The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What does the UK election result mean for Brexit and forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU?

The most important thing is that it means Brexit will definitely happen. Since the referendum, we’ve had three-and-a-half years of continued uncertainty where all outcomes were still possible. We now know that Brexit will become irreversible from 31 January.

That’s the biggest thing, because I think that will have a big psychological impact on politics, both in the UK and also on the EU side. The EU has been working with a partner that has been unsure about its direction, and perhaps some had still hoped that the process might still be reversed, but that direction is now completely clear.

Obviously the first order of business is to pass the withdrawal agreement, which should be pretty straightforward given the majority that the Conservatives have. That’s a formality now.

Then, the question becomes about the level of ambition for the next year. It is an exceptionally ambitious timetable to negotiate, ratify and implement a new relationship before the end of the transition period in December 2020.

What is achievable by the end of next year?

I think there are three possible outcomes here. One: that timetable doesn’t work and Boris Johnson follows through on his pledge to leave the transition period anyway, leading to a ‘no trade deal’ outcome.

Two: the negotiations are able to deliver something by the end of 2020, either because the depth and ambition of any agreement is relatively low level (what Michel Barnier has called a ‘vital minimum’)  and/or because they come up with some type of compromise on the process which is not called an extension, but something else: a type of temporary agreement or a new implementation period.

This is a situation where you might have a bare-bones agreement for the end of the transition period, but with an extended period of negotiation for different unresolved issues. The EU will probably insist upon level playing field guarantees and fishing access rights as a component of any such agreement.

Three: Boris Johnson breaks his manifesto pledge not to extend the transition. Now, he has stared down the barrel of leaving with no deal before and he made a political judgment that it was better to make significant compromises on his negotiating position than to follow through with ‘no deal’. I suspect he might make that same judgment again.

No option is ideal. The first is the most economically disruptive, the second means the EU will be in an even stronger position to dictate terms and the third means breaking a manifesto pledge.

How important is that end of transition deadline now? It was an important issue for the Brexit Party and hardliners in the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. But given the size of a majority, he may need to worry less about them. Is the transition deadline that important to people who voted Conservative, especially if he can show that he has taken the UK out of the EU by the end of January?

I think there may indeed be some political space for Johnson here, given the size of his majority and given that the first phase of Brexit will have been done, along with the debate about withdrawal.

There will be a lot of difficult, technical negotiations in all sorts of areas, some of which I think will become quite rancorous, but won’t necessarily become front page news in the way some of the first phase of negotiations has, not least because you won’t have the theatre of a hung parliament.

Hopefully, there will be more focus on the substance of the agreement, and the debate will be about the consequences of divergence versus staying more aligned with the EU, which is basically the central question now about the future relationship.

I still think for UK prime ministers to pick arbitrary dates, and then to make domestic political promises based around them, actually undermines the UK’s negotiating position. It would be in Britain’s interest to have more flexibility rather than a ticking clock.

Moving to the other big story from the night, the SNP won 48 of 59 seats in Scotland. How does the debate over Scotland’s future in the United Kingdom play out from here?

The SNP has really strengthened its position, more than many expected. This is now set up for a huge constitutional struggle over the future of the United Kingdom.

I think there is a key dilemma for Scottish independence supporters, which is that on the one hand Brexit greatly strengthens the political case for independence. The difference between the political preferences in Scotland and the rest of the UK, particularly in England, is a perfect demonstration of that.

At the same time, once the UK has left the EU, independence becomes much more difficult technically and economically. There will be many of the same difficulties that there have been in discussing Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland. There will be a difficult debate over the currency. There are all sorts of challenges to creating a trade or regulatory border between England and Scotland. This is particularly true if there is a harder Brexit outcome, where Britain leaves the EU without a large amount of regulatory alignment.

On demands for a second independence referendum, I think in the first instance Boris Johnson will simply refuse to hold one. It’s probably not in his short-term interest to do anything else. Theresa May played it this way in 2017, repeatedly saying ‘now is not the time’.

In a similar way I think Johnson will just try to ride the pressure out, to the point where the SNP will need to face the challenges of advocating independence with the UK outside the EU. The next flashpoint will be the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2021.

Ultimately, though, it will become a democratically unsustainable position if Scotland continues to vote for the SNP, and refusing to sanction a second independence referendum might only reinforce that sentiment.

