13 August 2020

Climbing out of the Chinese debt trap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Beijing must play a pivotal role in soothing African economic distress, says Alex Vines.

Poorer countries across the world – including many in Africa – are facing $35 billion in debt-service payments in 2022. According to the World Bank, around 40 per cent of this total is owed to China.

Across the African continent, the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic have increased rates of extreme poverty and inequality. Since early 2022 the situation has worsened even further, due to the knock-on effects of spiking inflation and interest rates following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Shortages of fuel and foodstuffs have caused prices to leap upwards. Urban unrest is on the rise, and African governments are having to make tough economic choices as their budgets are squeezed ever more tightly.

Across the continent, progress on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is being jeopardized, and non-energy-producing lower and lower-middle income African governments are struggling to repay their loans.

During the Covid pandemic, the G20 assisted 31 out of 36 eligible African countries with its Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). Established in May 2020, the DSSI helped countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable people before it expired at the end of 2021. From 2022, it has been replaced by the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments.

As the second-largest economy in the world after the United States, and the dominant lender for many African states, China has an important role to play in such initiatives. Beijing still tries to keep a low profile and renegotiate its terms on a bilateral basis – although it did support Angola’s early call for G20 action on an initiative that would fulfil what the DSSI delivered. The challenge is to encourage more consistency and trust in such initiatives, as Chinese officials consider them to be too western-oriented. 
 

China’s lending to Africa peaked in 2016

Contemporary views of Chinese lending in Africa remain coloured by the rapid expansion of Chinese finance from the early 2000s to resource-rich African states, and oil producers in particular. The reality is that much of China’s lending has evolved, and is neither intrinsically predatory nor problematic for African partners – and China increasingly prefers to do business with states it considers to be better run.

In fact, as commodity prices and growth rates declined from 2015, Chinese lending to Africa fell significantly, from a peak of $29.5 billion in 2016 to $7.6 billion in 2019. The socio-economic impact of the pandemic has made this situation worse.

That China has attracted criticism is often due to a lack of transparency in its investments, especially those in Kenya and Zambia. This reputation has not been helped by opaque lending arrangements imposed by Chinese state-owned banks, requiring borrowers to prioritize them for repayment. This could lead to cutbacks in key areas of social spending, with direct impacts on African communities.

Over the past two decades, Chinese finance has contributed to an infrastructure boom in many African countries. Angola, for example, was able to undertake a rapid post-conflict reconstruction of its infrastructure, with new roads and bridges being built across the country. New models of financing are being developed: in Kenya, the new Nairobi expressway was constructed under a $600 million Build-Operate-Transfer model that provides for ownership to revert to the national government after a 30-year concession period.

Chinese companies have helped African countries build and upgrade over 10,000km of railway, around 100,000km of highway, 1,000 bridges and 100 ports, as well as power plants, hospitals and schools.

China’s involvement in African debt has varied considerably between countries and over time. Although in recent years this involvement has been framed in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, it has for the most part been uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit being offered by competing lenders with links to different elements of the Chinese state.

In recent years, as reports have emerged around the poor quality of some of China’s past lending, the authorities in Beijing have sought greater control over new development lending and have imposed new sustainability requirements. At the same time, African countries have sought to diversify sources of supply for infrastructure contracts beyond China. Loans are generally now on a smaller, more manageable scale.

With the introduction of its Global Development Initiative in September 2021, there are indications that China is moving to a ‘new development paradigm’, with the emphasis on providing flows of foreign direct investment rather than loans and a focus on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, human capital investments and green development.
 

African debt distress

A paper drawing on expertise from Chatham House’s Africa, Asia and Global Economy and Finance experts will be published before the G20 summit in Bali in November 2022. It examines seven African countries that the World Bank deemed in 2020 to be in most debt distress or at risk of debt distress because of their Chinese stock – Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia. Two countries – Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa – have received new loans from China and are not in any distress.

