Last week international electronics mega-manufacturer Foxconn announced plans to invest $30 million in a new robotics plant in Harrisburg, PA. Foxconn, the notorious Chinese low-wage manufacturer of Apple’s iPhone, has become the poster child of U.S. outsourcing in the face of ruinous global labor cost competition. The calculus of manufacturing supremacy is seemingly simple: Low labor costs and taxes, proximity to a large consumer base, and manageable corruption levels equal a sure strategy to attract global firms.

So what’s going on in Harrisburg? Foxconn is beginning to realize what a number of global manufacturers have come to realize: Production sites that can leverage university, government, and private R&D, a market-ready STEM workforce, and a vibrant cluster of global manufacturing supply chains trump cheap labor and tax breaks. In this regard the Harrisburg region is a big win for Pennsylvania as well as Foxconn—a company trying to move away from a legacy of poor working conditions to one of high-value, high-skilled production.   

Harrisburg and the larger Rust Belt Pittsburgh-Youngstown region to the west are hotbeds of advanced manufacturing. Youngstown is home to the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute—an internationally recognized hub for so-called “3D printing” that draws together public- and private-sector resources. Pittsburgh—with the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, and firms like Google—has redefined itself from a gilded-era steel town to a modern technology leader in software and robotics. Indeed, Foxconn is investing $10 million in Carnegie Mellon’s world class advanced robotics R&D. Finally, also in the Rust Belt and including Harrisburg, Akron and Cleveland, cheap natural gas has helped push manufacturing job and firm growth in a region that was hit extremely hard by the recession.

While Foxconn may be one of the highest profile foreign firm to relocate to the United States it is certainly not, as we’ve discussed, the first. Again and again, global firms interested in high-end manufacturing are putting a renewed premium on geographic clusters of intensive innovation. To be sure, countries with low labor costs still maintain solid advantages in a number manufacturing industries that will help their economies grow—this is the benefit and reality of a global economy. But when it comes to advanced manufacturing, U.S. metro areas and regions that foster synergies between research, skills, and production will likely continue to be highly sought after from firms looking to move up the global value chain.

Policy Brief #179

During an "exit interview" with the Wall Street Journal, departing National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers argued that history would judge the United States based on how well we adjust to China’s emergence as a great power, economically and politically. In the face of China’s progress, America’s manufacturing sector faces major challenges in becoming and remaining competitive and our choice of national economic policies will affect how well we meet those challenges. It is essential that the U.S. trade deficit not balloon as the economy recovers. There is scope to expand our exports in services and agriculture, but improving the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing is vital.

The U.S. Trade Deficit: Background

Components of the Trade Deficit. The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services was just under $700 billion in 2008—4.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the deficit in goods trade was nearly $835 billion, which was partially offset by a $136 billion surplus in services trade. The latter surplus has grown consistently over a range of service types and has important potential to expand. Going forward, we can assume this surplus will remain around one percent of GDP. But services trade surpluses alone cannot solve the U.S. trade deficit problem, because of persistent large deficits in goods trade.

Very important are deficits in the energy sector. In 2008, petroleum products accounted for $386 billion of the total trade deficit (2.7 percent of GDP). reducing energy imports (and consumption) is a significant challenge for the U.S. economy, and with global energy demand continuing to rise and supply constrained, oil prices are more likely to rise than fall. The U.S. bill for imported oil is unlikely to fall below 2.7 percent of GDP for years to come.

In future, for overall U.S. trade in goods and services to be balanced, non-energy products (that is, manufactured and agricultural products) would have to achieve a surplus of around 1.7 percent of GDP. Added to the one percent services surplus, the two would balance out the almost unavoidable petroleum deficit.

Obviously, elements in this rough calculation could shift, for better or worse, but if the U.S. economy is to achieve a more balanced growth path, the competitive position of U.S. manufacturing must improve sharply.

Growth of the U.S. Trade Deficit. In 1999, the U.S. economy was experiencing strong growth and low inflation, but the trade deficit in manufactured and agricultural products was high—$262.5 billion—and concentrated in four broad industry categories. The largest deficit was in plastic, wood and paper products ($62 billion). Transportation equipment—from autos to aerospace—was close behind ($61 billion), followed by textiles and apparel ($52 billion) and computers and electronics ($44 billion). Only two categories had trade surpluses: chemicals at more than $9 billion and agriculture at $4 billion.

