Though not common, some Mac users are encountering a strange error message that says “Failed to personalize the software update. Please try again.” when attempting to update their Mac to MacOS Sequoia, and sometimes even with other MacOS software updates too. This is a frustrating error since it prevents the installation of a major system ... Read More

If Trump's proposed 60% tariff against China is enacted and the country responds aggressively, it could pressure some of America's largest companies.

California's San Francisco Bay Area is still solidly blue — but less than it used to be.

Are you dreaming of being your own boss someday, or would you like to bring in extra income? Starting an online business is one of the easiest ways to accomplish this. The biggest challenge of starting an online business can be developing your business plan. If you are struggling to come up with that brilliant […]

Szuhi Attila of ITE.HU placed third in our recent Avangate Network Affiliate Wars Contest despite being relatively new to the world of affiliate marketing. We interviewed him about his affiliate marketing techniques and overall approach to creating online content.

This article describes the current findings on phonics and phonological awareness instruction. It uses a question & answer format to explore 10 common questions that teachers ask about teaching phonics and phonemic awareness. Here are a few key questions addressed in the article: What are phonics and phonemic awareness? Should phonemic awareness be paired with print and taught together? Should phonological awareness be coordinated with phonics instruction? What is the best sequence for teaching phonics?

The country is set to experience varied weather conditions, with several impact-based warnings issued across various provinces, according to the South African Weather Service.

Like almost any question about AI, “How does AI impact software architecture?” has two sides to it: how AI changes the practice of software architecture and how AI changes the things we architect. These questions are coupled; one can’t really be discussed without the other. But to jump to the conclusion, we can say that […]

Jon Stewart tears apart the denials and false claims Trump supporters make about their terrible candidate and wonders how anyone can remain undecided.

At the top of this piece by Stewart sits the strange claim MAGAs keep making that Vice President Harris isn't clear about her plans. — Read the rest

The post Jon Stewart on the bewildering denial in remaining an undecided voter appeared first on Boing Boing.

Forbes.com published an article by Dan Woods where he describes a battle between the traditional enterprise software providers (Microsoft, SAP, and Oracle) and Saas providers like Salesforce.com and NetSuite.

According to Woods, SaaS applications are easier to use because they offer streamlined interfaces that are modeled after successful web consumer sites like Amazon.com, Yahoo!, eBay, Google, etc. These SaaS interfaces were designed to be easily configurable.

Traditional enterprise software is not as easy to use because user interfaces are often created before it is known exactly how the software would be used. Customization to the user interface is often done at installation by systems integrators who do not have any actual user behavior on which to base their customizations.

The Big Three are well aware of the usability gap between their products and SaaS software, but it is unclear how to solve the problem. Oracle emphasizes Fusion as an integration platform. SAP recently announced an experiment called Blue Ruby that is attempting to adapt Ruby on Rails as a user interface and programming technology for its applications. But is it possible to affordably automate a business starting with a configurable application platform that must be adapted to the specific user interfaces and business processes in a company? The SaaS model starts with a usable interface and a working automation of common processes, and then has the configuration proceed from there. The hosted nature of SaaS removes the deployment barriers.

As the article appeared in TechCrunch...

IVT, a company that produces enterprise-friendly webcasting software, has raised $5.5 million in Series B funding from Syncom Venture Partners with Barshop Ventures, Monitor Ventures and Tudor Ventures participating in the investment round. IVT raised $3 million in Series A funding in 2006.
IVT’s SaaS offering not only helps power webcasts, but also converts multimedia files, such as slideshows, into viewable videos for the web. IVT also offers a YouTube-like hosting and social media site for companies to disseminate videos and webcasts. And the startup has a number of prominent companies that use its webcasting software including Oracle, Dow Chemical, IBM and NEC.

IVT, Inc. has moved its industry-leading MediaPlatform webcasting software platform to the cloud. With MediaPlatform increasingly being used in large-scale webcasts by media producers, as well as Fortune 500 clients, the company is elevating its delivery capacity through a partnership with a tier-1 cloud infrastructure provider.

“Our mission has always been to deliver the best quality of service and enable our clients to produce webcasts at literally any audience size without concern for infrastructure,” said Jim McGovern, Chief Executive Officer of IVT. “Now that cloud-based platforms are gaining widespread acceptance across the IT world, we can give our clients the benefit of switching capacity on and off when required.”

This is not the first time IVT has been ahead of the technology curve in the webcasting industry. The company pioneered the concept of offering webcasting software on a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) basis with MediaPlatform. With MediaPlatform in the cloud, IVT enables its clients to benefit from what is rapidly emerging as the new paradigm for corporate computing.

In the cloud, MediaPlatform’s web services architecture can more readily serve diverse client needs by integrating with a range of enterprise systems, both cloud-based and on-premises.
The cloud, an approach to computing that places servers and infrastructure in remote, abstracted datacenters, is ideal for webcasting, which is known for unpredictable spikes in system load. By working with a tier-1 cloud infrastructure provider, IVT gains virtually unlimited capacity and world-class security, reliability, redundancy, failover, and load management.

IVT will continue to support the numerous on-premises installations of its software, including major deployments at global enterprises. IVT prides itself on offering its clients the choice between hosted and on-premises options.

The following article, Amazing: Trump Moved 48 States Toward the Republican Party, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

When the 2024 election dust settled early on Wednesday morning, it became clear that Donald Trump didn’t just win the election, he trounced Kamala Harris. It was so bad for the Democrats that nearly every state moved to the right. The GOP hasn’t seen so many votes move their way since Ronald Reagan in 1980. …

Continue reading Amazing: Trump Moved 48 States Toward the Republican Party ...

