War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Thinking out loud: Is disinformation here to stay? 10 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 October 2022 Chatham House

This event is postponed.

Have you ever wondered how Chatham House researchers approach the big deals that become research? Do you enjoy meeting other Chatham House members and engaging with questions that open your mind? ‘Thinking Out Loud’ invites a small group of members to a live, unscripted discussion with a Chatham House researcher. This in-person event is a way for researchers and members to think out loud to help shape ideas for future research.

Kate Jones, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme at Chatham House will pose some key questions facing how speech is governed in an online world:

• How has big tech influenced the way we think about speech and its limitations?

• Can disinformation be eliminated or even greatly reduced?

• Where should the responsibilities fall between government and business when it comes to speech regulation?

• What might the information landscape look like in 10 years’ time? Should that affect how we tackle disinformation today?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Members' Christmas drinks 6 December 2022 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 November 2022 Chatham House

Join us at 10 St James’s Square for a chance to raise a glass with fellow Chatham House members and staff.

This evening is a special opportunity to meet fellow Chatham House members and staff around the Christmas tree.

Please note this reception is open to members of Chatham House only. Regrettably, we are unable to register non-member guests.

Crisis in the international order 23 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

Why societies are challenging the international order?

Major global challenges, including the climate, refugee crises and the global pandemic, are increasingly revealing shortcomings in our international system and are bringing to the forefront calls for a more just world. But what is justice? 
 
Calls for justice come in many forms and from many directions - from the fair distribution of resources to the recognition of indigenous rights. While for some there is consensus on the importance of multilateral cooperation to tackle global issues, there is a sharp North/South divide at the centre of debates on issues such as the climate crisis, racial justice, and international law. Countries from the global South are demanding more equitable and redistributive solutions, for example in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, while the Global North seek the status quo. 
 
North/South division slows progress on reform. Some political actors are starting to challenge the very foundations of our global order, a move that could dramatically change the global system as we know it. 

Key questions to consider include:

• Why are there tensions between the global North and South?
• How can these issues be addressed?
• Does the global North ‘owe’ the global South some form of justice? Which form of justice?
• If these issues are not addressed, what are the implications for the current international order?

This event is held in conjunction with International Affairs.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

What is Labour’s foreign policy? 24 January 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with David Lammy, the UK shadow foreign secretary.

David Lammy MP, shadow secretary of state for foreign, commonwealth and development affairs, outlines Labour’s plan for UK foreign policy if elected to government.

He addresses the UK’s strengths and opportunities in a world that has become more divided, more dangerous, and more unpredictable. He also offers a critique of the current UK government’s approach to foreign policy, particularly at strained relationships with allies and Britain’s economic woes.

The shadow foreign secretary explores the following key questions:

• What would a future Labour government do to modernize Britain’s diplomacy and rebuild alliances to improve Britain’s global influence?

• In a new age of warfare in Europe, how would Labour pursue security cooperation with allies?

• How would Labour address high energy costs, energy security, and the climate crisis?

• As Britain’s economy falters, how can foreign policy drive prosperity at home?

• What is Labour’s plan for international development, following the UK government’s abandonment of the 0.7% commitment?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read a transcript

Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity.

Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. 

Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. 

Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community.

Key questions to discuss include:

• What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat?
• How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem?
• To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

An employment judge has cleared the way for Farah Jameel, a former chair of the BMA’s General Practitioners Committee for England (GPCE), to go ahead with claims of discrimination and unfair dismissal against the association over her removal from the post during maternity leave.Jameel, who was elected the first female chair in November 2021, was put on temporary suspension in 2022 after complaints by BMA staff. The BMA told her in August 2023 that her contract was being terminated.The contract described her as a contractor providing consultancy services rather than an employee. But in a preliminary ruling the employment judge Natasha Joffe has held that Jameel was in reality an office holder and an employee, opening the way for her claims to proceed to a full hearing by an employment tribunal.The GPCE passed a vote of no confidence in Jameel in July 2023, as a means of electing a new...

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has recommended that all women with suspected endometriosis be offered an early transvaginal ultrasound scan, even if the pelvic or abdominal examination is normal.In its updated guideline1 on the diagnosis and management of endometriosis, NICE recommends specialist ultrasound as an alternative to magnetic resonance imaging for investigating suspected cases of the condition in secondary care.The updated guideline follows recent reports from both the National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death2 and Endometriosis UK which highlighted problems with delayed diagnoses, partly owing to a lack of awareness among healthcare professionals of the condition and how it presents. Such delays can result in prolonged suffering, ill health, and risks to fertility, the reports warned.Other new and updated recommendations include asking women with suspected endometriosis if any first degree relatives have a history of the condition, and considering neurodiversity when taking into account...