By 2008, the trade deficit had risen to $400 billion, an increase of $138 billion or nearly 52 percent in nominal terms. The deficit in computers and electronics accounted for nearly half of the overall increase in the trade deficit (48 percent, a $66 billion increase). Two other industries had large deficit increases: plastic, wood and paper products; and textiles and apparel. By contrast, agricultural products contributed an additional $27 billion to a small 1999 surplus. And transportation equipment reduced its trade deficit by nearly $12 billion. Chart 1 illustrates how the increase in the U.S. goods trade deficit (excluding oil) was distributed by segment between 1999 and 2008.

Rising Imports from China

Simply put, the United States runs chronic trade deficits and China runs trade surpluses because we spend more than we produce, and they do the opposite. The U.S. trade deficit with China in manufactured and agricultural products was already large in 1999—$68.6 billion or 26 percent of the nation’s total trade deficit. By 2008, it had increased to nearly $268 billion. The story of the increasing U.S. trade deficit from 1999-2008—apart from oil—is the explosion in the deficit with China.

Computers and electronic products account for much of the increase in U.S. imports from China. In 2008, China exported $108 billion in these products to the United States, up from less than $19 billion in 1999. Beyond this sector, Chinese exports to the United States have grown strongly pretty much across the board. Although the United States exports agricultural products to China, there is a large return flow of processed and labor-intensive food products. And, while Chinese textile and apparel imports have risen, U.S. demand for Chinese goods in this category has grown only modestly as other emerging economies have become major clothing exporters.

The Nature of Chinese Exports. On a visit to China early in 2010, I heard a memorable speech declaring that the United States is exploiting China. The Chinese perception is based on where profits land. For example, a 2009 survey by Greg Linden, Kenneth Kraemer and Jason Dedrick of the University of California suggests that Apple, Inc. sells iPhones or iPods for several hundred dollars, most of them “made in China,” but the Chinese producer and Chinese workers receive just under four dollars apiece. The retail price of the 2005 video iPod was $299, the wholesale price $224 and the factory price $144.56. The largest part of the factory price ($101.40) came from Japanese components, with U.S. companies other than Apple supplying $14.14 in components and many different suppliers providing other small components. The final assembly and checking is done in China for $3.86, while Apple’s estimated gross margin is $80 per unit sold at wholesale, plus a portion of the retail margin through its Apple online and retail stores.

These same researchers deconstructed the value of a 2005 Hewlett-Packard Notebook PC, which sold at retail for $1,399 and had a factory cost of $856.33. Intel and Microsoft received a total of $305.43 for each computer sold, while the assembly and checking done in China netted $23.76— only 1.7 percent of the retail price. China’s massive export boom in computers and electronics derives from the fact that it is a very good place to assemble electronic products that clearly benefit U.S. companies’ profits. However, China’s policymakers want change; they are determined to attempt to obtain more of the value added of the goods their citizens assemble.

The place of China as a supplier to the United States is further illuminated in the forthcoming book Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States? by Lawrence Edwards and Robert Lawrence, who have taken a detailed look at the “unit values” of traded products, particularly U.S. exports and imports. Detailed trade data identify specific classes of products and provide total dollar value and number of physical items sold in each class. For example, the data report the value of electric motors exported by China to the United States, along with the number of motors, which allows a calculation of the price per motor. If a country is selling motors for electric shavers or toys, the unit value will be small; if the motors are for large capital goods, the unit value will be high.

Edwards and Lawrence find a striking result for China, one that also applies to other emerging economies. It turns out that unit values in the same product categories are hugely different. China sells low unit value products to the United States, and the United States sells high unit value products around the world. These price differentials are so great, in fact, they suggest the United States and China are not really competing. They are making completely different things. Perhaps even more surprising, over the past several years, there appears to be no tendency for the unit values to converge. This contradicts the hypothesis that China is successfully moving up the technology or “value ladder.” Instead, U.S. competitors are Europe and Japan.

Although the volume of Chinese exports to the United States has soared, in high-tech, as we saw, it is assembling components originating elsewhere and, in other industries, it is making primarily low value products, such as toys and children’s clothing— market niches where the U.S. would not be expected to be competitive.