The following article, Steve Bannon Issues 90-Second WARNING To Deep State At Trump Victory Party (Video), was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

(Natural News) Steve Bannon, one of Donald Trump’s most fired-up supporters and allies all throughout the former president’s tumultuous political career, delivered a powerful speech after Trump’s victory warning the deep state that justice is coming. Fresh out of federal prison for his involvement in the events of Jan. 6, 2021, Bannon took the stage to deliver …

Continue reading Steve Bannon Issues 90-Second WARNING To Deep State At Trump Victory Party (Video) ...

It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience.

—Albert Einstein, “On the Method of Theoretical Physics” (1934)

Context: Last week, I pinched off one of my typically woolly emails in response to an acquaintance whom I admire. He’s a swell guy who makes things I love, and he'd written, in part, to express concern that my recent Swift impersonation had been directed explicitly at something he'd made. Which, of course, it hadn’t—but which, as I'll try to discuss here, strikes me as irrelevant.

To paraphrase Bogie, I played it for him, so now I suppose I might as well play it for you.

(n.b.: Excerpted, redacted, munged, and heavily expanded from my original email)

There are at least a couple things that mean a lot to me that I'm still just not very good at.

• Make nuanced points in whatever way they need to be made; even if that ends up seeming “un-nuanced”
• Never explain yourself.

I want to break both these self-imposed rules privately with you here. [Editor’s Note: Um.] Because, I hope to nuance the shit out of some fairly un-nuanced points. And, to do that, I'll also (reluctantly) need to explain myself. But, here goes.

First [regarding my goofing on “distraction-free writing environments”] I think there are some GIANT distinctions at play here that a lot of folks may not find nearly as obvious as I do:

1. Tool Mastery vs. Productivity Pr0n – Finding and learning the right tools for your work vs solely dicking around with the options for those tools is just so important, but also so different. And, admittedly, it’s almost impossible to contrast those differences in terms of hard & fast rules that could be true for all people in all situations. But, that doesn’t make the difference any less qualitatively special or real.
   
   Similarly…

2. Self-Help Vs. “Self”–“Help” – Solving the problem that caused the problem that caused the problem that caused the symptom we eventually noticed. Huge. Arguably, peerless.

   • Viz.: How many of us ignore the actual cause of our problem in favor of just reading dozens of blog posts about how to “turbocharge” its most superficial symptoms? Sick.

3. Focus & Play – Yes, focusing on important work is, as Ford used to say, Job 1. But, that focus benefits when we maintain the durable and unapologetic sense of play that affords true creativity and fosters an emergence of context and connection that’s usually killed by stress. BUT.

   • Again, what conceivable “rule” could ever serve to immutably declare that “THIS goofing-off is critical for hippocampal plasticity” vs. “THAT goofing-off is just dumb, distracting bullshit?”

   • Impossible. Because drawing those kinds of distinctions is one of our most important day-to-day responsibilities. Decisions are hard, and there’s no app or alarm gadget that can change that.

     • Although, they certainly can help mask the depth of the underlying problem that made them seem so—what’s the parlance?—“indispensable”.
     • Think: Elmo Band-Aids for that unsightly pancreatic tumor.

4. Reducing Distraction through Care (Rather than braces, armatures, and puppet strings). Removing interruptions and external distractions that harm your work or life? Great. Counting on your distraction-removal tool to supplement your non-existent motivation to do work that will never get done anyway? Pathetic.

   • Frankly, this is a big reason I'm so galled when anyone touts their tool/product/service as being the poor, misunderstood artist’s new miracle medicine—rather than just admitting they've made a slightly different spoon.
   • Because, let’s be honest: although most of us have plenty of perfectly serviceable spoons, everybody knows collecting cutlery is way more fun than using it to swallow yucky medicine.

5. Using a System Vs. Becoming a System. Having a system or process for getting work done vs. making the iteration of that system or process a replacement for the work. This is just…wow…big.
   
   But, maybe most importantly to me…

6. Embracing the Impossibles. Getting past these or any other intellectual koans by simply accepting life’s innumerable and unresolvable paradoxes, hypocrisies, and impossibilities as God-given gifts of creative constraint. Rather than, say, a mimeographed page of long division problems that must be solved for a whole number, n.

   • I just can’t ever get away from this one. For me, it’s what everything inevitably comes back to.
   • The very definition of our jobs is to solve the right problem at the right level for the right reason—based on a combination of the best info we have for now and a clear-eyed dedication to never pushing an unnecessary rock up an avoidable hill.

   • YET, we keep force-feeding the monster that tells us to fiddle and fart and blame the Big Cruel World whenever we face work that might threaten our fragile personal mythology.

     • “Sigh. I wish I could finally start writing My Novel….Ooooooh, if only I had a slightly nicer pen…and Zeus loved me more….”

All that stuff? That there’s a complex set of ideas to talk about for many complex reasons—not least of which being how many people either despise or (try to) deny the unavoidable impact of ol' number six.

But, here’s the thing: as much as saying so pisses anybody off, I think the topics we're NOT talking about whenever we disappear into Talmudic scholarship about “full-screen mode” or “minimalist desks” or whatever constitutes a “zen habit”—those shunned topics are precisely the things that I believe are most mind-blowingly critical to our real-world happiness as humans.

In fact, I believe that to such a degree that helping provide a voice for those unpopular topics that can be heard over the din is now (what passes for) my career. I really believe these deeper ideas are worth socializing on any number of levels and in many media. Even when it’s inconvenient and slightly disrespectful of someone’s business model.

