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Discord Leaker Sentenced To 15 Years In Prison

An anonymous reader quotes a report from NBC News: Former Massachusetts Air National Guard member Jack Teixeira was sentenced Tuesday to 15 years for stealing classified information from the Pentagon and sharing it online, the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts announced. Teixeira received the sentence before Judge Indira Talwani in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. In March, the national guardsman pleaded guilty to six counts of willful retention and transmission of national defense information under the Espionage Act. He was arrested by the FBI in North Dighton, Massachusetts, in April 2023 and has been in federal custody since mid-May 2023. According to court documents, Teixeira transcribed classified documents that he then shared on Discord, a social media platform mostly used by online gamers. He began sharing the documents in or around 2022. A document he was accused of leaking included information about providing equipment to Ukraine, while another included discussions about a foreign adversary's plot to target American forces abroad, prosecutors said. [...] While the documents were discovered online in March 2023, Teixeira had been sharing them online since January of that year, according to prosecutors.

Read more of this story at Slashdot.




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New biography shows an evil Woodrow Wilson

(Oct. 28)  The roots of this nation’s Progressive Movement were racist, repressive, dismissive of the First Amendment and other civil liberties, and hostile to women’s rights to vote or to petition elected officials. Those […]

The post New biography shows an evil Woodrow Wilson appeared first on Quin Hillyer.




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Curry steals show on Thompson's return to Warriors

Steph Curry scores 37 points to guide the Golden State Warriors to victory - and spoil Klay Thompson's return with the Dallas Mavericks.




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‘I grieve for the person I was before' - Covid inquiry to begin new phase

The Covid inquiry opens its next set of hearings on Monday, looking at the impact on healthcare and the NHS.




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Chief medical officer had nightmares after spy poisoning

Dame Sally Davies told the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry she had worried about the disposal of the nerve agent.




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How unusual has this hurricane season been?

Hurricanes Helene and Milton have bookended a particularly stormy period. What's behind it?




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Anderson on England retirement and joining the IPL

James Anderson speaks to BBC Radio 4's Amol Rajan on how his England career came to an end and his potential return to cricket in the IPL aged 42.




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Ferguson takes hat-trick as NZ win dramatic T20

Lockie Ferguson takes a hat-trick and Glenn Phillips claims three wickets in the final over as New Zealand win a low-scoring second T20 against Sri Lanka.




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Sauber sign rookie Bortoleto for 2025 season

Gabriel Bortoleto, 20, will make his Formula One debut for the Audi-owned Sauber next season.




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US voters on one reason Trump won... and why Harris lost

After Donald Trump's decisive victory, we asked Americans what they think made the difference for each campaign.




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US airman Jack Teixeira sentenced to 15 years in prison

Teixeira leaked highly classified Pentagon documents to an online platform popular with gamers.




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Samson's century gives India easy win over South Africa

Sanju Samson blasts a 47-ball century as India clinch an emphatic win over South Africa in the first T20 international in Durban.




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How Long To Season Firewood After Splitting?

Properly seasoned firewood is the key to efficient and enjoyable fires during the cold months. But how long should you let firewood season after splitting it? This critical step in firewood preparation ensures that the wood burns cleanly and produces maximum heat. In this article, we will delve into the factors that influence the seasoning […]

The post How Long To Season Firewood After Splitting? appeared first on Patriot Outdoor News.




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Early prison release: 'I'm lost and don't know what to do'

One man tells BBC London not enough is being done to keep prisoners released early off the streets.




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Trump At Jacksonville Mocks Biden As ‘Lowest Energy Individual’ For Calling Campaign ‘Lid This Morning Again’

President Trump mocked Joe Biden Thursday evening for always calling a “lid” on campaign activities early in the morning, saying the Democratic presidential rival is “the lowest energy individual I’ve ever seen.” “Did you see [Biden] did a lid this morning again?” Trump told supporters during his campaign rally Thursday night at Cecil Airport hanger in Jacksonville, […]

The post Trump At Jacksonville Mocks Biden As ‘Lowest Energy Individual’ For Calling Campaign ‘Lid This Morning Again’ appeared first on Hispolitica.




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Mum’s anguish over son’s ‘endless’ prison sentence

James Lawrence threatened someone with a fake gun in 2006 and is still in prison.




