it Virtual Roundtable: US-China Geopolitics and the Global Pandemic By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 12:50:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 2 April 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm Event participants Dr Kurt Campbell, Chairman, CEO and Co-Founder, The Asia Group; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2009-13Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only. Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events. Department/project US and the Americas Programme US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Virtual Roundtable: Global Cities and the Response to Coronavirus By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 15:55:01 +0000 Research Event 8 April 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Penny Abeywardena, Commissioner, International Affairs, City of New YorkAmbassador Nina Hachigian, Deputy Mayor for International Affairs, City of Los Angeles; US Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2014-17)Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Europe, The New York Times Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only. Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events. Department/project US and the Americas Programme US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Webinar: Homeland Security and the Emergency Response to Coronavirus in the US By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 09:40:01 +0000 Research Event 26 May 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pmAdd to CalendariCalendar Outlook Google Yahoo Secretary Jeh Johnson, Partner, Paul, Weiss; US Secretary of Homeland Security, 2013 - 17Chair: Amy Pope, Partner, Schillings; Associate Fellow, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House This event is part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. US and Americas Programme Email Department/project US and the Americas Programme Full Article
it Latin America’s COVID-19 Moment: Differences and Solidarity By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 11:37:25 +0000 30 April 2020 Dr Christopher Sabatini Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme @ChrisSabatini LinkedIn There has been no better example of the political diversity in Latin America than the varying responses of governments to the coronavirus crisis. 2020-04-30-Chile-Covid.jpg A municipal cleaning worker disinfects the central market in Santiago, Chile on 7 April 2020 amid the coronavirus pandemic. Photo: Getty Images. Differing approaches across the hemisphere have had different impacts on presidential popularity and, at least in one case, on democratic institutions and human rights. Yet, even within that diversity, South America’s Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) have shown a sign of solidarity: protecting and facilitating trade flows, sponsoring cross-border research and ensuring citizens’ return to their home countries. The response from populist leadersOn the extreme have been the responses of presidents of Brazil, Nicaragua and Mexico, all of whom have ignored the science of the virus and of experts and refused to implement isolation policies. President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil fired his health minister, Luis Henrique Mandetta on 16 April for contradicting him and earlier had claimed that the pandemic was a hoax or little more than a ‘measly cold.' Meanwhile, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega has resisted closing businesses and schools. After a mysterious 34-day absence, Ortega appeared on television on 15 April reinforcing his refusal to close businesses saying that Nicaraguans must work or they will die and claiming that the virus was ‘imported.’ Mexico’s Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) has also resisted the call for strict stay-at-home policies, though with his Deputy Health Minister, Hugo López-Gatell, has closed schools – recently extending the closure to the 1st of June and urging non-essential businesses to close – but focusing primarily on social distancing. In contrast to his deputy health minister and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard – who had declared the situation a health emergency on 30th March, later than many neighbouring countries – AMLO has largely attempted to avoid discussion of the pandemic, claiming that in his case he has lucky charms that prevent him from contracting the virus. And both Bolsonaro and AMLO have participated in large public rallies, doing all the things that politicians love, shaking hands and hugging babies, and in the case of the former even wiping his nose before embracing an elderly woman.The Nicaraguan, Brazilian and Mexican presidents make an odd grouping since one (Bosonaro) is considered of the extreme populist right and the others (Ortega and AMLO) of the populist left. What unites them is good old-fashioned populism, a belief in a leader who represents the amorphous popular will and should be unfettered by checks and balances on his power, including something like… science. An eclectic groupAt the other extreme have been the quick responses by governments in Peru, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Colombia which put quarantine measures in place in mid-March. In these cases, governments have even banned outdoor activities and in the case of Peru and Colombia (in the large cities) have imposed alternating days for when women and men can leave the house so as to better control outside movement. This too, though, is an eclectic group. It includes a Peronist president Alberto Fernández in Argentina, conservative presidents Sebastian Piñera in Chile and Ivan Duque in Colombia, interim president and relative political neophyte Martin Vizcarra in Peru and outsider president Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. El Salvador’s strict quarantine measures have led to rising concerns that Bukele is using the crisis to consolidate personal power, using the national police and the armed forces to enforce the quarantine and ignoring three rulings by the Supreme Court urging the president to end the abuses. In Argentina, Peronist Fernández has shown a surprising commitment