Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

• Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
• The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
• Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

• Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
• Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
• If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

• The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
• Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

The primary objectives of this three-year partnership are to integrate consideration of global health security challenges into the MSC agenda, highlight the threats from infectious diseases and stimulate discussion of the importance of investment in global health, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. 

At the 2016 MSC, the Chatham House Centre on Global Health Security facilitated a roundtable on civilian access to health care during conflict and a panel session entitled 'The Plot Sickens – The Health-Security Nexus'. This marked the first time health security had been featured in the main conference, and highlights the growing significance of health security to broader global stability and security. Chatham House produced, with support from the Gates Foundation, a short film including insights from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Melinda Gates to introduce themes that were discussed as key security threats on the health-security nexus.

Initiated in 2015, the collaboration will continue with a Chatham House roundtable and a plenary session at the MSC’s Core Group Meeting in Addis Ababa in April, and further contributions to the 2017 MSC agenda.

He brings decades of experience as a health economist working in international development and health and is an internationally recognized expert on universal health coverage (UHC) and progressive health financing, operating at the highest political levels.

For the past five years, Rob has led the Centre’s work on Universal Health Coverage (UHC) as director of its UHC Policy Forum, which works on the political economy of UHC reform processes and advises political leaders and government ministries on how to plan, finance and implement national UHC reforms.

He has also worked closely with The Elders on presenting policy options on universal health reforms to heads of state across the world. Before leading the UHC Policy Forum at Chatham House, Rob was a senior health economist at the World Health Organization from 2011 to 2014, after moving from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), where he was a senior health economist. Prior to that, Rob was the deputy head of the Integrated UN Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He also spent five years working for the government of Uganda as a senior health economist, on secondment from DFID during the early 2000s.

'I am delighted to welcome Rob Yates as the head of the Centre on Global Health Security. He will bring a wealth of experience to the role at a time of risk but also great opportunity in the sector,' said Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House. 'Rob will continue to work on his own area of expertise – universal health coverage – while ensuring the Centre continues to address other major global health challenges that manifest themselves as foreign policy and international affairs problems.'

Rob replaces David Heymann, who retires from the role as the Centre marks its 10th anniversary but will remain involved in several of the Centre’s projects.

'I would also like to pay tribute to David Heymann, who launched the Centre on Global Health Security in 2009 to examine key global health challenges in international affairs and world politics,' Niblett added. 'Without David the Centre would not have had the impact that it has and I am truly grateful for his hard work and achievements over the last 10 years.'

Yates takes up his post this week.

'I am honoured to become the new head of the Centre on Global Health Security and build on the successes delivered by David Heymann and the team over the last decade,' he said. 'My priority as the new head will be to ensure that our research and activities have a real impact in accelerating progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals by focusing on improving health security and health coverage in countries across the world. Engaging in issues related to the political economy of health and health care reforms will be critical in achieving this impact.'

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, is chair of the NATO Group of Policy Experts, tasked with providing NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the North Atlantic Council with ideas on how to strengthen the Alliance's transatlantic bond ahead of September's  NATO summit in Wales. 

The group's report Collective Defence and Common Security: Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance was published on 10 June for discussion at a NATO conference in Brussels on the transatlantic bond.

 

Executive Summary 

Key points from the Policy Experts report to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, released at the Conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond in Brussels on 10 June 2014:

• Transatlantic security cannot be taken for granted. Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO needs to reaffirm its value around the twin objectives of collective defence and common security. 

Upholding peace and stability in Europe 

• The commitment under NATO’s Article V to treat an attack against one as an attack against all must be credible, and NATO members should take concrete steps together to make it so. Tallinn should be as secure as Toronto. 

• There can be no return to a ‘strategic partnership’ between NATO and Russia so long as Russia’s actions threaten European security.

• European governments bear particular responsibility for ensuring their own territorial security. They must invest in the necessary R&D, equipment and deployable capabilities. No amount of ‘smarter’ defence will compensate for a failure to reverse falling defence spending.

• NATO needs to develop effective responses to the ‘non-linear’ forms of aggression seen during the crisis in Ukraine. But the EU should take the lead in helping its members and neighbours embed good governance practices that will lessen their vulnerability to external destabilization.

•  European countries should reduce their dependence on Russian energy. Russia’s main strength should no longer be Europe’s main vulnerability. 

• NATO’s door should remain open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance. However, existing members must be ready, willing and able to extend the full benefits of Alliance membership to them, including those in Article V.