I’m often asked if I miss working in the House of Commons. Of course I do; it’s one of the most amazing places in the world and remains the cockpit of our nation.There are obviously days I miss it more than others, usually around the big national moments. Whatever your view of Kim Leadbeater’s private member’s bill—the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill—its second reading this month will be one of those big moments.Kim is a friend of mine, and we spoke before she decided to put her bill forward after it topped the private members’ ballot at the start of the new parliament. My advice was to proceed with great care, to remember that this will take over your career in many ways, and to read the report produced earlier this year by the Health and Social Care Committee, which I chaired, on the subject of assisted dying/assisted...

Concerns are mounting over whether the NHS can meet key performance targets this winter, NHS Providers has said, after a survey of trust leaders highlighted pressure on hospitals, ambulance services, and community and mental health teams.1Over nine in 10 of the leaders who responded (96%) said that they were extremely or moderately concerned about the effect of winter pressures on their trust and local area. The most common reasons for concerns related to financial constraints and staffing provision. The top three greatest risks to the provision of high quality patient care over winter were identified as delayed discharge (57%), social care capacity (49%), and acute care bed capacity (43%).NHS Providers surveyed 171 trust leaders from 118 trusts in September and October, accounting for 56% of the provider sector.Most trust leaders (79%) were worried or very worried about whether their trusts had capacity to meet demand for services over the next...

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Culture notes: Populists of the world unite The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

America’s hard-right has successfully played a long game at home, and now it’s schmoozing Europe. We should be worried, says Catherine Fieschi

The politics of advanced democracies is a rather Janus-faced affair these days. No sooner have we breathed a sigh of relief at the results of the French presidential election than a leaked United States Supreme Court document on Roe v Wade signals American abortion rights are under threat. 

Yes, Europe seems to be maintaining political unity in its support of Ukraine, and the US is lavishing eye-watering sums on it both in military and humanitarian aid. Yet one cannot help but feel that these might be short-lived spells of relief in the face of mounting storm clouds on the political horizon. Both at the domestic and international level, populist politics looks to be gathering pace still. 

On the domestic front, we should be cautious in our relief. In the French elections Emmanuel Macron was indeed re-elected, and comfortably so, but there is no denying the space occupied by populist politicians on the left and the right. In the first round, Marine Le Pen gained 23 per cent of the vote, left populist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon 22 per cent, and far-right candidate Éric Zemmour 7 per cent. Add to this a record low turnout, and the picture is one of a system in which mainstream politics has overall been rejected in favour of various populist options. 

The Hungarians weren’t so lucky, and Viktor Orbán’s capture of the media and quashing of the opposition over his years in power delivered solid victory. 

What should be cause for further concern is what is happening in the United States, as well as its potential impact on European politics. A quick flick through American politics today suggests dysfunctionalities of staggering magnitude and depth, and the full extent of the success of the right-wing Republican project, as confirmed by the intention to reverse Roe v Wade. 

Any reversal of Roe v Wade is a further step towards a drastic re-territorialization of American politics: into red states and blue states, into urban v rural, into places where taxes fund public education and public goods and where they won’t. It is also about a re-territorialization of institutional power away from the federal and into state institutions. 

The words of JD Vance, the Ohio Republican senatorial candidate – author of the rather good memoir Hillbilly Elegy – pander to an ‘American heartlands’ view of the United States’ role in the world. Asked about the fate of Ukraine, Vance simply replied that he ‘didn’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another’. 

On an even more basic level, we would do well to keep in mind that there were 440 anti-voter bills in 49 states at the end of 2021 and rising, calling into question citizens’ basic rights to vote. Republicans have pursued this agenda relentlessly. They have played a long game and invested in media, education and minor and not so minor projects – all of which have secured them a social and political base that is well-disposed towards the deep reversal of the American liberal global project and that of its allies across the world.

And it is perhaps on this last point that we should be most alarmed. Between May 18-20, the Conservative Political Action Conference, an American conclave of the right, was held in Europe. Viktor Orbán gave the keynote speech, and other speakers included the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and the president of Spain’s far-right party Vox, Santiago Abascal, as well as some well-known American Trumpian voices, including Trump himself. Marine Le Pen, whose earlier appearance at the conference had met with rapturous applause, chose not to cosy-up too closely to Orbán in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections in June but she sent her deputy. 

