Known as Buz Stop Boys, the group's leader says they want "a cleaner, healthier, and prouder Ghana".

Bryan Lanza tells the BBC there needs to be an "honest conversation" with Kyiv and returning Crimea is not a US priority.

Arab and Muslim leaders demanded that Israel withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories as a precondition for regional peace, while denouncing "shocking" Israeli crimes in war-ravaged Gaza.

Folk tales are meant to be flexible things, open-source stories infinitely moldable to the needs of teller and era. That’s the wonder of them — and of “The Skull,” an old Tyrolean yarn distilled to its droll essentials and marvelously reimagined by the Caldecott medalist (and national treasure) Jon Klassen. Klassen’s version, accompanied by a generous helping of his odd and beautiful illustrations, follows a young girl named Otilla who, one snowy night, “finally” runs away from home. She becomes hopelessly lost in a deep, dark forest.

Morgan Stanley analysts say Tesla will surge if it can expand to be an AI giant, which may be more likely if Elon Musk exerts influence in a second Trump term.

Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy will lead the Department of Government Efficiency, also known as DOGE, under Donald Trump's administration, Trump said.

We recently hosted an engaging live discussion with industry experts from G2Crowd, Instapage and Subscription Insider, covering trends and growth tips for online businesses. Check out what these leaders had to say about what they learned last year in the software industry, where people are missing opportunities and what’s coming next.

Earlier this year, Barakah Beats by Maleeha Siddiqui made it to the top of my “to be read” stack. The cover had caught my eye and I’d heard good things about it from friend and author Madelyn Rosenberg, who has excellent taste in books. 

Ever since that first childhood moment when I clapped two pot lids together and discovered the sounds that rang out, I’ve been fascinated by what sound can do to spark imagination and share information. I don’t use cookware as cymbals these days but am more quietly appreciative of how meaningful and beautiful the sounds around us can be.

Elon Musk could have a role in Donald Trump’s White House, and this could mean stricter AI standards. It’s no… Continue reading Musk and Trump’s relationship could lead to tougher AI standards

The post Musk and Trump’s relationship could lead to tougher AI standards appeared first on ReadWrite.

Nigeria began a process to sanction Starlink after the satellite-internet service owned by billionaire Elon Musk increased its prices without approval from the regulator.

I recently attended a weekend-long birthday getaway for an old college friend, and as soon as I arrived, he pulled out a box and said, "You have to play this game."

And he was right.

Hitster describes itself as a Music Party Board Game, and that's accurate. — Read the rest

The post Do you like party games and music history? Try HITSTER appeared first on Boing Boing.

With NASA's sights on moon bases, the question becomes how do you build shelters for tomorrow's lunar inhabitants? Carting up large amounts of raw materials from Earth is prohibitively expensive. And the only resources on the surface are regolith—lunar dust—and water. — Read the rest

The post NASA plans to grow mushroom houses on the moon appeared first on Boing Boing.

Neuroscientists have confirmed what every stoner already knows: music sounds better when you're high on weed. In a paper titled "Exploring the interaction between cannabis, hearing, and music," researchers from Toronto Metropolitan University reported results from a study in which participants "reported significantly greater hearing sensitivity and levels of state absorption while high compared to sober." — Read the rest

The post Music really does sound better when you're high, scientists report appeared first on Boing Boing.

The following article, ‘Utterly Unacceptable’: After Helping Trump Win, Elon Musk Makes Crucial Endorsement For Senate Majority Leader, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

Despite a landslide victory for Donald Trump and his “Make America Great Again” agenda last week, a ferocious battle has suddenly broken out in the U.S. Senate over who will be the chamber’s new leader, with some saying outgoing Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is trying to thwart the plans of the president-elect. “What the hell …

Continue reading ‘Utterly Unacceptable’: After Helping Trump Win, Elon Musk Makes Crucial Endorsement For Senate Majority Leader ...

Five years ago I was posting a lot to a publication called NewCo Shift, which is now offline. I got ahold of the archives, and found this review, which hasn’t lost any of its relevance – in fact, it kind of reads like it was written last week.  Everyone in tech loves Yuval Noah Harari. … Continue reading "From the Archive: Tech Must Get Over Its Superman Complex, Or We’re All Screwed"

If killjoy leftists can wear their self-parodying and ridiculous 'Handmaid's Tale' outfits, then they can't complain when a MAGA voter plays the same game... only better.

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Kamala was right about one thing: this election really DID deliver 'joy'... just not the way she expected.

The post EPIC: The ‘Songify’ Trend Of Clipping Speeches To Music Is Back… And AWESOME! appeared first on Clash Daily.

