A new crop of digital platforms aim to address housing equity, from improving mortgage terms to providing homelessness resources. But do technical answers work for social questions?

How parents of sick kids are coping with the children's hospital crisis; what Mastodon could teach Twitter users about 'netizenship'; Bernice Carnegie's call to action for hockey; Lindsay Lohan's Falling for Christmas; and more.

Bridge House's "work-first" approach is similar to Aurora's philosophy of how best to lift people out of homelessness.

The water was known to have been contaminated for years.

A book titled The Digital Polycrisis by Cha’Von Clarke-Joell is aiming to equip readers “with the tools and knowledge needed to thrive in the digital age.” A spokesperson said, “In an era of rapid technological change, professionals face unprecedented challenges and opportunities. Job security, career development, and continuous learning are more critical than ever. The […]

Philanthropy online has recently published an article on the initial charitable response to the cyclone disaster in Burma. unfortunately bureaucratic red tape has slowed the initial response some; numerous organizations are preparing a herculean response that will save lives, and perhaps improve the domestic situation in Myanmar over the long term.

Events like these confirm the importance of fund-raising in general and telephone fund-raising specifically. Its one thing to hear about a tragedy on television and remind oneself to try and make a donation. Its quite another to receive a phone call as a situation is unfolding and have an opportunity to directly influence the outcome of that situation.

I participated in campaigns after hurricanes Rita and Katrina. I also worked on the campaign to provide relief to the victims of the Asian Tsunami, and issue of personal significance to me as I lived for many years in Indonesia. It is in times like this when innovative fund raising strategies can truly make a significant difference by fully funding humanitarian emergency relief efforts before a crisis can intensify.

There is nothing like a call to action.

Illumio’s Raghu Nandakumara argues that non-user entities represent ‘the next frontier of risk’ in cybersecurity. Read more: Why identity security is having an identity crisis

Crisis Core: Final Fantasy VII Reunion

https://www.play-asia.com/crisis-core-final-fantasy-vii-reunion-multi-language/13/70fivr?tagid=16202

Abyss of the Sacrifice 

https://www.play-asia.com/abyss-of-the-sacrifice-multi-language/13/70dr1n?tagid=16202

Everyone goes through moments of doubt. Moments when the question of “what am I doing with my life?” feels more like a heavy weight than a fleeting thought. These times, often called existential crises, are not just about feeling lost or confused—they can be pivotal moments for personal growth. For example, a common existential crisis ... Read more

The post How to Navigate an Existential Crisis and Find Meaning in Life appeared first on LifeHack.

Hardcover, Kindle, Audiobook – March 3, 2020

Photo by Reed Naliboff  In a pivotal moment for reproductive rights in America, the Supreme Court has declined to intervene in the clash between federal emergency care law and Texas’ near-total abortion ban. This decision marks a significant setback for advocates of reproductive rights and has far-reaching implications, particularly for women of color in Texas. The […]

The post The Deepening Crisis: The Texas Abortion Ban and Its Far-Reaching Implications appeared first on Feminist Majority Foundation.

Can paranoia be a mode of historical emplotment? The catastrophe of the First World War produced a genre of pessimistic writing. Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West was among the most widely read. Still, the era produced dozens similar: Francesco Nitti’s The Decadence of Europe: The Path To Reconstruction (1923), Albert Demangeon’s Le Déclin de l’ Europe (1923), Wythe Williams’ Dusk of Empire: The Decline of Europe And The Rise Of The United States (1937), and Arturo Labriola’s Le Crépuscule de la Civilisation: L’Occident et les peoples de couleur (1936). In all, the coming historical consciousness of the colonized world figures significantly. Drawing on Hayden White’s notion of historical emplotment, this presentation will examine the paranoid structure of such writing.

Excessive outdoor lighting is deadly to animals and takes a toll on human health and wellbeing, too. But when it comes to large-scale environmental problems, this one may be a relatively easy fix.

In this video, Armed Scholar expounds on the recent decision by the US Supreme Court concerning our border and the flooding of illegal immigrants, including the Biden administration, through the Department of Homeland Security, concerning programs set up that promised citizenship to illegal aliens. The decision was handed down following the 2024 elections, striking down …

One of the worst famines in decades could be underway in Sudan, aid workers warn.

Europe’s most powerful economy is left rudderless, when EU leaders are nervous about a new Trump presidency.

Former Premier League striker Chris Sutton discusses Manchester City’s recent form, and asks if this can be considered a crisis for manager Pep Guardiola.

Businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aime was sworn in as Haiti's new prime minister on Monday as a gun attack on a passenger jet at the capital's airport underscored the utter breakdown in law and order in the Caribbean country.

Samsung Electronics issued a rare apology and acknowledged on Tuesday it was facing a "crisis" over its technological competitiveness, reflected in a disappointing profit guidance, despite a global AI boom.

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? Audio john.pollock 17 October 2024

Sophie Pedder and Shahin Vallée join the podcast to discuss France’s contentious budget and political drama, and the potential impact on Europe and beyond.

On this episode

France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Is there an end to the Central Bank of Libya crisis? 14 November 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2024 Online

Experts discuss implications for Libya’s economic governance.

