The recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to consider grave crimes allegedly perpetrated in its territory has led to the ICC Prosecutor’s preliminary examination identifying a wave of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

There are claims of persecution, forced conscription, deportation, sham trials, enforced disappearances, and property seizure - in Crimea. As well as killings, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and indiscriminate shelling - in Donbas. The court now needs to decide whether to open a full investigation which could lead to charges against specific individuals, as in the trial currently taking place in the Netherlands over MH-17.

However, the ICC does remain a court of last resort as Ukraine retains the principal power to prosecute grave violations perpetrated in its eastern regions and Crimea, with the court only stepping in if Ukraine (or another court with jurisdiction) is either unwilling or unable to do so.

As the evidence mounts up, Ukrainian investigators, prosecutors and judges are becoming more open to cooperation with foreign experts, law firms, human rights NGOs and younger domestic professionals - a significant proportion of whom are women.

Transformation shows determination

This is an unusual shift, given the rigid hierarchical nature of post-Soviet institutions, with elderly males in most of the top positions. The transformation shows the determination to see perpetrators of crimes in Crimea and Donbas tried by the ICC, with joint professional development trainings and joint communications about the alleged crimes.

Ukraine has also been strengthening its institutions. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has been improving quality control of its war crime proceedings, and has taken a strong pro-ICC stance. The Office of the Prosecutor General established a special department to monitor the armed conflict proceedings, and two specialised war crime units have been formed in Donbas.

Although too early to assess progress - given recent prosecution reform and that much-needed legislation on international crimes is still pending – these are promising signs of Ukraine’s intent to take a specialised approach to armed conflict violations. And Ukrainian civil society organisations are also playing a more important role, documenting alleged crimes and sending evidence to the ICC.

Any intervention by the ICC in Ukraine also has a considerable impact on the wider dynamics of addressing international crimes, further extending the court’s reach beyond a focus on Africa which has attracted widespread criticism since it began in 2002.

The ICC has already opened investigations in Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Afghanistan, with preliminary examinations in Colombia, Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Palestine, and The Philippines. But the Ukrainian case would further develop the European subtleties of the court’s jurisprudence.

Although the ICC is currently investigating the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the active phase of that armed conflict lasted for just five days whereas Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine has been ongoing for the six years. The temporal difference in no way diminishes the suffering of victims and the necessity for the proper investigation, prosecution and compensation in the Georgian context.

And yet, going by even the preliminary findings of the ICC prosecutor, the spectrum of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated in Ukraine is much wider. Some incidents, such as the illegal construction of the Crimean Bridge, is an amalgam of the violations against property, cultural heritage and the environment. Cumulatively, the Ukrainian and Georgian cases would substantially contribute to the development of the court’s emerging European lenses.

The Russia-Ukraine armed conflict is also the first instance of armed hostilities of such magnitude and duration in Europe since World War II and the Yugoslav Wars. The ICC’s readiness to take on such geopolitically challenging cases which leave itself open to attack will be tested.

But by examining new contexts - including Ukraine - the ICC would develop a more layered reading of the nature and scope of the crimes it works on. For example, alleged indoctrination and use of children by armed groups in eastern Ukraine is likely to differ from the known practices of abducting and recruiting child soldiers in Africa.

Investigating evidence of Russia’s persecution of pro-Ukrainian activists - forcing them out of Crimea - coupled with the creation of favourable conditions for Russian citizens to relocate to Crimea could lead to proving the existence of a policy of mass colonisation of the peninsula - adding new layers to the court’s jurisprudence on population displacement. And previously under-prosecuted crimes may come to the fore, such as attacks on cultural property or causing the destruction of the environment.

Although the ICC proceedings on Ukraine – along with those being held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) - are unlikely to bring immediate results, Ukraine has developed an international adjudication strategy based on the available viable options and what can be practically delivered.

The simple act of a reputed international court outlining Russia’s alleged violations in Crimea and Donbas and naming those individually responsible would be an impactful achievement in itself, regardless of whether Russia pays any attention or compensation.

