BISHKEK, 29 July 2016 – Some 30 police officers of different ranks from seven regions of Kyrgyzstan are taking part in a summer school training programme, which closes tomorrow in Issyk-Kul, on the topical issues of police reform, conducted by the Kyrgyz Association of Women Police and the Interior Ministry, with the support of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek.  

The training course, which began on 18 July 2016, aimed at enhancing the knowledge of the police on the regulatory and legal changes enacted as part of the police reform. The participants will also improve their capacity in the field of human rights and gender equality.

As part of the ‘Police reform measures’ adopted by the Kyrgyz Government in 2013, basic provisions such as the framework for comprehensive evaluation of police activities and mechanisms for the interaction between police and civil society institutions were developed with the support of OSCE experts and approved by the Government in 2015. These provisions create a legal basis for the openness and accessibility of the police, as well as co-ordination of actions by police and civil society in ensuring public safety and preventing crime.

"One of the main objectives of the police reform is to build the capacity of the police by enhancing their knowledge on the regulatory and legal changes in order to achieve sustainable results,” said Pavel Khalashnyuk, acting Head of the OSCE Centre’s Police Matters Programme. “The OSCE Centre in Bishkek is ready to provide extensive support to such training courses."

Kaana Aidarkul, Head of the Kyrgyz Association of Women Police, said: “Our Association played the main role in the development of the police reform regulatory framework. With the support of the OSCE Centre, members of our Association train police officers to apply these provisions, as well as to enhance their communicative and professional competences with respect to human rights and gender equality."

The summer school was organized as part of the OSCE Centre’s police reform project.

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TBILISI, 27 May 2016 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Special Representative on the South Caucasus Kristian Vigenin (MP, Bulgaria), today concluded a two-day visit to Georgia.

The Special Representative met with Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili, Chairman of the Georgian Parliament David Usupashvili, and Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze, as well as Members of the OSCE PA delegation and representatives of various political forces in the country. Vigenin also participated in events commemorating the 25th anniversary of the restoration of Georgia’s independence.

“In just 25 years, Georgia has achieved a great deal, and I look forward to seeing what further progress the next 25 years will bring,” said the Special Representative. He noted that the upcoming OSCE PA's 25th Annual Session to be held in Tbilisi, 1-5 July, is an opportune moment for Georgia to demonstrate its achievements to hundreds of parliamentarians from across the OSCE region.

“With parliamentary elections later this year, this is a sensitive period. Following incidents of violence against opposition leaders a few days ago during the local by-elections, a thorough and transparent investigation is necessary. While it is the government’s responsibility to hold those responsible accountable, I also call on all political forces to act with restraint in the coming months so that the October elections can take place in a calm and peaceful environment,” said the Special Representative, encouraging all efforts aimed at consolidating democratic progress.

Interlocutors welcomed OSCE observation of the parliamentary elections, expected on 8 October.
Vigenin discussed a range of security challenges faced by Georgia, and visited the Administrative Boundary Line in Khurvaleti, where the de facto authorities of South Ossetia have erected barbed wire fences dividing the village.

“The recent killing of a Georgian citizen in Khurcha, at the Administrative Boundary Line, is a reminder of the significant security challenges Georgia continues to face. I condemn this shooting unconditionally, and expect that those responsible will be brought to justice,” said Vigenin.

Reports indicate that on 19 May at the Khurcha-Nabakevi crossing point on the Administrative Boundary Line, armed men crossed from the Abkhaz side of the bridge and carried out the fatal shooting.

The Special Representative’s visit to Georgia follows meetings earlier this week in Armenia. He continues his travels with a visit to Azerbaijan today where high-level meetings are expected.

Vigenin was appointed Special Representative by OSCE PA President Ilkka Kanerva in February 2016. In his mandate, he is tasked with promoting dialogue in all segments of society, in particular at the parliamentary level, in order to encourage reconciliation and rehabilitation with regard to the protracted conflicts in the region.
This week’s visit is his first visit to the region as Special Representative.

Vigenin is a former Foreign Minister of Bulgaria and currently serves as Deputy Head of the OSCE PA’s Bulgarian Delegation.

To watch a recent interview in which he discusses his priorities as Special Representative, please click here. 

For photos of Vigenin's visit to the region, click here.

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BISHKEK, 3 June 2016 – Wrapping up a two-day visit to Kyrgyzstan, which has included meetings with the Speaker of the Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and officials at the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Special Representative for Central and Eastern Asia and Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Christine Muttonen spoke to students today at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek on conflict prevention and peace-building, noting the strengths of the OSCE’s approach, as well as areas for improvement.

Muttonen’s visit this week – her first to Kyrgyzstan since her appointment as Special Representative in January – has served as an opportunity to discuss confidence-building in the region and developing co-operative approaches to common challenges such as energy security, water management and border co-operation. In her meetings with Speaker of Parliament Chynybay Tursunbekov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Erlan Abdyldaev, Muttonen noted the importance of continuing to build trust and dialogue through the OSCE.

“There is a need to develop ways of countering the lack of trust and promoting co-operation between countries in the region,” she said. “The OSCE is our common organization, an inclusive organization in which all of its members have an equal voice, and we need to work effectively together within this forum.”

Discussions in Bishkek also focused on promoting follow-up on OSCE/ODIHR election-related recommendations and on the importance that Kyrgyzstan attaches to the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly. Muttonen expressed appreciation for the fact that Kyrgyzstan intends to send a full delegation to the OSCE PA’s 25th Annual Session in Tbilisi, Georgia, next month.

In meetings with staff of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Muttonen was briefed on the situation in the country and heard about the Centre’s ongoing projects, notably in the spheres of early warning and conflict prevention, as well as youth-oriented and parliamentary development projects. There was also discussion on the possibility of holding future OSCE PA events in the country.

In her lecture at the OSCE Academy, she highlighted the early warning capabilities of the OSCE – including through its field operations such as the Centre in Bishkek – but regretted that sometimes political considerations hamper effective implementation of early warning mechanisms. Discussing the OSCE’s consensus-based decision-making procedure and the non-binding character of its decisions, Muttonen pointed out the OSCE is only as strong as its participating States allow it to be.

Nevertheless, she said, the OSCE’s response to the crisis in and around Ukraine has served as an example of its ability to engage in conflict prevention and peace-building. “The Ukraine conflict has shown that the OSCE is well-placed and equipped to engage in conflict prevention and support mediation and peace-building,” said the PA Vice-President. “Through its unanimous vote principle, the OSCE and its participating States can formulate strong political agreements, even if the process may be slow.”

She noted that OSCE parliamentarians have been active in supporting the Central Asian countries’ peace-building efforts, notably through fact-finding missions.

Muttonen’s speech at the OSCE Academy concluded a week-long visit to Central Asia, which included meetings with government officials, parliamentary leaders and representatives of civil society in Astana, Almaty, and Bishkek.

In her mandate as Special Representative, she is tasked, inter alia, with encouraging active participation in the PA by parliamentarians from Central Asia, as well as liaising with and supporting the work of the OSCE field operations in the region.

To watch a recent interview with the Special Representative, in which she discusses her priorities, please click here. Photos of her visit this week to Central Asia are on Flickr. Her full remarks to the OSCE Academy are available here.

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The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 6 June 2016 released a publication to assist OSCE participating States in better following up on recommendations from final reports by election observation missions.

The Handbook on the Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations – the first tool of its kind for the OSCE region – outlines the key issues when developing and implementing electoral legislation and practice, based on ODIHR’s election observation missions, in line with OSCE commitments and international standards.

"With this handbook, we hope to establish a more systematic approach to follow-up to election observation activities, that is clearer and more consistent and, at the same time, puts emphasis on the implementation of recommendations," said Michael Georg Link, Director of ODIHR. "This handbook can serve as a practical guide for ODIHR in supporting interested participating States in their efforts to follow up on electoral recommendations."

The handbook combines explanations of technical aspects related to follow-up activities with examples of ways ODIHR can help participating States in improving their electoral legislation and processes.

ODIHR developed the handbook as part of its continued efforts to improve its methodology and to increase professionalism in its election observation activities.  All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly follow up on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations.

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ULAANBAATAR, 30 June 2016 – Election day was orderly and followed a competitive campaign. This, however, did not offset the impact of late fundamental changes to election laws on Mongolia’s democratic development, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. While the June 29 parliamentary elections were highly contested and freedoms of assembly and association were respected, restrictive campaign provisions, coupled with the media’s subservience to political interests, limited impartial and comprehensive information available to voters, the statement says.

