Một số nhà quan sát nhận định việc Campuchia rút khỏi Tam giác Phát triển Campuchia-Lào-Việt Nam là quyết định đột ngột đối với cả Việt Nam lẫn Lào, nhất là khi chỉ một tháng trước, Việt Nam còn nhấn mạnh tầm quan trọng của dự án này.
Việt Nam được cho là đang chịu sức ép từ cả hai phía Mỹ và Trung Quốc trong việc trao gói thầu lắp đặt 10 đường cáp ngầm trọng yếu dưới biển.
Cứ sau mỗi cuộc bầu cử thì nước Mỹ lại rộ lên câu chuyện các tiểu bang muốn ly khai. Nhưng liệu điều này có thể xảy ra?
Republicano será o primeiro ex-presidente a retornar ao cargo em mais de 130 anos; entenda a seguir o que acontece a partir de agora
Cerca de 44% das mulheres que foram às urnas deram seu voto ao republicano - uma margem maior do que ele conseguiu entre esse público em 2020 e 2016, segundo a boca de urna.
"No início da minha carreira, coisas como boas maneiras importavam e havia um nível esperado de decoro", disse Susan ao site Politico, descrevendo o partido Republicano como significativamente diferente do de várias décadas atrás.
A ideia de que o Estado deve se restringir a funções básicas, desregulamentar a economia e não interferir no comércio entre países ganhou força com o fim da Guerra Fria e chegou a ser promovida pelos EUA na América Latina. Essa agenda entrou em crise na última década, o que ajuda a explicar a plataforma econômica populista de Donald Trump - e seu retorno ao poder.
Guam tem 40 vezes mais aranhas do que as ilhas vizinhas — e uma população de cobras invasoras tão vorazes que acabaram com os pássaros das florestas.
O ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro e seus aliados políticos tentam reverter a inelegibilidade até 2030 imposta pela Justiça eleitoral com recursos e tentativas de mudar a legislação.
Junto com o empresário Vivek Ramaswamy, Musk vai liderar o novo Departamento de Eficiência Governamental, segundo anunciou Donald Trump nesta terça-feira (12/11).
Red Hat, the IBM-owned open source software firm, is acquiring Neural Magic, a startup that optimizes AI models to run faster on commodity processors and GPUs. From a report: The terms of the deal weren't disclosed. MIT research scientist Alex Matveev and professor Nir Shavit founded Somerville, Massachusetts-based Neural Magic in 2018, inspired by their work in high-performance execution engines for AI. Neural Magic's software aims to process AI workloads on processors and GPUs at speeds equivalent to specialized AI chips (e.g. TPUs). By running models on off-the-shelf processors, which usually have more available memory, the company's software can realize these performance gains. Big tech companies like AMD and a host of other startups, including NeuReality, Deci, CoCoPie, OctoML and DeepCube, offer some sort of AI optimization software. But Neural Magic is one of the few with a free platform and a collection of open source tools to complement it. Neural Magic had so far managed to raise $50 million in venture capital from backers like Andreessen Horowitz, New Enterprise Associations, Amdocs, Comcast Ventures, Pillar VC and Ridgeline Ventures.
Read more of this story at Slashdot.
By Ireland Owens President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said Friday that she proposed to President-elect Donald Trump the idea that the U.S. could supply more natural gas to Europe to decrease the bloc’s reliance on Russia, according to Barron’s. The EU chief said the topic of tapping U.S. liquefied natural gas […]
The post With Trump Returning To Power, Europe Chief Weighs Idea Of Buying More Natural Gas From US Instead Of Russia appeared first on Liberty Unyielding.
After a successful launch, the upper-stage of the rocket goes on to experience an anomaly.
A new study shows that the record-breaking rainfall was made more likely and intense by climate change.
A picture of a fox cub has won a prestigious European Wildlife Photographer of the Year award.
The prime minister was in Paris, while Sophie, the Duchess of Edinburgh led events at the National Memorial Arboretum.
Building the link to western Europe has become more urgent as the Baltics see Russia as a threat.
Antonin Panenka's penalty in the Euro 1976 final birthed a whole new 12-yard tactic. But the risks were higher than anyone could imagine.
velocityconf: LAST DAY for #velocityconf EU call for speakers http://t.co/qShofQCDPl Share your best #WPO, #Ops, and #DevOps stories.
The European Commission's president said the European Union could boost US liquified natural gas purchases in a deal with Trump.
