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What follows is the true and unredacted account of my tour of duty as a command leader for the Yin Brotherhood.

Map: 5p POK Kazadoom’s Notch Map generated on https://ti4-map-generator.derekpeterson.ca/

Factions: Yin, Yssaril, Nekro, Vuil’raith, Hacan.

Round 1 objectives: Engineer a Marvel (R1-1); Push Boundaries (R1-2)

Five experienced leaders gathered this weekend to prove themselves worthy. As the Yin, I found myself wedged between the Hacan (around the corner of a notch in the galaxy) and the Yssaril. Word had come down to the Blessed on Darien through our ambassadors and spies that both nearby factions were set on amassing larger fleets and armies, but to what end we were unsure. The Blessed discussed the matter at great length and decided our best defense was to rebuild our flagship the Van Hauge and to take control of as many planets as we could (more, at least, then our neighbors). That would allow us to stand firm in the face of any aggression.

As a command leader, I had heard the rumors not only of these rising neighbor armies, but also of some truly terrifying events taking place on the other side of the galaxy. The horrific Vuil’raith were actively recruiting with empty promises; telling factions whatever they wanted to hear to forge alliances. Left unchecked, they would surely seize and destroy our entire galaxy planet by planet. The Nekro Virus was also gaining strength on a planet nearby the Vuil’raith and while it was unclear who would come out the victor in the inevitable head-to-head match between them, I shuddered at the idea of either of them heading our way. Because I viewed Nekro and the Vuil’raith both as bigger threats to our Yin than Yssaril or Hacan, I decided to put all my efforts into leading my crew to Mecatol Rex as fast as possible. I knew that if we could successfully land and build up a presence, we could stand as a line in the sand against the wave of Nekro or Vuil’raith forces that would inevitably come crashing down upon us.

As time went on, I congratulated myself on recruiting warfare strategy experts and prioritizing our expansion to Mecatol Rex over building the flagship. It was the right choice. It had allowed me to maneuver our fleet onto the doorstep of Mecatol Rex. I had to explain to my Blessed brothers why we hadn’t built our flagship yet as ordered, but I pointed out that settling the planets along the way between Darien and Mecatol was in line with the orders given to seize control of new planets. Granted, we did not have more planets than our neighbors yet, but we did have more than we started with. I was sternly reminded to prioritize the flagship, especially since our spies had spotted the Hacan flagship (R1-1), but otherwise the matter was dropped.

End of R1 scores: Yin(0), Yssaril(0), Nekro(0), Vuil’raith(0), Hacan(1)

Round 2 objective: Erect a Monument (R2-1)

To provide the assistance I needed, I hired some well respected leadership strategy consultants. Their job was to provide me guidance on getting more out of my command, using the influence I’ve cobbled together. I’d been given a new objective by the Blessed – I was to gather the resources needed to build a monument to the brotherhood on one of our newly settled planets. I thought it absolutely ridiculous at a time like this. Word was that Hacan was also heading to Mecatol with a settlement force and the Blessed wanted me to make time for fundraising? Forget it. In my meetings with my brothers, I nodded and agreed on the importance of the monument, but secretly planned to prioritize what I deemed most urgent instead. Back at command, I forged ahead and reached Mecatol (MR1) before Hacan could do so. Built a space dock on her right away once construction was authorized, and then began amassing troops on the surface. At the same time, I was diligently managing the build of our flagship (R1-1) by our production teams back home on Darien.

Yssaril also finished their flagship (R1-1) and through some swift imperial strategy, settled enough new planets to control more than their neighbors (R1-2). Hacan got word that Vuil’raith had taken over a legendary planet in a distance sector (VS1) and in response intensified their own settlement efforts. In doing so, Hacan also found themselves controlling more planets than their neighbors (R1-2). Our ambassadors’ reports were increasingly worrisome – war was brewing and they were unsure where it would break out. And while the Vuil’raith were clearly planning something, the Nekro had gone completely silent. Our scientists on Darien continued their research, our production teams added more ships to our fleet, and we all waited for whatever was coming next.

Having established a settlement on Mecatol Rex, I called for an inaugural council meeting with the other leading factions. At this first meeting, we took up a couple of interesting proposals and passed a new law implementing technology that allowed all Alpha and Beta wormholes to connect.

End of R2 scores: Yin(2), Yssaril(2), Nekro(0), Vuil’raith(1), Hacan(2)

R3 objective: Discover Lost Outposts (R3-1)

Pleased with the completion of the Van Hauge, the Blessed advised that our intel had intercepted some encrypted communications about an objective the other factions’ were working on – to conduct in-depth explorations of their new settlements and identify any undocumented resources, pockets of political influence, or technology specialties. Any gains discovered during exploration were to be documented and written up in attachments to the planetary profiles faction leaders kept on hand for reference. I was told to keep on the efforts to settle more planets than our neighbors and to emphasis exploration of any new settlements. I was to report back when I’d successfully identified at least two different planets with enhancements worthy of documentation attachments. There was no more mention of the monument, and I was glad to have that off my to-do list. I decided to hire some tech strategy consultants to help develop new tech that could aid our explorations.