The export of the Fox News-driven conference from across the Atlantic is deeply worrying. Up until now populists have failed in their attempts at international alliances. At the European Union level their nationalism has always been in the way of their working together, and their groups tend to be short-lived or ineffective as a result. As for American attempts in Europe, the one led by Steve Bannon, the former White House adviser, in 2020 that aimed to create an Academy for the Judeo-Christian West ended as a damp squib – possibly not helped by his dismissal from the White House amid charges of defrauding donors.

But something may be changing: the conference’s embrace of Orbán and an international smattering of ‘strongmen’ hailing from the hard-right, aligned with Putin and sup-ported by Trump and a media empire, suggests that we are entering a Trumpian-infused second act that in its triumphal revanchism is seeking to create an international right-wing populist, or even authoritarian front. This is about politics, media, but also money – something European populist parties have been short of. As Marine Le Pen explained to French voters, her party is so poor it had to borrow money from a Russian bank.  

As some have pointed out, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has complicated matters when it comes to Russian funding of disinformation to the West. Many routes have been shut down. But a new route between the US and Hungary as a platform to floss Europe with dirty money is a good replacement to the old Russian route. 
 

Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2022 7 July 2022 TO 8 July 2022 — 12:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2022 Chatham House and Online

The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish dialogue that seeks to strengthen the extensive social, economic and political partnership between the two countries.

Please note this event has reached full in-person capacity. You are welcome to join virtually via the Zoom link: https://chathamhouse.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_QFwXsXb0RoSt-1ywkuPjfQ  

The video on this page is of the opening remarks from the Belvedere Forum, with addresses from Sir Robin Niblett KCMG, Dr Sławomir Dębski, Prof Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC, Ambassador Anna Clunes CMG OBE, Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon, Min Marcin Przydacz, and Ambassador Piotr Wilczek.

This and other session videos are available to watch on the Belvedere Forum 2022 playlist on YouTube. Photos by Mateusz Jozwiak, Zuzanna Nowak/PISM.

The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish bilateral dialogue bringing together a diverse group of actors from civil society, politics, business, academia and NGOs.

It seeks to strengthen and deepen the extensive partnership between the two countries by exploring political, economic, social and cultural issues through debate and discussion.

The forum is an annual event alternating between the UK and Poland. Originally created in 2017 by the governments of the UK and Poland, the forum is now jointly organized by Chatham House and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw.

The forum brings together a diverse group of actors to debate and discuss not only current British-Polish relations, but also the British and Polish responses to key European and global challenges.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Issues to watch in 2023 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

From nuclear proliferation to African debt, here are the issues six of our expert contributors expect to make the news in the year ahead.

Europe’s energy outlook

Mike Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School

There is cautious optimism that Europe will endure this winter without an energy crisis. Gas prices have fallen, storage is 95 per cent full, and the autumn was mild. High summer gas prices cut industrial demand but domestic heating demand will be critical over the winter. Already, France’s problematic nuclear fleet and lower hydroelectric output mean Europe is using more gas to generate power. 

Russian pipeline gas supply to southern Europe has fallen by 55 per cent. While Asian demand has fallen, Europe has still paid record prices to secure additional liquefied natural gas (LNG), largely from America but also Russia. European demand for LNG this winter will push prices up, and these will rise even higher if China relaxes its Zero-Covid policy and demand recovers. However, with luck, Europe will avoid power cuts in early 2023. The problem is next winter. With less Russian pipeline gas and a tight LNG market, 90 per cent winter gas storage levels will be much harder to achieve. 

NATO’s resurgence

Alice Billon-Galland, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House and one of 14 NATO Young Leaders

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new strategic concept. Member states will reinforce NATO battlegroups and bolster higher readiness forces from 40,000 troops to more than 300,000, while striving to avoid escalation with Russia. Turkey’s attempts to block Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership will preoccupy Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General, until he leaves his post next autumn.

Expect arguments on defence spending in the run-up to the July summit in Vilnius. Although only nine of its 30 members are expected to meet the 2 per cent spending target, the debate is moving towards 3 per cent, in part to reduce dependency on American assets and hedge against the uncertainty of the 2024 US presidential election. Infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in the Baltic, will also be a focus. Otherwise, NATO ’s eyes will be on China: from its relations with Russia to the threat of cyberattacks.