So, that’s what I try to do. I talk about these things. Seldom by careful design. Often poorly. But, always because they each mean an awful lot to me.

[…]

But, no matter how I end up saying whatever the hell I say, I believe in saying it not simply to be liked or followed or revered as a “nice guy” who pushes out shit-tons of whatever to “help people.”

Because, believe me, friend, a great many of those apparently “nice guys” swarming around the web “helping people” these days are ass-fucking their audience for nickels and calling it a complimentary colonoscopy. And, while I absolutely think that in itself is empirically wrong, I also think it’s just as important to say that it’s wrong. Sometimes, True Things need to be said.

Which in this instance amounts to saying, a) selling people a prettier way to kinda almost but not really write is not, in the canonical sense, “nice”—but, far worse, b) leaving your starry-eyed customers with the nauseatingly misguided impression that their “distraction” originates from anyplace but their own busted-ass brain is really not “helping.” Not on any level. It is, literally, harmful.

“Helping” a junkie become more efficient at keeping his syringe loaded is hardly “nice.”

It’s the opposite of nice. And, it’s the opposite of helpful. These are my True Things.

And, to me, saying your True Things also means not watering down the message you care about in order to render it incapable of even conceivably hurting someone’s feelings—or of even conceivably losing you even one teeny-tiny slice of that precious “market share.”

Well, that’s the price, and I'm fine paying it—best money I've ever spent.

But, it also means trusting your audience by letting each of them decide to add water only as they choose to—by never corrupting the actual concentrate in a way that might make it less useful to the smartest or most eager 5% of people who'd like to try using it undiluted. Because, at that point, you're not only abandoning the coolest people you have the honor of serving—you risk becoming a charlatan.

And, that’s precisely what you become when you start to iteratively inbreed the kind of fucktard audience for whom daily buffets of weak swill and beige assurance are life’s most gratifying reward.

Sure. Those poor bastards may never end up using any of that watery information to do anything more ambitious than turbocharging their most regrettable symptoms. But, who’s the last person in the universe who’s going to grab them by the ears and tell them to get back to work? Exactly—that same “nice guy” whose livelihood now depends on keeping infantalized strangers addicted to his “help.”

Holy shit—no way could I ever live with that. It’s so wrong, it’s not even right. ESC, ESC, ESC!

[…]

Okay. So anyhow, there’s a really long-winded, overly generous, and extremely pompous way of trying to say I don’t know how to do what I do except how I do it. But, I do genuinely feel awful when innocent people feel they have been publicly humiliated or berated simply because I'm some dick who hates people.

Which has to be my favorite irony of all.

When I was a kid, I thought my Mom was “mean” not to let me play in traffic on busy Galbraith Road. Today, I'm not simply grateful that she had the strength and resolve to be so “mean”—I actually can’t imagine how sad it would be to not have people in your life who care enough about your long-term welfare to tell you to stop fucking around in traffic. To where you eventually might start even seeking 12x-daily safety hacks from some of the very same drivers whose recklessness may eventually kill you. Wow.

[…]

Admitting when life is complicated or things aren’t shiny and happy all the time strikes me as a wonderfully sane and adult way to conduct one’s life. That there are so many folks offended by even the existence of this anarchic idea is not a problem I can solve.

No more than I can wish useless email away or pray hard enough that it never rains on anyone’s leaky roof. All out of scope.

And, then, I jizzed on at length about how much I admire the recipient’s work. Which I do.

Good work doesn’t need a cookie

I may admire your work, too. Especially if you care a lot about that work and don’t overly sweat peoples' opinions of it. Most definitely including my own.

For these purposes, it doesn’t really matter whether we're friends and, honestly, it doesn’t even matter whether I love, use, or agree with everything you do, say, or make in a given day.

It doesn’t matter because good work doesn’t need me to love it. Like tornadoes and cold sores, good work happens with total disregard to whether I'm “into it.”

But, conversely, let’s stipulate that the points-of-view undergirding our opinions—again, including mine—will and should survive either agreement or lack of agreement with equivalently effortless ease. Because, like really good work, a really good point-of-view doesn’t require another person’s benediction.

Guess we'll have to disagree to agree

Now, to be only vaguely clearer here, I'm not posting this circuitous ego dump in the service of altering your opinion of either me, my friend, his work, or practically anything else for that matter.

But, I would love it if we could all be more okay with the fact that real life means that we do each have a different, sometimes incongruous, and often totally incompatible point-of-view. Yes. Even you have a point-of-view that someone despises. Ready to change it now? Jesus, I sure hope not.

Then, to be only slightly more clear, I'm also not advocating for that fakey brand of web-based kum ba ya that gets trotted out alternately as “tolerance” or “inclusion” or some styrofoam miniature of “civility.”

I'm absolutely not against all of those things when authentically practiced, but I'm also really skeptical of the well-branded peacemakers who are forever appointing themselves the Internet’s “Now-Now-Let’s-All-Pretend-We're-Just-Saying-the-Same-Useless-Thing-Here” den mothers.

Because we're not all saying the same things. Not at all.

And, it infantalizes some important conversations when we tacitly demand that any instance of honest disagreement be immediately horseshat into a photo opp where some thought leader gets to hoist everyone’s hands in the air like he’s fucking Jimmy Carter.

Nope. Not saying that.

Who will you really rely on?

What I AM saying is that alllllll this seemingly unrelated stuff is absolutely related—that the pattern of not relying on other people for anything you really care about is arguably the great-grandaddy of every useful productivity, creativity, or self-help pattern.