Soon after I’d turned my attention to new settlements and exploration, the Nekro launched a direct attack on my fleet guarding Mecatol. I’m not the best negotiator and had been unable to secure the contractors needed to implement an imperial strategy, but holding onto Mecatol was still imperative for blocking the advancement of Nekro or the Vuil’raith toward Darien. Additionally, we had built a good rapport with everyone on Mecatol and their influence on the council was powerful. So I dug my heels in and fought. A couple of my destroyer pilots kamikazed their ships into the Nekro fleet, but it was not enough to stop them. They held the airspace above Mecatol while at the same time building their flagship in another production facility they controlled elsewhere (R1-1). Luckily for us, they underestimated the fortitude and persuasiveness of our infantry. We were able to turn at least one of their advancing infantry against them and through the strength of our troops, we held the planet. Still, they did not leave the system, so we had to make peace, at least temporarily, with their looming presence above us.

There was a skirmish between the Nekro and the Vuil’raith as well, and there also, the Nekro had come out ahead. After the battle, Vuil’raith regrouped and turned their efforts toward building their flagship (R1-1). Nekro had also been reported to be gathering relic fragments as they conquered and explored, only instead of holding onto them to reassemble a relic, our spies came back with word they were purging them (NS1). While all of this was going on, Yssaril was quietly continuing to settle and explore planets. Our spies kept a close watch on them and every step of progress they made was immediately relayed to the Blessed. Eventually, my superiors sent me a reprimand via encrypted message wanting to know why I still hadn’t made more progress with the attachments when Yssaril had already done so (R3-1). Worse, the Hacan commander had managed to submit 2 attachments for planetary profiles under their control (R3-1) AND build a monument to their leadership (R2-1). Now the Blessed were jealous and angry and every communication from them I received reflected that. I had faith in my strategy, but I was going to have to have something more to show for myself when I spoke with my brethren. When I got word from my construction team that we’d build a third space dock across our systems in record time (YiS1), I forwarded the progress report directly to the Blessed, hoping it would soothe them.

Another council meeting was called, and even though I wielded the most influence of any leader present, none of the proposed legislation before the council interested me much. Certainly nothing to really shake things up in favor of the Yin. I mostly abstained from voting and mentally prepared for my upcoming status report meetings with the Blessed.

End of R3 scores: Yin(3), Yssaril(3), Nekro(2), Vuil’raith(2), Hacan(4)

R4 objective: Raise a Fleet (R4-1)

I really wanted to implement the famous imperial strategy I’d heard so much about, as when a faction holds Mecatol, it’s especially rewarding for them. But you need the right experts who know how to do it and Hacan always managed to grab that team it each time their contract came up for renewal. One time, even after they’d agreed to go work for another faction, Hacan pulled out some fancy datahub tech and persuaded them to come back over to work with them. So I never got my turn with them. After my research consultants rolled off their contracts, I reached back out to our warfare experts who were on the market again. I wanted to bring them back under contract for guidance in troop redeployments. We had a problem with ship crews’ that fulfilled a deployment order and then wanted to rest on location for an extended amount of time before being redeployed. They’d gotten their union involved and it was a mess and I hoped the warfare strategy team could persuade at least one of our most essential crew teams to head back out sooner than they’d planned.

At my next status meeting, my brothers were frank with me. They were encouraged by my construction feat, but I was not back in their good graces yet. They told me I was to build my fleet up to 5 in at least one system (R4-1), but preferably in as many systems as possible. They were also interested in the spoils from the cultural planets my crews had been settling and asked me to have at least 4 under my control (YiS-2). I was easily able to do both of these things, and so our working relationship was going very well. With the Blessed giving me some breathing room, I took time for planning my own goals and priorities.

Hacan had been making a lot of noise about taking over Mecatol and the Vuil’raith leveraged the general atmosphere of distrust and anxiety to approach me directly about a potential alliance. It might be just what I reported before – that the faction knows how to say whatever you want to hear to get you on their side. But it also might be that the rumors of their all consuming evil were vastly overdramatized. All I know is they gave me some useful tech that allowed my production teams to go above and beyond their production limits. And I agreed to look the other way should they decide they wanted to stomp out Hacan or Nekro. And why shouldn’t I make such a deal? They never did anything to me or our people whereas Nekro had attacked us. There were also confirmed reports that the Nekro had built an impressive monument to themselves on one of the planets they had recently assimilated (R2-1). And Hacan needed to be stopped before they got any more powerful. Recently they had amassed 5 ships in one system (R4-1), won a battle with their flagship (HS1), and come to control enough planets to give them 12 influence votes on the council (HS2). No doubt the Blessed would have been thrilled with the Hacan commander, were he set up to answer to them.

At our third council meeting, Yssaril, Nekro, and Vuil’raith reported they now each had at least one 5 fleet system to serve as deterrents (R4-1) for aggression. Thank God I’d prioritized that myself or the Blessed would have really been up my ass. Nekro passed around pictures of the monument they recently built. It was absolutely hideous. I made no bones about saying so and they deflected with slander that I was just salty about their blockade of Mecatol. As we brought each agenda item up for consideration, Nekro pushed hard to get a seemingly dull law passed. I should have figured out their angle sooner, but I was distracted by the Vuil’raith who were on me to pay back that tech share by voting for them on an upcoming agenda item. At the end of things, the law Nekro was pushing was passed (NS2) and with my influence, the Vuil’raith was selected by the council as the elected beneficiary of a boost to their military operations (VS2).

