2015 The dark side of consensus in Tunisia: Lessons from 2015-2019 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 16:55:04 +0000 Executive Summary Since the 2011 revolution, Tunisia has been considered a model for its pursuit of consensus between secular and Islamist forces. While other Arab Spring countries descended into civil war or military dictatorship, Tunisia instead chose dialogue and cooperation, forming a secular-Islamist coalition government in 2011 and approving a constitution by near unanimity in… Full Article
2015 Latin America 2015: Time for Reform By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 09 Jan 2015 00:00:00 -0500 Latin America is starting off 2015 with a clear economic slowdown. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects a modest recovery (2.2 per cent) with respect to last year (in 2014 growth was only 1.1 per cent, the lowest since the 2009 crisis), though these calculations may vary due to several factors. The world economy is not helping. The downward trend in raw materials prices, scant dynamism in global demand, and the appreciation of the dollar are three factors that work against the region today. Venezuela and Argentina, are facing very complex economic contexts. Venezuela is in the midst of stagflation (aggravated by plummeting oil prices); and Argentina is experiencing negative growth, high inflation, and the unresolved conflict with the “vulture funds.” The two largest economies of the region, Brazil and Mexico, are facing their own demons. Brazil President Dilma Rousseff, with a weak mandate, is gambling the political capital of her second term (which just began on 1 January) on the new economic team led by Joaquim “Scissorhands” Levy. Levy is to make a fiscal adjustment that has been put off and is much needed; Rousseff hopes it will enable her to regain investor confidence, and thereby return to higher growth. The Petrobras scandal (in addition to the negative impact it has been having within the Workers Party) requires that she wage a head-on struggle against corruption and impunity (she just proposed a national anticorruption campaign), and that she implement a thoroughgoing political reform, which has been put off for too long. In Mexico, falling oil prices, economic growth below official expectations, and the wave of protests in the wake of the murders of the 43 students in school to become teachers at Ayotzinapa, have eclipsed the so-called Mexico moment and have Enrique Peña Nieto against the ropes. He has sought to retake the initiative by announcing new reforms and proposals, and he hopes to recover citizen trust if the structural reforms yield the results promised. The challenge of the polls In the 2015 electoral agenda, of special note are three presidential elections (Argentina, Guatemala, and Haiti), three legislative elections (El Salvador, Mexico, and Venezuela), and several state, regional, and municipal elections, in Bolivia, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay, among others. The three presidential elections continue to be very open races. In Guatemala (from the return of democracy to date) the party in power has never been returned to office. The three best-positioned presidential candidates are the government party candidate Alejandro Sinibaldi, and opposition candidates Manuel Baldizón (for now he’s leading the polls) and former first lady Sandra Torres. In Argentina, kirchnerismo is pulling into the election period worn down and without any clear candidate for now. The three leading candidates based on polling data are Peronists Daniel Scioli (former vice president of Néstor Kirchner and current governor of the province of Buenos Aires) and Sergio Massa (former chief of staff of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, currently a federal legislator and opponent of the government), and on the center-right Mauricio Macri (current head of government of the city of Buenos Aires). In Haiti, in a tense political environment, it is not clear who will succeed President Michel Martelly, or what the exact date will be for municipal, legislative, or presidential elections. It is rumored that presidential elections may be held in January 2016. Ultimately the electoral calendar will depend on how negotiations proceed between Martelly and the opposition. The Salvadoran legislative and municipal elections are especially important. The Sánchez Cerén administration will seek to revalidate its triumph of early 2014, ensuring good legislative and municipal support for his efforts with a view to the next three years, while the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) will seek to turn things around at the polls. In Mexico, the future of the administration of President Peña Nieto, beset by protests and scandals, turns on the midterm elections of June 2015. Whether Peña Nieto will have sufficient political capital to continue giving impetus to his agenda of structural reforms (“Pacto por México”) during the remaining three years of his term will hinge on the results of these elections. In Venezuela, the legislative elections will increase political tension and repression by the regime. The opposition has a golden opportunity to win back the legislative majority from the chavistas or President Chavez followers, taking advantage of the profound economic crisis looming over the country and the fall in Nicolás Maduro’s popularity in the polls. The big question is whether the opposition will prove capable of taking advantage of this opportunity and whether the elections will be truly free and competitive. The other aspect to monitor is whether Vatican diplomacy, under the leadership of Pope Francis (and with the precedent of the re-establishment of relations between the United States and Cuba in his favor), will be able to facilitate an effective political dialogue between the government and the opposition to seek a negotiated solution to Venezuela’s complex situation. Colombia, Cuba and Chile In Colombia, in addition to the regional elections (in which the uribistas, or followers of former President Álvaro Uribe, will seek to come out on top this time), attention is focused on the final phase of the negotiations in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Juan Manuel Santos aimed at achieving peace. If the negotiations are successful, it will no doubt be the most important political event in the region in 2015. The fate of the peace process will be subject to a referendum, which will probably be held in the second half of 2015 or early 2016 (depending on the speed at which the negotiations proceed and their success). The most important political event of 2014--the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba after more than 50 years of confrontation--will continue to capture considerable attention in 2015. This decision, which entails a 180-degree turnabout in U.S. policy to Cuba, will help improve relations between the United States and the region. It enables Cuba to fully assume its place in the hemisphere (its participation at the Seventh Summit of the Americas next April in Panama will make it a historic occasion), and at the same time it will also be able to diversify its trade relations and allow for new investment at a time when Venezuela (its main partner in recent years) is experiencing its own profound economic crisis. Full normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba (including the end of the embargo, a decision in the hands of Congress) will be a long and complex process, but the first step has already been taken, and in the right direction. In 2015 it will also be important to monitor the evolution and results of the economic reforms that Raúl Castro has been carrying out. In addition, 2015 is a vital year in Chile for the government of Michelle Bachelet who, with markedly diminished popularity and mounting criticism of her presidency, must address two major challenges in the second year of her administration: bringing about the recovery of an economy that has clearly slowed down (1.7 per cent during 2014), and continuing to give impetus to an ambitious agenda of reforms. This year the polemical education reform should be approved; it not only enjoys the backing of the opposition, but also provokes major tensions within the government coalition. In addition, the electoral reform should be unveiled (it will do away with the binomial system) and the labour reform, which is resulting in a new distancing of business from the government. Another point on the agenda is starting up the process aimed at amending the Constitution (one of Bachelet’s three main pledges during her campaign); the process promises to be the “mother of all reforms.” Different scenarios in regional relations In regional relations, seven events stand out for their importance and should be closely monitored: The first ministerial meeting of China-Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños CELAC Forum in Beijing, China (January 8 and 9); The third meeting of CELAC in Costa Rica (January 28 and 29), where Ecuador will assume the presidency; The Seventh Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Panama (April 10 and 11), and whose focus of attention will be Cuba’s participation for the first time since the Summits process began in 1994; The election of a new Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) with the capacity to strategically reposition this weakened regional organization affected by the political divisions among its member countries; The evolution of the process of rapprochement between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance; The EU-Latin America Summit; The recent re-launch of UNASUR (which took place in December in Quito), under the leadership of former President Ernesto Samper. My opinion Latin America finds itself in the doldrums, and must undertake a two-fold transition: from the model based on high raw materials prices and low financing costs, to one with low raw materials prices and higher financing costs. As the OECD rightly notes: “this abrupt economic slowdown is not a passing phenomenon, it has come to stay. It’s the end of a cycle.” This requires the region to urgently set in motion profound structural reforms, aimed at changing its development model which can strategically adapt to this new global context. Only by improving productivity and competitiveness, education and innovation, infrastructure, but also the quality of its institutions, will the region be able to achieve inclusive, equitable, and sustainable economic growth that makes it possible to continue reducing poverty and inequality. All this will enable the region to respond more effectively to the demands and expectations of citizens ever more aware and demanding of their rights and of quality public services. This economic slowdown and the implementation of an agenda of structural reforms (including the structural adjustment policies that we’ll see in some countries) will surely affect certain interests, thereby paving the way for certain countries to suffer greater social discontent in 2015 and a more complex situation when it comes to governability. Yet the region is not homogenous. On the contrary, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity that will determine a wide diversity of national situations. In effect, while Central America grew 3.7 per cent in 2014, and will grow 4.1 per cent in 2015, in South America these percentages are 0.7 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively. Yet there is also diversity among countries. Accordingly, for example, while Panama (7.0 per cent), Bolivia (5.5 per cent), Peru, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua (5.0 per cent) head up the list of economies with the best prospects for growth. Countries such as Brazil and Argentina – with more capacity for traction than the rest of the economies – have much more moderate projections. Mexico and Chile, predicted to experience 3 per cent annual growth, could help push the regional average up. Venezuela, similar to 2014 (with negative growth and inflation at about 64 per cent), will have a very complicated year economically speaking. As Warren Buffet said, and rightly so, “when the tide goes out you can see who's been skinny dipping.” Something similar will happen with the countries of the region in 2015. Soon we’ll know which governments have been financially exposed. This piece was originally published by International IDEA. Authors Daniel Zovatto Publication: International IDEA Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reute Full Article
2015 Was 2015 a PR success for the new Global Goals? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 09:33:00 -0400 The year 2015 was a big one for global development policy debates, marking the end of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the launch of the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also known as the “Global Goals.” But how much did major media pay attention? Last September, Christine Zhang and I published a working paper that examined mentions of the MDGs across major English-language press and academic outlets from 2000 through 2014. We blogged highlights from the original paper here. More recently, we updated some of the results to account for last year’s major MDG-SDG debates and events. Figure 1 adds 2015 newspaper data on the MDGs and also includes SDG mentions over the entire time period. Figure 1: MDG and SDG mentions across 12 major newspapers, 2000-2015 Note: The 12 newspapers included are the Los Angeles Times (USA), The New York Times (USA), USA Today, and The Washington Post (USA), the Financial Times (UK), The Guardian (UK), The Independent (UK), The Daily Telegraph (UK), The Economist (UK), The Globe and Mail (Canada), the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong SAR), and The Sydney Morning Herald (Australia). Source: LexisNexis, authors’ calculations. Here are three key takeaways from the new graph: First, by measure of article counts, 2015 was the second most prominent year for media coverage of the interlinked MDG-SDG agendas. But it only saw 62 percent as much coverage as the MDGs received in 2005, the year of the U.N. Millennium Project’s final report (January), the Gleneagles G-8 summit (July), and the U.N. World Summit (September). Second, global summits have consistently helped to ramp up media attention and debate. The years 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2015 all stand out as the top years for references—the same years in which the U.N. convened major summits linked to the MDGs and, in 2015, the SDGs. But U.N. summits do not guarantee attention. Notably, the 2012 Rio+20 summit that initially called for the SDGs did not cause a big splash in the media outlets examined. Third, recent years saw a discernible transition from MDG references to SDG references. By 2015, fully 41 percent of the relevant articles referenced only the SDGs, 30 percent mentioned both the SDGs and the MDGs, while only 29 percent mentioned the MDGs alone. To be clear, these results do not provide a complete assessment of MDG-SDG media references in recent years, especially because social media and other new digital technologies now account for such a large share of public debate. (Note that the graph also excludes developing country newspapers, some of which we examined in the original working paper and similarly updated with 2015 results, but those do not make much difference to the overall story.) Thus one should not consider Figure 1 a definitive analysis of whether SDG advocates were successful in their public outreach campaigns last year. From a research perspective, the simple new-ness of “new media” renders long-term comparisons difficult. Restricting the data sample to print media offers one way to benchmark apples-to-apples coverage across the period of interest back to 2000. That said, a seasoned media observer once suggested to me that traditional news outlets are inherently less connected to the bottom-up nature of emerging SDG conversations, and hence less likely to cover the SDGs accurately than new media channels in which user-generated content helps to drive the conversation. It’s an interesting hypothesis worth testing. At a minimum, 2015 was a significant year for public conversations about the MDGs and SDGs, even if it might not have matched the peak year of 2005. An interesting line of research could seek to explain why. In any case, for analysts of the new SDGs, more sophisticated forms of global media benchmarking will undoubtedly be in order through to the new deadline of 2030. Authors John McArthur Full Article
2015 A review of the 2015-2016 Indian budget By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 08:45:00 -0500 Event Information March 4, 20158:45 AM - 9:30 AM ESTOnline1775 Massachusetts Ave., NWWashington, DC A Brookings online discussion reviewing the 2015-2016 Indian budget.On March 4, The India Project at Brookings hosted an online panel discussion to review the first full-year budget released by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government on February 28, 2015. Panelists discussed the significance of the budget, key takeaways, the hits, and misses, as well as what actions they would like to see the Indian government take vis-à-vis the Indian economy over the next few months. Panelists included James Crabtree, Mumbai bureau chief for the Financial Times; Eswar Prasad, the New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow in Brookings’s Global Economy and Development program; and Shamika Ravi, fellow at the Brookings India Center in Delhi, in the Development Assistance and Governance Initiative at Brookings, and in Brookings’s Global Economy and Development program. Tanvi Madan, fellow in the Foreign Policy program and director of The India Project at Brookings, moderated the discussion. Join the conversation on Twitter using #IndiaBudget Full Article
2015 Wall Street Journal – May 4, 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 Full Article
2015 Highlight reel: Some of Brookings’s best foreign policy pieces of 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 Experts in the Brookings Foreign Policy program produced a lot of impressive work in 2015—from blog posts to policy papers to book manuscripts. Mike O'Hanlon, the program's research director, gives a snapshot of some of the highlights. Full Article Uncategorized
2015 Nine Priority Commitments to be made at the United Nations July 2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 03 Feb 2015 10:31:00 -0500 The United Nations will convene a major international conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from July 13 to 16, 2015, to discuss financing for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development. This conference, the third of its kind, will hope to replicate the success of the Monterrey conference in 2002 that has been credited with providing the glue to bind countries to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The analogy is pertinent but should not be taken too far. The most visible part of the Monterrey Consensus was the commitment by rich countries to “make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product” as official development assistance (ODA). This was anchored in a clear premise that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development,” which includes support for market-oriented policies that encourage the private sector. While not all of the Monterrey targets have been met, there has been a considerable increase in resources flowing to developing countries, as a central plank of efforts to achieve the MDGs. Today, aid issues remain pivotal for a significant number of countries, but they are less relevant for an even larger number of countries. The core principles of Monterrey need to be reaffirmed again in 2015, but if the world is to follow-through on a universal sustainable development agenda, it must address the multi-layered financing priorities spanning all countries. A simple “30-30-130” mnemonic helps to illustrate the point. There are 193 U.N. member states. Of these, only around 30 are still low-income countries (33 at the latest count). These are the economies that are, and will continue to be, the most heavily dependent on aid as the world looks to how it should implement the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Conversely, there are only around 30 “donor” countries (including 28 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, or DAC) that have made international commitments to provide more aid. For the remaining 130 or so emerging middle-income economies that have achieved higher levels of average prosperity, aid discussions risk forming a sideshow to the real issues that constrain their pursuit of sustainable development. The bottom line is that for most countries, the Financing for Development conference should unlock finance from many different sources, including but not exclusively aid, to implement the SDGs. Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral 2 political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries. There are other differences between Addis and Monterrey. Monterrey took place after agreement had been reached on the MDGs, while Addis will precede formal agreement on the SDGs by a few months. Monterrey was focused on a government-to-government agreement, while Addis should be relevant to a far larger number of stakeholders—including businesses, academics, civil society, scientists, and local authorities. Monterrey was held against a backdrop of general optimism about the global economy and widespread desire for intensified international collaboration following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Meanwhile, Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries. In addition, regulators are working to reduce risk-taking by large financial institutions, increasing the costs of providing long-term capital to developing countries. Against this backdrop, an Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Finance (ICESDF) crafted a report for the United Nations on financing options for sustainable development. The report provides an excellent overview of issues and the current state of global financing, and presents over 100 recommendations. But it falls short on prescribing the most important priorities and action steps on which leaders should focus at Addis. This paper seeks to identify such a priority list of actions, with emphasis on the near-term deliverables that could instigate critical changes in trajectories towards 2030. At the same time, the paper does not aim to describe the full range of outcomes that need to be in place by roughly 2025 in order to achieve the SDGs by their likely deadline of 2030. Addis will be a critical forum to provide political momentum to a few of the many useful efforts already underway on improving global development finance. Time is short, so there is limited ability to introduce new topics or ideas or to build consensus where none already exists. We identify three criteria for identifying top priorities for agreement in Addis: Priorities should draw from, and build on, on-going work—including the ICESDF report and the outputs of several other international workstreams on finance that are underway. Agreements should have significant consequences for successful implementation of the SDGs at the country, regional or global level. Recommendations should be clearly actionable, with next steps in implementation that are easy to understand and easy to confirm when completed. It is not necessary (or desirable) that every important topic be resolved in Addis. In practical terms, negotiators face two groups of issues. First are those on which solutions can be negotiated in time for the July conference. Second are those for which the problems are too complex to be solved by July, but which are still crucial to be resolved over the coming year or two if the SDGs are to be achieved. For this second group of issues, the intergovernmental agreement can set specific timetables for resolving each problem at hand. There is some precedent for this, including in the 2005 U.N. World Summit, which included timetables for some commitments. What is most critical is that the moment be used to anchor and advance processes that will shift toward creating a global financing system for achieving sustainable development across all countries. Committing to timetables for action and building on reforms already undertaken could be important ways of enhancing the credibility of new agreements. In this paper, we lay out nine areas where we believe important progress can be made. In each area, we start from identifying a gap or issue that could present an obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDGs if left unattended. In some cases the gaps will affect all countries, in other cases only a subset of countries. But we believe that the package of actions, taken as a whole, reflects a balance of opportunities, responsibilities and benefits for all countries. We also believe that by making the discussion issue-focused, the needs for financing can be balanced with policy actions that will be required to make sure financing is effectively and efficiently deployed. In addition to the nine areas listed below, there are other commitments already made which have not yet been met. We urge renewed efforts to meet these commitments, but also recognize that political and financial realities must be managed to make progress. Such commitments include meeting the Monterrey Consensus target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in official development assistance (ODA), the May 2005 agreement of all EC-15 countries to reach that target by 2015, and bringing the Doha Development Round of trade talks to a successful conclusion. These remain important and relevant, but in this paper we choose to focus on new areas and fresh ideas so as to avoid treading over well-worn territory again. Authors Homi KharasJohn McArthur Full Article