China and Multinational Companies

When China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and started on a path to become a productive and market-oriented economy, it faced massive educational, technological and business hurdles. Competent scientists, engineers and managers had been exiled and “re-educated.” Heroic efforts were needed to catch up to developed nations’ economies. Asian precursors such as Japan and Korea had faced their own catch-up challenges, taking advantage of the global market in capital goods to help them, and China followed their lead. Unlike the others, China encouraged direct foreign investments and required partnerships with domestic businesses. These relationships provided not only financing, but also the business and technology skills of global corporations and sped development of Chinese companies.

Germany provides a fascinating case study of the benefits and perils of a strong relationship with China. Spiegel Online notes that the most important driving force behind the current German economic upswing is its exports of sophisticated capital goods to China. German companies find, however, that the Chinese demand access to their industrial know-how. German businesses are reluctant to offend their Chinese customers, but deeply concerned about the loss of intellectual property. Beijing does not want merely to catch up to German companies—its goal is to surpass them. It has already done so in the manufacture of solar panels, by subsidizing research into solar technology. China exports perhaps 70 percent of its output of solar panels, about half of which goes to Germany, where demand is heavily subsidized by the German government. In electricity generation, Beijing invited Western companies to build power plants jointly with domestic Chinese partners. Now the Chinese are upgrading the plants with their own technology, based on what they learned through the German company Siemens and the French company Alstom.

A 2010 study by James McGregor of APCO sharply criticizing Chinese industrial and technology policies provides additional examples of China’s determination to leverage Western technology. Notably, China is expected to spend $730 billion on its rail network by 2020, with about half being used to expand high-speed passenger lines. This level of capital spending is irresistible for European producers. The China National Railway Corporation (CNR) invited Siemens to bid on a $919 million contract to build 60 passenger trains for service between Beijing and Tianjin. Siemens built the first three, but the remaining 57 were built in China by CNR, using 1,000 Chinese technicians Siemens had trained. In March 2009, Siemens announced an agreement for it to build 100 additional high-speed trains to serve Beijing-Shanghai, but China denied such an agreement ever existed. Siemens ultimately received a contract for $1 billion in components, but $5.7 billion went to CNR, which built the trains.

In the long run, China favors its own producers. It brings in foreign companies at the launching of an industry, then uses government procurement to advance the market share of Chinese companies and, eventually, to shut out competition. This strategy has allowed it to build on foreign companies’ expertise, develop domestic champions and raise the technological level of its economy and exports. Because of its large and rapidly growing market, China can pressure foreign companies to partner with Chinese companies, allowing their employees to learn managerial and technical skills. Over time, China has somewhat loosened formal requirements for foreign companies to accept partners, but the strategy of technology and skills transfer remains very much in force.

Developing countries naturally learn from best practices world-wide; indeed the 19th century economic history of the United States includes considerable technology transfer from Britain and the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, companies that have invested heavily to develop new technologies and efficient processes cannot afford to simply allow China to free-ride on their efforts. Yet many Chinese leaders make it clear they are on a mission to acquire the best technology, using their size and growth as a way to obtain it.

A December 23, 2010 New York Times editorial noted this strategy, saying, “[I]ntellectual property misappropriation cannot be a government policy goal, especially in a country the size of China, which can flood world markets with ill-begotten high tech products.” The editorial acknowledged some U.S. progress at the World Trade Organization, but urged our government to be “more vigilant and aggressive” against intellectual property losses.

Helping U.S. Manufacturers Adjust to China

1. Today’s trade deficit is not a technology problem. The U.S. economy simply must become a more attractive place to develop and manufacture new products. The best ways to do this are to balance the budget and lower the marginal tax rate on corporations. Our trade problem is that U.S. companies develop innovative products but choose not to manufacture much of their value here. One chronic reason is that the value of a dollar has been too high, making U.S. production too expensive. If the U.S. saved more and balanced the federal budget, that problem would take care of itself. This would require global exchange rate adjustments including an increase in the real exchange rate of the renminbi, although economic forces will force this to happen without the need for U.S. political action. In addition, the U.S. corporate tax rate is higher than that of other countries, encouraging overseas investments. Both of the recently announced deficit reduction plans provide blueprints for balancing the budget and lowering corporate tax rates.
    