End of R4 scores: Yin(5), Yssaril(4), Nekro(5), Vuil’raith(4), Hacan(7)

R5 objective: Command an Armada (R5-1)

In my next debrief with the Blessed, I told them all that had happened at the council meeting. I warned them especially of Hacan’s growing power, but they didn’t take me as seriously as I’d hoped. The Hacan had not attacked us in any memorable fashion (perhaps an accidental ship collision here or there) and wouldn’t it be better for them to come out on top versus Nekro or Vuil’raith, the destroyer of worlds? I didn’t have the heart to tell them I’d already made some preliminary deals with the the Vuil’raith. Their minds were made up on the more pressing threat. The Blessed presented me with my latest assignment – build up my fleet to 8 ships in a single system. A show of force to deter Vuil’raith and Nekro. I tried to remind them our great strength was in our infantry and holding the ground (especially with our Yin Spinner tech), not our pilots, but they didn’t care to listen. They sensed my reluctance and offered up double the cash incentive if I could get it done before the next council meeting. I told them I’d work on it, but as usual, I had other plans.

As always, Hacan lured away the Imperial strategy experts when they came off their contracts so I reached out to our on again off again leadership consultants. I also focused on settling more planets, including a few intrusions into Yssaril territory. They were in the midst of a monument building project (R2-1) and completely distracted so there was no retaliation even though I’d braced for it. The Nekro and Vuil’raith faced off against each other aggressively again. The tension between all of the factions was growing but despite our petty grievances with each other, all of us kept our eyes fixed on Hacan.

Just before the council met again, word came in that Hacan, Yssaril, and Nekro had each managed to build up a fleet of 8 powerful ships (R5-1) within a system they controlled. Dammit! The Blessed were going to be upset with me again. At least I’d settled enough additional planets to outnumber my neighbors as they’d asked me to do eons ago (R1-2). The Vuil’raith had done this also (R1-2), facing the increasing threat of the Nekro at every turn. While I didn’t have the fleet count the Blessed had asked of me, all my planet settling and incursions into Yssaril territory had given me control of planets in the same system as other factions (YiS3), which provided great accessibility for continuing covert operations. The Vuil’raith commander reported to me through back channels that Yssaril was creeping into systems neighboring their home planet in our galaxy (YsS-1). Yssaril had also formed a loose, informal alliance with the Nekro. Under friend of my enemy logic, that made the Yssaril a new enemy of the Yin.

The fourth council meeting was extremely stressful. Hacan was confronted regarding their massive fleet build up and asked of their plans. Instead of answering the question, they reminded us how they’ve always been generous in trading with us all, and how they had rarely shown any aggression. But we weren’t buying it. The continual build up of their fleet and infantry had to point to something big they were planning. Hacan was given a mandatory military reduction directive from the council. They would be sent back out from the council meeting with a limit of 3 command actions, 3 ships max in any fleet, and only permitted to conduct two strategic actions until we met again, unless they could gain more influence through better leadership. It passed by a wide margin, and I have to say Nekro looked especially pleased. As much as I fear and hate Nekro, I do not trust Hacan and the Vuil’raith commander had said that was wise on my part.

End of R5 scores: Yin(7), Yssaril(8), Nekro(7), Vuil’raith(5), Hacan(9)

R6 objective: Manipulate Galactic Law (R6-1)

Nekro announced a bold move – they had instigated a scheme their lawyers had crafted to force their consultants into an automatic follow-on contract. Each other faction was now doing the same, utilizing a fine print clause to make it so. I knew the Blessed would be disappointed if I released our teams, so I let our contractors know I was exercising the fine print as well and they belonged to us for a little while longer, whether they liked it or not. I needed to keep the Blessed content. My ears still stung from the berating comments my brothers had laid into me during our last status meeting following the fourth council. How had I let so many other factions get ahead of us on fleet size? Didn’t I see the danger? Did they need to replace me or could I get my head on straight and get us into a position of power? If Hacan or another faction were to take control of everything, there was a good chance they’d shut down our genetic cloning operations. They were prejudiced against our ways. They didn’t understand the threat of Greyfire.

It was true that Hacan was exceedingly close to seizing control of everything, but I couldn’t see an easy path for me or my fleet to stop them. Perhaps if I had built up the fleet as the brothers had ordered, but it was probably too late for that to make a difference now. What I did do, was send a message out across all channels – even to the Nekro – that I pledged my support in temporary alliance to all who would seek to destabilize Hacan.

Nekro moved first, easily taking control of multiple Hacan systems (although Hacan managed to hold the planets). Vuil’raith charged in next, infiltrating the Hacan home system and taking an entire planet hostage until Vuil'raith agreed to stand down.

