it Correction: A dual druggable genome-wide siRNA and compound library screening approach identifies modulators of parkin recruitment to mitochondria. [Additions and Corrections] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T06:08:45-07:00 VOLUME 295 (2020) PAGES 3285–3300An incorrect graph was used in Fig. 5C. This error has now been corrected. Additionally, some of the statistics reported in the legend and text referring to Fig. 5C were incorrect. The F statistics for Fig. 5C should state Fken(3,16) = 7.454, p < 0.01; FCCCP(1,16) = 102.9, p < 0.0001; Finteraction(3,16) = 7.480, p < 0.01. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of this work.jbc;295/17/5835/F5F1F5Figure 5C. Full Article
it Correction: Metabolic fingerprinting for diagnosis of fibromyalgia and other rheumatologic disorders. [Additions and Corrections] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T06:08:45-07:00 VOLUME 294 (2019) PAGES 2555–2568Due to publisher error, “150 l/mm” was changed to “150 liters/mm” in the second paragraph of the “Vibrational spectroscopy of samples” section under “Experimental Procedures.” The correct phrase should be “150 l/mm.” Full Article
it Correction: Comparative structure-function analysis of bromodomain and extraterminal motif (BET) proteins in a gene-complementation system. [Additions and Corrections] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 VOLUME 295 (2020) PAGES 1898–1914Yichen Zhong's name was misspelled. The correct spelling is shown above. Full Article
it Correction: Rational design, synthesis, and evaluation of uncharged, “smart” bis-oxime antidotes of organophosphate-inhibited human acetylcholinesterase. [Additions and Corrections] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 VOLUME 295 (2020) PAGES 4079–4092There was an error in the abstract. “The pyridinium cation hampers uptake of OPs into the central nervous system (CNS)” should read as “The pyridinium cation hampers uptake into the central nervous system (CNS).” Full Article
it Correction: Histone demethylase KDM6B promotes epithelial-mesenchymal transition. [Additions and Corrections] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 VOLUME 287 (2012) PAGES 44508–44517In Fig. 1A, the wrong image for the control group was presented. The authors inadvertently cropped the control images in Fig. 1, A and E, from the same raw image. Fig. 1A has now been corrected and does not affect the results or conclusions of the work. The authors sincerely apologize for their mistake during figure preparation and for any inconvenience this may have caused readers.jbc;295/19/6781/F1F1F1Figure 1A. Full Article
it Inbox: Are Giants waiting to make big splash? By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 14:40:47 EDT Do you think the Giants are just waiting around and could go after Bryce Harper for a big splash? Beat reporter Maria Guardado answers this question and more from fans. Full Article
it 30 low-key acquisitions who could pay off big By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 13:57:13 EDT Fans and analysts spend the entire offseason speculating where the top free agents could go, but sometimes an under-the-radar pickup can end up making a world of difference. As positional competitions begin to heat up at Spring Training camps this month, MLB.com's beat writers were asked to identify one potentially overlooked acquisition for each of the 30 clubs. Here's who they came up with. Full Article
it Bumgarner 'would love to stay' with Giants By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 18:52:43 EDT Despite trade speculation, Madison Bumgarner arrived at Scottsdale Stadium on Tuesday as Giants pitchers and catchers reported for Spring Training. He's still on track to be the club's starter on Opening Day, though his future in San Francisco remains murky as he prepares to enter his final season before free agency. Full Article
it Parra's addition provides veteran OF presence By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 18:05:40 EDT The Giants have expressed a desire to add multiple veteran outfielders throughout the offseason, and they made their first notable acquisition earlier this week after signing Gerardo Parra to a Minor League contract. Full Article
it Giants agree to deal with infielder Solarte By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 17:03:05 EDT Seeking to bring another versatile infielder into the fold, the Giants on Friday agreed to terms with Yangervis Solarte on a Minor League contract with an invitation to Major League Spring Training. Full Article
it Sandoval eager to do it all for Giants By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Sat, 16 Feb 2019 16:47:05 EDT Shortly after reporting to Giants camp this week, Pablo Sandoval met with manager Bruce Bochy and reiterated his desire to help the club in whatever way he can. Full Article
it Sandoval instrumental in recruiting FA friends By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Sun, 17 Feb 2019 19:20:33 EDT Pablo Sandoval said he recruited his friends Gerardo Parra and Yangervis Solarte to the Giants in the offseason. Full Article
it 'It's time': Giants' Bochy to retire after this season By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 18:34:51 EDT Bruce Bochy, who guided the Giants to three World Series championships in 2010, '12 and '14, announced Monday that he will retire at the end of the 2019 season, capping a celebrated 25-year managerial career in the Majors. Full Article
it Posey inspired for final season with Bochy By mlb.mlb.com Published On :: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:37:05 EDT Buster Posey has known only one manager since making his debut with the Giants a decade ago. While it's hard for him to envision playing for someone other than Bruce Bochy, he wasn't surprised to hear about his longtime manager's plans to retire after the 2019 season. Full Article
it Re: The positive effects of covid-19 By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Friday, May 8, 2020 - 06:35 Full Article
it Re: Mitigating the wider health effects of covid-19 pandemic response By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Friday, May 8, 2020 - 09:36 Full Article
it Benefits of face masks and social distancing in Tuberculosis - a lesson learnt the hard way during the COVID-19 pandemic. By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Friday, May 8, 2020 - 10:36 Full Article
it Combination upstream and downstream treatment modalities for RECOVERY from COVID-19 By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Friday, May 8, 2020 - 11:27 Full Article
it Online CBT is trialled for children with chronic fatigue syndrome By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 - 06:30 Full Article
it How changes to drug prohibition could be good for the UK—an essay by Molly Meacher and Nick Clegg By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Monday, November 14, 2016 - 23:30 Full Article
it Risks of duloxetine for stress incontinence outweigh benefits, say researchers By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Tuesday, November 15, 2016 - 06:30 Full Article
it Babies with microcephaly in Brazil are struggling to access care By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, November 16, 2016 - 13:46 Full Article
it Chemoprevention of colorectal cancer in individuals with previous colorectal neoplasia: systematic review and network meta-analysis By feeds.bmj.com Published On :: Monday, December 5, 2016 - 14:46 Full Article
it Role of phospholipid synthesis in the development and differentiation of malaria parasites in the blood [Microbiology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2018-11-09T03:40:54-08:00 The life cycle of malaria parasites in both their mammalian host and mosquito vector consists of multiple developmental stages that ensure proper replication and progeny survival. The transition between these stages is fueled by nutrients scavenged from the host and fed into specialized metabolic pathways of the parasite. One such pathway is used by Plasmodium falciparum, which causes the most severe form of human malaria, to synthesize its major phospholipids, phosphatidylcholine, phosphatidylethanolamine, and phosphatidylserine. Much is known about the enzymes involved in the synthesis of these phospholipids, and recent advances in genetic engineering, single-cell RNA-Seq analyses, and drug screening have provided new perspectives on the importance of some of these enzymes in parasite development and sexual differentiation and have identified targets for the development of new antimalarial drugs. This Minireview focuses on two phospholipid biosynthesis enzymes of P. falciparum that catalyze phosphoethanolamine transmethylation (PfPMT) and phosphatidylserine decarboxylation (PfPSD) during the blood stages of the parasite. We also discuss our current understanding of the biochemical, structural, and biological functions of these enzymes and highlight efforts to use them as antimalarial drug targets. Full Article
it The rule of law and maritime security: understanding lawfare in the South China Sea By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Sep 2019 13:46:35 +0000 4 September 2019 , Volume 95, Number 5 Douglas Guilfoyle Read online Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the ‘nine-dash line’ on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms. Full Article
it Maritime security: the uncharted politics of the global sea By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Sep 2019 14:25:01 +0000 4 September 2019 , Volume 95, Number 5 A special section in the latest issue explores recent developments in maritime security and ocean governance. Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds and Barry J. Ryan Read online In this introduction to a special section of the September 2019 issue of International Affairs, we revisit the main themes and arguments of our article ‘Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies’, published in this journal in November 2017. We reiterate our call for more scholarly attention to be paid to the maritime environment in international relations and security studies. We argue that the contemporary maritime security agenda should be understood as an interlinked set of challenges of growing global, regional and national significance, and comprising issues of national, environmental, economic and human security. We suggest that maritime security is characterized by four main characteristics, including its interconnected nature, its transnationality, its liminality—in the sense of implicating both land and sea—and its national and institutional cross-jurisdictionality. Each of the five articles in the special section explores aspects of the contemporary maritime security agenda, including themes of geopolitics, international law, interconnectivity, maritime security governance and the changing spatial order at sea. Full Article
it Human Rights Priorities: An Agenda for Equality and Social Justice By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 13:50:01 +0000 Members Event 19 November 2019 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Michelle Bachelet, United Nations High Commissioner for Human RightsChair: Ruma Mandal, Head, International Law Programme, Chatham House Following just over one year in office, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, outlines her ongoing priorities at a tumultuous time for fundamental rights protections worldwide.She discusses the rights implications of climate change, gender inequality including the advancement of sexual and reproductive rights, the protection of vulnerable groups and the need to work closely with states, civil society and business to protect and advance human rights. Department/project International Law Programme Members Events Team Email Full Article