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Keane 'advice' for future son-in-law Harwood-Bellis

Southampton defender Taylor Harwood-Bellis says his future father-in-law Roy Keane has played a part in his recent development.





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MacOS Sonoma 14.7.1 & MacOS Ventura 13.7.1 with Security Updates Available

Apple has released macOS Sonoma 14.7.1 and MacOS Ventura 13.7.1 for Mac users who have not yet updated to MacOS Sequoia, of which MacOS Sequoia 15.1 with Apple Intelligence was just released. macOS Sonoma 14.7.1 and macOS Ventura 13.7.1 both contain many security fixes, making them important updates to install for Mac user who are ... Read More




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Fix the “Failed to Personalize Software Update” Error in MacOS

Though not common, some Mac users are encountering a strange error message that says “Failed to personalize the software update. Please try again.” when attempting to update their Mac to MacOS Sequoia, and sometimes even with other MacOS software updates too. This is a frustrating error since it prevents the installation of a major system ... Read More




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Books are key to the future: an interview with Wade Hudson and Cheryl Willis Hudson

We hear a lot about diversity and inclusion these days, often as it relates to books for young readers. Just as publishing for children and teens has evolved over the years, so has adults’ perception of youth and what is appropriate for them.





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News24 Business | TikTok billionaire becomes China's richest person

ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming is China's richest person, with personal wealth of $49.3 billion (R872 billion), an annual rich list showed on Tuesday, although counterparts in real estate and renewables have fared less well.




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The Poisoning of America

The following article, The Poisoning of America, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

America has spoken: Donald J. Trump won a landslide victory on November 5. However, the butthurt leftists are doing what they did last time: throwing a hissy fit. The difference this time is that the victory was so strong that all they have is to make ridiculous claims that are in fact, the poisoning of …

Continue reading The Poisoning of America ...






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Another House Speaker Battle? Mike Johnson's Position May Be at Risk as Conservative Anger Heats Up

Now that there is a Republican majority in the next Congress, it’s time for the party to bare its internal fault lines. That is likely to take place Wednesday, according […]

The post Another House Speaker Battle? Mike Johnson's Position May Be at Risk as Conservative Anger Heats Up appeared first on The Western Journal.




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Sport | Makgopa's rise evidence of Broos' Bafana impact: 'You don't want to disappoint such a person'

Evidence Makgopa wore a sheepish smile when Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos showered him with praise before literally patting the forward on the back, making him blush at Dobsonville Stadium.




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State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity

State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2023

Analysing key foreign policy aspects of President Joe Biden’s annual address, and what it means for the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the year ahead.

Trade and economics are key areas to watch

Daniel W. Drezner

Russia’s absence from the Munich Security Conference will allow US and European policymakers to brag about their flourishing partnership. The past year has seen repeated predictions of a fracturing transatlantic relationship – only to see repeated agreement on how to sanction Russia and which arms to ship to Ukraine.

Putin invaded because he thought the West was divided. Events have proven him wrong. When one takes a step back, however, and examines the Biden administration’s embrace of geoeconomics, Putin’s assumption becomes easier to comprehend.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence. Both administrations have been wary of US interdependence with an increasingly autocratic China.

The primary difference has been that, while the Trump administration talked a good game, the Biden administration has passed laws and issued executive orders making the pivot away from trade liberalization a reality.

The passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) amount to the most ambitious US attempt at industrial policy in decades, accompanied by multiple executive orders examining US supply chain resilience and imposing unprecedented export controls targeting China.

The Biden administration’s restrictions on exchange with China’s semiconductors includes the use of the ‘foreign direct product rule’, essentially a means of applying US export controls in an extraterritorial manner.

The Biden administration’s angry response to the WTO panel ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs makes it clear the US will apply an expanded definition of national security to restrict trade. In many ways, the sanctions on Russia are a continuation of a US foreign economic policy grounded in geoeconomics.

Several of these measures have rankled European officials. The IRA massively subsidizes the North American production of environmentally-friendly cars, discriminating against European producers. And continued US hostility to the WTO leaves European officials wondering if they are the last bastion of multilateralism left in the world. In Washington and Davos last month, European policymakers made their displeasure clear.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence

Daniel W. Drezner

The sanctions against Russia and export controls against China threaten to be additional sore subjects. During the strategic embargo of the Soviet Union, US officials wanted to maximize restrictions while European allies wanted more trade opportunities. Since then, Europeans have suspected that the US uses multilateral export controls regimes to advance its commercial interests, while Americans worry Europe underestimates the risks of business-as-usual with China.