Meanwhile, I’d gotten an urgent dispatch from the Blessed. If I couldn’t take Hacan out militarily, the Blessed counseled that I needed to gain enough influence to impose even greater consequences on them during the next council meeting. To do this, according to their calculations, I needed to amass at least 16 votes of influence. So while all of the military operations against Hacan were going on, I moved into more of Yssaril territory to capture more planets so that we’d have a greater voice on the council. I also made a far reaching jaunt into Nekro systems thanks to one of our command heroes. I was bound and determined to collect enough planets under Yin control so that I would have the strength to stop Hacan. I also prioritized building out our fleet to 8 ships (R5-1). Better late than never.

Just before the fifth council meeting, both Vuil’raith and Nekro publicly announced they’d raised enough influence among their settlements to be in a position to heavily influence the next wave of galactic laws (R6-1). Nekro had also beaten up Vuil’raith badly in an anomaly (NS3) equidistant between their areas of control. And Yssaril had brought in a report of some new strategic tech they’d adapted (YsS2). As for Hacan, they came into the council meeting with their head down and shoulders slumped. They hadn’t been able to accomplish much of anything lately with the constant onslaught of attacks from all sides and the Vuil’raith hovering over their home planets. Did I feel sorry for them though? While I considered it, the Vuil’raith commander gave me a wink across the table. No, I did not feel bad for them at all. Yssaril proposed we give an official support of power vote to the faction that most aided the Hacan disruption. We were all in favor of that and passed the measure, but when it came time to decide who should receive the award, there was contention. Nekro made a good case for themselves, but we felt the honor belonged to the Vuil’raith and gave it to them instead (A1).

End of R6 scores: Yin(9), Yssaril(9), Nekro(10), Vuil’raith(7), Hacan(9)

R7: Subdue the Galaxy (R7-1)

I took news of all these developments (leaving out the wink from the Vuil’raith commander) back to the Blessed. They were extremely happy to hear the Hacan had stalled, even if it was temporary. We discussed the new problem – Nekro was gaining power and now they were on the verge of becoming unstoppable. In fact, they had assimilated not only our faction tech but Hacan’s! They were now able to seize control of any strategic contract team when needed during strategy contract negotiation windows. We could be faced with Hacan peeling away imperial strategy experts away from us and then Nekro peeling them away from Hacan. I told the Blessed that we had one last hope. The latest round of contract negotiations was approaching, and I was slotted last to recruit. My plan was to grab some strategic contractors who weren’t of any value to Hacan, but whose priority rank meant that I’d be given audience in my bid for total control before the other council members. If we could prove ourselves worthy, we could take control of the new empire before any of the other factions even got up to speak. I explained this would be possible because Yssaril always preferred to hire research contractors, Nekro would hire imperial strategy experts as it was the only way for him to win ultimate control, Vuil’raith would hire whomever they chose (they weren’t a threat to us), and then Hacan would take something they didn’t care too much about that was a higher number and then force Nekro to switch. The Blessed approved of my plan and suggested I continue to settle new planets – at least 11 outside of Darien – to give me firm footing on seizing total control. They didn’t have any new secret objectives to hand down to increase my power, but they said intel reports advised some of the relics could increase my power if I happened upon the best ones.

When strategy consultant negotiations began, I found I was wrong about Yssaril – their commander hired warfare experts instead of tech. But I was right about Nekro. And Hacan chose to hire tech experts instead of stealing away the imperial experts from Nekro. This was probably because they realized Nekro would just lure them back. So I hired some trade experts, knowing Hacan would not want to steal them from me. It was hard to leave the leadership consultants on the table, but I couldn’t risk losing them to Hacan if I hired them.

Based on my hiring choices, I held a better initiative than anyone else in the council except Vuil’raith. If everyone could just keep Nekro held back until the council was ready to meet again, and if I managed to find a powerful relic, I could seize control for the Yin.

With limited command actions due to a lack of leadership strategy consultants, everyone was careful with their actions. Except for the Yssaril of course, who kept stalling, as is their way. The faction commanders plotted in the open how to stop Nekro. It wasn’t going to be that hard. They didn’t have a massive fleet yet (they had the capacity but not the build out), nor did they have 11 planets outside their home system. They’d have to work for either. And work for them they did, but they were stymied at every turn by the Vuil’raith and perhaps once even by myself. The Nekro commander boasted about finally having more planets than their neighbors (R1-2), but that was truly too little, too late. Having neutralized the Nekro, and seeing the Hacan was still too weak to assume power, everyone’s attention turned toward Yssaril and our people, the Yin. It looked hopeless for me, so the focus remained on Yssaril who still held secret objectives that could bring them a measure of power.

I spent my time shoring up troops and ships on Mecatol and Primor, and as I turned in a handful of relic fragments, I prayed for a power granting relic. Nope. I pulled a relic that allowed me to destroy a planet. I would have to eventually face my Blessed brothers and explain to them why I had failed. My hopes dashed, I sent out my trade consultants. At least I could gather some trade goods to bring back to Darien. To my surprise, Hacan offered to give me 6 commodities in exchange for 2 trade goods and 2 commodities. It seemed to be for no particular good reason, but I suppose they needed the trade goods to continue rebuilding their fleet. They were not giving up yet on themselves. I accepted the trade as they truly seemed repentant and in no position to harm me.