 Confronting international insecurity 

• NATO should not turn inwards after 2014. Much of the Middle East, and North Africa face a decade of turmoil which will pose direct threats to NATO members. 

• In Asia, unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities are driving dramatic rises in defence spending. It must be remembered that the Pacific Ocean is the western flank of NATO. 

• In this context, it should not be left to the United States and a handful of others to deploy hard power beyond NATO’s borders. An over-reliance on US power projection will erode the foundations of the transatlantic bond over time. 

• NATO and the EU must also cooperate closely to deliver their comprehensive range of capabilities to manage international crises, from market access and development assistance to military intervention and post-conflict civilian support. 

• Completion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will strengthen the transatlantic community strategically as well as economically.

• NATO needs to differentiate its approach to working with its international partners. In particular, it should develop long-term cooperative arrangements with the small number of countries in Europe and beyond which have contributed actively alongside NATO to international security in recent years. 

• The NATO–Russia Council should continue to operate at ambassadorial and higher levels. This will help the two sides coordinate responses to international crises and potentially rebuild trust on European security. 

• NATO publics are increasingly sceptical about the value of any form of external intervention. Political leaders need to communicate better the deterioration of the security situation in Europe; the importance of international security to their nations' welfare and prosperity; and the need to protect the core values that underpin the Alliance, especially democratic governance, open economies and the rule of law.  

Chatham House press release: Director of Chatham House to Chair New NATO Group of Policy Experts

 

NATO press release: NATO Secretary General to attend conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond

With the Middle East in chaos and the future of many states increasingly uncertain, there is a large amount of attention as to how policy-makers in Europe and the US should respond. In particular, many in Europe are unsure of long-term US policy in light of competing American priorities, budgetary constraints and a public adverse to committing further resources abroad. In this context, it is important that European and American policy-makers understand each other’s positions.

At this all-day event, a group of experts will discuss how US policy towards the Middle East is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Paris.

Even though President Barack Obama cautioned that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ for a trade agreement with the US if the country chose to leave the EU, in the post-Brexit world a deal might be struck more swiftly. Various ideas for bringing the UK and US into a formal trade arrangement have been floated – ranging from a bilateral UK-US trade deal, or the UK joining NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico), to the UK becoming a part of the TPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership that the US is pursuing with 11 other countries along the Pacific Rim). However, one option stands out: opening the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US and EU are currently negotiating, to the UK after Brexit.

Good reasons for Britain in TTIP

First, from the perspective of the UK, signing up to TTIP would mean a more comprehensive deal with the US than a bilateral UK−US trade agreement. For instance, Britain is very keen to include financial services regulation in any trade agreement with America, but given Washington’s reluctance, this ambition might only be achievable if other countries like France and Germany throw their financial weight into the negotiations.

Second, continuing involvement in the TTIP negotiations allows London to begin securing its trade position with the US now. Though its influence in the EU may weaken as it heads for the exit, Britain could make the best use of influencing the EU position on TTIP while it is still a member. It could then accept the terms of TTIP and accede as a third party relatively quickly after exiting the EU. Official negotiations on a UK−US-only deal would have to wait until the UK has left the EU, as trade talks fall under the exclusive competence of the EU.

Third, for the US and EU, having the UK as a party to TTIP would ensure the scale of the deal is not reduced, and thereby maintain the strategic appeal and ability to set global standards. At the moment, the UK is the EU’s second-largest economy, accounting for approximately 18 per cent of GDP. With Britain in TTIP, the sheer size of the transatlantic market space will have more pull for other countries to adopt the common transatlantic rules in order to gain market access.

Fourth, the UK joining TTIP as a third party would establish the agreement as an ‘open platform’ that is available for other countries to join. Michael Froman, the United States trade representative, has characterized TTIP as being such an open agreement. EU representatives have been more ambivalent, though this is starting to change in the wake of Brexit. David O’Sullivan, the current EU ambassador to the US, recently said that as ‘we’ve always seen TTIP as a potential open platform, [the] UK could still benefit [from it] even not as a member of the European Union’. While now might not be the right time to expand the TTIP bloc beyond its original participants given that negotiations are already complex and drawn out, it would be beneficial for the negotiating partners to send a strong message that countries that are willing and able to commit to the high TTIP standards will be welcomed later on.

