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Lukashenka’s Commitment to Belarusian Sovereignty Is Overstated

18 February 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Although President Lukashenka has recently shown assertiveness in relations with Russia, overall he has done very little to ensure his country’s freedom of action.

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Putin and Lukashenka play ice hockey in Sochi after a day of talks in February. Photo: Getty Images.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the highest-ranking US official to visit Belarus since Bill Clinton in 1994. After meetings with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka – who Condoleezza Rice once memorably described as ‘Europe’s last dictator’ – Pompeo said he was ‘optimistic about our strengthened relationship’. 

The EU and its member states have also changed their tune, at least a little. Previously, prosecutions of democratic activists led to sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. But his less-than-liberal manner of governance did not prevent him from visiting Austria last November or from receiving invitations to Brussels. 

Eight years ago, most EU contacts with Belarusian officials were frozen. Now, Western diplomats regularly meet with Belarusian officials again. This year, a US ambassador to Belarus will be appointed after a 12-year break.

The West is also more willing to support Belarus financially. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development invested a record-breaking $433 million in the country in 2019. The European Investment Bank only began working with the country in 2017 but already has a portfolio of $600 million.

Certain policymakers in the EU and US now, at least publicly, appear to regard Lukashenka as one of the sources of regional security and a defender of Belarusian sovereignty against Russia.

There is some truth in this. He has taken a neutral position in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, and he has consistently resisted pressure from the Kremlin to establish a military base in Belarus.

Now, amid Moscow’s demands for deeper integration in exchange for the continuation of Russian energy subsidies, Lukashenka has shown reluctance to sell his autonomy. In a token attempt to portray sovereignty Belarus even started buying oil from Norway, although this makes no economic sense.

But Lukashenka’s long-term record shows he has done little to ensure the country’s sovereignty. Lukashenka has resisted reforms that would have strengthened the economy (because they would have weakened his own position). The political system is also dependent on Russia because Lukashenka has been unwilling to build better relations with the West. Belarusians are still strongly influenced by Russian culture and media because the authorities marginalize their own national identity.

Since the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenka’s primary goal has not been to strengthen the sovereignty of Belarus, but to preserve his absolute control over the country.

For example, when in 2018 Russia started pressing Belarus to deepen its integration in order to retain economic support, Minsk did not reject this approach outright; instead, it discussed no less than 31 ‘road maps’ for deepening integration for more than a year, hoping to receive more benefits. For Lukashenka, greater dependency on Russia is a matter of price and conditions, not principle. 

None of this is to say Belarus has illusions about Russia. It is just that Lukashenka does not take long-term steps to protect the country’s sovereignty or to strengthen relations with the West.

Belarus needs to start economic reform with the support of the International Monetary Fund, but this cannot happen without Lukashenka’s genuine commitment to transform the economy. Absence of cross-sectoral reform has led to the deterioration of the education system as well as unprecedented emigration. Few Belarusian experts are optimistic about their country’s future. Lukashenka knows all this, but does not change his system, fearing it would damage the stability of his regime.  

The West should therefore adopt a broader policy. Lukashenka is unlikely to still be president in 10–15 years, so policymakers should develop relations with the broader ruling elite, which will remain after he leaves, and try to be present in Belarus as much as possible helping it to improve public governance and develop private businesses.

The West should also support the country’s civil society and independent media, for whom Belarusian independence is a matter of principle rather than something to be bargained away.

Lukashenka may be a strong leader, but the state he has built is weak.




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Japan-Russia Relations in the Abe-Putin Era

Research Event

16 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Alexander Bukh, Senior Lecturer, International Relations, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand; Author of These Islands Are Ours: The Social Construction of Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia (Stanford University Press 2020)
Chair: Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Japan and Russia are often referred to as 'distant neighbours'. 

In the early days of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's second term in 2012, Japan sought to open a new era of bilateral relations with Russia. However, recent negotiations on the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories territorial dispute have stalled. Despite Abe’s extensive efforts to resolve the dispute, no concrete agreement has been reached so far. 

