. We've lived in more or less sedentary settlements and produced excess food for 7 or 8 thousand years. We've written down our thoughts for roughly 5 thousand years. And Science? The ancient Greeks had some, but science and its systematic application are overwhelmingly a European invention of the past 500 years. We can be proud of our accomplishments (quantum theory, polio vaccine, powered machines), and we should worry about our destructive capabilities (atomic, biological and chemical weapons). But it is quite plausible, as Koestler suggests, that we've only just begun to discover our cerebral capabilities. It is more than just plausible that the mysteries of the universe are still largely hidden from us. As evidence, consider the fact that the main theories of physics - general relativity, quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics - are still not unified. And it goes without say that the consilient unity of science is still far from us.

What holds for science in general, holds also for the study of uncertainty. The ancient Greeks invented the axiomatic method and used it in the study of mathematics. Some medieval thinkers explored the mathematics of uncertainty, but it wasn't until around 1600 that serious thought was directed to the systematic study of uncertainty, and statistics as a separate and mature discipline emerged only in the 19th century. The 20th century saw a florescence of uncertainty models. Lukaczewicz discovered 3-valued logic in 1917, and in 1965 Zadeh introduced his work on fuzzy logic. In between, Wald formulated a modern version of min-max in 1945. A plethora of other theories, including P-boxes, lower previsions, Dempster-Shafer theory, generalized information theory and info-gap theory all suggest that the study of uncertainty will continue to grow and diversify.

In short, we have learned many facts and begun to understand our world and its uncertainties, but the disputes and open questions are still rampant and the yet-unformulated questions are endless. This means that innovations, discoveries, inventions, surprises, errors, and misunderstandings are to be expected in the study or management of uncertainty. We are just getting started. 






is

New History of Psychiatry: Melancholy, Madness, Chinese Psychiatry, Psychedelic Therapy, and More

The June 2020 issue of History of Psychiatry is now online. Full details follow below: “Wild melancholy. On the historical plausibility of a black bile theory of blood madness, or hæmatomania,” Jan Verplaetse. Abstract: Nineteenth-century art historian John Addington Symonds coined the term hæmatomania (blood madness) for the extremely bloodthirsty behaviour of a number of … Continue reading New History of Psychiatry: Melancholy, Madness, Chinese Psychiatry, Psychedelic Therapy, and More




is

History of Spanish Psychology, 1800–2000

AHP readers may be interested in a recent piece on “History of Spanish Psychology, 1800–2000” in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology. Full details below. “History of Spanish Psychology, 1800–2000,” by Javier Bandrés. Abstract: In the history of Spanish psychology in the 19th century, three stages can be distinguished. An eclectic first stage was defined … Continue reading History of Spanish Psychology, 1800–2000




is

Review Article – Within a single lifetime: Recent writings on autism

AHP readers will be interested in a review article now available online from History of the Human Sciences “Within a single lifetime: Recent writings on autism.” Written by Gregory Hollin the piece reviews five recent books on autism.




is

Forthcoming HOPOS Special Issue on Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie

Two pieces forthcoming in a special issue of HOPOS, the official journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, will be of interest to AHP readers. The special issue, “Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie—in the Contexts of Historicism, Relativism, and Naturalism,” is guest-edited by Christian Damböck, Uljana Feest, and Martin Kusch. Full details … Continue reading Forthcoming HOPOS Special Issue on Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie




is

CfP: Shaping the ‘Socialist Self’? The Role of Psy-Sciences in Communist States of the Eastern Bloc (1948–1989)

CALL FOR PAPERSINTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP Shaping the ‘Socialist Self’? The Role of Psy-Sciences in Communist States of the Eastern Bloc (1948–1989) Date: 6 November 2020 Venue: Prague, Czech Republic Deadline for applications: 30 June 2020 Organizing institutions: CEFRES (French Research Center in Humanities and Social Sciences in Prague) Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences Collegium Carolinum … Continue reading CfP: Shaping the ‘Socialist Self’? The Role of Psy-Sciences in Communist States of the Eastern Bloc (1948–1989)




is

May HoP, including a Special Section: Who Was Little Albert? The Historical Controversy

Photographs of John Watson (left) and Rosalie Rayner (right) via Ben Harris. The May 2020 issue of History of Psychology is now online. The issue includes a special section on “Who Was Little Albert? The Historical Controversy.” Full details follow below. Special Section: Who Was Little Albert? The Historical Controversy“Journals, referees, and gatekeepers in the … Continue reading May HoP, including a Special Section: Who Was Little Albert? The Historical Controversy




is

Forthcoming in HHS: Homosexual Aversion Therapy, Comte on Organism-Environment Relationships

Two forthcoming pieces in History of the Human Sciences may be of interest to AHP readers. Full details below. “Cold War Pavlov: Homosexual aversion therapy in the 1960s,” by Kate Davison. Abstract: Homosexual aversion therapy enjoyed two brief but intense periods of clinical experimentation: between 1950 and 1962 in Czechoslovakia, and between 1962 and 1975 … Continue reading Forthcoming in HHS: Homosexual Aversion Therapy, Comte on Organism-Environment Relationships




is

This Essential Mineral Linked To COVID-19 Recovery

An essential mineral in the body have been linked to recovery of COVID-19 patients.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




is

Six Simple Signs Of A Narcissist (M)

One of the most commonly believed signs of a narcissist is a myth.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




is

Stress Has Risen In This Age Group More Than Any Other (M)