Universal health reforms

Robert Yates, Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House

In response to the perma-crisis experienced by many populations this past year, some leaders are launching or extending universal health reforms. New left-wing leaders in Chile, Colombia and Brazil have promised to rebuild their publicly financed universal health systems. In Brazil, newly elected president Lula da Silva has pledged to increase public health spending and improve access to medicines. It is hoped Malaysia’s new coalition will carry forward its predecessor’s pledge to raise health spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2027 to provide a universal package of free health services.

In September, world leaders will discuss universal health coverage at the UN General Assembly. There, Chatham House will publish its Commission for Universal Health report, identifying countries in which crises may trigger new national health programmes. Might this be when a US presidential candidate announces a platform to create a publicly financed health system?

Weapons of mass destruction

Patricia Lewis, Director of the International Security Programme, Chatham House

Since its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia has attacked civil nuclear power stations, falsely accused Ukraine of possessing bioweapons and radiological bombs, and threatened to use nuclear weapons. In contrast, NATO has instead demonstrated that deterrence can be highly effective with conventional weaponry. In the coming year, the Kremlin’s nuclear brinkmanship will still be a focus. Washington will try to restart bilateral nuclear negotiations with Moscow and similarly try to engage Beijing.

Following the failure of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to reach consensus in August, the next review cycle will start by looking at strengthening the process. Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain a concern, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is a growing threat. So, we are left with a question: will 2023 be the year of  nuclear conflict or the year when states get busy again on non-proliferation and disarmament?  

Africa’s mounting debt

Joseph Asunka, Chief Executive Officer, Afrobarometer

Inflation is at historic highs in several African economies. Meanwhile, many African countries including Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo will hold  elections in 2023, driving up public spending, increasing inflationary pressures and exacerbating poverty. According to Afrobarometer data, the proportion of Africans experiencing high levels of poverty has increased from 19 per cent in 2014/2015 to  26 per cent in 2021/2022.

Worse still, many of those countries holding elections are either, like Zimbabwe, in debt distress – that is unable to honour their obligations to creditors – or at high risk of debt distress, like Nigeria. This makes the elections in Zimbabwe and Nigeria critical. The expiration of the World Bank/IMF-backed debt service suspension initiative in 2021 has only amplified this risk. What are viable policy options to tackle this dire economic predicament? A debt service moratorium, debt cancellation and serious attention to fiscal discipline.

Feminist foreign policy

Daniela Philipson García, Co-founder of Internacional Feminista, and a PhD candidate, Monash University

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) is under threat. The war in Ukraine led to strengthened military budgets and alliances at odds with FFP’s human security and peace-centred approaches. Sweden’s new right-wing government reversed its FFP. In Mexico, the first Global South country to adopt an FFP, Congress has voted to expand the military’s role to curb cartel-related violence, in contradiction of its FFP. The second anniversary of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be a moment to assess how foreign policy, diplomacy and women’s and girls’ rights have been affected globally. 

There is hope. Germany, whose coalition government adopted an FFP in 2021, is to publish more guidelines in the spring. The governments of Colombia and Chile have announced their own FFPs. Colombia’s first National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, to be announced at the UN General Assembly in September, is expected to set a standard for a region submerged in violence. 

In conversation with Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania 23 March 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

From migration to Russia and China, how is Albania responding to the geopolitical challenges of today?

In late 2022, the UK government made a pointed remark that many of the illegal migrants attempting to get into the country were from Albania. In response, Albania prime minister Edi Rama replied that targeting Albanians as the cause of Britain’s crime and border problems ‘makes for easy rhetoric but ignores hard fact’. 

This nuanced response demonstrated the challenges and complexities that Albania faces, the same as many other countries. As well as being embroiled in the major challenge of international migration, Albania has suffered from a serious cyber-attack in July 2022 from Iran. Government networks were compromised for a month with Tirana removing the Iranian embassy in the capital.

Then there is the ongoing threat from Russia and China. Nestled in the already volatile Balkans, Albania has been at the heart of international affairs in recent months.

Prime Minister Rama speaks at Chatham House to discuss:

• How is Albania responding to Russian aggression and what is its stance on Ukraine?
• Where does Tirana believe China poses the most serious threat?
• How can countries in Europe best respond to illegal migration and better control the flow of people?
• How is the region of the Western Balkans effected by the war in Ukraine and how can it contribute to the security challenges posed by the war?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Review: Rediscovering Milan Kundera’s European tragedy The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

The Czech writer’s 40-year-old essay on the roots of Russia’s empire-building, ‘A Kidnapped West’, reads all too presciently, writes Stefan Auer.