2015 Implementing the post-2015 agenda and setting the narrative for the future By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 14:19:00 -0400 2015 is a pivotal year for global development; this fall is a pivotal moment. Meetings this fall will determine the global vision for sustainable development for 2030. Three papers being released today—“Action implications focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda,” “Systemic sustainability as the strategic imperative for the post-2015 agenda,” and “Political decisions and institutional innovations required for systemic transformations envisioned in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda”—set out some foundational ideas and specific proposals for political decisions and institutional innovations, which focus now on the implementation of the new global vision for 2030. This blog summarizes the key points in the three papers listed below. Fundamentals for guiding actions, reforms and decisions 1) Managing systemic risks needs to be the foundational idea for implementing the post-2015 agenda. The key political idea latent but not yet fully visible in the post-2015 agenda is that it is not a developing country poverty agenda for global development in the traditional North-South axis but a universal agenda based on the perception of urgent challenges that constitute systemic threats. The term “sustainable development” by itself as the headline for the P-2015 agenda creates the danger of inheriting terminology from the past to guide the future. 2) Goal-setting and implementation must be effectively linked. The international community learned from the previous two sets of goal-setting experiences that linking implementation to goal-setting is critical to goal achievement. G-20 leader engagement in the post-2015 agenda and linking the success of the G-20 presidencies of Turkey (2015), China (2016), and Germany (2017) would provide global leadership for continuity of global awareness and commitment. 3) Focus on the Sustainable Development Goals must be clear. Criticism of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as being too defuse and too detailed is ill-founded and reveals a lack of political imagination. It is a simple task to group the 17 goals into a few clusters that clearly communicate their focus on poverty, access, sustainability, partnership, growth, and institutions and their linkages to the social, economic, and environmental systemic threats that are the real and present dangers. 4) There must be a single set of goals for the global system. The Bretton Woods era is over. It was over before China initiated the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Never has it been clearer than now that maintaining a single global system of international institutions is essential for geopolitical reasons. For the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, all the major international institutions need to commit to them. Proposals for political action and institutional innovations In a joint paper with Zhang Haibing from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), we make five specific governance proposals for decision-makers: 1) Integrating the SDGs into national commitments will be critical. The implementation of the post-2015 agenda requires that nations internalize the SDGs by debating, adapting and adopting them in terms of their own domestic cultural, institutional, and political circumstances. It will be important for the U.N. declarations in September to urge all countries to undertake domestic decision-making processes toward this end. 2) Presidential coordination committees should be established. To adequately address systemic risks and to implement the P-2015 agenda requires comprehensive, integrated, cross-sectoral, whole-of-government approaches. South Korea’s experience with presidential committees composed of ministers with diverse portfolios, private sector and civil society leaders provides an example of how governments could break the “silos” and meet the holistic nature of systemic threats. 3) There needs to be a single global system of international institutions. China’s Premier Li Keqiang stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.” Together with a speech Li gave at the OECD on July 1st after signing an expanded work program agreement with the OECD and becoming a member of the OECD Development Center, clearly signals of China’s intention to cooperate within the current institutional system. The West needs to reciprocate with clear signals of respect for the increasing roles and influence of China and other emerging market economies in global affairs. 4) We must move toward a single global monitoring system for development targets. The monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the post-2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them. The U.N., the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF have all participated in joint data gathering efforts under the International Development Goals (IDGs) in the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 2000s. Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play now, but they need to be brought together under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system. 5) Global leadership roles must be strengthened. By engaging in the post-2015 agenda, the G-20 leaders’ summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered post-2015 agenda. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues. The G-20 finance ministers can play an appropriate role by serving as the coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the post-2015 agenda. A G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council, composed of the heads of the presidential committees for sustainable development from G20 countries, could become an effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability. These governance innovations could re-energize the G-20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination, and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the post-2015 agenda. Authors Colin I. Bradford Full Article
2015 2015 Brookings Blum Roundtable: Disrupting development with digital technologies By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 05 Aug 2015 09:00:00 -0400 Event Information August 5-7, 2015Aspen, Colorado The emergence of a new digital economy is changing the ways in which businesses and development organizations engage in emerging and developing countries. Transaction costs have been radically driven down, enabling greater inclusion. And technology is driving efficiency improvements, and permitting rapid scaling-up and transformational change. On August 5-7, 2015, Brookings Global Economy and Development is hosting the twelfth annual Brookings Blum Roundtable on Global Poverty in Aspen, Colorado. This year’s roundtable theme, “Disrupting development with digital technologies,” brings together global leaders, entrepreneurs, practitioners, and public intellectuals to discuss three trends in particular have the potential to redefine how global development occurs and how efforts will support it over the next 10 years: (1) the growing adoption of digital payments serving people everywhere with near-frictionless transactions; (2) the spread of internet connectivity and digital literacy; and (3) the harnessing of data to better serve the poor and to generate new knowledge. This event is closed, but you can follow along on Twitter using #Blum2015. Roundtable Agenda Wednesday, August 5, 2015 Welcome and opening remarks - 8:40-9:00 a.m.: Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners Mike Kubzansky, Omidyar Network Kemal Derviş, Brookings Institution Session I - 9:00-10:30 a.m.: Realizing the potential of the digital economy The digital revolution presents profound opportunities for global development. By integrating poor people into digital networks, the revolution can redefine what it means to be poor, and forge new pathways to prosperity for both individuals and countries. What are the challenges in making the digital revolution fully inclusive and scalable—and how can they be lifted? In a full-fledged digital economy, which constraints facing the poor will diminish and which will remain? What risks does the digital economy pose? Moderator: Kemal Derviş, Brookings Institution Introductory remarks: Michael Faye, GiveDirectly, Segovia Technology Tunde Kehinde, African Courier Express Christina Sass, Andela Tariq Malik, National Database and Registration Authority Session II - 10:50 - 12:20 p.m.: Global money Between 2011 and 2014, 700 million people started a bank account for the first time, representing a giant step toward the World Bank goal of universal financial inclusion by 2020. Meanwhile, the digitalization of payments, spurred in part by 255 mobile money services across the developing world, is pushing the cost of basic financial transactions down toward zero. How will an era of global money transform formal and informal business? Which sectors, product markets, and government services have the most to gain and lose from increased market efficiency? What are the consequences for financial regulation? Moderator: Henrietta Fore, Holsman International Introductory remarks: Ruth Goodwin-Groen, Better than Cash Alliance Luis Buenaventura, Rebit.ph, Satoshi Citadel Industries Tayo Oviosu, Paga Loretta Michaels, U.S. Department of the Treasury Lunch - 12:30-2:00 p.m. Cocktail reception and interview - 5:00-7:00 p.m.: During the reception, Richard Blum will lead a short discussion with Walter Isaacson and Ann Mei Chang on the topic “Silicon Valley and Innovation for the Developing World,” followed by questions. Remarks begin at 5:30 and will end at 6:15 p.m. Thursday, August 6, 2015 Session III - 9:00-10:30 a.m.: Global connections Numerous ventures are competing today to bring internet connectivity to the furthest corners of the planet, while low-cost, user-centered-designed platforms are expanding the spread of digital literacy. Social media and crowdsourcing offer efficient ways for people to share information, solve problems, and act collectively. To what extent can internet connectivity overcome isolation and empower poor communities that are socially, economically, and politically disenfranchised? Do the benefits of global connectivity for the world’s poor rely on issues like net neutrality, and what has been learned from recent battles to uphold this paradigm? Moderator: Anne-Marie Slaughter, New America Foundation Introductory remarks: Ross LaJeunesse, Google Andy O’Connell, Facebook Maria Ressa, Rappler Chris Locke, Caribou Digital Session IV - 10:50-12:20 p.m.: Global knowledge The creation of a universal digital network will provide the poor with greater access to the information they need, and generate new knowledge that can be used to serve poor people more effectively. Digital inclusion can expand possibilities for targeting, verification, and analysis, while big data from biometric registries, satellites, phones, payments, and the internet can unlock insights on individual needs and preferences. In addition, open source platforms and MOOCs have the potential to be powerful accelerators for technology and skill transfer. What kinds of new personalized services can be developed using improved capacity for targeting and tailoring? How might the reduction of barriers to information affect social mobility and economic convergence? How should big data be regulated? Moderator: Smita Singh, President’s Global Development Council Introductory remarks: David Soloff, Premise Rebecca Taber, Coursera Jonathan Hakim, Cignifi Deepak Mishra, World Bank Friday, August 7, 2015 Session V - 9:00-10:30 a.m.: Opportunities and challenges for business The digital economy promises to disrupt many existing markets and generate new business opportunities that employ and serve the poor. How can businesses employ digital technologies to expand their presence in poor and emerging countries? According to businesses, what is an effective regulatory framework for the digital economy? To what extent can strong digital infrastructure compensate for deficiencies in physical infrastructure or governance? Moderator: Laura Tyson, Blum Center for Developing Economies Introductory Remarks: Jesse Moore, M-KOPA Solar Anup Akkihal, Logistimo V. Shankar, formerly Standard Chartered Bank Barbara Span, Western Union Session VI - 10:50-12:20 p.m.: Opportunities and challenges for development cooperation The U.S. government sees itself as a leader in harnessing technology for global development. Meanwhile, aid agencies have been identified as a possible target for disintermediation by the digital revolution. How can development organizations, both government and non-government, accelerate the digital revolution? How might traditional aid programs be enhanced by employing digital knowledge and technologies? Does U.S. regulatory policy on the digital economy cohere with its global development agenda? Moderator: Mary Robinson, Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice Introductory remarks: Neal Keny-Guyer, Mercy Corps Michael Anderson, Children's Investment Fund Foundation Helen Clark, United Nations Development Program Ann Mei Chang, USAID Closing remarks: Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Mike Kubzansky, Omidyar Network Kemal Derviş, Brookings Institution Event Materials Participant List 731 Full Article
2015 Top Economic Stories of 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 00:00:00 -0500 Full Article
2015 The Education Link: Why Learning is Central to the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 07 Dec 2012 12:05:00 -0500 INTRODUCTION With fewer than three years until the planned end-date of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), attention is rapidly turning to what will follow. The elaboration of the next global development agenda is a complex, multi-pronged process that is academic, political and practical, involving experts from a myriad of social and economic sectors and representing a cross-section of constituencies. While the formal U.N. process is still in the early stages, the ongoing discourse (predominantly occurring in the global north, but not exclusively) has introduced several potential frameworks for this agenda. This paper describes the leading frameworks proposed for the post-2015 global development agenda and discusses how education and learning fit within each of those frameworks. While many within the education community are working to develop a cohesive movement to advance an “access plus learning” agenda, it remains equally important to engage proactively with the broader development community to ensure that education fits within the agreed upon overarching organizing framework. The frameworks described below represent a snapshot of current thinking in 2012. On the road to 2015, the education community will need to refine and sharpen its thinking with respect to how learning is incorporated into the prevailing framework. The seven frameworks that will be addressed in this paper are: Ending Absolute Poverty Equity and Inclusion Economic Growth and Jobs Getting to Zero Global Minimum Entitlements Sustainable Development Well-Being and Quality of Life Downloads Download the full paper Authors Anda Adams Image Source: © Adriane Ohanesian / Reuters Full Article
2015 The 2015 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project Report By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Sun, 23 Aug 2015 15:00:00 -0400 The 2015 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report and Scorecard evaluates access to and usage of affordable financial services across 21 geographically and economically diverse countries. The FDIP Report and Scorecard seek to answer a set of fundamental questions about today’s global financial inclusion efforts, including: 1) Do country commitments make a difference in progress toward financial inclusion?; 2) To what extent do mobile and other digital technologies advance financial inclusion?; and 3) What legal, policy, and regulatory approaches promote financial inclusion? Infographic The 2015 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project Scorecard August 2015 John D. Villasenor, Darrell M. West, and Robin J. Lewis analyzed the financial inclusion landscape in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Zambia. Countries received scores and rankings based on 33 indicators spanning four dimensions: country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption. The authors’ analysis also provides several takeaways about how to best expand financial inclusion across the world: Country commitment is fundamental. The movement toward digital financial services will accelerate financial inclusion. Geography generally matters less than policy, legal, and regulatory changes, although some regional trends in terms of financial services provision are evident. Central banks, ministries of finance, ministries of communications, banks, nonbank financial providers, and mobile network operators play major roles in achieving greater financial inclusion. Full financial inclusion cannot be achieved without addressing the financial inclusion gender gap. This year’s Report and Scorecard is the first of a series of annual reports examining financial inclusion activities around the world. View the full report and a full compendium of the country rankings here. Downloads Download the report Authors John VillasenorDarrell M. WestRobin J. Lewis Full Article
