The Egyptian military accounts for far less of the national economy than is commonly believed but transformations in its role and scope since 2013 have turned it into an autonomous economic actor that can reshape markets and influence government policy and investment strategies. Will the military economy contract to its former enclave status if Egypt achieves successful economic growth or has it acquired a permanent stake that it will defend or even expand?

This roundtable will mark the London launch of a Carnegie Middle East Center report on Egypt’s military economy. The report author, Yezid Sayigh, will begin the discussion with remarks on Egypt’s military economy model and offer thoughts on how external actors can engage the country’s formal and informal networks. David Butter will serve as discussant and the roundtable will be moderated by Lina Khatib.

To attend this event, please e-mail Reni Zhelyazkova. 

In September, the UK will host a summit on the future of NATO. The Wales Summit will chart the course of the alliance as it deals with the long-term implications of Russia’s policy towards Ukraine and prepares to complete its longest combat mission in Afghanistan. The secretary-general will outline the decisions that need to be taken to ensure that the alliance remains fit to face the future. He will set out NATO’s readiness action plan, address the debate on declining defence budgets, and explain how NATO intends to turn a new page in Afghanistan. 

This event will launch the US Project’s latest research paper on the way ahead for NATO and, in particular, examine what can be achieved at the NATO summit in September. The paper crystallizes the principal findings of a series of workshops and makes recommendations on the next steps for NATO. This event will bring together senior representatives from NATO and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to discuss the paper, respond to its key conclusions, and share their own thoughts on the future of NATO.

This event will be followed by a drinks reception until 19:00.

About the project

2014 is a pivotal year for NATO.  Prompted by defence austerity, Russian activities in Ukraine, and the conclusion of NATO’s major operations in Afghanistan, allies are raising important questions about NATO’s future in the run-up to the summit in September.  

As part of the project, NATO: Charting the Way Forward, Chatham House has held a series of expert roundtables to discuss these challenges and NATO’s role for the coming decades. Bringing together senior officials from both the public and private sectors, as well as from the academic and think-tank communities, these workshops have explored different aspects of NATO’s purpose, priorities and capabilities.  

This project is supported by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, and the Canadian Department of National Defence.

2014 is a pivotal year for NATO. Prompted by transatlantic defence austerity, Russian activities in Ukraine, and the conclusion of NATO’s major operations in Afghanistan, allies are raising important questions about NATO’s future in the run-up to the summit in September. 

At this event, representatives from two of the closest partners in the alliance will explore challenges and potential strategies for NATO.

Over the course of this year, Chatham House convened a series of expert roundtables to answer some of these questions. This report draws on the findings of those meetings and makes recommendations for NATO’s next steps in the lead-up to its 2014 Summit in Wales.

The paper suggests six principal actions for NATO:

• Find ways to caucus smaller groups within NATO rather than requiring all 28 members to make all decisions. NATO’s 28 member states all have their own interests and appetites for risk and bring diverse capabilities to the table. Yet rather than being a source of weakness, these differences of opinion can become a strength if properly managed. 
   
• Enhance interoperability. With operations in Afghanistan winding down, and in light of declining defence spending, NATO militaries must find new ways to improve their ability to work with one another on the ground, at sea and in the air. 
   
• Improve planning and positioning of forces together. For meaningful joint defence planning, and to share the burden of resources and responsibilities, NATO needs to facilitate collaborative discussions on challenges and capabilities. 
   
• Develop better acquisition systems. In the context of declining defence spending, bridging the gap between strategy and resources will require NATO members to streamline acquisition systems, make tough choices about national defence industries, and become more collaborative on procurement. 
   
• Rebuild public understanding and support for NATO. Public support is vital if member-state politicians are to make hard internal decisions on resources and to demonstrate the will and resilience required for effective deterrence and reassurance. 
   
• Build on NATO’s partnerships and differentiate them better. With defence budgets tightening, NATO needs to recognize and take advantage of the fact that many non-NATO states and other institutions have similar interests to those of members.

With the NATO summit in Wales taking place against a backdrop of instability in Ukraine and the end of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan, the panel will discuss these and other major challenges facing the alliance. 