“We were pleased to see that voting took place in a calm and peaceful manner. This was a genuinely competitive contest, with high turnout and no certainty as to which party would win. We applaud the fact Mongolia is a functioning democracy,” said Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Head of the European Parliament delegation. “There were, however, some elements which cause concern, including significant last-minute changes to the election laws, which, among other things, prevented 150,000 Mongolian citizens living outside the country, including diplomats, from voting.”

The observers said the consolidation of election legislation into a new law adopted on 25 December 2015, following an inclusive process, was a positive development toward establishing a cohesive electoral framework. However, changes in May 2016 – from a mixed electoral system to a solely majoritarian one, establishing 76 single-mandate constituencies and approving their boundaries – were introduced by parliament in a process that lacked transparency, public consultation and adherence to established criteria, the observers said. This resulted in profound population discrepancies among constituencies.

A total of 498 candidates, including 69 independents, was registered in a process that was largely inclusive and provided voters with a range of political choices. Contrary to OSCE commitments and other international obligations, however, there are disproportionate restrictions on candidacy rights the statement says. While there was general confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of the voting register, the May changes to the election laws also effectively disenfranchised 150,000 citizens living abroad for the parliamentary elections.

“For an election to be meaningful, voters first have to be offered a genuine choice, and voters were given that choice here. That choice also has to be between candidates competing on a level playing field and who have equal access to independent media to explain their platforms. In this, there is still work to do,” said Ambassador Audrey Glover, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR long-term election observation mission. “Elections are about voters, and the main problem for voters was understanding the significant last-minute changes to election laws, which affected the rules of the game profoundly and raised questions about political motivation.” 

Despite undue campaign restrictions, the freedoms of assembly and association were respected and candidates were generally able to convey their messages to the electorate. At times the lines were blurred between parties and the administration at both the national and local levels, the observers said. There were multiple instances of alleged vote-buying, which resulted in a number of formal complaints and the deregistration of two candidates.

The GEC received some 50 pre-election complaints. Courts reviewed 21 cases regarding candidate registration, and the police handled more than 1,000 campaign-related complaints. Although legislation clarifies the complaints and appeals process to some extent, a general lack of formalization and transparency in the process within the election administration and the protracted handling of disputes in courts undermined the right to effective remedy.

The media offered extensive election coverage, but abandoned their journalistic role, for the most part simply granting direct access to the politicians. Paid political advertisements and free airtime overshadowed editorial content, and campaign material prepared by political parties was also included in news programming, undercutting the credibility of the media. Consequently, voters were deprived of independent and analytical reporting, the observers said.

In preparation for election day, the General Election Commission met key operational deadlines and fulfilled its mandate. At the same time, the observers said, it lacked transparency and accountability to stakeholders, diminishing trust in the credibility of the process. The testing of vote-counting machines was conducted professionally by the Commission in the presence of stakeholders and, to address concerns over the machines’ accuracy and integrity, the law was amended stipulate that up to 50 per cent of polling stations would be subject to manual recounts. The procedures stipulating the manual re-count, however, were only finalized two days prior to the elections.

All parties and coalitions complied with the 20 per cent gender quota provided for by law, and 26 per cent of contestants were women. There were, however, no women candidates in more than one-third of the constituencies. While there is only one woman member of the General Election Commission, women were better represented in lower-level election commissions. Overall, women remain underrepresented in political life.

Election day proceeded in an orderly manner in most of the country and, while the right to vote was respected, the secrecy of the vote was not consistently ensured. The observers’ assessment of the counting and tabulation of votes was a notable exception to the overall positive assessment of voting, mostly as a result of significant procedural errors or omissions. A number of civil society organizations monitored the pre-election environment, including campaign finance and the media, and issued timely statements highlighting key shortcomings.

For further information, contact:
Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +976 95 14 1635 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Tim Boden, European Parliament, +976 99 976294 or +32 473 844431, timothy.boden@europarl.europa.eu

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The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) issued a final report on 8 July 2016 on the postponed early parliamentary elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which were scheduled for 5 June 2016. The final report assesses whether the electoral process and activities conducted before the postponement of elections were in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, and with national legislation.  

While recognizing that 2015 amendments to the Electoral Code attempted to address most of the prior OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, the report notes that late changes negatively affected electoral stakeholders’ understanding of new provisions and impacted their ability to fulfil their functions. In addition, a number of previous recommendations remain to be addressed and legal inconsistencies eliminated. The report recommends conducting a complete review of the Code after consultations between all political stakeholders and relevant civil society organizations.  

As one of the priority recommendations, the report recommends the State Election Commission and the Ministry of Internal Affairs continue the process of updating the voter register through a co-ordinated effort ahead of the next elections. In order to increase the citizens’ confidence in the accuracy of voter registration, it also recommends that the process is transparent and ensures political parties and civil society access for verification.  

Noting that some measures to prevent intimidation and pressure on citizens were taken by authorities, it however mentions that a climate of intimidation persisted, attributed to a fear of retribution existing in state companies and institutions. The report recommends that authorities actively encourage citizens to report any cases of pressure and intimidation and thoroughly investigate such instances. 

While a number of aspects for the media coverage of election campaigns have been detailed in the Electoral Code, a need for continued substantial reform was highlighted. The report suggests amending the legal framework to further clarify the requirements for balanced reporting during the pre-campaign period.

Additional recommendations in the report include deciding on election-related cases within timely deadlines and harmonizing the Electoral Code with the Constitution, which provides for public hearings. It also recommends periodic review of district boundaries by an independent body to ensure the equality of the vote.

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The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on Serbia’s 24 April 2016 early parliamentary elections recommends a comprehensive review of legislation to further improve election process.  

The report, while finding the elections were efficiently administered and held in a competitive environment, spells out key areas that would benefit from such a review, including unclear rules on candidate registration, inadequate regulation of campaign finance, deficiencies and loopholes in dispute resolution mechanisms, an absence of sanctions for some violations and the lack of provisions on election observation.

The report, published on 29 July 2016, notes that, while fundamental freedoms were respected and candidates were able to campaign freely, biased media coverage, undue advantage of incumbency and a blurring of the distinction between state and party activities hindered a level playing field for contestants. To this end, the report recommends specific campaign regulations, including the introduction of ceilings on campaign expenditures and preventing the misuse of administrative resources and the abuse of office.  

In noting the absence of an effective mechanism for monitoring media conduct during the campaign, the report recommends clarifying the competences of the media regulatory body in investigating and sanctioning breaches of legislation in a timely manner.

A review of the election appeals system to guarantee an effective and timely remedy for all complaints, and particularly in cases related to electionday irregularities and election results, is also among the report’s recommendations.

Additional recommendations relate to providing unrestricted access of citizen and international observers to the entire electoral process, including voting, counting and tabulation, and enhancing the transparency of the tabulation of results.

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MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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In promoting education as a tool for conflict prevention, The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities have offered a toolkit for preservation, inspiration and dialogue, said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Astrid Thors as she opened an expert meeting on 21 April 2016 at The Hague to mark two decades of these ground-breaking Recommendations.

Thors said that the Recommendations had been instrumental in preserving minority education during times of transition and education reforms, and an inspiration in calling for a proactive approach by OSCE participating States towards a progressive yet realistic realization of minority rights in education. She said the Recommendations have also encouraged the involvement of parents and minorities in formulating policies as well as providing a framework for dialogue that is useful for both the participating States and national minorities.

Discussions during the meeting focused on reforms to the education sector and accommodating diversity, language in multilingual educational contexts, and respect for diversity and pluralism in education content.

Participants agreed on the need to further share best practices, promote broader engagement and to adapt to changing environments.

Particularly emphasized was the need for teachers to receive adequate training to be equipped to manage multilingual and multicultural classrooms and for the foundations of education systems to be solid enough to handle adversity, such as budget cuts and extensive reforms.

Acknowledging the role of education in fostering a sense of opportunity and belonging, experts said that the politicization of history is not conducive to conflict prevention. Instead, different views should be allowed as an increased level of historical knowledge and understanding will lead to historical empathy, which can in turn lead to a unifying feeling when the pain of the past is shared.

The experts agreed a set of recommendations for future work in the field of minority education rights, which will be published as follow up to this event.

The expert meeting was held a day after a HCNM-organized conference gathered 180 participants from 32 participating States to assess two decades of The Hague Recommendations. Among the participants of the conference were government officials, experts, teachers, education professionals, non-governmental actors and other local and international stakeholders active in the field of education, conflict prevention and peace-making.