And any international judgments or those of domestic courts such as the Dutch MH-17 proceedings and Russia’s response - predicted to be non-compliance - is an important argument for continuing sanctions against Russia over its conduct in Ukraine.

The mutually reinforcing effect of both the Crimea and Donbas proceedings within Ukraine and at international courts should not be underestimated. These investigations into war crimes, terrorism and human rights issues are deeply relevant - not only for the conflict itself, but also for the development of international law.

Part One of this series assesses Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable as a state at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

This event is organized by Chatham House and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Keynote speaker:

• Lindene Patton, Climate Product Officer, Zurich Financial Services

Other speaker highlights:

• Alexis Livanos, Northrop Grumman
• Sir David King, University of Oxford
• Barend Van Bergen, KPMG
• Mike Keebaugh,Raytheon
• Peter Stott, UK Met Office
• Trevor Maynard, Lloyd's
• Shree Khare, Risk Management Solutions
• Giovanni Rum, Group on Earth Observations
• Greg Withee, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
• Man Cheung, Marsh Ltd

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has risen up the political agenda both nationally and internationally as a part of the effort to reduce CO2 emissions in power generation yet the applications, potential and impacts of this technology remain contested.

Is CCS - employed to produce low-carbon electricity and hydrogen - the panacea we urgently need to limit cumulative CO2 emissions to a level at which we stand a chance of avoiding dangerous climate change (and possibly also a renaissance in global nuclear fission)? Or does it shift the emphasis away from switching to more a sustainable renewable energy infrastructure that could avoid the use of fossil fuels and nuclear altogether?

In this meeting two leading voices in the debate give their opinions, separating the known from the unknown and kick starting an informed discussion about the pros, cons and politics of CCS.

Please note that attendance is by invitation only and there is a maximum of 25 places. 

This meeting is part of the Chatham House Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable.

In the aftermath of the recent Rio+20 conference, James Bacchus will discuss the potential for establishing new trade, investment and other international rules and arrangements to promote sustainable growth. In particular, he will explore the interconnections and the international arrangements relating to food, energy, water, climate and other issues affecting global sustainable development.

Attendance is strictly by invitation only. To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

About Director's Breakfast Briefings.

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are replacements for many of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) currently being phased out under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Unlike those ozone-depleting substances (ODS), HFCs do not destroy the ozone layer, but they are very powerful greenhouse gases (GHGs) – up to thousands of times more damaging to the climate than carbon dioxide – and their use is currently growing faster than any other category of GHGs. Projections show HFC use increasing as much as 30-fold by 2050, adding up to 0.1°C of global average temperature rise by mid-century, and increasing up to five-fold, to 0.5°C, by 2100. This clearly makes it more difficult to limit the rise in global temperature to the internationally agreed ceiling of 2°C – and thereby avoid dangerous climate change – by the end of the 21st century.

As GHGs, HFCs fall under the purview of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and are explicitly listed under the UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which controls emissions of HFCs and other GHGs. They are not, however, subject to any specific measures under the climate agreements, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Accordingly, the last five years have seen proposals to amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of HFCs.

Such a step would have a number of advantages. Since substitutes already exist for almost all uses of HFCs, the consumption and production phase-out model of the Montreal Protocol is better suited to controlling HFCs than the emissions limits controls of the climate regime; and the individuals and organizations involved in implementing the Montreal Protocol have accumulated substantial experience and expertise in dealing with precisely those industrial sectors in which HFCs are used, including refrigeration and air-conditioning, foams, solvents and aerosols.

This paper, which draws on the discussions at a workshop held at Chatham House in April 2014, outlines the main issues around the question of how best to craft a fair and effective global response to the growth in HFC use. A number of key issues are central to the debate: the principle of equity between developed and developing countries; the availability of alternatives to HFCs; the need for financial support for developing countries; the legal relationship between the climate and ozone regimes; and, underlying all these, the need for political will to resolve these challenges.

The European Union has reached agreement on its 2030 climate and energy package in preparation for the next major international climate summit in Paris in December 2015. In the agreement member states have signed up to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 40% by 2030 – compared to 1990 levels. Currently emissions are approximately 20% below 1990 levels and so the 2030 target represents a continuation of current decarbonization trends, but it is below the rate of reductions required to meet the longer term objective of cutting emission by 80-95% by 2050.