Obstacles to Britain in TTIP

But before the UK could be added to TTIP after Brexit, major hurdles will have to be jumped and crucial questions answered. The first obstacle is actually getting a TTIP deal, which will require significant efforts by political leaders and negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, selling the ‘UK in TTIP option’ to Brexiteers will not be an easy task. After all, Leave campaigners argued that the US−EU deal might undermine the NHS and was thus presented as one of the reasons to cut loose from Brussels. As the major rationale behind TTIP is regulatory harmonization, if the UK were to sign up to TTIP it would still have to apply many EU rules. This, however, would go counter to the arguments for leaving the EU in the first place.

Third, it will be a challenging job for the UK to untangle its trade relationship with the EU while at the same time negotiating TTIP together with the EU. It would be easiest if the UK decided to remain a member of the EU customs union. Britain would then be required to impose the EU’s external tariffs on countries like the US. This would fit seamlessly with the ‘UK in TTIP’ option. But as the UK will most likely pull out of the customs union, it will be more complicated than that.

Finally, the timing of Brexit and the TTIP negotiations could cause complications. In the unlikely event that a US-EU free trade deal is concluded and ratified while the UK is still a member of the EU, the agreement (or the parts of it that fall under national competence) would most likely continue to apply to Britain after Brexit without the need for accession. If the TTIP negotiations continue beyond Brexit, then the UK would move from negotiating as part of the EU bloc to becoming a third party. This raises the issue of whether the UK and EU continue to negotiate as one bloc vis-à-vis the US.

Special economic relationship

Still, the depth of the economic ties between the US and UK means that the TTIP option is likely to be welcomed favourably by both countries. The US is the most important single export market for the UK, with goods and services worth £45 billion shipped in 2015. Last year, the US ranked third (after Germany and China) as a source for UK imports. With nearly $1 trillion invested in each other’s economies, the US and the UK are also each other’s largest investors. Given this special economic relationship, Britain is unlikely to be at the ‘back of the queue’ in any event. But the TTIP option is the best path to preserving and strengthening the relationship post-Brexit while also realizing the wider strategic benefits of a transatlantic trade agreement.

A version of this article appeared on Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

While trade and tax remain at the heart of the difficult economic conversations between Europe and the US, a new issue has emerged as a potential source of even greater friction: data.

Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of those data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.

The rules that govern the collection, transmission and storage of data are perhaps one of the more surprising controversies in the transatlantic relationship. Similar liberal democracies with similar geostrategic interests might be expected to approach the handling of personal, corporate and government data in more or less the same way. And yet the US and its key European partners have struck different balances in the trade-offs between national security and citizens’ rights, between freedom of expression and personal privacy, and between free enterprise and market regulation.

While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.

This makes more determined efforts by US and European policymakers to agree basic principles that will guide the usage and protection of personal and commercial data all the more important. While common regulations or even greater alignment among regulators seem out of reach, a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ would provide a set of principles for more specific rules amid political landscapes and technological developments that are evolving rapidly. It could also provide the basis for firms, whether in manufacturing or financial services or health care, to draft their own voluntary standards on how they protect data even as they develop new algorithms that improve productivity, safety and customer satisfaction.

Embarrassing leaks, careful denials and endless lawsuits will continue to shape the awkward efforts of policymakers to find common ground around issues like cyberespionage, defence of common networks and the sharing of personal data with law enforcement. Cyberattacks with the aim of disrupting government operations or influencing election campaigns will add still further pressures. These will all serve as a noisy backdrop to a related but separate debate over how commercial firms should exploit the opportunities of global networks and ‘big data’ analytics while protecting national interests and privacy.

Yet, setting common guidelines for commercial data transmission and storage remains crucial both to protect the goods and services that already depend on sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, and to support the next generation of productivity gains and business opportunities.

Global firms yearn for clarity and predictability as they organize themselves to make the most of the data revolution. Neither is likely to become a reality soon. The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation will take effect in 2018, but its implementation will inevitably be coloured by the fact that American firms currently dominate the information technology business. Last year’s ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement between the US and the EU renews the permission for firms with transatlantic business interests to transfer data, subject to compliance with basic standards of protection, but the agreement remains vulnerable to European court challenges. Britain’s decision to leave the EU adds a further complication, as it establishes its own set of data protection rules that may not easily align with either European or US requirements. Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization continues to debate new rules for digital trade, even as markets like China, Russia and Brazil make up their own.