Where’s this matter? Pretty much everywhere you have any sort of stake:

• Don’t rely on other people to remove your totally fake “distractions.”
• Don’t rely on other people to pat your beret, re-tie your cravat, and make you a nice cocoa whenever that mean man on the internet points out that your “distractions” are totally fake. (Which they are)
• Don’t rely on other people to tell you when or whether you have enough information.
• Don’t rely on other people to define your job.
• Don’t rely on other people to “design your lifestyle.”
• Don’t rely on other people to decide when your opinions are acceptable.
• Don’t rely on other people to tell you when you're allowed to be awesome.
• Don’t rely on other people to make you care.
• Don’t even rely on other people to tell you what you should or shouldn’t rely on.

Yes. I went there.

Because that’s the point. These hypocrisies, paradoxes, and ambiguities that people get so wound up about—that many of us are constantly (impotently) trying to resolve—cannot be resolved.

Because, yeah: all of these harrowingly unsolvable problems are immune to new notebooks and less-distracting applications and shinier systems and “nicer” self-“help” and pretty much anything else that is not, specifically, you walking straight into the angriest and least convenient shitstorm you can find and getting your ass kicked until the storm gets bored with kicking it.

Then, you find an even angrier storm. Then, another. And, so on.

“Get the fuck off of my obstacle, Private Pyle!”

Doing that annoying hard stuff is how you grow, get better, and learn what real help looks like. Even if that’s not the answer you wanted to hear. You get better by getting your ass out of your RSS reader and fucking making things until they suck less. Not by buying apps.

You don’t whine about distractions, or derail yourself over needing a nicer pencil sharpener, or aggravate your chronic creative diabetes by starting another desperate waddle to the self-help buffet. No. You work.

And, for what it’s worth, just like you can’t get to the moon by eating cheese, you'll also never leave boot camp with your original scrote intact by telling your drill sergeant to try using more honey than vinegar.

No. That sergeant’s job is to make you miserable. It’s his job to break down your callow conceits about what’s supposed to be easy and fair. It’s his job to emotionally pummel you into giving up and becoming a Marine.

You? You're not there to give the sergeant notes; you're there to sleep two hours a night, then not mind getting beaten for 20 hours until a decent Marine starts to fall out.

Who knows? He may even surprise you by introducing a surprisingly effective “distraction-free learning environment.”

“Tee ell dee ahr, Professor Brainiac.”

Like most humans, I like things I can understand. Like most readers, I love specificity. Like most thinkers, I love clarity. Like most students, I love relevance and practicality. And, like most busy people, believe it or not, I actually do really like it when someone gets straight to the point.

But, here’s the problem. If my 2-year-old daughter asks me about time travel, and I blithely announce, “E=mc²”, I will have said something that is entirely specific, clear, relevant, practical, and/or straight-to-the-point. For somebody.

But, not so much for my daughter. And, to be honest, not even to any useful degree for me.

She'd probably either laugh derisively at me (which she’s great at), or she'd pause and ask, “Whuh dat?” (which she’s even better at).

Thing is, her understanding that jumble of characters less than me—and my understanding it WAY less than Professor Al—has zero impact on the profundity, truth, beauty, or impact of the man’s theory.

Sure. You could quite accurately fault me for being a smartass and a poseur, and you could even berate my toddler for her unaccountably shallow understanding of Modern Physics. But, in any case, you can’t really blame either Albert or his theory.

You're turbocharging nothing

Specifically, Albert can’t begin to tell us what he really knows if we don’t understand math.

So, let’s say this theory you've been hearing about really interests you. And, let’s also pretend, just for the sake of the analogy, that you haven’t completed Calculus III (212) or Quantum Mechanics (403) or even something as elementary as, say, Advanced Astrophysics II (537). I know you have. Obviously. But, let’s pretend. Where do you start?

Well, you could read some tips about learning math. You could find a list of 500 indispensable resources for indispensable math resources. You could buy a new “distraction-free math environment.” Heck, there’s actually nothing to stop you from just declaring yourself a “math expert.” Congratulations, Professor.

Thing is: you still don’t know math.

Which means you still can’t really understand the theory—no more than a pathetic Liberal Arts refugee like me or a dullard Physics ignoramus like my kid can really grok relativity.

Difference is, you will have blown a lot of time hoping that actual expertise follows non-existent effort—while my daughter and I get to remain total novices without charge. Only, we don’t get all mad at the theory as a result; a staggering number of fake math experts do.

I mean, be honest—after all that recreational non-work and make-believe dedication almost trying to kinda learn math sorta—you might actually get frustrated at how brazenly Al defies your fondness for shortcuts by continuing to rely on so many terms and proofs and blah-blah-blah that you still just don’t understand. So annoying.

You may simply decide that Albert Einstein’s a huge dick for never saying things that can be completely understood solely by scanning a headline.

EPIC EINSTEIN FAIL, amirite?

You never really know what you didn’t know until you know it

But, Al just told the truth.

Problem is, Al’s truth not only requires fancy things in order to be truly understood—the more of those fancy things you take away from his truth, the less true it gets. And, by the time it’s been diluted to the point where you're comfortable that you understand it? You'd be understanding the wrong thing. Even I can understand that.

But, not one bit of any of this is Al’s fault. Al doesn’t get to control who uses, abuses, gets, or doesn’t get what he said or why it matters. Especially since he’s been dead for over fifty years.

All I know is, regardless of who has ears to hear it on a given day, it would be to Al’s credit never to mangle something important in order to get it into terms everybody’s ready to handle without actually trying.

And God bless him for never agreeing that your “distractions” to learning math are his problem.