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OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors visited Washington DC and New York City from 25 to 29 April 2016, where she explored opportunities to strengthen co-operation in conflict prevention, implementing early action policies and in fostering inclusion within diverse societies.

Thors met with officials from the United States and representatives of international organizations, including the United Nations Secretariat, Funds, Programmes and Agencies, as well as members of the academia, think tanks and human rights organizations.

During her visit, Thors welcomed the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of the Resolution 2282 (2016) on the Review of United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture as renewed meaningful support to conflict prevention worldwide. In discussions, it was also noted that the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the data provided during their implementation are very relevantpertinent for building just and inclusive societies.

“I am pleased with the strengthened partnerships with the wider international community achieved during my trip, in particular in thematic areas such as access to justice and education, both highly relevant to national minorities and conflict prevention,” Thors concluded.

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OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors visited Croatia from 9 to 10 May 2016. During her visit, Thors focused on promoting the effective implementation of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, in particular the provisions regarding languages and scripts; on education matters; and, on issues pertaining to national minorities and good neighbourly relations.

Concerned that marginalizing or stigmatizing national minorities poses a threat to the cohesion of society and to bilateral relations, Thors urged the systematic condemnation of discriminatory rhetoric or conduct.

“Divisive rhetoric has proven a dangerous path. The more diversity, the richer a society is, as different cultures are the shared wealth of all,” Thors said. “It is crucial to foster a sense of belonging for all members of society in order to effectively promote the integration process,” she added. Thors called for ensuring the protection of the rights of national minorities whilst avoiding polarization of the society along ethnic lines, consistent with The Ljubljana Guidelines on the Integration of Diverse Societies, published by HCNM in 2012.

The High Commissioner also emphasized the need for a renewed dialogue between all political and social actors to overcome difficulties, including those related to the protection of minority rights, in a consultative manner. In this context, Thors welcomed the thorough process of the curricular reform and reiterated her support to teaching of a common curriculum, regardless of the instruction language, as an effective way to integrate diverse societies and provide for common points of understanding.

Thors was encouraged by the prospect of further co-operation with Croatian institutions. She also welcomed the attention given to the existing joint bilateral inter-governmental commissions. “Co-ordination of efforts with neighbouring countries in this field and the active role played by all ministries under the auspices of the State Office of Croats Abroad could consolidate the shared European aspirations in the neighbourhood,” Thors noted.

The High Commissioner met a variety of key interlocutors in Zagreb. These included Zdravka Bušić, Deputy Foreign Minister; Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović, Minister of Public Administration; Predrag Šustar, Minister of Science, Education and Sports; Furio Radin, Milorad Pupovac, Ivan Radić, and Marko Sladojev, Chairperson and members of the Parliamentary Committee on Human and National Minority Rights, respectively; Aleksandar Tolnauer, President of the Council for National Minorities; Lora Vidović, Ombudsman; Branko Sočana, Director of the Government Office for Human Rights and Rights of the National Minorities; and Zvonko Milas, Head of the State Office for Croats Abroad.

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OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Astrid Thors visited Moldova from 23 to 25 May 2016 to discuss issues including the draft integration strategy developed with HCNM’s assistance to the Bureau for Interethnic Relations, relations between Chisinau and the autonomous territorial unit of Gagauzia, and the education of national minorities. The High Commissioner also visited Tiraspol.

In Chisinau, the High Commissioner discussed the draft integration strategy with Prime Minister Pavel Filip and other interlocutors and encouraged the Government to fulfil without delay its commitment to adopt the strategy. “Adoption of the integration strategy will underscore the Government’s commitment to promoting an inclusive, diverse society,” said Thors. “Even more important will be the strategy’s implementation. I am ready to assist the Bureau for Interethnic Relations in this process.”

The High Commissioner praised the parliamentary decision in November 2015 to establish a permanent joint working group between the Moldovan Parliament and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia. She discussed the functioning of the working group with its co-chairs, Member of Parliament Elena Bacalu and People’s Assembly Member Gheorghii Leichu, Speaker of Parliament Adrian Candu, and the Bashkan of Gagauzia Irina Vlah. Thors encouraged the working group to be fully utilized as the primary platform for discussing issues related to the functioning of the autonomy so that questions that may contribute to tensions can be successfully addressed.

With Minister of Education Corina Fusu, the High Commissioner discussed implementation of the Education Code and the effect of education reforms on schools teaching in minority languages, including optimization of the school network and new procedures for the selection of school directors. “Having heard from national minority representatives that education is a primary concern, I encouraged the Minister to ensure that national minorities are consulted when implementing reforms,” she said. The High Commissioner noted with interest the adoption of a new programme to improve teaching of the State language in minority-language schools, remarking that it provides an opportunity to expand multilingual education as a tool for integration.

The High Commissioner met members of the Council of Ethno-Cultural Organizations in Chisinau and with the Transdniestrian de-facto authorities and civil society representatives in Tiraspol. She visited the Theoretical Lyceum Alexandru cel Bun in Bender and learned about the practical difficulties the school faces in maintaining its operations as a Moldovan-administered school teaching in the Latin script. Thors welcomed the active efforts of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the German Chairmanship of the OSCE to find sustainable solutions for the Latin-script schools among other issues as part of the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, and noted the anticipated resumption of talks in the 5+2 format, which she discussed with Deputy Prime Minister on Reintegration Gheorghe Balan and Transdniestrian Chief Negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev.

The High Commissioner also met with Deputy Prime Minister on Social Issues Gheorghe Brega, Director General of the Bureau for Interethnic Relations Oleg Babenco, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Lilian Darii, and representatives of civil society and the international community.

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Addressing the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on 2 June 2016, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors described country engagement and highlighted the disturbing increase in hate speech.

The statement covered the High Commissioner’s activities since her last statement to the Permanent Council in November 2015. During this period Thors visited Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Moldova.

The High Commissioner expressed concern about the increase in hate speech targeting national minorities. Thors called for renewed efforts to tackle hate speech in order to prevent tensions and to promote integration with respect for diversity.

Thors also informed the Permanent Council about the work her institution is doing together with researchers to identify best practices that highlight the bridge building potential of national minorities in diverse societies.

The full statement can be found here.

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During her visit to Kosovo from 7 to 10 June 2016, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors focused on education, implementation of the framework of language rights and access to justice.

The High Commissioner continues to urge for the adoption of the Strategy for the Protection and Promotion of Language Rights, contending that it will make the implementation of legislation more efficient and improve the quality and the consistency of different language versions of legal acts. “When in place, the strategy will lead to positive results quickly,” said Thors.

The visit included Prishtinë/Priština, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Prizren, Janjevë/Janjevo and Gračanica/Gracanicë where Thors met with ministers, local authorities, media representatives, judges, university professors and students, as well as representatives of the international community. The High Commissioner was joined in several meetings by the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Jean-Claude Schlumberger.

Thors commended the recent adoption of an administrative instruction of the Ministry of Education Science and Technology, which will make it easier for members of non-majority communities to pursue studies at universities in Kosovo as it, among others issues, improves the functioning of the existing quota system.

Whilst visiting the University of Prizren, the High Commissioner expressed concern that courses taught in Turkish and Bosnian have not yet received official accreditation for the next academic year. Such courses cater to the fundamental needs of non-majority communities in Kosovo. “I encourage relevant authorities to take urgent measures so that these options remain available also the next academic year,” said Thors.

High Commissioner Thors discussed extensively with a number of stakeholders the prospective establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities as well as ways to overcome the current stalemate in the process. She heard views on the need to respect the relevant legal framework but also to meet the expectations of concerned communities, in north Kosovo as elsewhere. Thors also noted the concerns expressed by Serbs living outside Serb majority municipalities, as well as non-Serb non-majority communities, who fear they will not benefit from the process.

In several meetings Thors pointed to the need to improve access to justice for all non-majority communities, to thoroughly follow up on crimes targeting them, as well as to fully enforce their property rights. “When such crimes are investigated and prosecuted, it sends a powerful and reassuring message to non-majority communities that their rights will be effectively protected by the authorities.”

On the last day of her visit, Thors attended a class of Serbian language instruction for Kosovo Albanian officials from the municipality of Prishtinë/Priština, part of a flagship partnership project on language acquisition by municipal officials sponsored by the Office of the Language Commissioner and the HCNM, with German funding, and implemented by the ECMI Kosovo.

