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Cyber Security Series: Comparing Best Practice Across Europe




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Undercurrents: Episode 21 - EU-US Relations after the Midterms, and Tackling the Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa




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Can Europe Save the Liberal International Order?




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The Geopolitical Positioning of Europe




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UK–EU Defence and Security Cooperation after Brexit




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Undercurrents: Episode 29 - The Future of EU-US Trade, and Why Russia Confronts the West




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Screening Room: Inside Europe - We Quit




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Are ‘Digital Parties’ the Future of Democracy in Europe?




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Undercurrents: Bonus Episode - Germany and the European Elections




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Undercurrents: Episode 35 - EU Elections, and Sustainable Development in Colombia




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Serbia, the Balkans and the European Union




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Undercurrents: Episode 37 - Women in Leadership, and Europe's Ageing Population




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How Democratic Is the EU?




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Getting to a New Deal: Guidance for the United States, Europe and Iran




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How Far Does the European Union’s Influence Extend?




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France, the UK and Europe: New Partnerships and Common Challenges




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The Climate Briefing: Episode 2 - European Climate Ambitions




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Undercurrents: Episode 49 - EU Responses to COVID-19, and the Politics of Celebrity




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Undercurrents: Episode 55 - Benjamin Netanyahu's Trial, and the Identity Politics of Eurovision




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Chatham House Commission on Democracy and Technology in Europe

Chatham House Commission on Democracy and Technology in Europe News Release sysadmin 25 July 2019

Our project on Democracy and Technology in Europe is now entering its final phase. Now we want your help in shaping the final report.








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Biochemical and biophysical analyses of hypoxia sensing prolyl hydroxylases from Dictyostelium discoideum and Toxoplasma gondii [Molecular Biophysics]

In animals, the response to chronic hypoxia is mediated by prolyl hydroxylases (PHDs) that regulate the levels of hypoxia-inducible transcription factor α (HIFα). PHD homologues exist in other types of eukaryotes and prokaryotes where they act on non HIF substrates. To gain insight into the factors underlying different PHD substrates and properties, we carried out biochemical and biophysical studies on PHD homologues from the cellular slime mold, Dictyostelium discoideum, and the protozoan parasite, Toxoplasma gondii, both lacking HIF. The respective prolyl-hydroxylases (DdPhyA and TgPhyA) catalyze prolyl-hydroxylation of S-phase kinase-associated protein 1 (Skp1), a reaction enabling adaptation to different dioxygen availability. Assays with full-length Skp1 substrates reveal substantial differences in the kinetic properties of DdPhyA and TgPhyA, both with respect to each other and compared with human PHD2; consistent with cellular studies, TgPhyA is more active at low dioxygen concentrations than DdPhyA. TgSkp1 is a DdPhyA substrate and DdSkp1 is a TgPhyA substrate. No cross-reactivity was detected between DdPhyA/TgPhyA substrates and human PHD2. The human Skp1 E147P variant is a DdPhyA and TgPhyA substrate, suggesting some retention of ancestral interactions. Crystallographic analysis of DdPhyA enables comparisons with homologues from humans, Trichoplax adhaerens, and prokaryotes, informing on differences in mobile elements involved in substrate binding and catalysis. In DdPhyA, two mobile loops that enclose substrates in the PHDs are conserved, but the C-terminal helix of the PHDs is strikingly absent. The combined results support the proposal that PHD homologues have evolved kinetic and structural features suited to their specific sensing roles.




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The Impact of Brexit on Energy Transformation in the UK and EU

The Impact of Brexit on Energy Transformation in the UK and EU 28 March 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The UK’s decision to leave the EU will fundamentally reshape many of the UK’s policies and its relations with countries around the world. For energy and climate, the changes could be significant and will need to be managed carefully to secure ongoing investment, stable energy prices and ambitious climate objectives. The UK’s departure will also affect the balance of political support for climate and energy policies with the EU institutions and potentially impact upon regional initiatives.

This roundtable will discuss:

  • The impact on the energy sector of Brexit during the transition period through until December 2020 including the operation of interconnectors and access to the Internal energy market, ongoing engagement in European research collaboration and the replacement of European financial resources.
  • The possible opportunities and risks for the UK’s energy sector in 2021 and beyond.
  • The implications of Brexit on the EU’s energy and climate policy.