So, yeah, if you only need to hand in a crappy 5-page paper, you could certainly Cliff’s Notes your way through Borges, Eliot, or Joyce in an afternoon, and feel like you haven’t missed a thing. Trouble is, if you did care even a little, it’s impossible to even say how much you're missing since you can’t be bothered to soldier through the source text. The text itself is the entire point.

Even the wonderfully cogent and readable layman’s explanations Einstein himself provided don’t really get to the nut, the application, and the implications of his real theory.

That all takes real math.

That “single datum of experience” matters

Sometimes, complex or difficult things stop being true when you try to make them too simple. Sometimes, you have to actually get laid to understand why people think sex is such a thing. Sometimes, you need to learn some Greek if you really want to understand The Gospel of John. And, yeah, sometimes, you're going to have to just work unbelievably hard at whatever you claim to care about before anyone can begin to help you get any better—or less “distracted”—at it.

The part I really know is what doesn’t work. Reading Penthouse Forum won’t help you CLEP out of Vaginal Intercourse 101. Watching a Rankin-Bass cartoon about the Easter Bunny will teach you very little about the intricacies of transubstantiation. And, if you can’t be troubled to care so much about your work that you reflexively force distractions away, dicking around with yet another writing application will merely aggravate the problem. Ironic, huh?

These quantum mechanics of personal productivity are rife with such frustrating “paradoxes.”

These are True Things.

Achieving expertise and doing creative work is all horribly complicated and difficult and paradoxical and frustrating and recursive and James Joyce-y—and any guide, blog, binary, guru, or “nice guy” that tries to suggest otherwise is probably giving you a complimentary colonoscopy. Do the math.

Want a new syllabus? Sure:

Run straight into your shitstorm, my friends. Reject the impulse to think about work, rather than finishing it. And, open your heart to the remote possibility that any mythology of personal failure that involves messiahs periodically arriving to make everything “easy” for you might not really be helping your work or your mental health or your long-standing addiction to using tools solely to ship new excuses.

Learn your real math, and any slide rule will suffice. Try, make, and do until you quit noticing the tools, and if you still think you need new tools, go try, make, and do more.

If you can pull off this deceptively simple and millennia-old pattern, you'll eventually find that—god by dying god—any partial truth that’s supported your treasured excuses for not working will be replaced by a no-faith-required knowledge that you're really, actually, finally getting better at something you care about.

Which is just sublimely un-distracting.

Dedication

This article is dedicated to my friend, Greg Knauss. No, he’s not the app guy–he’s just a good man who does good work, who accidentally/unintentionally helped me write this rant. He also happens to be a fella who could teach anyone a thing or two about writing with distractions. Thanks, Greg.

It's all over but the crying for a campaign that was supposed to be characterized by 'joy'. There will be no concession speech tonight. At little before 1 am, Kamala is running like a scared rabbit.

The post Cowardly Kamala Pulls A Hillary — Refuses To Concede As Trump Paints The Country Red appeared first on Clash Daily.

President-elect Donald Trump has chosen the next director of the CIA. Trump tapped former Texas congressman and director of national intelligence John Ratcliffe for the job. According to a statement […]

The post 'Warrior for Truth': Trump Has Chosen His Next CIA Director, Crediting Pick for 'Exposing Russian Collusion' Hoax appeared first on The Western Journal.

Wednesday's third T20 between South Africa and India at SuperSport Park in Centurion is shaping up to be a run-drenched one, especially if the weather holds and SA's bowling centre doesn't.

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2022

The increased role of geopolitics and ideology in Beijing’s economic decision-making is bad news not just for China but for the world.

This quote by President Xi clearly outlines the inward tilt of Chinese economic policymaking that is now becoming increasingly obvious to the rest of the world. But it actually has deep roots. Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, when the West’s reliability as a trading partner was thrown into question, self-reliance has become a more decisive organizing principle for Chinese officials.

As a result, the export-dependent growth model on which China built its economic rise in recent decades has been fraying. Exports as a share of China’s GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 2007 but had fallen to around 20 per cent by last year, a level not seen since before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This shows that net exports no longer make any meaningful contribution to Chinese GDP growth.

Although China’s inward tilt may have started out as a response to purely economic phenomena – the post-crisis global recession, belt-tightening in the West, the eurozone crisis, and a general softening of global trade growth in the post-crisis years – geopolitical considerations are now dominant in shaping this shift toward self-reliance.

The role of geopolitics in pushing China towards a more inward-looking development path became clear in China’s response to the aggressive tariffs and export controls introduced by the Trump administration in the US. Because of these new constraints on China’s access to international markets and technology, Beijing sought to limit its dependence on the rest of the world.   

The most obvious result of this was the introduction of the ‘dual circulation’ strategy in May 2020, which sets out a rebalancing of China’s economy away from a reliance on external demand as a stimulus to growth (‘international circulation’) towards increased self-dependence (‘domestic circulation’). 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided another geopolitical impetus to China’s pursuit of self-reliance. Since it is not far-fetched to think that China, like Russia, might one day also face coordinated sanctions, Chinese authorities must be thinking hard about how to respond to such a risk. 

The only credible strategy that China can adopt is to reduce its economic dependence on the West by creating, in effect, a kind of economic fortress, as its dependence on imported technology, food, and fossil fuels in particular, has created a substantial strategic vulnerability.

Over the next few years, Chinese policymakers will likely attempt to build up the country’s ability to supply its own semi-conductors, food, and green energy sources.

This new approach to economic policymaking isn’t just about China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Within China itself, a new emphasis on the role of the state is increasingly apparent – and seemingly rooted in ideology. 

The previous National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in October 2017, made a push for ‘stronger, better, and bigger’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the past five years have indeed seen a measurable rise in the role that SOEs play in the Chinese economy. These firms now account for more fixed investment in the economy than private firms, for the first time since 2005.