However, the overall 40% reduction will still drive structural changes in Europe’s economy and the energy sector. This could and should be seen as an opportunity for the EU to become a world leader in the innovation of both the new technologies and systems, such as electricity storage, dynamic demand responses and the deployment of electric vehicles, all of which are experiencing a rapid increase in the size of their global markets.

But there are some concerns. The climate and energy package has put forward a collective target to double the current level of renewables so that it will provide at least 27% of energy by 2030. However, the target is binding on the EU as a whole but not on individual member states, which creates uncertainty and is further complicated by a lack of clarity on the enforcement mechanism, which remains vague. To avoid loss of investor and industrial confidence a transparent process needs to be rapidly developed that ensures compliance. 

The EU has also failed to give energy efficiency the priority it deserves, downgrading it to an indicative target (i.e. one that is aspirational only) of a 27% reduction in energy use from business as usual. However, this is equivalent to, at most, a 19% reduction from Europe's pre-recession trajectory. The weaker energy efficiency and renewable energy elements of the package reflects the resistance of a relatively small number of countries to further EU-wide legal commitments, either because they prefer market inducement or due to their reluctance to reform their energy sectors. The package also makes clear that the a reformed Emissions Trading Scheme will be the main instrument to achieve the GHG reduction target and proposes to accelerate the reduction of the cap on maximum permitted emissions. However, this would only kick in after 2021, meaning the scheme will remain relatively ineffective for at least another five years. 

The crisis in Ukraine and the potential implications for security of supply once again highlights the importance of both domestic energy production and common European approaches to energy suppliers. Every 1% of energy saved across the EU reduces gas imports by 2.6%, and a stronger target would do more to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports. The EU’s failure to adopt a more far reaching and binding target on energy efficiency is a missed opportunity given that it is one  of the only approaches that delivers on the three pillars on energy policy, namely environmental protection, competitiveness and security of supply, simultaneously.

It is important to note the progress that the EU has made in both meeting its climate targets over the last decade and the impact that this has had on its other energy policy objectives. Currently, the EU’s 2020 target for reducing GHG emissions by 20% has or is very close to being met, in part due to the economic downturn, but also due to efficiency, renewable energy and changing industrial patterns and technologies. Furthermore, the use of renewable energy is now estimated to save around €30 billion per year in imported energy, improving balance of payments and improving security of supply. Likewise improvements in energy efficiency have been shown since the turn of the century to have contributed to a 1% annual reduction in energy consumption in the EU.

But the EU is not alone in preparing national carbon reduction targets for the UNFCCC conference in Paris 2015. Both China and the US, the world’s first and second largest emitters, are preparing their own emission reduction plans. China announced in September that it would put forward a new target for the peaking of its carbon dioxide emissions as early as possible. It is suggested that this might be as early as in 2025, with the potential for peak coal use coming even earlier in 2020. The US has proposed to set limits on the emissions from new coal-fired power stations and a 30% reduction in US power sector emissions by 2030 (relative to their 2005 baseline), and President Obama is expected to go further with new climate measures next year.

In the year ahead all countries that are party to the UNFCCC are expected to put on the table their national carbon abatement plans for 2030.  Some will be conditional upon further international assistance and commitments. The package agreed by Europe has scope to respond to increased efforts by other countries. This could include increasing the EU’s own domestic target (currently framed as ‘at least 40%’) or through international offsets and climate finance. How the EU responds to other countries efforts will be a test of its global leadership on climate issues.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback 

It has long been argued that if we are to limit the effects of climate change, some fossil fuel reserves must stay in the ground. But how much of each fuel; and which locations must remain untapped? A new study, recently published in Nature finds that a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves globally should remain in the ground and not be used before 2050 if global warming is to stay below the 2°C threshold. The speaker will discuss the methods used to generate these estimates, the key findings of the paper, and the implications that they may have in this milestone year for addressing climate change. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Summary