to containment even as it hurts his party’s working-class base, not something typically expected of the populist Peronist Party. In all of these cases, the quick, strong responses by the presidents shored up their popularity. Peru’s Vizcarra saw his popularity shoot up 35 points in a week to 82 per cent according to surveys taken in March. In late March 2020, Fernández in Argentina saw his approval ratings swell to 79.2 per cent with 94.7 percent of citizens approving of the government’s strict shelter-at-home policies. Even presidents Piñera and Duque who had struggled with low approval ratings throughout 2019 and saw those numbers sink even lower after the social protests that ended the year have seen their numbers rise. According to an 20th April poll, Piñera’s popular approval rating swelled from 13 percent in March 18th at the start of the crisis to 25 per cent by 20th April; while hardly a sweeping popular mandate, even that level was unthinkable only a few months ago when administration was battered by social protests. In Colombia, after a series of political missteps and the popular protests, Duque’s popular approval rating had slumped to 26 per cent; by April 2nd, 62 percent of Colombians supported the once-beleaguered president. (No recent surveys were available for Bukele in El Salvador.)In contrast, Bolsonaro’s in Brazil has only nudged up. Before the crisis hit, the president’s popularity had been in steady decline from a high of 49 per cent in January 2019 to 30 per cent by early December 2019. But by the first week in April, in the midst of a crisis in which other presidents saw their approval ratings increase by double digits, after his public disagreements with the health minister, Bolsonaro’s had sunk to 33 per cent while the soon-to-be-fired Mandetta’s stood at 76 per cent. AMLO in Mexico has fared no better. The populist leftist scored a high 86 per cent approval rating in February 1, 2019. By March 28, 2020 with concerns over his weak and flippant COVID-19 response and a severe contraction in economic growth, AMLO’s approval rating had sunk 26 points to 60 per cent and his disapproval stood at 37 per cent. In the midst of disharmony, coordinationDespite these differences, many countries in the region have shown the solidarity they often speak of but rarely follow in policy or practice. Peru, Chile and other countries have collaborated in repatriating citizens back to their home countries in the midst of the crisis. Even the countries of the Southern Cone common market, MERCOSUR, have pulled together on a number of fronts. The trade bloc had effectively been ruled a dead-man-walking after its failed efforts to integrate Venezuela into the bloc, lowering its standards to let in the petroleum dependent semi-authoritarian government of then President Hugo Chávez. Even on the basics of internal cooperation, the block was struggling, unable to coordinate monetary policies and non-tariff trade barriers between the original founding member states, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.The 35-year-old customs union seemed to get a breath a new life with the announcement that it had concluded 20-year-long negotiations with the EU for a free trade deal. Ratification of that deal, however, ran aground on the political differences between the recently elected governments of Bolsonaro in Brazil and the Peronist Fernández in Argentina. Bolsonaro refused to attend the Fernández December 2019 inauguration, in protest of the newly elected president’s leftist leanings. And this was well before their sharply divergent reactions to the COVID-19 virus. How surprising then that Mercosur has served as an effective coordination mechanism for these different and once opposed governments. The trade body is collaborating among member states to ensure the repatriation of citizens and has agreed to coordinate to ensure that trade flows, especially of medical supplies, are not interrupted by shutdown measures. Mercosur has even gone one step further than several other bodies have failed to take. In early April the bloc’s governing body, based in Montevideo, Uruguay created a $16 million (12 million pound) fund to augment country research and assist in the purchase of supplies needed to combat the virus. Now if Brazil, Argentina and the others could only coordinate their domestic coronavirus responses and economic policy. In late March Fernández announced he was pulling Argentina out of a possible Mercosur-EU trade deal. Full Article
it Virtual Roundtable: As COVID-19 Hits the Developing World, Where is the American-led Global Response? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 11:05:01 +0000 Research Event 9 June 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pmAdd to CalendariCalendar Outlook Google Yahoo Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, Chairman, SGO; Former Deputy Secretary-General and Chief of Staff, United NationsDr Elizabeth Cousens, President and CEO, United Nations FoundationAmbassador Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School; US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 2005 – 2008Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House This event is part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.This event will take place from 14:00 – 15:00 BST. US and Americas Programme Email Department/project US and the Americas Programme Full Article
it Diabetes Core Update: Covid-19 – Inpatient Management of Persons with Diabetes April 2019 By diabetescoreupdate.libsyn.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 16:44:58 +0000 This special issue focuses on Diabetes, Covid-19 and Inpatient Management. Recorded April 3, 2020. This podcast will cover: Risk with Diabetes of Covid-19 and Complications of Covid-19 Management of Hyperglycemia during Covid-19 Infection Sub-cutaneous Insulin for DKA CGM in the Hospital Setting Diabetes Education in the Hospital During Covid-19 Intended for practicing physicians and health care professionals, Diabetes Core Update discusses how the latest research and information published in journals of the American Diabetes Association are relevant to clinical practice and can be applied in a treatment setting. Presented by: Irl Hirsch, MD, Professor of Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle Guillermo E. Umpierrez, MD, CDE, Professor of Medicine, Emory University, Atlanta Georgia Full Article