The visit served to underline the importance attached by the High Commissioner to language learning as a key building block for integrated societies: “Speaking more than one language is beneficial, both for the person who speaks them and for society as a whole; it is even more important for local government officials, who regularly engage with members of public, to be able to communicate with every person in their community.”

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As part of a one-year project to support the engagement of national minority youth and civil society in public discussions and public service, a roundtable discussion was held at the OSCE Mission to Moldova on 24 June 2016.

The event brought together 23 representatives of the Moldovan Parliament, the authorities of Gagauz-Yeri, civil society and the international community to discuss institutional dialogue between central and Gagauz authorities.

Independent researchers from the Comrat-based NGO Piligrim-Demo presented a recent report detailing the joint commissions formed over the years to initiate dialogue on the implementation of Gagauzia’s status as an Autonomous Territorial Unit. They outlined their recommendations for improving the functioning of the current working group established between the Parliament of Moldova and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia. 

“Such discussions on the process of dialogue between civil society, the expert community and members of the Parliament and People's Assembly are important as they provide critical input to the process and build common understanding of issues,” said Jale Sultanli, Country Manager Moldova of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). Participants from Comrat and Chisinau welcomed the opportunity to study past and present practices to strengthen co-operation between the central and regional authorities in Moldova.

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A week-long regional summer school on multilingual and multicultural education was held from 10 July to 16 July 2016 in Cholponata in Kyrgyzstan - the fifth regional summer school organized as part of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’ (HCNM) Central Asia Education Programme.

Organized by the HCNM in co-operation with Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Education and Science, UNICEF and the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan, the summer school brought together 86 participants representing education institutions of the Central Asian States and of the wider region, including teacher trainers, methodological experts, university and pilot school managers and teachers, as well as international experts.

The summer school was aimed at providing practical expert support to further develop the capacity of education authorities and practitioners within multilingual and multicultural education.

Opening the summer school, Deputy Minister of Education of Kyrgyzstan Toktobubu Ashymbaeva highlighted the important role of the teacher in multilingual education programmes.

During the week, participants discussed pre-service and in-service teacher training, as well as facilitating the implementation of multilingual education programmes. Participants also developed training materials aimed at monitoring and evaluating multilingual and multicultural education programmes. As a result, eleven thematic materials were developed with the aim to further adapt them for practical use within the education institutions of the region.

Flera Saifulina, Head of the National Education Department of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, found that the diverse forms of activities enabled participants to express their opinions, raise concerns and receive comprehensive answers from fellow experts. She also expressed satisfaction to see how education is used for the integration of societies in the Central Asian countries.

Tatiana Aderikhina, Co-ordinator of Education and Child Protection Issues at UNICEF Kazakhstan, said: “I am glad that the cooperation between HCNM and UNICEF Kyrgyzstan continues as it brings synergies and benefits the target country.”

Zaiyrbek Ergeshev, representative of the Department of the Ethnic and Religious Issues of the Presidential Administration of Kyrgyzstan, concluded that multilingual and multicultural education is an important factor for forming a civic identity.

Since 2012, the High Commissioner has been implementing the Central Asia Education Programme, aimed at promoting multilingual and multicultural education and developing bilateral and multilateral co‑operation in the region to improve the education of national minorities and promote the integration of society.

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Building capacities of Ukrainian gender equality advisors was the focus of the workshop Mainstreaming Gender into Communication, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Equal Opportunities Caucus of the Parliament of Ukraine in Lviv, western Ukraine, on 24 June 2016.

Twenty-five participants from government and civil society, representing seven regions of Ukraine, had the opportunity to learn about effective ways to include a gender perspective into their internal and external communication.

Oksana Yurynets, a Member of Ukrainian Parliament and the Equal Opportunities Caucus, said: "The workshop focused on enhancing the abilities of regional state-administration gender advisors to communicate clear, strong messages to general public. Such communication helps to create an environment where dialogue about gender equality is possible. Working on these issues is very important for Ukraine as a country where equality remains a strategic target."

Kateryna Ryabiko, Project Co-ordinator at ODIHR, said that in accordance with the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, ODIHR is tasked to promote equality between women and men throughout the OSCE area, including through education in gender awareness. "Promoting gender mainstreaming is essential to recognizing gender equality as a vital element of democratization of society."

Participants also discussed findings of the recent report by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women that urged Ukraine to intensify its efforts to overcome persistent stereotypes that are discriminatory against women and to improve national capacity for promoting gender equality.

The event was organized as part of ODIHR’s project on “Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders in Ukraine on human dimension issues”. It was launched in April 2015 with the aim of enhancing effective mechanisms for dialogue to address key human rights issues in Ukraine, in line with OSCE commitments and international standards.

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The OSCE Mission to Moldova held a training event on essential debate techniques for 37 high-school students and 7 teachers from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River on 1 to 3 July 2016 in Vadul-lui-Vodă, a town by the river. The event, which gathered students from Balti, Bender, Cahul, Ceadir-Lunga, Comrat, Parcani, Tiraspol and Vulcanesti, aimed to enhance youth engagement in civic processes at the local and national levels.

“This event has equipped me with skills that will be vital for both my professional and private life,” said Daria Bogdanova, a student from Tiraspol. “Engaging in debates is an excellent way to help us convey our thoughts more convincingly, search for compromise and exercise objectivity.”

The training event introduced students to the Karl Popper debate format that teaches students how to conduct and participate in academic debates, demonstrate leadership, make public speeches, co-operate in teams and apply critical thinking. The aim of the event was to develop students’ analytical and debate skills in order to strengthen their professional opportunities and civic engagement.

The students attending the training will apply their newly acquired knowledge and skills in a series of two debate tournaments to be held in the autumn. The training sessions and tournaments are organized as part of a one-year project implemented jointly by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Comrat-based NGO Piligrim-Demo that aims to actively engage young people, including those representing national minorities, in civic process at the local and national levels by developing their debate skills.

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TBILISI, 5 July 2016 – At the close of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 25th Annual Session in Tbilisi today, members of the Assembly elected Austrian parliamentarian Christine Muttonen as President. Muttonen has previously served as OSCE PA Vice-President and Special Representative for Central and Eastern Asia, and is Deputy Head of the Austrian Delegation to the PA.

Upon being elected, Muttonen said that she would pursue direct talks with governments and other OSCE institutions on advancing avenues for closer co-operation.

“Parliamentarians can play a very important role in securing peace and stability,” she said. “It will be my duty to make sure they have the possibility to do so.”

OSCE PA Vice-Presidents were also elected today: Vilija Aleknaite Abramikiene (Lithuania), Azay Guliyev (Azerbaijan), and Isabel Santos (Portugal) were elected to three-year terms, and Victor Dobre (Romania) was elected to a one-year term.

On Monday, the OSCE PA’s General Committee on Political Affairs and Security elected its leadership. Members of the committee re-elected Roger Wicker (United States) and Margareta Cederfelt (Sweden) Chair and Rapporteur, respectively, and Guglielmo Picchi (Italy) was elected Vice-Chair.

In the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment on Sunday, members elected Nilza Sena (Portugal) Chair and Artur Gerasymov (Ukraine) Vice-Chair. Italian parliamentarian Marietta Tidei was re-elected Rapporteur.

Members of the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions on Monday elected Ignacio Sanchez Amor (Spain) Chair and Kyriakos Kyriakou-Hadjiyanni (Cyprus) Rapporteur. Vice-Chair Ivana Dobesova (Czech Republic) was re-elected by acclamation.

In his final address as Assembly President, Finnish parliamentarian and former Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE Ilkka Kanerva noted that he has led the PA during challenging times.

“In these times, it is important to recall the validity of all ten Helsinki Final Act principles. As President, I have worked to reaffirm these principles, even as they have been put to the test lately. I believe that reviving the spirit of Helsinki requires ensuring that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly remains an Assembly that is inclusive, open and transparent,” he said.

He also highlighted his special paper distributed at the Tbilisi Annual Session entitled “Our common vision for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.”

Kanerva was elected President of the Assembly at the Baku Annual Session in July 2014, and will now serve as President Emeritus of the Assembly.

For the full text of the OSCE PA’s Declaration and resolutions adopted today in Tbilisi, as well as speeches, photos, videos and more, please visit http://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi-annual-session. Additional photos are available on the Georgian Parliament’s Flickr pages at https://www.flickr.com/photos/geoparliament  and https://www.flickr.com/photos/oscepatbilisi/.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is comprised of 323 parliamentarians from 57 countries spanning Europe, Central Asia and North America. The Assembly provides a forum for parliamentary diplomacy, monitors elections, and strengthens international co-operation to uphold commitments on political, security, economic, environmental and human rights issues.