The Biden administration has tried to finesse these trade tensions, and was successful at persuading the Netherlands to join the US in the export controls on China. More generally, Biden officials talk about ‘friendshoring’ and propose mechanisms for greater policy coordination, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. But even in these gestures, US officials have taken greater market access off the table.

In the State of the Union address, Biden bragged about how the US ‘came together to defend a stronger and safer Europe’ as well as defending his ‘buy American’ plans and pledging to make sure the ‘supply chain for America begins in America’. At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, attention should be on how much officials talk about trade and economic issues. The more that topic comes up, the clearer it will be that both sides are subtweeting each other about the future of the transatlantic economic relationship.

Division on China now would bring a high price

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

President Biden has made unity his guiding principle and chief objective, but it is a tall order. His State of the Union address touted past bipartisan backing for investments in infrastructure, climate-friendly technologies, and semiconductor chips, along with a focus on creating jobs for working-class Americans, especially in manufacturing.

While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Little was said that was explicitly about China, but the Biden administration has said that China is its pacing challenge, and competing with China has shaped the ambition behind these legislative successes.

In fact, the hallmark of the address was its foreign policy minimalism. Biden hailed unity in the US defence of democracy in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. And in defending US sovereignty in the face of China’s violations, this time with a balloon.

But the presidents temporary minimalism on foreign policy will be short-lived. And unity with America’s partners and allies will continue to be at the centre of Biden’s strategy. In the past 12 months, it is the yardstick by which he has measured America’s success with respect to Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has so far served as a lubricant for the NATO alliance, and for the US relationship with its non-NATO allies.

This has not automatically sprung from the well of Russia’s aggression. NATO’s success, and transatlantic unity, has been achieved through the sheer force of diplomatic effort, not least by the US.

Now Biden is looking for unity on China. His administration has identified China as its pacing threat. While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China.

China’s balloon helps ensure unity will be an easy victory at home. For several days, the balloon floated across the US, captivating the American public, seizing the headlines, and hardening US attitudes towards its only peer competitor.

Republican leaders in Congress are determined to scrutinize US policy to ensure it is tough on China, especially on technology and deterrence. This intense domestic focus on China could put Biden in a bind as he seeks to resume diplomacy. It also explains why he was careful not to inflate the China threat in his address. Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing has already been postponed.

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, the president’s unity agenda will turn to Europe, but the timing is difficult. China is opening and a charm offensive across Europe is likely. Europe is vulnerable as it seeks to recover its economies, continue to hold Russia back, and inhibit greater alignment between Russia and China.

The risk for the US is that domestic pressure to take a harder line on China escalates and Europe refuses to keep up. But dividing on China would come at a high price, both for Europe and the US, so to avoid this, they should take a pragmatic and sequenced approach to cooperation.

The goal for now should be policy coordination, as success is vital to momentum and managing expectations in the current environment is critical. Alignment may be possible with discrete partners on specific topics. But the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

The US has postponed, not cancelled, Blinken’s trip while Europe is preparing to ramp up its diplomacy with China. A collective but temporary and shared transatlantic pause on diplomacy would offer low hanging fruit to give momentum to transatlantic cooperation.

It would also signal to China a unity that has a power of its own. A clear and coordinated signal, soon, that Europe and the US are moving forward with diplomacy is essential.

Munich can move the talk into action on Ukraine

James Nixey

Russia’s excommunication from this year’s Munich Security Conference is an opportunity. The principle of inclusivity may have pros and cons, but the cons have been evident since at least 2007 – its use as a platform for Russia’s leadership to launch broadsides about ‘western injustice’ and a reflexive default to increasingly inappropriate and harmful diplomatic courtesies and allowances.

Without the distraction of listening to Russian lies, there is at least now the remote possibility of a more unified West agreeing to specific action beyond the talk. As at the recent Ramstein talks, it is unlikely Munich will result in an agreement to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. That may prove a step too far for the West or it will need further Russian atrocities inflicted upon Ukrainians on a scale horrendous enough to prick consciences once again.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia

James Nixey

However, although President Biden’s State of the Union address has promised nothing new or innovative regarding Ukraine or Russia, it did re-establish the fundamentals of US support and so can serve as a ‘pre-read’ for a newfound resolve.