This event will be held in conjunction with the Foreign Press Association.

Read more on NATO: Charting the Way Forward >>>

The NATO Summit, held in September in Newport, Wales, was a way point in the larger strategic vision for NATO over the coming decade. The deliverables that the leaders laid out must now been acted upon. NATO and its member states must find ways to more effectively harness their significant resources to meet the challenges ahead, from the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, to the longer term threats posed by cyber-attack and energy insecurity.

The event will bring together senior representatives from a number of the NATO member states, NATO partners and external experts from industry, the media and the think-tank and academic communities, to discuss how best to move the deliverables forward, and how to most effectively work together in so doing.

This is the first of two workshops being held in collaboration with SWP-Berlin.

The NATO Summit, held in September 2014 in Newport, Wales, was a waypoint in the larger strategic vision for NATO over the coming decade. As the alliance continues to confront challenges on its eastern and southern frontiers, it must find ways to adapt its strategy for more effective responses, while also staying ahead of emerging threats and risks. 

The event will bring together senior representatives from a number of the NATO member states, NATO partners and external experts from industry, the media and the think-tank and academic communities, to examine what NATO member states have done thus far to move the deliverables forward, and how to most effectively work together in continuing to do so. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This is the second of two workshops held in collaboration with SWP-Berlin; the first took place at Chatham House in October 2014.

In the wake of the Paris attacks and the destruction of a Russian plane by a bomb in Sinai, Russia had been once more calling for a new level of engagement with Western partners over operations in Syria. Even an ‘anti-terrorism coalition’ appeared to gain traction after the terrorist attacks in Paris. But Russian attacks on Western-backed opposition groups in Syria and continuing violation of Turkish airspace narrowed the window of opportunity for engagement between NATO member states and Russia in Syria, and Tuesday’s incident – where Turkey shot down a Russian bomber − fundamentally challenged this option. NATO allies and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg were quick to call for ‘calm and de-escalation’ of the situation. But they face a problem: in the absence of a strategy, NATO lacks a mechanism—a form of transparent process for crisis resolution—between member states and partner nations when and if a dispute or disagreement arises.

NATO has three essential core tasks—collective defence (Article 5), crisis management and cooperative security; it does not prioritize one task over the other. Whereas collective defence applies to member states like Turkey, cooperative security involves engagement with partner nations, such as Russia, to assure Euro-Atlantic security. NATO’s role, in this sense, goes beyond protecting a member’s state’s sovereignty. This aspiration to provide enduring cooperation and cooperative security beyond members lies behind the now-obsolete NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in 1997.

NATO’s balance between these tasks and its role vis-à-vis partner states is ill-defined, and among the core issues the Alliance must consider at or before its next summit in Warsaw in July 2016. These discussions must include prioritizing and grouping partner nations—Russia and Sweden, for instance, are clearly not partners in equal terms – and clarifying the role of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC is a venue for political dialogue that includes consultation, cooperation and joint action, but does not have a crisis resolution mechanism. From 2014 onwards, the NRC has not functioned, yet it is the only venue where NATO and Russia could have discussions regarding the future of Syria, focusing on ISIS as a major threat both to the Alliance and to the partner nations. Neither Russia nor the Alliance will benefit from escalation; thus, both sides should bear in mind that a troubling partnership is better than an adversarial relationship.

This is even more important because NATO member states do not have a cohesive strategy regarding Syria’s future. For some countries, like Germany, the efforts lie on refugee relief policies, while for others, such as France, the focus is the military fight against ISIS. Russia is clearly testing NATO’s response mechanisms through hybrid warfare techniques. Yet, NATO also does not have a coherent policy regarding Russia’s assertiveness in Ukraine, involvement in Syria and its annexation of Crimea.  NATO officials are in general agreement that there can be ‘no grand bargain with Russia’ as long as it continues to violate international treaties and norms. Russian aggression and assertiveness is a long-term problem for the Alliance to tackle. So far, though, NATO benefits from ‘avoid[ing] that situations, incidents and accidents spiral out of control’, as the NATO secretary general noted in his speech after the extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting. Solidarity among allies and protecting Turkish territorial integrity is a clear role for NATO, but the Alliance’s response mechanism in crisis situations should not be exhausted and undermined with small-scale, bilateral disagreements and disputes.