The speaker will provide an overview of the current state of Japan-Russia relations, including the prospect of resolving the territorial dispute during Prime Minister Abe's remaining days in office.

 

Lucy Ridout

Programme Administrator, Asia-Pacific Programme
+44 (0) 207 314 2761




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POSTPONED: Transitional Justice in Ukraine: What Might it Look Like?

Invitation Only Research Event

17 March 2020 - 9:30am to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Kirsty Brimelow QC, Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers
Miles Jackson, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oxford
Anton Korynevych, Representative of the President of Ukraine for Crimea
Oleksandra Matviychuk, Head of the Board, Centre for Civil Liberties
Taras Tsymbrivksyy, Head, USAID Human Rights in Action Program; Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union

Still grappling with the war in the east and the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine’s new leadership has announced its intention to develop its transitional justice infrastructure to respond to the human rights violations arising from Russia’s aggression. 

Numerous reports (not least ones by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine) list persecutions, illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and killings among the crimes perpetrated in Crimea and parts of occupied Donbas. 

As Ukraine has only just started developing its transitional justice roadmap, this event will seek to discuss viable initial approaches, such as a ‘truth-telling commission’ or amnesties. 

The panellists will also discuss the role for civil society and those directly affected by hostilities in the transitional justice process.  

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Russia’s Uncertain Regime Transformation

11 March 2020

Professor Nikolai Petrov

Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Dr Ben Noble

Lecturer in Russian Politics, University College London; Senior Research Fellow, HSE, Moscow
Despite the drama, Vladimir Putin’s announcement endorsing a constitutional change allowing him to remain president from 2024 does surprisingly little to change the status quo.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses lawmakers debating on the second reading of the constitutional reform bill during a session of the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament March 10, 2020. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

With Putin’s current term as head of state due to run out in 2024, the question everybody has been asking is what he will do to remain in power. The Russian president’s recent speech, made in person in the State Duma during the second reading of his own constitutional reform bill, has been interpreted by many as a clear answer. Summaries such as “Putin forever” and “perpetual Putin” abound. But the reality is not so clear.

Putin has not committed to standing for re-election in 2024, never mind staying in power until 2036, when two additional six-year terms from 2024 would run out. What he has done is provide the constitutional grounds to retain power as president. It creates a highly credible option without committing him to it.

And the uncertainty matters. Because as long as members of the elite are unsure whether Putin will take up the option to remain president, they are kept in check.

Broader constitutional reform

With the flurry of interest around Putin’s announcement, we should not lose sight of his moves to further strengthen the presidency. As part of the broader constitutional reform package, Russia’s existing “super-presidency” will gain additional powers, such as the authority to fire top-tier judges and to block legislation when the legislature has overridden a presidential veto (in other words, a “super-veto”).

The proposals also put the autonomy of local self-government at risk, with Moscow and regional executives gaining the constitutional power to hire and fire officials who are not even technically part of the state. And the president now has a formalised role as “general leader” of the government. Putin is creating the “Great Presidency”.

However, the majority of constitutional changes do not relate to the presidency – they have different purposes. Firstly, to revitalise support for the regime which took a hit following unpopular pension reforms in 2018. Secondly, to distract or appease those worried by Putin remaining in a strengthened presidency. And perhaps most significantly, to boost turnout in the nationwide vote on reforms.

This desire to re-energise popular support becomes apparent as the changes – some of which will have to be inserted rather awkwardly into the constitution’s structure – focus on three elements aimed squarely at improving the regime’s appeal: increased material support from the state for citizens, including indexing state pensions; an emphasis on “traditional values”, including a declaration that marriage can only be a union between a man and a woman; and increased Russian sovereignty, including a “nationalisation” of the elite, with a constitutional ban on top-level officials having bank accounts abroad. 

Constitutional reform is, moreover, the most visible part of a broader political transformation already underway, including a major propaganda drive. Putin has promised a significant increase in resources for its “maternity capital” programme, putting more money in the pockets of young Russian families.