To finish things up what I assumed would be my last tour of duty, I looked for a high value target to destroy. Something with a lot of infantry or some structures. Then, at least I could tell the Blessed I went out with a bang and the event would be listed in my biography. I found it in a Vuil’raith system adjacent to their home. I called a 1:1 meeting with the Vuil’raith commander. While he watched, I unrolled a map of our galaxy and pointed to one of the planets bordering his home system. “I choose this planet”, I announced, as I showed him mercy with an advanced warning to evacuate. With a horrified look in his eyes, the Vuil’raith commander said, “Please don’t”, and pledged the support of the Vuil’raith for a Yin Brotherhood throne (SFTT1). Adrenaline surging, I agreed in earnest. I had not seen this coming and it was going to make all the difference.

Suddenly the factions were buzzing again. We picked up the chatter on every channel we interception. Now *I* would have the first audience in a bid for the thorne. I had 12 planets outside my home system, proving the Yin brotherhood worthy of ruling. Could they stop me? Only Nekro and Yssaril were still under normal operations at the time; the Vuil’raith and Hacan leaders had gone on holiday until our next council meeting. Vacation or not, they were still in communication with Nekro and Yssaril. Scheming together, the entire council plotted against me. They tried to work out the easiest planets to take from our people to bring our planet count below 11. Nekro made an incursion into one my systems and took a planet. Then came wave after wave of Yssaril attacks. After reducing our territory to just 9 planets outside our home system, there was a pause. The pause and the realization I had been calmly waiting for. The Yssaril commander called for a 1:1 with me, and when I arrived she wanted me to answer a burning question. Had I already submitted proof to the Blessed that I had completed the objective I’d been given to produce 16 votes of influence? “I have not”, I replied with a smile. “And how much influence does the Yin hold at this moment?” “TWENTY-SIX votes of influence”, I replied, with an even bigger smile. There wasn’t enough attacking and stalling in the world for Yssaril to knock us down below 16. I could buy 9 votes in trade goods alone, 4 from my heavily guarded home system patrolled by our suicide leaning flagship, and much more spread across the 6 or seven systems I controlled.

The Yssaril commander studied the situation from every angle. It was impossible. She had overlooked the key information – that I had finished my last tour of duty meeting both public objectives and she’d only stripped one of them from me. There was nothing she could do. She ended her tour of duty, dejected. Just before our next scheduled council meeting, Vuil’raith called a press conference on the steps of the council building to announce that they had won a measure of power by completing a secret objective they’d been given. (VS3). He also announced he had two planets with attachments under his control (R3-1). The crowd cheered for him. Everyone was really warming to these alleged monsters of the galaxy. And then I took to the steps and announced that our faction - the Yin brotherhood - who had peacefully resettled Mecatol and reinitiated the galactic council, were leaning on our 16 votes of influence to seize complete and total control of the galaxy. A gasp was heard from the crowd. And then cheering. Immense cheering from all sections of the crowd.

And that is how Yin took the unexpected Win.

End of R7 scores: Yin(12), Yssaril(9), Nekro(11), Vuil’raith(10), Hacan(9)

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Global trade 2025 27 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join government officials, global business and civil society leaders to discuss how economic security policies are changing the global landscape and what stakeholders can do to prepare for this.

You will receive further instructions regarding your registration soon.

The path towards economic security

The dynamics of global trade have reached an inflection point. Growing geopolitical fragmentation has driven competition and emerging trade wars in key regions. The architecture at the heart of global trade is increasingly outdated in addressing the needs of a modern, digital economy. Meanwhile the implications of global megatrends such as climate change are increasingly felt throughout global supply chains – demanding a coordinated response from the international community.

The resulting instability in this environment is driving government decision makers to embrace the developing trend of economic security. The principles of free trade, which have for decades formed the bedrock of the multilateral trading system, are taking a back seat in this evolving landscape. From the use of subsidies and tariffs, to the redrawing of supply chains with an eye to the geopolitical alignments of the future and through to the rise of ‘mini-lateral’ trade agreements, all these shifts will have profound implications for years to come.

The 2025 Global Trade Conference traces the implications of this path towards economic security within the global trade landscape, exploring the shifting dynamics across key regions, and examining the influence of global megatrends such as advanced technological development and climate change.

Why attend?

• Gain unique insights into the role that economic security will play in the future of global trade and what this means for business and government stakeholders alike.
• Hear from industry leading speakers on the crucial topics that will define the global trade landscape in the years to come.
• Come together with industry peers to meet in-person at Chatham House, network with leading experts in global trade and benefit from access to exclusive, in-person sessions held under the Chatham House Rule.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

Building trust in trade deals – is human rights monitoring the answer? 27 May 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 May 2021 Online

Exploring the arguments in favour of more robust human rights monitoring systems and why effective monitoring mechanisms have proved so difficult to get up and running.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

The recent signing of the EU-China Investment Agreement has reignited arguments about trade and human rights. While many trade agreements envisage human rights monitoring in some shape or form, the monitoring systems that have emerged so far are not especially coherent, systematic or impactful. 