Pro-Trump businessmen Elon Musk (the richest man in the world) and Vivek Ramaswamy have officially joined the incoming Trump administration. President-elect Donald Trump announced in a statement published Tuesday that […]

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Presented by the Middle East Forum on Nov. 18, 2022 Panel discussion with Daniel Pipes, Cynthia Farahat, and Jonathan Schanzer:

Originally published in Gatestone Institute on Nov. 25, 2022 By Cynthia Farahat Bahgat Saber, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, operates from his New York apartment and often streams live videos from Times Square. During his multi-hour videos, Saber routinely incites terrorism, assassinations, kidnapping and torture in an extremely graphic manner. The calls for violence […]

By SADF – Nov. 30, 2022 Online conversation on The West, a New Haven for the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Planetary Nebula’? On November the 29th at 16H.00 (CET), SADF promoted an online conversation in the web platform StreamYard titled ‘The West, a New Haven for the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Planetary Nebula’?’ The conversation included the Member of the European Parliament (EPP, […]

By Walter Donway, Savvy Street originally published on Dec. 4, 2022 Book Review: The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death by Cynthia Farahat, Post Hill Press, Bombardier Books (2022) A grim irony of twentieth-century history (but, of course, also predating it) is that the most horrendous threats to humanity have simply been too monstrously evil […]

Spotify still No. 1 by wide margin February 24, 2022 (New York, NY) – Pandora, once the dominant player in terms of digital music streaming, will be eclipsed by Amazon […]

A Digital India Must Embrace the Circular Economy Expert comment sysadmin 15 January 2018

A growing amount of e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society.

The latest Global E-Waste Monitor places India as one of the highest contributors to global e-waste, generating over 2 million metric tonnes in 2016. Posing serious health and environmental risks, growing e-waste represents the hidden cost of increasingly digital lives in an information society.

With just 33 per cent of the population owning a smart phone, India already has the second largest number of smart phone users in the world, nearly 4 times that of the United States. The amount of e-waste generated will exponentially increase in the coming decade as the cost of consumer electronics decline, middle-class incomes rise, and the frequency at which devices are discarded increases.

As governance instruments are increasingly digitized and industry re-repositions itself to leverage Industry 4.0 solutions, the generation of e-waste will become a byproduct of institutional choices rather than consumer consumption and behaviour alone.

India is already a leader in the management and recycling of e-waste. But over 90 per cent is managed in the unorganized sector by small businesses and individual entrepreneurs, typically from low-income marginalized communities, and often women. E-waste contains various toxic substances such as mercury and lead, prolonged exposure to which can lead to major health problems.

Almost 80 per cent of e-waste workers in India suffer from respiratory ailments due to improper standards and nearly 500,000 children are engaged in e-waste collection without adequate protection and safeguards. The bulk of the dirty and dangerous work supporting India’s march towards an increasingly digital society is done by those who have the least access to technology gains. Government regulations for the management of e-waste, on the other hand, are becoming more relaxed, presumably as a result of industry pressure. To streamline e-waste management, the government notified Electronic Waste Rules in 2011, based on the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR).

EPR makes manufacturers of electronic products responsible for the end-of-life management of their products, including setting up collection centres. By shifting the burden to manufacturers, the EPR framework, in theory, creates incentives for more environmentally friendly design. But the impact of EPR rules on manufacturers has been minimal, at best. The recently released Draft Notification (2017) by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change further relaxes the EPR rule by reducing the e-waste collection targets for industries.

While the efficiency and productivity gains of Digital India are to be welcomed, growing e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society. Data centres, for example, are one the largest contributors to global warming, contributing a similar amount to global greenhouse emissions as the aviation industry.

This amount is expected to triple in the next decade. In many ways, the sustainability challenge is a ‘wicked problem’ – where possible solutions create a new set of additional challenges and the choice between available alternatives is largely about competing values.

For example, data centres powered by renewable sources of energy such as solar provide a greener alternative, but will also create new forms of e-waste in the form of photovoltaic cells and panels. An unverified estimate suggests that India’s projected solar capacity of 100 gigawatts by 2022 will create 7.76 million tonnes of e-waste. Without adequate and preemptive consideration of how this waste should be disposed and recycled, renewable energy solutions can create new negative externalities.

For Digital India to be sustainable, we need to develop anticipatory knowledge for preemptive solutions. It is an opportune moment to think of the broader architecture of a digital society, one that avoids getting locked into unsustainable models of production and consumption, as is the case with many industrialized economies.

The argument that such considerations are premature for India, given high levels of poverty and unemployment, are misplaced. Enquiries into the sustainability of Digital India are no less urgent than the need for sustained job-creating economic growth. These issues should not be addressed in a sequential or linear manner, but in parallel, or else we will be only partially aware of available choices and their consequences, creating new forms of technological and economic lock-ins.