2015 Five key findings from the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project Report & Scorecard By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 02 Sep 2015 07:30:00 -0400 Editor’s note: This post is part of a series on the Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project, which aims to measure access to and usage of financial services among individuals who have historically been disproportionately excluded from the formal financial system. To read the first annual FDIP report, learn more about the methodology, and watch the 2015 launch event, visit the 2015 Report and Scorecard webpage. Convenient access to banking infrastructure is something many people around the world take for granted. Yet while the number of people outside the formal financial system has substantially decreased in recent years, 2 billion adults still do not have an account with a formal financial institution or mobile money provider.1 This means that significant opportunities remain to provide access to and promote use of affordable financial services that can help people manage their financial lives more safely and efficiently. To learn more about how countries can facilitate greater financial inclusion among underserved groups, the Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) sought to answer the following questions: (1) Do country commitments make a difference in progress toward financial inclusion?; (2) To what extent do mobile and other digital technologies advance financial inclusion; and (3) What legal, policy, and regulatory approaches promote financial inclusion? To address these questions, the FDIP team assessed 33 indicators of financial inclusion across 21 economically, geographically, and politically diverse countries that have all made recent commitments to advancing financial inclusion. Indicators fell within four key dimensions of financial inclusion: country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory commitment, and adoption of selected traditional and digital financial services. In an effort to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date understanding of the financial inclusion landscape possible, the FDIP team engaged with a wide range of experts — including financial inclusion authorities in the FDIP focus countries — and also consulted international non-governmental organization publications, government documents, news sources, and supply and demand-side data sets. Our research led to 5 overarching findings. Country commitments matter. Not only did our 21 focus countries make commitments toward financial inclusion, but countries generally took these commitments seriously and made progress toward their goals. For example, the top five countries within the scorecard each completed at least one of their national-level financial inclusion targets. While correlation does not necessarily equal causation, our research supports findings by other financial inclusion experts that national-level country commitments are associated with greater financial inclusion progress. For example, the World Bank has noted that countries with national financial inclusion strategies have twice the average increase in the number of account holders as countries that do not have these strategies in place. The movement toward digital financial services will accelerate financial inclusion. Digital financial services can provide customers with greater security, privacy, and convenience than transacting via traditional “brick-and-mortar” banks. We predict that digital financial services such as mobile money will become increasingly prevalent across demographics, particularly as user-friendly smartphones become cheaper2 and more widespread.3 Mobile money has already driven financial inclusion, particularly in countries where traditional banking infrastructure is limited. For example, mobile money offerings in Kenya (particularly the widely popular M-Pesa service) are credited with advancing financial inclusion: The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database found that the percentage of adults with a formal account in Kenya increased from about 42 percent in 2011 to about 75 percent in 2014, with around 58 percent of adults in Kenya having used mobile money within the preceding 12 months as of 2014. Geography generally matters less than policy, legal, and regulatory changes, although some regional trends in terms of financial services provision are evident. Regional trends include the widespread use of banking agents (sometimes known as correspondents)4 in Latin America, in which retail outlets and other third parties are able to offer some financial services on behalf of banks,5 and the prevalence of mobile money in sub-Saharan Africa. However, these regional trends aren’t absolute: For example, post office branches have served as popular financial access points in South Africa,6 and the GSMA’s “2014 State of the Industry” report found that the highest growth in the number of mobile money accounts between December 2013 and December 2014 was in Latin America. Overall, we found high-performing countries across multiple regions and using multiple approaches, demonstrating that there are diverse pathways to achieving greater financial inclusion. Central banks, ministries of finance, ministries of communications, banks, non-bank financial providers, and mobile network operators have major roles in achieving greater financial inclusion. These entities should closely coordinate with respect to policy, regulatory, and technological advances. With the roles of public and private sector entities within the financial sector becoming increasingly intertwined, coordination across sectors is critical to developing coherent and effective policies. Countries that performed strongly on the country commitment and regulatory environment components of the FDIP Scorecard generally demonstrated close coordination among public and private sector entities that informed the emergence of an enabling regulatory framework. For example, Tanzania’s National Financial Inclusion Framework7 promotes competition and innovation within the financial services sector by reflecting both public and private sector voices.8 Full financial inclusion cannot be achieved without addressing the financial inclusion gender gap and accounting for diverse cultural contexts with respect to financial services. Persistent gender disparities in terms of access to and usage of formal financial services must be addressed in order to achieve financial inclusion. For example, Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan have demonstrated a significant gap in formal account ownership between men and women. Guardianship and inheritance laws concerning account opening and property ownership present cultural and legal barriers that contribute to this gender gap.9 Understanding diverse cultural contexts is also critical to advancing financial inclusion sustainably. In the Philippines, non-bank financial service providers such as pawn shops are popular venues for accessing financial services.10 Leveraging these providers as agents can therefore be a useful way to harness trust in these systems to increase financial inclusion. To dive deeper into the report’s findings and compare country rankings, visit the FDIP interactive. We also welcome feedback about the 2015 Report and Scorecard at FDIPComments@brookings.edu. 1 Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, and Peter Van Oudheusden, “The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7255, April 2015, VI, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/04/15/090224b082dca3aa/1_0/Rendered/PDF/The0Global0Fin0ion0around0the0world.pdf#page=3. 2 Claire Scharwatt, Arunjay Katakam, Jennifer Frydrych, Alix Murphy, and Nika Naghavi, “2014 State of the Industry: Mobile Financial Services for the Unbanked,” GSMA, 2015, p. 24, http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf. 3 GSMA Intelligence, “The Mobile Economy 2015,” 2015, pgs. 13-14, http://www.gsmamobileeconomy.com/GSMA_Global_Mobile_Economy_Report_2015.pdf. 4 Caitlin Sanford, “Do agents improve financial inclusion? Evidence from a national survey in Brazil,” Bankable Frontier Associates, November 2013, pg. 1, http://bankablefrontier.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/BFA-Focus-Note-Do-agents-improve-financial-inclusion-Brazil.pdf. 5 Alliance for Financial Inclusion, “Discussion paper: Agent banking in Latin America,” 2012, pg. 3, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/discussion_paper_-_agent_banking_latin_america.pdf. 6 The National Treasury, South Africa and the AFI Financial Inclusion Data Working Group, “The Use of Financial Inclusion Data Country Case Study: South Africa – The Mzansi Story and Beyond,” January 2014, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/the_use_of_financial_inclusion_data_country_case_study_south_africa.pdf. 7 Tanzania National Council for Financial Inclusion, “National Financial Inclusion Framework: A Public-Private Stakeholders’ Initiative (2014-2016),” 2013, pgs. 19-22, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/tanzania-national-financial-inclusion-framework-2014-2016.pdf. 8 Simone di Castri and Lara Gidvani, “Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Tanzania,” GSMA, February 2014, http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tanzania-Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies.pdf. 9 Mayada El-Zoghbi, “Mind the Gap: women and Access to Finance,” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 13 May 2015, http://www.cgap.org/blog/mind-gap-women-and-access-finance. 10 Xavier Martin and Amarnath Samarapally, “The Philippines: Marshalling Data, Policy, and a Diverse Industry for Financial Inclusion,” FINclusion Lab by MIX, June 2014, http://finclusionlab.org/blog/philippines-marshalling-data-policy-and-diverse-industry-financial-inclusion. Authors Robin LewisJohn VillasenorDarrell M. West Full Article
2015 Inclusion in India: Unpacking the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 07:30:00 -0400 Editor’s Note: The Center for Technology Innovation released the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report on August 26th. TechTank has previously covered the FDIP launch event and outlined the report’s overall findings. Over the next two months, TechTank will take a closer look at the report’s findings by country and by region, beginning with today’s post on India. With about 21 percent of the world’s entire unbanked adult population residing in India as of 2014, the country has tremendous opportunities for growth in terms of advancing access to and use of formal financial services. In the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report and Scorecard, we detail the progress achieved and possibilities remaining for India’s financial services ecosystem as it moves from a heavy reliance on cash to an array of traditional and digital financial services offered by diverse financial providers. As noted in the 2015 FDIP Report, government-led initiatives to promote financial inclusion have advanced access to financial services in India. Ownership of formal financial institution and mobile money accounts among adults in India increased about 18 percentage points between 2011 and 2014. Recent regulatory changes and public and private sector initiatives are expected to further promote use of these services. In this post, we unpack the four components of the 2015 FDIP Scorecard — country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption of traditional and digital financial services — to highlight India’s achievements and possible next steps toward greater financial inclusion. Country commitment: An unprecedented year with no sign of slowing India’s national-level commitment to promoting financial inclusion earned it a “country commitment” score of 100 percent. A historic government initiative helped India garner a top score: In August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the “Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana,” the Prime Minister’s People’s Wealth Scheme (PMJDY). This effort — arguably the largest financial inclusion initiative in the world — “envisages universal access to banking facilities with at least one basic banking account for every household, financial literacy, access to credit, insurance and pension facility,” in addition to providing beneficiaries with an RuPay debit card. As part of this effort, the program aimed to provide 75 million unbanked adults in India with accounts by late January 2015. As of September 2015, about 180 million accounts had been opened; about 44 percent of these accounts did not carry a balance, down from about 76 percent in September 2014. The PMJDY initiative is a component of the JAM Trinity, or “Jan-Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile.” Under this approach, government transfers (also known as Direct Benefit Transfers, or DBT) will be channeled through bank accounts provided under Jan-Dhan, Aadhaar identification numbers or biometric IDs, and mobile phone numbers. The Pratyaksh Hanstantrit Labh (PaHaL) program is a major DBT initiative in which subsidies for liquefied petroleum gas can be linked to an Aadhaar number that is connected to a bank account or the consumer’s bank details. As of July 2015, about $2 billion had been channeled to beneficiaries in 130 million households across the country. Mobile capacity: Ample opportunity for digital services, but limited awareness and use India received 16th place (out of the 21 countries considered) in the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard’s mobile capacity ranking. India’s mobile money landscape features an extensive array of services, and the licensing of new payments banks (discussed below) may drive the entry of new players and products that can improve low levels of awareness and adoption of digital financial services. An InterMedia survey conducted from September to December 2014 found that while 86 percent of adults owned or could borrow a mobile phone, only about 13 percent of adults were aware of mobile money. Awareness of mobile money is increasing — the 13 percent figure is double that of the first wave of the survey, which concluded in January 2014 — but uptake remains low. The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database found only 2 percent of adults in India had a mobile money account in 2014. Implementing interoperability across mobile money offerings, increasing 3G network coverage by population, and enhancing unique mobile subscribership could boost India’s mobile capacity score in future editions of the FDIP report. Regulatory environment: Opening up the playing field to non-bank entities India tied for 7th place on the regulatory environment component of the 2015 Scorecard. The country’s recent shift to a more open financial landscape contributed to its strong score, although more time is needed to see how recent regulations will be operationalized. India has traditionally maintained tight restrictions with respect to which entities are involved in financial service provision. Non-banks could manage an agent network on behalf of a bank as business correspondents or issue “semi-closed” wallets that did not permit customers to withdraw funds without transferring them to a full-service bank account. These restrictions likely contributed to the country’s slow and limited adoption of mobile money services. However, 2014 brought significant changes to India’s regulatory landscape. The Reserve Bank of India’s November 2014 Payments Banks guidelines were heralded as a major step forward for increasing diversity in the financial services ecosystem. These guidelines marked a significant shift from India’s “bank-led” approach by providing opportunities for non-banks such as mobile network operators to leverage their distribution expertise to advance financial access and use among underserved groups. While these institutions cannot offer credit, they can distribute credit on behalf of a financial services provider. They may also distribute insurance and pension products, in addition to offering interest-bearing deposit accounts. We noted in the 2015 FDIP Report that timely approval of license applications for prospective payments banks, particularly mobile network operators, would be a valuable next step for India’s financial inclusion path. In August 2015, the Reserve Bank of India approved 11 applicants, including five mobile network operators, to launch payments banks within the next 18 months. As noted in Quartz India, the “underlying objective is to use these new banks to push for greater financial inclusion.” India has also made strides in terms of establishing proportionate “know-your-customer” requirements for financial entities, including payments banks. While India has made significant progress in terms of promoting a more enabling regulatory environment, room for improvement remains. For example, concerns have been raised regarding the low commission rate for banks distributing DBT, with many experts noting that a higher commission would enhance the ability of these banks to operate sustainably. Adoption: Access is improving, but promoting use is key India ranked 9th for the adoption component of the 2015 Scorecard. Recent studies have demonstrated that adoption of formal financial services among traditionally underserved groups is improving. For example, InterMedia surveys conducted in October 2013 to January 2014 and September to December 2014 found that the most significant increase in bank account ownership was among women, particularly women living below the poverty line. Still, further work is needed to close the gender gap in account ownership. As noted above, adoption of digital financial services such as mobile money is minimal compared with traditional bank accounts (0.3 percent compared with 55 percent, according to the September to December 2014 InterMedia survey); nonetheless, we believe that the introduction of payments banks, combined with government efforts to digitize transfers, will facilitate greater adoption of digital financial services. While PMJDY has successfully promoted ownership of bank accounts, incentivizing use of these services is critical for achieving true financial inclusion. Dormancy rates in India are high — about 43 percent of accounts had not been deposited into or withdrawn from in the previous 12 months, according to the 2014 Global Findex. More time may be needed for individuals to understand how their new accounts function and, equally importantly, how their new accounts are relevant to their daily lives. A February 2015 survey designed by India’s Ministry of Finance, MicroSave, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation found about 86 percent of PMJDY account holders reported the account was their first bank account. While this survey is not nationally representative, it provides some context as to why efforts to promote trust in and understanding of these new accounts will be key to the success of the program. An opportunity for promoting adoption of digital financial services was highlighted during the public launch of the 2015 Report and Scorecard: As of June 2015, it was estimated that fewer than 6 percent of merchants in India accepted digital payments. The U.S. government is partnering with the government of India to promote the shift to digitizing transactions, including at merchants. The next annual FDIP Report will examine the outcomes of such initiatives as we assess India’s progress toward greater financial inclusion. Suggestions and other comments regarding the FDIP Report and Scorecard are welcomed at FDIPComments@brookings.edu. Authors Robin LewisJohn VillasenorDarrell M. West Image Source: © Mansi Thapliyal / Reuters Full Article
2015 Governance innovations for implementing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 09:00:00 -0400 Event Information March 30, 20159:00 AM - 5:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 2015 is a crucial year for the international community. For the first time, all nations will converge upon a new set of Sustainable Development Goals applicable to advanced countries, emerging market economies, and developing countries, with the experience of implementing the Millennium Development Goals to build upon. Implementation is the critical component. The Brookings Global Economy and Development program hosted a day-long private conference at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC on Monday, March 30 to focus on “Governance innovations for implementing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.” Hosted in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, this high-level conference drew on experiences from the North-South Helsinki Process on Globalization and Development carried out over the past 15 years. The Helsinki Process presaged many of the prerequisites for achieving accelerated progress by linking goal-setting to goal-implementation and by utilizing multistakeholder processes to mobilize society and financing for social and environmental goals to complement sound economic and financial policies. Download the conference agenda » Download the related report » Download the list of registrants » Download the conference statement » Brookings President Strobe Talbott shakes hands with Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja after welcoming participants to the conference. Former President of Finland Tarja Halonen shares insights in the conference’s opening panel. Over 75 conference participants from governments, multilateral institutions, civil society, the private sector, and think tanks participated in a number of roundtable discussions throughout the day. President Halonen and Minister Tuomioja share lessons from the Helsinki process as conference participants consider paths forward for implementing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Event Materials 330 PostReportFinalConference Agenda_FINALMarch 30 List of RegistrantsConference Statement Brookings Post2015 Implementation Full Article
2015 The role of multilateral development banks in supporting the post-2015 development agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Sat, 18 Apr 2015 10:00:00 -0400 Event Information April 18, 201510:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20036 The year 2015 will be a milestone year, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda by world leaders in September; the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development in July; and the conclusion of climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December. The draft Addis Ababa Accord, which focuses on the actions needed to attain the SDGs, highlights the key role envisaged for the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the post-2015 agenda. Paragraph 65 of the draft accord notes: “We call on the international finance institutions to establish a process to examine the role, scale, and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda.” Against this backdrop, on April 18, 2015, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings held a private roundtable with the leaders of the MDBs and other key stakeholders to discuss the role of the MDBs in supporting the post-2015 development agenda. The meeting focused on four questions: What does the post-2015 development agenda and the ambitions of the Addis and Paris conferences imply for the MDBs? Given the ability of the MDBs to leverage shareholder resources, they can be efficient and effective mechanisms for scaling up development cooperation, particularly with respect to the agenda on investing in people and to the financing of sustainable infrastructure. New roles, instruments and partnerships might be needed. How can MDBs best take advantage of the political attention that is being paid to the various conferences in 2015? The World Bank and selected regional development banks have launched a series of initiatives to optimize their balance sheets, address other constraints and enhance their catalytic role in crowding in private finance. And new institutions and mechanisms are coming to the fore. But the responses are not coordinated to best take advantage of each MDB’s comparative advantage. What are the key impediments to scaling up the role and engagement of the MDBs? Views on constraints are likely to differ but discussions should cover policy dialogue, capacity building, capital, leverage, shareholder backing on volume, instruments on leverage and risk mitigation, safeguards, and governance. How should the MDBs respond to the proposal to establish a process to examine the role, scale and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda? A proactive response and engagement on the part of the MDBs would facilitate a better understanding of the contribution that the MDBs can make and greater support among shareholders for a coherent and stepped-up role. Event Materials Participant ListMDB PostEvent Summary Full Article