Although some European countries are a lost cause, others – Germany for example – have proved able to be guilted into action. The key lesson for everyone to understand is that Ukraine is sovereign. Or at least ‘nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine’. The difference is moot but, from these simple precepts, all else flows.

Ukrainians will be their impassioned selves at Munich. But although publicly gracious and thankful, privately they are distraught at the West’s collective failure to affirm these principles and back them with the necessary support, not just to force a stalemate or a ‘frozen conflict’ but to engineer victory.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia, which can be defeated with the requisite tangible assistance. In Munich, beyond fine words of support – watertight from some, ambiguous from others – there lurks the ever-present danger of the politician who simply wants it all to go away by offering Putin an off-ramp.

The irony of the host city of this forum is that many times over the past year compromise ‘solutions’ have been described as having ‘a whiff of Munich’ about them – a reference of course to appeasement in 1938, which still haunts.

As it should, because the failure to ensure Ukraine’s victory with an outcome the Ukrainian government and people are content with and which convinces Russia it was a disastrous mistake to escalate, will lead to a global security collapse too catastrophic to contemplate.

Middle East security challenges must be dealt with

Dr Sanam Vakil

A trifecta of security concerns – Iran’s advancing nuclear programme, the export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, and a heavy-handed response towards protests in Iran – has raised alarm bells in Washington, Europe and the UK. These intersecting challenges lay bare the lack of a broader Iran strategy and the deprioritization of Middle East security among transatlantic partners.

This downgrading of the Middle East was evident in President Biden’s State of the Union speech as, for the first time in decades, the region was not even mentioned. The upcoming Munich Security conference provides a much needed opportunity for the transatlantic community to align on next steps and multilateral policy responses.

Tehran has little confidence in the political and economic benefits that could emerge from the JCPOA and is choosing to double down with Moscow

Dr Sanam Vakil

Transatlantic partners have long relied on the prism of the JCPOA negotiations as the pathway to both separate and manage nuclear tensions from broader regional challenges associated with Iran’s export of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxy groups.

Despite repeated negotiation efforts led by the Biden administration since April 2021, the JCPOA has languished due to Tehran’s fears over another US retreat. The promise of sanctions relief has also failed to incentivise Iran’s return to the deal. Tehran’s nuclear programme has accelerated without the consistent IAEA oversight which was part of the initial deal and is now at a level where it can produce enough uranium enrichment for four nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s decision to send drones to support Moscow’s war effort has further elevated transatlantic concerns, and reports have circulated that Tehran may also export its missile capabilities and build a drone factory in Russia. In tandem, the two sanctioned states have begun to strengthen their economic arrangements.




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Comparison of Label-free Methods for Quantifying Human Proteins by Shotgun Proteomics

William M. Old
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1487-1502
Research




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Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting

It sounds like an oxymoron: “How to keep blood-sports interesting?” You’ve got blood and you’ve got sports, the term does its own advertising! And yet, fighting promotions rise and fall, where Pride and Strikeforce once reigned, now stand One and Bellator, but one promotion stands above all its competitors. The world of MMA knows one promotion which has clawed its way to the international top and established itself as the gold standard upon whose hallowed surface skulls are crushed and blood is poured. I’m talking about none other than the UFC.

Having established itself over the years as a beacon of both quality matches and consistent drama, the UFC attracts the lion’s share of international talent in the MMA world, and with it the eyes and ears of MMA fans everywhere. Having well and truly stroked the ego of the promotion, you might be wondering what on earth any of this has to do with writing or fantasy?

Well, does your world happen to feature prizefighting, ritual combat, or the eternally popular fantasy fixture called the gladiatorial arena? If so, there are a lot of writing and worldbuilding lessons you can learn from observing the biggest promotion in the biggest modern blood-sport of the world.

Continue reading Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting at Mythic Scribes.




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The Politics of Personality in the Middle East




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The Reconstruction of Iraq: Lessons from Mosul




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A Decade on from the Financial Crisis: the Legacy and Lessons of 2008 - The Rt Hon Lord Darling of Roulanish




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Our Shared Humanity: Cool and Reasoned Judgement




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Undercurrents: Summer Special - Allison Gardner on Artificial Intelligence




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Undercurrents: Episode 41 - Personalized Political Advertising, and Climate Justice in Chile




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20 Years On: Removal of the Ban on LGBTIQ+ Personnel Serving in the UK Armed Forces




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Announcing Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis

Announcing Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis News Release sysadmin 1 June 2020

London Design Biennale and Chatham House announce Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis, which calls for action by designers around the world to create radical design solutions to critical problems across four key areas: Health, Environment, Society and Work.