The paper observes that a lack of transparency over the nature of the terms agreed by these African governments has led to intense domestic criticism and international accusations that China is seeking control over strategic assets.

In fact, in Angola and Zambia, China may have accidently fallen into its own debt trap through profligate and uncoordinated lending.

Zambia became the first pandemic-era default in 2020 and is seeking relief on $17 billion of external debt. After holding general elections in August 2022, Angola and Kenya will also seek additional debt relief, but both may also seek more funds from the private commercial market because of the slow progress of the G20’s Common Framework – something flagged as a concern by China.

All seven of the countries that are most indebted to China are actively seeking to reduce this financial reliance on Beijing in the future.

China has a pivotal role to play in finding effective solutions to these and other African countries’ debt distress. Improved coordination and cooperation between creditors in China and in other parts the world could enhance the positive impact of multilateral initiatives, such as the Common Framework, which has aimed to bring China and India to the negotiating table along with the IMF, the Paris Club group of creditor nations and private creditors.

So far, Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia are the only African countries to have signed up to the framework since its launch in 2020. Although China is suspicious of the IMF, if African states collectively encouraged Beijing to engage with the Common Framework, it could be improved so as to provide debt relief to those African countries finding it difficult to repay their loans.

Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023 Audio NCapeling 13 January 2023

Episode ten discusses Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent, and how the world should be responding to the major conflicts of 2023.

The first episode of 2023 examines Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent as a new Chatham House report highlights 22 African countries suffering from debt distress with Beijing a key creditor to many of them.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang is also touring several African states this week and next, with visits planned to Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, and the headquarters of the African Union (AU).

This week Chatham House also hosted Dr Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, to discuss ten conflicts to watch in 2023. The panel examines some of the key conflicts mentioned and how the world is responding to them.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week from Chatham House are Dr Alex Vines, director of the Africa programme, Creon Butler, director of the Global Economy and Finance programme, Dr Yu Jie, senior fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme, and Armida van Rij, research fellow with the International Security programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

China-Africa relations Explainer jon.wallace 18 January 2023

What are China’s objectives in Africa, how valid is the concept of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, and what are China’s military ambitions in the region?

A brief history of China-Africa relations

Africa has been crucial to China’s foreign policy since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1947. China supported several African liberation movements during the Cold War, and for every year since 1950 bar one, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has first visited an African country.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang visited five African countries and the African Union in January 2023. Wang Yi, the former foreign minister, visited 48 African countries and premier Xi Jinping undertook 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.

In 1971, the votes of African countries were instrumental in winning the PRC control of China’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council – displacing representatives from Chinese nationalist forces, who had been defeated in the civil war and now governed Taiwan.

In the following decades, China’s focus in Africa switched to eliminating all remaining recognition for Taiwan’s government. Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, Senegal and others all switched their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Eswatini is the only African nation still to recognize Taiwan’s government in 2023.

In 1999 China created its ‘Going Out’ strategy, which encouraged Chinese companies to invest beyond China.

The strategy was a statement of China’s growing economic might and created a new wave of Chinese engagement in Africa. It was also an important source of employment for Chinese citizens working on new infrastructure projects.

In November 2003 the first tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing. FOCAC was created to improve cooperation between China and African states and signalled China’s growing strategic initiative in Africa.

In 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Xi Jinping, featuring an ambition to reinvigorate the old silk trading route along the East African coast. This should theoretically have seen Chinese investment concentrated in East Africa, but many other African states also sought opportunities through the BRI, making the initiative quickly expand in scope and ambition.

The BRI saw a huge number of signature infrastructure projects built across Asia and Africa, funded by Chinese loans whose size, nature and origin were often opaque. Some African countries became badly exposed to Chinese lending during this period. 

Chinese investment peaked around 2016. Since then, Chinese loans to African governments declined significantly, falling from $28.4 billion in 2016 to $1.9 billion in 2020 – partly due to changing priorities in domestic Chinese politics, and partly due to the apparent difficulty African countries had repaying loans.