2015 Political decisions and institutional innovations required for systemic transformations envisioned in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 08 Sep 2015 11:04:00 -0400 2015 is a pivotal year. Three major workstreams among all the world’s nations are going forward this year under the auspices of the United Nations to develop goals, financing, and frameworks for the “post-2015 sustainable development agenda.” First, after two years of wide-ranging consultation, the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September will endorse a new set of global goals for 2030 to follow on from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate this year. Second, to support this effort, a financing for development (FFD) conference took place in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to identify innovative ways of mobilizing private and public resources for the massive investments necessary to achieve the new goals. And third, in Paris in December the final negotiating session will complete work on a global climate change framework. These three landmark summits will, with luck, provide the broad strategic vision, the specific goals, and the financing modalities for addressing the full range of systemic threats. Most of all, these three summit meetings will mobilize the relevant stakeholders and actors crucial for implementing the post-2015 agenda—governments, international organizations, business, finance, civil society, and parliaments—into a concerted effort to achieve transformational outcomes. Achieving systemic sustainability is a comprehensive, inclusive effort requiring all actors and all countries to be engaged. These three processes represent a potential historic turning point from “business-as-usual” practices and trends and to making the systemic transformations that are required to avoid transgressing planetary boundaries and critical tipping points. Missing from the global discourse so far is a realistic assessment of the political decisions and institutional innovations that would be required to implement the post-2015 sustainable development agenda (P2015). For 2015, it is necessary is to make sure that by the end of year the three workstreams have been welded together as a singular vision for global systemic transformation involving all countries, all domestic actors, and all international institutions. The worst outcome would be that the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 are seen as simply an extension of the 2015 MDGs—as only development goals exclusively involving developing countries. This outcome would abort the broader purposes of the P2015 agenda to achieve systemic sustainability and to involve all nations and reduce it to a development agenda for the developing world that by itself would be insufficient to make the transformations required. Systemic risks of financial instability, insufficient job-creating economic growth, increasing inequality, inadequate access to education, health, water and sanitation, and electricity, “breaking points” in planetary limits, and the stubborn prevalence of poverty along with widespread loss of confidence of people in leaders and institutions now require urgent attention and together signal the need for systemic transformation. As a result, several significant structural changes in institution arrangements and governance are needed as prerequisites for systemic transformation. These entail (i) political decisions by country leaders and parliaments to ensure societal engagement, (ii) institutional innovations in national government processes to coordinate implementation, (iii) strengthening the existing global system of international institutions to include all actors, (iv) the creation of an international monitoring mechanism to oversee systemic sustainability trajectories, and (v) realize the benefits that would accrue to the entire P2015 agenda by the engagement of the systemically important countries through fuller utilization of G20 leaders summits and finance ministers meetings as enhanced global steering mechanisms toward sustainable development. Each of these changes builds on and depends on each other. I. Each nation makes a domestic commitment to a new trajectory toward 2030 For global goal-setting to be implemented, it is essential that each nation go beyond a formal agreement at the international level to then embark on a national process of deliberation, debate, and decision-making that adapts the global goals to the domestic institutional and cultural context and commits the nation to them as a long-term trajectory around which to organize its own systemic transformation efforts. Such a process would be an explicitly political process involving national leaders, parliaments or rule-making bodies, societal leaders, business executives, and experts to increase public awareness and to guide the public conversation toward an intrinsically national decision which prioritizes the global goals in ways which fit domestic concerns and circumstances. This political process would avoid the “one-size-fits-all” approach and internalize and legitimate each national sustainability trajectory. So far, despite widespread consultation on the SDGs, very little attention has been focused on the follow-up to a formal international agreement on them at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2015. The first step in implementation of the SDGs and the P2015 agenda more broadly is to generate a national commitment to them through a process in which relevant domestic actors modify, adapt, and adopt a national trajectory the embodies the hopes, concerns and priorities of the people of each country. Without this step, it is unlikely that national systemic sustainability trajectories will diverge significantly enough from business-as-usual trends to make a difference. More attention needs to now be given to this crucial first step. And explicit mention of the need for it should appear in the UNGA decisions in New York in September. II. A national government institutional innovation for systemic transformation The key feature of systemic risks is that each risk generates spillover effects that go beyond the confines of the risk itself into other domains. This means that to manage any systemic risk requires broad, inter-disciplinary, multi-sectoral approaches. Most governments have ministries or departments that manage specific sectoral programs in agriculture, industry, energy, health, education, environment, and the like when most challenges now are inter-sectoral and hence inter-ministerial. Furthermore, spillover linkages create opportunities in which integrated approaches to problems can capture intrinsic synergies that generate higher-yield outcomes if sectoral strategies are simultaneous and coordinated. The consequence of spillovers and synergies for national governments is that “whole-of-government” coordinating committees are a necessary institutional innovation to manage effective strategies for systemic transformation. South Korea has used inter-ministerial cabinet level committees that include private business and financial executives as a means of addressing significant interconnected issues or problems requiring multi-sectoral approaches. The Korea Presidential Committee on Green Growth, which contained more than 20 ministers and agency heads with at least as many private sector leaders, proved to be an extremely effective means of implementing South Korea’s commitment to green growth. III. A single global system of international institutions The need for a single mechanism for coordinating the global system of international institutions to implement the P2015 agenda of systemic transformation is clear. However, there are a number of other larger reasons why the forging of such a mechanism is crucial now. The Brettons Woods era is over. It was over even before the initiative by China to establish the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Beijing and the New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai. It was over because of the proliferation in recent years of private and official agencies and actors in development cooperation and because of the massive growth in capital flows that not only dwarf official development assistance (concessional foreign aid) but also IMF resources in the global financial system. New donors are not just governments but charities, foundations, NGOs, celebrities, and wealthy individuals. New private sources of financing have mushroomed with new forms of sourcing and new technologies. The dominance of the IMF and the World Bank has declined because of these massive changes in the context. The emergence of China and other emerging market economies requires acknowledgement as a fact of life, not as a marginal change. China in particular deserves to be received into the world community as a constructive participant and have its institutions be part of the global system of international institutions, not apart from it. Indeed, China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.” The economic, social and environmental imperatives of this moment are that the world’s people and the P2015 agenda require that all international institutions of consequence be part of a single coordinated effort over the next 15 years to implement the post-2015 agenda for sustainable development. The geopolitical imperatives of this moment also require that China and China’s new institutions be thoroughly involved as full participants and leaders in the post-2015 era. If nothing else, the scale of global investment and effort to build and rebuild infrastructure requires it. It is also the case that the post-2015 era will require major replenishments in the World Bank and existing regional development banks, and significantly stronger coordination among them to address global infrastructure investment needs in which the AIIB and the NDB must now be fully involved. The American public and the U.S. Congress need to fully grasp the crucial importance for the United States, of the IMF quota increase and governance reform. These have been agreed to by most governments but their implementation is stalled in the U.S. Congress. To preserve the IMF’s role in the global financial system and the role of the U.S. in the international community, the IMF quota increase and IMF governance reform must be passed and put into practice. Congressional action becomes all the more necessary as the effort is made to reshape the global system of international institutions to accommodate new powers and new institutions within a single system rather than stumble into a fragmented, fractured, and fractious global order where differences prevail over common interests. The IMF cannot carry out its significant responsibility for global financial stability without more resources. Other countries cannot add to IMF resources proportionately without U.S. participation in the IMF quota increase. Without the US contribution, IMF members will have to fund the IMF outside the regular IMF quota system, which means de-facto going around the United States and reducing dramatically the influence of the U.S. in the leadership of the IMF. This is a self-inflicted wound on the U.S., which will damage U.S. credibility, weaken the IMF, and increase the risk of global financial instability. By blocking the IMF governance reforms in the IMF agreed to by the G-20 in 2010, the U.S. is single-handedly blocking the implementation of the enlargement of voting shares commensurate with increased emerging market economic weights. This failure to act is now widely acknowledged by American thought leaders to be encouraging divergence rather than convergence in the global system of institutions, damaging U.S. interests. IV. Toward a single monitoring mechanism for the global system of international institutions The P2015 agenda requires a big push toward institutionalizing a single mechanism for the coordination of the global system of international institutions. The international coordination arrangement today, is the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation created at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. This arrangement, which recognizes the increasingly complex context and the heightened tensions between emerging donor countries and traditional western donors, created a loose network of country platforms, regional arrangements, building blocks and forums to pluralize the architecture to reflect the increasingly complex set of agents and actors. This was an artfully arranged compromise, responding to the contemporary force field four years ago. Now is a different moment. The issues facing the world are both systemic and urgent; they are not confined to the development of developing countries, and still less to foreign aid. Geopolitical tensions are, if anything, higher now than then. But they also create greater incentives to find areas of cooperation and consensus among major powers who have fundamentally different perspectives on other issues. Maximizing the sweet spots where agreement and common interest can prevail is now of geopolitical importance. Gaining agreement on institutional innovations to guide the global system of international institutions in the P2015 era would be vital for effective outcomes but also importantly ease geopolitical tensions. Measurement matters; monitoring and evaluation is a strategic necessity to implementing any agenda, and still more so, an agenda for systemic transformation. As a result, the monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the P2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them. The UN, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF all have participated in joint data gathering efforts under the IDGs in the 1990s and the MDGs in the 2000s. Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play, but they need to be brought together now under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system and to help the G20 finance ministers coordinate their functional programs. The OECD has established a strong reputation in recent years for standard setting in a variety of dimensions of the global agenda. Given the strong role of the OECD in relation to the G20 and its broad outreach to “Key Partners” among the emerging market economies, the OECD could be expected to take a strong role in global benchmarking and monitoring and evaluation of the P2015 Agenda. The accession of China to the OECD Development Centre, which now has over fifty member countries, and the presence and public speech of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the OECD on July 1st, bolsters the outreach of the OECD and its global profile. But national reporting is the centerpiece and the critical dimension of monitoring and evaluation. To guide the national reporting systems and evaluate their results, a new institutional arrangement is needed that is based on national leaders with responsibility for implementation of the sustainable development agendas from each country and is undertaken within the parameters of the global SDGs and the P2015 benchmarks. V. Strengthening global governance and G20 roles G-20 leaders could make a significant contribution to providing the impetus toward advancing systemic sustainability by creating a G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council charged with pulling together the national statistical indicators and implementing benchmarks on the SDGs in G-20 countries. The G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council (G-20 GSDC) would consist of the heads of the presidential committees on sustainable development charged with coordinating P2015 implementation in G-20 countries. Representing systemically important countries, they would also be charged with assessing the degree to which national policies and domestic efforts by G20 countries generate positive or negative spillover effects for the rest of the world. This G-20 GSDC would also contribute to the setting of standards for the global monitoring effort, orchestrated perhaps by the OECD, drawing on national data bases from all countries using the capacities of the international institutions to generate understanding of global progress toward systemic sustainability. The UN is not in a position to coordinate the global system of international institutions in their functional roles in global sustainable development efforts. The G-20 itself could take steps through the meetings of G-20 Finance Ministers to guide the global system of international institutions in the implementation phase of the P2015 agenda to begin in 2016. The G-20 already has a track record in coordinating international institutions in the response to the global financial crisis in 2008 and its aftermath. The G-20 created the Financial Stability Board (FSB), enlarged the resources for the IMF, agreed to reform the IMF’s governance structure, orchestrated relations between the IMF and the FSB, brought the OECD into the mainstream of G-20 responsibilities and has bridged relations with the United Nations by bringing in finance ministers to the financing for development conference in Addis under Turkey’s G-20 leadership. There is a clear need to coordinate the financing efforts of the IMF, with the World Bank and the other regional multilateral development banks (RMDBs), with the AIIB and the BRICS NDB, and with other public and private sector funding sources, and to assess the global institutional effort as whole in relation to the P2015 SDG trajectories. The G-20 Finance Ministers grouping would seem to be uniquely positioned to be an effective and credible means of coordinating these otherwise disparate institutional efforts. The ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum and the Busuan Global Partnership provide open inclusive space for knowledge sharing and consultation but need to be supplemented by smaller bodies capable of making decisions and providing strategic direction. Following the agreements reached in the three U.N. workstreams for 2015, the China G-20 could urge the creation of a formal institutionalized global monitoring and coordinating mechanism at the China G-20 Summit in September 2016. By having the G-20 create a G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council (G-20 GSDC), it could build on the national commitments to SDG trajectories to be made next year by U.N. members countries and on the newly formed national coordinating committees established by governments to implement the P2015 Agenda, giving the G-20 GSDC functional effectiveness, clout and credibility. Whereas there is a clear need to compensate for the sized-biased representation of the G20 with still more intensive G-20 outreach and inclusion, including perhaps eventually considering shifting to a constituency based membership, for now the need in this pivotal year is to use the momentum to make political decisions and institutional innovations which will crystallize the P2015 strategic vision toward systemic sustainability into mechanisms and means of implementation. By moving forward on these recommendations, the G-20 Leaders Summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered P2015 Agenda, going beyond finance to issues closer to peoples’ homes and hearts. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues. The G-20 Finance Ministers would be seen as playing an appropriate role by serving as the mobilizing and coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the P2015 Agenda. And the G-20 GSDC would become the effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability not only within G20 countries but also in terms of their positive and negative spillover effects on systemic sustainability paths of other countries, contributing to standard setting and benchmarking for global monitoring and evaluation. These global governance innovations could re-energize the G20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the P2015 Agenda. Conclusion As the MDGs culminate this year, as the three U.N. workstreams on SDGs, FFD, and UNFCC are completed, the world needs to think ahead to the implementation phase of the P2015 sustainable development agenda. Given the scale and scope of the P2015 agenda, these five governance innovations need to be focused on now so they can be put in place in 2016. These will ensure (i) that national political commitments and engagement by all countries are made by designing, adopting, and implementing their own sustainable development trajectories and action plans; (ii) that national presidential committees are established, composed of key ministers and private sector leaders to coordinate each country’s comprehensive integrated sustainability strategy; (iii) that all governments and international institutions are accepted by and participate in a single global system of international institutions; (iv) that a G-20 monitoring mechanism be created by the China G-20 in September 2016 that is comprised of the super-minister officials heading the national presidential coordinating committees implementing the P2015 agenda domestically in G-20 countries, as a first step; and (v) that the G-20 Summit leaders in Antalya in November 2015 and in China in September 2016 make clear their own commitment to the P2015 agenda and their responsibility for its adaption, adoption and implementation internally in their countries but also for assessing G-20 spillover impacts on the rest of the world, as well as for deploying their G-20 finance ministers to mobilize and coordinate the global system of international institutions toward achieving the P2015 agenda. Without these five structural changes, it will be more likely that most countries and actors will follow current trends rather than ratchet up to the transformational trajectories necessary to achieve systemic sustainability nationally and globally by 2030. References Ye Yu, Xue Lei and Zha Xiaogag, “The Role of Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance---With a Special Analysis on China’s Role”, UNDP, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance: Scoping Papers, (Beijing: UNDP, October 2014). Zhang Haibing, “A Critique of the G-20’s Role in UN’s post-2015 Development Agenda”, in Catrina Schlager and Chen Dongxiao (eds), China and the G-20: The Interplay between an Emerging Power and an Emerging Institution, (Shanghai: Shanghai Institutes for International Studies [SIIS] and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES], 2015) 290-208. Global Review, (Shanghai: SIIS, 2015,) 97-105. Colin I. Bradford, “Global Economic Governance and the Role International Institutions”, UNDP, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance: Scoping Papers, (Beijing: UNDP, October 2014). Colin I. Bradford, “Action implications of focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda.”, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development paper, September 2015). Colin I. Bradford, “Systemic Sustainability as the Strategic Imperative for the Future”, (Washington: The Bookings Institution, Global Economy and Development paper; September 2015). Wonhyuk Lim and Richard Carey, “Connecting Up Platforms and Processes for Global Development to 2015 and Beyond: What can the G-20 do to improve coordination and deliver development impact?”, (Paris: OECD Paper, February 2013). Xiaoyun Li and Richard Carey, “The BRICS and the International Development System: Challenge and Convergence”, (Sussex: Institute for Development Studies, Evidence Report No. 58, March 2014). Xu Jiajun and Richard Carey, “China’s Development Finance: Ambition, Impact and Transparency,” (Sussex : Institute for Development Studies, IDS Policy Brief, 2015). Soogil Young, “Domestic Actions for Implementing Integrated Comprehensive Strategies: Lessons from Korea’s Experience with Its Green Growth Strategy”, Washington: Paper for the Brookings conference on “Governance Innovations to Implement the Post-2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, March 30, 2015). Authors Colin I. BradfordHaibing Zhang Full Article