The roundtable will discuss the role of the public and business in shaping the future deal as it will need to be ratified by the parliaments of all member states.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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Nuclear Energy in a Post-Brexit Europe

Nuclear Energy in a Post-Brexit Europe 11 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Brexit will significantly change the balance within the EU in relation to nuclear energy. Apart from France and Finland, both of whose nuclear development programmes are behind schedule, the UK is the only member state in northern or western Europe currently investing in new nuclear capacity. Brexit will therefore leave the supporters of nuclear energy within the EU27 and the European Commission in a weaker position.

The speaker will argue that at a time when the energy industry needs to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, and when the electricity generation industry must cut its carbon emissions faster than it has ever managed to do in the past, this change is unhelpful.

The workshop will also address the need for additional interconnector capacity and the future of carbon-trading outside the EU emission trading system and how this relates to potential nuclear energy capacity.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy

The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy 21 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 27 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Despite its name, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides support to the agricultural sector that varies widely between the 27 member states. The OECD calculates the extent of this support at the EU level but members have blocked the organization calculating support levels for individual EU members. Overall, the EU’s producer support is equivalent to 20 per cent of farm income which is well-above the levels seen in the US at 12.2 per cent and China at 14.3 per cent.
This roundtable will discuss the first estimates of support levels by EU countries produced by Ian Mitchell from the Center for Global Development. It will look at both direct subsidies under the CAP and those that inflate market prices. The discussion will consider the implications for EU finance, for the potential role of EU subsidy reform and for the UK’s options after Brexit.
Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.




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Rethinking European and Afghan policy approaches to migration

Rethinking European and Afghan policy approaches to migration 9 February 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

Afghanistan is a key country of origin for asylum seekers in Europe, and the prime global recipient of EU development assistance. It was one of the first nations to conclude a migration partnership agreement with the EU, in 2016.

Implementation has been thwarted, however, by war and violence, limited state capacity, entrenched economic deprivation, internal displacement and the unfolding impact of COVID-19.

The speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy. They underscore the strength of Afghanistan’s responses to migration, returns, reintegration, security and peace, and point to the need for synchronizing the EU’s policy approaches.

They argue that effective policy must consider the historical significance of mobility for Afghanistan and the need for coherent regional responses to migration.

This event launches the publication The EU and the Politics of Migration Management in Afghanistan.





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Compressible Euler limit from Boltzmann equation with complete diffusive boundary condition in half-space

Ning Jiang, Yi-Long Luo and Shaojun Tang
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5323-5359.
Abstract, references and article information




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Pseudonyms in Mathematics




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I'm a Neurologist, and This Is This Is the One 'Healthy' Breakfast I'll Never, Ever Eat




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China reveals reusable cargo shuttle design for Tiangong space station (video)




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Identification and biochemical characterization of Asp t 36, a new fungal allergen from Aspergillus terreus [Protein Structure and Folding]

Aspergillus terreus is an allergenic fungus, in addition to causing infections in both humans and plants. However, the allergens in this fungus are still unknown, limiting the development of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies. We used a proteomic approach to search for allergens, identifying 16 allergens based on two-dimensional immunoblotting with A. terreus susceptible patient sera. We further characterized triose-phosphate isomerase (Asp t 36), one of the dominant IgE (IgE)-reactive proteins. The gene was cloned and expressed in Escherichia coli. Phylogenetic analysis showed Asp t 36 to be highly conserved with close similarity to the triose-phosphate isomerase protein sequence from Dermatophagoides farinae, an allergenic dust mite. We identified four immunodominant epitopes using synthetic peptides, and mapped them on a homology-based model of the tertiary structure of Asp t 36. Among these, two were found to create a continuous surface patch on the 3D structure, rendering it an IgE-binding hotspot. Biophysical analysis indicated that Asp t 36 shows similar secondary structure content and temperature sensitivity with other reported triose-phosphate isomerase allergens. In vivo studies using a murine model displayed that the recombinant Asp t 36 was able to stimulate airway inflammation, as demonstrated by an influx of eosinophils, goblet cell hyperplasia, elevated serum Igs, and induction of Th2 cytokines. Collectively, our results reveal the immunogenic property of Asp t 36, a major allergen from A. terreus, and define a new fungal allergen more broadly. This allergen could serve as a potent candidate for investigating component resolved diagnosis and immunotherapy.