it Security and Prosperity in Asia: The Role of International Law By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 01 Nov 2019 11:38:35 +0000 1 November 2019 The 'Security and Prosperity in Asia' conference looked at the impact of international law in the Asia-Pacific with a focus on regional economic and security issues such as the South China Sea disputes. Read online Download PDF Security and Prosperity in Asia Cover Image.jpg Singapore skyline at sunset, 2016. Photo: Getty Images. About the ConferenceAt a time of geopolitical uncertainty and with multilateralism under pressure, this conference brought together diverse actors to explore the evolving role of international law on critical security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific. From trade agreements to deep-sea mining, cyberwarfare to territorial disputes, the breadth of the discussion illustrated the growing reach of international law in the region.Hosted by the International Law Programme and the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House on 27 March 2019, the conference focused on three themes: trade and investment, maritime security and governance, and emerging security challenges. What trends are emerging in terms of engagement with international law in the region, and how can international standards play a greater role in encouraging collaboration and reducing tensions? And, with the eastward shift in geopolitical power, how will Asia-Pacific states shape the future of international law? Department/project International Law Programme, Global Governance and the Rule of Law, Asia-Pacific Programme, Geopolitics and Governance, Trade, Investment and Economics Full Article
it Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 05 Nov 2019 11:03:02 +0000 6 November 2019 Although some digital platforms now have an impact on more people’s lives than does any one state authority, the international community has been slow to hold to account these platforms’ activities by reference to human rights law. This paper examines how human rights frameworks should guide digital technology. Download PDF Kate Jones Associate Fellow, International Law Programme @katejones77 LinkedIn 2019-11-05-Disinformation.jpg A man votes in Manhattan, New York City, during the US elections on 8 November 2016. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryOnline political campaigning techniques are distorting our democratic political processes. These techniques include the creation of disinformation and divisive content; exploiting digital platforms’ algorithms, and using bots, cyborgs and fake accounts to distribute this content; maximizing influence through harnessing emotional responses such as anger and disgust; and micro-targeting on the basis of collated personal data and sophisticated psychological profiling techniques. Some state authorities distort political debate by restricting, filtering, shutting down or censoring online networks.Such techniques have outpaced regulatory initiatives and, save in egregious cases such as shutdown of networks, there is no international consensus on how they should be tackled. Digital platforms, driven by their commercial impetus to encourage users to spend as long as possible on them and to attract advertisers, may provide an environment conducive to manipulative techniques.International human rights law, with its careful calibrations designed to protect individuals from abuse of power by authority, provides a normative framework that should underpin responses to online disinformation and distortion of political debate. Contrary to popular view, it does not entail that there should be no control of the online environment; rather, controls should balance the interests at stake appropriately.The rights to freedom of thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation. When digital platforms exploit decision-making biases in prioritizing bad news and divisive, emotion-arousing information, they may be breaching these rights. States and digital platforms should consider structural changes to digital platforms to ensure that methods of online political discourse respect personal agency and prevent the use of sophisticated manipulative techniques.The right to privacy includes a right to choose not to divulge your personal information, and a right to opt out of trading in and profiling on the basis of your personal data. Current practices in collecting, trading and using extensive personal data to ‘micro-target’ voters without their knowledge are not consistent with this right. Significant changes are needed.Data protection laws should be implemented robustly, and should not legitimate extensive harvesting of personal data on the basis of either notional ‘consent’ or the data handler’s commercial interests. The right to privacy should be embedded in technological design (such as by allowing the user to access all information held on them at the click of a button); and political parties should be transparent in their collection and use of personal data, and in their targeting of messages. Arguably, the value of personal data should be shared with the individuals from whom it derives.The rules on the boundaries of permissible content online should be set by states, and should be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Digital platforms have had to rapidly develop policies on retention or removal of content, but those policies do not necessarily reflect the right to freedom of expression, and platforms are currently not well placed to take account of the public interest. Platforms should be far more transparent in their content regulation policies and decision-making, and should develop frameworks enabling efficient, fair, consistent internal complaints and content monitoring processes. Expertise on international human rights law should be integral to their systems.The right to participate in public affairs and to vote includes the right to engage in public debate. States and digital platforms should ensure an environment in which all can participate in debate online and are not discouraged from standing for election, from participating or from voting by online threats or abuse. Department/project International Law Programme, Cyber, Sovereignty and Human Rights, Rights, Accountability and Justice Full Article
it Courageously critiquing sexual violence: responding to the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 08:42:19 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Read online Maria Stern Marysia Zalewski's work has taught us, as a collective of feminist scholars, to be cautious of neat instruction manuals and coherently set out plans of action; of claims to sure knowledge about danger, violence, and its subjects and remedies; of the fanfare of grand arrivals; and of the quieter staking of ground that has been seemingly won. Zalewski has persistently reminded us in different ways that we/she does ‘not even know what gender is or does’. Far from a flippant response to the emptiness of gender mainstreaming policies, this seemingly simple statement instead serves as a glaring post-it note on the margins of our texts about International Relations theory, feminism, sex/gender and violence— both those that we read, as well as those that we write. However, this lesson is often forgotten in our rush to understand and establish gendered harms as valid and important, and to seek their redress. Gleaning insights from Zalewski's work, this article critically considers possible responses to the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize. Its aim is not to delve into a discussion of the politics or effects of the Peace Prize as such, but to instead use the 2018 Peace Prize as a marker—a moment to consider the possibility for critique in relation to sexual violence. Full Article
it Marking failure, making space: feminist intervention in Security Council policy By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 08:54:21 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Sam Cook Read online Feminist interventions in international politics are, more often than not, understood (and visible) as interventions in relation to policy documents. These policies—in this case the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Women, Peace and Security—often feature as the end point of feminist advocacy efforts or as the starting point for feminist analysis and critique. In this article the author responds to the provocations throughout Marysia Zalewski's work to think (and tell) the spaces of international politics differently, in this case by working with the concept of feminist failure as it is produced in feminist policy critique. Inspired by Zalewski's Feminist International Relations: exquisite corpse, the article explores the material and imaginary spaces in which both policies and critique are produced. It picks up and reflects upon a narrative refrain recognizable in feminist critiques on Women, Peace and Security policy—that we must not make war safe for women—as a way to reflect on the inevitability of failure and the ostensible boundaries between theory and practice. The author takes permission from Zalewski's creative interventions and her recognition of the value of the ‘detritus of the everyday’—here a walk from New York's Grand Central Station to the UN Headquarters, musings on the flash of a particular shade of blue, and the contents of a footnoted acknowledgement, begin to trace an international political space that is produced through embodied and quotidian practice. Full Article
it Brexit and the UN Security Council: declining British influence? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 09:14:28 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Jess Gifkins, Samuel Jarvis and Jason Ralph Read online The United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union has ramifications beyond the UK and the EU. This article analyses the impact of the Brexit referendum on the UK's political capital in the United Nations Security Council; a dimension of Brexit that has received little attention thus far. Drawing on extensive elite interviews we show that the UK has considerable political capital in the Council, where it is seen as one of the most effective actors, but the reputational costs of Brexit are tarnishing this image. With case-studies on the UK's role in Somalia and Yemen we show how the UK has been able to further its interests with dual roles in the EU and Security Council, and the risks posed by tensions between trade and human rights after Brexit. We also analyse what it takes to be influential within the Security Council and argue that more attention should be paid to the practices of diplomacy. Influence is gained via penholding, strong diplomatic skill and a well-regarded UN permanent representative. The UK accrues political capital as a leader on the humanitarian and human rights side of the Council's agenda, but this reputation is at risk as it exits the EU. Full Article
it Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 13:25:01 +0000 Research Event 21 January 2020 - 5:30pm to 7:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Andrew Cayley, Director, Service Prosecuting Authority, UK Ministry of DefenceLarry Lewis, Vice President and Director, Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence, CNAJelena Pejic, Senior Legal Adviser, International Committee of the Red CrossChair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House Countries should have adequate systems in place for investigating violations of international humanitarian law, for launching criminal prosecutions for war crimes and for inquiring into responsibility for unlawful actions of national armed forces. There also needs to be proper counting and recording of the civilian casualties of military operations. This event, which will be introduced by the director of the UK Service Prosecuting Authority, Andrew Cayley, will discuss the new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law, Guidelines on Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy and Good Practice, as well as the problems and challenges associated with recording civilian casualties of armed conflict. This meeting is the third in a series of three commemorating the 70th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions supported by the British Red Cross. It will be followed by a drinks reception. Department/project International Law Programme, The Limits on War and Preserving the Peace Jacqueline Rowe Programme Assistant, International Law Programme 020 7389 3287 Email Full Article