2015 Systemic sustainability as the strategic imperative for the post-2015 agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 11:21:00 -0400 “The Earth in the coming decades could cease to be a ‘safe operating space’ for human beings,” concludes a paper by 18 researchers “trying to gauge the breaking points in the natural world,” published in Science in January 2015. That our planetary environment seems to be approaching “breaking points” is but one of several systemic threats looming on the horizon or lurking under the surface. Since the economic crisis in 2008, the world has learned that financial instability is a global threat to sustainable livelihoods and economic progress. The underlying dynamics of technological change seem to be more labor displacing than labor absorbing, creating increasing anxiety that employment and career trajectories are permanently threatened. These two challenges undermine public confidence in the market economy, in institutions, and in political leaders. They constitute systemic threats to the credibility of markets and democracy to generate socially and politically sustainable outcomes for societies. The fact that one billion people still live in extreme poverty, that there are scores of countries that are considered to be “failed states,” and that genocide, virulent violence, and terrorism are fed by this human condition of extreme deprivation together constitute a social systemic threat, global in scope. These challenges together merge with a growing public awareness of global inequality between nations and of increasing inequality within nations. The power of money in public life, whether in the form of overt corruption or covert influence, disenfranchises ordinary people and feeds anger and distrust of the current economic system. These systemic threats constitute challenges to planetary, financial, economic, social, and political sustainability. These are not just specific problems that need to be addressed but pose severe challenges to the viability and validity of current trends and practices and contemporary institutional arrangements and systems. Systemic sustainability is the strategic imperative for the future These challenges are global in reach, systemic in scale, and urgent. They require deliberate decisions to abandon “business-as-usual” approaches, to rethink current practices and engage in actions to transform the underlying fundamentals in order to avoid the collapse and catastrophe of systems that average people depend upon for normal life. Systemic risks are real. Generating new pathways to systemic sustainability are the new imperatives. Holistic approaches are essential, since the economic, social, environmental, and political elements of systemic risk are interrelated. “Sustainable development,” once the label for environmentally sensitive development paths for developing countries, is now the new imperative for systemic sustainability for the global community as a whole. Implications for global goal-setting and global governance 2015 is a pivotal year for global transformation. Three major work streams among all nations are going forward this year under the auspices of the United Nations to develop goals, financing, and frameworks for the “post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.” First, in New York in September—after two years of wide-ranging consultation—the U.N. General Assembly will endorse a new set of global development goals to be achieved by 2030, to build upon and replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate this year. Second, to support this effort, a Financing for Development (FFD) conference took place in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to identify innovative ways to mobilize private and public resources for the massive investments necessary to achieve the new goals. And third, in Paris in December, the final negotiating session will complete work on a global climate change framework. These three landmark summits will, with luck, provide the broad strategic vision, the specific goals, and the financing for addressing the full range of systemic threats. Most of all, these events, along with the G-20 summit of leaders of the major economies in November in Antalya, Turkey, will mobilize the relevant stakeholders and actors crucial for implementing the post-2015 agenda—governments, international organizations, business, finance, civil society, and parliaments—into a concerted effort to achieve transformational outcomes. Achieving systemic sustainability is a comprehensive, inclusive effort requiring all actors and all countries to be engaged. [3] Four major elements need to be in place for this process to become a real instrument for achieving systemic sustainability across the board. First, because everyone everywhere faces systemic threats, the response needs to be universal. The post-2015 agenda must be seen as involving advanced industrial countries, emerging market economies, and developing nations. Systemic sustainability is not a development agenda limited to developing countries, nor just a project to eradicate poverty, nor just an agenda for development cooperation and foreign aid. It is a high policy agenda for all countries that goes to the core of economics, governance, and society, addressing fundamental dynamics in finance, energy, employment, equity, growth, governance, and institutions. Second, systemic threats are generated because of spillover effects from activities that used to be considered self-contained and circumscribed in their impact. The world of silos and vertical self-sufficiency has given way to an integrated world in which horizontal linkages are as important as vertical specialization. The result of these interlinkages is that synergies can be realized by taking comprehensive integrated approaches to major issues. In this new context, positive-sum benefits are potentially more easily realized, but integrated strategies are necessary for doing so. This new context of spillovers and synergies has two implications. The domestic dimension is that whole-of-government approaches are necessary for addressing systemic sustainability. Cross-sectoral, inter-ministerial approaches are essential. Since markets alone are not able to realize optimal outcomes in the widespread presence of externalities, the only way to realize the positive sum potential of synergies is through coordination among related actors. On the international dimension, this new context also requires more cooperation and coordination than competition to realize synergistic, positive-sum outcomes. Third, domestic political pressures are primary. This may be a variant of the old saying that “all politics is local.” However, the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis has been a world of hurt in which impacted publics are feeling anger and alienation from an economic system that has threatened their jobs, incomes, pensions, homes, and livelihoods. The task of leaders is not to pander to these plights but to lead their people to understand the vital linkage between domestic conditions and external forces and the degree to which the global context inevitably impacts on domestic conditions. Leaders need to be able to explain to their people that systemic threats have inextricable global–domestic linkages that need to be managed, not ignored. Fourth, given all this, it is absolutely necessary that the global system of international institutions be “on the same page,” share the same vision, strategy, and goals, rather than each taking its primary mandate as a writ for independence from the common agenda. The major challenges for global governance in this pivotal turn from goal-setting in 2015 to the beginning of implementation in 2016 are to ensure (i) that all countries adapt and adopt the post-2015 agenda in ways that are congruent with their national culture and context while at the same time committing to reporting on all aspects of the agenda; (ii) that whole-of-government institutional mechanisms and processes are put in place domestically to realize the synergies that can accrue only from comprehensive, integrated approaches and that international cooperation mechanisms gain greater traction to reap the positive-sum outcomes from global consultation, coordination, and cooperation; (iii) that national political leaders learn new modes of domestic and international leadership that are capable of articulating the new context and new systemic risks that need to be managed both internally and globally; and (iv) that each international institution realizes the need to be part of a system-wide global effort to achieve systemic sustainability through concerted efforts of all relevant actors working together on behalf of a common global agenda. [2] The Sustainable Development Goals as guidelines to systemic sustainability Currently under discussion are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 indicators for 2030 to extend and replace the eight MDGs for 2015, which had 21 targets and a variety of indicators, which in turn extended and replaced seven International Development Goals (IDGs) agreed to in 1995 by development cooperation ministers from OECD countries. There is much chatter now about whether the SDGs and indicators are too many, too ambitious, and too widespread. The Economist asserts that the SDGs “would be worse than useless,” dubbing them “stupid development goals”. And Charles Kenney at the Center for Global Development in a thoughtful piece argues that “we lost the plot.” It may be true that there is too much detail. Two previous efforts, one by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the Korean Development Institute (KDI) had 10 goals, and the other, the U.N. High Level Panel of Eminent Persons report in 2013 had 12 goals.[iii] This quibble alone does not prevent the use of political imagination to conjure a storyline that connects the 17 proposed SDGs with the vision of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda as addressing systemic threats and having comprehensive integrated strategies for addressing them. Fourteen of the 17 SDGs can be clustered into four overarching strategic components: poverty (2); access (6); sustainability (5); and partnership (1). The other three goals have to do with growth and governance (institutions), which were underpinnings for both the IDGs and the MDGs though not embodied in the sets of goals themselves. The four SDG components seamlessly continue the storyline of the IDGs and the MDGs, both of which included poverty as the first goal, gender equality- education-and-health as issues of access, an environmental sustainability goal, and (in the MDGs) a partnership goal. The two underpinning components of growth and governance remain crucial and, if anything, are still more important today than 20 years ago when the global goal-setting process began. Continuity of strategic direction in transformational change is an asset, ensuring persistence and staying power until the goal is fulfilled. The SDGs now convey a sense of the scale and scope of systemic threats. The sustainability goals (goals 11 through 15) highlight the environmental threats from urbanization, over-consumption/production, climate change, destruction of ocean life, to ecosystems, forests, deserts, land, and biodiversity. No knowledgeable person would leave out any of these issues when considering threats to environmental sustainability. The fact that goal 10, to “reduce inequality within and among countries,” is on the list of SDGs signals a new fact of political life that inequality is now front-and-center on the political agenda globally and nationally in many countries, advanced, emerging, and developing. This goal is really the “chapeaux” for goals 3 through 7, which deal with health, education, gender, water and sanitation, and energy for all—the access goals that must be met to “reduce inequality within and among countries.” It is inconceivable that a group of global goals for a sustainable future in the 21st century would leave out any of these goals crucial for achieving social sustainability, and undoubtedly political sustainability as well. Reducing inequality is not an end in itself but a means of providing skills and livelihoods for people in a knowledge-based global economy and hence the social and political sustainability required for stable growth. Growth is both a means and an end. The two poverty goals are now more ambitious and inclusive than earlier. “Ending poverty” is different from reducing it, as in the IDGs and MDGs. And “ending hunger” through food security, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture are means to the end of eliminating poverty. For the Economist, eliminating extreme poverty should be the most important goal, stating that “it would have a much better chance of being achieved if it stood at the head of a very short list.” This observation would apply if the SDGs are again intended to be, as the IDGs and MDGs were previously, development goals for developing countries. But development for developing countries is not the primary thrust and drive of the post-2015 agenda taken as a whole. The world is now facing systemic risks that threaten unacceptable collapse in social, political, economic, and environmental systems. A global community under threat from systemic risks needs a strategic vision and a pathway forward with specific guideposts, benchmarks, and means of implementation. The SDGs, the FFD documents and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change accords will not be perfect. But, the three U.N. processes in 2015 capture the main elements, attempt to get specific in terms of priority actions and accountability, and together will provide a vision for the future for achieving systemic sustainability in its multiple, interconnected dimensions. To think that simplifying the wording is going to simplify the problems is illusory. To narrow the vision to poor countries and poor people is to misunderstand the systemic nature of the threats and the scope and scale of them. This is a global agenda for all. Partnership now means we are all in the same boat, no longer acting on a global North-South axis of donor and recipient. Without the participation of all nations, all stakeholders, and all the international institutions, actual transformation will fall short of necessary transformation, and the world will reach breaking points that will inflict pain, suffering, and high costs on everyone in the future. The post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda for 2030 brings an awareness of the future into the present and makes us understand that the time for action is now. Endnotes: [1] For an example of a recent multistakeholder interactive conference on this set of issues, review the related report on the Brookings-Finland private meeting on March 30, 2015 on “implementing the post 2015 sustainable development agenda. [2] See “Action Implications of Focusing Now on the Implementation of the post-2015 Agenda,” which outlines in more detail the key elements of implementation that need to be set in motion during 2015 and 2016, emphasizing especially roles for the Turkey G-20 summit in 2015 and the China G-20 summit in 2016. Authors Colin I. Bradford Full Article
2015 Action implications of focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 13:29:00 -0400 The consequences of the global financial crisis still ripple through the international system after the initial surge in global economic cooperation and governance immediately following the crisis. The ultimate effects have been that, while some elements of the international system of institutions have gotten stronger, the system as a whole is now seen as weaker, fractured, and driven more by geopolitical conflict than by institutional norms and frameworks. The issue is how to move the global policy agenda forward in such a way that substantive progress induces institutional strengthening. The next two years offer new opportunities for creating a positive symbiosis between policy advance and systemic improvements. I. The U.N. global agenda The United Nations global agenda has three tracks that relate to each other and provide opportunities to pull the world together around an integrated, comprehensive strategic vision for the world’s people and strengthen the international system in the process. The first track is the elaboration of a sustainable development agenda for each and all countries, not just developing countries, but advanced industrial economies and emerging market countries too. This effort is already well underway and will result in a summit of global leaders in September 2015 at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) in New York. This process entails a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 to be developed and affirmed by and for all countries, and which succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate in 2015 and applied only to developing countries. This post-2015 goal-setting process will provide the substantive, cross-cutting, multidimensional agenda for the next 15 years. It is simultaneously a social, economic, and environmental agenda that relates goals to each other in functional terms requiring coordination among public and private sectors, ministries, civil society groups, and international institutions. The second track is the financing for development (FFD) track, which goes well beyond reliance conceptually and practically on foreign aid or official development assistance as in the past. FFD for the SDGs includes a focus, first and foremost, on domestic sources of finance beyond government revenues. FFD is engaged in searches for innovative sources of finance, private sector mobilization of resources, creative market incentives and mechanisms, initiatives by civil society organizations, and development of entrepreneurial and small- and medium-size business opportunities that address global issues. This effort resulted in a global leaders meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July of 2015 that reached agreement on the major thrusts for mobilizing resources for the post-2015 agenda (Kharas and MacArthur (2014)). The third track is the global climate change negotiations currently under way to achieve a global agreement on the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), which will result in a global summit in Paris in December of 2015. While these detailed negotiations on climate are a separate track, it is clear that the sustainable human development trajectories being put forward in the post-2015 agenda impact and are crucially affected by the efficacy of the climate change arrangements worked out in the UNFCCC agreements in 2015. Whereas these three tracks operationally are going forward separately, the substantive aspects of each track affect and are affected by the content of the other two. The ultimate convergence of these three streams of activities and actions will have to occur in the beginning of 2016 at the global, regional, and national levels if the implementation phase is to be successful. A business-as-usual approach will not be satisfactory if at the global level, for example, the international institutions are unable to coordinate their work, or if at the national level ministries remain within their “silos” of sectoral expertise and responsibility. Synergies exist between goal areas that cannot be realized without coordination across sectors and institutions, impacting goal achievement (see OECD 2014 PCD). A systemic approach is necessary at all levels to address the global challenges identified in the post-2015 agenda. II. The G-20 summits for 2015 and 2016 A major opportunity presents itself in terms of providing impetus, momentum, and leadership for these large work streams and their convergence by linking the G-20 presidency of Turkey for 2015 with the G-20 leadership of China in 2016. Turkey and China working together in tandem within the G-20 Troika over the next two years to explain, support, and sustain the mobilization effort toward the post-2015 agenda could be a major contribution to it but also strengthen the global system of international institutions in the process. For the Turkish G-20 summit, scheduled to take place in November 2015 in Antalya, between UNGA in New York in September and the UNFCCC in Paris in December, Turkey could use part of its G-20 summit to have the leaders of the world’s largest advanced and emerging market economies explain to the world the nature, importance, and relevance of the SDGs to domestic concerns and priorities of ordinary people. A weakness of G-20 summits thus far has been that G-20 leaders have become trapped by finance ministers’ issues and discourse and have failed to connect with their publics on larger issues of direct concern to people everywhere. The post-2015 agenda provides an opportunity for G-20 leaders to lead their people in understanding how global efforts relate to domestic conditions and why dealing only domestically with issues will not suffice to advance the human agenda where the global interface is extremely palpable. G-20 leaders, under Turkey’s leadership, could step out beyond the technical jargon of finance ministries and central banks, as important as those issues continue to be, and directly address the longer-term, fundamental conditions that affect the lives and livelihoods of all people. They would thereby strengthen their own leadership profile internally by explaining the global dimensions of domestic issues as means of creating public support for the sustainability issues in the post-2015 agenda. Past experience with the International Development Goals (IDGs) of the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals since the early 2000s demonstrates that linking the goal-setting effort to the implementation phase yields powerful results by capturing the political momentum of the goal setting phase and carrying that energy forward directly into implementation efforts. If Turkey and China were to work together in 2015 and 2016, thereby bridging the goal-setting year in 2015 to the beginning of the implementation phase in 2016, they could provide the catalytic leadership and continuity that would maximize the staying power of the momentum from one phase to the next. China, for its G-20 summit preparations in 2016, could focus on developing a road map, in concert with the other countries and international organizations and especially with the United Nations, that would explicitly keep alive the activities, groups, and initiatives manifested in the goal-setting phase into the next phase of implementation beginning in 2016. These combined efforts by Turkey and China could jump-start societies focusing