2. Technology may become a problem in the future. The United States should work with the European Union, Japan and multinational companies to develop a uniform code of conduct to protect technology and patents when emerging market companies work with multinationals. Government sanctions that would draw the United States into direct conflict with China are inadvisable, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has limited effectiveness. Thus, multinational corporations should take the lead and refuse to work with foreign entities that demand access to and misuse proprietary technology. They should be fully informed of past unacceptable practices and the policies and behavior they should expect before entering new markets. If companies nevertheless reveal their technology as the price of market access, that is their choice.
    
3. Policymakers must work with the private sector to identify and reduce barriers to U.S. exports. The expansion of U.S. exports will be in industries such as advanced manufacturing, electronics, aerospace and medical devices. These industries will require new technologies, capital, R&D and skilled labor. There is a strong case for support of technology development through direct funding, improved tax treatment of R&D, increased access to capital and a reduced marginal corporate tax rate. Skill shortages appear to be another important barrier to expansion. Improving the U.S. education and training system in science, math, engineering and technology is a long-term national priority. Furthermore, as recommended by Brookings vice president Darrell West, easing restrictions on H-1B visas to prioritize high-value immigrants with technology expertise is an obvious policy fix with immediate benefits.
    
4. The policy debate must focus on the right issue, and not be drawn down blind alleys. Indicators that the U.S. economy is falling behind must be evaluated carefully. For example, A 2007 National Academy of Sciences study, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, reviewed a range of such indicators. It noted that China is building 50 chemical plants, whereas the United States is building one; and computer chip fabrication plants are being built in China (and elsewhere in Asia), but not in the United States. However, the lack of U.S. investment in these sectors may not be a reason for concern. It can be difficult to operate either bulk petrochemical or chip fabrication plants profitably over the long run, and they create few jobs.
    
5. Companies should focus on innovation and cost reduction and avoid dragging policymakers and themselves along time-wasting tangents. Endless discussions took place during the Clinton administration about how Fuji was competing unfairly with Kodak, whereas the real challenge to Kodak was not Fuji but digital technology. Currently, the World Trade Organization is assessing appeals from the European Union (EU) and the United States regarding its decision that the EU unfairly subsidized Airbus to the detriment of Boeing. Whatever the merits of the arguments in the parties’ six years of legal wrangling over this issue, Boeing’s future success may depend more on how well it solves problems with the new 787, now several years behind schedule, and whether it can make its factories leaner and more productive.

Conclusion

Expanding manufactured exports is a key to our nation’s global competitiveness and reduced trade deficits. Recovery in manufacturing will help employment and the revival of local economies. Competition from emerging economies, especially China, means that innovation in products and processes will be essential to maintaining U.S. leadership. While emerging economies are important markets for U.S. manufacturers, these exchanges should not become opportunities to misappropriate U.S. companies’ intellectual property. U.S. policymakers must create a climate that fosters growth in manufacturing while protecting U.S. innovation and technology.

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Over the past decade, drug shortages and product recalls in the U.S. have occurred at unprecedented rates, limiting patient access to critical medicines and undermining health care. A majority of these shortages and recalls have been due to manufacturing quality issues. In response to these problems, and as part of its ongoing efforts to ensure a continuous supply of high-quality pharmaceuticals in the U.S., the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is pursuing a range of strategies designed to improve the flexibility, reliability, and quality of pharmaceutical manufacturing. Among these strategies is the promotion of new manufacturing technologies, including continuous manufacturing. Continuous manufacturing offers several important advantages over current approaches to manufacturing and has the potential to significantly mitigate the risks of quality failures. At present, however, these technologies and processes are not widely used by the pharmaceutical industry, and there remain a number of barriers to their broader adoption. In collaboration with a range of stakeholders, FDA is currently exploring ways in which it can help to address these barriers and facilitate the uptake of new manufacturing technologies.

Under a cooperative agreement with FDA, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings held a workshop on October 19 entitled “Promoting Continuous Manufacturing in the Pharmaceutical Sector.” This workshop provided an opportunity for industry, academia, and government partners to identify the major barriers to the adoption of continuous manufacturing, discuss regulatory policies and strategies that could help to address those barriers, and explore approaches to improving public and private sector alignment and collaboration to promote the adoption of continuous manufacturing.