it Power Politics Could Impede Progress on Responsible Regulation of Cyberspace By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 03 Dec 2019 14:34:13 +0000 3 December 2019 Harriet Moynihan Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme @HarrietMoyniha9 A new Chatham House paper examines the prospects of countries reaching agreement on issues of sovereignty and non-intervention in cyberspace in the face of persistent, low-level, state-to-state cyber attacks. 2019-11-29-Intl-Law-Cyberattacks.jpg A computer hacked by a virus known as Petya. The Petya ransomware cyberattack hit computers of Russian and Ukrainian companies on 27 June 2017. Photo: Getty Images. In discussions to date about how international law applies in cyberspace, commentators have tended to focus their attention on how the rules on the use of force, or the law of armed conflict, apply to cyber activities conducted by states that give rise to physical damage, injury or death.But in practice, the vast majority of state cyberattacks fall below this threshold. Far more common are persistent, low-level attacks that may leave no physical trace but that are capable of doing significant damage to a state’s ability to control its systems, often at serious economic cost.Such cyber incursions might include network disruptions in the operation of another government’s websites; tampering with electoral infrastructure to change or undermine the result; or using cyber means to destabilize another state’s financial sector.For these kinds of cyber operation, the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs, are the starting point.A UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) agreed in 2013 and 2015 that the principles in the UN Charter, including sovereignty and the prohibition on intervention in another state’s affairs, apply to states’ activities in cyberspace. The 2015 GGE also recommended eleven (non-binding) norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.However, states have not yet reached agreement on how to apply these principles. Until recently, there has also been very little knowledge of what states actually do in cyberspace, as they usually conduct cyber operations covertly and have been reluctant to put their views on record.A new Chatham House research paper analyses the application of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to state cyberattacks that fall below the principle of use of force. As well as analysing the application of the law in this area, the paper also makes recommendations to governments on how they might best make progress in reaching agreement in this area.Existing rules or new rules?As the research paper makes clear, there is currently some debate, principally between countries in the West, about the extent to which sovereignty is a legally binding rule in the context of cyberspace and, if so, how it and the principle of non-intervention might apply in practice.In the last few years, certain states have put on record how they consider international law to apply to states’ activities in cyberspace, namely the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands. While there may be some differences in their approaches, which are discussed in the paper, there also remains important common ground: namely, that existing international law already provides a solid framework for regulating states’ cyber activities, as it regulates every other domain of state-to-state activity.There is also an emerging trend for states to work together when attributing cyberattacks to hostile states, enabling them to call out malign cyber activity when it violates international law. (See, for example, the joint statements made in relation to the NotPetya cyber attack and malicious cyber activity attributed to the Russian government).However, other countries have questioned whether existing international law as it stands is capable of regulating states’ cyber interactions and have called for ‘new legal instruments’ in this area.This includes a proposal by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by Russia and China) for an International Code of Conduct on Information Security, a draft of which was submitted to the UN in 2011 and 2015, without success. The UN has also formed a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under a resolution proposed by Russia to consider how international law applies to states’ activities in cyberspace.The resolution establishing the OEWG, which began work earlier this year, includes the possibility of the group ‘introducing changes to the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States’ agreed in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports. In the OEWG discussions at the UN in September, several countries claimed that a new legal instrument was needed to fill the ‘legal vacuum’ (Cuba) or ‘the gap of ungoverned areas’ (Indonesia).It would be concerning if the hard-won consensus on the application of international law to cyberspace that has been reached at past GGEs started to unravel. In contrast to 2013 and 2015, the 2017 meeting failed to reach an agreement.On 9 December, a renewed GGE will meet in New York, but the existence of the OEWG exploring the same issues in a separate process reflects the fact that cyber norms have become an area of geopolitical rivalry.Aside from the application of international law, states are also adopting divergent approaches to the domestic regulation of cyberspace within their own territory. The emerging trend towards a ‘splinternet’ – i.e. between states that believe the internet should be global and open on the hand, and those that favour a ‘sovereignty and control’ model on the other – is also likely to make discussions at the GGE more challenging.Distinct from the international law concept of sovereignty is the notion of ‘cybersovereignty’, a term coined by China to describe the wide-ranging powers it assumes under domestic law to regulate its citizens’ access to the internet and personal data within its territory. This approach is catching on (as reflected in Russia’s recently enacted ‘Sovereign Internet Law’), with other authoritarian states likely to follow suit.The importance of non-state actorsIn parallel with regional and UN discussions on how international law applies, a number of initiatives by non-state actors have also sought to establish voluntary principles about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder body that has proposed principles, norms and recommendations to guide responsible behaviour by all parties in cyberspace, recently published its final report. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord aims to promote collaboration between tech companies on stability and resilience in cyberspace. President Macron’s ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace’ has to date received the backing of 67 states, 139 international and civil society organizations, and 358 private-sector organizations.It remains to be seen in the long term whether the parallel processes at the UN will work constructively together or be competitive. But notwithstanding the challenging geopolitical backdrop, the UN GGE meeting next week at the least offers states the opportunity to consolidate and build on the results of past meetings; to increase knowledge and discussion about how international law might apply; and to encourage more states to put their own views of these issues on the record. Full Article
it Michelle Bachelet: ‘Politics Is Getting Nastier’ By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 14:22:17 +0000 12 December 2019 Gitika Bhardwaj Editor, Communications & Publishing, Chatham House @GitikaBhardwaj LinkedIn Michelle Bachelet United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; President of Chile (2006-10) and (2014-18) In a series exploring women in international affairs, Michelle Bachelet speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about her experiences of sexism in politics, her concerns about the pace of change for women’s rights and how to address the social inequalities driving people to protest around the world. Bachelet-11.jpg UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, the first woman to become president of Chile in 2006, talks about her experiences as a woman in politics and her work realising human rights around the world. Photo: Chatham House. Michelle Bachelet, as a young woman you became involved with political issues, supporting Chile’s transition to democracy following the Augusto Pinochet regime. What first sparked your interest in politics and what was it like for you as a young woman in Chile at this time? I guess it’s related to the environment that I lived in as a child because none of my parents were involved in politics but they were people who were interested in what happened to other people. We would have interesting discussions about what was going on in Chile and around the world and I had grown up being a person who wanted to be part of finding solutions to different challenges.When I was a student, there were lots of things happening in Chile that I became interested in even though I was in medical school at the time. Then came an important political moment in the 1970s for Chile and I thought that I needed to help make Chile a better place for everyone – that my voice alone would not be enough – so I wanted to meet other people who might have answers to the questions I had. That’s when I became politically active.I always say that, in my milk bottle, the word responsibility was included because I always have felt responsible for things. My parents also always used to tell me that we’re all human beings and, although we might have differences, we should all have dignity and be respected and have the same rights and opportunities because it is the right thing to do. So that’s how I became what I became.You became the first woman in Latin America to hold the post of minister of national defence in 2002 and pushed to include more women in conflict resolution. Given that the inclusion of women in peace processes increases the likelihood of agreements being reached, yet women are largely excluded from the negotiating tables, why should more women in peace and security be prioritized? I used to push hard to have more women as negotiators and mediators at different levels when I was minister of national defence but I was told ‘We don’t have enough women with the capacity’. Of course that was not true. So one of the tasks I set myself was to build a roster of capable women so that tomorrow nobody could use this excuse. We built a roster, but still, as you say, there was a tendency not to have women included at all levels. I think this is because there’s still machoism and sexism that exists at some levels. Some men feel that women are weaker, that they’re not capable enough, and that’s not true. Women are important because women have the right skills to be negotiators and mediators.I have to say that UN Secretary-General António Guterres has done a great job by appointing women in half of all the posts for special envoys and special representatives in conflict places. But we still need to do more. Why do I believe women make a difference? Conflicts matter to both women and men because they impact both, but usually, the experiences of women are invisible in the eyes of many who work in negotiating and mediating peace. That’s why you need people that can bring this perspective to the table. The other thing is that women can often get close to other women in conflict places, and in that case, they can get a lot of useful information from women on the ground because they don’t feel threatened by other women. This is particularly true of women who have been victims of sexual violence who are more willing to tell another woman what they have experienced. But, at the end of the day, women are half of the population of the world and I think we need them to be represented adequately.In 2006, you became the first female president