Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2022

The attitude of Russia’s elite – and wider population – to the states which used to constitute the USSR needs to change in order to solve the Russia challenge.

Although the reverberations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly stretch around the globe, the strongest shocks are – and will continue to be – felt by those countries Moscow used to directly rule.

These countries struggle to shrug off a Soviet legacy as, to varying degrees – linguistically, technologically, culturally, and politically – they bear psychological and physical scars of Russia’s colonial past and its present mentality.

It does not help that these countries lack an appropriate collective descriptor. Over the years there has been ‘Newly Independent States’ – hardly appropriate after 31 years – the now-defunct ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, the ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘Former Soviet Union’ which both reference the past, and simply ‘Eurasia’ which is hardly appropriate for either Ukraine or Turkmenistan.

Some of these former ‘colonies’ are as badly governed and as sinister – albeit not as lethal beyond their borders – as Russia itself. Others, most notably the Baltic states, are modern, liberal, affluent societies, but Moscow’s shadow still looms.

There is a strong mindset in most of Russia’s citizens that, because that it used to rule these other countries, it either still has privileged rights over them or they are not real countries at all – but instead historical aberrations to be extinguished.

What is past is gone

As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, whatever the wrongs of Putin’s ‘history-based’ assertions about the ‘return of historic lands’, all historical claims are bunkum anyway. If the past brings validity, almost no land border on earth would be beyond dispute. It is agreements which count, and Russia signed away the other successor states in 1991.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House has, for the last 31 years, always taken as a starting position that these countries are as sovereign as any other. This of course this means they can choose to be in Russia’s embrace if they wish. But none do because Russia is insufficiently attractive. Some have better relationships with Moscow than others – mainly the more autocratic ones – but no former slave goes back to their master willingly.

At the recent Chatham House conference Russia’s war: How will it shape the region’s future? (note the avoidance of a specific descriptor), the overwhelming consensus was that Russia must lose, that Ukraine must be reconstructed and planning for that must start now, and that the regional economy is convulsing.

But another key view was that, in Russia, rent seeking and buying loyalty are likely to lead to the separation of the Russian people and the regime, especially as the population ages and young men being sent to die at the front. Putin may still be popular in some places in Russia, but not in others – although popularity can rise and fall fast in Russia. However, few at the conference foresaw the disintegration of Russia any time soon.

With continued skill, determination, and more weaponry, Ukraine may well vanquish Russia on the battlefield, and this remains a necessary pre-requisite for European security. But even a Ukraine victory will not erase malign intent.

The Russian imperial itch is so deeply embedded, it must be excised not just from Russian capability but from the intention and mindset of elites and in the popular imagination. That is hard to achieve when so many believe in it as fervently as a religion – even the Russian Orthodox Church invokes a messianism in Russia’s imperial ‘rights’.

The wider region is suffering

Getting Russians to look upon their neighbours as equals requires widescale self-reassessment in a post-Putin Russia. But, for now, the wider region will surely be looking to simply neuter Russia’s destructive capacities.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Lessons for Brexit 15 March 2018 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

Turkey and the EU are preparing to open negotiations to modernize their 22 year old customs union and expand its scope beyond goods to include services, public procurement and a more liberal regime for agriculture. At the same time, the UK is debating whether to seek a customs union with the EU to facilitate a frictionless flow of goods and to prevent a hard border with Ireland. The speaker will discuss Turkey’s customs union modernization agenda and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit 12 December 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 November 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey and the EU have been in a customs union since 1995. Both sides recognize that the current agreement is in need of modernization and have agreed to open negotiations to expand its scope to include services, public procurement, agriculture and other elements that would help bring it into the 21st century.

At the same time, the UK Parliament is debating whether to approve the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It includes a backstop which – if triggered – would keep the UK and the EU in a single customs territory which would limit the disruption of withdrawal but hamper Britain’s ability to pursue an independent trade policy. The political declaration proposes building on this customs arrangement as the basis for the future relationship.

In this context, the speaker will discuss the current EU-Turkey customs union arrangement and its shortcomings, examine the prospects for its modernization and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU.

The event will launch the briefing paper ‘EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit’.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

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March 20, 2024 — The Pawsey Supercomputing Research Centre invites Australian-based research groups to join the Pawsey Uptake Project call. This initiative will provide teams with access to dedicated Pawsey […]

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MILAN, Nov. 6, 2024 — ENEA, Italy’s National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development, has selected Lenovo for the installation of an HPC system at the Portici […]

The post ENEA Chooses Lenovo for Supercomputer to Accelerate Sustainable Energy Research appeared first on HPCwire.

Nov. 11, 2024 — A team of researchers used the Frontier supercomputer at the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a new methodology for conducting a genome-wide association […]

The post ORNL’s Frontier Powers KAUST-Led Genome Study for Gordon Bell Prize Nomination appeared first on HPCwire.

Study of workplace stress finds there's a better way to cope than relaxation.

Sara Giusto is a talent manager, but not in the sense you might imagine. Her biggest client is imma, an influencer with pink hair ... who isn't human. Giusto discusses what the rise of "virtual humans" means for the real world — and invites imma onstage to explore an important question: In an increasingly digital world, what's really real?

Joel Bervell was one of the only Black students in his medical school program. After noticing how misconceptions about race were embedded in health care, he turned to social media to raise awareness about the harmful impact of biases in medicine. He unpacks the long history of race-based health care disparities — and shows what the medical field can do to better serve all patients.

We tend to consider romantic partners and family ties to be our most important relationships, but deep friendships can be just as meaningful. In a perspective-shifting talk, author Rhaina Cohen introduces us to the people unsettling norms by choosing a friend as a life partner — and shows why we're all better off recognizing there's more than one kind of significant other.

Montana Superintendent Elsie Arntzen offers practical advice to schools that could open as early as May 7, even as she says "how they open schools and how learning takes place is up to them."

Lisa Duty of The Learning Accelerator, a Rhode Island Department of Education (RIDE) and Highlander Institute funding partner, outlines the Rhode Islands's commitment to a blended learning future. She describes how the state is developing its new five-year strategic plan that's engaging RIDE's Ambas

Ohio auditor Dave Yost, a Republican, says that virtual schools should be compensated based on what their students learn.

COVID-19 has revealed stark inequities, but education leaders should seize the moment to dismantle them, writes Sonja Brookins Santelises.

Our political system is out of balance, and teachers must prepare the next generation to do better, argues teacher-turned-legislator John Waldron.

The Trump administration backs three families seeking to require the state of Maine to pay tuition for their children to attend religious high schools.

A Nebraska senator introduced a bill that would give teachers legal cover to physically restraint disruptive students, prompting a strong positive response from members of the state teachers' union.