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Hydrogen/deuterium exchange memory NMR reveals structural epitopes involved in IgE cross-reactivity of allergenic lipid transfer proteins [Protein Structure and Folding]

Identification of antibody-binding epitopes is crucial to understand immunological mechanisms. It is of particular interest for allergenic proteins with high cross-reactivity as observed in the lipid transfer protein (LTP) syndrome, which is characterized by severe allergic reactions. Art v 3, a pollen LTP from mugwort, is frequently involved in this cross-reactivity, but no antibody-binding epitopes have been determined so far. To reveal human IgE-binding regions of Art v 3, we produced three murine high-affinity mAbs, which showed 70–90% coverage of the allergenic epitopes from mugwort pollen–allergic patients. As reliable methods to determine structural epitopes with tightly interacting intact antibodies under native conditions are lacking, we developed a straightforward NMR approach termed hydrogen/deuterium exchange memory (HDXMEM). It relies on the slow exchange between the invisible antigen-mAb complex and the free 15N-labeled antigen whose 1H-15N correlations are detected. Due to a memory effect, changes of NH protection during antibody binding are measured. Differences in H/D exchange rates and analyses of mAb reactivity to homologous LTPs revealed three structural epitopes: two partially cross-reactive regions around α-helices 2 and 4 as well as a novel Art v 3–specific epitope at the C terminus. Protein variants with exchanged epitope residues confirmed the antibody-binding sites and revealed strongly reduced IgE reactivity. Using the novel HDXMEM for NMR epitope mapping allowed identification of the first structural epitopes of an allergenic pollen LTP. This knowledge enables improved cross-reactivity prediction for patients suffering from LTP allergy and facilitates design of therapeutics.




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A combinatorial native MS and LC-MS/MS approach reveals high intrinsic phosphorylation of human Tau but minimal levels of other key modifications [Neurobiology]

Abnormal changes of neuronal Tau protein, such as phosphorylation and aggregation, are considered hallmarks of cognitive deficits in Alzheimer's disease. Abnormal phosphorylation is thought to precede aggregation and therefore to promote aggregation, but the nature and extent of phosphorylation remain ill-defined. Tau contains ∼85 potential phosphorylation sites, which can be phosphorylated by various kinases because the unfolded structure of Tau makes them accessible. However, methodological limitations (e.g. in MS of phosphopeptides, or antibodies against phosphoepitopes) led to conflicting results regarding the extent of Tau phosphorylation in cells. Here we present results from a new approach based on native MS of intact Tau expressed in eukaryotic cells (Sf9). The extent of phosphorylation is heterogeneous, up to ∼20 phosphates per molecule distributed over 51 sites. The medium phosphorylated fraction Pm showed overall occupancies of ∼8 Pi (± 5) with a bell-shaped distribution; the highly phosphorylated fraction Ph had 14 Pi (± 6). The distribution of sites was highly asymmetric (with 71% of all P-sites in the C-terminal half of Tau). All sites were on Ser or Thr residues, but none were on Tyr. Other known posttranslational modifications were near or below our detection limit (e.g. acetylation, ubiquitination). These findings suggest that normal cellular Tau shows a remarkably high extent of phosphorylation, whereas other modifications are nearly absent. This implies that abnormal phosphorylations at certain sites may not affect the extent of phosphorylation significantly and do not represent hyperphosphorylation. By implication, the pathological aggregation of Tau is not likely a consequence of high phosphorylation.




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Europe’s Clean Energy Future: Shared Challenges for Norway and the UK

3 July 2020

Antony Froggatt

Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

Professor Paul Stevens

Distinguished Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

Siân Bradley

Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
European oil and gas producers, such as Norway and the UK, face serious challenges in terms of the direction their energy sectors should take. There is an opportunity for both countries to place an accelerated energy transition at the heart of their post-pandemic economic recovery.

2020-07-03-Norway-Climate-Protest.jpg

Students gather to protest inaction on climate change in front of the parliament building in Oslo, Norway on 22 March 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was clear that the world is undergoing a transition away from fossil fuels and carbon-intensive sectors, towards renewable energy and clean growth. The collapse of oil demand and prices have simply compounded the challenges that oil and gas producers already faced.

What happens next will have significant implications for Norway, as one of the world’s largest exporters of both energy and capital, and for the UK, as it plans its recovery and looks ahead to its hosting of the next major climate change summit in 2021 - COP26.

While the speed and scale of the transition has always been uncertain and contested, an accelerated transition with deep implications for future oil and gas demand looks plausible.

There has long been a debate over when global demand will peak, but what happens after demand has peaked is perhaps the more critical question. Now there is the additional uncertainty of how this post-peak demand might be affected by an oncoming global recession and potentially by the greening of recovery measures implemented in response to it. Will there be an extended plateau, a gentle decline or a sudden collapse?