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• Continuous Manufacturing Agenda
• CM Panelist Bio Sheet
• Participant list
• Continuous manufacturing discussion guide
• allslides_Continuousmanufacturingworkshop_101915
• meetingsummary_101915_continuousmanufacturing

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A decade into the 21st century, the role of manufacturing in global and metropolitan economies continues to evolve. After 20 years of rapid globalization in which manufacturing production shifted to emerging markets, demand for consumption is growing there, too. Emerging market demand, in fact, has unprecedented momentum as 1.8 billion people enter the global consuming class. At the same time, a robust pipeline of product innovation and manufacturing processes has opened new ways for U.S. manufacturing companies to compete.

On November 19, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings hosted a forum to release a report from the McKinsey Global Institute that examines the role of manufacturing in advanced and developing economies and the choices that manufacturers grapple with in this new era of global competition. Following presentations by the authors, an expert panel discussed the key trends shaping manufacturing competitiveness, global strategies, the next era of manufacturing innovation, and what these changes imply for growth and employment in manufacturing across the globe.

Video

• Bruce Katz: A Region Has to Know What It Can Do Well
• Martin Baily: Manufacturing Creates Jobs
• Katy George: Manufacturing Is an Entity That Is Constantly Shifting
• James Manyika: Manufacturing Matters a Great Deal
• Gardner Carrick: Education Is Key
• James W. Griffith: Closing Remarks

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• Global Manufacturing: Entering a New Era

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20121119_global_manufacturing

Once upon a time, ambitious young people with a knack for math and science went to work in manufacturing. They designed planes, computers, and furniture, figured out how to lay out an assembly line, helped to make new cars faster and refrigerators more efficient, pushed the limits of computer chips, and invented new medicines. But, as the role of manufacturing diminished in advanced economies, the brightest talents tended to gravitate to finance and other service fields that were growing rapidly – and paying well.

But here’s some news: global manufacturing has the potential to stage a renaissance and once again become a career of choice for the most talented.

Of course, any manufacturing rebound in the advanced economies will not generate mass employment; but it will create many high-quality jobs. There will be more demand for software programmers, engineers, designers, robotics experts, data analytics specialists, and myriad other professional and service-type positions. In some manufacturing sectors, more such people may be hired than will be added on the factory floor.

Exploding demand in developing economies and a wave of innovation in materials, manufacturing processes, and information technology are driving today’s new possibilities for manufacturing. Even as the share of manufacturing in global GDP has fallen – from about 20% in 1990 to 16% in 2010 – manufacturing companies have made outsize contributions to innovation, funding as much as 70% of private-sector R&D in some countries. From nanotechnologies that make possible new types of microelectronics and medical treatments to additive manufacturing systems (better known as 3D printing), emerging new materials and methods are set to revolutionize how products are designed and made.

But, to become a genuine driver of growth, the new wave of manufacturing technology needs a broad skills base. For example, it will take many highly-trained and creative workers to move 3D printing from an astounding possibility to a practical production tool.

Consider, too, the challenges of the auto industry, which is shifting from conventional, steel-bodied cars with traditional drive trains to lighter, more fuel-efficient vehicles in which electronics are as important as mechanical parts. The Chevrolet Volt has more lines of software code than the Boeing 787. So the car industry needs people fluent in mechanical engineering, battery chemistry, and electronics.

Manufacturing is already an intensive user of “big data” – the use of massive data sets to discover new patterns, perform simulations, and manage complex systems in real-time. Manufacturing stores more data than any other sector – an estimated two exabytes (two quintillion bytes) in 2010. By enabling more sophisticated simulations that discover glitches at an early stage, big data has helped Toyota, Fiat and Nissan cut the time needed to develop new models by 30-50%.

Manufacturers in many other branches are using big data to monitor the performance of machinery and equipment, fine-tune maintenance routines, and ferret out consumer insights from social-media chatter. But there aren’t enough people with big-data skills. In the United States alone, there is a potential shortfall of 1.5 million data-savvy managers and analysts needed to drive the emerging data revolution in manufacturing.

