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Japan’s presence in the Arctic is not new, but it has been limited mostly to scientific research. Japan has stepped up its engagement after it gained observer status to the Arctic Council and appointed its first Arctic ambassador in 2013. However, Japan has yet to flesh out a full-blown Arctic strategy that identifies the range of its national interests in the polar region and actionable strategies to achieve them. The Arctic offers Japan an opportunity to expand cooperation with the United States in an uncharted area, poses hard questions on how to interact with Russia in the post-Ukraine era, and creates the interesting proposition of whether China and Japan can cooperate in articulating the views of non-Arctic states.

On October 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion on what components should be included in Japan’s Arctic strategy, ranging from resource development, environmental preservation, and scientific research, to securing access to expanding shipping lanes and managing a complex diplomatic chessboard. 

Join the conversation on Twitter using #JapanArctic

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• Charting Japan's Arctic strategy

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The Center for Neighborhood Technology, a Chicago-area nonprofit promoting urban sustainability, has a long-run vision of a Chicagoland building energy-efficiency system, which, if started up quickly, would help to effectively deploy relevant stimulus dollars in the near-term. Its activities focus on ramping up existing weatherization and retrofit programs in the short-term to take best advantage of current stimulus dollars while at the same time building the institutional capacity to launch and sustain a new regional initiative aimed at coordinating energy efficiency information, financing, and service delivery for the seven-county region over the long-term.

The Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT) is using ARRA and other resources to work toward a long-run vision of a sustainable regional energy efficiency system. CNT envisions a centrally-coordinated initiative— either through a new stand-alone entity or a formalized network—to manage the financing, marketing, performance monitoring and certification, information provision, supply chain development, and customer assistance required to efficiently scale up the delivery of retrofit services for all types of buildings across the Chicago region.

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Bringing together the five counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania, the nonprofit Metropolitan Caucus, a new regional consortium there, is promoting a joint regional application for ARRA’s competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant dollars. Its four-part proposal, which will add and refine partners and programs over time, draws on the collaboration of multiple regional institutions to establish and operate a loan fund for green building and retrofits; support clean energy technology deployment; assist local governments with energy efficiency plans; and measure the energy performance of public facilities.

The newly created Metropolitan Caucus of southeastern Pennsylvania is leading the bold new regional energy efficiency strategy targeting for the competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants (EECBG) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Unprecedented for the region, the Metropolitan Caucus has brought together five area counties—Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia—to make the most of the stimulus opportunity by coordinating their plans, goals, and assets to achieve maximum regional benefit. Their proposed joint EECBG competitive application for roughly $35 million calls for financing construction and retrofits, supporting clean energy companies, measuring building energy performance, and assisting local governments in implementing various sustainability solutions. To carry out each of these activities, the caucus intends to engage in broad cross-sector collaboration to leverage the strengths and unique assets of regional educational institutions, key nonprofits, and planning agencies.

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Nearly eight years after a U.S.-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime, Afghanistan remains far from stable. As President Barack Obama considers alternatives to increasing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, his administration’s new counternarcotics strategy meshes well with counterinsurgency and state-building efforts in the country. It is a welcome break from previous ineffective and counterproductive policies. The effectiveness of the policy with respect to counternarcotics, counterinsurgency and state-building, however, will depend on the operationalization of the strategy. The details are not yet clear, but the strategy potentially faces many pitfalls.

Efforts to bankrupt the Taliban through eradication are futile and counterproductive since they cement the bonds between the population and the Taliban. But interdiction is very unlikely to bankrupt the Taliban either. Security needs to come first before any counternarcotics policy has a chance of being effective. Counterinsurgent forces can prevail against the Taliban, without shutting down the Taliban drug income, by adopting an appropriate strategy that provides security and rule of law to the population and by sufficiently beefing up their own resources vis-à-vis the Taliban. Rural development is a long term and multifaceted effort. Simplistic strategies that focus simply on price ratios or try to raise risk through “seed-burn-seed” approaches are ineffective. Wheat replacement strategy as a core of the alternative livelihoods effort is singularly inappropriate for Afghanistan. Shortcuts do not lead to sustainable policies that also mitigate conflict and enhance state-building.

The Obama administration will need to reduce expectations for quick fixes and present realistic timelines to Congress, the U.S. public and the international community for how long rural development and other counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan will take to show meaningful and sustainable progress that advances human security of the Afghan people, mitigates conflict and enhance state building. Unless this is conveyed, there is a real danger that even a well-designed counternarcotics policy will be prematurely and unfortunately discarded as ineffective.

The New Strategy in Afghanistan’s Context

In summer 2009, the Obama administration unveiled the outlines of a new counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. The new policy represents a courageous break with previous misguided efforts there and thirty years of U.S. counternarcotics policies around the world. Instead of emphasizing premature eradication of poppy crops, the new policy centers on increased interdiction and rural development. This approach strongly enhances the new counterinsurgency policy focus on providing security to the rural population, instead of being preoccupied with the numbers of incapacitated Taliban and al Qaeda.

In Afghanistan, somewhere between a third and a half of its GDP comes from poppy cultivation and processing and much of the rest from foreign aid, so the illicit poppy economy determines the economic survival of a large segment of the population. This is true not only of the farmers who cultivate opium poppy frequently in the absence of viable legal and illegal economic alternatives. But, as a result of micro- and macro-economic spillovers and the acute paucity of legal economic activity, much of the economic life in large cities is also underpinned by the poppy economy. After a quarter century of intense poppy cultivation, the opium poppy economy is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of the society. Islamic prohibitions against opiates notwithstanding, the poppy economy inevitably underlies Afghanistan’s political arrangements and power relations. Profits from taxing poppy cultivation and protecting smuggling rings bring substantial income to the Taliban. A recent CRS report (August 2009) estimates the income at $70-$100 million per year, which accounts for perhaps as much as half of Taliban income. But many other actors in Afghanistan profit from the opium poppy economy in a similar way: former warlords cum government officials; members of Afghanistan’s police; tribal chiefs; and independent traffickers.

Moreover, the Taliban and many others who protect the opium poppy economy from efforts to suppress it derive much more than financial profits. Crucially, they also obtain political capital from populations dependent on poppy cultivation. Such political capital is a critical determinant of the success and sustainability of the insurgency since public support or at least acceptance are crucial enablers of an insurgency. Indeed, as I detail in my forthcoming book, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, along with providing order that the Afghan government is systematically unable to provide and capitalizing on Ghilzai Pashtun sentiments of being marginalized, protection of the poppy fields is at the core of the Taliban support. By not targeting the farmers, the new counternarcotics strategy is thus synchronized with the counterinsurgency efforts because it can deprive the Taliban of a key source of support. Its overall design also promises to lay the necessary groundwork for substantial reductions in the size and impacts of the illicit economy in Afghanistan.

However, while appropriate in its overall conception, the new strategy has pitfalls. Specifically how to operationalize interdiction and rural development will to a great extent determine the effectiveness of the strategy—not only with respect to the narrow goal of narcotics suppression, but also with respect to counterinsurgency and state-building. While many of the details still remain to be developed, some of those that have trickled out give reasons for concern.