The value-based choice demanded by the ‘wicked problem’ at hand is one that embraces the idea of a circular economy — one that departs from the linear economic growth model predicated on ‘take, make, dispose’ to embrace a growth model based on creating closed loops of production, consumption and re-use. A circular economy model is built on the idea of designing out waste and pollution; keeping products and materials in use; and regenerating natural systems. In many ways, India is already a leader in the circular economy.

Alongside, the management of e-waste and other forms of recycling, high levels of repair and reuse are distinctly observable. A number of reports note that the informal waste management sector in India works better than systems in many industrialized economies.

A circular economy vision for Digital India would include organizing informal waste management systems, including safety and social protection initiatives for workers; revising and tightening existent e-waste rules for increased accountability by manufacturers both in terms of durable design and responsible disposal; green data centres; and building future smart cities with a view towards energy and water efficiency, among others.

A recent report by the Ellen McArthur Foundation and the World Economic Forum also estimates that a circular economy path to development could bring India annual benefits of $624 billion by 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions could also be 44 per cent lower in 2050, compared with current development path.

Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries are leading the way in promoting the idea of a circular economy. Sweden recently announced tax breaks for repair related activities and Finland hosted the first global conference on the circular economy earlier this year. The circular economy provides an opportunity for India to capitalize and leverage an already existing culture of circular activities, and promote it as a policy agenda that will create new forms of employment while facilitating sustainable environmental management.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

Digital politics threatens democracy and must change Expert comment NCapeling 13 January 2023

Violence in Brazil has again brought into focus the need for technology platforms to prioritize social responsibility to help prevent anti-democratic action.

Immediately following the violent storming of Brazil’s congressional building, supreme court, and presidential palace, comparisons to the infamous events of 6 January 2021 in the US came quickly and easily – and with good reason.

Both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro built a fervent – albeit inchoate – political base of grievance which included Christian evangelicals, gun enthusiasts, and the disenfranchised. Both cynically spread doubts about the election victories of their successors without evidence. And it has been claimed both incited their supporters to overturn these results.

But this list of similarities extend beyond mere politics. The attack on democracy in Brazil was recorded, amplified, coordinated, and funded by exactly the same technologies used by the protesters in the US on 6 January.

In Brazil, the main engines of misinformation and insurrection planning were Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, although some election-denying diehards also shifted to Twitter.

Tactical use of social media to mobilize and fundraise

When Bolsonaro was originally elected in 2018, these platforms were already a medium for promoting disinformation, conspiracy, and fear. But in the lead-up to the violence of 8 January, they became a means by which ‘Bolsonaristas’ raised funding for an attack and mobilized supporters to come to Brasilia – advertising the availability of buses and even free food for marchers – using the Festa da Selma hashtag.

To avoid detection by authorities, organizers used a simple switch of the letter ‘v’ to ‘m’ so that Selva, meaning ‘jungle’, became Selma – which means ‘party in the jungle’ to those in the know. But the authorities in the Brasilia state of Distrito Federal appeared to care little about preventing the attack anyway.

Civil society organizations have warned for decades that policies made in a Silicon Valley boardroom fit poorly to the realities of countries such as Brazil, Somalia, or Myanmar. Content moderation is a near-impossible task at the scale demanded by platforms as vast as those operated by big tech, and automated solutions are far from being a silver bullet as they create as many problems as they solve.

Extremism has found an unfettered enabler on mainstream platforms, and an increasingly sprawling network of alternative tech has made such voices resilient to challenge. Platforms such as Gettr, Gab, and Telegram have become go-to platforms for extremist networks when fringe voices find themselves blocked by mainstream platforms.

Telegram has come under significant scrutiny for the role it played in the storming of Congress in Brasilia but any number of tools and platforms – each with millions of users – could have achieved similar results.

The sordid events in Brasilia are just the latest chapter in digital extremism and conspiracy- mongering which often erupts into anti-democratic violence, and should serve as a reminder of the urgent risks of disinformation and the role digital technology plays in inciting, coordinating, fundraising, and amplifying such events.

But the checks on the power of private social media companies are still few and splintered. In Brazil, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, head of the elections tribunal, attempted to crack down on social media, banning users for spreading misinformation in a move which sparked complaints of censorship from Bolsonaro supporters.

Following the elections, Moraes has advocated for greater judicial authority to regulate social media – but the justice is only one person and his impartiality is already being challenged given his aggressive pursuit of Bolsonaro supporters posting inflammatory messages.

And one justice doing it alone only inflames an already volatile situation. Effective regulation of social media requires an independent body vested with multiparty support and operating under clearly-defined rules and authority.

A global movement to find solutions

Brazil is not alone in an increasingly frantic search for checks on digital power as dozens of regulatory regimes are springing up around the world. All are premised on platforms being responsible for their own fiefdoms, but few tackle the threat posed to democracy by unchecked corporate power over digital commons.