• The Paris Agreement, reached at COP21, was a triumph of diplomacy. The deal can be characterized as: flexible, combining a ‘hard’ legal shell and a ‘soft’ enforcement mechanism; inclusive, as it was adopted by all 196 parties to the UNFCCC and is therefore the first truly global climate deal; messy, as the bottom-up process of creating nationally determined contributions means the system is unstandardized; non-additive, as the contributions do not currently deliver the agreement’s stated long-term goal of keeping the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below 2˚C’; and dynamic, as the deal establishes a ratchet mechanism that requires more ambitious contributions every five years.
• The next five years are critical for keeping the below 2˚C goal within reach. A ‘facilitative dialogue’ starting in 2018 will give states the opportunity to revisit their contributions in advance of the agreement entering into force in 2020. International forums, such as the G7 and G20, can play a crucial role in kickstarting these efforts.
• The ‘coalitions of the willing’ and clubs that were launched under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda provide an innovative space for state and non-state actors to unlock transformational change. However, it is important that these groups set specific and measurable targets to ensure effective delivery of objectives.
• The post-Paris regime implies a significant role for civil society organizations. However, in many countries the ‘safe operating space’ both for these organizations and for the media is shrinking. Expanding the capacity of civil society and the media in areas such as communications, litigation, project implementation and technical expertise will be important if they are to support the regime effectively.

Summary

• Over the last 30 years the EU has played a central role in addressing the competitiveness, security and climate dimensions of energy policy among its member states. The UK has been critical in driving forward integration of the European energy market, and has been a strong advocate of liberalized energy markets and some climate change mitigation policies.
• If, at the June 2016 referendum, the UK does vote to leave the EU, energy and climate policy will be part of the overall package of issues to be negotiated, as it is unlikely that each sector will be treated separately. The model of relations for energy and climate may well be determined by political and public sentiment on higher-profile issues such as freedom of movement, rather than by what is best for the UK in these policy areas.
• The UK is increasingly reliant on imports, including from and through continental Europe, and its energy market is deeply integrated with that of its European neighbours. As a growing share of the UK’s electricity is exchanged with EU partners, it would be neither possible nor desirable to ‘unplug’ the UK from Europe’s energy networks. A degree of continued adherence to EU market, environmental and governance rules would be inevitable.
• This paper reviews the risks and trade-offs associated with five possible options for a post-exit relationship. Of these, the Norway or the Energy Community models would be the least disruptive, enabling continuity in energy market access, regulatory frameworks and investment; however, both would come at the cost of accepting the vast majority of legislation while relinquishing any say in its creation. The UK would thus have less, rather than more, sovereignty over energy policy.
• The Switzerland, the Canada and the WTO models offer the possibility of greater sovereignty in a number of areas, such as buildings and infrastructure standards as well as state aid. None the less, each would entail higher risks, with greater uncertainty over market access, investment and electricity prices. These models would reduce or even eliminate the UK’s contribution to the EU budget, but would also limit or cut off access to EU funding mechanisms.
• All five Brexit models would undermine the UK’s influence in international energy and climate diplomacy. The UK would no longer play any direct role in shaping the climate and energy policies of its EU neighbours, at a time when the EU’s proposed Energy Union initiatives offer the prospect of a more integrated and effective European energy sector. A decision to leave the EU would make it easier for a future UK government to change direction on climate policy, since only a change in domestic legislation would be required.
• ‘Brexit’ could affect the balance of energy policy among the remaining member states. In its absence, the centre of gravity for EU energy policy might shift away from market mechanisms and result in weaker collective action on greenhouse gas reduction targets.
• In the field of energy and climate change policy, remaining in the EU offers the best balance of policy options for Britain’s national interests: the UK would continue to benefit from the integrated energy market, while maintaining influence over its direction and minimizing uncertainty for crucial investment.