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Civilian priorities for ending the war in Sudan 31 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Dr Abdalla Hamdok, former prime minister of Sudan and chairperson of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), will discuss the prospects for conflict resolution in Sudan.

The intensification of fighting across Sudan demonstrates that both warring parties and their allies are continuing to pursue an outright military victory in the war, with little regard for the human cost. Diplomatic efforts, including the US-led Geneva talks in August, have produced little progress towards a ceasefire.  Meanwhile, the conflict has resulted in widespread devastation, mass displacement, and an escalating hunger crisis.

Civilian perspectives on ending the war, their vital efforts in providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and the aspiration of many Sudanese for a more inclusive and democratic Sudan, have been sidelined by the interests and actions of the belligerent parties.

At this event, Dr Abdalla Hamdok will discuss options for reaching a ceasefire and seeking a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. He will also address the urgent need for an international response to what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must ‘register interest’ in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Monday 28 October at 15:00.

Why technology does not make easy wars Interview LJefferson 28 November 2022

Stephanie Carvin explains why technology does not overcome the challenges of war.

The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that many of the assumptions held about the role of technology in contemporary warfare are flawed. The lesson that technology cannot overcome the challenges of warfare is one that the West has also yet to learn, despite a series of failed interventions since the end of the Cold War.

In a wide-ranging conversation, Isabel Muttreja sat down with Stephanie Carvin to talk about her contribution to the September 2022 issue of International Affairs on ‘how not to war’. They discuss the US’ over-reliance on technology and why ‘easy wars’ become ‘forever wars.’

You argue in your article that the US overly relies on technology in war. When did this start?

I don’t necessarily think the US is exceptional. I think all states have tried in some ways to use technologies. One of the key arguments in the article is that the US is an enlightenment country, and part of the enlightenment is a belief in rationality and science and that you can better things through the application of science.

I think that there is this particular scientific approach or embracing of technology, in the American and in fact larger Western tradition on technology as a way to save lives. There is a strange humanitarian impulse that often underlies this use of technology.

We are seeing a quest to try and get perfect information. The idea is that if you have perfect information, you are going to be able to dominate the battlefield, and that’s proven itself to be false. I’m not even sure you can ever get perfect information.

But it underlines this modern approach, that if you can have all the information that’s out there, crunch it into some kind of algorithm, that you can then target discriminately, proportionately, reduce the level of casualties, and reduce the level of unnecessary damage. And that’s a kind of liberal tradition. You are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

You talk about the US being an ultimately liberal state, but they have been involved in a lot of wars over the last 10–20 years. Is that a contradiction?

I hope it is. But I think it goes back to the enlightenment nature of the United States, which is that the US sees itself as a shining city on a hill that has to protect itself at all costs. Liberals abhor tyranny, and they abhor unnecessary deaths. But I think that the idea is that if you threaten us, we see ourselves as embodying these values, therefore, we have to protect ourselves.

There’s a tendency to not really recognize the kind of insurgencies that we’ve seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Vietnam, as war. We don’t really see that as a kind of armed conflict, even though, arguably, that has been the dominant mode of conflict for some time. They even used to call it ‘military operations other than warfare’. We tend to still think of war as great power competition or as the Second World War.

My first book was on prisoners of war in the American tradition. What often determined the treatment of people as prisoners of war was if the United States recognized their form of warfare. There’s a racial element here too that I don’t want to dismiss.

So, for example, the US war in the Philippines at the start of the 20th century: They went in, won a very quick victory over the Spanish and effectively took over the Philippines. And then they had a long insurgency for two years with the native Filipinos who didn’t want US domination. While they gave the Spanish all the prisoner of war rights, they didn’t give them to the Filipinos.

This is because they recognized the form of conflict that the Spanish engaged in, but the Indigenous way of warfare was not recognized. The West has struggled to culturally understand the way other people fight. And that’s when the laws of war conventions have broken down between, say, the United States, the West, and other states.

You talk in your article about the US entering ‘easy wars’ and ending up with ‘forever wars’ – what does this mean?

There’s an allure to this high-tech version of warfare, that it can solve a lot of problems, but it’s an illusion. It is ultimately a bit of a false promise.

The idea that machines are going to replace humans is fundamentally untrue. We are seeing this to a certain extent right now, even in the Russia/Ukraine war. This is very much a battle of machines and soldiers. One of the themes of this issue of International Affairs is hubris. The idea that things that appear to be quick wins often tend to be long-term losses. And that’s exactly what this article is talking about.

‘Forever wars’ is not my favourite term, but it’s this concept that what was promised to be an easy war, a high technology-driven conflict, where you can go in, use some surgically precise weapons, take care of the problem, eliminate your opponent and then extract yourself from a situation, has actually turned into a quagmire.

The limits of technology become apparent within a few months as well as the fact of the messy business of state-building, or the fact that insurgencies and political movements don’t just disintegrate at the show of some high-tech, sophisticated weaponry. It just tends to mean that these wars do go on for a long time, and you have to eventually extricate yourself, but there’s no clean way to do this. We saw this of course with Afghanistan, and to a large extent Iraq.

We get distracted by the shiny object. We see this promise, we see this vision of a kind of warfare that for some may have great appeal.  There are new super weapons, whether it be cyber information warfare or artificial intelligence. Everyone wants to be ahead of the curve, right?

Are these lessons on technology and ‘easy wars’ applicable to other countries?