on accelerating efforts to transform their societies by mobilizing policies and resources for highly related goal areas of direct benefit to their people. The immediate effects of coordinated sequential efforts by Turkey and China in their respective G-20 years to advance the post-2015 agenda would be to strengthen the relationship between the G-20 and the United Nations on the agenda itself and to strengthen the G-20 summits by having leaders lead on issues of central concern to their people, strengthening the G-20 as a leadership forum in the process. For these results to occur, Turkey and China would need to begin to work together now to develop concordance in their individual efforts and initiate activities that would benefit greatly by beginning now and running through 2016 and beyond. Accelerating implementation: Several initiatives could be undertaken now that would set up the dynamics for accelerated implementation in 2016 and beyond. National strategies for achieving the SDGs: Encourage countries to adapt and adopt the SDGs to their respective priorities and social, political, and cultural contexts through deliberate decision processes and wide societal engagement. The role of parliaments: Bring parliamentarians and parliaments into the goal-setting process so that they are aware of the legislative, regulatory, and budgetary implications of the post-2015 agenda. The role of domestic ministries: Bring finance ministers and other domestic ministries and agencies together with foreign ministers in the goal-setting year to set in motion mutually involved functional relationships and operational guidelines to enhance implementation across sectors. The G-20 as broker and mobilizer: The G-20 could act as a broker between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and regional development banks and the U.N. and its agencies to assure not just coordination but more intensive interactions that would be designed to accelerate the mobilization of resources and as well as policies and private sector activities that would enhance implementation. The policy role of the OECD: The strong, substantive role of the OECD in G-20 summits on issues high on the G-20 agenda—such as structural reform, tax base erosion, development, environment, energy, employment, and social issues—position the OECD to continue to provide important substantive inputs to the G-20 in 2015 and 2016. The OECD would enhance the relationship of its 34 members with G-20 emerging market economies by OECD involvement in both the G-20 and the U.N. post-2015 agenda. Financial stability and the SDGs: Encouraged by the G-20 summits, the IMF, the Financial Stability Board, and the OECD could work together to integrate the financial regulatory reform agenda into the post-2015 U.N. process by clarifying the linkages between financial stability, regulatory reform, and incentives for long-term private investment in infrastructure (crucial to all the SDGs) and in productive activities which generate greater employment and growth. Multi-stakeholder participation in implementation: G-20 summits can facilitate multi-stakeholder processes for engaging civil society, labor, private sector, religious, academic, and expert communities not only in the G-20 summits, as is the current practice, but also in the post-2015 agenda and its implementation, connecting societal leaders with the SDG agenda. III. The overarching importance of a single global agenda If these efforts to bring together a wide cross-section of domestic and international agencies, public and private sector leaders, stakeholders, and civil society actors are to translate into actions that are meaningful to the lives and livelihoods of people, a single set of goals is essential. The lesson learned from the IDG-MDG experience was that the tendency to differentiate roles by identifying different institutions with different sets of goals was real. The United Nations had inadvertently put forward the Millennium Declaration at the September 2000 U.N. General Assembly that had “millennium targets” which were similar but not identical to the International Development Goals (IDGs). The IDGs had been developed in the mid-1990s by OECD development ministers and subsequently were endorsed by the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. and the OECD. In fact, in 2000, for the first time ever, the heads of those four institutions signed, and the institutions themselves published, a joint report, A Better World For All: Progress towards the International Development Goals. Despite the appearance of unity and in part because there was a lack of concordance between the Millennium Declaration Targets (MDTs) and the IDGs, there was a moment in March 2001 when it looked like there might be a decisive divergence between the U.N. and the Bretton Woods institutions, with the U.N. taking the lead on the MDTs and the World Bank and IMF taking the lead on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSPs), leaving the IDGs marginalized altogether. This potential division of labor was thwarted by a decision to reconcile the differences between the MDTs and the IDGs by forging the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which embodied the principal elements of both. The MDGs surfaced and were endorsed by the Monterrey Summit on Financing for Development in March of 2002, keeping the major global institutions on the same page with bilateral donors and the same path moving toward achieving the MDGs in 2015. Most people who know about the MDGs think their origins began at the U.N. in the year 2000. It is an often overlooked fact that the MDGs only came forward in 2002 to bridge the potential divide between the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. If that divide had occurred, it would have been disastrous from a goal setting-goal implementation point-of-view. This history is quite important to bring forward into public light now because it illustrates divisive dangers that currently lurk under the surface threatening unity if not squarely addressed. From the perspective of prioritizing implementation, the truth is that multiple sets of goals blur the strategic vision, fail to communicate direction, weaken effective leadership, and encourage special pleading for differentiated interests instead focusing on the common, public interest. The U.N. has the lead role in global goal setting and has strengthened its own role in the global system in recent years. However, looking forward now to the SDG implementation phase, a danger might be that the Post-2015 agenda could be seen as the creature and captive of the United Nations, whereas it must be fully endorsed and internalized within the global system of international institutions as a whole. For that to happen, it would be necessary to move now, during the goal-setting year, to include all the relevant international and domestic actors that are crucial to the implementation phase of the post-2015 agenda. The implications of including the post-2015 agenda in the G-20 summits in 2015 and 2016: It would make clear to relevant publics and actors that this set of global goals is universal, applicable to advanced countries, emerging market economies, and developing countries; it is not a “development agenda” but a “sustainability agenda,” which is broader, more strategic, and higher on the policy agenda of most countries. It would make clear the inextricable dynamics between domestic priorities and global goals; the SDGs are not foreign policy objectives or aid targets for development; they are domestic priorities affected by global impacts and generating global spillovers that need to be managed, not neglected. It would make the incorporation of finance ministers and domestic ministers with foreign ministers, along with international institutions, an imperative, rather than a utopian, ideal. It would make obvious the need to have a wide range of international institutions dealing with health, labor, education, women, climate, and the environment on the same page with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions working together toward the SDGs. It would link the need for multi-stakeholder participation in goal setting to the goal implementation phase to mobilize support, policies, and resources but also to reveal and work on the interconnectedness of the goals themselves taken as a whole. Hence, the critical imperative is that there be a single narrative, a single set of goals, for all the domestic and global players to relate to, affirm, and implement. Otherwise, a fractured global order will produce lower-yield outcomes, and competition among priorities, sectors, and actors will result in poorer goal performance than would be possible with an integrated, concerted approach where all actors are working toward the same ends. IV. Possible G-20 Actions by Turkey and China Turkey has developed a process for the G-20 summit scheduled for November 14-15, 2015 in Antalya. Implementation, inclusion, and investment—the three “I’s”—are the overarching themes already established. The three “I’s” ties are tightly tied to the Australian G-20 outcomes—implementing action plans to achieve the incremental growth target of an additional 2 percentage points of GDP by 2018; including lower-income people in growth and lower-income countries in the global economy; and investing in infrastructure. Each of these priorities is supportive of and compatible with the post-2015 agenda, even though they are not yet directly addressed to it. A decision by Turkey to include the post-2015 agenda in the 2015 G-20 would be easily achieved by cross-walking the SDGs over to and into the three “I’s” and vice versa. The central priority of the post-2015 agenda is, after all, “implementation.” The overarching meaning of the six elements of the post-2015 agenda (dignity, prosperity, justice, partnership, planet, and people (U.N. SG Synthesis Report December 2014)) is their impact on “inclusion.” And “investment” in infrastructure is crucial to all of the 17 SDGs. The three pillars for Turkey’s 2015 agenda are: (i) strengthening the global recovery and lifting potential growth (the 2 percent target); (ii) enhancing resilience (financial regulatory reform]; and (iii) buttressing sustainability. Clearly, the third pillar on sustainability opens the door for the incorporation of the post-2015 agenda into the Turkey G-20, if Turkey wishes to do so. And the other two pillars fully support the sustainability agenda and are linked to it, or need to be. For China, the post-2015 agenda presents a unique opportunity for the Chinese government to seize on a global agenda that has specific, strong, and visible links to the domestic concerns of the Chinese people. China could use the 2016 G-20 summit both to provide international leadership for global cooperation and to demonstrate the connection of global issues to domestic conditions through their impact and spillover effects. Because the post-2015 agenda is a universal agenda, by prioritizing it in its G-20 summit, China would be embracing the multiplicity of its own identity as a developing country but also as a dynamic emerging market economy that is destined to eventually play a global leadership role equivalent to advanced countries. Furthermore, China seems intent on being a competitive nation in various spheres while at the same time being cooperative in others. The G-20 summit presidency for China in 2016 provides China with an opportunity to strengthen its role in international cooperation by being ambitious in the reach of its agenda for the G-20 in 2016, by its conduct as a member of the G-20 Troika for the next three years, and as the host government for the G-20 in 2016. By choosing to support Turkey in its consideration of incorporating the post-2015 agenda in the G-20 summit in 2015 and by China itself addressing the implementation issues in 2016, China would be reaping the demonstrably higher-yield gains generated by linking the SDG goal-setting phase in 2015 to the implementation phase in 2016. Integrating the three tracks of SDG goal setting, financing for development, and progress on climate change actions is complementary but complex. While challenging, China has sufficiently high stakes in the outcomes of all three of these tracks to have a national interest in leading a global effort over the next three years to energize the convergence of agendas and institutional mandates necessary to generate bigger outcomes for people everywhere, including in China. V. Results: Strengthening global governance and leadership What follows from the analysis here is that the decision to include the post-2015 agenda in the Turkey and China G-20 summits would be a choice about the substance but also about the process of global economic governance, in which the G-20 has a leadership role. To do so in the way outlined here, would: Strengthen the global system of international institutions by bringing them together around a single comprehensive, integrated sustainability agenda; Create synergies between the United Nations and the other international institutions rather than identifying the post-2015 agenda with the U.N. alone and relying unnecessarily on the U.N. for its implementation; Connect G-20 leaders with a broader human and planetary agenda beyond economics and finance, which in turn would connect G-20 leaders with their publics as they visibly address the domestic concerns of their people in their global context; and Strengthen the role of the G-20 in global economic governance by putting the G-20 out in front as a broker among stakeholders, a catalytic coordinator of relevant domestic and international actors, and a leader on behalf of the concerns, lives, and livelihoods of people. Selected References Colin I. Bradford (2002), “Toward 2015: From Consensus Formation to Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. Issues for the Future: The Implementation Phase”, Development Economics Department (DEC), The World Bank, December 2002. Colin I. Bradford (2014), “The Changing World Economy and Global Economic Governance”, power point presentation at the Korean Delegation seminar “The OECD and Global Governance”, OECD, Paris, December 11, 2014. Colin I. Bradford (2014), “Global Economic Governance and the Role of International Institutions”, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance: Scoping Papers, UNDP Beijing China, 22 October 2014. Colin I. Bradford (2015), “Governance Innovations for Implementing the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda: Conference Report”, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 30, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Events/2015/03/30-post-2015-sustainable-development-agenda/330-PostReportFinal.pdf?la=en Ye Yu, Xue Lei and Zha Xiaogang (2014), “The Role of Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance---with a Special Analysis on China’s Role”, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance: Scoping Papers, UNDP Beijing China, 22 October 2014. Authors are from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies. Homi Kharas and John McArthur (2014), “Nine Priority Commitments to be Made at the UN’s July 2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,” October 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/02/united-nations-financing-for-development-kharas-mcarthur OECD (2014), “Policy Coherence for Development and the Sustainable Development Goals”, Paris: OECD, 10 December 2014, prepared for the 8th Meeting of the National Focal Points for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) held at the OECD on 17-18 December 2014. Authors Colin I. Bradford Full Article
2015 Implementing the post-2015 agenda and setting the narrative for the future By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 14:19:00 -0400 2015 is a pivotal year for global development; this fall is a pivotal moment. Meetings this fall will determine the global vision for sustainable development for 2030. Three papers being released today—“Action implications focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda,” “Systemic sustainability as the strategic imperative for the post-2015 agenda,” and “Political decisions and institutional innovations required for systemic transformations envisioned in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda”—set out some foundational ideas and specific proposals for political decisions and institutional innovations, which focus now on the implementation of the new global vision for 2030. This blog summarizes the key points in the three papers listed below. Fundamentals for guiding actions, reforms and decisions 1) Managing systemic risks needs to be the foundational idea for implementing the post-2015 agenda. The key political idea latent but not yet fully visible in the post-2015 agenda is that it is not a developing country poverty agenda for global development in the traditional North-South axis but a universal agenda based on the perception of urgent challenges that constitute systemic threats. The term “sustainable development” by itself as the headline for the P-2015 agenda creates the danger of inheriting terminology from the past to guide the future. 2) Goal-setting and implementation must be effectively linked. The international community learned from the previous two sets of goal-setting experiences that linking implementation to goal-setting is critical to goal achievement. G-20 leader engagement in the post-2015 agenda and linking the success of the G-20 presidencies of Turkey (2015), China (2016), and Germany (2017) would provide global leadership for continuity of global awareness and commitment. 3) Focus on the Sustainable Development Goals must be clear. Criticism of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as being too defuse and too detailed is ill-founded and reveals a lack of political imagination. It is a simple task to group the 17 goals into a few clusters that clearly communicate their focus on poverty, access, sustainability, partnership, growth, and institutions and their linkages to the social, economic, and environmental systemic threats that are the real and present dangers. 4) There must be a single set of goals for the global system. The Bretton Woods era is over. It was over before China initiated the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Never has it been clearer than now that maintaining a single global system of international institutions is essential for geopolitical reasons. For the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, all the major international institutions need to commit to them. Proposals for political action and institutional innovations In a joint paper with Zhang Haibing from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), we make five specific governance proposals for decision-makers: 1) Integrating the SDGs into national commitments will be critical. The implementation of the post-2015 agenda requires that nations internalize the SDGs by debating, adapting and adopting them in terms of their own domestic cultural, institutional, and political circumstances. It will be important for the U.N. declarations in September to urge all countries to undertake domestic decision-making processes toward this end. 2) Presidential coordination committees should be established. To adequately address systemic risks and to implement the P-2015 agenda requires comprehensive, integrated, cross-sectoral, whole-of-government approaches. South Korea’s experience with presidential committees composed of ministers with diverse portfolios, private sector and civil society leaders provides an example of how governments could break the “silos” and meet the holistic nature of systemic threats. 3) There needs to be a single global system of international institutions. China’s Premier Li Keqiang stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.” Together with a speech Li gave at the OECD on July 1st after signing an expanded work program agreement with the OECD and becoming a member of the OECD Development Center, clearly signals of China’s intention to cooperate within the current institutional system. The West needs to reciprocate with clear signals of respect for the increasing roles and influence of China and other emerging market economies in global affairs. 4) We must move toward a single global monitoring system for development targets. The monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the post-2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them. The U.N., the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF have all participated in joint data gathering efforts under the International Development Goals (IDGs) in the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 2000s. Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play now, but they need to be brought together under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system. 5) Global leadership roles must be strengthened. By engaging in the post-2015 agenda, the G-20 leaders’ summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered post-2015 agenda. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues. The G-20 finance ministers can play an appropriate role by serving as the coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the post-2015 agenda. A G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council, composed of the heads of the presidential committees for sustainable development from G20 countries, could become an effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability. These governance innovations could re-energize the G-20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination, and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the post-2015 agenda. Authors Colin I. Bradford Full Article
2015 Top Priorities for Africa in 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 The year 2015 will be an eventful one for the more than one billion people living in Africa. China, Africa’s largest trading partner, will hold the Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; the Post-2015 Development Agenda will chart a new course for global responses to poverty; West Africa will begin its recovery from the devastating Ebola… Full Article