Even before the pandemic, this age group were reporting record levels of levels.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




is

How Technology Is Improving Safety On the Roads and Reducing Driving Anxiety

Technology has changed a number of aspects of our everyday lives and has led to increased efficiency. But when it comes to driving, has it helped or hindered the process? In this article, we will be looking into some of the ways that technology has improved safety on our roads in the last 10 years. […]




is

4 Ways Therapists Assist People with Mental Health Issues

One of the primary reasons people seek therapy is to get help with mental health issues. Some of the more common mental disorders affecting individuals today include depression, anxiety, post traumatic stress (PTSD), phobias, addiction, and attention deficit hyperactivity (ADHD). Depending on the type and intensity of your issue, your therapist may adjust his treatment […]




is

Is Addiction Hereditary?

Addiction is a major health problem, both mentally and physically. In fact, it is probably one of the most complicated illnesses to deal with because it is has to be dealt with on both a physical and psychological level. Approximately one in eight adults struggle with drug and alcohol addiction at the same time and […]




is

Intimacy vs Isolation: Why Do Some People Struggle to Form Intimate Relationships?

Loneliness is a surprisingly common phenomenon in the 21st century. In 2018, a survey conducted by The Economist and the Kaiser Family Foundation revealed that 22% of adults in the United States and 23% of adults in the United Kingdom often or always feel lonely or left out. Interestingly, many people who describe themselves as […]




is

The landfill nudge shows up at a Whole Foods in Lake Forest, Illinois

Hat tip: Brad Bennett




is

Was this yard sale successful?

The problem with this sign is that the best yard sale goodies were probably available “yesterday.” You’re down to the dregs today. Better to post a sign that is fuzzy with time and refers only to “today.” Hat tip to photographer Mary Ann Henningsen.




is

The Obama administration launches RECAP

It goes by the name “Smart Disclosure,” in an announcement to the heads of federal departments and agencies. The term “smart disclosure” refers to the timely release of complex information and data in standardized, machine readable formats in ways that enable consumers to make informed decisions. Smart disclosure will typically take the form of providing [...]




is

Where is behavioral economics headed in the world of marketing?

The Nudge blog sat down (electronically) with John Kenny, Senior Vice President of Strategic Planning in Draftfcb’s Chicago office, to explore whether behavioral economics is just a fad in marketing or a legitimate tool to help the industry perform better. Starting with the Institute of Decision Making, Draftfcb has been one of the leaders in [...]




is

does resurge work : Resurge weight reduction supplement is a...



does resurge work : Resurge weight reduction supplement is a distinct advantage program that would bolster your ascent to control. It will change you and make you more grounded than at any other time with improved wellbeing that can assist you with getting away from heftiness. This Resurge audit tells how the Supplement will help your lack of sleep and weight reduction cause. Improved digestion change will enable the body to acquire vitality.




is

Seeking Participants for a Study on How COVID-19 is Affecting Sex and Relationships

The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is causing a number of societal changes that are new to nearly all of us, with governments around the world locking down cities and countries in an attempt to slow the spread of the virus. This situation is pushing some people together, but pulling others apart—and we’ve never seen anything quite like it in the modern era. Countless media articles have been written about the ways in which this is affecting people’s sex lives and relationships; however, most of them are purely speculative. This led some of my colleagues at the Kinsey Institute and I to wonder what’s really happening—and we’ve designed a study to help us better understand how emergency situations like this affect people’s sexual and romantic lives, which may help us to better plan and prepare for similar events in the future.



  • Professional Issues in Psychology

is

The History of the Clitoris (Video)

The clitoris is an organ that has been wildly misunderstood and mischaracterized for most of human history. The last three decades have dramatically changed the way that scientists think and talk about the clitoris; however, many myths and misconceptions remain.




is

Why The Pandemic is Making Some People Horny--But Turning Others Off

There are a lot of conflicting media reports out right now about how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting people’s sex drives. Some are saying that all of the stress and anxiety is putting a damper on desire, while others are saying that everyone is super horny. So which is it? Truth be told, it’s probably a bit of both.




is

How Do You Help a Partner Who is Depressed? Advice From a Sex Therapist

Depression is one of the most common mental health issues in the United States. In fact, according to the National Institutes of Mental Health, 1 in 14 Americans experienced an episode of major depression in the last year alone. Given the circumstances surrounding the current COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, many in the mental health community predict that the number will be even higher this year because these circumstances are creating a “perfect storm” of depression risks. The widespread prevalence of depression has a lot of implications for our lives, even if we don’t personally have depression ourselves. Many of us will have loved ones, such as a romantic partner, who develops depression at some point. In these situations, it’s common for people to wonder how they can help their partner most effectively. So what should they do?




is

Sex and Psychology Podcast: Maintaining a Healthy Intimate Life During Lockdown and Social Distancing

These are unprecedented times. Much of the world is currently living under lockdown conditions and practicing social distancing in order to curb the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus. So how is this affecting people’s intimate lives? How are our sex lives and relationships holding up, and is there anything we can do to more effectively navigate this complex and challenging situation? For the answers to these questions, I spoke to Dr. Lori Brotto, a Professor at the University of British Columbia, a practicing psychologist, and author of the book Better Sex Through Mindfulness. I asked Dr. Brotto what she has been seeing in her clinical practice since the pandemic began and how it’s different from usual.