I think what we’ve learned about the Russian military is that there’s a lot more at the heart of it. Part of the problem Russia is experiencing is that its capabilities were not what it thought they were. It’s clear that Vladimir Putin was enamoured with a lot of the ideas, like that the Russian military was increasingly high-tech and that they had these hypersonic missiles.

They also had very powerful cyber weapons amongst other things. Putin, too, seems to have been caught up in this idea that he could have had a 72-hour special military operation, which would have taken Kyiv. Clearly, that hasn’t happened. Once again, we see the underestimation of the human factor.

The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

Sean R. Collins
Mar 1, 2007; 6:439-450
Research

The Chatham House Centenary Award winners announced News release jon.wallace 29 July 2021

Black Lives Matter, Greta Thunberg and Sir David Attenborough have been recognized for their achievements tackling racial inequality, climate change and biodiversity loss.

As Chatham House wraps up its centenary activities, the institute has made three Centenary Awards recognizing outstanding contributions to confronting the critical challenges facing the world today.

The awards are unique as they were voted on by the institute’s staff and pay tribute to the individual or organization they believe has played a significant role in progressing the Chatham House mission: to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Greta Thunberg has been awarded the Chatham House Centenary Changemakers Award in recognition of her vanguard role in mobilizing young people to take up climate activism.

Greta’s message has cut through where politicians and scientists have failed time and time again. She has commanded the attention of world leaders, addressed intergovernmental organizations and inspired millions of people to join the global climate strike. She has demonstrated the electrifying power of young voices speaking truth to power and focused the world’s attention on environmental injustices.

Sir David Attenborough has been named as the Chatham House Centenary Lifetime Award winner for his tireless commitment to conservation and raising public and political awareness of the growing climate crisis.

Together with the BBC, he has pioneered the way in which we experience and understand life on this planet, bringing the wonders of the natural world into our homes. Over the last 60 years, from black-and-white to 4K TV, his pioneering documentaries have been broadcast around the world and have sounded the alarm on the devastating impact humanity has had on the environment.

He has become one of the most compelling voices on important issues such as biodiversity loss, climate change and the destruction of natural habitats. Sir David was previously awarded the Chatham House Prize in 2019 for his work on Blue Planet II and tackling ocean plastic pollution.

Melina Abdullah, one of the co-founders of the Los Angeles chapter of the Black Lives Matter movement and co-director of Black Lives Matter Grassroots, has accepted the Chatham House Centenary Diversity Champion Award on behalf of the movement.

This award is in recognition of the momentous work Black Lives Matter has done towards empowering black people and promoting a more inclusive approach to race in policy-making. The movement has brought global attention to systemic injustice against black lives and is helping to build a better world that draws on more diverse voices and inclusive approaches.

Dr Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted to recognise three special centenary awards today in recognition of the individuals who our staff believe are redefining the ways in which each of us can drive positive global change.

‘The vision and achievements of each of the winners echo Chatham House’s own goals for its second century and demonstrate a shared commitment to building a more sustainable and inclusive world.

‘We are inspired by the ways the award winners are leading global efforts to combat climate change, protect biodiversity and bring about more equal and inclusive societies.’

For more information, please contact: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org

Robin Niblett awarded knighthood in Queen's Birthday Honours News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

Chatham House director Dr Robin Niblett CMG receives a knighthood for services to international relations and to British foreign policy.

Chatham House Council and staff congratulate the institute’s director Robin Niblett, who has been appointed as a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) by HM The Queen in her Birthday Honours list.

The citation for the KCMG, awarded at the recommendation of the UK foreign secretary, recognizes Dr Niblett’s ‘outstanding personal contribution to British soft power and influence in his role as director of Chatham House over the last 15 years’.

The citation also states: ‘With exceptional energy and talent, he has greatly enhanced the research reputation of the Institute, strengthened its international convening power, finances and staffing, and modernised its premises, image and diverse outreach’.

Dr Niblett is standing down in the summer and will be replaced by Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Dr Niblett says: ‘I am deeply honoured by this award, which is as much a recognition of the tireless and selfless work of my colleagues at Chatham House throughout my tenure as director.

‘Together, and through challenging times, we have offered a vital source of independent debate and analysis. And, with the engagement of our supporters and a new generation of thinkers and actors, I know the institute will continue to provide creative ideas for a better future.’

Independent Thinking: War in Ukraine, Congress in China Audio NCapeling 21 October 2022

The inaugural episode of our new podcast examines the latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  

Bronwen is joined by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House, and Dr Yu Jie, senior research fellow in Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific programme.

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Reporting Putin’s wars Audio NCapeling 8 December 2022

Episode eight of our new weekly podcast reflects on almost one year of war in Ukraine, and 12 years of war in Syria.

In the studio with Bronwen Maddox is special guest Oz Katerji, a war correspondent and freelance journalist who in the early stages of the Syrian uprising reported on the brutality of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its impact on neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey.

Having written extensively on Syria and the Middle East, in January 2022 he journeyed to Ukraine and was in Kyiv on 24 February as Russia began its invasion. He has reported extensively on the battle for Ukraine’s capital, and later the Donbas, in Foreign Policy magazine, the New Statesman and Rolling Stone.

Joining Bronwen and Oz to discuss the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria from Chatham House are James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme, and Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

The killing of Yahya Sinwar won’t change the course of the Gaza war Expert comment jon.wallace 18 October 2024

Israel has larger ambitions for Gaza beyond the Hamas leader’s death and the armed group is still asserting its influence despite its degradation.

After a year of being hunted as one of the most wanted men in the Middle East, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces on 17 October, in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip.

Hailing from Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar was imprisoned in Israel in 1989 for the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers. He was freed alongside 1,000 other prisoners during a major 2011 exchange, gradually building a notorious reputation as an intelligent and ruthless political figure.

