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NBC's newest workplace sitcom is here, and we'll show you where to watch St. Denis Medical if you don't have cable.

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The following article, Will These Deranged Celebrities Who Promised To End Their Lives Or Flee The Country If Trump Wins Actually Follow Through?, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

(Natural News) Similar to what happened in 2016, a host of celebrities and influencers made wild claims that they would leave the country or even end their lives if Donald Trump won another term in the White House. Will any of them actually follow through? Take Rob Reiner, for instance. He promised to “set himself on …

Continue reading Will These Deranged Celebrities Who Promised To End Their Lives Or Flee The Country If Trump Wins Actually Follow Through? ...

You know it's bad when you give the Democrats a whoopin and the corprate media clowns have no choice but to concede your point.

The post GLORIOUS: Scott Jennings Gets Van Jones To Cry ‘Uncle’ Live On CNN appeared first on Clash Daily.

Three years ago, Chris Wallace walked away from Fox News over concerns that those at the “Fair and Balanced” network were beginning to, as he put it, “question the truth.” […]

The post CNN Host Reportedly Leaving Network After Short-Lived Stay: His Career Change Is Completely Absurd appeared first on The Western Journal.

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

Roland Bruderer
May 1, 2015; 14:1400-1410
Research

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

JL Dixon
Feb 1, 1993; 34:167-179
Reviews

JM Dietschy
Oct 1, 1993; 34:1637-1659
Reviews

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

With tears streaming down his face and his voice trembling, a windshield wiper made a declaration that he would rather live in the cemetery than with his relatives. "A the cemetery me ago live. Unnu wicked to me," Ramarieo Bailey declared. Bailey...

Visual Abstract

Marco De Giorgi
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1675-1686
Research Articles

Genetic variants that increase the risk of fatty liver disease (FLD) and cirrhosis have recently been identified in the proximity of membrane bound O-acyltransferase domain-containing 7 (MBOAT7).  To elucidate the link between these variants and FLD we characterized Mboat7 liver-specific knock-out mice (Mboat7-LSKO).  Chow-fed Mboat7-LSKO mice developed fatty livers and associated liver injury.  Lipidomic analysis of liver using mass spectrometry revealed a pronounced reduction in 20-carbon polyunsaturated fatty acid content in phosphatidylinositols (PIs), but not in other phospholipids. The change in fatty acid composition of PIs in these mice was associated with a marked increase in de novo lipogenesis due to activation of SREBP-1c, a transcription factor that coordinates the activation of genes encoding enzymes in the fatty acid biosynthesis pathway. Hepatic removal of both SREBP cleavage activating protein (Scap) and Mboat7 normalized hepatic triglycerides relative to Scap only hepatic knock-out showing increased SREBP-1c processing is required for Mboat7 induced steatosis.  This study reveals a clear relationship between PI fatty acid composition and regulation of hepatic fat synthesis and delineates the mechanism by which mutations in MBOAT7 cause hepatic steatosis.

Sphingolipids have become established participants in the pathogenesis of obesity and its associated maladies. Sphingosine kinase 1 (SPHK1), which generates S1P, has been shown to increase in liver and adipose of obese humans and mice and to regulate inflammation in hepatocytes and adipose tissue, insulin resistance, and systemic inflammation in mouse models of obesity. Previous studies by us and others have demonstrated that global sphingosine kinase 1 KO mice are protected from diet-induced obesity, insulin resistance, systemic inflammation, and NAFLD, suggesting that SPHK1 may mediate pathological outcomes of obesity. As adipose tissue dysfunction has gained recognition as a central instigator of obesity-induced metabolic disease, we hypothesized that SPHK1 intrinsic to adipocytes may contribute to HFD-induced metabolic pathology. To test this, we depleted Sphk1 from adipocytes in mice (SK1^fatKO) and placed them on a HFD. In contrast to our initial hypothesis, SK1^fatKO mice displayed greater weight gain on HFD and exacerbated impairment in glucose clearance. Pro-inflammatory cytokines and neutrophil content of adipose tissue were similar, as were levels of circulating leptin and adiponectin. However, SPHK1-null adipocytes were hypertrophied and had lower basal lipolytic activity. Interestingly, hepatocyte triacylglycerol accumulation and expression of pro-inflammatory cytokines and collagen 1a1 were exacerbated in SK1^fatKO mice on a HFD, implicating a specific role for adipocyte SPHK1 in adipocyte function and inter-organ cross-talk that maintains overall metabolic homeostasis in obesity. Thus, SPHK1 serves a previously unidentified essential homeostatic role in adipocytes that protects from obesity-associated pathology. These findings may have implications for pharmacological targeting of the SPHK1/S1P signaling axis.