A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe
Milan Kundera, Faber, £10

‘In November 1956, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, shortly before his office was flattened by artillery fire, sent a telex to the entire world with a desperate message announcing that the Russian attack against Budapest had begun. The dispatch ended with these words: “We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe.”’ Thus, Milan Kundera began his 1983 essay for the French journal Le Débat, reflecting on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.

A seminal essay

The Czech author might well have written a near-identical passage about the fraught hours immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the event, Russian tanks failed to occupy Kyiv, unlike Budapest in 1956. Nevertheless, Faber has chosen this moment, 40 years later, to republish Kundera’s seminal essay on Europe and Russian aggression in its original translation for the New York Review of Books by Edmund White. How salient are its observations today?

The essay’s original French title, ‘Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale’ (The Kidnapped West, or the Tragedy of Central Europe), described the fate of Hungary, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and, to an extent, Poland in 1980-81 at the hands of the Soviet Union. Owing to the Cold War division of Europe, the countries of Central Europe were denied their true destiny, Kundera thought, to be an integral part of the liberal, democratic West. Kundera himself fled Czechoslovakia for France in 1975.

The author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being might no longer be as well-known as he was at the height of his fame in the 1980s, but his novels and essays still deserve attention. So, it is pleasing to see Kundera’s masterpiece republished, even as it is awful to witness the enduring relevance of the questions it raises.

What did the Hungarian journalist mean when he declared his willingness to die for Europe, Kundera asked? That ‘Russians, in attacking Hungary, were attacking Europe itself. He was ready to die so that Hungary might remain Hungary and European’. The journalist did indeed die in the uprising.

It is a line that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his supporters abroad have echoed time and again: that Ukrainian soldiers are not just dying for their country, they are dying for Europe at large.

The ‘tragedy’ in Kundera’s essay was that the West didn’t care. ‘Europe hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home,’ Kundera wrote, ‘because Europe no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity.’

In other words, as the cultural sphere in Central Europe continued to defy the political restrictions imposed by the Soviet empire, it embodied the western values of freedom and democracy more than the West itself did. The extent to which this analysis remains relevant today will prove decisive for Europe’s future.

As timely as ever

Kundera’s essay is as timely as ever but in ways that both vindicate and challenge his key arguments. His suspicion of Russia has been validated. His frustration about the indifference of the West less so. But the true tragedy of Ukraine would be if the West has not changed sufficiently. So far, the West appears to be doing enough to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but not enough to defeat the aggressor.

Faber has made an excellent decision in combining The Tragedy of Central Europe with a lesser-known text by Kundera: his 1967 speech to the Czech Writers’ Congress given the year before the ill-fated Prague Spring. In it, Kundera addressed what was to become a lifelong preoccupation: the fate of small nations. ‘For Czechs’, Kundera wrote, ‘nothing has ever constituted an indisputable possession – neither their language nor their belonging to Europe.’

Rather than reflecting the size of its territory or population, a small nation ‘is one whose very existence can be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear, and it knows it.’ In this way Ukraine, Europe’s largest country, apart from Russia, is fighting to avoid the fate of Kundera’s ‘small nation’.

Historically, the ‘small’ nations of Central Europe were threatened by both Germany and Russia. But after the Second World War, the threat was from the Soviet Union, which for Kundera was indistinguishable from Russia (tacitly including Ukraine). In its expansiveness, Russia was the opposite of Central Europe. While the latter was based on the principle of ‘the greatest variety within the smallest space’, the former represented ‘the smallest variety within the greatest space’.

In this sense, authoritarian communism was the fulfilment of Russian history, Kundera argued, writing that ‘Russian communism vigorously reawakened Russia’s old anti-western obsessions and turned it brutally against Europe’. Vladimir Putin’s Russia appears to build on these same pernicious impulses.

Kundera was widely criticized for observations in his essay that smack of civilizational racism (including by me) describing Russians as fundamentally different from us: ‘Russia knows another (greater) dimension of disaster, another image of space (a space so immense that entire nations are swallowed up in it), another sense of time (slow and patient), another way of laughing, living, and dying’.

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema.

In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest.

The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity.

The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar.

Cultural diplomacy

While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries.

Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself.

This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena.

Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly.

And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion.

Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year.

In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957.

It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia.

As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied.

In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win.