Well-intentioned regulation will fall short so long as it is narrowly focused on a never-ending game of ‘content whack-a-mole’ and is hamstrung by powerful voices who see any rules as an attack on freedoms of expression or corporate decision-making.

Democracies are traditionally cautious in managing speech, in separating good information from bad information, or in defining acceptable politics. The steady watering down of the UK’s Online Safety Bill, now so thin on disinformation as to be essentially homeopathic, shows that democratic regulation is willing to go only so far in tackling challenges posed by digital politics.

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022

Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.

The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.

That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.

When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.

But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.

Repairing EU trade relations is priority

The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.

When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.

And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.

But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.

That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.

A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.

For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.

The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.

Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.

Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.

Taking a hard line needs context

There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.

Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.

When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace 11 October 2024

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.

Digital governance must not marginalize smaller states Expert comment LToremark 19 May 2021

For effective and inclusive digital governance, multi-stakeholderism must raise its game.

Last month, the G7 announced it is to work towards a trusted, values-driven digital ecosystem. While this is commendable, the G7 must recognize that key international digital governance decisions should involve all states whose populations will be affected. Not doing so is to deny the legitimate interests of those populations and may cause a lack of trust in international digital governance that embeds longer-term instability.

While a multi-stakeholder approach to digital governance is important, it must be structured in a way that allows for meaningful representation of states’ interests and ensures their representatives have the opportunity and capacity to take part. As the internet becomes fundamental to life in every country of the world, international digital governance is increasingly important to all governments and excluding some states’ perspectives may engender wider risks to international security and governance.

The ‘glitter ball’ of digital governance

International digital governance is playing catch-up with the digital sphere it needs to govern. Its starting point is a ‘glitter ball’ of governance initiatives: a large number of complex facets with overlapping impacts – and an almost impenetrable core. Governance initiatives (see infographic) include governance of the internet itself and its uses, international cybersecurity, international human rights, data management, as well as the impact of digital developments in areas such as armed conflict, trade and health.

Many of the bodies involved – such as the Internet Governance Forum, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and technical standards bodies – include a wide range of stakeholders, yet there is no one accessible, central body. Furthermore, certain key issues, such as the role and responsibilities of tech platforms, are barely touched upon by international governance mechanisms. There is also currently only a limited role for traditional UN multilateral decision-making, a process which builds in a role for smaller states.

The sheer number of forums involved, each with a different set of working methods and rules on participation, makes it difficult to fully grasp what digital governance looks like as a whole. The UN secretary-general’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation recognized the complexity of digital cooperation arrangements and the barriers to inclusion facing small and developing countries as well as under-represented groups. In response, the June 2020 UN Roadmap on Digital Cooperation accepts the need to streamline digital governance while ensuring marginalized voices are heard.

The UN is considering potential models for future governance, each of which would – reassuringly – involve multi-stakeholder participation, dedicated funds to boost participation, consolidation of discussions currently split between different forums and a minor coordinating role for the UN.  

Building in roles for smaller states

As the UN designs new digital governance architecture, it is particularly important to build in roles for small and medium states. Core constituencies affected by decisions should be at the centre and governments – as guardians of public interest – should have a key say in the decision-making process. The distrust generated by built-in power imbalances needs to be addressed, as does the dominance of voices from the Global North in bodies such as ICANN.   

There has been some progress made to increase participation. For example, the Freedom Online Coalition includes a number of developing countries and the 2020 Internet Governance Forum included input from 175 states.

However, participation is not only a matter of having a seat at the table. As discussed at the March 2021 UN Open-ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, capacity-building is vital. The group’s conclusions include the suggested development of a global cyber capacity-building agenda with information sharing and norms guidance under the auspices of the UN. Representatives of small and medium states need a roadmap to understand in which forums they can defend and pursue their interests, and the financial help to do so if necessary.

Managing multi-stakeholder participation

A multi-stakeholder approach has been fundamental to digital governance from the start and has played a vital role in helping to secure the openness and universality of the internet. This approach is rightly seen as essential to effective governance because it introduces diverse expertise, allows the interests of all impacted sectors to be taken into account and helps ensure decisions are accepted by those affected.

However, as identified in a Chatham House report on inclusive global governance, multi-stakeholderism needs to raise its game. One of its downsides is that in the cacophony some important voices may not be heard because they lack resource or capacity to speak up. There is a perennial risk of debate and decision-making being captured by the wealthiest companies or the most powerful states. At present, small and medium states are under-represented in multi-stakeholder forums and it is important that those managing such forums seek to identify and include previously excluded voices.