of Chile, what was this like for you and did you feel pressure taking up this mantle?Yes of course. I mean, there were a lot of people who would say ‘I want to vote for you but I don’t think it’s a woman’s place’. Journalists would also ask you ‘You are divorced and don’t have a man by your side. How are you going to cope?’ and I would respond by saying ‘I have always done it myself.’Sometimes if I took some time to make a decision, because I thought it needed a bit more time to reflect on what to do, they would say ‘She doesn’t take decisions’ but if you made a quick decision then they would say ‘She improvises’. I’m not complaining, I’m just describing the kinds of things that go on, and these are the things I have spoken about with other female leaders from around the world. For example, I once talked to Helle Thorning-Schmidt, the former prime minister of Denmark, and she would tell me that during the election campaign they would discuss the size of her purse and if she had a boyfriend. I mean, really, people tend to diminish women by talking about unsubstantial issues – there will be a lot of attempts to try to bring a woman’s self-esteem down. What I would say is, if you know exactly why you are there and what you want to do as a president, parliamentarian or whatever and you’re sure that what you want to do is the right thing – and the smart thing – then do it. Pick a team that is honest, that works with the same passion as you and that is loyal to you but is not afraid to tell you when things aren’t working. But it’s hard and difficult and politics is getting nastier every day.You said politics is getting nastier. Julia Gillard recently spoke to me about the dark side of social media for women. In what ways do you think politics is changing for women in particular? I remember seeing that, in the European Parliament, about 85 per cent of women have experienced psychological violence whether they have received death threats or threats of rape and all kinds of things just because they’re female.There is also a bias against women during election campaigns where people say she cannot be elected because she’s not capable just because she’s a woman. Then there are those that, as I mentioned before, try to talk about personal things or spread fake news. Politics has always been about debate between people with different positions, and that’s fine, but I think sometimes you see it goes past the limit in terms of respect for the other person.Then there is the language. Failing to understand that the other person is a competitor, not an enemy, and using language to, sort of, symbolically destroy the other one is not right. I see it everywhere and I think that’s not what politics is for – we came to serve the people and words matter. I think all of these things are making a lot of people not want to get involved in politics anymore because it’s not the kind of environment that we want to be in. But I hope, on the other hand, that if we have more women in politics, maybe we can turn that trend to a more positive and constructive one, where there can still be intense debate but in a way where everybody feels that we’re all part of the same country and we can all build the country together.How did you find your male counterparts responding to you as leader? Was there a time, for example, your gender became an issue for you while you were in office? When I was a student of medicine, what mattered was whether you were a good student or a good doctor, not if you were a man or a woman, but in politics, I found that when I appointed ministers, some of them struggled with me being a woman. For example, sometimes I would conclude a meeting by saying ‘We’re going to do this’ but there would be a male minister who would have to have the last word. Or some of them, particularly the more senior ones who had been in senior positions before, found it challenging to accept a secondary role to a woman.On the other hand, with the military, I had no problem. Neither as minister of defence and neither as president because they understood the chain of command.It’s interesting to look at women in other leadership positions too. For example, I remember a friend who worked in a place many years ago and she would tell me that she needed to swear and almost to spit on the ground so that men would respect her because the majority of the leaders there were men. I said to her ‘You don’t need to look like a man to be a leader.’Perhaps sometimes it’s more difficult because strength is understood in different ways but my message would be that you can be a leader in your own way. Michelle Bachelet takes part in a ceremonial parade following her inauguration on 11 March 2006 outside the Congress in Valparaiso, Chile. Michelle Bachelet was sworn in as Chile's first woman president in the history of the socially conservative country. Photo: Getty Images. While president of Chile, you introduced a number of policies aimed at addressing women’s rights issues notably on the gender pay gap and on sexual and reproductive rights for women. How do you view your legacy on these issues? Were there other policies you wanted to implement but were unable to? And how would you like these initiatives to be furthered today in light of, for example, the rolling back of reproductive rights for women in some parts of the world?We went from trying to improve the legal framework that applies to women to creating the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity. We also tried to push for changing the electoral roll with quotas for women which we got to an extent but not as much as I wanted. There was no appetite for having a quota for 40 per cent of all those elected to be women so we settled for 40 per cent of all candidates to be women. We still improved a little bit in terms of the number of women being elected from 14 per cent to 24 per cent through this but I didn’t get everything I wanted. Nevertheless, during my time in office, we were able to increase the representation of women in the Senate and the House which was positive. On sexual and reproductive rights, in Chile, abortion was criminalized so we were able to decriminalize abortion and we also advanced LGTBI rights and so on. We also developed a better legal framework for dealing with sexual violence but of course sexual violence is a complicated issue that cannot be solved in a short period of time and we need to continue working strongly on that.The other thing I’m a believer of is the importance of early child development which is good for both boys and girls. So we set up a network of kindergartens free of charge, particularly for poorer people, because there are so many women who cannot afford to put their children in kindergartens while they study or work. So we tried to do lots of things to expand women’s opportunities and women’s rights during my time in office.Women are increasingly making it to the top level of politics around the world, yet in Latin America, the number of female heads of states has dropped to 0 following a generation of female political leaders across the continent. Why do you think this is the case and could we see this change again in the future? Do you think Chile is likely to see another female president soon, and if so, who do you think could take up the mantle?The truth is that there was a moment that I think the region had four or so female heads of states, and although there are currently some female vice presidents, the number of presidents is 0 but I wouldn't be able to say that this is necessarily a bad thing. There doesn’t need to be a female president every time. We need to have female leaders where their citizens believe that they’re the best people to lead their countries.But we do need to do more to support women making it to the top so they can have all the skills needed to be a president or a prime minister and work more with young women too so that they can think of themselves as being able to take up such positions of leadership in the future. In Chile, I hope, of course, there will be another woman president one day but I have no idea when. I will not run again, I can tell you that, but I hope when the time comes, the people of Chile will believe in them.In your current role, you have said that ‘The climate crisis is the greatest threat to human rights’ and that climate change and gender equality are inextricably linked. How do you see this link and what does that mean for how these issues should be addressed? Climate change is the biggest threat to human rights because it affects the right to life, to food, to health and to live without violence, and if we are not able to tackle it, it will lead to water scarcity, food insecurity, forced migration and conflict – all of which we are seeing already.Why is it linked to gender equality? There are many reasons. One of them is that women, who make up half the global population, are usually among the most vulnerable people in the world. Today there are billions of people who don’t have access to water, sanitation or housing with women having less access to all of these tools that would permit them to adapt [to a changing climate].For example, women will be more affected by food insecurity because imagine a woman who is pregnant without food. She will likely end up being underweight, and then afterwards, this will impact her child who will be at risk of malnourishment. We see it everywhere where women avoid eating so that their children can eat.Furthermore, if we have water scarcity, that will also affect women because today, in many parts of the world, women and girls fetch the water for their families. If water becomes increasingly scarce, they will have to walk longer to fetch it, and today we already see women and girls who are subject to sexual gender-based violence as they carry out their day-to-day tasks. That’s why we need to provide women with the tools to empower them and to devise gender-responsive policies to climate change. Throughout your career, have you seen the scale and pace of change for human rights, particularly women’s rights, around the world that you would have wanted?It depends on how you look at things. It has been over 70 years since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written when maternal mortality was incredibly high in many parts of the world and women did not have the vote everywhere.If you look from that time to now, of course, women’s rights have seen a lot of progress. Maternal mortality has reduced and women can vote I think [in almost every democracy].But over the last few years, we have seen a pushback on women’s rights, particularly in some areas like sexual and reproductive health rights, and that it something that concerns me a lot.So I would say we’re not there yet. I hope we will be able to push back the pushback and move forward. Because if we go on along the same trajectory as we are now, we will have economic equality for women in 120 years, which is too long. I mean, nobody wants your great, great, great grandchildren to have to wait so long for equality. We need to stand up for women’s rights – and for all human rights – now and accelerate the progress we’ve been making.In the past couple of months, there have been ongoing protests in Chile and around the world. What in your estimation is driving the protests and in what ways should governments, civil society and others respond to help address their demands? I think it’s a phenomenon we are seeing in Chile and many places around the world. It’s a new process where young people are voicing their grievances but with no particular leaders. It’s what some people are calling a ‘new power’ and I think the situation in Chile is very similar to what’s happening in Lebanon, Hong Kong and elsewhere but with different triggers. In some places, people are challenging the outcome of an election; in other places, they are protesting because leaders want to change the constitution to be re-elected again; in other places, it can be, like in the case of Chile, a result of economic issues following the increase of the price of what you would call the Underground here. These inequalities lead to a mistrust in our institutions and in traditional leaders and I think this is a universal experience at the moment.The current political and economic system is not delivering and it’s failing to meet people’s needs. So these young people protesting don’t see, in the current political and economic system, the solutions to the concerns they have.The other thing that is interesting is the role social media has played in many of these recent protests. Social media has become a different way to allow people to learn from each other. When the students in Chile decided to protest against the increasing price of public transport, they went to the Metro and jumped over the barriers and then, two weeks’ later, I saw it in New York. Hundreds of students, for different reasons – against police brutality – doing exactly the same thing. So they learn from each other and they see what works in one place. So I think there is something in the world that is making people go to the streets. If it’s peacefully done then that’s fine. The problem is that sometimes it has triggered a harsh response from governments and that leads to more violence. I believe what needs to be done is to try to set up a national dialogue that includes all sectors of all societies where governments listen to the grievances that people have. You cannot change things in a day but I think people are reasonable enough to understand if you are committed to change. That’s why the UN has developed the Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development to leave no one behind. It probably won’t solve everything, but it will, I guess, if we are able to achieve the goals, help us have a planet that’s for everyone. Full Article