it Diabetes Core Update: COVID-19 - Empowering Patients with Diabetes During Covid-19 April 2019 By diabetescoreupdate.libsyn.com Published On :: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 18:00:00 +0000 This special issue focuses on Empowering Patients with Diabetes During Covid-19 Recorded April 9, 2020. This podcast will cover: Defining terms and talking with patients about the epidemiology of COVID-19 How should providers talk with patients about the risk of COVID-19 – The impact of testing COVID-19 infection and its impact on self-care Barriers to Problem Solving Diabetes Self Care Helping to Create a Sense of Normalcy Self-Care – “Its OK not to be OK” – Acknowledging our feelings Coping with Stress Intended for practicing physicians and health care professionals, Diabetes Core Update discusses how the latest research and information published in journals of the American Diabetes Association are relevant to clinical practice and can be applied in a treatment setting. Presented by: Mary de Groot, PhD President, Health Care & Education, ADA Jane Jeffrie-Seley, DNP, MPH New York Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Medicine Jean M. Lawrence, ScD, MPH, MSSA, FACE Southern California Permanente Medical Group Kaiser Permanente Research Full Article
it Diabetes Core Update: COVID-19 – Older Adults with Diabetes and Covid-19 April 2019 By diabetescoreupdate.libsyn.com Published On :: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 18:00:00 +0000 This special issue focuses on Older Adults with Diabetes and Covid-19. Recorded April 20, 2020. This podcast will cover: Risk of COVID-19 in Older Adults What are the recommendations for glucose control during the pandemic Telemedicine Challenges to home care Long-term care settings Intended for practicing physicians and health care professionals, Diabetes Core Update discusses how the latest research and information published in journals of the American Diabetes Association are relevant to clinical practice and can be applied in a treatment setting. Presented by: Irl Hirsch, MD University of Washington Elbert Huang, MD, MPH, FACP University of Chicago Stacie Levine, MD University of Chicago Full Article
it NICE recommends implantable monitor to identify atrial fibrillation after stroke By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Tuesday, January 14, 2020 - 00:30 Full Article
it Stroke: “striking reductions” are seen in number of people with symptoms seeking help By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Monday, April 6, 2020 - 11:10 Full Article
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it Covid-19: NHS bosses told to assess risk to ethnic minority staff who may be at greater risk By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Monday, May 4, 2020 - 14:16 Full Article
it Covid-19: Doctors face shortages of vital drugs, gases, and therapeutics, survey finds By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Monday, May 4, 2020 - 16:36 Full Article
it Covid-19: Lack of capacity led to halting of community testing in March, admits deputy chief medical officer By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 12:25 Full Article
it Covid-19: Projections of mortality in the US rise as states open up By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 12:26 Full Article
it Covid-19: UK death toll overtakes Italy’s to become worst in Europe By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 13:37 Full Article
it Covid-19: Woman with terminal cancer should be released from care home to die with family, says judge By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 15:01 Full Article
it Covid-19: Campaigner calls for national guidance to stop DNR orders being made without discussion with patients and families By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Thursday, May 7, 2020 - 12:31 Full Article
it Covid-19: Nightingale hospitals set to shut down after seeing few patients By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Thursday, May 7, 2020 - 13:50 Full Article
it Covid-19: Allow pharmacists to dispense controlled drugs without prescription, urge specialists By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Thursday, May 7, 2020 - 16:31 Full Article
it PERMEN AILIDA CANDY OBAT PERANGSANG WANITA - Rahasia Pria By investing.96.lt Published On :: Sun, 22 Jan 2017 10:55:47 UTC Permen Ailida Candy Obat Perangsang merupakan perangsang wanita herbal yang berbentu permen candy denga rasa manis seperti buah untuk meningkatkan gairah Full Article Sports and Health
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it UTech community in mourning over passing of lecturer By jamaica-gleaner.com Published On :: Fri, 08 May 2020 13:49:03 -0500 The University of Technology, Jamaica (UTech) fraternity has been plunged into mourning following the death of lecturer Jamar Thelwell. The 34-year-old passed away yesterday from cancer. His colleague Jerome Shepherd said Thelwell’s death has... Full Article
it No immediate COVID-19 real estate hit, say players By jamaica-gleaner.com Published On :: Sat, 09 May 2020 00:06:38 -0500 Local real estate players say it could take years for the sector to recover from the economic fallout brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. While local estimates were unavailable, the international real estate market is projecting a decline from US$... Full Article
it Some 25 charities, organisations to benefit from AFJ grant By jamaica-gleaner.com Published On :: Sat, 09 May 2020 00:10:58 -0500 The Open Arms Development Centre, a homeless shelter in downtown Kingston, and Jamaica’s COVID-19 Response Fund Food Relief are among 25 charitable and community organisations across the island to benefit from the latest round of grants from US-... Full Article
it Rock and roll legend, Little Richard, dead By jamaica-gleaner.com Published On :: Sat, 09 May 2020 09:54:43 -0500 One of rock and roll's founding fathers, Little Richard, has died. He was 87 years-old. According to Rolling Stone Magazine, his death was confirmed by his son, Danny Penniman. The cause of his death is not yet known. Richard,... Full Article