The shift of manufacturing demand to developing economies also requires new skills. A recent McKinsey survey of multinationals based in the U.S. and Europe found that, on average, these companies derive only 18% of sales from developing economies. But these economies are projected to account for 70% of global sales of manufactured goods (both consumer and industrial products) by 2025. To develop these markets, companies will need talented people, from ethnographers (to understand consumers’ customs and preferences) to engineers (to design products that fit a new definition of value).

Perhaps most important, manufacturing is becoming more “democratic,” and thus more appealing to bright young people with an entrepreneurial bent. Not only has design technology become more accessible, but an extensive virtual infrastructure exists that enables small and medium-size companies to outsource design, manufacturing, and logistics. Large and small companies alike are crowd-sourcing ideas online for new products and actual designs. “Maker spaces” – shared production facilities built around a spirit of open innovation – are proliferating.

And yet, across the board, manufacturing is vulnerable to a potential shortage of high-skill workers. Research by the McKinsey Global Institute finds that the number of college graduates in 2020 will fall 40 million short of what employers around the world need, largely owing to rapidly aging workforces, particularly in Europe, Japan, and China. In some manufacturing sectors, the gaps could be dauntingly large. In the U.S., workers over the age of 55 make up 40% of the workforce in agricultural chemicals manufacturing and more than one-third of the workforce in ceramics. Some 8% of the members of the National Association of Manufacturers report having trouble filling positions vacated by retirees.

Indeed, when the NAM conducted a survey of high-school students in Indianapolis, Indiana (which is already experiencing a manufacturing revival), the results were alarming: only 3% of students said that they were interested in careers in manufacturing. In response, the NAM launched a program to change students’ attitudes. But not only young people need persuading: surveys of engineers who leave manufacturing for other fields indicate that a lack of career paths and slow advancement cause some to abandon the sector.

Manufacturing superstars such as Germany and South Korea have always attracted the brightest and the best to the sector. But now manufacturers in economies that do not have these countries’ superior track record must figure out how to be talent magnets. Manufacturing’s rising coolness quotient should prove useful, but turning it into a highly sought-after career requires that companies in the sector back up the shiny new image with the right opportunities – and the right rewards.

Can this sector be saved? We often hear sentiments like: "Does America still produce anything?" and "The good jobs in manufacturing have all gone." There is nostalgia for the good old days when there were plentiful well-paid jobs in manufacturing. And there is anger that successive U.S. administrations of both parties have negotiated trade deals, notably NAFTA and the admission of China into the World Trade Organization, that have undercut America's manufacturing base.

Those on the right suggest that if burdensome regulations were lifted, this would fire up a new era of manufacturing prowess. On the left, it is claimed that trade agreements are to blame and, at the very least, we should not sign any more of them. Expanding union power and recruiting are another favorite solution. Despite his position on the right, Donald Trump has joined those on the left blaming China for manufacturing’s problems.

What is the real story and what needs to be done to save this sector? The biggest factor transforming manufacturing has been technology; and technology will largely determine its future.

Disappearing jobs

Employment in the manufacturing sector declined slowly through the 1980s and 1990s, but since 2000, the decline has been much faster falling by over 6 million workers between 2000 and 2010. There were hopes that manufacturing jobs would regain much of their lost ground once the recession ended, but the number of jobs has climbed by less than a million in the recovery so far and employment has been essentially flat since the first quarter of 2015. Manufacturing used to be a road to the middle class for millions of workers with just a high school education, but that road is much narrower today—more like a footpath. In manufacturing’s prime, although not all jobs were good jobs, many were well paid and offered excellent fringe benefits. Now there are many fewer of these.

Sustained but slow output growth

The real output of the manufacturing sector from 2000 to the present gives a somewhat more optimistic view of the sector, with output showing a positive trend growth, with sharp cyclical downturns. There was a peak of manufacturing production in 2000 with the boom in technology goods, most of which were still being produced in the U.S. But despite the technology bust and the shift of much of high-tech manufacturing overseas, real output in the sector in 2007 was still nearly 11 percent higher than its peak in 2000.