it Crimea’s Occupation Exemplifies the Threat of Attacks on Cultural Heritage By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 04 Feb 2020 14:24:47 +0000 4 February 2020 Kateryna Busol Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @KaterynaBusol LinkedIn Societies, courts and policymakers should have a clearer awareness that assaults against cultural heritage constitute a creeping encroachment on a people’s identity, endangering its very survival. 2020-02-04-Bakhchysarai.jpg 'The destructive reconstruction of the 16th-century Bakhchysarai Palace is being conducted by a team with no experience of cultural sites, in a manner that erodes its authenticity and historical value.' Photo: Getty Images. Violations against cultural property – such as archaeological treasures, artworks, museums or historical sites – can be no less detrimental to the survival of a nation than the physical persecution of its people. These assaults on heritage ensure the hegemony of some nations and distort the imprint of other nations in world history, sometimes to the point of eradication.As contemporary armed conflicts in Syria, Ukraine and Yemen demonstrate, cultural property violations are not only a matter of the colonial past; they continue to be perpetrated, often in new, intricate ways.Understandably, from a moral perspective, it is more often the suffering of persons, rather than any kind of ‘cultural’ destruction, that receives the most attention from humanitarian aid providers, the media or the courts. Indeed, the extent of the damage caused by an assault on cultural property is not always immediately evident, but the result can be a threat to the survival of a people. This is strikingly exemplified by what is currently happening in Crimea.Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula has been occupied by Russia since February 2014, meaning that, under international law, the two states have been involved in an international armed conflict for the last six years.While much attention has been paid to the alleged war crimes perpetrated by the occupying power, reports by international organizations and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have been less vocal on the issue of cultural property in Crimea. Where they do raise it, they tend to confine their findings to the issue of misappropriation.However, as part of its larger policy of the annexation and Russification of the peninsula and its history, Russia has gone far beyond misappropriation.Crimean artefacts have been transferred to Russia – without security justification or Ukrainian authorization as required by the international law of occupation – to be showcased at exhibitions celebrating Russia’s own cultural heritage. In 2016, the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow staged its record-breaking Aivazovsky exhibition, which included 38 artworks from the Aivazovsky Museum in the Crimean town of Feodosia.Other ‘cultural’ violations in the region include numerous unsanctioned archaeological excavations, whose findings are often unlawfully exported to Russia or end up on the black market.There is also the example of Russia’s plan to establish a museum of Christianity in Ukraine’s UNESCO World Heritage site, the Ancient City of Tauric Chersonese. This is an indication of Russia’s policy of asserting itself as a bastion of Orthodox Christianity and culture in the Slavic world, with Crimea as one of the centres.The harmful effects of Russia’s destructive cultural property policy can be seen in the situation of the Crimean Tatars, Ukraine’s indigenous Muslim people. Already depleted by a Stalin-ordered deportation in 1944 and previously repressed by the Russian Empire, the Crimean Tatars are now facing the destruction of much of the remainder of their heritage.For example, Muslim burial grounds have been demolished to build the Tavrida Highway, which leads to the newly built Kerch Bridge connecting the peninsula to Russia.The destructive reconstruction of the 16th-century Bakhchysarai Palace – the only remaining complete architectural ensemble of the indigenous people, included in the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List – is another example of how the very identity of the Crimean Tatars is being threatened. This reconstruction is being conducted by a team with no experience of cultural sites, in a manner that erodes its authenticity and historical value – which is precisely as Russia intends.There is a solid body of international and domestic law covering Russia’s treatment of Crimea’s cultural property.Under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict – ratified by both Ukraine and Russia – the occupying power must facilitate the safeguarding efforts of the national authorities in occupied territories. States parties must prevent any vandalism or misappropriation of cultural property, and, according to the first protocol of the convention, the occupying power is required to prevent any export of artefacts from the occupied territory.The 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention confirm that the authentic domestic legislation continues to apply in occupied territories. This leaves Russia with no excuse for non-compliance with Ukraine’s cultural property laws and imposing its own rules unless absolutely necessary.Besides, both Ukrainian and Russian criminal codes penalise pillage in occupied territory, as well as unsanctioned archaeological excavations. As an occupying power, Russia must not just abstain from such wrongdoings in Crimea, but also duly investigate and prosecute the alleged misconduct.The clarity of the international legal situation demonstrates that no exhibitions in continental Russia and no archaeological excavations which are not sanctioned by Ukraine can be justified. Likewise, any renovation or use of cultural sites, especially those on permanent or tentative UNESCO lists, must only be conducted pursuant to consultancy with and approval of the Ukrainian authorities.But the resonance of the Crimean case goes beyond law and touches on issues of the very survival of a people. The Soviet deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 did not only result in the deaths of individuals. Their footprints in Crimea have been gradually erased by baseless treason charges, the long exile of the indigenous community from their native lands and ongoing persecution.First the Soviet Union and now Russia have targeted the Crimean Tatars’ cultural heritage to undermine their significance in the general historical narrative, making attempts to preserve or celebrate this culture seem futile. Russia is thus imposing its own historical and political hegemony at the expense of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian layers of Crimean history.As exemplified by occupied Crimea, the manipulation and exploitation of cultural heritage can serve an occupying power’s wider policies of appropriating history and asserting its own dominance. Domestic cultural property proceedings are challenging due to the lack of access to the occupied territory, but they should still be pursued.More effort is needed in the following areas: case prioritization; informing the documenters of alleged violations about the spectrum of cultural property crimes; developing domestic investigative and prosecutorial capacity, including by involving foreign expert consultancy; more proactively seeking bilateral and multilateral cooperation in art crime cases; liaising with auction houses (to track down objects originating from war-affected areas) and museums (to prevent the exhibition of the artefacts from occupied territories).When possible, cultural property crimes should also be reported to the ICC.Additionally, more international – public, policy, media and jurisprudential – attention to such violations is needed. Societies, courts and policymakers should have a clearer awareness that assaults against cultural heritage constitute a creeping encroachment on a people’s identity, endangering its very survival. Full Article
it The Security Council's peacekeeping trilemma By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 13:34:10 +0000 4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2 Paul D. Williams Read Online The United Nations (UN) Security Council is stuck in a peacekeeping trilemma. This is a situation where the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously. This trilemma stems from longstanding competing pressures on how the Council designs UN peacekeeping operations as well as political divisions between peacekeeping's three key groups of stakeholders: the states that authorize peacekeeping mandates, those that provide most of the personnel and field capabilities, and those that pay the majority of the bill. Fortunately, the most negative consequences of the trilemma can be mitigated and perhaps even transcended altogether. Mitigation would require the Council to champion and implement four main reforms: improving peacekeeper performance, holding peacekeepers accountable for misdeeds, adopting prioritized and sequenced mandates, and strengthening the financial basis for UN peacekeeping. Transcending the trilemma would require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the key stakeholder groups in order to create much greater unity of effort behind a re-envisaged peacekeeping enterprise. This is highly unlikely in the current international political context. Full Article
it Webinar: International Humanitarian Law Amid Coronavirus By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:20:01 +0000 Members Event Webinar 15 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pmAdd to CalendariCalendar Outlook Google Yahoo Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Chanu Peiris, Programme Manager, International Law Programme, Chatham HouseFurther speakers to be announced. In April 2020, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for a global ceasefire in order for communities and states to focus efforts on responding to the coronavirus outbreak. The consequences of armed conflict – including displacement, detention, lack of access to health services and disrupted social infrastructures – mean that those in conflict-ridden areas are amongst the most vulnerable to the virus. Observing international humanitarian law (IHL) could be one way of safeguarding against, at least, the provision of vital medical supplies and personnel for vulnerable groups. Against the backdrop of a growing health and economic emergency that is otherwise dominating government agendas, how do we emphasise the importance of humanitarian action and guarantee - or improve - compliance?The panellists will discuss the remit and limitations of international humanitarian law and how the pandemic might complicate compliance. What is the framework for humanitarian action under international humanitarian law? What are the challenges to delivering relief? And how has COVID-19 impacted humanitarian action in conflict-ridden areas?This event is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more. Full Article