it The Changing Nature of Russia’s Military Strategy and Its Tactical Application By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 10:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 12 November 2019 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Oscar Jonsson, Director, Stockholm Free World Forum (Frivärld)Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Alice Billon-Galland, Research Associate, Europe Programme, Chatham House Russia’s military strategy is increasingly blurring the boundaries between war and peace. As the nature of warfare changes, the Kremlin is adapting its strategies to pursue conflict, especially through non-military means - below the threshold of armed violence. Russian military tactics are often mistaken for strategy in the West. Oscar Jonson, author of The Russian Understanding of War, will talk through this debate and explore how the Russian leadership now understands military strategy in the context of modern warfare. Mathieu Boulègue will address the more operational aspects of contemporary warfare for Russia, notably grey zone operations. Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 09:45:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 28 November 2019 - 1:30pm to 3:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham HouseKassymkhan Kapparov, Founder, Economist.kzJoanna Lillis, Reporter, The Guardian, The Economist and The IndependentKate Mallinson, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham HouseDossym Satpayev, Director, Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group; Member of the Presidium, Kazakhstan Council on International RelationsChair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House At face value at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as seeking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev wants to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set while safeguarding Kazakhstan’s stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. But this is easier said than done. Is Kazakhstan ready for the challenges of the future? This event marks the launch of Chatham House’s major report Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition. Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 11:22:01 +0000 27 November 2019 A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past? Read online Download PDF Annette Bohr Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme Dr Nigel Gould-Davies Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House @Nigelgd1 Google Scholar Kate Mallinson Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @Kate_Mallinson1 James Nixey Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme @jamesnixey Birgit Brauer Analyst, Writer and Journalist Covering Central Asia Nargis Kassenova Senior Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Joanna Lillis Kazakhstan-Based Journalist Reporting on Central Asia Dosym Satpayev Independent Political Analyst and the Director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition Kazakhstan is at a turning point in its history. At face value, at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as looking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev seeks to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set, while safeguarding regime stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. This is easier said than done.The uncertainty around this project is substantial, especially considering a ‘rowback’ decree just seven months after Nazarbayev’s resignation, limiting the powers of his anointed successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. How long can Tokayev credibly remain president considering such a transparent undermining of his authority? Is Nazarbayev, in fact, grooming his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, another relative or a power player from outside the family for the leadership in the longer term? Will the ‘Kazakh tandem’ of Nazarbayev and Tokayev function effectively, or will tensions and conflicts arise between them as many claim is happening already? How will the leadership cope with the protest mood now manifest on the streets of Kazakhstan, and address the political and socio-economic grievances fuelling this discontent? How might the political transition play out if Nazarbayev were to suddenly exit the political scene altogether?And what is the long-term transition plan for the time when Nazarbayev has departed, and how effective will it be?As Kazakhstan enters uncharted territory, the purpose of this report is twofold. First, to make the case for the West to devote more attention to Kazakhstan. The country’s relative importance in Central Asia, and as the constant focus of intense attention from China and Russia, suggests that the West is wrong to direct so little time and diplomatic effort and so few resources towards it. This is not so much a miscalculation (that would be to assume there had been a calculation in the first place) as a misstep through neglect, presupposing that the future will resemble the present – with Kazakhstan remaining stable internally, relatively inconsequential geopolitically but nevertheless a friendly ally to the West. In fact, the country’s trajectory over the next few years is of potentially strategic import. This is because even its political semi-transition presents the West with a rare opportunity to push back against the global rise of authoritarianism, in a state that is open to rational argument and economic logic.The second function of the report is to serve as a well-intentioned message to the leadership of Kazakhstan. The research undertaken by the report’s eight authors shows that Kazakhstan is at risk of failing to achieve the goals its leadership has set for the country. As significant as it has been, the partial stepping aside of Nazarbayev by no means guarantees the modernization and renewal that he and his successor have promised. Far deeper political, economic and social reforms will be needed if Kazakhstan is to meet the growing challenges to its stability, prosperity and development. Street protests since Nazarbayev’s resignation have demonstrated a level of popular disaffection far higher than the authorities acknowledge. The leadership needs to bridge the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and start listening to its people.To avoid slipping into decline, and to resist external pressures and geopolitical overtures that could diminish the sovereignty that its leadership is so determined to safeguard, Kazakhstan needs new faces – innovators and reformers – throughout every level of the administration, as well as new ideas. This report is intended to help with the ‘ideas’ part of that proposition. It also includes a series of recommendations for Western governments and institutions and for the Kazakhstan government. Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Internal Dynamics and External Interests in Central Asia Full Article