Multi-stakeholderism should not come at the expense of efficiency. While it does not have to mean huge, inefficient meetings or endless discussion, it should also not mean that smaller, less well-funded voices are not heard. Instead, such processes should enable representation of appropriate interest groups, complemented by wider meetings (such as regional meetings, or sector-specific meetings) as needed. While inclusivity and transparency are key, synergies between regional and global forums can work well –  for example, some countries have adopted national versions of the Internet Governance Forum –  and so too can hybrid models such as the Freedom Online Coalition, which meets both as government members and for regular multi-stakeholder dialogue.

A multi-stakeholder approach should also not lose sight of the key role of states – and where mandated, sub-state entities – in making public policy decisions.

An important role for the UN

For 75 years, the UN has acted as a bulwark of international security and shared values, and a promoter of economic and social development. If misused, technology has the potential to undermine this bulwark, to facilitate conflict, erode rights and undermine development. The UN must encourage the harnessing of technology for society’s benefit, while leading a collective effort to guard against the risks through the retention and growth of a universal, open internet – particularly in the face of growing digital authoritarianism exacerbated by COVID-19.

The UN can also help protect against a commercial culture that threatens to trample fundamental freedoms of privacy and autonomy in its pursuit of wealth and to widen economic and social gulfs by leaving large swathes of the world behind. If the UN is to play this role effectively – and for the benefit of all its members ­– it requires the active participation of all states, large and small.

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.

Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 30 May 2022

Restrictions on supply of certain items and financial sanctions can impede vital relief unless adequate safeguards are put in place such as exceptions or general licences.

Sanctions play a major role in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations (UN) has not imposed sanctions, but an important number of states have done so. They have imposed a wide array of restrictions and the number of targeted – or ‘designated’ – persons is unprecedented.

The public has been captivated by the freezing of oligarchs’ assets. There is ongoing discussion about seizing them to provide compensation for war damage. Debate continues about how far to ban oil and gas imports.

One aspect of the sanctions has received far less attention, even though it can exacerbate the effect of the conflict on civilians. Some of the trade restrictions and financial sanctions pose immediate and concrete challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to work in Ukraine and in neighbouring states.

Trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and UK prohibit the export or supply of certain goods and technology in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil or mineral exploration sectors to non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts, or for use there.

Restricted items include technical equipment which is necessary for humanitarian operations, such as water pumps and refrigerating equipment, but also far more mundane items such as vehicles for transport of persons and goods, and office equipment that are necessary for humanitarian organizations trying to work in the region.

Designations can reduce options for support

Financial sanctions also raise problems. Some are immediately apparent. Significantly for humanitarian operations, the two de facto republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are designated by the EU, the UK, and the US. Consequently, it is prohibited to make funds or assets available to them directly or indirectly.

This prohibition covers the payment of any taxes, licences, and other fees to these authorities, as well as the provision of assets to ministries under their control in the course of humanitarian operations, such as ministries of health and education.

Designations of other entities may also be relevant, such as Russian ‘state enterprises’ which operate in these areas and are the sole providers of commodities necessary for humanitarian response, such as heating fuel.

These are the designations which most obviously impact humanitarian response. However, more than 1,000 persons and entities have been designated and humanitarian organizations must avoid purchasing goods and services from them.

Risk-averse commercial partners

Commercial actors – such as banks, insurers, freight companies and commodity providers – whose services are required by humanitarian organizations must also comply with the sanctions. Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks.

Fears of violating the sanctions, coupled with the fact humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, have led them to severely restrict the services they provide.

This is not the first occasion the problem has arisen. What is different in relation to Ukraine is the number of designated persons and the ‘sanctions packages’ adopted in quick succession. As compliance officers struggle to keep abreast, their institutions become even more risk-averse.

For UK banks, the situation is exacerbated by the adoption of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. This amends existing rules by removing the requirement for the UK Treasury to prove knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that a transaction violated sanctions, imposing strict liability for sanctions violations.

Time for the UK to follow others

The EU, the US, Switzerland, and other states which have imposed sanctions have sought to mitigate their adverse effects by including safeguards for humanitarian action. Although the UK has largely replicated the measures adopted by the EU in terms of restrictions and designations, it lags behind in including such safeguards.

The UK trade restrictions and financial sanctions do not include exceptions for humanitarian action. While several general licences have been issued, none relate to humanitarian operations.

Instead, the UK measures foresee only the possibility of applying for specific licences – from the Treasury in the case of financial sanctions and the Department of International Trade for trade restrictions. But obtaining specific licences is a time-consuming process which is simply not appropriate for emergency response.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions – either in the form of exceptions or general licences.

What matters is they cover all key humanitarian organizations responding to the Ukraine crisis that are subject to UK sanctions – either because they are UK persons or because their funding agreements with the UK government require them to comply with UK measures.

These include UN agencies, funds and programmes, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis in Ukraine and neighbouring states. The provision must also clearly extend to commercial entities which provide necessary services for humanitarian operations.