Effects of Previous Eradication-Centered Policy

During the 2008-09 growing season, the area of cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 22% to 123,000 hectares and opium production fell by 10 percent to 6,900 metric tons (mt). Much of this decline in cultivation was driven by market forces largely unrelated to policy: After several years of massive overproduction in Afghanistan that surpassed the estimated global market for opiates by almost three times, opium prices were bound to decline. Even at 6,900 mt, production still remains twice as high as world demand, leading to speculation that someone somewhere is stockpiling opiates.

More significant, the persistence of high production betrays the ineffectiveness of simplistic policies, such as premature forced eradication before alternative livelihoods are in place, which since 2004 (until the new Obama strategy) was the core of the counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. Policies that fail to address the complex and multiple structural drivers of cultivation and ignore the security and economic needs of the populations dependent on poppy cultivation generate vastly counterproductive effects with respect to not only counternarcotics efforts, but also counterinsurgency, stabilization and state building.

The eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar provides a telling example. For decades, Nangarhar has been one of the dominant sources of opium poppy. But over the past two years, as a result of governor Gul Agha Shirzai’s suppression efforts—including bans on cultivation, forced eradication, imprisonment of violators and claims that NATO would bomb the houses of those who cultivate poppy or keep opium—cultivation declined to very low numbers. This has been hailed as a major success to be emulated throughout Afghanistan.

In fact, the economic and security consequences were highly undesirable. The ban greatly impoverished many, causing household incomes to fall 90% for many and driving many into debt. As legal economic alternatives failed to materialize, many coped by resorting to crime, such as kidnapping and robberies. Others sought employment in the poppy fields of Helmand, yet others migrated to Pakistan where they frequently ended up recruited by the Taliban. The population became deeply alienated from the government, resorting to strikes and attacks on government forces. Districts that were economically hit especially severely, such as Khogiani, Achin and Shinwar, have become no-go zones for the Afghan government and NGOs. Although those tribal areas have historically been opposed to the Taliban, the Taliban mobilization there has taken off to an unprecedented degree. The populations began allowing the Taliban to cross over from Pakistan, and U.S. military personnel operating in that region indicate that intelligence provision to Afghan forces and NATO has almost dried up. Tribal elders who supported the ban became discredited, and the collapse of their legitimacy is providing an opportunity for the Taliban to insert itself into the decision-making structures of those areas. And all such previous bans in the province, including in 2005, turned out to be unsustainable in the absence of legal economic alternatives. Thus, after the 2005 ban, for example, poppy cultivation inevitably swung back.

The Ingredients of Success

Security
The prerequisite for success with respect to narcotics is security, i.e. sustained state control of territory. Without it, Afghanistan cannot be stabilized and the state strengthened; nor can counternarcotics policies be effective. Whether one adopts iron-fisted eradication or sustainable rural development as the core of a counternarcotics policy, security is essential. Without security first, counternarcotics efforts have not yet succeeded anywhere. Suppression without alternative livelihoods in place requires firm control of the entire territory to prevent illicit crop displacement and harsh suppression of the population dependent on illicit crops. Apart from being problematic with respect to human rights, this harsh approach is also very costly politically. Rural development requires security, otherwise investment will not come in, the population will not make risky long-term investments in legal crops and structural drivers of cultivation will not be effectively addressed. Development under a hail of bullets simply does not work, and in the context of insecurity, illicit economies persist and dominate.

Nor have counternarcotics policies, such as eradication or interdiction, succeeded in bankrupting or severely weakening any belligerent groups profiting from drugs anywhere in the world. Not in China, Thailand, Burma, Peru, Lebanon or even Colombia. Instead, they cement the bonds between marginalized populations dependent on illicit crops and belligerents plus severely reduce human intelligence flows to the counterinsurgent forces.

But counterinsurgent forces can prevail against insurgents and terrorists without stopping or reducing the terrorists’ drug-based financial inflows—either by increasing their own forces and resources vis-à-vis the belligerents or by adopting a smarter strategy that is either militarily more effective or wins the hearts and minds. This was the case in China, Thailand, Burma, and Peru where counterinsurgents succeeded without eradication. Evidence that counterinsurgent forces can prevail without bankrupting the belligerents through eradication also holds in the case of Colombia where the FARC has been weakened militarily not because of the aerial spraying of coca fields, but in spite of it. Today, more coca is grown there than at the beginning of Plan Colombia; but as a result of U.S. resources and training, Colombian forces were capable of greatly weakening the FARC even though forced eradication virtually eliminated human intelligence from the population to the government.

Interdiction with the Right Focus
The broad focus of the new counternarcotics strategy on interdiction is well placed, but interdiction’s effectiveness will depend on its objectives and execution. Just like eradication, interdiction will not succeed in bankrupting the Taliban. The Taliban has many other sources of income, including donations from Pakistan and the Middle East, taxation of legal economic activity, smuggling with legal goods, wildlife and illicit logging. In fact, it rebuilt itself in Pakistan between 2002 and 2004 without access to the poppy economy. Overall, drug interdiction has a very poor record in substantially curtailing belligerents’ income, with only a few successes registered in, for example, highly localized settings in Colombia and Peru.

Instead, the objective of the policy should be to reduce the coercive and corrupting power of organized crime groups. But achieving that requires a well-designed policy and a great deal of intelligence. Previous interdiction efforts in Afghanistan have in fact had the opposite effect: they eliminated small traders and consolidated the power of big traffickers, giving rise to the vertical integration of the industry. They also strengthened the bonds between some traffickers and the Taliban (although many traffickers continue to operate independently or are linked to the government).

Large-scale interdiction that targets entire networks and seeks to eliminate local demand for opium from local traders, which some are arguing for, is extraordinarily resource-intensive given the structure of the Afghan opium industry. Prioritization will need to be given to devoting scarce resources to drug interdiction or directly to counterinsurgency. The odds of success are not high. But even if such an interdiction strategy did succeed in shutting down local demand, the policy would become counterproductive since in local settings its effects would approximate the effects of eradication, thus once again alienating the population. Such large-scale interdiction is thus not currently appropriate for Afghanistan.

But even the NATO-led selective interdiction of targeting designated Taliban-linked traffickers (the United States has identified fifty such traffickers) is not free from pitfalls. First, selective interdiction can actually provide opportunities for the Taliban to directly take over the trafficking role or strengthen the alliance between the remaining traffickers and the Taliban, thus achieving the opposite of what it aims for. In fact, interdiction measures in Peru and Colombia frequently resulted in tightening the belligerents-traffickers nexus and belligerents’ takeover of trafficking.

Second, uncalibrated interdiction can provoke intense turf wars among the remaining traffickers, thus intensifying violence in the country and muddling the battlefield picture by introducing a new form of conflict. Mexico provides a vivid example of such an undesirable outcome. In the Afghan tribal context, such turf wars can easily become tribal or ethnic warfare.

Third, such selective interdiction can also send the message that the best way to be a trafficker is to be a member of the Afghan government, thus perpetuating a sense of impunity and corruption and undermining long-term state building and legitimacy.

Finally, the effectiveness of interdiction is to a great extent dependent on the quality of rule of law in Afghanistan plus the capacity and quality of the justice and corrections systems, all of which are woefully lacking in Afghanistan and are deeply corrupt.

Comprehensive Rural Development
Rural development appropriately lies at the core of the new strategy because, despite the enormous challenges, it has the best chance to effectively and sustainably strengthen the Afghan state and reduce the narcotics economy. But for rural development to do that, it needs to be conceived as broad-based social and economic development that focuses on improvements in human capital—including health care and education—and addresses all of the structural drivers of opium poppy cultivation. In Afghanistan, these drivers include insecurity; lack of physical infrastructure (such as roads), electrification and irrigations systems; lack of microcredit; lack of processing facilities; and the absence of value-added chains and assured markets. They also include lack of land titles and, increasingly, the fact that land rent by sharecroppers has become dependent on opium poppy cultivation as land concentration has increased over the past eight years. Poppy cultivation and harvesting are also very labor-intensive, thus offering employment opportunities unparalleled in the context of Afghanistan’s economy.

The price-profitability of poppy in comparison to other crops is only one of the drivers and frequently not the most important one. Without other structural drivers being addressed, farmers will not switch to licit crops even if they fetch more money than the illicit ones. By the same token, however, farmers are frequently willing to sacrifice some profit and forgo illicit crop cultivation as long as the licit alternatives bring them sufficient income and address all of the structural drivers, including the insecurity to which farmers are exposed in illicit economies.

Unfortunately, the wheat distribution program that was the core of rural development in Afghanistan last year (and that is slated to be its key component this year) is likely to be woefully ineffective for several reasons. First, in 2008, the program was based solely on an unusually high price ratio of wheat to poppy, driven by poppy overproduction and a global shortage of wheat. However, this price ratio is unlikely to hold; Afghanistan’s wheat prices are dictated anyway by surrounding markets, such as Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Second, the program did nothing to address the structural drivers. In fact, it had counterproductive effects because the free distribution of wheat undermined local markets in seeds. Afghan farmers can obtain seeds; their challenge lies in how to obtain profit afterwards. Thus, some sold the wheat seed instead of cultivating it. Third, those who actually cultivated wheat frequently did so not for profit, but for subsistence to minimize costs of buying cereals on the market. In fact, because of land distribution issues, many Afghan farmers do not have access to enough land to cover even their subsistence needs with wheat monocropping. A key lesson from alternative development over the past thirty years is that monocropping substitution strategies are particularly ineffective. Fourth, if all of current poppy farmers switched to wheat cultivation, Afghanistan would experience a great increase in unemployment since wheat cultivation employs 88% less labor than poppy cultivation and harvesting do.

Instead of wheat, rural development in Afghanistan needs to emphasize diversified high-value, high-labor-intensive crops, such as fruits, vegetables and specialty items like saffron. Generating lasting off-farm income opportunities will also be important, but even more challenging than jump-starting legal agromarkets.

After eight years of underresourcing and neglecting agriculture development, the new counternarcotics policy’s focus on the farm is appropriate. But the new strategy needs to take care not to throw away the baby with the bath water. The effort still needs to include developing value-added chains and assured internal and external markets plus enabling sustained access to them. Once again, thirty years of history of alternative livelihoods show that without value-added chains and accessible markets even productive legal farms become unsustainable and farmers revert back to illicit crops.

Finally, rural development requires time. Perhaps in no country in the world since Mao wiped out poppy cultivation in China in the 1950s did counternarcotics efforts face such enormous challenges as they do in Afghanistan—in terms of the scale of the illicit economy, its centrality to the overall economy of the country and hence its vast marco- and micro-economic and political effects, the underdevelopment of the country and its human capital and the paucity of viable economic alternatives. Even under much more auspicious circumstances along all the above dimensions, counternarcotics rural development in Thailand took thirty years.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is a need to quickly bring some economic, social and rule of law improvements to the lives of the Afghan people. Without such quick, visible and sustainable change, it will become impossible to rebuild the confidence of the Afghan people in the future, harness their remaining aspirations and to persuade them that the central state with support of the international community is preferable to the Taliban or local warlord- or tribal-based fiefdoms. But there is an equal need to urge strategic patience in the United States—both for counterinsurgency and for counternarcotics.

Eradication can be a part of the mix of counternarcotics policies, but should only be adopted in areas that are free of violent conflict and where sufficient legal economic alternatives are available to the population. Interdiction needs to focus on reducing the coercive and corrupting power of crime groups. Before interdiction measures are undertaken, an analysis of second and third- order effects needs to be conducted. It needs to be carefully calibrated with the strength of law enforcement in Afghanistan to avoid provoking dangerous turf wars, ethnic violence and cementing the relationship between the Taliban and the traffickers. It also needs to target top traffickers linked to the Afghan government. Interdiction needs to encompass building the justice and corrections system in Afghanistan and broad rule of law efforts. Rural development needs to address all structural drivers of poppy cultivation. It needs to focus not only on the farm, but also on value-added chains and assured markets. It needs to emphasize diversified high-value, high-labor intensive crops, and not center on wheat.

Evaluations of counternarcotics policies need to back away from simplistic and inappropriate measures, such as the numbers of hectares eradicated or traffickers caught. Instead, the measures need to encompass the complexity of the issue, including, size of areas cultivated with licit as well as illicit crops, human development indexes, levels of education, the number of resource-poor farmers dependent on illicit crops for basic subsistence or vulnerable to poverty-driven participation in illicit economies, food security, availability of legal microcredit, prevalence of land titles and accessibility of land, infrastructure density and cost of infrastructure use (such as road tolls), availability of non-belligerent dispute resolution and arbitrage mechanisms, quality of property rights, prevalence of value-added chains, and accessibility of markets. The United States and its allies must reduce public expectations for quick fixes and dedicate increased resources to rural development for a long time. Although U.S. forces do not need to stay in Afghanistan for decades, economic development will take that long.

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Policy Brief #180

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
	The year 2010 in Afghanistan had some encouraging signs but on balance it was less positive than had been hoped. In 2011, therefore, it is important to do two things: first, look for further improvements in our strategy; and second, develop a backup plan, should the current approach not yield the kind of progress that is necessary and expected. This policy brief addresses the first challenge, improving the U.S./NATO counterinsurgency campaign. The basic logic of current strategy is accepted, but several new initiatives or ideas are explored to make it more promising and more effective. Three main ideas are developed: Promoting Afghan political organizations built around ideas and platforms, not individuals and ethnicities, in a change from longstanding American policy that could improve the quality of governance in the country. Taking pressure off the bilateral U.S.-Afghan relationship on the issue of anticorruption, largely by creation of an international advisory board consisting of prominent individuals from key developing countries like Indonesia and Tanzania that have had considerable success improving their own nations' governance in recent times. Offering a civilian nuclear energy deal to Pakistan, conditional on clear action by Islamabad to shut down insurgent sanctuaries that are currently using its territory to attack the Afghan government as well as NATO forces.

The past year was not without good news in Afghanistan. It saw a successful deployment of nearly another 40,000 NATO troops to Afghanistan; twice as much growth in Afghan security forces together with a much more robust approach to their training; increases in American civilian capacity in Kabul and in the field; and highly effective targeting of Afghan (and Pakistani) insurgents within Afghanistan and just over the border with Pakistan. I would also count the September parliamentary elections as more good than bad, since it was Afghans who held other Afghans accountable for infractions, and since the Karzai government appears on balance to be tolerating an outcome that will reduce the strength of its cronies in the elected assembly (though this issue remains a work in progress). Finally, NATO's decision at the November Lisbon Summit to emphasize the year 2014 as the time when Afghanistan would assume full control of security operations-rather than President Obama's earlier preference to emphasize July 2011 as the point when the U.S. departure would begin-clarified the American and international commitments to get the job done right before going home. Among other benefits, this change should help convince more Afghan and Pakistani fence-sitters that they can count on us, rather than encouraging hedging behavior out of fear of a premature, hurried NATO exit.

However, 2010 also witnessed a roughly 50 percent increase in the overall level of violence that can only partially be explained by our increased presence and tempo of operations. That increase reflects a very resilient insurgency. Problematic relations between the Obama administration and the Karzai government have also continued, the corruption problem has remained intractable (largely fueled by the western presence with all of its trappings), and the Pakistani government still tolerates sanctuaries for the Haqqani network and the "Quetta Shura Taliban" (that is, the Afghan Taliban) on its territory.

For the most part, the strategy of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under General David Petraeus, and the efforts of the international community more broadly, seem sound. The paramount goal in Afghanistan is to put the country's government in a position to control its own territory. That is the way to ensure that no large terrorist sanctuaries re-emerge there that could threaten the United States, nuclear-armed Pakistan, or other core western interests. But to achieve that goal, a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that helps build up the Afghan state is needed, because establishing control of territory requires that the government possess a certain legitimacy among its people-which in turn requires some measure of economic and political progress. Hence, to achieve a fairly simple goal, we have properly undertaken a fairly ambitious strategy, after having tried the opposite, minimalist approach for the first half dozen years of the war only to see the Taliban make a comeback. Yet the strategy still needs improvement to address its two main vulnerabilities: the weakness and corruption of the Afghan government, and the schizophrenic approach to the war on the part the Pakistani government. This policy brief proposes ideas to address each of these problems. The proposals would also improve the prospects of any sound backup plan that might have to be considered this year, such as the concept that Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel and I have recently developed that we call a "Plan A-" for the country.

Afghan Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Working with the Karzai government is an inherently complex matter. On the one hand, we have no choice but to partner with Afghanistan's elected leader, who in fact remains reasonably popular among his own people with a 62 percent favorability rating according to the latest polls. On the other hand, the government is widely seen as ineffective by many of its own citizens, helping generate motivation and recruits for the insurgency. So do we work with Karzai, or work around him? In fact, we must do both. We need a better way to help the Afghan government improve its performance without inciting periodic public spats along the way that set back our efforts to cooperate. And we also need a way to help build for Afghanistan's post-Karzai future, the sooner the better.

Improving Afghan Governance and Fighting Corruption

General Stanley McChrystal's 2009 assessment of the situation in Afghanistan famously and dramatically concluded that corruption in the Afghan government was comparable to the insurgency itself in posing a serious threat to the country. As such, General Petraeus has been right to focus intently on corruption since assuming command, including assigning the formidable Brigadier General HR McMaster to the task, and some positive things are happening as a result. More intelligence assets are being devoted to the problem. Field commanders and development specialists are more aware of the need to understand the power of money, and to be cognizant of whom they are empowering or embittering through their contracting processes and economic development efforts.

Yet problems remain. Corruption remains very serious. And disputes about corruption with President Karzai still go public too often. The United States and the international community more generally should reframe the issue of fighting corruption, as Marine Colonel Greg Douquet and I have previously argued. The challenge should be seen and described primarily as one of improving governance in Afghanistan rather than tackling a culture of criminality.

Blantant, extreme corruption must be prosecuted. But by criminalizing routine corruption, we not only encourage unrealistic expectations in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere about the progress that is achievable over the next few years, we may miss opportunities to work with Afghan "reconciliables"-individuals who may have had some corrupt tendencies yet also try to provide a certain level of effective governance. We also fail to recognize our own past role in the dynamic. Pumping billions of dollars a year into a poor economy, and inadvertently favoring certain power brokers and tribes over others in the process, feeds the very corruption that we so abhor.

Research on fighting corruption and improving governance points to a better way of thinking about this problem. One key insight from renowned development expert Paul Collier and others is that young democracies with weak checks on presidential powers and an easy source of cash tend to have major problems with corruption-so Afghanistan's challenges, rather than being viewed primarily as criminal, should be expected in some ways. Taking this tone with the Karzai government can improve atmospherics and bolster our odds of eliciting cooperative behavior from Kabul.

Another key finding from MIT's Benjamin Olken and other researchers is that trained, independent auditors deployed from the central government to various parts of the country can improve the quality of government performance. Government auditors could also counter the "inverse pyramid" patronage network that is common in the Karzai administration, a network in which corrupt officials "invest" in purchasing government positions and their "dividends" are paid to them in the form of bribes and extortion. Reforming Afghanistan's government will require reversing this trend, or at least mitigating it, through such auditors and other governmental improvements.

And perhaps most important of all, the development literature shows that a number of countries around the world have made headway in combating corruption and improving governance over the years. Brookings and World Bank scholars Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton document progress in places including Indonesia, Hong Kong, Georgia, Albania, Tanzania and Rwanda. We should try to involve more experts from such countries in the effort. President Karzai and others might react more positively to hearing suggestions about how to reduce bribes, check nepotism, and improve governance from Indonesians or Tanzanians rather than Americans.

With U.S. assistance, Afghanistan's government has improved. We are now seeing points of light in the anticorruption effort, such as President Karzai's new specialized anticorruption agency-the High Office of Oversight. Several key ministers in the Karzai cabinet are also exemplary on this front, including for example Minister of Interior Mohammadi. We should emphasize their sound efforts more often. But there is clearly a long way to go, and an international contact group may help.

Strengthening Afghan Political Parties and Institutions

Afghanistan's corruption problem is largely rooted in the fact that the young political system is still too driven by personalities-and to a lesser extent ethnicity-and not enough by ideas.

Part of the challenge is to make sure that Mr. Karzai relinquishes power in 2014, when he reaches the constitutional limit of two full presidential terms. Prudence requires that we assume Mr. Karzai will seek to change the constitution or otherwise manipulate the electoral and legal process to stay in office-not out of any megalomania, but as much as anything out of fear for himself and his friends and relatives given the uncertainty of who might follow him in office. As such, it is possible that Karzai could declare martial law and suspend future elections. He could seek a peace deal with insurgents that makes him the compromise candidate under a future modified constitution. He could even consider a military coup.

It is important to deflate this possibility before it gains momentum. U.S. policymakers should, for example, mention publicly that Mr. Karzai will no longer be president after 2014. This is unobjectionable as a point of legal fact-at least right now-so there is no reason to shy away from saying so. Talking about it enough will help clarify the international community's intentions and expectations. And given Afghanistan's long-term need for international security and economic assistance, Afghan leaders would have to take notice.

The second imperative is to strengthen Afghan political organizations. That means helping Afghanistan's reformers and patriots, of whom there are many, to form strong political movements. Mr. Karzai has chosen some good cabinet officials and governors, but these are just a few individuals. Afghanistan's organized political parties are very weak. There are some fledgling new movements-like the one spearheaded by former foreign minister and presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah. But they are loosely organized and have relatively vague policy platforms.

Afghanistan needs political movements tied to ideas and governing principles rather than ethnicity or individuals. Mr. Karzai has so far discouraged their formation. He has argued that Afghans dislike political parties because of the legacy of Communist Party abuses in the late 1970s and 1980s. But the 1980s are increasingly ancient history. Those who oppose parties today seem motivated mostly by their own desire to divide and conquer a weak, inchoate opposition.

It is time for the U.S. government and the many other governmental and nongovernmental organizations present in Afghanistan to strongly support the activities of new political movements. They should encourage and fund Afghans as they hold policy conferences, create research institutes, do grass-roots political organizing, and talk policy and politics in print, on television and on the radio. This approach need not be anti-Karzai; the president himself could form a party.

Such dynamics could affect even the shorter-term calculations of Afghan politicians. If Afghan voters in 2014 and thereafter are empowered to make real policy choices, candidates will take notice and start developing ideas they can run on. That may be as good an antidote to weak governance and rampant corruption as we can find-not only for the future but for today as well.

Getting Pakistan Off the Fence

Pakistan arguably remains the most complex ally the United States has ever had in wartime. Nine years into the campaign, we still cannot clearly answer the question of whether Pakistan is with us or against us. America needs bold new policy measures to help Islamabad-in all its many dimensions and factions-make up its mind.

Despite allowing massive NATO logistics operations through its territory and helping the United States pursue al Qaeda operatives, Pakistan tolerates sanctuaries on its soil for the major insurgencies fighting in Afghanistan. These include the Afghan Taliban (known as the Quetta Shura Taliban because its principle base remains in Quetta in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan) as well as the Haqqani and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) networks. The Haqqanis straddle the border between the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika as well as North Waziristan and other tribal areas within Pakistan; HiG is further north, operating in and around the Khyber Pass connecting Kabul and Jalalabad in Afghanistan with Peshawar and points east in Pakistan. Thus, all three major Afghan insurgent groups have home bases in Pakistan, and despite the occasional drone strike are generally beyond NATO's reach as a result.

Pakistan has taken some worthy actions against extremists in its remote northern and western areas in recent years. Specifically, it has recognized the so-called Pakistani Taliban (the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) as a mortal threat to the Pakistani state and responded accordingly in some tribal areas. Pakistanis argue, however, that limited numbers of ground troops combined with the past year's devastating floods prevent them from doing more. Quetta, North Waziristan, and other key places remain dens of iniquity, havens for extremists who continue to attack NATO and Afghan troops across the border and then return home for rest, regrouping, and fresh recruiting. Major command-and-control hubs are permanently located within Pakistan as well, and key insurgent leaders like Mullah Omar (to say nothing of Osama bin Laden) probably remain safely ensconced on Pakistani territory where U.S. forces cannot get at them. But it is perhaps not just a matter of available troops. Pakistan would rather have the Taliban and the Haqqanis back in power, especially in the country's south and east, than any group like the former Northern Alliance, which it views as too close to India. Since Islamabad cannot be sure that the current Afghan political system will survive, therefore, it keeps a backup plan based largely on the Taliban and its associates.

Under these circumstances, part of the right policy is to keep doing more of what the Obama administration has been doing with Pakistan-building trust, as with last fall's strategic dialogue in Washington; increasing aid incrementally, as with the new five-year, $2 billion aid package announced during that dialogue; encouraging Pakistan-India dialogue (which would help persuade Islamabad it could safely move more military forces from its eastern border to its western regions) and coordinating militarily across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. But President Barack Obama needs to think bigger. The clarification that the U.S.-led ISAF mission will continue until 2014, and indeed beyond, at the November Lisbon summit was a step in the right direction but more is needed.

Obama should offer Islamabad a much more expansive U.S.-Pakistani relationship if it helps win this war. Two major incentives would have particular appeal to Pakistan. One is a civilian nuclear energy deal like that being provided to India, with full safeguards on associated reactors. Pakistan's progress on export controls in the wake of the A.Q. Khan debacle has been good enough so far to allow a provisional approval of such a deal if other things fall into place as well, including Islamabad’s compliance with any future fissile production cutoff treaty. Second is a free trade accord. Struggling economically, Pakistan needs such a shot in the arm, and a trade deal could arguably do even more than aid at this point.

But the key point is this: Pakistan should be told that these deals will only be possible if the United States and its allies prevail in Afghanistan. Small gestures of greater helpfulness are not adequate; bottom-line results are what count and what are needed. If Afghanistan turns around in a year or two, the deals can be set in motion and implemented over a longer period that will allow the United States to continually monitor subsequent Pakistani cooperation in the war. These terms are really just common sense, and they are based on political realism about America's domestic politics as well as its strategic interests, since there is no way the Congress would support such a nuclear deal if Pakistani policy ultimately contributed to our losing the war in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Current strategy in Afghanistan is built on reasonably sound counterinsurgency principles and is fairly promising in its prospects for the year ahead. But every such operation is different. That is a basic corollary of counterinsurgency theory, with its emphasis on local politics, conditions, and personalities-meaning that there is no reason to believe that current strategy is good enough just because its fundamentals are time-tested.

A number of other policy reforms, beyond those discussed here, may be worth considering in the coming months as well. The numerical goal for the Afghan security forces is probably still too low, and should approach 400,000 uniformed personnel rather than the current 305,000 target (this debate is well underway as of this writing). The legal system remains weak, with glaring problems such as a major dearth of judges and severely inadequate pay for prosecutors, as well as no clear strategy for linking the formal justice system to the local, traditional justice systems that remain important in Afghanistan today. Finally, in the aftermath of the September 2010 parliamentary elections, some patchwork solution to the disenfranchisement of Pashtuns in provinces like Ghazni where many of them could not vote (or had their votes thrown out) is probably needed. Perhaps some additional modest number of Pashtuns could be given non-voting adjunct status in the parliament, allowing their voices to be heard even if they were ultimately not able to win seats.

But the three changes to our current approach discussed in this policy brief are central, and have not received their due attention. On the anticorruption front, adoption of a less bilateral approach that includes a high-level international advisory body on good governance for the Karzai government could improve the tone and substance of the effort. On the Afghan politics front, the international community should be unapologetic about supporting Afghan political parties built on ideas and agendas more than personalities and ethnicities. And finally, in regard to Pakistan, an informal but public U.S. offer to pursue a bilateral civilian nuclear energy deal should Pakistan help us win the war by clamping down on insurgent sanctuaries, might motivate greater efforts by our on-again off-again allies across the border. Adoption of these recommendations would improve our prospects for at least moderate success in Afghanistan and help make 2011 the belated turnaround year that we so badly need.

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After years of warnings from the public health community about the growing threat of antibiotic resistance, yesterday the White House announced a national strategy to combat the growing problem of antibiotic resistance within the U.S. and abroad. The administration’s commitment represents an important step forward, as antibiotic-resistant infections are responsible for 23,000 deaths annually, and cost over $50 billion in excess health spending and lost productivity.  The administration’s National Strategy on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria includes incentives for developing new drugs, more rigorous stewardship of existing drugs, and better surveillance of antibiotic use and the pathogens that are resistant to them.  President Obama also issued an Executive Order that establishes an interagency Task Force and a non-governmental Presidential Advisory Council that will focus on broad-based strategies for slowing the emergence and spread of resistant infections. 

While antibiotics are crucial for treating bacterial infections, their misuse over time has contributed to a rather alarming rate of antibiotic resistance, including the development of multidrug-resistance bacteria or “super bugs.” Misuse manifests throughout all corners of public and private life; from the doctor’s office when prescribed to treat viruses; to industrial agriculture, where they are used in abundance to promote growth in livestock. New data from the World Health Organization (WHO) and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirm that rising overuse of antibiotics has already become a major public health threat worldwide.

The administration’s announcement included a report from the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) titled “Combatting Antibiotic Resistance,” which includes recommendations developed by a range of experts to help control antibiotic resistance. In addition, they outline a $20 million prize to reward the development of a new rapid, point-of-care diagnostic test. Such tests help health care providers choose the right antibiotics for their patients and streamline drug development by making it easier to identify and treat patients in clinical trials.  

The Need for Financial Incentives and Better Reimbursement

A highlight of the PCAST report is its recommendations on economic incentives to bring drug manufacturers back into the antibiotics market. Innovative changes to pharmaceutical regulation and research and development (R&D) will be welcomed by many in the health care community, but financial incentives and better reimbursement are necessary to alleviate the market failure for antibacterial drugs. A major challenge, particularly within a fee-for-service or volume-based reimbursement system is providing economic incentives that promote investment in drug development without encouraging overuse.

A number of public and private stakeholders, including the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform and Chatham House’s Centre on Global Health Security Working Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, are exploring alternative reimbursement mechanisms that “de-link” revenue from the volume of antibiotics sold. Such a mechanism, combined with further measures to stimulate innovation, could create a stable incentive structure to support R&D. Further, legislative proposals under consideration by Congress to reinvigorate the antibiotic pipeline, including the Antibiotic Development to Advance Patient Treatment (ADAPT) Act of 2013, could complement the White House’s efforts and help turn the tide on antibiotic resistance. Spurring the development of new antibiotics is critical because resistance will continue to develop even if health care providers and health systems can find ways to prevent the misuse of these drugs.

       

Editors’ Note: It is time to establish a regional reconstruction strategy for the Middle East, argues Sultan Barakat, that involves collective vision, broad participation, smart security, equality, and other key elements.This post originally appeared in Huffington Post.

The World Bank is hosting its annual Fragility Forum this week with the aim of making progress on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. This week has also seen a fragile ceasefire in Syria, potentially landmark elections in Iran, and a violent clash between Jordanian security and so-called Islamic State members. Together these developments have prompted me to reassess what needs to be done to resolve the issues of conflict and fragility in the Middle East.

For the Middle East, the starting point should be to move away from any process that reinforces the image of the West devising solutions and proposing "new" visions to the region. Such approaches are reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the neoconservatives' "grand strategy" of the early 2000s and do not appreciate that the Middle East has changed fundamentally since 2011. The region, at all levels, now expects to be treated with dignity and to be the driving force behind its own development.

It is high time to pull together to establish a "Regional Reconstruction Strategy" that can address all sorts of violence, not just Islamist-related conflict. The region needs an ever-evolving strategy that maintains a holistic, problem-solving outlook while drawing on various forms of intervention (e.g. community driven development, inter-regional development projects, targeted counterinsurgency operations, stabilization, statebuilding, etc.) without being straightjacketed by any one toolkit or template. Novel approaches rooted in genuine regional leadership, broad participation, youth engagement, and the utilization of technology will increasingly need to be applied. The pillars of such a strategy should be a collective regional vision, effective local participation, smart security, reconciliation and justice, equity, reconstruction and development, and capacity.

Collective Vision: With the aspirations of the Arab Spring unrealized and many countries descending into sectarianism, what is needed now is a collective vision that goes beyond national borders. This would include pooling the region's resources, specifically all the ingredients for large-scale development, such as human resources, an educated population, capital, mobility, and nature. We could then look to the day when region-wide development is synergistic and not predatory or a zero-sum game. What Morocco has achieved with solar energy is a shining example—a visionary investment has addressed regional developmental and environmental challenges, stimulated employment, and raised confidence that hi-tech and innovative sectors can thrive in the Middle East. Such a broad vision is crucial if the region is to leapfrog into the twenty-first century and not remain in a vicious cycle of conflict and failed development.

Key to an inclusive and non-adversarial vision will be both accepting and embracing Islam as a majority religion while building on human security as an area of common ground. For this to happen some real changes are required in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—which would enable both to exercise their regional leadership in coalescing a constructive collective vision rather than perpetuating sectarian hostility.

Broad Participation: It is important that the regional vision recognizes that development requires an active civil society, a free media, and rooting action and ideas at the local level and with popular participation. The process of engaging in a region-wide consultation where contributions are coming from schools, villages, city halls, political parties, unions, and many other civic forums can help the region start dreaming about what it wants to look like in the 50 years to come.

Smart Security: Instead of a collective vision for development we have one for defense, formed with the excuse of the Islamic State group. All appreciate that a minimum level of security is important for implementing reconstruction, but a lack of security cannot be a pretext to do nothing. Experience has shown that delaying reconstruction efforts pushes people down the slope of conflict and violence and leads to dependence on humanitarian assistance. The region needs to find ways of better understanding the granular texture of security at local and regional levels so that strategies can be developed in which localized insecurity does not hold back development in other areas. This could support "spot reconstruction" efforts that create exemplars of what a degree of stability combined with reconstruction intervention can achieve in the midst of larger instability.

Reconciliation and Justice: No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without genuine reconciliation across the region. Twenty years ago the main fault line was Israel-Palestine. Today, there are many additional fault lines that need to be addressed, including Muslim-Christian tensions, tensions between displaced and host communities, and tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to make sure that the rule of law applies to all and that everyone has access to justice regardless of the mechanism. On this a lot can be built on local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation.

Equity: A common mistake with reconstruction is that it proceeds without sufficient regulation and monitoring to ensure that benefits are equitably distributed. This region has repeatedly seen how easily reconstruction "lords" (most of whom were previously warlords) can emerge to line their pockets at the expense of the general public, thus perpetuating that country's crisis. World Bank arguments for the private sector to take the lead in reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere have done nothing but strengthen this model. Assad's efforts to liberalize Syria's economy prior to 2011 led to the further enrichment of a corrupt elite, contributing to what we see today. Going forward, reconstruction efforts must take into consideration the poorest and least capable—so that nobody is left out.

Reconstruction and Development: There is an urgent need to find new ways of inducing development through international engagement with the region. The current instability has shifted spending toward security and away from the basics of development. As a result, some of the most important development indicators—freedom of expression, women's participation, poverty, quality of education—have taken a step back. All this is happening when the region is facing financial challenges due to severely reduced oil prices. This may prove to be an opportunity as some countries needed a good wake-up call to the pernicious effects of a model of capital development in which billions of dollars are invested in the West, generating jobs and stabilizing economies thousands of miles away at the expense of the region. If the West wants to help the region it should seek to focus minds within the Arab world on the value of investment in addressing regional problems in a mutually beneficial way. Ultimately a more stable region will lead to more prosperous neighbors both in the East and the West.

Building Capacity: To do this we must invest enormous amounts in fostering sustainable capacity at regional, national, and local levels. It is essential to invest in education at all levels, in particular going beyond primary education to support the young men and women that will become leaders with the conviction and capabilities to rebuild the region. In a rush to capture development, we have focused on the hard sciences, engineering, business studies, and computer science while ignoring our own culture, languages, and history. We must correct this imbalance, and it is time we develop our ideas in our own language and not rely on translation.

For all this to happen, fragility must be addressed within a coherent regional vision, not individual national plans. It would be constructive if the international community and donors would try to view the region as a whole—as one canvas in which to facilitate cross-border mobility of population, capital, ideas, and labor—and encourage regional responsibility with different countries leading in their areas of competency. International partners can support this with new and innovative forms of funding that utilize collateral guarantees from the region, not just individual countries. If we can embrace a truly regional approach, there may be a day when we elevate human dignity and human development above petty politics and sectarianism.

      

       

       

       

       

       

      

       

In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

• The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends
• The increase in non-cash compensation
• The fixation on quarterly earnings
• The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

• Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption
• Improve corporate disclosure practices
• Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting
• Toughen executive compensation rules
• Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.  

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Last June, Brookings senior fellow Elaine Kamarck and I published a paper laying out the rise of short-term thinking in U.S. corporations. We argued that this trend was bad for the economy, and we suggested policies that would at least slow it down and diminish its effects.

Since then, additional research on short-termism has emerged, and an increasing number of corporate leaders are expressing concern about the trajectory of U.S. firms. Last November, for example, the Boston Consulting Group documented a worrisome decline in the corporate activities and investments designed to discover and nurture future growth opportunities. This turn away from exploratory activities may not immediately affect investors, said the BCG report: in the short term, companies can maintain earnings and shareholder returns by “cutting costs, increasing dividends, and pursuing share buybacks.” (As Kamarck and I showed, this is what is happening across our economy.) But in the long run, BCG researchers found, firms that invest in exploration boost revenues and total returns far faster than do those who are content to exploit their existing lines of business and return most of their earnings to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks.

A few days ago, Laurence Fink, the chief executive of the world’s largest investment fund and a long-time foe of short-termism, sent a letter to the heads of S & P 500 companies and large European corporations. He noted that in the twelve months ending September 30 2015, buybacks had risen by 27 percent over the previous year, when buybacks already stood at record levels. “Today’s culture of quarterly earning hysteria,” he declared, is “totally contrary to the long-term approach we need.” And he warned corporate executives that in the absence of well-considered long-term plans for investment and growth, they would expose their firms “to the pressures on investors focused on maximizing near-term profit at the expense of long-term value.”

Many influential investors agree with Fink, and they are joining forces. On February 1, the Financial Times reported that since last summer, the world’s largest asset managers—Warren Buffett, Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, and the heads of BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, and Capital Group, among others—have been holding secret meetings to frame proposals that would encourage longer-term investments while reducing friction with shareholders. These proposals, which are reportedly some months away from final agreement and publication, may well involve changes in boards of directors, executive compensation, and shareholder rights.

The summit participants plan to support these changes for the companies in which they invest. Given the pools of funds they control, which amount to many trillions of dollars, their coordinated action may well represent a turning-point in the struggle to reorient corporate strategy toward the long term.

       

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Japan’s presence in the Arctic is not new, but it has been limited mostly to scientific research. Japan has stepped up its engagement after it gained observer status to the Arctic Council and appointed its first Arctic ambassador in 2013. However, Japan has yet to flesh out a full-blown Arctic strategy that identifies the range of its national interests in the polar region and actionable strategies to achieve them. The Arctic offers Japan an opportunity to expand cooperation with the United States in an uncharted area, poses hard questions on how to interact with Russia in the post-Ukraine era, and creates the interesting proposition of whether China and Japan can cooperate in articulating the views of non-Arctic states.

On October 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion on what components should be included in Japan’s Arctic strategy, ranging from resource development, environmental preservation, and scientific research, to securing access to expanding shipping lanes and managing a complex diplomatic chessboard. 

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On March 26, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings hosted an expert consultation on the development of the World Bank Group's new Education Strategy. The consultative meeting brought together a small group of experts from diverse fields. The purpose of the discussion was to gather input and suggestions aimed at strengthening the World Bank Group's work in the education sector.

Elizabeth King, Director of Education in the Human Development Network at the World Bank, opened the event by providing an overview of the Bank’s current approach to education, and how it has evolved over the last several decades. She described the Bank’s priorities as reconnecting education to the broader development agenda, supporting more equitable access, ensuring better learning, and strengthening education systems. The Bank’s main operating principals are taking a whole-sector approach, building the evidence base in education, and measuring the results and impact. Beginning with this extensive consultation process, the Bank is demonstrating its willingness to work with others in the development community to build a larger and more robust evidence base from which to draw lessons to improve the quality of limited staff to maximize the impact of Bank activities, to underscore its commitment to partnerships with other organizations and civil society groups, and to move toward improving the measurement of results so as to be able to further improve the Bank’s education programs around the world.

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On October 17, the Brookings Project on International Order and Strategy hosted a discussion with Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and MIT Professor Barry Posen on U.S. grand strategy. Amid a background of seeming geopolitical upheaval, the discussion focused on whether the United States should pursue a strategy that seeks to maintain U.S. pre-eminence and global leadership or whether the United States can or must adopt a more restrained posture.

In his May 2014 New Republic essay "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," Kagan argued that the United States has an enduring responsibility and capacity to shape the world order.

Posen is the Ford international professor of political science and director of the security studies program at MIT. He is the author of the new book, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2014). Posen argues that consistent U.S. overreaching has led to numerous failures and unexpected problems and cannot be sustained. Posen urges the United States to adopt a strategy of restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength.

Brookings Fellow Jeremy Shapiro moderated the discussion.

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On October 17, the Brookings Institution’s Project on International Order and Strategy hosted two of the most prominent thinkers on American grand strategy to discuss whether Washington should remain forward-leaning in its posture, or if it should adopt a more restrained approach to global engagement.

The event was moderated by Brookings Foreign Policy Fellow Jeremy Shapiro, and featured a debate between Brookings Foreign Policy Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and Barry Posen, Ford International Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kagan argued that the United States has an enduring responsibility and capacity to shape the world order and must remain actively engaged abroad to prevent the international order from collapse. Posen, on the other hand, warned against American overreach in foreign policy and urged Washington to embrace restraint, focusing on its own national security interests and limiting engagement – particularly military - abroad.

In their discussion of the Middle East, both scholars sought to define American regional interests with greater precision. Posen argued that “affective” relationships, such as those with Israel, do not explain the U.S. defense budget dedicated to the region or contingency plans for the region. Posen also disputed the view that oil is the primary driver of U.S. regional policy, suggesting that threats to major suppliers could be managed with a less robust regional security commitment than Washington has traditionally maintained.

Kagan argued that President Obama is more intellectually inclined toward Posen’s strategy of restraint than most of his predecessors, and yet he too has been drawn into the Middle East. “It can’t just be pure stupidity that has had the United States involved in the Middle East as consistently as it has been for almost 70 years now, taking the place of the previous powers that had been involved in the Middle East,” he said.

Posen discussed U.S. efforts against the Islamic State group (also called ISIS or ISIL). He noted that President Obama’s rhetoric on ISIS has gone beyond what is prudent, describing the strategy as one of “containment that’s augmented by the promise of future counter-offensives and destruction.” Washington’s current strategy, Posen argued, has demobilized allies by enabling them to skirt responsibility for the crisis.

Posen and Kagan differed in their interpretations of the track record of American interventions in the region. Posen criticized American understanding of the causes and effects of intervention, saying that it is easier to oust a government than to generate internal consensus or transform a country into a stable democracy. By contrast, Kagan argued that the U.S. has never invaded a Middle Eastern country with the purpose of rearranging domestic politics.

There was little discussion of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, though Posen identifies these two threats as major items on which the U.S. should remain engaged. More information about Posen’s arguments can be found in his new book, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2014). Kagan’s argument for continued pre-eminence and engagement in grand strategy can be found in his influential May 2014 New Republic essay “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire.”

      

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As President Obama's second term winds down and the 2016 presidential election draws ever closer, the United States finds itself involved in two wars and other global hotspots continue to flare. As is often the case, defense and national security will be critical topics for the next president. Questions remain about which defense issues are likely to dominate the campaigns over the coming months and how should the next president handle these issues once in office. In addition, with the defense budget continuing to contract, what does the future hold for U.S. military and national security readiness, and will those constraints cause the next president to alter U.S. strategy overseas?

On February 1, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted an event examining defense and security options for the next president. Panelists included Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute, Robert Kagan of Brookings, and James Miller, former undersecretary for policy at the Department of Defense. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, author of “The Future of Land Warfare” (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), moderated the discussion.

 

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Abstract

An individual-based computational model of smallpox epidemics in a two-town county is presented and used to develop strategies for bioterror containment. A powerful and feasible combination of preemptive and reactive vaccination and isolation strategies is developed which achieves epidemic quenching while minimizing risks of adverse side effects. Calibration of the model to historical data is described. Various model extensions and applications to other public health problems are noted.

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Last week’s Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama will be remembered for the historic handshakes and broad smiles shared by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro—the first sit-down meeting of leaders from the two nations since Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana in early 1959. But this memorable encounter was merely the most visible piece of a much broader Cuban strategy at the Panama Summit.

The large Cuban delegation took full advantage of the several forums that comprise the complex Summit process. These periodic inter-American conclaves feature meetings among heads of state and foreign ministers, a CEO Summit for corporate executives, and a Civil Society Forum for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Cubans seized all three opportunities and fielded strong teams to advance their interests: to engage with the multi-level inter-American system, and to send clear signals back home of where government policy is headed.

Face-to-face diplomacy

In addition to the Obama-Castro encounter, foreign ministers John Kerry and Bruno Rodriguez held a lengthy bilateral. Since Obama and Castro publicly announced their intention to renew relations on December 17 of last year, negotiations have dragged on. Cuba is reluctant to grant American diplomats unrestricted travel throughout the island to engage with Cuban citizens, including political dissidents. This is the norm in international diplomacy, the United States argues, whereas the Cubans remain fearful that U.S. diplomats will provide encouragement and assistance to activists advocating for political pluralism. The Cubans want to be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation which automatically invokes economic sanctions. The White House is withholding that relief as a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

In his opening plenary remarks, President Castro spoke passionately and at length, impressing the audience with his heartfelt remarks even as he came across as an elder statesman indulging in the memories and glories of his youth. Yet, Castro was also sending signals to the stalwarts in the Communist Party back home that he had not forgotten their sacrifices and was not abandoning their values. His engagement with the United States would not be allowed to endanger their tight control of Cuban society. Still, most significantly, Castro kept the door open to engagement with the United States by dramatically addressing President Obama, tossing him compliments: “President Obama is an honest man…I have read his two memoirs and I believe he is a man who has remained faithful to his humble origins.”

By lauding Obama, holding a private bilateral, and appearing with a broad smile at a press opportunity, Castro reaffirmed his commitment to improving relations with the United States. He also may have been nudging his negotiators to wrap up the talks to allow the mutual re-opening of embassies. The Cubans are aware that not all of Washington favors improved relations, and that they must consolidate the process of diplomatic normalization while Obama commands the White House.

The CEO and Civil Society Forums

Presumably, the main Cuban motivation for engaging the United States is economic: to attract more tourists, financial remittances, and eventually productive investments from the United States and the rest of the world, and to extract a relaxation of sanctions, particularly those impeding international financial transactions. Cuban Minister of Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca led a commercial delegation that included top executives from state-owned enterprises, as well as leadership from the new Mariel Development Zone. At the CEO Summit, Malmierca was granted one of the few time slots for a keynote address. But rather than take advantage of this unique opportunity, the Cuban minister rushed through an uninspired text, offering nothing that could not be found in previous government press releases and official documents. More than two years after the passage of a much-heralded foreign investment law and over a year after the official opening of the Mariel Development Zone, very few new investments have earned official authorization.  

While potentially interested in Cuban markets, executives I spoke with remain cautious, skeptical that the government has yet created a sufficiently business-friendly environment to warrant the risk. They speculate as to why so few new foreign ventures are underway: is it opposition from well-placed hard-liners, bureaucratic inertia, or lack of financing or other necessary business inputs? In private conversations, Malmierca hinted at a political obstacle: many Cubans identify the revolution with nationalizations of private property, so it will be difficult to explain to them why foreign investment is now so welcome.

The Cubans also fielded a significant presence at the Civil Society Forum. The dominant group represented government-affiliated “non-governmental” organizations (GONGOS) such as the official trade union or Confederation of Cuban Women, while opposition NGOs marshalled about a dozen persons. At a pre-Summit speech in Caracas, Castro had ominously labelled these opposition NGOs “mercenaries” in the pay of foreign intelligence services. Following that lead, the government-affiliated group staged aggressive, noisy demonstrations denouncing the opposition representatives and accusing them of harboring infamous terrorists. The GONGOS threatened to boycott the Forum (although some did eventually participate), and disrupted the Forum’s working group on democratic governance. Here again, the message being telegraphed back home was clear: the Cuban government does not consider these opposition voices to be legitimate actors and loyal Cuban citizens should not associate with them.

Discernable signals

Altogether, at the three forums the Cubans demonstrated their strong interest in participating actively in hemispheric affairs and institutions. The Cubans are capable of fielding smart, disciplined delegations with well-scripted strategies and messages. Once again, the high-quality Cuban diplomacy demonstrated that it has few peers in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The messages transmitted at the Panama Summit were subtle but decodable. In the diplomatic sphere, Castro wants to move forward, to take advantage of Obama’s tenure to relax U.S.-Cuban tensions and gain some economic advantages. In the business sphere, Malmierca reaffirmed Castro’s oft-repeated admonitions that economic change on the island will be very gradual and socialist planning will not be discarded under his watch. In the political sphere, the Cuban Communist Party intends to maintain its absolute hegemony—political pluralism outside the Party is definitely not yet on the policy agenda.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on how the United States came out of the Panama Summit of the Americas.