Are the human rights commitments in trade agreements more than just window-dressing?  If so, what kind of monitoring is needed to ensure they are lived up to? 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, participants explore the arguments in favour of more robust human rights monitoring systems and why effective monitoring mechanisms have proved so difficult to get up and running in this context. 

• What factors are presently holding governments back, and where is innovation and investment most needed?
• What are the political, economic and structural conditions for fair and effective human rights monitoring of trade agreements? 
• Is human rights monitoring best done unilaterally – or should more effort be put into developing joint approaches? 
• What role might human rights monitoring have to play in governments’ strategies to ‘build back better’ from the COVID-19 pandemic?

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.

Expert

Visualizing the Data: The Evolution of Trade Tensions in Metals and Minerals Markets 18 January 2018 — 4:30PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 December 2017 Chatham House, London

Over the past decade, producer countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Indonesia, the DRC and, most recently, Tanzania have restricted exports of unprocessed precious metals, copper, nickel, cobalt and other minerals in an attempt to support, or create, downstream processing industries and jobs or increase revenues. These moves have invariably created tensions with trading partners. Research suggests that export restrictions are not the best way to achieve such policy objectives and can instead harm the producer country’s economy and undermine the functioning of international metals and minerals.

Drawing on OECD and Chatham House research on resource trade, the speaker will present analysis and data visualizations exploring the drivers of past export restrictions and their political and economic impacts. They will also consider how the drivers of ‘resource nationalist measures’ are changing, whether and where export restrictions might present strategic and economic risks in the current context, and the extent to which producer and consumer governments and international governance mechanisms are prepared to address them.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Bangladesh: The Trade-Off Between Economic Prosperity and Human Rights 11 March 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Bangladesh’s recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

Recent studies have suggested that innate immune responses exhibit characteristics associated with memory linked to modulations in both vertebrates and invertebrates. However, the diverse evolutionary paths taken, particularly within the invertebrate taxa, should lead to similarly diverse innate immunity memory processes. Our understanding of innate immune memory in invertebrates primarily comes from studies of the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, the generality of which is unclear. Caenorhabditis elegans typically inhabits soil harboring a variety of fatal microbial pathogens; for this invertebrate, the innate immune system and aversive behavior are the major defensive strategies against microbial infection. However, their characteristics of immunological memory remains infantile. Here we discovered an immunological memory that promoted avoidance and suppressed innate immunity during reinfection with bacteria, which we revealed to be specific to the previously exposed pathogens. During this trade-off switch of avoidance and innate immunity, the chemosensory neurons AWB and ADF modulated production of serotonin and dopamine, which in turn decreased expression of the innate immunity-associated genes and led to enhanced avoidance via the downstream insulin-like pathway. Therefore, our current study profiles the immune memories during C. elegans reinfected by pathogenic bacteria and further reveals that the chemosensory neurons, the neurotransmitter(s), and their associated molecular signaling pathways are responsible for a trade-off switch between the two immunological memories.

6 July 2020

A booming tech sector can unleash pan-African trade The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The new African Continental Free Trade Area must embrace hyperscale data centres, cross-border digital payments and other innovations to realise its potential.

The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) not only lays the groundwork for a single market across the continent, it can act as a driving force to unleash the full potential of the technology revolution that is under way across the African continent. 

To help achieve this, the AfCFTA must go beyond simply lowering barriers to the movement of goods and services, to what the World Bank calls an ‘FDI [foreign direct investment] deep scenario’. This requires harmonizing policies on investment, competition, intellectual property rights and e-commerce to encourage FDI at a greater scale. 

The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA could increase income across the continent by 7 per cent by 2035 (an additional $445 billion), mainly by boosting intra-regional trade in manufactured goods and lifting approximately 40 million people from extreme poverty. Under an FDI deep scenario, the projected income growth jumps to 9 per cent by 2035, supporting 50 million people out of extreme poverty. 

The initial focus of the AfCFTA is on movement of goods and services and the associated financial flows through the establishment of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), a technology that enables instant local currency payment across Africa without first converting to a hard currency. In addition, harmonizing policies and easing the movement of data could enable technology to accelerate the anticipated AfCFTA income growth.

Global venture capital is pouring in

There is no doubt the African tech industry is growing. In 2021, 681 African technology companies raised $5.2 billion in equity venture funding, up from $2 billion in 2019, according to Partech Partners’ annual Africa Tech Venture Capital report. 

It is understandable why the industry has attracted global venture capital. While tech businesses are often initially focused on meeting needs in their home markets, most have a strong desire to tap into the pan-African market, with its 1.3 billion consumers across 54 countries and a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion. This in turn should attract global venture capital to invest in Africa. 

The AfCFTA has created a framework for technology-led companies to scale across the continent in a way that will impact digital infrastructure, logistics, energy and much else. For example, Africa’s hyperscale data centre capacity would benefit from the ability to locate centres in the lowest cost jurisdiction with the best energy availability and to use that to power cloud storage across the continent.

Yet various regulatory constraints, including the desire for each state to own its population’s data on local servers, prevent that. As a result, African data centres are less competitive than those in America and China. 