If this ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ were adopted bilaterally, say as part of the annual reviews of the US–EU Privacy Shield agreement, it could form the basis for broader cooperation on these issues, helping to drive progress in the G7 and G20 and ultimately perhaps in trade agreements under the WTO. It would hardly secure complete alignment on these questions, but it could help establish the framework for a debate that all too often lurches to extremes and risks damaging a fundamental alliance for global stability – along with a fundamental driver of 21st-century economic progress.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Linking health and security has become a mainstream approach to health policy issues over the past two decades. So much so that the discourse of global health security has become close to synonymous with global health, their meanings being considered almost interchangeable. While the debates surrounding the health–security nexus vary in levels of analysis from the global to the national to the individual, this article argues that the consideration of health as a security issue, and the ensuing path dependencies, have shifted in three ways. First, the concept has been broadened to the extent that a multitude of health issues (and others) are constructed as threats to health security. Second, securitizing health has moved beyond a rhetorical device to include the direct involvement of the security sector. Third, the performance of health security has become a security threat in itself. These considerations, the article argues, alter the remit of the global health security narrative; the global health community needs to recognize this shift and adapt its use of security-focused policies accordingly.

The world’s second-largest Ebola outbreak is ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and experts from around the world have been parachuted in to support the country’s operation to stamp out the outbreak. The signs are encouraging, but we need to remain cautious.

In such emergencies, little thought is usually given to what happens to the body-fluid samples taken during the course of the outbreak after the crisis is over. What gets left behind has considerable implications for global biosecurity.

Having unsecured samples poses the obvious risk of accidental exposures to people who might come into contact with them, but what of the risk of malicious use? Bioterrorists would have ready access to materials that have the characteristics essential to their purpose: the potential to cause disease that is transmissible from person to person, the capacity to result in high fatality rates and, importantly, the ability to cause panic and social disruption at the very mention of them.

Comparisons can be drawn with the significant international impact of the anthrax attacks in the US in 2001. Not only was there a direct effect in the US with five deaths and a further 17 people infected, but there was a paralysis of public health systems in other countries involved in the testing of countless samples from the so-called ‘white-powder incidents’ that followed.

Many laboratory tests were done purely on a precautionary basis to eliminate any possibility of a risk, no matter how remote. However, the UK was also hit when a hoaxer sent envelopes of white powder labelled as anthrax to 15 MPs.

The threat of the pathogen alone resulted in widespread fear, the deployment of officers trained in response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents and the evacuation of a hospital emergency department.

We learned from the 2014–16 West Africa Ebola outbreaks that during the emergency, the future biosecurity implications of the many thousands of samples taken from people were given very little consideration. It is impossible to be sure where they all are and whether they have been secured.

It is widely recognized that the systems needed at the time for tracking and monitoring resources, including those necessary for samples, were weak or absent, and this has to be addressed urgently along with other capacity-building initiatives.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the remaining biosecurity risk is only being addressed after the fact. To help achieve this, the government of Canada is in the process of providing a secure biobank in the Sierra Leonean capital of Freetown. The aim is to provide the proper means of storage for these hazardous samples and to allow them to remain in-country, with Sierra Leonean ownership.

However, it is already more three years since the emergency was declared over by the then director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Margaret Chan, and the biobank and its associated laboratory are yet to be fully operational.

There are many understandable reasons for this delay, including the critical issue of how best to ensure the sustainability of any new facility. But what is clear is that these solutions take time to implement and must be planned for in advance.

The difficulties of responding to an outbreak in a conflict zone have been well documented, and the frequent violence in DRC has undoubtedly caused delays in controlling the outbreak. According to figures from WHO, during 2019 approximately 390 attacks on health facilities in DRC killed 11 and injured 83 healthcare workers and patients.

Not only does the conflict inhibit the response, but it could also increase the risk posed by unsecured samples. There are two main potential concerns.

First is the risk of accidental release during an attack on a health facility, under which circumstances sample containers may be compromised or destroyed. Second is that the samples may be stolen for malicious use or to sell them to a third-party for malicious use. It is very important in all outbreaks to ensure the necessary measures are in place to secure samples; in conflict-affected areas, this is particularly challenging.

The sooner the samples in the DRC are secured, the sooner this risk to global biosecurity is reduced. And preparations for the next emergency must be made without further delay.

The following steps need to be taken:

• Affected countries must ‘own’ the problem, with clear national government commitment to take the required actions.
• Funding partners must coordinate their actions and work closely with the countries to find the best solutions.
• If samples are to be kept in-country, secure biobanks must be established to contain them.
• Sustainable infrastructure must be built for samples to be kept secure into the future.
• An international agreement should be reached on the best approach to take to prepare for the aftermath of global health emergencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.