The post-peak trend will impact oil producers and exporters to varying degrees, in terms of their vulnerability to reduced volumes and lower prices, and their ability to compete in a shrinking market. There is also growing scepticism over whether natural gas can act as a bridge between coal-fired power and renewables, as increasingly, renewables directly replace coal.  There is also significant uncertainty over extent to which hydrogen, either produced from fossil fuels or renewable energy, will play a significant role in a decarbonizing energy sector.

Even before the pandemic, there was growing public and political pressure in most EU member states for more ambitious action on climate change. More challenging climate targets now look certain as a growing number of governments and companies commit to becoming carbon-neutral by ever-earlier dates.

While market developments, such as the rate of change and the costs of technologies such as renewable energy and electric vehicles will heavily influence their deployment rates, policy interventions and large-scale investment in core infrastructure are still crucial to their scaling up. We are now seeing the EU refocus its Green Deal in support of post-COVID recovery, and scale its support for transition in coal-dependent and carbon-intensive regions with its €100bn Just Transition Mechanism.  

These developments have significant implications for fossil fuel producers and energy consumers both inside and outside the EU. It will particularly affect Norway, not only as a significant supplier of energy to the EU, but as a member of the European Economic Area, with likely pressure to adopt similarly binding domestic carbon reduction legislation. Similarly, as the UK forges new post-Brexit trading and regulatory relationships, it will need to align with European policies for efficiency.

As the host of the critical COP26 UN Climate Change Summit in Glasgow next year, the UK will also need to at least match the EU in terms of its ambition on national emissions reductions, and in placing decarbonization and sustainability at the heart of COVID-19 recovery measures. However, unfortunately, the early indications are that 'Project Speed' will focus on traditional infrastructure projects are less than promising.    

The UK and Norway face similar challenges, as oil and gas producers that recognize the importance of climate change, and will rightly face scrutiny where they reinvest in their oil and gas sectors. They are both outside, yet highly dependent on developments within the EU. However, they are also both, somewhat surprisingly, world leaders in different aspects of decarbonization, such as off-shore wind or electric vehicle deployment, in part due their offshore capabilities and advanced manufacturing capabilities. This presents an opportunity for both countries and their industries to place an accelerated energy transition at the heart of their economic recovery and their relationship with the EU.

There will of course be different opinions on how to do this. A new Chatham House paper – Expert Perspectives on Norway’s Energy Future – explores these issues in the Norwegian context, and draws upon the views of 15 international experts on energy transition and climate change, each interviewed in depth. While unsurprisingly there is little consensus, these views provide valuable background from which to consider the future of future of energy for Norway, and for its partners including the UK and the EU.




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EU Budget Battle Could Undermine its International Ambitions

17 July 2020

Alice Billon-Galland

Research Associate, Europe Programme

Vassilis Ntousas

Stavros Niarchos Foundation Academy Fellow, Europe Programme
EU’s heated budget negotiations risk producing a compromise at the expense of its longer-term international agenda.

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel (L) talks with French President Emmanuel Macron (C) and President of European Council Charles Michel (R) during an EU summit on 17 July 2020 in Brussels, Belgium. Photo by Thierry Monasse/Getty Images.

With all EU economies still reeling from COVID-19, the ongoing heated deliberations on the bloc’s next budget, which will determine the amount of money matching its priorities for the next seven years, have taken on an urgency rarely felt in Brussels.

Relying in part on an unprecedentedly large volume of jointly issued debt, the European Commission’s plan for a €750 billion coronavirus recovery instrument is embedded within a revamped proposal for the EU’s long-term budget, of €1.1 trillion for the 2021-27 period. 

Now the ball is in the member states’ court. All seem to agree that getting the EU budget right is crucial to fostering an economic recovery and ensuring the Union is on the right track towards its long-term pre-COVID objectives, from increasing its strategic autonomy to reaching climate neutrality by 2050. However, stark differences persist as to what that means in practice.

Most of the core divisions predate the pandemic’s outbreak. In a special European Council meeting in February, leaders failed to find common ground on the Union’s first post-Brexit budget. Net contributor countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands — the so-called ‘Frugal Four’— refused to agree to higher overall spending and instead advocated for cuts in the Common Agricultural Policy or cohesion funds, meeting the resistance of states like France and Portugal.