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The void in governance created by the ongoing Syrian conflict has been capitalized upon by warlords, militias and extremist groups to expand and consolidate their power – but has also helped to generate activism, with new leaders born as a reaction to authoritarian governance and conflict limitations.

As public social services have been taken over as war tools, local coordination committees, local councils, humanitarian support groups, citizen journalist networks, women’s groups, and more, have mushroomed across all of Syria. But this new civil society continues to be threatened by many challenges.

It remains hindered by structural weakness and limited capacity - largely as a result of the legacy of Ba’athist policies, which did not allow civil society to exist in the so-called Damascus Spring, but only under the umbrella of the Government, First Lady Asma al-Assad and business NGOs (GoNGOs, FLNGOs and BoNGOs). Beyond this, civil society was limited to purely charitable and religious causes, known as “moujtamaa ahli”.

In addition, Syrian civil society is often a victim of counter-terrorism legislation, with laws and regulations across many countries and institutions prohibiting Syrians from registering an organization and opening bank accounts.  This makes it difficult to secure financial support in an environment where funding has already been dwindling due to a “Syria fatigue” among potential donors, and where any money available is mainly directed at large, often international, NGOs.

Trust, hope and legitimacy

To reach funds, many organizations have to submit to this “NGOization” process. But even this rarely allows for civil society to foster its own interests through core funding. Civil society in Syria is treated more as a “project” with strict indicators, deals and deadlines, when working under conflict necessitates building relationships of trust with a community over time and often has to cover the direct needs on the ground to gain local legitimacy and increase effectiveness. Trust, hope and legitimacy are not aspects you can report against or cover in a sophisticated proposal.

But despite such obstacles, activists and civil society groups continue to volunteer for various causes, ensuring many have not had to seek refuge elsewhere. And their work has included challenging authoritarian and extremist governance.

In Aleppo in 2014, it was civil society with the support of a military faction of Jaish Al Mujahideen that helped expel ISIS. Local councils have since been providing services ranging from humanitarian aid and garbage collection to re-establishing order and resolving local conflicts, thus challenging the legitimacy of jihadist institutions.

NGOs such as the Civil Defense Forces (known as the White Helmets) continually risk their lives to save others by rescuing people from bombed out buildings. On September 19, when a UN sanctioned aid convoy was attacked in Aleppo – reportedly by Russian aircraft – it was the White Helmets that responded, before then coming under attack themselves.

Human rights activists, meanwhile, persist in documenting human rights abuses in the hope that the perpetrators will eventually be held accountable.

However, a Syrian civil society tragedy is unfolding as their work is struggling to survive. To give but one example, Kesh Malek, one of the biggest groups running home-based schooling for children in Aleppo, has already had to close some of its schools.

Lacking international protection, the fate of these children in relation to arms and radicalization is all the more alarming.  Several local councils have also been much weakened, especially vis-à-vis warlords, authoritarian and/or extremists actors.

At its best, the current bombing campaign serves to kill any potential alternatives to an authoritarian regime, and only boosts human suffering, radicalization and displacement.

If this situation is to be reversed, international actors need to ensure security at the local Syrian level, showing that Syrian security is as important as that of Europe.

This means financial security through a deeper and more sustainable capacity building and funding to civil society, and it means protecting civilians and civil society groups though the creation of a safe haven.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The UK will host the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) in November 2020 in Glasgow. In the run up, Chatham House is organizing a monthly briefing series targeted to:

• The diplomatic service based in London, in particular, staff of the London embassies who are reporting on climate change issues.
• Senior UK government civil servants, officials and politicians engaged in climate change.
• Academics, experts, business representatives and NGOs.

The first briefing in the series focuses on the results from COP25 held in Madrid in December 2019 and what this means for 2020.

This briefings series offer an opportunity to discuss, in an informal setting, the most pressing and complex climate issues of the day with UK and international government officials and experts.

In December 2019, the EU launched the European Green Deal, a comprehensive policy package which aims to make the continent carbon-neutral by 2050. It contains a wide range of legal and policy measures including support for restoring ecosystems and biodiversity, low-carbon mobility, and sustainable food systems and healthy diets.

Even though the UK has now left the EU, and the UK government has made clear that there will be no regulatory alignment and no rule-taking from the EU, this will affect Britain’s markets, trade negotiations and stance in global climate action.