Summary

• The use of wood for electricity generation and heat in modern (non-traditional) technologies has grown rapidly in recent years, and has the potential to continue to do so.
• The EU has been, and remains, the main global source of demand, as a result of its targets for renewable energy. This demand is largely met by its own forest resources and supplemented by imports from the US, Canada and Russia.
• Countries outside the EU, including the US, China, Japan and South Korea, have the potential to increase the use of biomass (including agricultural residues as well as wood), but so far this has not taken place at scale, partly because of the falling costs of competing renewables such as solar PV and wind. However, the role of biomass as a system balancer, and its supposed ability, in combination with carbon capture and storage technology, to generate negative emissions, seem likely to keep it in contention in the future.
• Although most renewable energy policy frameworks treat biomass as though it is carbon-neutral at the point of combustion, in reality this cannot be assumed, as biomass emits more carbon per unit of energy than most fossil fuels. Only residues that would otherwise have been burnt as waste or would have been left in the forest and decayed rapidly can be considered to be carbon-neutral over the short to medium term.
• One reason for the perception of biomass as carbon-neutral is the fact that, under IPCC greenhouse gas accounting rules, its associated emissions are recorded in the land use rather than the energy sector. However, the different ways in which land use emissions are accounted for means that a proportion of the emissions from biomass may never be accounted for.
• In principle, sustainability criteria can ensure that only biomass with the lowest impact on the climate are used; the current criteria in use in some EU member states and under development in the EU, however, do not achieve this as they do not account for changes in forest carbon stock.

Also see Woody Biomass for Power and Heat: Impacts on the Global Climate, which assesses the impact of the use of biomass for energy on greenhouse gas emissions, how these are accounted for under international climate accounting rules, and analyses the sustainability criteria currently in use and under development to minimise negative impacts.

Chatham House’s recent paper, Woody Biomass for Power and Heat: Impacts on the Global Climate, highlights how the use of wood for electricity generation and heat in modern (non-traditional) technologies has grown rapidly in recent years, and has the potential to continue to do so. EU member states’ national targets for renewable energy generation agreed in 2009 have helped ensure that the EU is now the world’s largest producer and consumer of wood for energy. And although other member states use wood more extensively for heat, the UK is the EU’s largest user for electricity generation, mostly sourced from the US and Canada.

Wood for energy often has a positive image: a natural product of growing forests. The biomass energy industry, which has grown rapidly on the back of government subsidies, likes to contrast it with dirty coal or oil. They point to the government’s sustainability criteria, which notionally guarantee a reduction of at least 60 per cent in greenhouse gas emissions compared to the fossil fuels the biomass replaces.

The problem with this happy picture, however, is that in fact biomass, when burnt, emits more carbon per unit of energy than most fossil fuels. The exact amount varies with the type of biomass and the type and age of the power plant, but figures from the Drax power station, Europe’s largest consumer of wood pellets, show that in 2013 it emitted about 13 per cent more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated from biomass than from coal.

How is this consistent with meeting the government’s requirement for a 60 per cent reduction in emissions? Only by completely ignoring the carbon emitted when the wood is burnt; the sustainability criteria measure only supply-chain emissions from harvesting, processing and transporting the wood. (Direct land-use change – for example, clearance of the forest for agriculture or urban development – also falls outside the criteria, but biomass for energy generally originates from existing forests.)

This treatment of combustion emissions as zero – and thus, the awarding to wood the same kind of financial and regulatory support as other renewables such as solar PV and wind – is justified on the basis that the carbon contained in woody biomass is part of the natural forest cycle. The carbon released during combustion was absorbed by forest growth in the past and will be reabsorbed by forest growth in the future; in contrast, fossil fuels originate outside this cycle and their combustion adds carbon to the atmosphere.

But this argument rests on a basic fallacy. Carbon is carbon, wherever it comes from, and if you burn wood for energy, you increase carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere (by more than if you had used fossil fuels), and thereby contribute to climate change. The fact that the carbon emitted was absorbed by growing trees in the past is simply irrelevant. After all, when it’s harvested you don’t have to burn it; you could use it for construction or furniture or window frames or a host of other uses, fixing the carbon in wood products rather than emitting it to the atmosphere.

Climate impacts

It is true that continued forest growth will absorb carbon in the future, but the process is a long one, taking decades or even centuries if whole trees are harvested and burnt. Replacing large mature trees, with plentiful leaf cover absorbing large volumes of carbon dioxide, with small young ones mean that the rate of carbon uptake will be far lower for years. On top of that, the impact of harvesting itself releases soil carbon into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change.