China’s investment in Africa

China has taken a position contrary to Western governments in its African investment. It characterizes its loans as mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries, promising not to interfere in the internal politics of those it loans to.

In this respect it presents itself in contrast to Western countries, who are accused by China and some African governments of arrogant, democratic posturing – often by former colonial powers that looted African resources during the 18th and 19th centuries.

China has learned by doing, and the reality of large-scale investments taught Chinese investors the limits of their approach. For instance, during the South Sudanese civil war, China had to deal with representatives of various forces opposed to the government to maintain the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended, claiming that Chinese communism could not be replicated outside of China.

However, ideological links exist between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the rulers of a state like Ethiopia, whose Prosperity Party has origins in ‘revolutionary democracy’ and Marxist-Leninism.

China’s National People’s Congress has formal relations with 35 African parliaments and the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) has relations with 110 political parties in 51 African countries.

Western politicians have increasingly voiced fears that China’s intentions in Africa are predatory, intended to create a network of African states that are obliged to service their debts by offering China access to resources, trade opportunities and locations for military bases.

Debt trap diplomacy

US commentators often describe Chinese policy in Africa as a ‘debt trap’, part of a deliberate strategy to loan unmanageable sums to African countries, draw them into China’s sphere of influence, and force unfair commitments upon them.

Some African nations do have extensive Chinese loans and are suffering from out-of-control debt, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and high interest rates. But their situations cannot be entirely blamed on Chinese loans. States including Kenya and Zambia have poorly managed their debt to all creditors, not only China.

Meanwhile, other African countries have created realistic, manageable debt arrangements with China without the tremendous risk and uncertainties that characterized some major BRI projects.

China also faces significant problems due to its extensive loans made during the BRI boom period, as it will struggle to force repayment while maintaining its image as a friend of developing nations.

BRI projects were largely uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit offered by competing Chinese lenders. This contradicts the idea of a coherent ‘debt trap’ policy by China.

However, the idea that China may use debt strategically, to expand its influence in the African content and secure access to resources, cannot be completely dismissed. China is an emerging superpower in strategic competition with the US. Building stronger economic relationships in Africa would be a logical step in its aspirations to be a global power.

Sophos X-Ops unveils five-year investigation tracking China-based groups targeting perimeter devices

Accompanied with nutrition transition, non-HDL-C levels of individuals in Asian countries has increased rapidly, which has caused the global epicenter of nonoptimal cholesterol to shift from Western countries to Asian countries. Thus, it is critical to underline major genetic and dietary determinants. In the current study of 2,330 Chinese individuals, genetic risk scores (GRSs) were calculated for total cholesterol (TC; GRS_TC, 57 SNPs), LDL-C (GRS_LDL-C, 45 SNPs), and HDL-C (GRS_HDL-C, 65 SNPs) based on SNPs from the Global Lipid Genetics Consortium study. Cholesterol intake was estimated by a 74-item food-frequency questionnaire. Associations of dietary cholesterol intake with plasma TC and LDL-C strengthened across quartiles of the GRS_TC (effect sizes: –0.29, 0.34, 2.45, and 6.47; P_interaction = 0.002) and GRS_LDL-C (effect sizes: –1.35, 0.17, 5.45, and 6.07; P_interaction = 0.001), respectively. Similar interactions with non-HDL-C were observed between dietary cholesterol and GRS_TC (P_interaction = 0.001) and GRS_LDL-C (P_interaction = 0.004). The adverse effects of GRS_TC on TC (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.51, 0.82, 1.21, and 1.31; P_interaction = 0.023) and GRS_LDL-C on LDL-C (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.66, 0.52, 1.12, and 1.56; P_interaction = 0.020) were more profound in those having higher cholesterol intake compared with those with lower intake. Our findings suggest significant interactions between genetic susceptibility and dietary cholesterol intake on plasma cholesterol profiles in a Chinese population.