Similarly, logistics and other sectors would be transformed if the information on goods in transit, such as digital customs documentation, could move easily across borders while being tracked across all 54 countries. Financial services would also benefit from the ability to pay across borders in a low-cost, frictionless way.

Fintech companies should be encouraged to build technology solutions linking to PAPSS and other initiatives to accelerate the adoption-of-use cases that PAPSS supports – such as intra-Africa instant payment, embedded finance and remittances services.

AfCFTA may also unlock mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity among African and international firms. Technology companies are using M&A to enter new markets, as the international payments platform Stripe did when it acquired the Nigerian business Paystack, and the payments business MFS Africa did when it took over the fintech start-up Baxi. 

Governments and regulators must support innovation

Given the difficulty of a country-by-country organic growth strategy across Africa, M&A is likely to increase in various technology sectors over the next few years. With the anticipated ease of doing business that the AfCFTA could facilitate, we are likely to witness further welcome consolidation, creating larger corporates that create more jobs and increase tax revenues. 

To unlock the benefits that technology will bring, governments and regulators need to play a supportive role in encouraging innovation. They will need to ensure the appropriate consumer protections are in place without stifling creativity through regulation, inefficiencies or rent-seeking. 

At the same time, governments and regulators should not permit themselves to be held to ransom by dominant incumbents, such as banks and mobile operators in the fintech space, at the expense of stifling technology companies looking to disrupt their respective industries. 

Only then will the AfCFTA allow Africa to benefit from its tech potential. 

Risana Zitha writes this article in a personal capacity

Tackling Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa: Economic Incentives and Approaches Research paper sysadmin 5 October 2018

Combating illegal wildlife trade and further pursuing conservation-development models could help generate considerable economic benefits for African countries, while ensuring the long-term preservation of Africa’s wealth of natural capital.

Summary

• The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) significantly impacts African economies by destroying and corroding natural, human and social capital stocks. This hinders the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has an impact on national budgets. Illicit financial flows from IWT deny revenue to governments where legal wildlife product trade exists and perpetuate cash externalization. IWT diverts national budgets away from social or development programmes, increases insecurity and threatens vulnerable populations.
• In expanding wildlife economies and pursuing conservation-driven development models, governments can protect their citizens, derive revenue from wildlife products, and establish world class tourism offerings. The illegal exploitation of wildlife is often due to a failure to enforce rights over those resources, where rights are unclearly defined or not fully exercised. Southern African countries have defined these rights in various ways, contributing to regional differences in conservation practices and the socio-economic benefits derived from wildlife resources. Combating IWT is an important step towards allowing legitimate business and communities to develop livelihoods that incentivize stewardship and connect people to conservation.
• The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has several framework policies for the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs). These promote local stewardship across multiple land-use areas to conserve biodiversity and increase the welfare and socioeconomic development of rural communities. Private-sector partnerships also increase skills transfer, improve access to investment finance, and expand economic opportunities, including through the promotion of local procurement. The economic benefits of TFCAs extend beyond tourism.
• The economic value of African ecosystems is often under-recognized because they remain unquantified, partly due to the lack of available data on the broader economic costs of IWT. Improved monitoring and evaluation with key performance indicators would help governments and citizens to appreciate the economic value of combating IWT.

Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade Research paper sysadmin 20 September 2019

This paper explores a set of core trade-related issues affecting the food and land use system, and proposes constructive ways forward in reconfiguring the global trading system towards delivering a more sustainable and healthy diet for all.