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ALMATY, 5 July 2016 – The annual OSCE Central Asian Youth Network (CAYN) forum and seminar began today in Almaty.

The three-day event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana for some 35 university students and CAYN alumni from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongolia. Representatives of the OSCE and expert speakers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway and the Russian Federation are also taking part.

The topic of this year’s forum “Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security” was selected to reflect the priorities of Germany’s 2016 OSCE Chairmanship. The participants will discuss the key challenges for comprehensive security in Central Asia and beyond, and explore ways to address them in their communities and together with co-operation from neighbouring countries. They will also address the issue of civil society’s role in promoting fundamental freedoms and human rights, and re-examine co-operation in Central Asia on its way to integration with a special emphasis on connectivity and multilateral co-operation.

“Through CAYN we hope that when you begin to take responsibility for your communities and your countries you can say with confidence that you have learned about key security challenges in the region,” said Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana György Szabó. “Moreover, you have heard perspectives from some of the best minds in the region and experts from around the world on how to address them.”

Renate Schimkoreit, Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany to Almaty presented the priorities of the German OSCE Chairmanship. Pal Dunay, Director of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and Milena Stošić, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office on Youth and Security, will focus on engaging youth in promoting OSCE values and principles and in addressing security challenges and threats in the wider region. Special attention will be paid to youth involvement in the OSCE's 'United in Countering Violent Extremism' campaign.

The forum will be followed by training workshops focused on using technology for governance, civil society development, networking and data utilization. The event will culminate with an outdoor exercise to promote team building.

Nurlan Dulatbekov, a Member of Kazakhstan’s Parliament spoke about the role of promoting social security as part of national and regional security as well as initiatives to counter violent extremism through engaging youth at the grassroots level.

The event is part of the Office’s efforts to enhance young people’s understanding of contemporary security threats and challenges and to explain the OSCE’s role in addressing them.

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The OSCE Office in Tajikistan on 24 July 2016 organized the first regional forum for promoting women’s political participation in Khujand, with the aim of increasing community outreach, engaging women leaders in the region and supporting women’s empowerment in political and public life.

The forum brought together 40 experts from political parties, local authorities, international organizations and civil society members, and is designed as a platform for dialogue between women politicians and communities. They will work to motivate young girls who aspire to become leaders or hold decision-making positions in public life, and aim to gain support from communities and local authorities for the advancement of women in political life.

“Our project aims to build strong support for women leaders, to tackle gender stereotypes, to surface and articulate the aspirations, choices and skills of women and girls of Tajikistan, so that they can realize their full potential in public and political life,” said Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, Head of the Democratization Unit at the OSCE Office. 

Shanjeev Thiruchelvam, OSCE Field Officer in Khujand, said: “Both male and female community leaders, politicians and civil society representatives have expressed keen interest in the continued work of the Sughd Women's Forum, which recognizes, and aims to provide opportunities to develop female leadership in Sughd public life.”

Similar forums are to be organized across the country. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a significant increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region on 30 July compared to 29 July. A decrease in the number of recorded violations was noted on 31 July, though this figure was still higher than that recorded on 29 July. The SMM recorded a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations observed in Luhansk on 30 July compared to the day before. No violations were recorded on 31 July. Two SMM unmanned aerial vehicles came under small-arms fire on 30 July. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government on five occasions, and faced conditional access on two occasions. It faced freedom-of-movement restrictions, the majority of which were in areas not under government control.

The SMM recorded an increased number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to 29 July[1]. Fewer ceasefire violations were recorded on 31 July compared to the day before but the number of recorded ceasefire violations remained high.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the night of 29 July, the SMM recorded at least 50 undetermined explosions approximately 10km north.

On the evening of 29 July, while in government-controlled Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard nine explosions 1-2km east-south-east and three undetermined explosions (one assessed as from a mortar) 2-3km south-south-east and east-north-east of its position.

On 30 July positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and uncountable, overlapping bursts of heavy machine gun-fire 1-7km west and north-west of its position over a 40-minute period. Later, in the afternoon, the SMM recorded a salvo of approximately 20 outgoing Grad rockets, 51 undetermined explosions, approximately 40 mortar impacts; uncountable, overlapping heavy-machine gun and small-arms bursts in areas 2-6km west-south-west, west-north-west, west, and north-west of its position over approximately two and a half hours.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) throughout the day on 30 July, the SMM heard, over a two and a half-hour period, four undetermined explosions, two mortar impacts (one 120mm and one 82mm) and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-5km south and south-east of its position. Two outgoing explosions caused by 122mm artillery were also heard 3-4km south-east of the SMM’s position in Avdiivka.

While at Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk) on 30 July, the SMM saw and heard four airbursts assessed as recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire, heard 10 outgoing explosions of armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire and bursts of heavy-machine gun and small-arms fire all 2-3km east and east-south-east of its position.

On 30 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard two 82mm mortar impacts 3-4km north-west. The SMM also saw one 120mm mortar airburst, heard five undetermined explosions, 14 shots of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGL) fire and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1–3km north-west, north-north-west and north of its position. A short time later the SMM heard 39 undetermined explosions, 20 shots of automatic-grenade-launcher fire and heavy machine gun-fire, all 7–10km west and north-east of its position.

Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) on the morning of 30 July, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 4-8km north, north-west and north-north-east of its position. In the afternoon the SMM heard 171 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km north-north-east of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city on the night of 30-31 July, the SMM heard 138 explosions (47 assessed as outgoing artillery explosions, 91 undetermined) all 5-15km west, west-north-west, north-west, north and north-north-east of its position.

On the same night the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded multiple bursts of tracer fire in areas to the north-east. At 21:10 the camera recorded 25-27 tracer rounds fired from south-south-west to north-north-east; two undetermined explosions; 23-25 tracer rounds fired from south-west to north-east, and 17-19 tracer rounds fired from north-west to north-east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata throughout the day of 31 July the SMM heard 241 undetermined explosions, many bursts of heavy machine gun-fire and small-arms fire, all 1-6km west-south-west and west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka on 31 July the SMM heard five undetermined explosions south-south-east.

While conducting monitoring with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) on 30 July, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire immediately followed by two bursts of small-arms fire 300-400m north-east of the SMM’s position.* The SMM assessed the fire as likely directed at its UAV, which was immediately landed. No damage was observed.

Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station throughout the day of 31 July the SMM heard 44 undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts of small-arms fire all 1-8km south-south-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations on 30 July compared to 29 July. The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on 31 July.

Positioned in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) on the night of 30 July, the SMM heard a total of 15 outgoing rounds followed by 15 impacts assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) fire. The rounds were fired from 3.5-4km south (from the direction of the disused railway bridge and/or pedestrian bridge) and impacted 4-5.7km south of the SMM’s position.

While flying a UAV over government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) on 30 July the SMM heard small-arms fire and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire approximately 600-700 metres north-east of its position, in the area of the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which had not sustained damage. The SMM phoned a Ukrainian officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) who said that Ukrainian Armed Forces had fired at the UAV.

On 29 July the SMM conducted crater analysis in Donetsk city’s Kuibyshevskyi district in the presence of the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the JCCC. Five metres in front of a house the SMM saw one large crater that had been filled in with debris, making analysis impossible. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to nearby fences and a gas pipeline, which was undergoing repair. Residents reported that a shell had hit at 1:20 on 29 July and that no one had been injured. A second crater was in the garden within two metres of a house. The SMM saw that the walls surrounding the crater had been penetrated with shrapnel and that the south-west facing wall near the crater was demolished. Based on size, and the presence of shrapnel, the SMM assessed the crater as caused by an artillery round of at least 122mm; the direction of fire could not be assessed. According to residents, the impact occurred at approximately 2:00 on 29 July and no one was injured.

The SMM, accompanied by Russian Federation officers from the JCCC, observed two fresh craters in a residential street in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km north-west of Donetsk). Based on analysis and a tail fin found at the site, the SMM assessed the craters as caused by 120mm mortars fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to walls and shattered windows. Residents said that shells had struck at 1:30 on 29 July and that no one was injured.