it Accountability, denial and the future-proofing of British torture By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:24:20 +0000 7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3 Read online Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael When powerful liberal democratic states are found to be complicit in extreme violations of human rights, how do they respond and why do they respond as they do? Drawing on the example of the United Kingdom's complicity in torture since 9/11, this article demonstrates how reluctant the UK has been to permit a full reckoning with its torturous past. We demonstrate that successive UK governments engaged in various forms of denial, obfuscation and attempts to obstruct investigation and avoid accountability. The net effect of their responses has been to deny the victims redress, through adequate judicial processes, and to deny the public adequate state accountability. These responses are not simply aimed at shielding from prosecution the perpetrators and those who have oversight of them, nor preventing political embarrassment. The various forms of denial and obstruction are also designed to ensure that collusion can continue uninterrupted. A core concern of intelligence officials and ministers has been to prevent any process that would lead to a comprehensive prohibition on involvement in operations where torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are a real possibility. The door remains wide open, and deliberately so, for British involvement in torture. Full Article
it China and Russia in R2P debates at the UN Security Council By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:36:16 +0000 7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3 Zheng Chen and Hang Yin Read online While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’. Full Article
it US–China Strategic Competition: The Quest for Global Technological Leadership By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 18:26:46 +0000 7 November 2019 The current dispute between the US and China goes far beyond trade tariffs and tit-for-tat reprisals: the underlying driver is a race for global technological supremacy. This paper examines the risks of greater strategic competition as well as potential solutions for mitigating the impacts of the US–China economic confrontation. Read online Download PDF Marianne Schneider-Petsinger Senior Research Fellow, US and the Americas Programme @mpetsinger Dr Jue Wang Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme (based in Holland) LinkedIn Dr Yu Jie Senior Research Fellow on China, Asia-Pacific Programme @yu_jiec LinkedIn James Crabtree Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme @jamescrabtree LinkedIn Examining the US-China Trade Competition Video: Marianne Schneider-Petsinger and Dr Yu Jie discuss key themes from the research paperSummaryThe underlying driver of the ongoing US–China trade war is a race for global technological dominance. President Trump has raised a number of issues regarding trade with China – including the US’s trade deficit with China and the naming of China as a currency manipulator. But at the heart of the ongoing tariff escalation are China’s policies and practices regarding forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft and non-market distortions.As China’s international influence has expanded it has always been unlikely that Beijing would continue to accept existing global standards and institutions established and widely practised by developed countries based on ‘the Washington Consensus’.China’s desire to be an alternative champion of technology standard-setting remains unfulfilled. Its ample innovation talent is a solid foundation in its quest for global technology supremacy but tightening controls over personal freedoms could undermine it and deter potential global partners.It is unclear if Chinese government interventions will achieve the technological self-sufficiency Beijing has long desired. China’s approach to macroeconomic management diverges significantly from that of the US and other real market economies, particularly in its policy towards nurturing innovation.Chinese actors are engaged in the globalization of technological innovation through exports and imports of high-tech goods and services; cross-border investments in technology companies and research and development (R&D) activities; cross-border R&D collaboration; and international techno-scientific research collaboration.While the Chinese state pushes domestic companies and research institutes to engage in the globalization of technological innovation, its interventions in the high-tech sector have caused uneasiness in the West.The current US response to its competition with China for technological supremacy, which leans towards decoupling, is unlikely to prove successful. The US has better chances of success if it focuses on America’s own competitiveness, works on common approaches to technology policy with like-minded partners around the globe and strengthens the international trading system.A technically sound screening mechanism of foreign investment can prevent normal cross-border collaboration in technological innovation from being misused by geopolitical rival superpowers. Department/project Asia-Pacific Programme, Trade, Investment and Economics, US and the Americas Programme, US Geoeconomic Trends and Challenges Full Article
it Iran Crisis: How Far Does Trump’s Authority Go? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 12:26:36 +0000 10 January 2020 Dr Leslie Vinjamuri Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme @londonvinjamuri Google Scholar The legal and political boundaries of presidential power are being redefined, but the president may still be attentive to some constraints. 2020-01-10-Trump.jpg Donald Trump arrives for a rally in Toledo, Ohio on 9 January. Photo: Getty Images. On Thursday, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution affirming its authority under the War Powers Resolution Act, and reminding the president, the American people and the world that when it comes to the use of military force, Congress must be taken into account. President Donald Trump replied by retweeting John Bolton, his former national security advisor, who tweeted that the War Powers Act was ‘unconstitutional’, effectively dismissing Congressional efforts to rein in the president.This round of legal Twitter diplomacy came days after the president tweeted that ‘legal notice (to Congress) is not required, but it is given nevertheless’ and that ‘should Iran strike any US person or target, the United States will quickly and fully strike back, and perhaps in a disproportionate manner.’ President Trump’s overt attacks on Congressional authority and disregard for the law are not normal for a US president, but legal constraints over the president’s authority to use military force have been eroding for several years.In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, requiring the president to report to Congress and acquire Congressional approval for continued overseas troop deployments. But Congressional authority over the use of military force has continued to diminish, especially since the 9/11 attacks. Now, Congress is pushing back – a resolution similar to that passed by the House is likely to be voted on by the Senate soon. Given the intense frustration of some senators over the president’s handling of the current conflict, this resolution may pass, though the president is still likely to veto. The bigger problem, of which this is one part, is the expansion of executive authority, and it predates this presidency. Many argue that executive power is greatest on matters of foreign policy, and that in this domain the US president is unconstrained. As partisanship has increased and the demands on Congress have made it harder for its members to cultivate foreign policy expertise, the power of the president has grown.So the fact that Congress is taking active steps to check the president’s power not only on the question of impeachment, but also on foreign policy, is significant, even if the law is not likely to restrain President Trump. But Congress is also playing a long game. And its growing determination to assert its authority matters not only for this presidency, but also for the future.Political constraintsIn the short term, other constraints matter more. Even if President Trump rejects legal restraints – and shuns diplomatic pressure that might have mattered to other presidents – he is not impervious to political restraint.Already there are signs that Trump listens to his key Republican allies in Congress. When Senator Lindsay Graham pushed back against the president’s threat to attack cultural heritage sites in Iran, and the Pentagon failed to shore up the president’s threat, the president changed his position. The threats also provoked an overwhelming response in Europe, and across the Middle East, but the president has shown that he is willing to disregard international admonishment. Not so for domestic allies.Nor is this the first time that Senator Graham’s views have mattered. When the president announced his decision to pull troops from northeast Syria, effectively abandoning the Kurds, a key partner to the US in its fight against ISIS, Senator Graham and Senator Mitch McConnell pushed back and it mattered. Public opinion also matters to the president, especially Republican public opinion, and this is likely to affect the president’s next steps. Recent polls suggest that Americans feel less safe as a result of the killing of General Qassem Soleimani by a considerable margin of 55% to 24%.But the same survey also shows that a majority of Americans support the decision to kill Soleimani. Already Vice President Mike Pence has spoken at a rally in Ohio designed to bolster support for this Presidential action. So what might change public opinion and will this alter the president’s future steps?Americans are very reluctant to support further deployments of troops overseas. President Trump knows this and he has consistently stated that he seeks to pull US troops out of the Middle East.In fact, the opposite has happened. And once again, the decision to kill General Soleimani is pulling the US further into the Middle East and putting into stark light the inconsistency of Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. In recent days, the United States has committed to sending thousands of troops to the region.Continued US troop deployments may not play well with Trump’s base, though they currently support his Iran policy. But absent an obvious justification, this could change, so it is not surprising that this has become a rallying point for Vice President Pence.An even greater political risk, and one that will matter to the president, is the risk to US military personnel and civilians overseas. Public support for the killing of Soleimani and increased US presence in the region is bound to dissipate if Americans are killed.But it isn’t clear how the president will respond, and already the death of one American in the militia attack on 27 December seems to have been a critical factor in Trump’s decision to authorize the assassination of General Soleimani. So far, Iran’s response appears to be calibrated to avoid this kind of public backlash, and keep the door open to some sort of managed resolution of the current crisis.But the considerable risk of miscalculation and mistakes has already been born out. A week after the killing of Soleimani, the world is tuning in to the tragic news that a civilian airliner departing Iran for Ukraine appears to have been accidentally shot down by an Iranian missile, resulting in the deaths of all 176 people on board, including 82 Iranians and 63 Canadians.Whether the US president is constrained is a critical question for Americans, for US democracy and for the rest of the world. Trump is different, but he is not unconstrained. Steps taken by Congress along with diplomatic and political pressure mean he is still operating within boundaries. But it is clear that these boundaries are being redefined. Full Article