Mass spectrometry has become an indispensable tool for the characterization of glycosylation across biological systems. Our ability to generate rich fragmentation of glycopeptides has dramatically improved over the last decade yet our informatic approaches still lag behind. Although glycoproteomic informatics approaches using glycan databases have attracted considerable attention, database independent approaches have not. This has significantly limited high throughput studies of unusual or atypical glycosylation events such as those observed in bacteria. As such, computational approaches to examine bacterial glycosylation and identify chemically diverse glycans are desperately needed. Here we describe the use of wide-tolerance (up to 2000 Da) open searching as a means to rapidly examine bacterial glycoproteomes. We benchmarked this approach using N-linked glycopeptides of Campylobacter fetus subsp. fetus as well as O-linked glycopeptides of Acinetobacter baumannii and Burkholderia cenocepacia revealing glycopeptides modified with a range of glycans can be readily identified without defining the glycan masses before database searching. Using this approach, we demonstrate how wide tolerance searching can be used to compare glycan use across bacterial species by examining the glycoproteomes of eight Burkholderia species (B. pseudomallei; B. multivorans; B. dolosa; B. humptydooensis; B. ubonensis, B. anthina; B. diffusa; B. pseudomultivorans). Finally, we demonstrate how open searching enables the identification of low frequency glycoforms based on shared modified peptides sequences. Combined, these results show that open searching is a robust computational approach for the determination of glycan diversity within bacterial proteomes.

China's Regions in an Era of Globalization Book sysadmin 14 May 2018

The rise of China has been shaped and driven by its engagement with the global economy. This engagement cannot be understood at the level of national policymaking alone, but requires analysis of the differences in participation in the global economy across China’s regions.

China is a continent-sized economy and society with substantial diversity across its different regions. This book traces the evolution of regional policy in China and its implications in a global context.

Detailed chapters examine the trajectory of what is now becoming known as the Greater Bay Area in southern China, the inland mega-city of Chongqing, and the role of China’s regions in the globally focused Belt and Road Initiative launched by the Chinese government in late 2013.

It will be of interest to practitioners and scholars engaging with contemporary China’s political economy and international relations.

This book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization

About the author

Tim Summers works on the political economy and international relations of contemporary China. He is a Lecturer at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a (non-resident) Senior Consulting Fellow on the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was British consul general in Chongqing from 2004 to 2007.

This book is published in collaboration with Routledge.

Purchase

• Worldwide (via Routledge)
• Students (via Browns Books)

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One Other resource sysadmin 29 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

The Angels announced their Minor League coaching staffs on Saturday, including former Major League catcher Lou Marson being named the new manager of Triple-A Salt Lake and former big leaguer David Newhan as the new skipper at Double-A Birmingham.

How Influential Is China in Zimbabwe? Expert comment sysadmin 20 November 2017

A trip to Beijing by Zimbabwe’s military chief was a ‘normal military exchange’, China’s foreign ministry said after the army seized power in Harare. Alex Vines examines the extent of China’s influence in Zimbabwe.

The news that General Constantino Chiwenga had visited China only a few days before the military takeover in Zimbabwe was a coincidence that did not go unnoticed. There was also speculation after China said it was closely watching developments, but stopped short of condemning President Robert Mugabe’s apparent removal from power.

China is Zimbabwe’s fourth-largest trading partner and its largest source of investment - with stakes worth many billions of pounds in everything from agriculture to construction. Zimbabwe is the dependent partner - with China providing the largest market for its exports and much needed support to its fragile economy.

China’s relations with Zimbabwe are deep, starting during the Rhodesian Bush War. Robert Mugabe failed in 1979 to get Soviet backing, so turned to China, which provided his guerrilla fighters with weapons and training. Both countries formally established diplomatic relations at Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and Mugabe visited Beijing as prime minister the following year. He has been a regular visitor since.