These early divisions foreshadowed the risk of a budget compromise that would leave little space for new policy priorities. The COVID-induced economic crisis has made a traditionally fraught political process even more difficult, putting the squeeze on what were previously priority areas of funding.

The Frugal Four agree on the need for the coronavirus recovery plan but vehemently oppose the volume of grants or the issuance of too much common debt in the proposed instrument, reflecting the unpopularity of these proposals with their domestic audiences. Hungary has also threatened to derail progress on the EU’s rescue plan if rule of law criteria are weaved into mechanisms for the allocation of EU funding.

As European leaders reconvene at the 17-18 July Council meeting, EU Council President Michel proposed a revised 'negotiating box' in preparation for the discussions. The document, which tries to bridge these intra-bloc divisions, bolts the demands for short-term recovery onto the EU’s longer-term ambitions. For instance, it sets an increased target of 30 per cent of funding to go toward climate-related projects, which is necessary for the Union’s green transformation. It also retains the link between the rule of law and EU funding — despite Budapest’s opposition — which is critical for the bloc’s internal accountability and transparency, and external credibility. Furthermore, it proposes a set of new mechanisms through which the EU can sustainably raise its own revenue, including a plastics levy as well as more controversial carbon border tax and digital levy.

Yet in several other critical ways, Michel’s proposals fall short. This is particularly true for some of the more ‘geopolitical’ goals of the Union, as previously expressed by Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, or the repeated calls by the Union’s high representative that the EU should learn to use the language of power.

For all the rhetoric around the EU’s need to boost its ability to act more autonomously in the field of security and defence, reductions in important thematic programmes in this domain could result in a critical loss of momentum, if confirmed. For instance, in Michel’s proposals, flagship defence initiatives such as the European defence fund and the military mobility plan are facing cuts of about 39 per cent and 74 per cent respectively (to some €7 billion for the former and €1.5 billion for the latter) compared with the initial Commission proposal of 2018.

Moreover, the tragic developments at the Greece-Turkey border in the beginning of the year might have brought migration back to the forefront of the EU’s attention, but the overall funding for migration and border management is also significantly lower compared to initial proposals. This serves as another example of a discrepancy between the figures on the table today and those that the EU commission had previously regarded as necessary to address the challenges the bloc faces.

Similarly, under the Council president’s latest proposal, the combined funding allocated for the EU’s external action (under the ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ heading) is lower than the figures in the Commission’s May announcements – from €118.2 billion to €113.9 billion overall. This represents an increase compared to the previous EU budget, but it is not in line with the elevated ambitions recognized by the Commission in May, which have only been made more compelling by the pandemic.

Brokering a deal in EU budget negotiations has always been a brutal affair, requiring sacrifices and compromise under the pressure of a ticking clock. 2020 was never likely to be an exception to this rule; but the pandemic has complicated the politics and raised the stakes.

The risk is that the budget negotiations lead to a compromise which, while delivering a historic coronavirus package, does not adequately support some of the key elements of the Union’s long-term agenda, especially its international ambitions.




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Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another when it comes to Africa

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 




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Challenges with 177Lu-PSMA-617 Radiopharmaceutical Therapy in Clinical Practice




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Impact of 18F-FDG PET/MRI on Therapeutic Management of Women with Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer: Results from a Prospective Double-Center Trial

Visual Abstract




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Diagnostic Radiopharmaceuticals: A Sustainable Path to the Improvement of Patient Care




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MIRD Pamphlet No. 31: MIRDcell V4--Artificial Intelligence Tools to Formulate Optimized Radiopharmaceutical Cocktails for Therapy

Visual Abstract




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Oncologist, Business Leader, and Investor Arie S. Belldegrun Discusses a Career in Innovative Medical Entrepreneurship: A Conversation with Ken Herrmann and Johannes Czernin




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[18F]FDG and [68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04-Directed Imaging for Outcome Prediction in Patients with High-Grade Neuroendocrine Neoplasms

Visual Abstract




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Feasibility, Tolerability, and Preliminary Clinical Response of Fractionated Radiopharmaceutical Therapy with 213Bi-FAPI-46: Pilot Experience in Patients with End-Stage, Progressive Metastatic Tumors

Visual Abstract





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Kinome Profiling of Primary Endometrial Tumors Using Multiplexed Inhibitor Beads and Mass Spectrometry Identifies SRPK1 as Candidate Therapeutic Target

Alison M. Kurimchak
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2068-2089
Research