As Hamas’ Gaza chief since 2017, Sinwar oversaw the consolidation of the movement’s authoritarian rule in the Strip and co-directed its military confrontations with Israel. He is regarded as a chief architect of Hamas’ deadly assault of 7 October, which killed 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, in southern communities.

Many world leaders and pundits were quick to embrace Sinwar’s death as an opportunity to press for a ceasefire in Gaza and secure the release of roughly 100 Israeli hostages still held by Hamas and other groups. It is too early to know the full repercussions of this development, but these hopes are largely misplaced – and reflect a reluctance to confront the larger obstacles and motivations that are preventing an end to the war.

Morale amid aimlessness

For Israelis, Sinwar’s death is undoubtedly a morale booster. It is a symbolic victory over a man deemed responsible for the 7 October massacres, and a tactical success that rids Israel of a formidable foe – one who was also an invested ally of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli politicians and generals will relish the news as another step towards restoring their reputations after their failure to prevent the 7 October attack.

Yet contrary to some wishful thinking, Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Israel’s calculus in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose popularity has been slowly recovering in recent months, described the news as ‘the beginning of the end’ but warned that ‘the task before us is not yet complete’.

The intensification of Israel’s war with Hezbollah – including a ground invasion of Lebanon, airstrikes across the country, and the displacement of over 1 million people – has shifted Israelis’ focus away from Gaza over the past month, especially as Hezbollah rockets disrupt life in Israel’s central cities as well as the north.

During that time, the Israeli army has begun a major offensive in the northern part of the Strip, implementing what appears to be the first part of the so-called ‘General’s Plan’ – an operation to besiege and force out roughly 300,000 Palestinian civilians who remain in the area. It could also pave the way for Israel’s absorption of part of the territory. (Israel’s military has denied pursuing the plan).

As such, the Israeli government has relegated the importance of the hostages. Netanyahu is eager to divert the public’s frustration with his months-long sabotage of a deal, while the military – despite its clashes with the prime minister – is seizing the chance to redraw Israel’s geopolitical environment. Even if a deal is struck in the wake of Sinwar’s death, Israel’s bombing and carving-up of Gaza and south Lebanon will likely continue.

Dynamic but degraded

For Hamas, the killing of its fiery politburo chief – just over two months after the assassination of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – is certainly a blow to its leadership and internal stability. But the Islamist movement’s dynamism has not changed. Hamas’s decision-making processes are not pegged to specific individuals, and other figures, whether in Gaza or in exile, will be rotated into senior positions.

It is unclear whether Hamas will promote a leader who shares Sinwar’s hardline orientation, or drift back to a more moderate figure similar to Haniyeh. Regardless, Hamas’s core demands in any ceasefire and hostage negotiations are unlikely to shift significantly. The movement is still seeking a permanent end to the war, and Israel is still refusing to grant it.

Hamas’s military capacity has been severely degraded by the Israeli offensive, not least by the fact that much of Gaza has been made unliveable and ungovernable. But the movement is far from destroyed. Its militants continue to fight a guerrilla war to undermine Israel’s foothold in Gaza, while trying to reassert Hamas control over public order, the war economy, and the distribution of aid.

Moreover, as the history of movements like Hamas and Hezbollah shows, the devastating nature of Israel’s campaigns and occupations are planting the seeds for further militancy among Palestinians, whether organized under Hamas or smaller, decentralized groups. The war has brutally decimated Gaza’s society, and the notion that killing figures like Sinwar will dissuade future recruits to fight Israel is fanciful.

On the Palestinian political level, Hamas and Fatah are still in talks about forming a unity agreement, though negotiations have so far remained fruitless. Even if a pact is made, Israel’s relentless targeting of Hamas personnel, the perception of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) as feckless collaborators, and Palestinians’ feeling of total abandonment raise doubts about the parties’ ability to regain popular support or legitimacy – whether to lead an interim government or the wider national movement.

The gravest threat

The killing of Sinwar is a significant marker in the Gaza war, with important ramifications for the movement he led and the conflict he seismically shaped. Israel will portray his death as validation of its aggressive military approach, and a further step in the erosion of Iran’s regional influence – an agenda the US has actively supported.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

Chatham House awarded major centenary grant to establish Stavros Niarchos Foundation Wing News Release sysadmin 16 April 2019

Chatham House has been awarded a transformational £10m grant ahead of its upcoming 2020 centenary.

Sir David Attenborough and the BBC Studios Natural History Unit awarded Chatham House Prize 2019 for ocean advocacy News Release sysadmin 18 November 2019

The 2019 Chatham House Prize is awarded to Sir David Attenborough and Julian Hector, head of BBC Studios Natural History Unit, for the galvanizing impact of the Blue Planet II series on tackling ocean plastic pollution.

How are war crimes prosecuted? Explainer Video NCapeling 26 April 2022

Explaining what war crimes are and how, in the circumstances of Ukraine, could war crimes be prosecuted.

The Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 describe what they call ‘grave breaches’ of international humanitarian law, and both Ukraine and Russia are parties to these treaties.

Grave breaches include directly attacking civilians and launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian property.

Many states and the International Criminal Court (ICC) also have the possibility to prosecute a wider set of war crimes although, in the past, states have not prosecuted many such crimes committed outside their own territory.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the ICC Statute, but Ukraine did declared it accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes on its territory, and and investigations have now started.

But there are several problems to be overcome to achieve successful prosecutions, such as the collection and preservation of evidence, proof of the intent of the suspects in the heat of war, how to be arrest suspects, and the issue of immunity.

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.