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What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.




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Explicit calculations for Sono’s multidimensional sieve of ????₂-numbers

Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
Abstract, references and article information




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If You Think Blocking People Over Political Views Is Petty, Just Wait Until You See The Other Reasons People Shared




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Too many wild deer are roaming England's forests. Can promoting venison to consumers help?




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A mom’s worst nightmare - East Kingston mother mourns teen son after deadly clash with cops

Kadian Morgan was overwhelmed with grief as she leaned against a wall outside her gate on Jackson Lane, East Kingston, yesterday, tears streaming down her face. Her 19-year-old son, Kayshan 'Bem Bem' Smith, was lying in the morgue after being...




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Policeman's murder won't deter fight against crime says Superintendent Nicholson

A police sergeant who was shot and injured at his home in Portmore, St Catherine, on Thursday night succumbed to his injuries on Monday morning.




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Father imprisoned for sexually molesting daughter

A father who pleaded guilty to sexually molesting his 13-year-old daughter was sentenced to several years of imprisonment in the St Catherine Circuit Court on Tuesday.




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Malawi’s Re-Run Election is Lesson for African Opposition

1 July 2020

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme
The overturning of the result in the fresh presidential contest sets a bold precedent for the continent, as a process built upon the resilience of democratic institutions and the collective spirit of opposition.

2020-07-01-Malawi-Chakwera-Election

Lazarus Chakwera, leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) arriving at the Mtandire suburb of the capital Lilongwe for an election rally. Photo by AMOS GUMULIRA/AFP via Getty Images.

Malawi is only the second African country to annul a presidential election, after Kenya in 2017. It is the first in which the opposition has won the re-run.

The initial May 2019 vote had narrowly returned incumbent Peter Mutharika to the presidency. But in February 2020 a landmark ruling by Malawi’s constitutional court annulled the result citing ‘widespread, systematic and grave’ irregularities, including the now-infamous use of corrective fluid in vote tallying, and the Malawi Electoral Commission’s (MEC) failure to address complaints before announcing results. New elections were ordered within 150 days.

In a decisive contrast with the previous year, the fresh polls on 23 June saw the coming together of Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and running mate Saulos Chilima of the United Transformation Movement (UTM) to head a coalition of nine opposition parties - having fiercely competed as the leading challengers previously.

The constitutional court ruling had also changed Malawi’s electoral system, replacing a first-past-the-post model with one demanding an outright majority, which further encouraged the regional power bases of Malawi’s opposition to cast ego aside and work in alliance with each other.

In tandem with a slick digital campaign, the new alliance travelled widely to hold rallies across what is one of the world’s youngest countries, while the elderly Mutharika remained largely confined to the capital. It would be a strategy that ultimately delivered Chakwera to the presidency, polling 58 per cent of votes to Mutharika’s 39.

Political opposition elsewhere in Africa should take note from Malawi’s coalition - dialogue, not division, can offer a genuine path to change, especially in those countries with less favourable institutional conditions. Neighbouring Zambia would certainly do well to heed this example ahead of a pivotal election of its own in 2021.

A victory built on institutional precedent

Yet the story here is not only about throwing out an incumbent: Malawians had already done so twice before, rejecting sitting presidents at the polls in 1994 and 2014. It is also not unfamiliar to see public opinion and the judiciary work in parallel to uphold the constitution: former president Bakili Muluzi was twice blocked from abolishing term limits by popular demonstration during his second term, and again prevented from running for a third time in 2009 by the constitutional court.

The new result did not arise as the foregone conclusion of a judicial miracle. Rather, throughout the re-run process Malawi has had to repeatedly draw upon the strength of its broad-based institutional foundations. The image of the constitutional court judges arriving to deliver their annulment verdict in February wearing bulletproof vests under their robes was a stark reminder that this was never the easy route to take.