The UK has essentially three choices in how to react. First, non-alignment, with low ambition for domestic climate and environmental policies and product standards; second, so-called dynamic alignment, which means non-regression on existing environmental regulations, with domestic UK policies mirroring those of the EU in the future; third, non-alignment but higher ambition, with a domestic policy agenda to emerge as global leader on climate and green industrial development.

What would be the consequences of each of these three options?  

Non-alignment

There is concern that the UK might be going down this route, swapping an established set of stringent EU environmental protections for a new set of deliberately loose regulations. For instance, standards on air pollution have been watered down in the new UK Environment Bill.

As part of the European Green Deal, a carbon border adjustment tax to prevent ‘carbon leakage’  – companies relocating to countries with laxer climate policy outside the EU to avoid higher costs, with the result of increasing overall emissions  – was also announced. The EU has already threatened to potentially apply this mechanism against the UK as part of its policy to ensure a ‘level playing field’ in trade between the two.

Non-alignment on European carbon taxation and border adjustment would help to facilitate a quick trade deal with the US but it would clearly make it more difficult for UK businesses to sell into the EU market.

Furthermore, the UK’s and the EU’s climate security concerns and interests continue to be closely tied together. Ignoring European climate policy developments might jeopardize the UK’s long-term climate security.

Dynamic alignment and mirroring future standards

This would be beneficial to the future industrial competitiveness of the UK’s manufacturing sector.

The European Green Deal is more than a set of ambitious environmental policies. It also includes comprehensive plans for industrial policies, digitalization, financing mechanisms and investment programmes.

A new Circular Economy Action Plan to be published in March 2020 (a leaked draft version is available) will introduce a set of new targets and regulations on a range of products. The aim is that ‘by 2030, only safer, circular and sustainable products should be placed on the EU market’.

We can expect to see new eco-design requirements for information and communication technologies, and a revision of laws on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. The European Green Deal also aims to boost trade in secondary raw materials with regional initiatives aimed at ‘harmonizing national end-of-waste and by-product criteria’. Those could be a first step towards EU-wide criteria.

Furthermore, the European Strategy for Data will facilitate the development of a ‘single market for data’ and develop electronic product passports which can improve the availability of information of products sold in the EU to tackle false green claims.

The UK would benefit from mirroring these industrial policies domestically to achieve equivalence of standards. This could facilitate a closer partnership and would potentially also offer chances to UK businesses in the green technology sector to benefit not only in terms of EU market access, but also from the European Green Deal investment plan – a €1 trillion opportunity.

Higher ambition: aiming for global leadership

This gives the UK the unique opportunity to become a frontrunner. There are many challenges to implementing the European Green Deal, such as member states with little interest in green issues, which the UK can avoid.

The new UK Environment Bill is the first example of a policy departure from EU regulations. While there are some elements that point to a loosening of standard, in statements accompanying the bill, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has insisted that the UK will not be bound by future EU green rules and even ‘go beyond the EU’s level of ambition’ on the environment.

For example, the bill introduces new charges for single-use plastic items to minimize their use and incentivize reusable alternatives. Plus, the UK aims to exceed the EU’s level of ambition to create global action by introducing powers to stop the exports of plastic waste to developing countries.

Taking a global leadership role on climate would also benefit the UK's climate diplomacy to make this year’s COP 26 (jointly hosted with Italy) in Glasgow a success. The European Green Deal agenda sets a new benchmark for climate action and shows global leadership. If the UK also wants to be seen as leading the climate and sustainability agenda, it can scarcely afford to be seen as falling behind.

The decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Myanmar should take all measures available to prevent acts of genocide against the persecuted Rohingya minority is truly ground-breaking. The case shows how small states can play an important role in upholding international law and holding other states accountable. 

The Gambia, acting with the support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, skilfully used Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which allows for a state party to the convention to pursue cases against another state party where it is felt there has been a dispute regarding the ‘interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the convention.

Seventeen states have entered reservations against this specific provision but Myanmar is not one of them. It was on this basis that The Gambia was able to take its case to the ICJ. This exciting development expands the possibilities of international accountability at the state-to-state level.

But it should be noted that the current ruling is focused on provisional measures – the central case could still take years to conclude. There is still a long road ahead on the court determining whether the Myanmar authorities committed acts of genocide.