it Political Will Was Not Enough for Justice Reform in Moldova By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 15:51:37 +0000 27 November 2019 Cristina Gherasimov Former Academy Associate, Russia and Eurasia Programme @cgherasimov The pro-reform Sandu government had the will to dismantle oligarchic power structures, but was taken down by limited political experience. 2019-11-26-Sandu.jpg Maia Sandu in Germany in July. Photo: Getty Images. The lack of political will to carry out rule of law reforms is frequently the reason why reforms are not fully implemented. The case of Moldova proves that in societies where strong vested interests still persist, political savviness is equally as important as political will.Old and new political power brokers in Moldova struck a fragile pact in June to oust Vladimir Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc had built a network of corruption and patronage with the help of the Democratic Party, which he treated as a personal vehicle and which allowed him and a small economic elite circle to enrich themselves off of government institutions and state-owned enterprises, to the detriment of Moldovan citizens and the health of their political process.Maia Sandu, co-leader of the pro-reform ACUM electoral bloc, then formed a technocratic government with a remit to implement Moldova’s lagging reform agenda. Though made up of ministers with the integrity and political will to implement difficult transformational reforms, its biggest weakness was its coalition partner – the pro-Russian Socialists’ Party and its informal leader, Igor Dodon, the president of Moldova.Now the Socialists – threatened by how key reforms to the justice system would impact their interests – have joined forces with Plahotniuc’s former allies, the Democratic Party, to oust ACUM, exploiting the party’s lack of political savviness. Reform interruptedIt was always clear the coalition would be short-lived. President Dodon and the co-ruling Socialists joined to buy themselves time, with the hope that they could restrict the most far-reaching reforms and tie the hands of ACUM ministers. In less than five months, however, the Sandu government initiated key reforms in the judicial system, aimed at dismantling Plahotniuc’s networks of patronage but also impacting the Socialists, who to a large degree also profited from the previous status quo.The red line came over a last-minute change in the selection process of the prosecutor general proposed by Sandu on 6 November, which the Socialists claimed was unconstitutional and gave them the justification to put forward a motion of no confidence in the Sandu government. This was conveniently supported by the Democratic Party, who appeared threatened by an independent prosecutor’s office and saw an opportunity to return to power.Thus, the political will to reform proved insufficient in the absence of a clear strategy on how to address the concerns of the old regime that they would be prosecuted and their vested interests threatened. Here, ACUM’s lack of political experience let them down. With their hands tied from the beginning in a fragile coalition with the Socialists, ACUM were unable to prevent sabotage from within state institutions and their own coalition, and could not find consensus to proceed with more radical methods to tackle corruption.Less than two days after the Sandu government was out, a new government was sworn in on 14 November. Prime Minister Ion Chicu was an adviser to President Dodon before taking office and former minister of finance under the Plahotniuc-backed government of Pavel Filip, as part of a cabinet of ministers consisting largely of other presidential advisers and former high-level bureaucrats and ministers from the Plahotniuc era. The new governmentA top priority for the Chicu government is to convince the international community that it is independent from President Dodon, and that its ‘technocrats’ will keep the course of reforms of the Sandu government. This is critical to preserving the financial assistance of Western partners, which the Moldovan government heavily relies on, particularly with a presidential election campaign next year, when they will likely want to create fiscal space for various giveaways to voters.But within its first week in office, Chicu appears incapable of walking this line. Reverting to the initially proposed pre-selection process of prosecutor general signals that the post could be filled by a loyal appointee of President Dodon. Moreover, Chicu’s first visit abroad was to Russia, allegedly a major financial contributor of the Socialists’ Party. With the Socialists now holding the presidency, government, Chisinau mayoralty, and the parliament speaker’s seat, the danger of an increased Russian influence on key political decisions is very real.A government steered by President Dodon risks bringing Moldova back to where it was before June, with a political elite mimicking reforms while misusing power for private gains. The biggest danger is that instead of continuing the reform process to bring Moldova back on its European integration path, the new government may focus on strengthening the old patronage system, this time with President Dodon at the top of the pyramid.LessonsThis new minority government, supported by the Democrats, is a more natural one for President Dodon and therefore has more chances to survive, at least until