Given the UK recently adopted an exception along similar lines in relation to the Afghanistan sanctions, there is a valuable precedent for Ukraine.

The UK must not sleepwalk into leaving the ECHR Expert comment NCapeling 17 March 2023

Talk of the UK leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) keeps rearing its head with little thought for the real impact.

Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has not been firmly ruled out as a potential UK government policy option to allow easier implementation of its controversial new measures to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda. This, in the context of a UK general election looming and tackling the ‘small boats problem’ being one of the five priorities of UK prime minister Rishi Sunak.

In recent months, ECHR withdrawal has come up in relation to the UK’s controversial draft Illegal Migration Bill, the (now shelved) bill of rights, and – perhaps most significantly – the Northern Ireland Protocol deal with implications for the Good Friday Agreement. But leaving the ECHR – and likely the Council of Europe – would be counterproductive for the UK’s global leadership.

UK values and priorities will be undermined

The only other countries in the region outside of the Council of Europe, Russia and Belarus, both had sanctions imposed on them by the UK for their human rights record. Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in 2022 due to its aggression in Ukraine and, although the UK would be deciding to remove itself from Europe’s oldest and largest intergovernmental human rights body, the optics would not be good.

This is especially true considering the UK’s vocal support for Ukraine in international forums, including its intervention in Ukraine’s case against Russia before the International Court of Justice and, potentially, in a separate case against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights itself.

More significantly and closer to home, the ECHR is a fundamental part of the Good Friday Agreement. It is difficult to argue UK withdrawal would not breach the agreement. As well as risking damage to intercommunal relations, such a breach is likely to significantly harm strategic relations with the US – and President Biden is set to visit Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to mark the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement.

It would also damage relations with the UK’s closest neighbours, Ireland, and the European Union (EU), with whom the prime minister has only recently scored credits for securing the Northern Ireland Protocol deal. If the UK withdraws from the ECHR, the EU would be entitled to terminate important provisions concerning international law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal justice matters under Article 692 of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement, further isolating the UK from allies who share its legal and other values.

Withdrawal would be in the name of sovereignty but with little thought to the practical implications on rights and few perceived gains from doing so. But the idea could easily gain traction by erroneously conflating the Strasbourg court and Council of Europe (of which the UK is a member) with the European Union (which the UK has left).

This means leaving the ECHR could easily be confused as a post-Brexit ‘tidy up’ exercise of taking back control from the EU when the reality is the UK would be withdrawing from a completely different regional body.

It would also be at odds with the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh which, reassuringly, contains references to the UK’s commitment to the rule of law, ‘respect for the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law’, and ‘universal human rights that underpins our democracy’. This would make the UK far less able to champion international law and influence states with long records of human rights violations, and run contrary to UK strategic priorities such as tackling aggression from Russia and China, its support for multilateralism, and its global legal leadership.

All this loss would come for little gain. Before going down this path, there must be a clearer understanding about exactly what concerns there are about the ECHR, and whether they stand up to scrutiny. Are they about UK sovereignty, specific issues about the European Court of Human Rights, or about the rights and obligations contained in the Convention?

The latter would raise a far bigger question on the UK’s commitment to other international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, as many ECHR obligations also exist elsewhere in both common law and international law.

The need for cool heads and a long-term view

The significant concerns surrounding proposals in the Illegal Migration bill have been well-documented, including in relation to obligations under the ECHR and UN Refugee Convention.

There are many reasons beyond simply human rights concerns which are preventing migrants being deported to Rwanda, including the fact there are insufficient countries with which the UK has agreements to allow for deportation.

Expert

Expert

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

In 2020, when Anthony Parker, known to his fans as DJ Specs, decided to trade his textbooks for turntables, he didn't just pivot his career -- he pivoted his entire life. At just 25 years old, this Kingston-born DJ has already carved out a space...

Carnosine (β-alanyl-l-histidine) and anserine (β-alanyl-3-methyl-l-histidine) are abundant peptides in the nervous system and skeletal muscle of many vertebrates. Many in vitro and in vivo studies demonstrated that exogenously added carnosine can improve muscle contraction, has antioxidant activity, and can quench various reactive aldehydes. Some of these functions likely contribute to the proposed anti-aging activity of carnosine. However, the physiological role of carnosine and related histidine-containing dipeptides (HCDs) is not clear. In this study, we generated a mouse line deficient in carnosine synthase (Carns1). HCDs were undetectable in the primary olfactory system and skeletal muscle of Carns1-deficient mice. Skeletal muscle contraction in these mice, however, was unaltered, and there was no evidence for reduced pH-buffering capacity in the skeletal muscle. Olfactory tests did not reveal any deterioration in 8-month-old mice lacking carnosine. In contrast, aging (18–24-month-old) Carns1-deficient mice exhibited olfactory sensitivity impairments that correlated with an age-dependent reduction in the number of olfactory receptor neurons. Whereas we found no evidence for elevated levels of lipoxidation and glycation end products in the primary olfactory system, protein carbonylation was increased in the olfactory bulb of aged Carns1-deficient mice. Taken together, these results suggest that carnosine in the olfactory system is not essential for information processing in the olfactory signaling pathway but does have a role in the long-term protection of olfactory receptor neurons, possibly through its antioxidant activity.