NATO could move to incorporate a crisis resolution mechanism, in specified non-escalatory terms and processes, between member states and partner states, where NATO member states and Russia meet together as equals in case of a crisis. This could re-establish a communication channel between NATO and Russia in particular, especially when the NRC is not functioning. If such a mechanism were in existence today, Turkey could have taken the issue to NATO’s crisis management system and pointed out its concerns over airspace violations, rather than shooting down the Russian bomber. This could have enabled the Alliance and Russia to participate in a dialogue that has been silent for more than a year. Instead, this incident demonstrates the delicate strategy of balancing deterrence policies with engagement between a member state and a rather troubling partner nation.

When Syria’s future is discussed, as it will be, at the Warsaw summit, Russia will be an unavoidable part of the discussion. But until there is a way to de-escalate these small-scale incidents, it will be increasingly difficult for Russia and NATO to determine whether they do in fact have any scope for cooperation, or at the least collaboration, on shared challenges and threats.

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Early last month NATO launched a new maritime security mission, ostensibly to prevent people smuggling across the Aegean Sea. This mission, however, was not originally a reaction to the humanitarian catastrophe at sea. Instead, it was a response to growing Russian assertiveness.

A maritime patrol unit was first discussed in the North Atlantic Council in December 2015, when the Alliance agreed to provide a ‘tailored package of assurances’ to Ankara in a period of heightened tensions after Turkey shot down a Russian jet. The package included measures such as early reconnaissance planes (AWACS), air policing, naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, provisions for Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA) and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR), and port visits. None of the discussion at the time linked it with protecting refugees. Now framing this decision in that light creates a new mission for NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM), a mission that it has never conducted before.

Neither NATO’s founding documents or the most recent 2010 Strategic Concept provide for this type of mission, and NATO units are not trained to carry out an actual rescue mission. Protecting strategic assets and goods, such as oil tankers, escorting naval vessels providing food into conflict zones, deterring piracy and monitoring the Mediterranean for terrorist activity have been the main priorities for MARCOM in the post-Cold War period. These activities and maritime exercises were aimed at defence against non-state actors.

The positioning of NATO’s maritime fleet in the Aegean Sea to save refugees, however, has the potential to be used as a deterrent against Russia’s Anti Access/Anti-Denial capacity in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia, meanwhile, has increased its naval presence at the Tartus naval base in Syria, which it has used to support its air campaigns in Syria. This level of reciprocated military build-up is hard to sustain in the long-run.   

NATO−Russia tensions

Over the past few years, Russia’s assertive policies – its multiple military operations, the continuing modernization of its army and ‘simulated attacks’ such as the one in 2013 that tested Sweden’s air defence response mechanisms − have increasingly worried the Alliance and its partners. Clashing interests over Syria’s future and Russia’s attacks against the Western-supported rebel groups have also served to increase tensions between NATO member states and Russia. Recent analysis logged 60 dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area between Russia and NATO counties in the period between March 2014 and March 2015. NATO’s preparedness has been severely tested by these incidents, and has led the alliance to strengthen its presence on Europe’s southern flank.

Such increased tensions could create a situation whereby accidents and miscalculations lead to escalation. NATO forces and Russia are already engaged in further force posturing − the decision to accelerate Montenegro’s accession to NATO and the increased conduct of wartime exercises, such as NATO’s search for submarines in open waters (Dynamic Manta 2016), reconnaissance operations (Cold Operation 16) or Russia’s simulated exercises, for instance – which could undermine global stability. Three weeks after the Russian jet was shot down, a Russian patrol ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel to attract attention and avoid a collision. This event did not escalate but given the heightened tensions, similar events may spiral out of control.  

The tentative cease-fire in Syria is a confidence building measure that could normalize and rebuild relations. But further steps should be taken to establish political dialogue, open up the channels for potential meetings at the NATO−Russia Council, and increase transparency and risk mitigation in exercises and activities. The longer both sides wait, the more likely a confrontation will be.

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