presidential elections in autumn of 2020. Both the Socialists and the Democrats will likely seek to use this time to rebuild their own methods of capturing state resources. But with the Socialists relying on the Democrats’ votes in parliament, this is a recipe for further political instability.Similar to Moldova, several other states across the post-Soviet space such as Ukraine and Armenia have had new political forces come to power with the political will and mandate to carry out difficult reforms to strengthen rule of law and fight systemic corruption in their countries. What they all have in common is the lack of political experience of how to create change, while old elites, used to thinking on their feet to defend their vested interests, retain their connections and economic and political influence.Moldova is a good example of why political will needs to be backed up by clear strategy on how to deal with threatened vested interests in order for new political forces to be able to maintain themselves in power and reforms to be sustainable. When the chance comes again for fresh leaders to come to power, it is importantthey are politically prepared to use it swiftly and wisely. Full Article
it Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System: Stability Versus Growth By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 17 Dec 2019 16:50:53 +0000 17 December 2019 How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management. Read online Download PDF Professor Philip Hanson OBE Former Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme GettyImages-1174485152.jpg Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, Labour and Social Safety Minister Maxim Topilin, Economy and Finance Department Head Valery Sidorenko, and Russian presidential aide Andrei Belousov (l–r) after a meeting on stimulating economic growth, at Gorki residence, Moscow, on 8 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryRussia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted. Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Russia's Domestic Politics Full Article
it The New Orthodox Church of Ukraine: Opportunities and Challenges of Canonical Independence By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 09:55:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 22 January 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Archbishop Yevstraty (Zoria) of Chernihiv, Deputy Head of Department for External Church Relations, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine) In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine a self-governing status, ending its centuries-long subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Orthodox Church condemned this decision and severed its links with the Constantinople Patriarchate.More than 500 parishes have left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).What challenges is the new church facing? Has its independence been recognized by other Orthodox churches? How is it affected by the schism between Constantinople and Moscow? What are UOC’s priorities in relations with the West and with the Orthodox world? Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Ukraine Forum Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Three Challenges for UK Peacebuilding Policy in the South Caucasus After Brexit By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:24:44 +0000 21 January 2020 Laurence Broers Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @LaurenceBroers Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal. 2020-01-21-NK.jpg A building in Nagorny Karabakh flies the flag of the self-proclaimed republic. 'Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh have evolved into examples of what scholars call "de facto states" that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty,' writes Laurence Broers. Photo: Getty Images. What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.Three challengesThis niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts. The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.RecommendationsBritain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways. First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live. Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal. Full Article
it Russia’s Human and Social Capital By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 05 Feb 2020 15:50:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 5 March 2020 - 9:30am to 1:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Agendapdf | 85.57 KB Event participants Christopher Davis, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Population Ageing, University of OxfordSamuel Greene, Director, King's Russia Institute; Reader of Russian Politics, King’s College LondonNikolai Petrov, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham HouseNatalia Zubarevich, Director, Regional Programme, Independent Institute for Social Policy Russia’s published development agenda to 2024 focused on gaining advantage from its human capital. In reality however, issues surrounding Russia’s population remain a major challenge, considering its demographic trends, an undoubted brain drain and societal divisions.This expert roundtable will explore the current state of – and interconnections between – human and social capital in Russia. The speakers will also address Russia’s regional disparities, migration effects and political elite dynamics and their relationship to the population at large. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Russia's Domestic Politics Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Lukashenka’s Commitment to Belarusian Sovereignty Is Overstated By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 15:56:54 +0000 18 February 2020 Ryhor Astapenia Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @ryhorastapenia LinkedIn Although President Lukashenka has recently shown assertiveness in relations with Russia, overall he has done very little to ensure his country’s freedom of action. 2020-02-18-LP.jpg Putin and Lukashenka play ice hockey in Sochi after a day of talks in February. Photo: Getty Images. Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the highest-ranking US official to visit Belarus since Bill Clinton in 1994. After meetings with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka – who Condoleezza Rice once memorably described as ‘Europe’s last dictator’ – Pompeo said he was ‘optimistic about our strengthened relationship’. The EU and its member states have also changed their tune, at least a little. Previously, prosecutions of democratic activists led to sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. But his less-than-liberal manner of governance did not prevent him from visiting Austria last November or from receiving invitations to Brussels. Eight years ago, most EU contacts with Belarusian officials were frozen. Now, Western diplomats regularly meet with Belarusian officials again. This year, a US ambassador to Belarus will be appointed after a 12-year break.The West is also more willing to support Belarus financially. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development invested a record-breaking $433 million in the country in 2019. The European Investment Bank only began working with the country in 2017 but already has a portfolio of $600 million.Certain policymakers in the EU and US now, at least publicly, appear to regard Lukashenka as one of the sources of regional security and a defender of Belarusian sovereignty against Russia.There is some truth in this. He has taken a neutral position in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, and he has consistently resisted pressure from the Kremlin to establish a military base in Belarus.Now, amid Moscow’s demands for deeper integration in exchange for the continuation of Russian energy subsidies, Lukashenka has shown reluctance to sell his autonomy. In a token attempt to portray sovereignty Belarus even started buying oil from Norway, although this makes no economic sense.But Lukashenka’s long-term record shows he has done little to ensure the country’s sovereignty. Lukashenka has resisted reforms that would have strengthened the economy (because they would have weakened his own position). The political system is also dependent on Russia because Lukashenka has been unwilling to build better relations with the West. Belarusians are still strongly influenced by Russian culture and media because the authorities marginalize their own national identity.Since the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenka’s primary goal has not been to strengthen the sovereignty of Belarus, but to preserve his absolute control over the country.For example, when in 2018 Russia started pressing Belarus to deepen its integration in order to retain economic support, Minsk did not reject this approach outright; instead, it discussed no less than 31 ‘road maps’ for deepening integration for more than a year, hoping to receive more benefits. For Lukashenka, greater dependency on Russia is a matter of price and conditions, not principle. None of this is to say Belarus has illusions about Russia. It is just that Lukashenka does not take long-term steps to protect the country’s sovereignty or to strengthen relations with the West.Belarus needs to start economic reform with the support of the International Monetary Fund, but this cannot happen without Lukashenka’s genuine commitment to transform the economy. Absence of cross-sectoral reform has led to the deterioration of the education system as well as unprecedented emigration. Few Belarusian experts are optimistic about their country’s future. Lukashenka knows all this, but does not change his system, fearing it would damage the stability of his regime. The West should therefore adopt a broader policy. Lukashenka is unlikely to still be president in 10–15 years, so policymakers should develop relations with the broader ruling elite, which will remain after he leaves, and try to be present in Belarus as much as possible helping it to improve public governance and develop private businesses.The West should also support the country’s civil society and independent media, for whom Belarusian independence is a matter of principle rather than something to be bargained away.Lukashenka may be a strong leader, but the state he has built is weak. Full Article
it POSTPONED: Transitional Justice in Ukraine: What Might it Look Like? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 10:10:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 17 March 2020 - 9:30am to 1:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Agendapdf | 107.46 KB Event participants Kirsty Brimelow QC, Barrister, Doughty Street ChambersMiles Jackson, Associate Professor of Law, University of OxfordAnton Korynevych, Representative of the President of Ukraine for CrimeaOleksandra Matviychuk, Head of the Board, Centre for Civil LibertiesTaras Tsymbrivksyy, Head, USAID Human Rights in Action Program; Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union Still grappling with the war in the east and the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine’s new leadership has announced its intention to develop its transitional justice infrastructure to respond to the human rights violations arising from Russia’s aggression. Numerous reports (not least ones by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine) list persecutions, illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and killings among the crimes perpetrated in Crimea and parts of occupied Donbas. As Ukraine has only just started developing its transitional justice roadmap, this event will seek to discuss viable initial approaches, such as a ‘truth-telling commission’ or amnesties. The panellists will also discuss the role for civil society and those directly affected by hostilities in the transitional justice process. PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Ukraine Forum Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 09 Apr 2020 10:00:11 +0000 9 April 2020 Keir Giles Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @KeirGiles LinkedIn Google Scholar Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common. 2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images. Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.Fertile ground for disinformationOne reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective. Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future. Full Article