2015 Brookings Doha Energy Forum Report 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 18 May 2015 00:00:00 -0400 From the rapid fall in oil prices to the conflicts that have threatened key energy sources and transit routes in the Middle East and North Africa, the global energy landscape has shifted dramatically over the past year. The change of a single number – the price of a barrel of crude oil – can carry profound implications for government policies and company decisions around the world, from efforts at subsidy reform to shale oil extraction. Understanding the interplay between key geopolitical events and energy markets remains crucial. Has Asian consumers’ growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies prompted greater interest in providing for the region’s security? How will new sources and new transit routes reshape the global LNG and natural gas landscape? What has been the impact of falling energy prices on unconventional production and investment in renewable energy resources? At the fourth annual Brookings Doha Energy Forum, experts and policymakers from around the globe met to discuss the key global energy trends. In broad plenary sessions and focused roundtable discussions, industry leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the United States wrestled with these and other questions. The findings of these many conversations are reflected in this report, jointly prepared by the Brookings Doha Center and the Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Downloads English PDFArabic PDF Publication: The Brookings Doha Center & Brookings Energy Security Initiative Image Source: , Full Article
2015 Nigeria’s 2015 Elections: Prologue to the Past? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 In the 45 years since the Nigerian civil war ended in January 1970, Nigeria has often seemed on the verge of making significant political advances. While its population soared, however, the country stumbled through one contentious electoral exercise after another, interspersed with military rule. The recent 2015 elections, which elevated Muhammadu Buhari to the powerful… Full Article Uncategorized
2015 Retirement Security a Priority in the 2015 State of the Union By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 20 Jan 2015 16:48:00 -0500 In the 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama made retirement security a priority for his Administration by promoting the Automatic IRA, a retirement savings plan that originated at the Retirement Security Project. The proposals would increase the ability of part-time workers to join their employer’s plan and improve tax incentives for businesses that either start an Automatic IRA or other type of retirement plan or add automatic enrollment to an existing plan. Only about half of all American workers have access to a payroll deduction retirement savings plan at work. For part-time workers, fewer than four in ten have the opportunity to save at work. And while these individuals could in theory save on their own in an IRA, the best estimate is that only about one in twenty eligible to contribute to an IRA actually do so on a regular basis. Last year, the President announced the creation of My Retirement Account, or “MyRA.” Similar to the R-Bond discussed in a recent AARP Public Policy Institute paper written by William Gale, David John and Spencer Smith, MyRA would allow individuals to save up to $15,000 in a government bond account similar to the one offered as an option to federal employees through the Thrift Savings Plan. Now, the White House proposes to build on the MyRA. Because the Automatic IRA would require employers with more than 10 employees to offer retirement accounts, about 30 million more workers would have the opportunity to save for retirement via payroll deduction. Using automatic enrollment, a mechanism that both works and that employees strongly support, the Automatic IRA would serve as a permanent retirement savings plan, rather than a starter account like MyRA. To further increase the number of retirement savers, the Obama Administration also proposes to allow part-time employees who have worked for the employer for at least 500 hours a year for the past three years to make voluntary contributions to the employer’s plan. Currently, employers are allowed to exclude any employee who works less than 1,000 hours per year. And to encourage employers to offer retirement plans, the existing tax credits for small employers who start a new retirement plan or pension would be greatly expanded. Small employers who create an Automatic IRA would be eligible for a $3,000 tax credit, while those who open another type of retirement plan would be eligible for a $4,500 tax credit. And just adding automatic enrollment to an existing plan would earn a small employer a tax credit of $1,500. While these proposals would all need the approval of congress, they may well be able to rise above the usual political maneuvering. For instance, both left and right have made positive comments about the Automatic IRA, and businesses should support the call for expanded tax credits to cover their costs in implementing the plans. Most important, the president continues to make retirement security a priority with practical solutions that would allow many more Americans to build retirement security through their own efforts. His proposals promote the kind of values and self-reliance that both sides of the political spectrum find attractive. Authors William G. GaleDavid C. John Image Source: © Brian Snyder / Reuters Full Article
2015 Early Childhood Development: A Chinese National Priority and Global Concern for 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 11:54:00 -0400 The Chinese government has recently made early childhood development a national priority, recognizing the social and economic dividends that quality early learning opportunities reap for its human capital in the long term. As the country with the largest population in the world, 100 million children under the age of six in China stand to benefit from increased access to high quality early childhood education. The quality of education in a country is indicative of its overall development prospects. Over the past two decades – building on the momentum generated by the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals – there have been significant increases in the number of children enrolled in school. Now, with discussions heating up around what the next set of development goals will look like in 2015, it is critical that learning across the education spectrum – from early childhood through adolescence and beyond – is included as a global priority. Starting early helps children enter primary school prepared to learn. High-quality early childhood development opportunities can have long-term impacts on a child’s later success in school. Last month, the Chinese Ministry of Education, in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund, launched its first national early childhood advocacy month to promote early learning for all children. The campaign, which includes national television public service announcements on the benefits of investing early in education, builds on a commitment made by the government in 2010 to increase funding for early childhood education over the next decade. The Chinese government pledged to build new preschool facilities, enhance and scale up teacher training, provide subsidies for rural families for access to early learning opportunities, and increase support for private early childhood education centers. A new policy guide by the Center for Universal Education outlines recommendations that education stakeholders, including national governments, can take to ensure that all children are in school and learning. These steps include establishing equity-based learning targets for all children, systematically collecting data for tracking progress against these targets, and allocating sufficient resources to education beginning in early childhood. The policy guide, based on a report calling for a Global Compact on Learning, is available in Mandarin, as well as Spanish, Portuguese, French and, soon, Arabic. The success of China’s productivity and growth over the last few decades is attributable in part to its commitment to building a robust education system. As international attention mounts around the post-2015 education and development agendas, the priorities of national governments must be a central organizing principle. When national governments take bold steps to prioritize early childhood development, the global community should take its cue and integrate early childhood development into the broader push toward access plus learning. There is an opportunity for the global education community to push toward reaching the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals while ensuring that the post-2015 agendas include a focus on the quality of education, learning and skills development, beginning with the youngest citizens. Authors Lauren GreubelJacques van der Gaag Image Source: Jason Lee / Reuters Full Article
2015 Saban Forum 2015—Israel and the United States: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 04 Dec 2015 19:45:00 -0500 Event Information December 4-6, 2015Online OnlyLive Webcast On December 4 to 6, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted its 12th annual Saban Forum, titled “Israel and the United States: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow.” The 2015 Saban Forum included webcasts featuring remarks by Israel’s Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon, Chairman of the Yesh Atid Party Yair Lapid, National Security Adviser to President George W. Bush Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video), and former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. The forum’s webcast sessions focused on the future for Israelis and Palestinians, Iran’s role in the Middle East, spillover from the war in Syria, and the global threat posed by the Islamic State and other violent jihadi groups. Over the past twelve years, the Saban Forum has become the premier platform for frank dialogue between American and Israeli leaders from government, civil society, business, and the media. As a result, the Saban Forum is a seminal event, generating new ideas and helping shape the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Join the conversation on Twitter using #Saban15 Video A conversation with Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s minister of defenseHow to restore order in the Middle EastKeynote address: U.S. Secretary of State John KerryAddress by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video)Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Audio Saturday, December 5, 8:00pm - How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state Transcript Uncorrected Transcript--Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--Address by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state (.pdf)U.S. Department of State Release--Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--How to restore order in the Middle East (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--A conversation with Moshe Ya'alon, Israel's minister of defense (.pdf) Event Materials Uncorrected TranscriptKeynote addressFormer Secretary of State Hillary Rodham ClintonUncorrected TranscriptAddress by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin NetanyahuUncorrected TranscriptHow to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic stateUS Department of State ReleaseRemarks by Secretary of State John KerryUncorrected TranscriptHow to restore order in the Middle East 2Uncorrected TranscriptA conversation with Moshe Yaalon Israels minister of defense Full Article
2015 The President's 2015 R&D Budget: Livin' with the blues By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 07:30:00 -0400 On March 4, President Obama submitted to Congress his 2015 budget request. Keeping with the spending cap deal agreed last December with Congress, the level of federal R&D will remain flat; and, when discounted by inflation, it is slightly lower. The requested R&D amount for 2015 is $135.4 billion, only $1.7 billion greater than 2014. If we discount from this 1.2% increase the expected inflation of 1.7% we are confronting a 0.5% decline in real terms. Reaction of the Research Community The litany of complaints has started. The President’s Science and Technology Advisor, John Holdren said to AAAS: “This budget required a lot of tough choices. All of us would have preferred more." The Association of American Universities, representing 60 top research universities, put out a statement declaring that this budget does “disappointingly little to close the nation’s innovation deficit,” so defined by the gap between the appropriate level of R&D investment and current spending. What’s more, compared to 2014, the budget request has kept funding for scientific research roughly even but it has reallocated about $250 million from basic to applied research (see Table 1). Advocates of science have voiced their discontent. Take for instance the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology that has called the request a “disappointment to the research community” because the President’s budget came $2.5 billion short of their recommendations. The President’s Research and Development Budget 2015 Source: OMB Budget 2015 These complaints are fully expected and even justified: each interest group must defend their share of tax-revenues. Sadly, in times of austerity, these protestations are toothless. If they were to have any traction in claiming a bigger piece of the federal discretionary pie, advocates would have to make a comparative case showing what budget lines must go down to make room for more R&D. But that line of argumentation could mean suicide for the scientific community because it would throw it into direct political contest with other interests and such contests are rarely decided by the merits of the cause but by the relative political power of interest groups. The science lobby is better off issuing innocuous hortatory pronouncements rather than picking up political fights that it cannot win. Thus, the R&D slice is to remain pegged to the size of the total budget, which is not expected to grow, in the coming years, more than bonsai. The political accident of budget constraints is bound to change the scientific enterprise from within, not only in terms of the articulation of merits—which means more precise and compelling explanations for the relative importance of disciplines and programs—but also in terms of a shrewd political contest among science factions. Authors Walter D. Valdivia Full Article
2015 The dark side of consensus in Tunisia: Lessons from 2015-2019 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 16:55:04 +0000 Executive Summary Since the 2011 revolution, Tunisia has been considered a model for its pursuit of consensus between secular and Islamist forces. While other Arab Spring countries descended into civil war or military dictatorship, Tunisia instead chose dialogue and cooperation, forming a secular-Islamist coalition government in 2011 and approving a constitution by near unanimity in… Full Article
2015 The role of multilateral development banks in supporting the post-2015 development agenda By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Sat, 18 Apr 2015 10:00:00 -0400 Event Information April 18, 201510:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20036 The year 2015 will be a milestone year, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda by world leaders in September; the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development in July; and the conclusion of climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December. The draft Addis Ababa Accord, which focuses on the actions needed to attain the SDGs, highlights the key role envisaged for the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the post-2015 agenda. Paragraph 65 of the draft accord notes: “We call on the international finance institutions to establish a process to examine the role, scale, and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda.” Against this backdrop, on April 18, 2015, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings held a private roundtable with the leaders of the MDBs and other key stakeholders to discuss the role of the MDBs in supporting the post-2015 development agenda. The meeting focused on four questions: What does the post-2015 development agenda and the ambitions of the Addis and Paris conferences imply for the MDBs? Given the ability of the MDBs to leverage shareholder resources, they can be efficient and effective mechanisms for scaling up development cooperation, particularly with respect to the agenda on investing in people and to the financing of sustainable infrastructure. New roles, instruments and partnerships might be needed. How can MDBs best take advantage of the political attention that is being paid to the various conferences in 2015? The World Bank and selected regional development banks have launched a series of initiatives to optimize their balance sheets, address other constraints and enhance their catalytic role in crowding in private finance. And new institutions and mechanisms are coming to the fore. But the responses are not coordinated to best take advantage of each MDB’s comparative advantage. What are the key impediments to scaling up the role and engagement of the MDBs? Views on constraints are likely to differ but discussions should cover policy dialogue, capacity building, capital, leverage, shareholder backing on volume, instruments on leverage and risk mitigation, safeguards, and governance. How should the MDBs respond to the proposal to establish a process to examine the role, scale and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda? A proactive response and engagement on the part of the MDBs would facilitate a better understanding of the contribution that the MDBs can make and greater support among shareholders for a coherent and stepped-up role. Event Materials Participant ListMDB PostEvent Summary Full Article
2015 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education: How Well Are American Students Learning? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 00:00:00 -0400 Editor's Note: The introduction to the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education appears below. Use the Table of Contents to navigate through the report online, or download a PDF of the full report. TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I: Girls, Boys, and Reading Part II: Measuring Effects of the Common Core Part III: Student Engagement INTRODUCTION The 2015 Brown Center Report (BCR) represents the 14th edition of the series since the first issue was published in 2000. It includes three studies. Like all previous BCRs, the studies explore independent topics but share two characteristics: they are empirical and based on the best evidence available. The studies in this edition are on the gender gap in reading, the impact of the Common Core State Standards -- English Language Arts on reading achievement, and student engagement. Part one examines the gender gap in reading. Girls outscore boys on practically every reading test given to a large population. And they have for a long time. A 1942 Iowa study found girls performing better than boys on tests of reading comprehension, vocabulary, and basic language skills. Girls have outscored boys on every reading test ever given by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)—the first long term trend test was administered in 1971—at ages nine, 13, and 17. The gap is not confined to the U.S. Reading tests administered as part of the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) reveal that the gender gap is a worldwide phenomenon. In more than sixty countries participating in the two assessments, girls are better readers than boys. Perhaps the most surprising finding is that Finland, celebrated for its extraordinary performance on PISA for over a decade, can take pride in its high standing on the PISA reading test solely because of the performance of that nation’s young women. With its 62 point gap, Finland has the largest gender gap of any PISA participant, with girls scoring 556 and boys scoring 494 points (the OECD average is 496, with a standard deviation of 94). If Finland were only a nation of young men, its PISA ranking would be mediocre. Part two is about reading achievement, too. More specifically, it’s about reading and the English Language Arts standards of the Common Core (CCSS-ELA). It’s also about an important decision that policy analysts must make when evaluating public policies—the determination of when a policy begins. How can CCSS be properly evaluated? Two different indexes of CCSS-ELA implementation are presented, one based on 2011 data and the other on data collected in 2013. In both years, state education officials were surveyed about their Common Core implementation efforts. Because forty-six states originally signed on to the CCSS-ELA—and with at least forty still on track for full implementation by 2016—little variability exists among the states in terms of standards policy. Of course, the four states that never adopted CCSS-ELA can serve as a small control group. But variation is also found in how the states are implementing CCSS. Some states are pursuing an array of activities and aiming for full implementation earlier rather than later. Others have a narrow, targeted implementation strategy and are proceeding more slowly. The analysis investigates whether CCSS-ELA implementation is related to 2009-2013 gains on the fourth grade NAEP reading test. The analysis cannot verify causal relationships between the two variables, only correlations. States that have aggressively implemented CCSS-ELA (referred to as “strong” implementers in the study) evidence a one to one and one-half point larger gain on the NAEP scale compared to non-adopters of the standards. This association is similar in magnitude to an advantage found in a study of eighth grade math achievement in last year’s BCR. Although positive, these effects are quite small. When the 2015 NAEP results are released this winter, it will be important for the fate of the Common Core project to see if strong implementers of the CCSS-ELA can maintain their momentum. Part three is on student engagement. PISA tests fifteen-year-olds on three subjects—reading, math, and science—every three years. It also collects a wealth of background information from students, including their attitudes toward school and learning. When the 2012 PISA results were released, PISA analysts published an accompanying volume, Ready to Learn: Students’ Engagement, Drive, and Self-Beliefs, exploring topics related to student engagement. Part three provides secondary analysis of several dimensions of engagement found in the PISA report. Intrinsic motivation, the internal rewards that encourage students to learn, is an important component of student engagement. National scores on PISA’s index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics are compared to national PISA math scores. Surprisingly, the relationship is negative. Countries with highly motivated kids tend to score lower on the math test; conversely, higher-scoring nations tend to have less-motivated kids. The same is true for responses to the statements, “I do mathematics because I enjoy it,” and “I look forward to my mathematics lessons.” Countries with students who say that they enjoy math or look forward to their math lessons tend to score lower on the PISA math test compared to countries where students respond negatively to the statements. These counterintuitive finding may be influenced by how terms such as “enjoy” and “looking forward” are interpreted in different cultures. Within-country analyses address that problem. The correlation coefficients for within-country, student-level associations of achievement and other components of engagement run in the anticipated direction—they are positive. But they are also modest in size, with correlation coefficients of 0.20 or less. Policymakers are interested in questions requiring analysis of aggregated data—at the national level, that means between-country data. When countries increase their students’ intrinsic motivation to learn math, is there a concomitant increase in PISA math scores? Data from 2003 to 2012 are examined. Seventeen countries managed to increase student motivation, but their PISA math scores fell an average of 3.7 scale score points. Fourteen countries showed no change on the index of intrinsic motivation—and their PISA scores also evidenced little change. Eight countries witnessed a decline in intrinsic motivation. Inexplicably, their PISA math scores increased by an average of 10.3 scale score points. Motivation down, achievement up. Correlation is not causation. Moreover, the absence of a positive correlation—or in this case, the presence of a negative correlation—is not refutation of a possible positive relationship. The lesson here is not that policymakers should adopt the most effective way of stamping out student motivation. The lesson is that the level of analysis matters when analyzing achievement data. Policy reports must be read warily—especially those freely offering policy recommendations. Beware of analyses that exclusively rely on within- or between-country test data without making any attempt to reconcile discrepancies at other levels of analysis. Those analysts could be cherry-picking the data. Also, consumers of education research should grant more credence to approaches modeling change over time (as in difference in difference models) than to cross-sectional analyses that only explore statistical relationships at a single point in time. Part I: Girls, Boys, and Reading » Downloads Download the report Authors Tom Loveless Image Source: Elizabeth Sablich Full Article