The SMM observed two houses damaged by shelling in Avdiivka that an accompanying Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC representative said had taken place on 30 July. A fresh crater was seen a few meters from a house. The walls, roofs and windows of two nearby houses were badly damaged by shrapnel. An electricity pole had been snapped in half and had fallen into a yard of one of the houses. No injuries were reported. The residents of the house - a couple aged in their 70s - said that this was the second time their house had been shelled since May. They added that shelling starts every day at 17:00 and lasts until 5:00.

The SMM, following up on JCCC reports of shelling in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) observed four fresh craters and damage to houses in a residential area. One crater was situated in the middle of the street and another in the garden of a house, with shrapnel damage evident to the wall and fence of two houses. One house had broken windows. Two shells had landed away from houses, causing little damage. The SMM were told of another shell that had landed in tall grass which the SMM could not observe because of security concerns. Based on analysis of four craters the SMM assessed that they were caused by 82mm mortars fired from an easterly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling happened on 29 July and that no one was injured.

On 31 July in the Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed a wounded man being taken by ambulance to Horlivka general hospital. According to ambulance personnel, he had been struck by shrapnel from an automatic grenade launcher while in his garden.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines an SMM UAV observed two tanks and other military-type vehicles in a compound near the railway station in the centre of “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 26 July of a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) in the south-western suburbs of “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites and observed that three continued to be abandoned as of 11 February, 14 and 17 March 2016 respectively, with 27 tanks (16 T-72, 11 T-64) and 19 mortars (13 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, and six 2B11 Sani, 120mm) missing. Thirty tanks (T-64), missing from one site as of 19 March 2016, continued to be absent. Additional weapons were observed at this site.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and nine MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm). Six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) first observed missing on 1 May 2016 continued to be absent from one area. Another area was abandoned as it had been since 1 May 2016 with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) missing. Two MLRS (BM 21 Grad, 122mm) continued to be missing from one site, as first reported on 5 April 2015. One site continued to be observed as abandoned as of 22 April 2016, with all previously recorded 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) missing. The SMM was unable to visit one site as a newly constructed earth barrier blocked the road.*

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM saw three tanks (T-64s) in a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 26 July of: 34 tanks, 20 artillery pieces (two self-propelled, 18 towed) in areas near “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 28 July of a jamming communication station, assessed as an R-330ZH Zhytel system, hidden among trees in “DPR”-controlled Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk); three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-2) near government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk); two IFVs (one BMP-2, one BMP-1-Ksh) in government-controlled Svitlychne (48km north-west of Luhansk); one stationary armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) near government-controlled Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk); two BMP-2 parked between houses near government-controlled Stanytsia-Luhanska and one stationary BMP-2 near government-controlled Bolotene (21km east of Luhansk). An SMM UAV observed at least eight BMP, three armoured tracked vehicles (MT-LB), one MT-LB engineering variant and one BTR in a compound close to the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a parade of five military-style and 12 civilian vehicles, all of which carried Ukrainian flags while the lead vehicle also carried a red and black flag. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM the parade marked the anniversary of the “liberation of Krasnohorivka from the “DPR””.

The SMM monitored four border areas not controlled by the Government, visiting one area twice. At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) for a total of 30 minutes on 29 July, the SMM observed 36 vehicles and three buses with Ukrainian number plates, a covered commercial truck with Belarus plates and five vehicles with Russian plates waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. Two covered trucks and a bus, all with Ukrainian number plates, entered Ukraine. The SMM returned to the border crossing point on 31 July and had their names, ID numbers taken by an “LPR” member.* Over 50 minutes of monitoring the SMM saw 52 cars, six with Russian Federation number plates, 46 with Ukrainian plates and four covered commercial trucks with Ukrainian plates waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. Four cars were observed entering Ukraine in this period. At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed the following over a 25-minute period: three covered trucks and 28 cars with Ukrainian number plates, one minibus with Russian plates (travelling from Luhansk to Rostov) and one minibus (travelling from Rovenky to Rostov); two buses with Ukrainian plates leaving Ukraine; and eight cars with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation plates entering Ukraine. At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) an “LPR” member took the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors and the plate numbers of vehicles. Over a total of 20 minutes of observation, the SMM saw 29 vehicles (all had Ukrainian plates bar one with a Russian plate) and five motorbikes, all with Ukrainian plates, crossing into the Russian Federation. Four pedestrians were seen entering the Russian Federation while one entered Ukraine. At the border crossing point near “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two trucks and six cars waiting to cross east into the Russian Federation during ten minutes of monitoring.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 29 July, armed “LPR” members at the “LPR” forward position on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge denied the SMM passage from government-controlled to “LPR”-controlled areas. The JCCC was informed.
• On 29 July, an armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and took the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors. The SMM was allowed to proceed. Passing the “LPR” forward position on the bridge, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that they could not travel from government-controlled areas towards “LPR”-controlled areas .
• On 31 July armed “LPR” members at the same position on Stanytsia Luhanska bridge denied the SMM further passage from government-controlled to “LPR”-controlled areas. The JCCC was informed.
• On 31 July armed “DPR” members - citing security concerns - turned the SMM away from a checkpoint close to Horlivka after a detonation was heard in the area.
• On 31 July a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier stopped the SMM near government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) and prevented the SMM from proceeding to Svitlodarsk. The JCCC was informed.
• On 31 July Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from monitoring the area along the railway line near Lomonosova Street in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), citing demining work in the area.
• On 31 July a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that he would shoot down an SMM UAV if it was launched near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). He claimed not to have received the information the SMM had passed to the JCCC regarding the flight. The JCCC was informed.
• On 31 July the SMM was unable to visit a Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons storage site as a newly constructed earth barrier blocked the road.

Delayed access:

• On 30 July an armed “DPR” member at a weapons storage site told the SMM to retreat ten steps while he sought approval for the SMM’s access. While saying this, he loaded his rifle and refused SMM requests to use their mobile phones, return to their vehicles, or to return later. After 15 minutes, another “DPR” member arrived and confirmed the SMM’s access.

Conditional access:

• On 30 July at a checkpoint near Horlivka, armed “DPR” members searched two SMM vehicles.
• On 30 July an armed “LPR” member at the border crossing point near Sievernyi took the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors.
• On 31 July an armed “LPR” member at the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne took the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors.

Other restrictions:

• On 30 July, an SMM UAV was targeted with small-arms fire over government-controlled Lobacheve.
• On 30 July, an SMM UAV was targeted with small-arms fire over “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve.

[1 Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 27 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 1 August compared to both 30 and 31 July, particularly with regard to explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations than on 30 and 31 July combined. The SMM followed up on reports of casualties and analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. The Mission noted mines and mine hazard signs. The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM facilitated repairs to essential infrastructure on both sides of the contact line in Shchastia, Krasnyi Lyman and Zolote. The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and its access was restricted at one*.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to both 30 and 31 July with no violations recorded during the night by the SMM forward patrol base in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk)[1].

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in the night hours of 31 July, the SMM heard 79 undetermined explosions, at a range of 3 to 15km north and north-west of its location.

In the area of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk), in the evening hours of 31 July the SMM recorded 24 undetermined explosions, at a range of 2 to 7km north-north west of its location within a 70 minute period. Earlier in the evening, positioned 7km north of Horlivka, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds 0.5-0.8km north of its position.

In the evening hours of 31 July, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions north-east of its location in Mariupol city (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk). On the same night the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 20:36 and 22:59, facing north-east and north, recorded 21 undetermined explosions, seven rocket-assisted projectiles, and 21 bursts of direct heavy-machine gun tracer fire all from west to east. Later, the camera recorded one burst of direct tracer fire from east to west as well as one unidentified indirect ballistic projectile fired from east to north-west, and two impacts of an unknown projectile at an undetermined distance.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) during the entire day on 1 August, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations on 1 August compared to 30 and 31 July combined.

Whilst in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) on the night of 31 July, in an hour around midnight, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions as well as small-arms and machine-gun fire 3-5km south-south-west of its location. In the same time period, the SMM also heard three explosions assessed as outgoing, one of which it assessed as a cannon round (23mm or 30mm), as well as machine-gun bursts and small-arms shots 3.5km south-west of its location. Additionally, the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions and machine-gun bursts 10 - 14km south-east of its location.

Within 10 minutes in the morning, while positioned at the northern outskirts of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard three explosions assessed as impacts of an unknown projectile 10-15km north-west of its position.

The SMM followed-up on reports of casualties and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM spoke to a doctor on duty at the hospital who said that one Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier had received minor injuries caused by an explosive device and had been brought to the clinic on the night of 31 July. The physician added that he had not been seriously injured and had already been transferred to another hospital. In government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM talked to a man (50 years old) who had been injured in the village as a result of a booby-trap explosion. According to him, he and another man who had also been injured were planning to transport some watermelons to their relatives on the other side of the Siverskyi Donets river and accidentally moved a boat on the river bank, which turned out to be booby-trapped. The SMM saw the man had injuries to his head, torso and legs.

The SMM observed the aftermath of shelling in a residential area, a 250m-by-250m block at the northern outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “DPR” members. According to residents, the shelling occurred around 22:00 on 31 July. The SMM saw a large volume of blood at a second-floor apartment, which was destroyed by an impact and a man had reportedly been killed. In the same area, the SMM analysed two fresh craters 50m-apart it assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a west-north-westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to surrounding buildings, cars and trees at a 50m radius and a first floor apartment in the same building destroyed, the roof had been penetrated and a balcony had been destroyed. The SMM also saw overhead cables had been damaged, while gas pipes were being repaired by local services. At the Yasynuvata central hospital, the SMM confirmed the death of a man (51 years old) from the second-floor apartment on the night of 31 July and saw that he had received multiple penetrating injuries to his head, chest and stomach. The SMM did not observe armed presence in the area.

The SMM, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC and armed “DPR” members, observed three impact sites in close proximity (100m-by-100m area) in Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city. No casualties were reported. According to residents, shelling had started about 22:00 on 31 July and continued through the night of 1 August. The SMM analysed one fresh crater, which it assessed as caused by a 122mm or larger calibre artillery round fired from a west-north-westerly direction. Shrapnel had lacerated and penetrated a metal fence and residential building walls in the vicinity. The SMM also observed damage assessed as resulting from a 122mm artillery round striking the roof of a detached house and exploding. The roof had partially collapsed and surrounding walls and foliage were shrapnel lacerated. Finally, the SMM observed the completely destroyed and still burning wing of a residential building which it assessed as having been struck by a 152mm artillery round (direction of fire could not be determined). One of the owners of the house claimed that, as a result of the blast wave, he had become partially deaf in his left ear. The SMM did not observe armed presence in the area.

Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces position south-east of government-controlled Orikhove (56km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the area during the previous night. The SMM analysed two fresh craters 200-300m from the position and assessed them as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, fired from an easterly direction. No casualties or material damage were reported. At the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets river, in the area of the “LPR” forward position, some 10-20 meters away from the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw four fresh craters 20-30 centimetres in diameter on the side of the road. An armed “LPR” member present said that the shelling had occurred in the night hours of 31 July and nobody had been injured.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM saw in government-controlled areas: two infantry fighting vehicles (one BMP-2, one BMP-1-Ksh) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (ARV; BRDM-2) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); one stationary ARV (BRDM-2) near Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk); three stationary armoured personnel carriers (BTR) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines. In areas controlled by the “DPR” the SMM saw, 2km south of “DPR”-controlled Styla (34km south of Donetsk), one mine attached to a tree, approximately 2-2.5m above the ground. Previously, the SMM had observed three mines in the same area (see SMM Daily Report 16 March 2016). In government-controlled areas, at the western outskirts of Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a Ukrainian State Emergency Services team visually inspecting for mines an area on the side of the road.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. In government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk), in the area of the local cemetery the SMM saw a new improvised mine hazard sign (a white plastic board reading “Welcome on” in English and underneath it “Mines” in Russian and a white plastic board with red letters reading “Mines” in Russian). The SMM spoke to two different groups of residents (men and women, about 60 years old) who said that there had been a fire in the cemetery, which they had extinguished, but were afterward warned for the first time by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel not to enter the cemetery because the area was mined.  The SMM also observed a new mine hazard sign (dark green metal board reading “Mines” in red Cyrillic letters) on the northern side of the road approximately 1km east of “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. The SMM monitored the cleaning of a water pump zone at the Shchastia power plant; repairs to the water pipes in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) as well as repair works on electrical power lines in Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government, and was restricted in its freedom of movement at one of them.* At the “LPR”-controlled Novoborovytsi pedestrian border crossing point (79km south of Luhansk), the SMM, within 30 minutes, saw no people crossing the border in either direction and again observed no armed “LPR”-members present (see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2016). At the “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi border crossing point, the SMM noted a significant increase in traffic flow. The SMM saw two parked covered cargo trucks, both with Ukrainian plates. The SMM also observed six full passenger buses, all with Ukrainian plates (bearing signs reading: ‘Luhansk – Moscow’, ‘Moscow – Horlivka’, ‘Alchevsk – Yalta’, ‘Luhansk – Krasnodar’ and ‘Luhansk – Rostov’) queuing to enter the Russian Federation. The SMM saw 37 civilian cars (26 with Ukrainian licence plates and 11 with Russian Federation plates). Ten cars with Ukrainian plates were parked by the side of the road. Within 40 minutes the SMM saw five cars cross into the Russian Federation, but no buses or trucks. An armed “LPR” member then told the SMM to leave.*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed man at the “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi border crossing point (85km south-east of Luhansk) asked the SMM to show its patrol plan. The SMM did not comply and the armed man told it to leave the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 28 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.

On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.

In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.

On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.

In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.

In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.

The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.

In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*

The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.

The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.

The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Lyuksemburg, “DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), and prevented the SMM from proceeding further east. The SMM took an alternative route to Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Four armed “LPR” members in two vehicles stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member threatened one of SMM’s monitors with “arrest”, unless the SMM complied with their instruction not to stop at a pedestrian path leading to the railway tracks. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men limited the SMM’s access to a weapons holding area. The gate was locked and the SMM was informed that the guard with the key was unavailable. The armed “DPR” members present only allowed two monitors and a language assistant to climb the wall (1.2m) in order to record the serial numbers of the designated weapons. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). He informed his superior and only allowed the SMM to proceed after noting down monitors’ names and IDs.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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WARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.

“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.

Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.

“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to  act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.

On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.

In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.

On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.

In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.

In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.

The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.

In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*

The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.

The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.

The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Lyuksemburg, “DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), and prevented the SMM from proceeding further east. The SMM took an alternative route to Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Four armed “LPR” members in two vehicles stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member threatened one of SMM’s monitors with “arrest”, unless the SMM complied with their instruction not to stop at a pedestrian path leading to the railway tracks. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men limited the SMM’s access to a weapons holding area. The gate was locked and the SMM was informed that the guard with the key was unavailable. The armed “DPR” members present only allowed two monitors and a language assistant to climb the wall (1.2m) in order to record the serial numbers of the designated weapons. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). He informed his superior and only allowed the SMM to proceed after noting down monitors’ names and IDs.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016

Just saw this in-store near the checkouts when picking up something else. Seems like good price, may be available in other stores as well. Bought one, not sure where I will be using it yet but can figure that out later!

Stock checker report

Just bought one of these and thought I'd share
I paid A$53.29 including GST shipped

Power Train P60 M-ATX Portable Computer Case ITX Motherboard ATX/SFX Power Supply Support U3 Type-C Desktop MINI Small Chassis

Original Coupon Deal

15% off selected (looks like most) Ubiquiti products as part of early Black Friday deals.

Highlighted in the promo email:

• Ubiquiti UniFi Dream Router - All-in-one WiFi 6 router USG 2x PoE Output - $390.15
• Ubiquiti UniFi G5 Turret Ultra Tamper-resistant IK04 IP66 Weatherproof 2K HD PoE Camera - $168.30
• Ubiquiti UniFi U6+ WiFi 6 Dual-Band 2x2 Access Point (No PoE Injector) - $147.9
• Ubiquiti UDM SE Dream Machine Special Edition 8x Gbe PoE RJ45 Ports 3.5inch HDD Bay - $798.15
• Ubiquiti UniFi Protect G4 Doorbell Pro PoE Kit with Chime - $632.40
• Ubiquiti UniFi WiFi 7 U7-Pro Access Point 9.3 Gbps Over-the-air Speed PoE+ Powered - $271.15

Hi Tec Stinger Men's Comfortable Waterproof Shoes $39.95 + Shipping @ Brand House Direct

$39.95 + shipping when you apply coupon code: STING at checkout

2nd Deal: BlueAnt X1i Portable 14-Watt Bluetooth Speaker – Crimson Red for $59
Code POP10 to claim $10 off.
https://www.popphones.com.au/shop/blueant-x1i-portable-14-wa…

BlueAnt X4 Portable 50-Watt Bluetooth Party Speaker – White

LIGHT UP YOUR PARTY
With a range of vivid colors to brighten any room, the X4 takes the party to another level with lights that groove in time to the music.