For years, Zimbabwe’s officials have tried to play off China against the West, advocating the country’s ‘Look East’ strategy, particularly following the introduction of EU sanctions in 2002. Indeed, a decade ago, Mugabe told a packed rally at the Chinese-built national sports stadium in Harare: ‘We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.’

China’s military engagement also deepened during Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ era. Significant purchases were made, including Hongdu JL-8 jet aircraft, JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, vehicles, radar and weapons. However, following a controversy about a shipment of arms in 2008, Beijing decided to list Zimbabwe for ‘limited level’ military trading.

Despite Zimbabwe’s efforts, the ‘Look East’ strategy did not bring the investment flood hoped for and a decade later, in August 2015, Mugabe openly asked for Western re-engagement in his ‘state of the nation’ address.

Now, the reality is that increasingly Chinese and Western interests - particularly those of the UK - have become aligned. Not far from each other in the outer suburbs of Harare, two of the biggest embassies in Zimbabwe are the British and the Chinese. As other embassies scaled down or closed, Beijing’s expanded. Whereas British diplomats were well connected with business, civil society and opposition figures, the Chinese invested in ‘technical support’ of the party of government Zanu-PF, including state security and the presidency. When it came to Zanu-PF politics and factionalism, Chinese diplomats were well connected and insightful and, like their Western colleagues, concerned about stability, a better investment climate and adherence to the rule of law.

President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe in 2015 and President Mugabe visited Beijing in January 2017. In public, the Chinese leader said his country is willing to encourage capable companies to invest in Zimbabwe. But in private, the message was that there would be no more loans until Zimbabwe stabilized its economy.

In 2016 trade between the two countries amounted to $1.1 billion, with China the biggest buyer of Zimbabwean tobacco and also importing cotton and various minerals. In return Zimbabwe imported electronics, clothing and other finished products. Chinese state construction firms have also been active, building infrastructure including Zimbabwe’s $100 million National Defence College. And last year China agreed to finance a new 650-seat parliament in Harare.

But Chinese diplomats and many businesses are waiting for better days in Zimbabwe. Some companies have found the investment climate challenging - being burned on diamonds, for example - and have looked for alternative markets. A couple of weeks ago I was in China, attending a meeting on China-Africa relations and Zimbabwe was not mentioned once. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan, or Angola that are strategic partners, or big markets like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe is far from being Beijing’s new priority.

So, Beijing’s interest is in a better investment climate in Zimbabwe. A clear transitional arrangement resulting in elections for a legitimate government in Harare is as much in Beijing’s interest as London’s.

The ‘Look East’ and the ‘Re-engagement with the West’ strategies have not brought about the confidence and investment that Zimbabwe needs. What Zimbabwe requires is stable and accountable government - then investors from Asia, America and Europe will seriously consider that Zimbabwe has an investment future. This was the message that Mugabe received in Beijing in January. And the one which Zimbabwe’s military chief also was given last week.

This article was originally published by BBC News.

Chatham House Primer: Inside China’s government 30 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House

How are decisions made in Beijing, across China and where does the CCP fit in?

Still little is known in Western circles about the inner workings of China’s government. In power since 1949, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has evolved over decades to its current embodiment under President Xi Jinping.

The need for a better understanding of China’s government has been heightened, particularly as the country navigates post-COVID troubles, global economic downturns, wars in Europe, climate change and heightened tension with the United States.

This Primer has been prepared to pull back the veil on the Chinese government. Key issues to be tackled include:

• What is the decision-making process in China’s government?

• How is the party–government relationship best explained?

• How has the party evolved in recent years with new forms of governance and leadership?

• How has China’s government evolved in recent years, particularly in a globalized environment?

• A description of the central government–province dynamic?

• How are citizens engaged in the political process?

• What are the major centres of power in the Chinese political system?

• Has the COVID-19 pandemic altered attitudes towards and the operation of government?

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

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