2 July 2020

11 August 2020

16 September 2020

Cancer cachexia is characterized by reductions in peripheral lean muscle mass. Prior studies have primarily focused on increased protein breakdown as the driver of cancer-associated muscle wasting. Therapeutic interventions targeting catabolic pathways have, however, largely failed to preserve muscle mass in cachexia, suggesting that other mechanisms might be involved. In pursuit of novel pathways, we used untargeted metabolomics to search for metabolite signatures that may be linked with muscle atrophy. We injected 7-week–old C57/BL6 mice with LLC1 tumor cells or vehicle. After 21 days, tumor-bearing mice exhibited reduced body and muscle mass and impaired grip strength compared with controls, which was accompanied by lower synthesis rates of mixed muscle protein and the myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic muscle fractions. Reductions in protein synthesis were accompanied by mitochondrial enlargement and reduced coupling efficiency in tumor-bearing mice. To generate mechanistic insights into impaired protein synthesis, we performed untargeted metabolomic analyses of plasma and muscle and found increased concentrations of two methylarginines, asymmetric dimethylarginine (ADMA) and NG-monomethyl-l-arginine, in tumor-bearing mice compared with control mice. Compared with healthy controls, human cancer patients were also found to have higher levels of ADMA in the skeletal muscle. Treatment of C2C12 myotubes with ADMA impaired protein synthesis and reduced mitochondrial protein quality. These results suggest that increased levels of ADMA and mitochondrial changes may contribute to impaired muscle protein synthesis in cancer cachexia and could point to novel therapeutic targets by which to mitigate cancer cachexia.

Why Ethiopia must close its political gender gap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Women urgently need to gain access to high office if the country hopes to survive, say Hilina Berhanu Degefa and Emebet Getachew.

At the end of 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government announced the formation of a three-year national dialogue to address Ethiopia’s political crisis, looking at the ongoing civil war and conflict, inflation, unemployment, drought and other urgent domestic issues. 

But, while efforts have been made to ensure the participation of women in this dialogue, it must be more than symbolic otherwise gaps in meaningful gender inclusion could have significant implications on the very survival of the country.
 
One of the challenges for meaningful inclusion is that Ethiopia is a highly patriarchal society. Patriarchal norms and practices permeate all aspects of the country’s social, economic and political life. Women constitute over half of the Ethiopian population and represent 41 per cent of the national parliament.

Nevertheless, most political parties, including those with liberal credentials, are exclusively governed by men, with women taking almost no part in key decision-making processes. As a result, women are relegated to the margins of political and economic activities. 

Though there has been little systematic study of the structural challenges faced by Ethiopian women in politics, women members of political parties encounter many barriers, including political violence, male-coded norms and sexist discourses across Ethiopian society.
 
The nature and scale of political violence perpetrated against women is particularly disempowering and affects their ability to participate in political spaces.

While attitudes to gender equality, sexual violence and gender discrimination are often trivialized, they remain ever-present threats in women’s lives. As late as 2016, a significant minority of men still believed wife-beating to be justified in certain situations. Even when women overcome social pressure to pursue their political ambitions, patriarchal views and practices within political party structures about the role of women significantly undermine their active participation and engagement. 

The political space is even more inaccessible to women with disabilities and in conflict and climate-related crises such as among internally displaced people and in pastoral communities. Male-coded norms ingrained at both party and community levels remain a significant concern. Specifically, sex in exchange for candidacy, inconsiderate working schedules affecting women with children and denial of access to equal information and financial resources are frequently reported as major internal hurdles among political parties.

Closing the gender gap could offer Ethiopia a new beginning

Many political initiatives designed to tackle these gender imbalances often have been driven by short-term political considerations without proper gender-gap assessment and policy analysis. In most cases, the authorities have viewed gender-targeted reforms as acts of benevolence, dispensed by the government, without adopting the legal and financial measures necessary to ensure sustainability and impact.
 
Take, for example, Abiy’s appointment of a 50:50 gender-balanced cabinet in 2018. At the time, much was made about its transformative potential, with the prime minister attracting widespread global approval. Yet, a cabinet reshuffle in 2021 reduced female representation to 36.3 per cent, with far less scrutiny or accountability.