And, while the decision was unanimous and binding, the ICJ cannot enforce its ruling. Myanmar has shown itself resistant to international criticism and there is a real risk they will fail to comply.

One way forward, should Myanmar not respect the ruling, is that the UN Security Council could agree a resolution to compel action. However, it seems unlikely that China would ever vote for such a resolution, given its strong stance on non-intervention and its economic interests in the country. 

Vladimir Putin’s proposed constitutional reforms will transform Russia’s political regime and allow him to prolong his grip on power when his fourth presidential term expires in 2024.

The proposals suggest that he will not seek another term as president after 2024, but is preparing the ground for retaining power after he leaves the presidency. The changes will introduce checks and balances on his close associates and ensure the country’s judiciary, legislative and executive bodies remain passive.

The State Duma, the lower house of parliament, is unlikely to rock the boat with legislative elections approaching in 2021. Former prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet has been replaced by an acting government headed by a new prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin. The highest courts will be weakened further by Putin’s proposal to give the president the power to dismiss judges.

Most of the proposed changes are vague. Notable specific proposals include the requirement that any presidential candidate must be resident in Russia for a minimum of 25 years prior to the elections, and that anyone who has held a residency permit abroad at any point in their life would not be eligible to run. This is clearly aimed at eliminating political opposition based abroad.

While Putin mentioned a popular vote on the constitutional changes (which is not required by law), it is important to note that he didn’t use the term ‘referendum’, which would have mandated that the results be acted upon. Regardless, it is clear that, with no easy foreign policy and military wins in the offing, Putin will seek to boost his legitimacy through a popular vote. The current federal electoral cycle starts next year and will end in 2024 with the presidential election.

The key question now is how Putin will maintain control over the siloviki, Russia’s political elite, though he has made this task easier for himself by replacing some of the strongest players with mid-level officers and weakening the authority of those who remain.

The proposals to consult with the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, when appointing siloviki and to keep the president in charge of law enforcement are a smokescreen. Putin will consolidate his power through his leadership at the Security Council and by chairing the State Council. For this reason, Putin is seeking to enshrine the State Council, which was reshaped in 2018 to include senior government ministers, in the constitution. 

It is too early to be certain of the major beneficiaries of these sweeping reforms, though Sergey Sobyanin, the current mayor of Moscow, is likely to become Putin’s deputy at the State Council. The head of the audit chamber, Alexei Kudrin, and Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko are also likely to benefit from the changes, after helping to develop Putin’s political and economic strategies prior to the 2018 presidential election.

Notably, the audit chamber, headed by Kudrin, will now have the power to check Rostekh, Rosneftegaz and Gazprom, organizations associated with major siloviki figures Sergey Chemezov and Igor Sechin. The role offered to Medvedev – deputy chair of the Security Council – will be newly created: the scope is unclear but it is unlikely that Putin will relinquish any of his influence over the siloviki.

The decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Myanmar should take all measures available to prevent acts of genocide against the persecuted Rohingya minority is truly ground-breaking. The case shows how small states can play an important role in upholding international law and holding other states accountable. 

The Gambia, acting with the support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, skilfully used Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which allows for a state party to the convention to pursue cases against another state party where it is felt there has been a dispute regarding the ‘interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the convention.

Seventeen states have entered reservations against this specific provision but Myanmar is not one of them. It was on this basis that The Gambia was able to take its case to the ICJ. This exciting development expands the possibilities of international accountability at the state-to-state level.

But it should be noted that the current ruling is focused on provisional measures – the central case could still take years to conclude. There is still a long road ahead on the court determining whether the Myanmar authorities committed acts of genocide.

And, while the decision was unanimous and binding, the ICJ cannot enforce its ruling. Myanmar has shown itself resistant to international criticism and there is a real risk they will fail to comply.

One way forward, should Myanmar not respect the ruling, is that the UN Security Council could agree a resolution to compel action. However, it seems unlikely that China would ever vote for such a resolution, given its strong stance on non-intervention and its economic interests in the country. 

The UK will host the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) in November 2020 in Glasgow. In the run up, Chatham House is organizing a monthly briefing series targeted to:

• The diplomatic service based in London, in particular, staff of the London embassies who are reporting on climate change issues.
• Senior UK government civil servants, officials and politicians engaged in climate change.
• Academics, experts, business representatives and NGOs.