In contrast to many other African states, Mutharika was unable to call upon military support as the Malawi Defence Forces (MDF) had moved to shield protesting citizens and protect the judiciary since the 2019 election. The MDF also had previous form in this respect, having defended then-vice president Joyce Banda’s constitutional right to assume the presidency after the incumbent’s death in 2012.

And this institutional resilience from the army would facilitate a smooth and mostly peaceful election process during the re-run, despite Mutharika attempts to intervene by replacing the MDF’s commander and his deputy in March 2020.

Just ten days before the fresh vote the Mutharika government switched focus back to the country’s legal system by attempting to enforce the premature retirement of Malawi’s chief justice, only to be blocked by the high court. Even as unofficial tallies trickled in, Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) demanded the MEC annul the result: claiming their monitors were intimidated in MCP strongholds, and requesting unlawful access to scrutinise null and void votes.

Headed by a new chairperson, this time the MEC displayed enormous patience in the verification process and openly tackled complaints, now mainly from the DPP. On social media, Malawians celebrated the contrast between images of tally sheets from 2019 and the re-run.

Writing a new chapter

There are lessons here too for international partners. UK diplomacy played a subtle role in encouraging Mutharika to accept the legal process - he was invited to appear at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in January - while also helping promoting early dialogue among opposition parties.

At a time of pressure for UK engagement to offer clear strategic value, the impact of less easily quantifiable forms of influence should not be overlooked, especially as international observer missions effectively went missing in the discredited 2019 election. Preliminary statements back then from the Commonwealth, European Union, African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) struck a mostly congratulatory tone and were non-committal on the issues that would prove decisive in the court ruling. None went on to release their final reports.

Malawi must now start to move beyond election mode. Though COVID-19 cases remain low by global standards, a budget already heavily dependent on foreign aid and hampered by 18 months of political uncertainty will be slashed further by the pandemic’s impact. The IMF has predicted GDP growth of just 1% in 2020, down from a pre-coronavirus projection of 5%.

As it inherits a major balance of payments crisis, mounting debt and with no tourism revenue to fall back on, the new government will need to use its political capital to push for immediate reform. But it must not forget the core tenet of its campaign. The coalition that defeated Mutharika united the MCP’s rural support base with the middle-class urban following of the UTM. This spirit of unity and inclusion must be expanded and focus on long-term recovery. On this undertaking – unlike the polls – there will be no opportunity for a re-run.




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Domestic Violence in Ukraine: Lessons from COVID-19

23 July 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The pandemic has shed light on domestic violence in Ukraine, mobilizing civil society to demand more nuanced policy on the issue.

2020-07-23-UkraineIWD.jpg

A protester chants slogans on a megaphone during an International Women's Day protest on 8 March 2019 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Photo: Getty Images.

The virus of violence

During quarantine, the greater economic vulnerability of Ukrainian women has locked many of them with abusive partners. The uncertainty of personal finances, health and security in confinement has exacerbated domestic violence against women, in certain cases aggravated by the perpetrator’s war-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In pre- pandemic times, only one third of domestic violence victims, 78% of whom are women, reported the abuse. During the pandemic, the calls to domestic violence helplines increased by 50% in the Donbas war zone and by 35% in other regions of Ukraine.

However, more precise estimates are hard to make. This is largely because some fractions of Ukrainian society still see domestic violence as a private family matter, which will get little assistance from the police. Also, reporting from a small confinement place permanently shared with a perpetrator during the lockdown can trigger more abuse.

The COVID-19-tested legal framework

The spike in domestic violence during lockdown has intensified the debate about the inadequacy of Ukraine’s approach.

Ukraine adopted the law on domestic violence in 2017 and made such behaviour punishable under administrative and criminal law. Importantly, the law does not limit domestic violence to physical abuse, but recognizes its sexual, psychological and economic variations. Domestic violence is further not limited to a married couple or close family members, but can be perpetrated against a distant relative or a cohabiting partner.

The extended definition of rape now includes rape of a spouse or a family member as an aggravating circumstance. A special police unit has been designated to deal with domestic abuse cases. Police can now issue protection orders in prompt reaction to an offence and immediately distance a perpetrator from a victim.

The victim can also spend time in a shelter - a system which the Ukrainian government has promised to create. A special registry of domestic violence cases has been set up for the exclusive use by the designated law enforcement and social security authorities to help them be more holistically informed in building a response.

However important, the introduced legal and institutional infrastructure was slow in proving its efficiency pre-COVID-19. It is struggling even more to stand the test of the coronavirus.