• Meeting future global food security requirements is not just about quantity; it is also about meeting growing needs in a way that safeguards human as well as planetary health. But national priorities and policies often remain out of sync with aspirations for more sustainable and healthy food systems.
• International trade and trade policies play an ambiguous role in the current food system. With 80 per cent of the world’s population depending on imports to meet at least part of their food and nutritional requirements, trade has a unique function in offsetting imbalances between supply and demand. However, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or pricing frameworks that internalize environmental, social or health costs, trade can exacerbate and globalize challenges associated with food production and land use trends such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and the shift to unhealthy diets.
• Over the last two decades, trade in agricultural products (excluding intra-EU flows) has more than tripled in value, to reach $1.33 trillion. The geography of global food trade flows has also shifted, primarily towards South–South trade, which now accounts for roughly a quarter of total agricultural trade flows. The nature of global trade has changed drastically, with traditional exports such as wheat and coffee growing slowly at around 2 per cent per year, while products such as palm oil, fruit juice, soft drinks and other processed products have grown at 8 per cent or more annually.
• This overall increase in trade in agricultural products raises questions about the growing utilization of resources, such as water or soil nutrients, that are embedded in those products through production and processing. Trade itself also causes negative environmental impacts, starting with greenhouse gas emissions associated with transport and storage. If the environmental cost associated with production and trade is not reflected in the final price of goods, trade may accelerate the depletion of resources or their unsustainable use.
• It is critical to ensure that trade policy options pursued by producing and consuming countries alike will support a transition to more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. The first step in addressing trade-related food systems challenges must involve rebuilding trust among policy actors. There is a need for new spaces for informal dialogue among actors, and ‘soft’ governance mechanisms that can help rebuild consensus on the best ways forward. Meeting these challenges also requires an appreciation of the complex interactions between sectoral policies (e.g. on water, land, food, etc.) and their multiple interfaces with trade policies.
• Conditioning the use of subsidies on their sustainability and/or health impacts encourages the delivery of essential public goods in ways that are consistent with sustainability and health goals. A first step therefore is the removal of perverse incentives (e.g. subsidies encouraging the overuse of fertilizers or pesticides or the overproduction of certain commodities, as well as certain biofuels subsidies) and replacing them with market-correcting subsidies.
• Trade facilitation measures for fruits and vegetables that are aimed at easing transit at the border, by cutting unnecessary bureaucracy and reducing waiting times, can improve their availability, reduce costs and improve food quality and safety for consumers. Similarly, measures aimed at improving sustainable cold storage and upgrading value chains can support better diets and consumption by increasing the availability of fresh produce on markets, especially in developing countries.
• A global food stamps programme developed through the G20 and facilitated by the UN’s food agencies could address purchasing power imbalances and tackle malnutrition in developing countries. If carefully designed, such ‘safety net’ schemes can not only contribute to improving calorific intakes but also help deliver more balanced and healthier diets. Careful attention must be given to how such a scheme would work in practice, building on experience to date with similar initiatives.
• Integrating the notion of sustainable food and inputs trade in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework can help to deliver more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. This could be achieved by likeminded countries introducing a set of goals or targets aimed at mitigating the role of trade in placing indirect pressure on biodiversity, and to encourage trade in biodiversity-based products including natural ingredients produced ethically and following sustainability principles and criteria.
• An SDG-oriented agenda for agricultural trade is needed. It could be formed by countries seeking to remove perverse incentives, guaranteeing a safe harbour for market-correcting measures, clarifying existing rules and establishing plurilateral negotiations among subsets of the WTO membership, or sectoral approaches, to address specific challenges.
• Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from trade need to be addressed. Governments could seek to achieve this through ensuring the carbon neutrality of existing and new trade deals, either by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by developing joint initiatives to tax international maritime and air transport emissions.

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

Taking Stock of Turkey's Trade Policy 11 September 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 August 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As the only large economy outside of the EU with a customs union agreement, Turkey has a unique trade policy. Amid domestic economic challenges, Turkey’s trade minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, will discuss prospects for upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union. She will also discuss relations between the UK and Turkey and outline strategies for post-Brexit trade.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Dallas Cowboys agreed to trade a fourth-round pick in the 2025 NFL Draft to the Carolina Panthers in exchange for wide receiver Jonathan Mingo and a seventh-round pick, a league source told UPI on Tuesday.

Middle and high schools in Maine are returning their iPads and switching back to laptops after a survey found that 88.5 percent of teachers and 74 percent of students in one district preferred laptops for schoolwork and instruction, reports the Lewiston-Auburn Sun Journal.

The Montreal Canadiens are not the only team in the midst of a rebuild and it's not easy for anybody, especially not for Craig Conroy who's at the helm of the Calgary Flames and will be down a first-round pick at the next draft.

The Pittsburgh Penguins traded Lars Eller to the Washington Capitals for two draft picks after a blowout loss dropped them to 6-9-2 on the season.

Former Montreal Canadiens forward Lars Eller was traded from the Pittsburgh Penguins to the Washington Capitals on Tuesday.

With a need for youth in the system and for an urgent NHL course correction simultaneously, Pittsburgh will be a team to watch in the trade market

Dopamine (DA) and norepinephrine (NE) have been repeatedly implicated in neuropsychiatric vulnerability, in part via their roles in mediating the decision-making processes. Although two neuromodulators share a synthesis pathway and are coactivated under states of arousal, they engage in distinct circuits and modulatory roles. However, the specific role of each neuromodulator in decision-making, in particular the exploration–exploitation tradeoff, remains unclear. Revealing how each neuromodulator contributes to exploration–exploitation tradeoff is important in guiding mechanistic hypotheses emerging from computational psychiatric approaches. To understand the differences and overlaps of the roles of these two catecholamine systems in regulating exploration, a direct comparison using the same dynamic decision-making task is needed. Here, we ran male and female mice in a restless two-armed bandit task, which encourages both exploration and exploitation. We systemically administered a nonselective DA antagonist (flupenthixol), a nonselective DA agonist (apomorphine), a NE beta-receptor antagonist (propranolol), and a NE beta-receptor agonist (isoproterenol) and examined changes in exploration within subjects across sessions. We found a bidirectional modulatory effect of dopamine on exploration. Increasing dopamine activity decreased exploration and decreasing dopamine activity increased exploration. The modulatory effect of beta-noradrenergic receptor activity on exploration was mediated by sex. Reinforcement learning model parameters suggested that dopamine modulation affected exploration via decision noise and norepinephrine modulation affected exploration via sensitivity to outcome. Together, these findings suggested that the mechanisms that govern the exploration–exploitation transition are sensitive to changes in both catecholamine functions and revealed differential roles for NE and DA in mediating exploration.

Researchers trained African giant pouched rats to detect commonly smuggled items, including rhino horns and elephant tusks