2015 The Road to Paris: Transatlantic Cooperation and the 2015 Climate Change Conference By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: On October 16, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted Laurence Tubiana, special representative of France for the Paris 2015 Climate Conference and ambassador for climate change, for the 11th annual Raymond Aron Lecture. In her remarks, Tubiana offered a multilevel governance perspective for building a more dynamic climate regime. She reflected on economically… Full Article
2015 Sudan: Election 2015 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 01 Apr 2015 10:49:00 -0400 Later this month, Sudanese voters will head to the polls to elect their next president. Like many of Sudan's earlier elections, this one is not without controversy: Current President Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) have been in power for decades and are under intense criticism for human rights abuses and for their failure to significantly improve living conditions for most of the Sudanese people. The NCP is the expected favorite, largely due to current regional violence and lack of government openness, among other problems. Thus, opposition leaders have called on the country to postpone the elections until certain critical issues are resolved—including peace agreements with various groups that are fighting the central government and the adoption of major constitutional reforms. Similarly, Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army that has been fighting national government forces in Darfur, believes that the April election will not resolve the country’s governance and development quagmire. In fact, arguing that their participation would help legitimize the process, many of the opposition parties, led by the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a coalition of political parties opposed to the NCP, has indicated that it will not participate in the April exercise and has, in fact, launched a campaign for the boycott of the elections. Then again, some commentators argue that this decision is ill-advised and could further marginalize the opposition, destroying its ability to participate in governance in the future. Who is contesting Sudan’s 2015 election? President al-Bashir rose to power in a 1989 bloodless coup and declared himself president in 1993. Since that time and despite the efforts of pro-democracy movements to change the status quo, al-Bashir has managed to maintain his monopoly on power. In addition to the fact that he has been helped by a brutal civil war and the opposition’s decision to boycott elections, al-Bashir and his government have outlawed political parties and engaged in the brutalization of many regions of the country. In fact, in 2008, the International Criminal Court called for his arrest for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur. In addition, in January of this year, the country’s parliament, which is dominated by al-Bashir’s NCP, enacted a series of constitutional amendments granting the president additional powers, effectively strengthening what has been an imperial presidency, reinforcing the country’s highly centralized and authoritarian governing process. Despite the fact that as many as 15 individuals are running for president, both al-Bashir and the NCP are likely to emerge victorious. According to the National Election Commission, six presidential candidates are being sponsored by their political parties; the rest are running as independents. The largest opposition party, the National Umma Party (NUP), led by seasoned politician al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, has decided to boycott the 2015 elections. Al-Mahdi and the NUP want the elections postponed, and a transitional government of unity formed and granted the power to oversee the amendment of the constitution. As argued by the opposition, once a new, democracy-enhancing constitution has been drafted and ratified, the country can proceed with elections to pick a permanent government. Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) and some factions within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are also boycotting the 2015 elections. Will the election be considered fair and credible by the Sudanese people? The fact that the government in Khartoum has persistently refused to consider the opposition’s arguments that the elections should be postponed until the national dialogue has been completed, a transitional government of unity formed, and a more acceptable constitution drafted and adopted means that there is likely to be much controversy. In addition, given the fact that most of the opposition has already indicated that it would boycott the election, making sure that the election is fair, free, and credible is challenging. Recently, the opposition has accused security forces of making it difficult for them to express themselves and educate Sudanese citizens about the government’s continued suppression of individual freedoms, including the right to express opinions not favored by or favorable to the incumbent regime in Khartoum. Given the fact that a large part of the Sudanese electorate believes that the present political environment within the country is not conducive to the carrying out of a fair and free election, those individuals and groups are not likely to accept the results or consider the process as fair and free—and that will definitely put the legitimacy of the government to question. If the international community also concludes that the elections were neither credible nor free and fair, which is also quite likely, that could further isolate the regime in Khartoum and hamper any efforts to resolve conflicts in various regions of the country and generally improve the environment for investment and economic growth. Sudan’s dilemma Since independence in 1956, Sudan has not been able to provide itself with institutional arrangements and a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. The failure of the country’s laws and institutions to adequately constrain the state has allowed state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) to behave with impunity and engage in activities (e.g., corruption) that have constrained economic growth and development, endangered the peaceful coexistence of the country’s diverse population groups, alienated the international community, significantly reduced foreign investment, and endangered the country’s international standing. In addition, many government policies during most of the post-independence period have been viewed by several groups as marginalizing them and pushing them to the economic and political periphery. Some of these groups have been engaged in armed conflict against the national government for many years. If, on the highly unlikely chance that al-Bashir capitulates to the opposition and forms its proposed transitional government, many questions need to be answered. How would it be chosen? Would al-Bashir and the NCP be part of it? Given the fact that the NCP has not been willing to participate in any efforts to reform the country’s political system and provide for more transparency in government communications, as well as improved accountability of the government to the people, how likely is it that a transitional government involving the NCP would be able to successfully undertake the reforms suggested by the opposition? On the other hand, assuming that the 2015 elections are carried out as scheduled and al-Bashir and the NCP win, will the new government undertake the reforms necessary to enhance Sudan’s ability to take its place among the other democratic countries of the world—specifically, those that respect human rights, provide legal mechanisms for their citizens to organize their private lives and live together peacefully, and enhance the creation of the wealth needed to deal fully and effectively with poverty and high rates of material deprivation? But, is this optimism justified? President al-Bashir and the National Congress Party have ruled Sudan with significant levels of discretion for many decades. During this period, little effort has been made to engage the Sudanese people in the type of institutional reforms that would have provided the country with more democracy-enhancing institutional arrangements, that is, those that guarantee the rule of law. In his campaign speeches, President al-Bashir has alluded to his government’s supposed interest in peace and development. However, during nearly two decades in power, [1] he and the NCP have either been unwilling or incapable of spearheading the reforms needed to bring about peaceful coexistence and genuine development in Sudan. In fact, the constitutional amendments implemented by the NCP-dominated legislature in January this year significantly increased the powers of the presidency and effectively negated efforts by the opposition to transition the country to democratic governance. Thus, while it is possible that al-Bashir and the NCP might surprise us after the elections, decide to shed their authoritarian image, form a unity government that will undertake necessary institutional reforms (some of which are mentioned above), and transition this important country to democracy, with laws and institutions that guarantee the rule of law, and hence, enhance peaceful coexistence and the creation of the wealth that the country needs to fight poverty and improve national living standards, it is hard to be optimistic, especially given al-Bashir’s and his government’s long history of political opportunism. What is in store for the post-election government? Regardless of the winner (though it is most likely to be al-Bashir and the NCP), the post-election government will have to deal with several urgent and critical issues facing the country: First, the new government must engage all relevant stakeholder groups in Sudan in constitutional talks to develop and adopt a development-oriented constitution and one that is acceptable to all of the country’s different groups. The new government must steer the country away from authoritarianism and toward democracy and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This can be accomplished, first, by forming a transitional government of national unity, one that provides representation for all of the country’s relevant stakeholders, and then empowering that government to engage the people in robust constitution making to develop and adopt a constitution that adequately constrains the state, enhances peaceful coexistence, and guarantees the rule of law. Such a governing process, for example, can be characterized by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances. Perhaps, some sort of national sovereign conference, to be attended by representatives of all of the country’s relevant stakeholder groups, including especially historically marginalized regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, can be granted the power to draw up the political principles that would guide and form the foundation for the construction of the country’s permanent constitution. As I note above, this new transitional government will face complex challenges, especially regarding the NCP’s role in it. The question on everyone’s minds is: How likely is it that such a transitional government would be formed if al-Bashir and the NCP are victorious in the April 2015 election? Second, the new government must make an effort to resolve the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile states, and other parts of the country, enhance the peace, and provide an enabling environment for the peaceful coexistence of groups, as well as for economic growth and development. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir intimated that Sudan is a rich country with significant endowments of resources that could be used to meet the needs of all its citizens. He then called on groups who have taken arms against the government to seek peace so that the country could proceed with its development agenda. So far, the country’s civil wars and regional conflicts have squandered resources (including scarce human capital) that could have been used to develop the country. Nevertheless, Khartoum and the new government must reach out to historically alienated groups and give them a reason to lay down their arms and negotiate in good faith so that the country can achieve the peace necessary to begin the process of genuine political and economic development in the country. Relatedly, national identity needs to be strengthened. Many groups in Sudan, especially those living in peripheral areas, unsurprisingly consider themselves alienated from the government in Khartoum. National integration and nation-building must be at the top of any post-election government’s policy priorities. Fourth, the new government must deal with a relatively high unemployment rate, especially among young people, by significantly increasing investment in education and job training, especially for people living in areas of the country that have, historically, been pervaded by conflict. It is important that these economically and politically marginalized regions be fully integrated into the country’s economy and be made full participants in wealth creation and economic growth. Additionally, the new government must make certain that genuine efforts are made to improve access to education for other historically marginalized groups, notably girls and women. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir announced that his government intends to invest heavily in higher education and provide opportunities for all Sudanese to acquire human capital. While higher education is critical to Sudan’s industrial transformation, it is important for the government to recognize the fact that a robust, well-funded, and easily accessible system of primary and secondary schools is the foundation for any sustainable industrialization scheme. Fifth, the new government needs to improve its relations with the international community and with its neighbors—better relations should improve the country’s ability to participate gainfully in the global economy, as well as create opportunities for foreign investment flows, cultural and educational exchanges, and improved protection of human rights, especially those of ethnic and religious minorities. Of critical importance is the need for Sudan’s post-election government to settle its disputes with its neighbor South Sudan, especially on Abyei, the border, the use of Sudan’s pipelines to transport South Sudan’s oil to export markets, South Kordofan, and the status of refugees. Finally, al-Bashir and the National Congress Party, the likely winners of the 2015 elections, must ask themselves how they want posterity to judge and remember them. African political elites rarely think about the type of legacy that they are likely to leave to future generations. For al-Bashir and the NCP, the April 2015 election offers a rare opportunity for them to rehabilitate themselves and emerge as public servants with truly transformative development agendas, and not as opportunistic exploiters whose only interest was self-enrichment. [1] Although al-Bashir came into office in 1989, the National Congress party was came into being in 1996. Note: This article was amended on April 1, 2015 to reflect the delay of the elections to April 13. Authors John Mukum Mbaku Full Article
2015 Worldwide Smart Grid Spending to Hit $46 Billion in 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Wed, 11 Apr 2012 16:02:44 -0400 A new report says utilities around the world will ramp up smart grid spending, with worldwide projects hitting $46.4 billion in 2015. Full Article Technology
2015 World Environment Day 2015 to promote sustainable lifestyles By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:45:00 -0400 The UN Environment Program takes aim at unsustainable consumption in 2015. Full Article Living
2015 Will 2015 bring legalization of hemp? By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 06:27:00 -0500 2012 and 2014 brought hemp closer to federal legalization. Will 2015 be the year it finally happens? Full Article Business
2015 News Corporation Announces New Sustainability Targets for 2015 and Beyond By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 01 Mar 2011 09:07:55 -0500 News Corporation, parent company of Fox, the Wall Street Journal, and most recently of The Daily for the iPad, was the first global media company to commit to and then achieve the goal of becoming carbon neutral. Full Article Business
2015 Greenpeace releases the Canned Tuna Shopping Guide for 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:00:00 -0400 Learn which brands should be avoided and which are making a sincere effort to provide ocean-safe options, then vote with your wallet. Full Article Living
2015 The best and worst of the Interior Design Show 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Mon, 26 Jan 2015 09:27:31 -0500 Green and sustainable used to be buzzwords here. They don't appear to even exist anymore. Full Article Design
2015 2015: The year in wood construction By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 15:40:16 -0500 We're not called TreeHugger for nothing. Full Article Design
2015 The top 10 Urban Design stories of 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 13:19:21 -0500 Many of them seem to be about bikes and transportation though.... Full Article Design
2015 Barcelona to Build First Carbon-Neutral Indoor Ski Slope in 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 19 Jan 2012 03:39:17 -0500 Barcelona wants to build an indoor carbon-neutral ski dome, taking waste energy from the gas industry to cool the hall and using renewable energy to power the rest... fact or fiction? Eco-friendly or greenwashing? Full Article Design
2015 2015 sets record for murders of environmental activists By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 06:57:15 -0400 Something to put all the composting, shorter showers and EV talk in perspective. Full Article Business
2015 Costa Rica hasn't used any fossil fuels for electricity so far in 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 07 Apr 2015 13:21:49 -0400 Prices have fallen 12% thanks to this switch to renewables. Full Article Energy
2015 Good news for 2015: compostable clothing By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Fri, 02 Jan 2015 15:10:45 -0500 For consumers, biodegradable and compostable products have mostly been a bust. Still, it is good news that the swiss company Freitag has succeeded making jeans that will break down on commercial compost piles. Full Article Design
2015 Electric vehicle wins famed Pikes Peak Hill Climb 2015 By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 12:39:00 -0400 What these cars are capable of will come as no surprise to EV fans, but winning the King of the Mountain title puts another feather in the EV cap Full Article Transportation
2015 Rules are Changing for Corporate Reputation Management, According to Sodexo 2015 Workplace Trends Report - 2015 Sodexo Workplace Trends Overview By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 28 Jan 2015 16:35:00 EST 2015 Sodexo Workplace Trends Overview Full Article Workforce Management Human Resources Broadcast Feed Announcements Survey Polls & Research MultiVu Video
2015 Watch the European Business Awards Gala Ceremony and Celebrations Live from London - European Business Award Teaser 2015 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 22 May 2015 14:45:00 EDT European Business Award Teaser 2015 Full Article Banking Financial Services Publishing Information Services Awards MultiVu Video
2015 Recommendations From Astana Economic Forum 2015 - Recommendations from Astana Economic Forum 2015 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 06 Jul 2015 13:20:00 EDT Recommendations from Astana Economic Forum 2015 Full Article Banking Financial Services Oil Transportation Trucking Railroad Economic news trends analysis Trade show news Foreign policy International affairs MultiVu Video
2015 BGC Partners And Cantor Fitzgerald Raise Approximately $12 Million On BGC's Eleventh Annual Charity Day - BGC Charity Day 2015 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 14 Sep 2015 11:50:00 EDT Dozens of nonprofits, celebrities and BGC partners unite for Charity Day 2015. Full Article Banking Financial Services Not for Profit Broadcast Feed Announcements Corporate Social Responsibility MultiVu Video
2015 Cantor Fitzgerald and BGC Partners Raise Approximately $12 Million on Cantor Fitzgerald's Annual Charity Day - Cantor Fitzgerald Charity Day 2015 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 14 Sep 2015 14:00:00 EDT Dozens of charities and celebrity ambassadors join Cantor Fitzgerald on their 5th annual Charity Day in New York Full Article Banking Financial Services Not for Profit Broadcast Feed Announcements Corporate Social Responsibility MultiVu Video