Changing the established mindset takes time. 38% of Ukraine’s judges and 39% of prosecutors still struggle to see domestic violence not as a household issue. Even though the police are becoming more reactive to home abuse complaints, getting emergency protection orders is still difficult. The court restraining orders are more effective, however they require the unnecessarily protracted and humiliating procedures of proving one’s own victimhood to different state authorities.

In response to the challenges of coronavirus for women, the police spread information posters and created a special chat-bot about the available help. However, while the domestic violence helplines of La Strada and other human rights NGOs are busier than ever, the police statistics suggest that the lockdown has not catalyzed home abuse.

This could indicate a higher trust to non-state institutions and the inability of a considerable group of women to use more sophisticated communication means such as chat-bots when they cannot call the police in the presence of an abuser. This problem is exacerbated by a current  lack of shelters in rural areas, as most are located in urban settings. Overcrowded in ordinary times, the shelters’ capacity to accept survivors during the lockdown is further limited by the social distancing rules.

Istanbul Convention – The bigger picture

Ukraine failed to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women, better known as the Istanbul Convention, largely due to the opposition of religious organizations. Concerned that the treaty’s terms ‘gender’ and ‘sexual orientation’ would contribute to the promotion of same-sex relationships in Ukraine, they argued that Ukraine’s current legislation provides adequate protection against domestic violence. However, this is not the case.

The Istanbul Convention does not ‘promote’ same-sex relationships, it only mentions sexual orientation among the non-exhaustive list of prohibited discrimination grounds. Remarkably, Ukraine’s domestic violence law itself is against such discrimination.

The Convention defines ‘gender’ as the socially constructed roles a society attributes to women and men. Ukraine’s overcautiousness about the term is ironic at least in two dimensions.

First, the 2017 domestic violence law restates its aim to eliminate discriminating beliefs about the social roles of each ‘sex’. In doing so, the law supports the rationale of what the Istanbul Convention denotes as ‘gender’ without using the term itself.

Second,  it is exactly the constraints of the rigidly defined niches for both sexes in Ukraine that have substantially contributed to the intensified domestic violence, whether it be  war or  coronavirus-related. The lack of sustainable psychological support for traumatized veterans and the stigma of mental health struggles, especially among men, mars their reintegration to peaceful life. This often results in alcohol abuse or even suicide.

As the economic uncertainty of the war and the virus prevents some men from fully living up to their traditional socially - and self-imposed - breadwinner role, this increases the risk of problematic behaviour and domestic violence.

By diverting the focus of the debate  to the term ‘gender’ used in the Istanbul Convention, conservative groups have ignored the fact that it describes the priority already enshrined in Ukraine’s 2017 law - to eliminate discriminatory beliefs about the socially constructed roles of men and women. This has drawn away time and resources needed to protect those vulnerable to domestic abuse.

Ukraine has not addressed the pigeonholing of women and men into gendered stereotypes. This has harmed men while further victimizing women and children, especially during the lockdown. Ironically, this is leading to the undermining of the very traditional family values certain opponents of the Istanbul Convention appealed to.

Fortunately, Ukraine’s ever-vigilant civil society,  dismayed at the wave of the lockdown domestic violence, petitioned President Zelenskyy to ratify the Convention. With a new draft law on ratification, the ball is now in the parliament’s court. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine’s policymakers will be up to the task.            




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Lessons from COVID-19: A Catalyst for Improving Sanctions?

26 August 2020

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, efforts by states and humanitarian actors to stop its spread and to treat the sick are being hindered by existing sanctions and counterterrorism measures.

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Syrians walk past a mural painted as part of an awareness campaign by UNICEF and WHO, bearing instructions on protection from COVID-19, in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli, Syria, on 16 August 2020. Photo by Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images.

If sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU, or states unilaterally, are not sufficiently targeted, and do not include adequate safeguards for humanitarian action, they can adversely affect the very populations for whose well-being they were imposed in the first place.  This is not a new concern, but one brought starkly to the fore by their impact on responses to COVID-19.

The detrimental impact of sanctions, which can prevent the supply of medical or personal protective equipment (PPE), or the provision of technical support or training to local health authorities is evident. Sanctions can also affect remote learning if support cannot be provided to local education authorities, export licences cannot be obtained for the necessary equipment and software, or if the companies providing reliable internet coverage are designated under the sanctions.