The impact on the climate of using sawmill or forest residues for energy rather than whole trees is undoubtedly lower, since these tend to be wastes from other industries which harvest trees for their own purposes, and do not imply any additional harvesting. Sawmill wastes which, if left to themselves, would rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere in a matter of months or years, are in many ways the ideal feedstock; it makes sense to use them for energy rather than leave them to decay. However, mill residues are already intensively used and there seems little room for expansion; a survey in the US in 2011 found that over 99 per cent of mill residues were already used, mainly for energy and wood products such as particleboard.

Forest residues are the parts of harvested trees that are left in the forest after log products have been removed, including stumps, tops and small branches, and pieces too short or defective to be used; these can amount to as much as 40–60 per cent of the total tree volume. Their impact on the climate if used for energy varies significantly. While the smallest pieces tend to rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere quite quickly, if left in the forest, they are generally not suitable for use for energy, as they contain too much dirt and ash to be burnt cleanly. Larger pieces are more suitable but take much longer to decay; burning them for energy instead of leaving them in the forest thereby increases carbon concentrations in the atmosphere for years or decades. And on top of that, a portion of the carbon and other substances contained in the residues is transferred to the soil as they decay; their removal from the forest for energy may reduce both soil carbon and the levels of the nutrients trees need to grow, again with negative impacts on the climate.

The biomass industry generally likes to claim that it uses mainly mill and forest residues, though on closer inspection the categories they report often contain whole trees, perhaps classified as ‘unmerchantable’ or similar. (This is not helped by the fact the categories used by Ofgem, for example, to whom UK biomass users have to report, are confusing and potentially overlapping.) Several independent studies, however, have concluded that the use of mill and forest residues is in reality substantially lower; pellet plants in the US – the UK’s main source of supply – in fact source about 75 per cent whole trees.

Setting aside these arguments about feedstock, however, can it be safely assumed that future forest growth allows us to treat biomass as carbon-neutral? If the trees would have grown anyway, even in the absence of the biomass energy industry, it cannot be assumed that their future absorption of carbon cancels out the carbon emitted when wood is burnt. If the rate of carbon absorption in forests remains the same whether or not some of the harvested wood is burnt, then clearly, the best outcome for the climate in the short and probably medium term is not to burn it, but to use it for wood products or leave it to decay slowly in the forest. This is not an academic argument: the current global rate of emissions of greenhouse gases is incompatible with the aims of the Paris Agreement and may risk triggering irreversible tipping points in the Earth’s climate system. We need to reduce carbon emissions now, not in several decades’ or centuries’ time.

The biomass industry likes to point to the expansion of US forests in recent decades to show that forests overall have been absorbing more carbon even while increasing volumes are burnt for energy – sometimes implying that this forest growth has been encouraged by the demand for energy. But in fact US forest expansion started in the 1950s, decades before European subsidies stimulated the expansion of the modern biomass industry. And there is little evidence of recent overall forest growth in the US southeast, the location of almost all the pellet plants supplying European demand. In any case, the point is not whether US (or European) forests are expanding, but whether they would have grown at a different rate if part of their wood had not been burnt for energy. If they would have grown at the same rate, or faster, in the absence of biomass energy use then it cannot be assumed that using wood for biomass is good for forests, or the climate.

Redirecting public money

There is no question that renewable energy policy and forest policy both have a critical role to play in the mitigation of climate change. But governments have limited resources to deploy in their support, which is why the Chatham House paper questions whether it is really a good use of public money to subsidise activities which release stored forest carbon into the atmosphere, thereby increasing carbon emissions and accelerating climate change.

I argue instead that support should be limited to those feedstocks which genuinely reduce carbon emissions over the short term – i.e. mill residues and post-consumer wood waste. This would not only have a positive direct impact on the climate but would also release more resources for genuine zero-carbon technologies, such as solar, wind or tidal – and perhaps also for programmes encouraging afforestation and the more extensive use of wood in buildings and products. Use it, don’t burn it.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback