In Alzheimer's disease (AD), tau, a microtubule-associated protein (MAP), becomes hyperphosphorylated, aggregates, and accumulates in the somato-dendritic compartment of neurons. In parallel to its intracellular accumulation in AD, tau is also released in the extracellular space, as revealed by its increased presence in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Consistent with this, recent studies, including ours, have reported that neurons secrete tau, and several therapeutic strategies aim to prevent the intracellular tau accumulation. Previously, we reported that late endosomes were implicated in tau secretion. Here, we explore the possibility of preventing intracellular tau accumulation by increasing tau secretion. Using neuronal models, we investigated whether overexpression of the vesicle-associated membrane protein 8 (VAMP8), an R-SNARE found on late endosomes, could increase tau secretion. The overexpression of VAMP8 significantly increased tau secretion, decreasing its intracellular levels in the neuroblastoma (N2a) cell line. Increased tau secretion by VAMP8 was also observed in murine hippocampal slices. The intracellular reduction of tau by VAMP8 overexpression correlated to a decrease of acetylated tubulin induced by tau overexpression in N2a cells. VAMP8 staining was preferentially found on late endosomes in N2a cells. Using total internal reflection fluorescence (TIRF) microscopy, the fusion of VAMP8-positive vesicles with the plasma membrane was correlated to the depletion of tau in the cytoplasm. Finally, overexpression of VAMP8 reduced the intracellular accumulation of tau mutants linked to frontotemporal dementia with parkinsonism and α-synuclein by increasing their secretion. Collectively, the present data indicate that VAMP8 could be used to increase tau and α-synuclein clearance to prevent their intracellular accumulation.

Genetic mutations related to ALS, a progressive neurological disease, have been discovered in the gene encoding σ-1 receptor (σ1R). We previously reported that σ1RE102Q elicits toxicity in cells. The σ1R forms oligomeric states that are regulated by ligands. Nevertheless, little is known about the effect of ALS-related mutations on oligomer formation. Here, we transfected NSC-34 cells, a motor neuronal cell line, and HEK293T cells with σ1R-mCherry (mCh), σ1RE102Q-mCh, or nontagged forms to investigate detergent solubility and subcellular distribution using immunocytochemistry and fluorescence recovery after photobleaching. The oligomeric state was determined using crosslinking procedure. σ1Rs were soluble to detergents, whereas the mutants accumulated in the insoluble fraction. Within the soluble fraction, peak distribution of mutants appeared in higher sucrose density fractions. Mutants formed intracellular aggregates that were co-stained with p62, ubiquitin, and phosphorylated pancreatic eukaryotic translation initiation factor-2-α kinase in NSC-34 cells but not in HEK293T cells. The aggregates had significantly lower recovery in fluorescence recovery after photobleaching. Acute treatment with σ1R agonist SA4503 failed to improve recovery, whereas prolonged treatment for 48 h significantly decreased σ1RE102Q-mCh insolubility and inhibited apoptosis. Whereas σ1R-mCh formed monomers and dimers, σ1RE102Q-mCh also formed trimers and tetramers. SA4503 reduced accumulation of the four types in the insoluble fraction and increased monomers in the soluble fraction. The σ1RE102Q insolubility was diminished by σ1R-mCh co-expression. These results suggest that the agonist and WT σ1R modify the detergent insolubility, toxicity, and oligomeric state of σ1RE102Q, which may lead to promising new treatments for σ1R-related ALS.

The cornea is densely innervated, mainly by sensory nerves of the ophthalmic branch of the trigeminal ganglia (TG). These nerves  are important to maintain corneal homeostasis, and nerve damage can lead to a decrease in wound healing, an increase in corneal ulceration and dry eye disease (DED), and neuropathic pain. Pathologies, such as diabetes, aging, viral and bacterial infection, as well as  prolonged use of contact lenses and surgeries to correct vision can produce nerve damage. There are no effective therapies to alleviate DED (a multifunctional disease) and several clinical trials using -3 supplementation show unclear and sometimes negative results. Using animal models of corneal nerve damage, we show that treating corneas with pigment epithelium-derived factor (PEDF) plus docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) increases nerve regeneration, wound healing, and tear secretion. The mechanism involves the activation of a calcium-independent phospholipase A2 (iPLA2) that releases the incorporated DHA from phospholipids and enhances the synthesis of docosanoids neuroprotectin D1 (NPD1) and a new resolvin stereoisomer  RvD6i. NPD1 stimulates the synthesis of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), nerve growth factor (NGF), and of semaphorin 7A (Sema7A).  RvD6i treatment of injured corneas modulates gene expression in the TG resulting in enhanced neurogenesis; decreased neuropathic pain and increased sensitivity. Taken together, these results represent a promising therapeutic option to re-establish the homeostasis of the cornea.

N-acylethanolamines (NAEs) are endogenous lipid-signaling molecules derived from fatty acids that regulate numerous biological functions, including in the brain. Interestingly, NAEs are elevated in the absence of fatty acid amide hydrolase (FAAH) and following CO₂-induced ischemia/hypercapnia, suggesting a neuroprotective response. Tetracosahexaenoic acid (THA) is a product and precursor to DHA; however, the NAE product, tetracosahexaenoylethanolamide (THEA), has never been reported. Presently, THEA was chemically synthesized as an authentic standard to confirm THEA presence in biological tissues. Whole brains were collected and analyzed for unesterified THA, total THA, and THEA in wild-type and FAAH-KO mice that were euthanized by either head-focused microwave fixation, CO₂ + microwave, or CO₂ only. PPAR activity by transient transfection assay and ex vivo neuronal output in medium spiny neurons (MSNs) of the nucleus accumbens by patch clamp electrophysiology were determined following THEA exposure. THEA in the wild-type mice was nearly doubled (P < 0.05) following ischemia/hypercapnia (CO₂ euthanization) and up to 12 times higher (P < 0.001) in the FAAH-KO compared with wild-type. THEA did not increase (P > 0.05) transcriptional activity of PPARs relative to control, but 100 nM of THEA increased (P < 0.001) neuronal output in MSNs of the nucleus accumbens. Here were identify a novel NAE, THEA, in the brain that is elevated upon ischemia/hypercapnia and by KO of the FAAH enzyme. While THEA did not activate PPAR, it augmented the excitability of MSNs in the nucleus accumbens. Overall, our results suggest that THEA is a novel NAE that is produced in the brain upon ischemia/hypercapnia and regulates neuronal excitation.

Voltage-gated Cav1 and Cav2 Ca2+ channels are comprised of a pore-forming α1 subunit (Cav1.1-1.4, Cav2.1-2.3) and auxiliary β (β1-4) and α2δ (α2δ−1−4) subunits. The properties of these channels vary with distinct combinations of Cav subunits and alternative splicing of the encoding transcripts. Therefore, the impact of disease-causing mutations affecting these channels may depend on the identities of Cav subunits and splice variants. Here, we analyzed the effects of a congenital stationary night blindness type 2 (CSNB2)-causing mutation, I745T (IT), in Cav1.4 channels typical of those in human retina: Cav1.4 splice variants with or without exon 47 (Cav1.4+ex47 and Cav1.4Δex47, respectively), and the auxiliary subunits, β2X13 and α2δ-4. We find that IT caused both Cav1.4 splice variants to activate at significantly more negative voltages and with slower deactivation kinetics than the corresponding WT channels. These effects of the IT mutation, along with unexpected alterations in ion selectivity, were generally larger in channels lacking exon 47. The weaker ion selectivity caused by IT led to hyperpolarizing shifts in the reversal potential and large outward currents that were evident in channels containing the auxiliary subunits β2X13 and α2δ-4 but not in those with β2A and α2δ-1. We conclude that the IT mutation stabilizes channel opening and alters ion selectivity of Cav1.4 in a manner that is strengthened by exclusion of exon 47 and inclusion of β2X13 and α2δ-4. Our results reveal complex actions of IT in modifying the properties of Cav1.4 channels, which may influence the pathological consequences of this mutation in retinal photoreceptors.

The assembly of the postsynaptic transmitter sensing machinery at inhibitory nerve cell synapses requires the intimate interplay between cell adhesion proteins, scaffold and adaptor proteins, and γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) or glycine receptors. We developed an in vitro membrane system to reconstitute this process, to identify the essential protein components, and to define their mechanism of action, with a specific focus on the mechanism by which the cytosolic C terminus of the synaptic cell adhesion protein Neuroligin-2 alters the conformation of the adaptor protein Collybistin-2 and thereby controls Collybistin-2-interactions with phosphoinositides (PtdInsPs) in the plasma membrane. Supported hybrid membranes doped with different PtdInsPs and 1,2-dioleoyl-sn-glycero-3-{[N-(5-amino-1-carboxypentyl)iminodiacetic acid]succinyl} nickel salt (DGS-NTA(Ni)) to allow for the specific adsorption of the His6-tagged intracellular domain of Neuroligin-2 (His-cytNL2) were prepared on hydrophobically functionalized silicon dioxide substrates via vesicle spreading. Two different collybistin variants, the WT protein (CB2SH3) and a mutant that adopts an intrinsically 'open' and activated conformation (CB2SH3/W24A-E262A), were bound to supported membranes in the absence or presence of His-cytNL2. The corresponding binding data, obtained by reflectometric interference spectroscopy, show that the interaction of the C terminus of Neuroligin-2 with Collybistin-2 induces a conformational change in Collybistin-2 that promotes its interaction with distinct membrane PtdInsPs.

The neuronal basis of complex social behavior is still poorly understood. In honeybees, reproductive investment decisions are made at the colony-level. Queens develop from female-destined larvae that receive alloparental care from nurse bees in the form of ad-libitum royal jelly (RJ) secretions. Typically, the number of raised new queens is limited but genetic breeding of "royal jelly bees" (RJBs) for enhanced RJ production over decades has led to a dramatic increase of reproductive investment in queens. Here, we compare RJBs to unselected Italian bees (ITBs) to investigate how their cognitive processing of larval signals in the mushroom bodies (MBs) and antennal lobes (ALs) may contribute to their behavioral differences. A cross-fostering experiment confirms that the RJB syndrome is mainly due to a shift in nurse bee alloparental care behavior. Using olfactory conditioning of the proboscis extension reflex, we show that the RJB nurses spontaneously respond more often to larval odors compared with ITB nurses but their subsequent learning occurs at similar rates. These phenotypic findings are corroborated by our demonstration that the proteome of the brain, particularly of the ALs differs between RJBs and ITBs. Notably, in the ALs of RJB newly emerged bees and nurses compared with ITBs, processes of energy and nutrient metabolism, signal transduction are up-regulated, priming the ALs for receiving and processing the brood signals from the antennae. Moreover, highly abundant major royal jelly proteins and hexamerins in RJBs compared with ITBs during early life when the nervous system still develops suggest crucial new neurobiological roles for these well-characterized proteins. Altogether, our findings reveal that RJBs have evolved a strong olfactory response to larvae, enabled by numerous neurophysiological adaptations that increase the nurse bees' alloparental care behavior.

At neuronal synapses, activation of group I metabotropic glutamate receptors (mGluR1/5) triggers a form of long-term depression (mGluR-LTD) that relies on new protein synthesis and the internalization of AMPA-type glutamate receptors. Dysregulation of these processes has been implicated in the development of mental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders and therefore merit a better understanding on a molecular level. Here, to study mGluR-induced signaling pathways, we integrated quantitative phosphoproteomics with the analyses of newly synthesized proteins via bio-orthogonal amino acids (azidohomoalanine) in a pulsed labeling strategy in cultured hippocampal neurons stimulated with DHPG, a specific agonist for group I mGluRs. We identified several kinases with important roles in DHPG-induced mGluR activation, which we confirmed using small molecule kinase inhibitors. Furthermore, changes in the AMPA receptor endocytosis pathway in both protein synthesis and protein phosphorylation were identified, whereby Intersectin-1 was validated as a novel player in this pathway. This study revealed several new insights into the molecular pathways downstream of group I mGluR activation in hippocampal neurons, and provides a rich resource for further analyses.

Hirschsprung disease (HSCR) is a heterogeneous group of neurocristopathy characterized by the absence of the enteric ganglia along a variable length of the intestine. Genetic defects play a major role in the pathogenesis of HSCR while family studies of pathogenic variants in all the known genes (loci) only demonstrate incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity for unknown reasons. Here, we applied large-scale, quantitative proteomics of human colon tissues from 21 patients using iTRAQ method followed by bioinformatics analysis. Selected findings were confirmed by parallel reaction monitoring (PRM) verification. At last the interesting differentially expressed proteins were confirmed by western blot. A total of 5341 proteins in human colon tissues were identified. Among them, 664 proteins with >1.2-fold difference were identified in 6 groups: groups A1 and A2 pooled protein from the ganglionic and aganglionic colon of male, long-segment HSCR patients (L-HSCR, n=7); groups B1 and B2 pooled protein from the ganglionic and aganglionic colon of male, short-segment HSCR patients (S-HSCR, n=7); and groups C1 and C2 pooled protein from the ganglionic and aganglionic colon of female, S-HSCR patients (n=7). Based on these analyses, 49 proteins from 5 pathways were selected for PRM verification, including ribosome, endocytosis, spliceosome, oxidative phosphorylation and cell adhesion. The downregulation of three neuron projection development genes ARF4, KIF5B and RAB8A in the aganglionic part of the colon were verified in 15 paired colon samples using WB. The findings of this study will shed new light on the pathogenesis of HSCR and facilitate the development of therapeutic targets.

Drones and the European Union: Prospects for a Common Future Research paper sysadmin 30 January 2018

The debate over the use of drones is an opportunity for states to identify elements of military practice that their publics find uncomfortable or troubling, and to explain these areas of military operations in context.

Summary

• The debate over the use of drones is an opportunity for states to identify elements of military practice that their publics find uncomfortable or troubling, and to explain these areas of military operations in context.
• Countries would benefit from working together to identify accountability gaps arising from fundamental elements of military cooperation, including the role of intelligence transfers in joint operations, and the distribution of responsibility for lethal actions in the context of coalition operations.
• Transparency in investigation procedures, as well as devoting sufficient resources towards ensuring that mistakes are identified, will improve the perception of drone use among domestic audiences.
• Identifying and communicating common standards and practices of mitigating complicity should be a priority for countries to ensure that they do not unwittingly become complicit in unlawful lethal operations.
• Although operational safety may hinder the ability of states to be completely transparent, understanding among the general public could be improved through the communication of policies and procedures regarding non-lethal assistance to partner states conducting lethal operations, both inside and outside the context of an armed conflict.

Exploring Transatlantic Responses to Far-right Populism in Europe: Simulation Exercise Research paper sysadmin 1 May 2018

A new paper summarizes the findings of a recent simulation exercise exploring how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state.

Summary

• To better understand how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state, Chatham House organized a simulation event involving a group of experts drawn from the public sector, academia and NGOs.
• Simulation exercises enable the testing and modelling of the responses of different actors when presented with specific situations; participants’ interactions in a given set of circumstances are explored, and patterns of negotiation are captured and analysed.
• In this simulation, European, US and multilateral representatives were given the task of managing relations with Baltia, a fictional Eastern European state on the verge of electing a far-right nationalist, Eurosceptic government. They were then challenged to manage their relationship with Baltia after it had elected such a government, which was pushing for a ‘leave’ vote in a planned referendum on the country’s continued EU membership.
• The simulation highlighted a number of issues:
  • Limited instruments are available to liberal democratic governments where there is cause for concern regarding the outcome of an election in an allied country. There are relatively few tools at the disposal of governments to support political allies, or to prevent outcomes that are perceived as threatening democratic norms. The simulation reinforced the view that interventionist moves, either from the European Commission or from individual national governments, would be more likely to come in response to an unfavourable development rather than pre-emptively.
  • The EU, and caucuses of European states, are the main international interlocutors in this type of political crisis involving an EU member state. The US opted to play a limited role in the negotiations; the same was largely true for NATO, aside from its action in sharing intelligence about a potential coup in Baltia. France and Germany formed a natural working partnership, taking meetings together and coordinating policies first before discussing them with a wider European circle, although their positions did not always align.
  • The UK’s capacity to shape the outcome of collective EU discussions appeared more restricted, while Brexit also seemed to shape the response of other EU states to the developing situation in Baltia. Although member states were undoubtedly reluctant to see another country go down this route, they were also resolute in demonstrating a unity of approach and limited flexibility in the face of the new populist government’s attempt to divide them.

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

The World in Brief: European Court of Justice The World Today Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2021

EU brings members into line over fundamental rights

The European Union has had a challenging start to the summer trying to uphold the rule of law and avoid democratic regression in its member states.

On July 14, the Polish constitutional court ruled that the country did not have to comply with the measures imposed by the European Court of Justice against its controversial judicial reforms, citing that these measures were not in line with the Polish constitution.

The ruling Law and Justice Party, known as PiS, has introduced extensive changes to the judiciary since coming to power six years ago. In 2018, the government appointed new judges and set up a disciplinary chamber for the Supreme Court, which was given a temporary suspension by the European Court of Justice in an interim decision last year.

PiS reasoned that the changes were necessary to eliminate corruption stemming from the communist era, but critics say it merely allows the government to punish judges it regards as disloyal. Under the disciplinary system, Polish judges can have sanctions imposed on them for their judgments in the lower courts or if they refer cases to EU courts for preliminary rulings.

In the day following the Polish top court’s decision, the stand-off worsened when the European Court of Justice ruled that the disciplinary chamber undermines judicial independence and violates EU law. It ordered its immediate suspension and reiterated that the EU has primacy over national law – a vital condition countries agree to when joining the EU.

Didier Reynders, the European justice commissioner, sent a letter to Warsaw with an August 16 deadline for an answer on whether Poland would comply with the ruling. If the EU does not receive a satisfactory answer, it will impose financial sanctions on the state.

The former communist country, which joined the EU in 2004, is one of the bloc’s success stories. Its economy has boomed, and most people hold favourable views about the union – less than a handful of other member states have greater support for EU membership.

A recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung showed that ‘although only 35 per cent of Poles are satisfied with the democracy in their own country, a full 70 per cent express positive views on the state of democracy in the EU’. These figures feed into a larger picture of many Europeans welcoming the EU as a supervisory agent that is capable of intervening when individual states falter.

Recently, however, the EU has had to step up its efforts as members express anger over the gradual dismantling of fundamental rights under populist governments, not only in Poland.

The persistent backsliding in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has led to concerns in the EU parliament, which is putting pressure on the European Commission to do more to protect the EU’s values and legal order.

In a simultaneous battle in July, the commission launched legal action against Poland and Hungary, challenging anti-LGBTQ laws in those countries. It was triggered by a decision of more than 100 Polish regions to pass resolutions declaring themselves free of ‘LGBTQ ideology’, and a recently adopted law in Hungary banning any depiction of LGBTQ people on television or in books for under-18s.

An annual report on the rule of law in the union, released by the commission in July, singled out the two countries for their non-compliance. The report, the second of its kind, is a new tool to address concerns that the union was not scrutinizing democratic backsliding within its own bloc. Critics were quick to point out, however, that there is no mention of enforcement actions.

At the start of the year the EU vowed to be tougher in upholding democracy with a new regulation that lets it withhold money from member states that breach the rule of law. The EU has already delayed approving spending plans for Hungary and Poland as part of the €800 billion pandemic recovery fund.

As the European Parliament calls for the commission to reduce budget allocations to those that undermine democratic rights, Poland and Hungary could see the new mechanism put to the test this autumn.

The future of Europe post-Brexit 28 September 2021 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2021 Online

In conversation with Michel Barnier, Chief Brexit Negotiator, European Union (2016-2019).

Drawing on the diary he kept during the 1600 days of complex and acrimonious Brexit negotiations, Michel Barnier explores the political and practical implications for Europe post-Brexit.

Britain’s departure from the European Union has been a long and difficult journey. Many questions remain about what future lies ahead for the UK and EU and the relations between them.

• To what extent were UK negotiating positions shaped by politics within the ruling Conservative government? How did domestic politics in EU member states shape EU positions? What were key turning points in the negotiations?
• What are the hopes and expectations for bilateral relations between the UK and EU states?
• What is the scope for UK – EU cooperation on transatlantic issues and relations with China

This event forms part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on Effective Multilateralism.

Read a transcript.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation. Attending this event and watching the full event video is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

Europe's strategic choices 2021 4 November 2021 TO 5 November 2021 — 8:00AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Ritz Carlton Berlin

The 2021 conference will consider how Europe can navigate its political, economic and security challenges, in the context of the lasting effects of the coronavirus pandemic and an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

Registration is a two step process and you will receive a link to register on the conference virtually in advance. Please email if you wish to attend in-person.

The Eighth Annual Europe’s Strategic Choices conference, jointly developed and hosted by Chatham House, the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, aims to understand the complex set of challenges facing Europe in the areas of security, economic competitiveness, trade, technology, and global influence.

Set against the backdrop of a Europe emerging gradually from the COVID-19 pandemic, this annual forum brings together policymakers, and representatives from business, civil society and academia, to explore how European countries can best respond, individually and collectively to their common challenges in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

The conference will be hosted in hybrid format to enable speakers and participants to join in person and allow others to engage virtually via the Conference Plus digital platform. This format ensures we can connect with a geographically diverse audience whilst incorporating important elements of in person engagement in accordance with German Federal government guidelines.

Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe.

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war?

The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options?

The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions?

Review: Rediscovering Milan Kundera’s European tragedy The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

The Czech writer’s 40-year-old essay on the roots of Russia’s empire-building, ‘A Kidnapped West’, reads all too presciently, writes Stefan Auer.

A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe
Milan Kundera, Faber, £10

‘In November 1956, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, shortly before his office was flattened by artillery fire, sent a telex to the entire world with a desperate message announcing that the Russian attack against Budapest had begun. The dispatch ended with these words: “We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe.”’ Thus, Milan Kundera began his 1983 essay for the French journal Le Débat, reflecting on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.

A seminal essay

The Czech author might well have written a near-identical passage about the fraught hours immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the event, Russian tanks failed to occupy Kyiv, unlike Budapest in 1956. Nevertheless, Faber has chosen this moment, 40 years later, to republish Kundera’s seminal essay on Europe and Russian aggression in its original translation for the New York Review of Books by Edmund White. How salient are its observations today?

The essay’s original French title, ‘Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale’ (The Kidnapped West, or the Tragedy of Central Europe), described the fate of Hungary, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and, to an extent, Poland in 1980-81 at the hands of the Soviet Union. Owing to the Cold War division of Europe, the countries of Central Europe were denied their true destiny, Kundera thought, to be an integral part of the liberal, democratic West. Kundera himself fled Czechoslovakia for France in 1975.

The author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being might no longer be as well-known as he was at the height of his fame in the 1980s, but his novels and essays still deserve attention. So, it is pleasing to see Kundera’s masterpiece republished, even as it is awful to witness the enduring relevance of the questions it raises.

What did the Hungarian journalist mean when he declared his willingness to die for Europe, Kundera asked? That ‘Russians, in attacking Hungary, were attacking Europe itself. He was ready to die so that Hungary might remain Hungary and European’. The journalist did indeed die in the uprising.

It is a line that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his supporters abroad have echoed time and again: that Ukrainian soldiers are not just dying for their country, they are dying for Europe at large.

The ‘tragedy’ in Kundera’s essay was that the West didn’t care. ‘Europe hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home,’ Kundera wrote, ‘because Europe no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity.’

In other words, as the cultural sphere in Central Europe continued to defy the political restrictions imposed by the Soviet empire, it embodied the western values of freedom and democracy more than the West itself did. The extent to which this analysis remains relevant today will prove decisive for Europe’s future.

As timely as ever

Kundera’s essay is as timely as ever but in ways that both vindicate and challenge his key arguments. His suspicion of Russia has been validated. His frustration about the indifference of the West less so. But the true tragedy of Ukraine would be if the West has not changed sufficiently. So far, the West appears to be doing enough to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but not enough to defeat the aggressor.

Faber has made an excellent decision in combining The Tragedy of Central Europe with a lesser-known text by Kundera: his 1967 speech to the Czech Writers’ Congress given the year before the ill-fated Prague Spring. In it, Kundera addressed what was to become a lifelong preoccupation: the fate of small nations. ‘For Czechs’, Kundera wrote, ‘nothing has ever constituted an indisputable possession – neither their language nor their belonging to Europe.’

Rather than reflecting the size of its territory or population, a small nation ‘is one whose very existence can be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear, and it knows it.’ In this way Ukraine, Europe’s largest country, apart from Russia, is fighting to avoid the fate of Kundera’s ‘small nation’.

Historically, the ‘small’ nations of Central Europe were threatened by both Germany and Russia. But after the Second World War, the threat was from the Soviet Union, which for Kundera was indistinguishable from Russia (tacitly including Ukraine). In its expansiveness, Russia was the opposite of Central Europe. While the latter was based on the principle of ‘the greatest variety within the smallest space’, the former represented ‘the smallest variety within the greatest space’.

In this sense, authoritarian communism was the fulfilment of Russian history, Kundera argued, writing that ‘Russian communism vigorously reawakened Russia’s old anti-western obsessions and turned it brutally against Europe’. Vladimir Putin’s Russia appears to build on these same pernicious impulses.

Kundera was widely criticized for observations in his essay that smack of civilizational racism (including by me) describing Russians as fundamentally different from us: ‘Russia knows another (greater) dimension of disaster, another image of space (a space so immense that entire nations are swallowed up in it), another sense of time (slow and patient), another way of laughing, living, and dying’.

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema.

In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest.

The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity.

The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar.

Cultural diplomacy

While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries.

Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself.

This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena.

Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly.

And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion.

Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year.

In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957.

It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia.

As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied.

In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win.