Production fell in the Great Recession at a breathtaking pace, dropping by 24 percent starting in Q3 2008. Manufacturing companies were hit by a bomb that wiped out a quarter of their output. Consumers were scared and postponed the purchase of anything they did not need right away. The production of durable goods, like cars and appliances, fell even more than the total. Unlike employment in the sector, output has reclaimed it previous peak and, by the third quarter of 2015, was 3 percent above that peak. The auto industry has recovered particularly strongly. While manufacturing output growth is not breaking any speed records, it is positive.

Understanding the pattern

The explanation for the jobs picture is not simple, but the Cliff Notes version is as follows: manufacturing employment has been declining as a share of total economy-wide employment for 50 years or more—a pattern that holds for all advanced economies, even Germany, a country known for its manufacturing strength. The most important reason for U.S. manufacturing job loss is that the overall economy is not creating jobs the way it once did, especially in the business sector. This conclusion probably comes as a surprise to most Americans who believe that international trade, and trade with China in particular, is the key reason for the loss of jobs. In reality, trade is a factor in manufacturing weakness, but not the most important one.

The most important reason for U.S. manufacturing job loss is that the overall economy is not creating jobs the way it once did, especially in the business sector.

The existence of our large manufacturing trade deficit with Asia means output and employment in the sector are smaller than they would be with balanced trade. Germany, as noted, has seen manufacturing employment declines also, but the size of their manufacturing sector is larger than ours, running huge trade surplus. In addition, right now that there is global economic weakness that has caused a shift of financial capital into the U. S. looking for safety, raising the value of the dollar and thus hurting our exports. In the next few years, it is unlikely that the U.S. trade deficit will improve—and it may well worsen.

Even though it will not spark a jobs revival, manufacturing is still crucial for the future of the U.S. economy, remaining a center for innovation and productivity growth and if the U.S. trade deficit is to be substantially reduced, then manufacturing must become more competitive. The services sector runs a small trade surplus and new technologies are eliminating our energy trade deficit. Nevertheless a substantial expansion of manufactured exports is needed if there is to be overall trade balance.

Disruptive innovation in manufacturing

The manufacturing sector is still very much alive and reports of its demise are not just premature but wrong. If we want to encourage the development of a robust competitive manufacturing sector, industry leaders and policymakers must embrace new technologies. The sector will be revived not by blocking new technologies with restrictive labor practices or over-regulation but by installing them—even if that means putting robots in place instead of workers. To speed the technology revolution, however, help must be provided to those whose jobs are displaced. If they end up as long-term unemployed, or in dead-end or low-wage jobs, then not only do these workers lose out but also the benefits to society of the technology investment and the productivity increase are lost.

The manufacturing sector performs 69 percent of all the business R&D in the U.S. which is powering a revolution that will drive growth not only in manufacturing but also in the broader economy as well. The manufacturing revolution can be described by three key developments:

1. In the internet of things, sensors are embedded in machines, transmitting information that allows them to work together and report impending maintenance problems before there is a breakdown.
2. Advanced manufacturing includes 3-D printing, new materials and the “digital thread” which connects suppliers to the factory and the factory to customers; it breaks down economies of scale allowing new competitors to enter; and it enhances speed and flexibility.
3. Distributed innovation allows crowdsourcing is used to find radical solutions to technical challenges much more quickly and cheaply than with traditional R&D.

In a June 2015 Fortune 500 survey, 72 percent of CEOs reported their biggest challenge is that technology is changing fast, naming it as their number one challenge. That new technology churn is especially acute in manufacturing. The revolution is placing heavy demands on managers who must adapt their businesses to become software companies, big data companies, and even media companies (as they develop a web presence). Value and profit in manufacturing is shifting to digital assets. The gap between current practice and what it takes to be good at these skills is wide for many manufacturers, particularly in their ability to find the talent they need to transform their organizations.

Recent OECD analysis highlighted the large gap between best-practice companies and average companies. Although the gap is smaller in manufacturing than in services because of the heightened level of global competition in manufacturing, it is a sign that manufacturers must learn how to take advantage of new technologies quickly or be driven out of business.

Closing the trade deficit

A glaring weakness of U.S. manufacturing is its international trade performance. Chronic trade deficits have contributed to the sector’s job losses and have required large-scale foreign borrowing that has made us a net debtor to the rest of the world -- to the tune of nearly $7 trillion by the end of 2014. Running up endless foreign debts is a disservice to our children and was one source of the instability that led to the financial crisis. America should try to regain its balance as a global competitor and that means, at the least, reducing the manufacturing trade deficit. Achieving a significant reduction in the trade deficit will be a major task, including new investment and an adjustment of today’s overvalued dollar.