it The UK, US and Mauritius: Decolonization, Security, Chagos and the ICJ By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 13:35:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 30 January 2020 - 8:15am to 9:15am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Professor Philippe Sands QC, Professor of Law, UCL Richard Burt, Managing Partner, McLarty AssociatesChair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme; Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy, Chatham House The Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean has garnered media attention recently after the UK failed to abide by a UN deadline to return the islands to Mauritius. The US has landed in the middle of the dispute as a 1965 agreement with the UK has allowed the US to establish a military base on one of the islands, Diego Garcia, which has since become instrumental in US missions in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. In February 2019, an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Chagos archipelago was unlawfully dismembered from Mauritius, in violation of the right to self-determination and that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to end its administration of the Chagos archipelago ‘as rapidly as possible’. The UN General Assembly subsequently voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK leaving the islands by the end of November 2019 and the right of the former residents who were removed by the UK to return. The UK does not accept the ICJ and UN rulings and argues that the islands are needed to protect Britain from security threats while Mauritius has made clear the base can remain.Professor Philippe Sands QC, professor of law at University College London and lead counsel for Mauritius on the ICJ case on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, will be joining Ambassador Richard Burt, US chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union for a discussion on the fate of the archipelago including the future of the military base and the right of return of former residents. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it US 2020: America’s National Security Strategy and Middle East Policy By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 14:00:02 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 10 February 2020 - 10:30am to 11:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Dr Kori Schake, Resident Scholar and Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme In the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, then-candidate Donald Trump made a series of campaign promises concerning US foreign policy towards the Middle East. Since assuming office, President Trump has withdrawn the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, withdrawn troops from Syria, relocated the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and orchestrated the strike against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.Against a backdrop of Trump's inclination towards withdrawing from the region, countries across the Middle East are being rocked by protests, Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile has threatened to undermine cohesion within NATO and the much hoped for ceasefire in Libya between UN-backed government leader, Fayez al-Sarraj, and opposition leader, Khalifa Haftar, failed to materialize.In light of the upcoming US elections in November 2020, the future of US national security policy promises to be a prominent issue for the next administration. In this vein, the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House plans a yearlong focus on the pivotal US 2020 elections.At this event, Dr Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute will discuss the future of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. How have domestic and party politics in the US – and the unfolding presidential campaign – shaped recent policy decisions by the Trump administration? Should we expect policy objectives in the Middle East to remain consistent or shift under a second Trump term? And what direction could US foreign policy towards the region take under a Democratic administration?Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Britain Walks Post-Brexit Tightrope With Huawei Decision By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 04 Feb 2020 13:28:57 +0000 4 February 2020 Dr Leslie Vinjamuri Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme @londonvinjamuri Google Scholar The UK government seems to have balanced competing interests of the economy, national security and relations with America. But the full US response remains to be seen. 2020-02-04-JohnsonPompeo.jpg Mike Pompeo meets Boris Johnson in London on 30 January. Photo: Getty Images. In the face of multiple competing pressures, most especially intense pressure by the US president and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the UK government has carved out an independent choice on the role that Huawei will play in its 5G mobile networks. Announced just days before the UK exited the European Union, a move designed to allow the UK to reclaim its sovereignty, this was a model example of a sovereign decision, but one that carries risk and will create ongoing uncertainty.The government’s assessment is that this will bolster Britain’s economic competitiveness through a rapid rollout of its 5G mobile network while staving off pressure from the United States and economic retaliation from China.Britain’s decision treads a cautious line. The effort to balance the drive for competitiveness, the imperatives of national security and, especially, to appease while not appearing to appease America, has meant that the UK faces multiple pressures just as it seeks to forge an independent political future. So far, the UK government has handled these pressures artfully.After months of intense scrutiny that at times looked like prevarication, and at other times looked a lot more contentious, the UK has decided to restrict Huawei’s access to a maximum of 35% of the market share of what it argues is the non-core part of its 5G mobile networks, and to enforce a total ban on Huawei’s access to the core. But no one should rest easy with the current choice. The UK has been divided internally on this decision, even among those on its National Security Council who have had privileged access to the intelligence offered by GCHQ. As the UK’s decision loomed, Tom Tugendhat, chair of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, cited Huawei’s connection to China’s intelligence services and its police state in Xinjiang and asked ‘is the risk worth it?’.This division created latitude for the Johnson government to stake out its own position. But it also suggests that when it comes to national security, the case is not clear. The US response is more puzzling. Donald Trump and Pompeo have been coming down hard on the UK. But in the lead up to the UK’s decision, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin struck a much more nuanced tone, at least on the public record.Despite weeks of pressure by Trump and Pompeo leading up to the announcement, the UK’s Huawei decision has so far failed to make headlines in the US, or garner much of an official response.In an oped published in the Financial Times just days after the UK’s decision, acting US Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey took a strong line on China, calling for transatlantic unity and stressing the comprehensive nature of the competition that China presents. But he refrained from any specific mention of the UK’s announced decision. Given the previous US threat that allowing Huawei access would compromise future US–UK intelligence sharing and undermine the prospect for a free trade deal, this relatively muted response is surprising. Few among US national security experts have diverged from the view that Huawei presents a singular threat to national security.This suggests one of two things: either that, even among those in the US who agree about the threat that Huawei presents for national security, opinion differs on how to deal with this threat; or, that America has conceded to the UK’s choice, even if it is a different position to its own.What comes next is less certain. Now that Boris Johnson’s decision has been announced, the US has good reason to lay low. Restricting US–UK intelligence is a hollow threat: the US is a major beneficiary of this relationship and any attempt to unravel it would be costly for both parties.The same is true of a future US–UK free trade deal, from which the US will most certainly reap substantial benefits, politically as well as economically.The risk for the United States, of course, is that if it does not follow through, future threats to retaliate against the UK’s sovereign choices will become increasingly meaningless. And President Trump is not just any president. The current quiet could quickly be reversed if he sees a reason to make an example of the UK to signal to other countries currently debating their position on Huawei that proceeding will carry significant penalties.The question remains whether in forging ahead, but with elements of caution, Britain has made the right decision. If the measure of success is political independence befitting the moment of Britain’s historic exit from the European Union, then the answer would appear to be yes. National security is an entirely different matter, and on this the debate is not over. Full Article
it Trade, Technology and National Security: Will Europe Be Trapped Between the US and China? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 07 Feb 2020 15:25:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 2 March 2020 - 8:00am to 9:15am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Sir Simon Fraser, Managing Partner of Flint Global; Deputy Chairman, Chatham HouseChair: Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, Senior Research Fellow, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House The US and China have entered into an increasingly confrontational relationship over trade and technology. This may force Europe to make difficult choices between the two economic superpowers – or perform a balancing act. Although the recent US-China phase-1 trade deal has eased the relationship for now, the trade and technology tensions are a structural issue and are likely to persist.The debate over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks is an example of how the UK and other countries may face competing priorities in economic, security and foreign policy. Can Europe avoid a binary choice between the US and China? Is it possible for the EU to position itself as a third global power in trade, technology and standard-setting? What strategies should Europeans adopt to keep the US and China engaged in the rules-based international order and what does the future hold for trade multilateralism?Sir Simon Fraser will join us for a discussion on Europe’s future role between the US and China. Sir Simon is Managing Partner of Flint Global and Deputy Chairman of Chatham House. He previously served as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the UK Diplomatic Service from 2010 to 2015. Prior to that he was Permanent Secretary at the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. He has also served as Director General for Europe in the FCO and Chief of Staff to European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme, Global Trade Policy Forum, US Geoeconomic Trends and Challenges US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Reflections from the Munich Security Conference on America’s Role in the World By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 13:35:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 17 February 2020 - 8:00am to 9:15am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Senator Chris Coons, United States Senator, DelawareChair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme In the aftermath of World War II, the United States cemented its role as the leader of a new global order, characterized by the creation of international institutions and treaties like the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More recently, however, the United States has appeared to take an inward turn, a trend which has been mirrored across the globe and has led to the international order being challenged more now than ever before.As the Trump administration and US members of Congress attempt to address multiple challenges from a rising China and a disruptive Russia to a nuclear North Korea and shifting Middle East, Senator Chris Coons will offer his vision for restoring American leadership on the world stage.What is the role of Congress in setting and shaping US foreign policy? How will the outcome of the consequential 2020 elections shape the future of America’s global role? Would a change in administration necessarily increase prospects of American reengagement, and if so, across which international spheres? Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Trade and Environmental Sustainability: Towards Greater Coherence By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 16:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 27 February 2020 - 8:30am to 10:00am Graduate Institute Geneva | Chemin Eugène-Rigot | Geneva | 1672 1211 The WTO Ministerial Conference in June 2020 presents a critical opportunity to move ahead on better alignment of trade and environmental sustainability objectives, policymaking and governance. In light of the challenges facing the WTO, meaningful efforts to address environmental sustainability would also help to reinvigorate the organization and strengthen its relevance. In this context, the meeting aims to advance discussion on two questions: How can the multilateral trade system better contribute to meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate goals? What priorities and tangible outcomes on trade and environmental sustainability should be advanced at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Nur Sultan in June and beyond?The event will be hosted by the US and the Americas Programme and the Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy at Chatham House in partnership with both the Global Governance Centre and the Centre for Trade and Economic Integration at the Graduate Institute, Geneva.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this event from the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum’s founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc and EY, and on the Graduate Institute side, from the government of Switzerland. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme, Global Trade Policy Forum US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it Exploring the Obstacles and Opportunities for Expanded UK-Latin American Trade and Investment By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 12:40:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 14 January 2020 - 8:30am to 11:00am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Trade and investment between the UK and Latin America is woefully underdeveloped. Latin America’s agricultural powerhouses Brazil and Argentina only accounted for a total of 1.6% of the UK’s agricultural market across eight sectors in 2018, all of those areas in which Argentina and Brazil have substantial comparative advantages. Conversely, UK exports to the large Latin American economies remain far below their potential. To cite a few examples, in 2018 in the electrical equipment sector, the UK only exported $95.7 million of those products to Brazil, making the ninth largest economy in the world only the 42nd export market for those goods from the UK; Mexico only imported $91.4 million of UK-made electrical goods, placing it directly behind Brazil as UK’s market for those goods.As we look to the future, any improvement to the relationship will depend on two factors: 1) how the UK leaves the EU and 2) whether Latin American agricultural producers can improve their environmental practices and can meet the production standards established by the EU and likely maintained by a potential post-Brexit Britain.In the first meeting of the working group, Chatham House convened a range of policymakers, practitioners and academics to explore this topic in depth, identify the key issues driving this trend, and begin to consider how improvements might best be made. Subsequent meetings will focus on specific sectors in commerce and investment.We would like to thank BTG Pactual, Cairn Energy plc, Diageo, Equinor, Fresnillo Management Services, HSBC Holdings plc and Wintershall Dea for their generous support of the Latin America Initiative. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project US and the Americas Programme, Latin America Initiative US and Americas Programme Email Full Article
it America's Coronavirus Response Is Shaped By Its Federal Structure By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 09:00:36 +0000 16 March 2020 Dr Leslie Vinjamuri Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme @londonvinjamuri Google Scholar The apparent capacity of centralized state authority to respond effectively and rapidly is making headlines. In the United States, the opposite has been true. 2020-03-16-Coronavirus-America.jpg Harvard asked its students to move out of their dorms due to the coronavirus risk, with all classes moving online. Photo by Maddie Meyer/Getty Images. As coronavirus spreads across the globe, states grapple to find the ideal strategy for coping with the global pandemic. And, in China, Singapore, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Europe, divergent policies are a product of state capacity and legal authority, but they also reveal competing views about the optimal role of centralized state authority, federalism, and the private sector.Although it is too soon to know the longer-term effects, the apparent capacity of centralized state authority in China, South Korea and Singapore to respond effectively and rapidly is making headlines. In the United States, the opposite has been true. America’s response is being shaped by its federal structure, a dynamic private sector, and a culture of civic engagement. In the three weeks since the first US case of coronavirus was confirmed, state leaders, public health institutions, corporations, universities and churches have been at the vanguard of the nation’s effort to mitigate its spread.Images of safety workers in hazmat suits disinfecting offices of multinational corporations and university campuses populate American Facebook pages. The contrast to the White House effort to manage the message, downplay, then rapidly escalate its estimation of the crisis is stark.Bewildering responseFor European onlookers, the absence of a clear and focused response from the White House is bewildering. By the time President Donald Trump declared a national emergency, several state emergencies had already been called, universities had shifted to online learning, and churches had begun to close.By contrast, in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, the state has led national efforts to shutter borders and schools. In the UK, schools are largely remaining open as Prime Minister Boris Johnson has declared a strategy defined by herd immunity, which hinges on exposing resilient populations to the virus.But America has never shared Europe’s conviction that the state must lead. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the leading national public health institute and a US federal agency, has attempted to set a benchmark for assessing the crisis and advising the nation. But in this instance, its response has been slowed due to faults in the initial tests it attempted to rollout. The Federal Reserve has moved early to cut interest rates and cut them again even further this week.But states were the real first movers in America’s response and have been using their authority to declare a state of emergency independent of the declaration of a national emergency. This has allowed states to mobilize critical resources, and to pressure cities into action. After several days delay and intense public pressure, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo forced New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio to close the city’s schools.Declarations of state emergencies by individual states have given corporations, universities and churches the freedom and legitimacy to move rapidly, and ahead of the federal government, to halt the spread in their communities.Washington state was the first to declare a state of emergency. Amazon, one of the state’s leading employers, quickly announced a halt to all international travel and, alongside Microsoft, donated $1million to a rapid-response Seattle-based emergency funds. States have nudged their corporations to be first movers in the sector’s coronavirus response. But corporations have willingly taken up the challenge, often getting ahead of state as well as federal action.Google moved rapidly to announce a move allowing employees to work from home after California declared a state of emergency. Facebook soon followed with an even more stringent policy, insisting employees work from home. Both companies have also met with World Health Organization (WHO) officials to talk about responses, and provided early funding for WHO’s Solidarity Response Fund set up in partnership with the UN Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation.America’s leading research universities, uniquely positioned with in-house public health and legal expertise, have also been driving preventive efforts. Just days after Washington declared a state of emergency, the University of Washington became the first to announce an end to classroom teaching and move courses online. A similar pattern followed at Stanford, Harvard, Princeton and Columbia - each also following the declaration of a state of emergency.In addition, the decision by the Church of the Latter Day Saints to cancel its services worldwide followed Utah’s declaration of a state of emergency.The gaping hole in the US response has been the national government. President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency came late, and his decision to ban travel from Europe but - at least initially - exclude the UK, created uncertainty and concern that the White House response is as much driven by politics as evidence.This may soon change, as the House of Representatives has passed a COVID-19 response bill that the Senate will consider. These moves are vital to supporting state and private efforts to mobilize an effective response to a national and global crisis.Need for public oversightIn the absence of greater coordination and leadership from the centre, the US response will pale in comparison to China’s dramatic moves to halt the spread. The chaos across America’s airports shows the need for public oversight. As New York State Governor Cuomo pleaded for federal government support to build new hospitals, he said: ‘I can’t do it. You can’t leave it to the states.'When it comes to global pandemics, we may be discovering that authoritarian states can have a short-term advantage, but already Iran’s response demonstrates that this is not universally the case. Over time, the record across authoritarian states as they tackle the coronavirus will become more apparent, and it is likely to be mixed.Open societies remain essential. Prevention requires innovation, creativity, open sharing of information, and the ability to inspire and mobilize international cooperation. The state is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient alone. Full Article