A comparison of US and EU sanctions on Syria reveals key challenges, but also opportunities for improving current arrangements for the imposition and implementation of sanctions so as to minimize adverse consequences in Syria and more generally.

The US has imposed broad sanctions, such as restrictions on the provision of funds, goods or services – even charitable contributions – to the Syrian government, including the health and education ministries, now playing a central role in the COVID-19 response.

UN agencies are exempted from these restrictions. A general license authorizes NGOs to conduct activities to meet basic needs, but it excludes those involving the government. So NGOs wishing to provide medical devices, PPE, training or other support to ministry of health staff have to apply for a specific licence.

But procedures for applying for licences are complicated, and the approval process notoriously slow.  No accommodation has been made to facilitate the COVID-19 response: no interpretative guidance – that would be valuable for all NGOs – has been issued, and no procedures established for reviewing applications more quickly.  There is no statement of policy indicating the circumstances under which specific licences might be granted.

Transactions with designated entities other than the government, such as internet providers whose services are necessary for remote learning, remain prohibited, and regulations expressly preclude applying for specific licences.

US sanctions frequently have a broad scope, both in direct and indirect application.  NGOs registered in the US, and staff who are US nationals, are directly bound by them, and grant agreements between the US government and non-US NGOs require the latter to comply with US sanctions.

This leaves the non-US NGOs in a Catch-22 situation – as they are not ‘US persons’ they cannot apply for specific licenses, but if they operate without such licences they may be violating grant requirements. This lack of clarity contributes to banks’ unwillingness to provide services, and may lead NGOs to curtail their activities.  This situation is regrettable in Syria, where the US is the first donor to humanitarian action, and also arises in other contexts where the US has imposed similar sanctions.

The EU’s sanctions for Syria are far more targeted. Of relevance to the COVID-19 response, they do not include prohibitions on the provision of support to the government that could impede assistance in the medical field.  There are, however, restrictions on the provision of certain types of PPE or substances used for disinfection, and also on transactions with designated telecommunications providers that affect continuity of education during lockdowns.  Although not prohibited, these activities must be authorized by member states’ competent authorities. Similar concerns arise about the complexity and delays of the processes.

The EU sanctions framework is complex, so the recent European Commission Guidance Note on Syria providing official clarification of how it applies to humanitarian action is welcome.  Although the note only explains the existing rules rather than amending them to facilitate the COVID-19 response, it does include a number of important elements relevant not just to Syria, but to the interplay between sanctions and humanitarian action more broadly.

First, it notes that ‘in accordance with International Humanitarian Law where no other option is available, the provision of humanitarian aid should not be prevented by EU restrictive measures’.  This recognizes that humanitarian assistance takes priority over any inconsistent restrictions in sanctions, and it also applies both to UN sanctions and unilateral measures. It is a starting premise that is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether sanctions should include exceptions for humanitarian action.  Its reaffirmation is timely, and it must guide states in drawing up future sanctions.

Second, the note states that sanctions do not require the screening of final beneficiaries of humanitarian programmes.  This means that once someone has been identified as an individual in need on the basis of humanitarian principles, no further screening is required.  This is extremely important to COVID-19 responses as it reflects a foundational principle of IHL that, to the fullest extent practicable, everyone is entitled to the medical care required by their condition without distinction.

Third, while responsibility for the implementation of sanctions, including the granting of authorizations, lies with member states, the note nudges them to adopt a number of measures to expedite and streamline such processes.  These include the suggestion that states could issue a single authorization for the provision of humanitarian aid in response to the pandemic.

The European Commission is to be commended for this initiative, which should be replicated for other contexts where the COVID-19 response may be undermined by sanctions.  These include Gaza, where it would be important to highlight that the designation of Hamas under EU counterterrorism sanctions must not prevent the provision of assistance to relevant ministries.

Failing to draw a distinction between the designated political party and the structures of civil administration risks turning targeted financial sanctions into measures akin to comprehensive sanctions.

The pandemic should serve as a catalyst for improving the system for the adoption and implementation of sanctions by the UN, the EU and individual states, including the UK as it elaborates its sanctions policy post-Brexit. The principles are clear: without prejudicing the aims for which sanctions have been imposed, humanitarian needs must always be prioritized, and met.