HMG-CoA reductase (Hmgcr) is the rate-limiting enzyme in the mevalonate pathway and is inhibited by statins. In addition to cholesterol, Hmgcr activity is also required for synthesizing nonsterol isoprenoids, such as dolichol, ubiquinone, and farnesylated and geranylgeranylated proteins. Here, we investigated the effects of Hmgcr inhibition on nonsterol isoprenoids in the liver. We have generated new genetic models to acutely delete genes in the mevalonate pathway in the liver using AAV-mediated delivery of Cre-recombinase (AAV-Cre) or CRISPR/Cas9 (AAV-CRISPR). The genetic deletion of Hmgcr by AAV-Cre resulted in extensive hepatocyte apoptosis and compensatory liver regeneration. At the biochemical level, we observed decreased levels of sterols and depletion of the nonsterol isoprenoids, dolichol and ubiquinone. At the cellular level, Hmgcr-null hepatocytes showed ER stress and impaired N-glycosylation. We further hypothesized that the depletion of dolichol, essential for N-glycosylation, could be responsible for ER stress. Using AAV-CRISPR, we somatically disrupted dehydrodolichyl diphosphate synthase subunit (Dhdds), encoding a branch point enzyme required for dolichol biosynthesis. Dhdds-null livers showed ER stress and impaired N-glycosylation, along with apoptosis and regeneration. Finally, the combined deletion of Hmgcr and Dhdds synergistically exacerbated hepatocyte ER stress. Our data show a critical role for mevalonate-derived dolichol in the liver and suggest that dolichol depletion is at least partially responsible for ER stress and apoptosis upon potent Hmgcr inhibition.

Withdrawn by Author.

Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade Research paper sysadmin 20 September 2019

This paper explores a set of core trade-related issues affecting the food and land use system, and proposes constructive ways forward in reconfiguring the global trading system towards delivering a more sustainable and healthy diet for all.

• Meeting future global food security requirements is not just about quantity; it is also about meeting growing needs in a way that safeguards human as well as planetary health. But national priorities and policies often remain out of sync with aspirations for more sustainable and healthy food systems.
• International trade and trade policies play an ambiguous role in the current food system. With 80 per cent of the world’s population depending on imports to meet at least part of their food and nutritional requirements, trade has a unique function in offsetting imbalances between supply and demand. However, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or pricing frameworks that internalize environmental, social or health costs, trade can exacerbate and globalize challenges associated with food production and land use trends such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and the shift to unhealthy diets.
• Over the last two decades, trade in agricultural products (excluding intra-EU flows) has more than tripled in value, to reach $1.33 trillion. The geography of global food trade flows has also shifted, primarily towards South–South trade, which now accounts for roughly a quarter of total agricultural trade flows. The nature of global trade has changed drastically, with traditional exports such as wheat and coffee growing slowly at around 2 per cent per year, while products such as palm oil, fruit juice, soft drinks and other processed products have grown at 8 per cent or more annually.
• This overall increase in trade in agricultural products raises questions about the growing utilization of resources, such as water or soil nutrients, that are embedded in those products through production and processing. Trade itself also causes negative environmental impacts, starting with greenhouse gas emissions associated with transport and storage. If the environmental cost associated with production and trade is not reflected in the final price of goods, trade may accelerate the depletion of resources or their unsustainable use.
• It is critical to ensure that trade policy options pursued by producing and consuming countries alike will support a transition to more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. The first step in addressing trade-related food systems challenges must involve rebuilding trust among policy actors. There is a need for new spaces for informal dialogue among actors, and ‘soft’ governance mechanisms that can help rebuild consensus on the best ways forward. Meeting these challenges also requires an appreciation of the complex interactions between sectoral policies (e.g. on water, land, food, etc.) and their multiple interfaces with trade policies.
• Conditioning the use of subsidies on their sustainability and/or health impacts encourages the delivery of essential public goods in ways that are consistent with sustainability and health goals. A first step therefore is the removal of perverse incentives (e.g. subsidies encouraging the overuse of fertilizers or pesticides or the overproduction of certain commodities, as well as certain biofuels subsidies) and replacing them with market-correcting subsidies.
• Trade facilitation measures for fruits and vegetables that are aimed at easing transit at the border, by cutting unnecessary bureaucracy and reducing waiting times, can improve their availability, reduce costs and improve food quality and safety for consumers. Similarly, measures aimed at improving sustainable cold storage and upgrading value chains can support better diets and consumption by increasing the availability of fresh produce on markets, especially in developing countries.
• A global food stamps programme developed through the G20 and facilitated by the UN’s food agencies could address purchasing power imbalances and tackle malnutrition in developing countries. If carefully designed, such ‘safety net’ schemes can not only contribute to improving calorific intakes but also help deliver more balanced and healthier diets. Careful attention must be given to how such a scheme would work in practice, building on experience to date with similar initiatives.
• Integrating the notion of sustainable food and inputs trade in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework can help to deliver more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. This could be achieved by likeminded countries introducing a set of goals or targets aimed at mitigating the role of trade in placing indirect pressure on biodiversity, and to encourage trade in biodiversity-based products including natural ingredients produced ethically and following sustainability principles and criteria.
• An SDG-oriented agenda for agricultural trade is needed. It could be formed by countries seeking to remove perverse incentives, guaranteeing a safe harbour for market-correcting measures, clarifying existing rules and establishing plurilateral negotiations among subsets of the WTO membership, or sectoral approaches, to address specific challenges.
• Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from trade need to be addressed. Governments could seek to achieve this through ensuring the carbon neutrality of existing and new trade deals, either by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by developing joint initiatives to tax international maritime and air transport emissions.

Public Service, Accountability and Delivery in Malawi 17 October 2018 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

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In his address to the Joint Meeting of the Finance and Programme Committees this morning, the Director-General assured Members of the determination and commitment to delivery of the current Programme [...]

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It all started in 2016 and after many productive deliberations, in October 2020 at the 27^th session of the Committee on Agriculture (COAG) the