This indicates that gender equality in Ethiopia is not considered a priority but rather an endeavour for more opportune, ‘stable’ times. Without thorough measures that create the conditions for real change, the aspiration of having a gender-balanced cabinet will always be challenging to translate into lasting equal representation.
 
The proposed national dialogue presents an ideal opportunity for Ethiopian women to begin reshaping attitudes and closing the gender gap through their inclusion and participation in the political process. To do so, three issues must be addressed.
 
First, the varying rights of women need to be consolidated, including on identity, constitutional reform and economic issues .

Second, gender equality considerations must be absorbed into mainstream political discourse at all levels.

Third, the experiences of women in the recent war, other ongoing conflicts and past and lingering legacies of political violence targeting women from specific communities, must be acknowledged and remedied. 

If Ethiopia is indeed serious about addressing its asymmetric gender power dynamics, this national dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to begin the process. Genuine participation of women as independent actors, with their own agency, could offer Ethiopia a new beginning.

Tirsa L. E. van Westering
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2047-2067
Research

The absence of the dystrophin protein in Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) results in myofiber fragility and a plethora of downstream secondary pathologies. Although a variety of experimental therapies are in development, achieving effective treatments for DMD remains exceptionally challenging, not least because the pathological consequences of dystrophin loss are incompletely understood. Here we have performed proteome profiling in tibialis anterior muscles from two murine DMD models (mdx and mdx52) at three ages (8, 16, and 80 weeks of age), all n = 3. High-resolution isoelectric focusing liquid chromatography-tandem MS (HiRIEF-LC–MS/MS) was used to quantify the expression of 4974 proteins across all 27 samples. The two dystrophic models were found to be highly similar, whereas multiple proteins were differentially expressed relative to WT (C57BL/6) controls at each age. Furthermore, 1795 proteins were differentially expressed when samples were pooled across ages and dystrophic strains. These included numerous proteins associated with the extracellular matrix and muscle function that have not been reported previously. Pathway analysis revealed multiple perturbed pathways and predicted upstream regulators, which together are indicative of cross-talk between inflammatory, metabolic, and muscle growth pathways (e.g. TNF, INF, NF-B, SIRT1, AMPK, PGC-1α, PPARs, ILK, and AKT/PI3K). Upregulation of CAV3, MVP and PAK1 protein expression was validated in dystrophic muscle by Western blot. Furthermore, MVP was upregulated during, but not required for, the differentiation of C2C12 myoblasts suggesting that this protein may affect muscle regeneration. This study provides novel insights into mutation-independent proteomic signatures characteristic of the dystrophic phenotype and its progression with aging.

Many cell surface and secreted proteins are modified by the covalent addition of glycans that play an important role in the development of multicellular organisms. These glycan modifications enable communication between cells and the extracellular matrix via interactions with specific glycan-binding lectins and the regulation of receptor-mediated signaling. Aberrant protein glycosylation has been associated with the development of several muscular diseases suggesting essential glycan- and lectin-mediated functions in myogenesis and muscle development but our molecular understanding of the precise glycans, catalytic enzymes and lectins involved remain only partially understood. Here, we quantified dynamic remodeling of the membrane-associated proteome during a time-course of myogenesis in cell culture. We observed wide-spread changes in the abundance of several important lectins and enzymes facilitating glycan biosynthesis. Glycomics-based quantification of released N-linked glycans confirmed remodeling of the glycome consistent with the regulation of glycosyltransferases and glycosidases responsible for their formation including a previously unknown di-galactose-to-sialic acid switch supporting a functional role of these glycoepitopes in myogenesis. Furthermore, dynamic quantitative glycoproteomic analysis with multiplexed stable isotope labelling and analysis of enriched glycopeptides with multiple fragmentation approaches identified glycoproteins modified by these regulated glycans including several integrins and growth factor receptors. Myogenesis was also associated with the regulation of several lectins most notably the up-regulation of galectin-1 (LGALS1). CRISPR/Cas9-mediated deletion of Lgals1 inhibited differentiation and myotube formation suggesting an early functional role of galectin-1 in the myogenic program. Importantly, similar changes in N-glycosylation and the up-regulation of galectin-1 during postnatal skeletal muscle development were observed in mice. Treatment of new-born mice with recombinant adeno-associated viruses to overexpress galectin-1 in the musculature resulted in enhanced muscle mass. Our data form a valuable resource to further understand the glycobiology of myogenesis and will aid the development of intervention strategies to promote healthy muscle development or regeneration.

Shohei Ohtani remains a must-watch player for Angels fans in 2019, and his recovery from Tommy John surgery will be worth monitoring throughout the season as he prepares to pitch again in '20.

Spring Training is officially here for the Angels, with pitchers and catchers reporting to Tempe Diablo Stadium on Tuesday. And there's a new face at manager, with Brad Ausmus replacing longtime skipper Mike Scioscia this offseason.