it Online Study Group: All Lukashenka’s Men: The Belarusian Ruling Elite and Why It Matters By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 07:50:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 22 April 2020 - 2:30pm to 4:00pm Event participants Ryhor Astapenia, Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham HouseChair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House Soon after assuming power in 1994, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka turned his back on democratic norms and overpowered the Belarusian political elite. However, the influence of the governing elite in Belarus is growing again. It seems likely that the current governing class could rule the country after Lukashenka leaves. It is thus important to study Belarusian elites not only to understand the current regime, but also to better forecast and navigate the political system that will one day replace it. This study group aims to disentangle how the Belarusian political system works, outline the types of individuals that make up the Belarusian ruling elite, assess the interaction of the elite and institutions with the West, and suggest changes that Western political actors might make to their approach to the Belarusian ruling class. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Full Article
it Virtual Roundtable: Land Reform in Ukraine: Is Zelenskyy's Government Getting it Right? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 00:05:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 14 May 2020 - 12:00pm to 1:30pmAdd to CalendariCalendar Outlook Google Yahoo Ihor Petrashko, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, UkraineAndriy Dykun, Chair, Ukrainian Agricultural CouncilVadim Tolpeco, Ukrlandfarming PlcChair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House Ukraine is known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ thanks to its grain exports. On 31 March 2020, the Ukrainian parliament passed a landmark law ending a 19-year ban on the sale of privately owned agricultural land. Due to come into force in July 2021, the law applies to 41.5 million hectares of farmland and economists predict substantial economic gains from this liberalization. This event will discuss the impact of the law on Ukraine’s agricultural sector and food security. How can the government best implement this reform and ensure that small and medium-sized agricultural companies increase their productivity? What does this change mean for Ukraine’s capacity to export grain? Can the country’s food supply withstand crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic? What role could foreign direct investors play in boosting production? This event will be held on the record. Anna Morgan Administrator, Ukraine Forum +44 (0)20 7389 3274 Email Department/project Russia and Eurasia Programme, Ukraine Forum Full Article
it We cavort wildly with Language By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Sun, 24 May 2015 20:22:00 +0000 The fish comes steaming, and English is not the only language making sense. Here politics comes with dark green Kale spewing flavor, Kenyans having lunch on the Boulevard, Lakeshore strip, Victoria; Commitment is the idea that momentum cannot disrupt motion, that Committed, one moves forward, Becoming better, Choosing beyond the sound Of Visiting Americans, Prodigal […] Full Article Poetry Africa fish friendship Kenya language lunch poetry
it Dignity By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 19:00:00 +0000 He was drunk on the wheelchair, oily, black skin, black, greasy hair, greasy, black overalls, Dead drunk on the side of the road, Wheelchair crooked up against the curb, head hanging off the back, eyes wide-open and rolled right up, cars swerving passed carelessly, Was drunk, like any other drunk on the side of the […] Full Article Poetry Dignity homecoming military poetry US Marines US Navy USAF Veterans war
it Meditation By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 05:19:49 +0000 Tie the thread to the farmer! Marry the Bride to the Groom! Arrange a wedding for five billion people, We are approaching the end! Road rage is the immediate, And sudden reconfiguration of, A prior expectation and we are doing well, The old lady, the Guru and I, We are making effort. It is, In […] Full Article Poetry CEO meditation poetry religion UNEP
it Walking with butterflies By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 16:53:23 +0000 She shifts with the breeze, Neon white with blue streaks, Antenna filtering the air for blossoms, Fabulous, Owning the street, Owning the couple, At sunset before, The African roundabout, A butterfly that will not let go, Wafting beyond reach, Before the hawk and Gently anyway – Ever been a glass-wearer looking for your glasses with, […] Full Article Poetry
it Hanging out with my father, and my brother and sister By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 06:11:42 +0000 So I thought about my brother and sister a lot this weekend. It’s not like me at all. You don’t count on people just, sort of vanishing. I’ve been talking about death since I was born, so with my Dad it was kinda different. I knew he was dying. It was strange. We both […] Full Article Poetry cancer coming out death family memory Prose United Nations writing
it Editing the bible By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 20:40:22 +0000 We’ve all seen them, Womens circle knitting on, Saturday, Mens having breakfast to learn, How to lead, Ever been inside a church, I mean inside? You know the ones; Don’t Talk on the phone when you’re, Writing notes, Don’t come in late when Next door, Looking over the shoulder of The fat woman in […] Full Article Poetry poem poetry religion
it The Painting with the smudge By kolembo.wordpress.com Published On :: Sun, 09 Apr 2017 09:49:32 +0000 I remember her detail, How she looked, how she talked to her husband, I just stood on the pavement and cried, I’ll Never see her again, not here, That’s it. Whatever came, came for a moment and then left, we were Going to live forever. I don’t get in touch with anyone anymore, It scares […] Full Article Poetry cancer coping death family life poem poetry