PAIR 100 SPEAKERS TOGETHER
Join in the fun and the party keeps getting bigger as you add your music to the mix. Connect up to 100 speakers in party mode.

5 LED MODES
Dance the night away to up to 5 light shows.

UNLEASH YOUR INNER ROCKSTAR
The X4 comes with a bonus microphone so you can unleash your inner rockstar or channel the diva inside you.

MAKE A SPLASH
The X4 is splashproof and the range of colors helps make your X4 a personal statement.

BOOST THE BASS
To increase the intensity, simply press the Bass Boost button for out-of-this-world sound.

POWER UP
The X4 includes a built-in power bank so you can keep your phone topped up as you rock out.

What’s In The Box
I x X4 Party Speaker
I x Rapid Charger
I x Bonus Microphone
I x Product Manual

Very nice price drop for these tissues. Works out to be $1.35 per box. Enjoy!

• Made with 3 ply tissue for extra thickness. Kind to noses and perfect for make-up removal, mopping up small spills and wiping away tears
• Quilton Hypo-allergenic tissues are dermatologically tested to be extra gentle on sensitive skin
• Created with a unique combination of strength and softness
• Country of Origin: Australia
• Come in a variety of designs ( actual box design may vary from the ones shown here)
• Manufactured using FSC certified forest resources – your guarantee you are supporting forest sustainability for future generations

One day only.
They may look u up on the system to verify or u can show the latest newsletter envelope that has the deal listed on cover.
Exclusions: cards, magazines, gift cards, oos items, laybuys, holds, reservations, other offers.
Discount is off rrp.
Wearing a MAGA cap may invalidate the deal too lol.

Note it seems they may be stopping newsletter post mailouts from now on.

Readings are usually more expensive than Amazon so check Amazon prices before buying but it’s good to support local stores and get your book on the spot with knowledgeable service.

I got a notification form dekudeals and I think its a great deal https://www.dekudeals.com/items/mortal-kombat11-ultimate

First time poster, so please take it easy on me if ive done any mistakes with the post.

Just bought these from WestCoast Hifi & customer service been prompt and awesome. I have put some features below which i pulled from the website but I don’t think you can go wrong.

Key Features

• 2-way 9.2 mm Dynamic Drive Unit with Balanced Armature
• Up to 5 hours battery for earbuds. Additional 16 hours from charging case
• True 24-bit audio connection with Adaptive Active Noise Cancelling
• Bluetooth 5.0 with aptX™ Adaptive technology
• Audio retransmission from charging case

Cheapest I believe by a long way. Similar price to the xe75 set

Found this offer in my Flybuys account, so you might be targeted.

3 recipes for 4 people weekly plan works out to be $5.4 for the first box.

QuiteLike is a subscription service like HelloFresh. So make sure to cancel the subscription after ordering your first box.

Collect up to 15,000 bonus points when you join QuiteLike.1

Cooking is rewarding in many ways, from the delight of creating delicious flavours to the joy of feeding loved ones. QuiteLike has partnered with Flybuys to make cooking even more rewarding.

Just activate this offer and order your first QuiteLike box by Tue 19 Nov 2024 to collect bonus points based on the value of your order.

Collect 5,000 bonus points for plans under $98 per week (excluding delivery).
Collect 7,500 bonus points for plans with a price of $98-$134 per week (excluding delivery).
Collect 15,000 bonus points for plans above $134 per week (excluding delivery).

Plus, save up to $210 off your first 5 boxes, use the discount code FLYBUYS at the QuiteLike checkout at quitelike.com.

Offer valid Wed 06 Nov until Tue 19 Nov 2024.
Offer redeemable once to new QuiteLike members only.
Flybuys number must be provided at the time of purchase.
QuiteLike is a weekly meal subscription service that remains effective until cancelled by you. Subscription may be paused or cancelled at any time. QuiteLike currently deliver to a range of suburbs in NSW, VIC, ACT and QLD.

Terms and Conditions
1 Collect up to 15,000 Flybuys bonus points when you purchase your first QuiteLike box
Offer available on your first order placed with QuiteLike between Wed 06 Nov to Tue 19 Nov 2024 (Offer Period). Offer valid for new, first time QuiteLike customers only. Bonus points are calculated as set out below depending on the value of your order. To collect points, enter your Flybuys number online at the checkout at the time of purchase or in your QuiteLike account profile before you place your order. Only one Flybuys account can be linked to each QuiteLike profile. To qualify for this offer you must be a Flybuys member, activate this offer and place your first order with Quitelike online at quitelike.com during the Offer Period. Offer is redeemable once per Flybuys account. QuiteLike may not be available in your area. QuiteLike currently deliver to a range of suburbs in NSW, VIC, ACT and QLD. You can check if QuiteLike can deliver to your area by entering your postcode at www.quitelike.com/plan. Bonus points will be awarded to your Flybuys account 28 business after purchasing your first QuiteLike box. You have been specifically selected for this offer and it is not transferable.

Bonus points are awarded based on the value of your first QuiteLike order:
For plans priced under $98 per week (excluding delivery), you will receive 5,000 Flybuys bonus points.
For plans with a price of $98-$134 (excluding delivery), you will receive 7,500 Flybuys bonus points.
For plans with a price of $134 and above (excluding delivery), you will receive 15,000 Flybuys bonus points.

Points are awarded based on meal kit plan size not the price at checkout. Offer valid with FLYBUYS discount promo code offer.

Terms and Conditions of QuiteLike apply and can be viewed at quitelike.com.
QuiteLike is a weekly subscription service that remains effective until cancelled by you. Subscription may be paused or cancelled at any time. QuiteLike currently deliver to a range of suburbs in NSW, VIC, ACT and QLD. You can check if QuiteLike can deliver to your area by entering your postcode at www.quitelike.com/plan.

To collect and redeem Flybuys points you must be a current Flybuys member. Flybuys' privacy policy applies. Standard Flybuys terms and conditions apply and are available at flybuys.com.au.
You have been specifically selected for this offer and it is not transferable.

The discount code (FLYBUYS) applies the following discount.
40% Off Box 1 + Free Delivery
35% Off Box 2
25% Off Box 3
20% Off Box 4
10% Off Box 5
It's really worth it only for Box 1. You get a progressively smaller discount and have to pay delivery fees on the next 4 Boxes.

3 recipes per week for 4 people seems to be the sweet spot as it makes the plan exactly $134. Pay $80.4 after applying the discount code (FLYBUYS) and collect 15,000 flybuys points equivalent to $75. Total out of pocket cost works out to be $80.4 - $75 = $5.4

Not the cheapest, but may be of interest to some.

Whittakers Peanut Slab Bar 50g (Pack of 50) also available for the same price.

I've been eyeing these for a while. Not an all-time low (which was $349 back in Sep 2023) however this is the lowest it's been in a year.

Unsure if these will get even cheaper during Black Friday deals, but personally I'm in no rush and I'll probably wait it out and see before pulling the trigger. Great price for those who want to grab a pair now.

The Technics AZ80s are pretty underrated IMO - been watching many "middle end" earbud reviews (the real top of the line stuff is in a whole other league) and these are very competitive against all the other big name earbuds out there (Bose QC2, Sony XM5, Jabra Elite, Nothing Ear, AirPods Pro if you are on iOS, etc.).

"When a soldier dies, you suck it up." Briarcliff Ent. has unveiled an official trailer for a movie called My Dead Friend Zoe, marking the feature directorial debut of filmmaker Kyle Hausmann-Stokes (who was in the US Army). A fresh new take on veterans. This initially premiered at the 2024 SXSW Film Festival earlier this year, where it won the Audience Award in the Narrative Spotlight section. You can tell why from this trailer! Engaged in a mysterious relationship with her dead best friend from the Army, a female Afghanistan veteran comes head to head with her Vietnam vet grandfather while at the family's ancestral lake house. At its core, this is about a complicated friendship, a divided family and the complex ways in which we process grief. This unique indie film stars Sonequa Martin-Green as Merit, Natalie Morales as Zoe, along with Ed Harris, Morgan Freeman, Utkarsh Ambudkar, and Gloria Reuben. This is an impressively dark comedy about grief and veterans, following her around as she deals with a lingering ghost of her best friend. This looks VERY smart and clever, which is what cinema really should be all about these days. Take a look. Here's the official trailer […]