The technology revolution provides an opportunity, making it profitable to manufacture in the U.S. using highly automated methods. Production can be brought home, but it won’t bring back a lot of the lost jobs. Although the revolution in manufacturing is underway and its fate is largely in the hands of the private sector, the policy environment can help speed it up and make sure the broad economy benefits.

First, policymakers must accept that trying to bring back the old days and old jobs is a mistake. Continuing to chase yesterday’s goals isn’t productive, and at this point it only puts off the inevitable. Prioritizing competitiveness, innovativeness, and the U.S. trade position over jobs could be politically difficult, however, so policymakers should look for ways to help workers who lose jobs and communities that are hard hit. Government training programs have a weak track record, but if companies do the training or partner with community colleges, then the outcomes are better. Training vouchers and wage insurance for displaced workers can help them start new careers that will mostly be in the service sector where workers with the right skills can find good jobs, not just dead-end ones.

Second, a vital part of the new manufacturing is the ecosystem around large companies. There were 50,000 fewer manufacturing firms in 2010 than in 2000, with most of the decline among smaller firms. Some of that was inevitable as the sector downsized, but it creates a problem because as large firms transition to the new manufacturing, they rely on small local firms to provide the skills and even the technologies they do not have in-house. The private sector has the biggest stake in developing the ecosystems it needs, but government can and has helped, particularly at the state and local level. Sometimes infrastructure investment is needed, land can be set aside, mentoring programs can be established for young firms, help can be given in finding funding, and simplified and expedited permitting processes instituted.

It is hard to let go of old ways of thinking. Policymakers have been trying for years to restore the number of manufacturing jobs, but that is not an achievable goal. Yes manufacturing matters; it is a powerhouse of innovation for our economy and a vital source of competitiveness. There will still be good jobs in manufacturing but it is no longer a conveyor belt to the middle class. Policymakers need to focus on speeding up the manufacturing revolution, funding basic science and engineering, and ensuring that tech talent and best-practice companies want to locate in the United States.

Policies and initiatives to promote U.S. manufacturing would be well advised to take a value chain perspective of this economic sector. Currently, our economic statistics do not include pre-production services to manufacturing such as research and development or design or post-production services such as repair and maintenance or sales. Yet, manufacturing firms invest heavily in these services because they are crucial to the success of their business. 

In a new paper, Kate Whitefoot and Walter Valdivia offer a fresh insight into the sector’s labor composition and trends by examining employment in manufacturing from a value chain perspective. While the manufacturing sector shed millions of jobs in the 2002-2010 period—a period that included the Great Recession—employment in upstream services expanded 26 percent for market analysis, 13 percent for research and development, and 23 percent for design and technical services. Average wages for these services increased over 10 percent in that period. Going forward, this pattern is likely to be repeated. Technical occupations, particularly in upstream segments are expected to have the largest increases in employment and wages.

In light of the findings, the authors offer the following recommendations: 

• Federal manufacturing policy: Expand PCAST’s Advanced Manufacturing Partnership recommendations—specifically, for developing a national system of certifications for production skills and establishing a national apprenticeship program for skilled trades in manufacturing—to include jobs outside the factory such as those in research and development, design and technical services, and market analysis.
• Higher education: Institutions of higher education should consider some adjustment to their curriculum with a long view of the coming changes to high-skill occupations, particularly with respect to problem identification and the management of uncertainty in highly automated work environments. In addition, universities and colleges should disseminate information among prospect and current students about occupations where the largest gains of employment and higher wage premiums are expected. 
• Improve national statistics: Supplement the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) with data that permits tracking the entire value chain, including the development of a demand-based classification system. This initiative could benefit from adding survey questions to replicate the data collection of countries with a Value Added Tax—without introducing the tax, that is—allowing in this manner a more accurate estimation of the value added by each participant in a production network.

Whitefoot and Valdivia stress that any collective efforts aimed at invigorating manufacturing must seize the opportunities throughout the entire value chain including upstream and downstream services to production.

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