As a digital company, your business is not bound by conventional borders and has the freedom and opportunity to reach customers anywhere in the world. And just as you look outward for new markets, customers are also looking beyond their physical borders for their goods and services. As a study by KPMG shows, online buyers […]
Meta is taking the European Union a little more seriously, as the EU has requested the US-based company to put… Continue reading Meta and the EU butt heads again amid changes to ads
The post Meta and the EU butt heads again amid changes to ads appeared first on ReadWrite.
The following article, Left Already Losing It As Trump Announces Starting Lineup (Video), was first published on Conservative Firing Line.
Trump learned some hard lessons from his first kick at the can. This time, he’s not making the same mistakes. Personnel IS policy. Last time around DJT was hamstrung right out of the gate when the Alabama Senator he tapped to be his AG was stuck in purgatory under bogus Russia allegations. The Deep State …
Continue reading Left Already Losing It As Trump Announces Starting Lineup (Video) ...
He learned some hard lessons from his first kick at the can. This time, he's not making the same mistakes. Personnel IS policy.
The post Left Already Losing It As Trump Announces His Starting Lineup (VIDEO) appeared first on Clash Daily.
Total media ad spend in Russia to drop nearly 50%   March 30, 2022 (New York, NY) – Insider Intelligence expects the ongoing war in Ukraine to have a significant […]
Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023
With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.
It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.
Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change.
The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.
Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.
Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.
Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.
There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.
But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.
Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.
China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.
In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.
Business Briefing: Assessing the geopolitical implications of EU AI regulation 17 September 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House
Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology.
Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology
Governments, technology companies and civil society groups across the world are now advocating firmer AI regulation. Machine learning algorithms have changed the way we interact with technology and powered much of our online lives for decades: why has this pendulum swung back so far toward greater control, and why now?
In 2023 the UK government seized the initiative with its Bletchley AI Safety Summit. The event attempted to address the so called ‘frontier risks’ associated with AI development. Global competition on AI is reflected in AI governance efforts in China, US, the Gulf and beyond. But to date, it is the EU that has led the West in passing AI legislation. The EU AI Act, has separated AI systems into graded risk categories carrying different regulatory requirements, and it remains to be seen whether global AI will feel the Brussels effect.
This conversation will cover the following questions:
The main protease (3CL Mpro) from SARS–CoV-2, the etiological agent of COVID-19, is an essential enzyme for viral replication. 3CL Mpro possesses an unusual catalytic dyad composed of Cys145 and His41 residues. A critical question in the field has been what the protonation states of the ionizable residues in the substrate-binding active-site cavity are; resolving this point would help understand the catalytic details of the enzyme and inform rational drug development against this pernicious virus. Here, we present the room-temperature neutron structure of 3CL Mpro, which allowed direct determination of hydrogen atom positions and, hence, protonation states in the protease. We observe that the catalytic site natively adopts a zwitterionic reactive form in which Cys145 is in the negatively charged thiolate state and His41 is doubly protonated and positively charged, instead of the neutral unreactive state usually envisaged. The neutron structure also identified the protonation states, and thus electrical charges, of all other amino acid residues and revealed intricate hydrogen-bonding networks in the active-site cavity and at the dimer interface. The fine atomic details present in this structure were made possible by the unique scattering properties of the neutron, which is an ideal probe for locating hydrogen positions and experimentally determining protonation states at near-physiological temperature. Our observations provide critical information for structure-assisted and computational drug design, allowing precise tailoring of inhibitors to the enzyme's electrostatic environment.
Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017
For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.
Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online
How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?
On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services?
This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation.
US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House
As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?
Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.
The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.
As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?
Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online
This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.
While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?
Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants
This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.
Staphylococcus aureus adhesion to the host's skin and mucosae enables asymptomatic colonization and the establishment of infection. This process is facilitated by cell wall-anchored adhesins that bind to host ligands. Therapeutics targeting this process could provide significant clinical benefits; however, the development of anti-adhesives requires an in-depth knowledge of adhesion-associated factors and an assay amenable to high-throughput applications. Here, we describe the development of a sensitive and robust whole cell assay to enable the large-scale profiling of S. aureus adhesion to host ligands. To validate the assay, and to gain insight into cellular factors contributing to adhesion, we profiled a sequence-defined S. aureus transposon mutant library, identifying mutants with attenuated adhesion to human-derived fibronectin, keratin, and fibrinogen. Our screening approach was validated by the identification of known adhesion-related proteins, such as the housekeeping sortase responsible for covalently linking adhesins to the cell wall. In addition, we also identified genetic loci that could represent undescribed anti-adhesive targets. To compare and contrast the genetic requirements of adhesion to each host ligand, we generated a S. aureus Genetic Adhesion Network, which identified a core gene set involved in adhesion to all three host ligands, and unique genetic signatures. In summary, this assay will enable high-throughput chemical screens to identify anti-adhesives and our findings provide insight into the target space of such an approach.
Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.
This article is by Emma Lammers.
Author’s note: neurodivergent is term used to refer to people whose neurological functions differ from the norm because of an innate or acquired condition. Examples of these conditions include autism, learning disabilities, mood disorders, traumatic brain injuries, and more. People who do not have any neurodivergent conditions are considered neurotypical.
To the delight of many readers, more characters in fantasy literature reflect aspects of real-world people than ever before. Today’s heroes can be people of colour, people of any gender or sexual identity, people of nearly any age. Writers are answering the call for more diversity in their work, and oftentimes they do it well, portraying realistic, nuanced characters from marginalized communities.
Some people, however, aren’t as likely to see themselves accurately reflected in the pages of a fantasy story. I’ve searched long and hard to find literary characters who experience autism, anxiety, and sensory processing disorder as I do, and very few of these characters show up in fantasy – a detriment to my favourite genre. Villainous characters are often portrayed as neurodivergent because writers think that this will make them scarier, and you will encounter the occasional hero with post-traumatic stress disorder, but these depictions tend to lack accuracy, diversity, and consideration for the people who actually have the conditions used in the story.
Continue reading Writing Neurodivergent Characters in Fantasy at Mythic Scribes.
Europe should become the top priority for Liz Truss Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022
Liz Truss has the chance to be a better prime minister than Boris Johnson was, not least in the UK’s foreign policy.
For all the smoke-and-mirrors talk now commonplace about Brexit opportunities, there is real potential that Liz Truss could extract from the aftermath of that upheaval as well as from the turmoil in the world.
But the approach and priorities she revealed during her one year as a better UK foreign secretary than Boris Johnson was – although he did set a low bar – as well as the past three months campaigning for the leadership of her party contain a warning.
She has shown a willingness to aggravate relationships with allies in pursuit of the support of her party faithful, and of a vision of British independence as well as a tendency to dismiss economic analysis when it inconveniently questions her assertions about favoured policies.
At the heart of her political identity is a notion which is both a strength and a potentially calamitous weakness – a love of the notion of being a disrupter which injects a deliberate unpredictability into her approach towards a world in extreme flux.
If she indulges this without good judgment, she could do real damage to Britain’s prospects and standing in the world.
In foreign policy, Europe should be her starting point and the opportunity here for the UK is clear. The war in Ukraine and crisis in the cost of energy gives it a role – despite having left the European Union (EU) – in talking to EU governments about the future of the continent on many fronts.
Johnson’s emphatic support of President Zelensky gave the UK a position of moral and strategic clarity which Truss can build on through what will be an exceptionally difficult winter for Europe’s governments.
She is in a position to persuade European leaders to remain united in Ukraine’s support while planning better how they are going to source energy. She could expand on that to help the EU find a way through its many other problems, such as upholding democratic values throughout the bloc or finding a response to migration.
There is also a chance for the UK to shape Europe’s thinking on the development and regulation of digital technology and medicine, energy, and the environment.
Truss’s declaration that the UK should now spend three per cent of its GDP on defence could help her in taking that kind of role. However this campaign declaration is not yet credible, given the pressures on the national finances and her silence so far on support for households on energy costs.
But that is the opportunity in theory and the signs are this is not her approach to Europe. Her provocative and opportunistic comment that the ‘jury’s out’ on whether President Macron (and France) was a friend or foe shocked both Britain’s allies and opponents.
For those keen to see divisions among democracies, it gave unexpected, heady encouragement, and to those within those countries, it injected a doubt about shared values which was deeply damaging. The chilly poise of Macron’s response – that the UK and France would always be allies – showed how far she had departed from normal protocol.
The episode encapsulated one of the sources of unease about the Truss style – improvisation under the banner of ‘disruption’ without thought of consequences.
However, she has shown consistency over the Northern Ireland Protocol with little sign of compromise, and that alone could cause much unnecessary damage to UK interests. It also puts her on a collision course with the EU and the UK House of Lords, due to consider controversial legislation again in early October after the Conservative party conference.