In August this year, the Libyan Presidency Council moved to replace Libya’s longtime central bank governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. Kabir had been in position since September 2011, and in the period following the administrative division of Libya, he rose to prominence as one of the most influential figures on the Libyan political scene.

In the absence of a functioning relationship between executive and legislature, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) took on many of the competencies of the ministry of finance and became an arbiter of which payments were made and when. In October, following UN-led and parallel back-channel negotiations, a new governor was selected and the CBL board of directors reconstituted.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What challenges will the new CBL leadership face?
• Can we expect significant changes for Libya’s economic governance?
• What are the implications for the balance of power between Libya’s rival power centres?

This webinar is organized in partnership with the North Africa Initiative (NAI) at the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) of the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Announcing Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis News Release sysadmin 1 June 2020

London Design Biennale and Chatham House announce Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis, which calls for action by designers around the world to create radical design solutions to critical problems across four key areas: Health, Environment, Society and Work.

Design In An Age of Crisis - Open Call News Release sysadmin 21 July 2020

Chatham House and London Design Biennale announce full details of 'Design In An Age of Crisis,' a global Open Call for radical design thinking.

Design in an Age of Crisis Launches News Release jon.wallace 13 January 2021

Design open call receives 500 submissions from over 50 countries across six continents.

Expert

Expert

Expert

Feminist solutions to the climate crisis 8 March 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 March 2022 Online

This International Women’s Day panel explores intersectional feminist approaches to solving the climate crisis.

Gender inequality and climate change are closely intertwined. Due to their different and unequal social roles and status, women, girls and people of marginalised genders are disproportionately affected by climate change impacts, also differentiated by factors such as age, race, ability and location.

They are also leading innovative solutions to climate change at all levels, especially in frontline communities. Yet as the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement highlighted at COP26, there is still a lack of momentum for prioritising their knowledge, tools and leadership in climate policy and action.  

This panel considers what feminist approaches can bring to climate change communication and movement building, spotlighting a range of local and regional gender-responsive climate initiatives. It also discusses concrete examples of feminist and gender-responsive policies to address climate change, such as the Feminist Green New Deal.

The panel highlights the critically important work being carried out by diverse feminist activists and researchers, and how the audience can centre gender and social equality in their work on climate change.  

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

Putting the Hong Kong Crisis into Historical and Comparative Perspective 14 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This roundtable will focus on current events unfolding in Hong Kong, where the territory has been convulsed with protests for several months.

The speakers will examine how class, race and poverty play into the conflict. Taking a comparative approach, they will examine the generational divide, looking at the ideological gulf between the older, more conservative and pro-Beijing population versus the younger, more pro-democracy protesters. The discussion will also draw upon the erosion of trust between police and the wider public.

While acknowledging the unique features of this wave of unrest, the speakers will draw parallels, placing the current crisis in Hong Kong beside events that have occurred in other periods and other places.

Parallels to be explored include those with Shanghai struggles of the 1910s through 1980s and upheavals and crackdowns in the former Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

The Rohingya Crisis: Three Years On 17 September 2020 — 1:30PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2020 Online

Speakers examine the current situation of the Rohingya people and assess the threat that COVID-19 poses to the health and human rights of refugees and displaced people.

It has been three years since a military-led crackdown forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border into Bangladesh to escape collective punishment and violence in Myanmar.

Most refugees have sought shelter in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, where access to clean water is limited, sanitation facilities are lacking, and due to overcrowding, social distancing is impossible.

While the number of reported COVID-19 cases has so far been relatively low, testing capacity remains limited and anecdotal reports from humanitarians suggest that COVID-19 has spread extensively through the refugee camps and the Bangladeshi host community.

The speakers also consider the different approaches taken by neighbouring states, regional and international organizations in responding to the crisis.

What can be done to address the needs of refugees in the short term and how can fundamental human rights be restored and protected during the time of COVID-19? What aid provision has been successfully delivered within Rakhine State and in what ways?

Ahead of elections in Myanmar in November, how can the international community persuade the Myanmarese government into positive action? And what would a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis look like and what are the competing views over how such a solution should be delivered?

This event is held in partnership with The Atlantic Council.

13 July 2020

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

• After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
• Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
• The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
• Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
• Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
• Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
• Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
• Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
• Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
• Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

• Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

• Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Crisis in the international order 23 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

Why societies are challenging the international order?

Major global challenges, including the climate, refugee crises and the global pandemic, are increasingly revealing shortcomings in our international system and are bringing to the forefront calls for a more just world. But what is justice? 
 
Calls for justice come in many forms and from many directions - from the fair distribution of resources to the recognition of indigenous rights. While for some there is consensus on the importance of multilateral cooperation to tackle global issues, there is a sharp North/South divide at the centre of debates on issues such as the climate crisis, racial justice, and international law. Countries from the global South are demanding more equitable and redistributive solutions, for example in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, while the Global North seek the status quo. 
 
North/South division slows progress on reform. Some political actors are starting to challenge the very foundations of our global order, a move that could dramatically change the global system as we know it. 

Key questions to consider include:

• Why are there tensions between the global North and South?
• How can these issues be addressed?
• Does the global North ‘owe’ the global South some form of justice? Which form of justice?
• If these issues are not addressed, what are the implications for the current international order?

This event is held in conjunction with International Affairs.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.