The first briefing in the series focuses on the results from COP25 held in Madrid in December 2019 and what this means for 2020.

This briefings series offer an opportunity to discuss, in an informal setting, the most pressing and complex climate issues of the day with UK and international government officials and experts.

In December 2019, the EU launched the European Green Deal, a comprehensive policy package which aims to make the continent carbon-neutral by 2050. It contains a wide range of legal and policy measures including support for restoring ecosystems and biodiversity, low-carbon mobility, and sustainable food systems and healthy diets.

Even though the UK has now left the EU, and the UK government has made clear that there will be no regulatory alignment and no rule-taking from the EU, this will affect Britain’s markets, trade negotiations and stance in global climate action.

The UK has essentially three choices in how to react. First, non-alignment, with low ambition for domestic climate and environmental policies and product standards; second, so-called dynamic alignment, which means non-regression on existing environmental regulations, with domestic UK policies mirroring those of the EU in the future; third, non-alignment but higher ambition, with a domestic policy agenda to emerge as global leader on climate and green industrial development.

What would be the consequences of each of these three options?  

Non-alignment

There is concern that the UK might be going down this route, swapping an established set of stringent EU environmental protections for a new set of deliberately loose regulations. For instance, standards on air pollution have been watered down in the new UK Environment Bill.

As part of the European Green Deal, a carbon border adjustment tax to prevent ‘carbon leakage’  – companies relocating to countries with laxer climate policy outside the EU to avoid higher costs, with the result of increasing overall emissions  – was also announced. The EU has already threatened to potentially apply this mechanism against the UK as part of its policy to ensure a ‘level playing field’ in trade between the two.

Non-alignment on European carbon taxation and border adjustment would help to facilitate a quick trade deal with the US but it would clearly make it more difficult for UK businesses to sell into the EU market.

Furthermore, the UK’s and the EU’s climate security concerns and interests continue to be closely tied together. Ignoring European climate policy developments might jeopardize the UK’s long-term climate security.

Dynamic alignment and mirroring future standards

This would be beneficial to the future industrial competitiveness of the UK’s manufacturing sector.

The European Green Deal is more than a set of ambitious environmental policies. It also includes comprehensive plans for industrial policies, digitalization, financing mechanisms and investment programmes.

A new Circular Economy Action Plan to be published in March 2020 (a leaked draft version is available) will introduce a set of new targets and regulations on a range of products. The aim is that ‘by 2030, only safer, circular and sustainable products should be placed on the EU market’.

We can expect to see new eco-design requirements for information and communication technologies, and a revision of laws on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. The European Green Deal also aims to boost trade in secondary raw materials with regional initiatives aimed at ‘harmonizing national end-of-waste and by-product criteria’. Those could be a first step towards EU-wide criteria.

Furthermore, the European Strategy for Data will facilitate the development of a ‘single market for data’ and develop electronic product passports which can improve the availability of information of products sold in the EU to tackle false green claims.

The UK would benefit from mirroring these industrial policies domestically to achieve equivalence of standards. This could facilitate a closer partnership and would potentially also offer chances to UK businesses in the green technology sector to benefit not only in terms of EU market access, but also from the European Green Deal investment plan – a €1 trillion opportunity.

Higher ambition: aiming for global leadership

This gives the UK the unique opportunity to become a frontrunner. There are many challenges to implementing the European Green Deal, such as member states with little interest in green issues, which the UK can avoid.

The new UK Environment Bill is the first example of a policy departure from EU regulations. While there are some elements that point to a loosening of standard, in statements accompanying the bill, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has insisted that the UK will not be bound by future EU green rules and even ‘go beyond the EU’s level of ambition’ on the environment.

For example, the bill introduces new charges for single-use plastic items to minimize their use and incentivize reusable alternatives. Plus, the UK aims to exceed the EU’s level of ambition to create global action by introducing powers to stop the exports of plastic waste to developing countries.

Taking a global leadership role on climate would also benefit the UK's climate diplomacy to make this year’s COP 26 (jointly hosted with Italy) in Glasgow a success. The European Green Deal agenda sets a new benchmark for climate action and shows global leadership. If the UK also wants to be seen as leading the climate and sustainability agenda, it can scarcely afford to be seen as falling behind.