There is huge opposition in the Lords to two aspects of the legislation. The first target is the intention of the Johnson government – likely to be repeated by a Truss government – to use the bill to jettison aspects of the protocol, which many argue breaks international law. The second is the delegated power the bill would give ministers.
The cost of a new, serious clash – or worse, a full trade war – with the EU is high. There is the loss of trade, the increase in friction for business, which is consistently underestimated by the UK government, and the loss of scientific and research partnerships.
More than that, though, there is the weakening of ties to a set of allies with common values sharing an increasingly troubled neighbourhood.
And to say Europe should come first is not to dismiss other claims on the UK’s foreign policy. Her instinctive liking for the US will help Truss in relations with Washington at a difficult time, and her apparent intention to designate China as ‘a threat’ will support that relationship too.
The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022
Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.
The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.
That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.
When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.
But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.
The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.
When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.
And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.
But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.
That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.
A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.
For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.
The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.
Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.
Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.
There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.
Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.
When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.
Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.
Alzheimer's disease (AD) is characterized by neuronal loss and accumulation of β-amyloid-protein (Aβ) in the brain parenchyma. Sleep impairment is associated with AD and affects about 25–40% of patients in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. Sleep deprivation leads to increased Aβ production; however, its mechanism remains largely unknown. We hypothesized that the increase in core body temperature induced by sleep deprivation may promote Aβ production. Here, we report temperature-dependent regulation of Aβ production. We found that an increase in temperature, from 37 °C to 39 °C, significantly increased Aβ production in amyloid precursor protein-overexpressing cells. We also found that high temperature (39 °C) significantly increased the expression levels of heat shock protein 90 (Hsp90) and the C-terminal fragment of presenilin 1 (PS1-CTF) and promoted γ-secretase complex formation. Interestingly, Hsp90 was associated with the components of the premature γ-secretase complex, anterior pharynx-defective-1 (APH-1), and nicastrin (NCT) but was not associated with PS1-CTF or presenilin enhancer-2. Hsp90 knockdown abolished the increased level of Aβ production and the increased formation of the γ-secretase complex at high temperature in culture. Furthermore, with in vivo experiments, we observed increases in the levels of Hsp90, PS1-CTF, NCT, and the γ-secretase complex in the cortex of mice housed at higher room temperature (30 °C) compared with those housed at standard room temperature (23 °C). Our results suggest that high temperature regulates Aβ production by modulating γ-secretase complex formation through the binding of Hsp90 to NCT/APH-1.
European Hub for Contemporary China
The European Hub for Contemporary China is a three-year project focused on original research on China.
dora.popovaThe European Hub for Contemporary China (EuroHub4Sino) is a three-year project, which began in October 2023, to produce original research on China. It also seeks to create an online platform that pools a wide array of European knowledge and expertise on contemporary China in one publicly accessible research platform. The project is run by a consortium of eight partners across six European states.
Find out more by visiting the project website.
EuroHub4Sino is co-funded by the European Union. UK participants in Horizon Europe Project European Hub for Contemporary China are supported by UKRI grant numbers 10108183 and 10108749.
Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House and Online
Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.
The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.
Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.
As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.
At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.
How to revive Europe’s economy and unlock its potential 7 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House and Online
Enrico Letta, former prime minister of Italy, and other experts discuss how the European Union’s economy must adapt to a challenging world.
Amid a fractured geopolitical environment, global trade volatility and hardening protectionist policies in many countries, the European economy must adapt fast. The single market is a key driver of European integration, but it was designed in a very different global economic context.
Launched in April, Enrico Letta’s Much more than a market report set out how the European Union should adapt the arrangements of the single market to ensure it delivers prosperity and economic security for EU citizens in the 21st century. The report resonates with ongoing debates over the future of European competitiveness, industrial strategy and how to respond to an apparently deglobalizing world. In this event, Letta and other experts on the European economy and integration will discuss the prospect of meaningful reform of the single market, and what the incoming Commission can do to ensure the EU unlocks the potential of its economy for all its citizens.
Key questions will include:
The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.
Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House
Threat assessment and practical solutions.
Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?
Key questions:
This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.
This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.
Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.
Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.
The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.
Trump and his growing number of European allies threaten the European project Expert comment LToremark
With Trump in the White House, a key challenge for Europe will be the growing transatlantic illiberal ties which risk undermining European unity.
As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.
The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.
Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.
The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe.
Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.
What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.
It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result.
Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.
Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds.
But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.
Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.
Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market.
Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.
Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional.
It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.
Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.
The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.
The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.