And he has instructed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s government to focus on delivering his “national projects” – goals aimed at improving Russians’ lives across a range of areas, from infrastructure to education and healthcare.

Taking advantage of several imminent historical milestones is also on the cards. It has been reported Putin will sign the constitutional reform bill on March 18 – the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And May 9 is the 75th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War (the Russian term for the Second World War), with foreign dignitaries invited to attend events in Moscow.

Putin has also been filling the airwaves with a high-production-values series called “20 Questions for Vladimir Putin”, as well as holding public meetings with citizens in provinces such as Cherepovets and Ivanovo. There is a clear aim to demonstrate the president is not only still in control, but also concerned with the well-being of everyday Russians.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2021 the Kremlin knows that, to maintain its control of a super-majority of seats in the State Duma, its ratings-raising drive has to work – even if it does always have the option of using manifestly authoritarian methods for realising desired election results. A proposal to call early State Duma elections was made during the second reading of Putin’s reform bill, but was quickly withdrawn after Putin spoke out against the idea.

Russia’s complex architecture of “power”

Throughout this transformation, maintaining control of the elite – particularly of the siloviki – is key for Putin. A reshuffling and removal of senior officials in the Procuracy has seen Yury Chaika replaced as general prosecutor by Ivan Krasnov, previously a deputy chair of the Investigative Committee, which is widely seen as a rival structure in Russia’s complex architecture of “power” bodies.

When considered alongside the constitutional changes giving the president broader powers in appointing regional prosecutors, this is textbook “divide and rule”. Power balancing is also on display with the Security Council, as the job description for Dmitry Medvedev’s new role as its deputy chair could provide fertile ground for clashes with the body’s secretary, Nikolai Patrushev.

Pitting rival patronal networks against each other means Putin can keep rivals in check within the broader structure of the “Great Presidency”, while staying firmly in control himself.

The prospect of Putin remaining president is unlikely to be popular. According to data from independent Russian polling agency the Levada Centre, only 27 per cent of Russians want Putin to stay in the post after 2024. This figure could, of course, change in either direction as the prospect becomes more real for Russians. But if Putin’s announcement galvanises mass opposition, the authorities may well use responses to the COVID-19 outbreak to keep protesters at bay – something already on display in Moscow.

What this all means for Russia is that, despite the drama, considerable uncertainty remains following Putin’s announcement. What we can say for certain, however, is that it dashes hopes of serious political change any time soon.




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In a COVID-19 World, Russia Sticks to International Distancing

29 March 2020

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
While a global response is needed against the coronavirus crisis, Russia does not see it as in its interests to contribute – and in fact the Kremlin is using the crisis to further destabilise the world.

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Young woman wearing a face mask in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, Moscow. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

Persistent internet rumours claiming the coronavirus outbreak originated from a secret American pharmaceutical company with the aim of destroying China from within were quickly discredited. Pop culture fans recognised the supposed activities of the Umbrella Corporation as being from the famous Japanese video games series Resident Evil.

However, although fake news, it can likely be attributed to Russian trolls conducting this and other similar activities online, especially when considered within the wider context of how the Russian regime is using this worldwide crisis to further destabilize the West and test its resolve.

Russian trolls never sleep

Russia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic - ‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’ - while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.

For the domestic audience in Russia, some media are reporting the pandemic marks the collapse of the Western world and liberalism altogether, calling it a form of collective punishment. Other point out how fast liberal democracies have curbed individual and entrepreneurial freedoms in order to slow down the viral outbreak, and seek to diminish the credibility of the Western response to the crisis.

Exploiting the coronavirus crisis in this way is a new low in Russia’s wider political warfare campaign to undermine global governance overall, as these activities are detrimental to people's very safety. For example, in Ukraine, it is thought a Russian-engineered disinformation operation may have caused the outburst of violence in the city of Novi Sanzhary following the arrival of evacuees from China.

In the military realm, fake news has been targeting the US-led multinational exercise DEFENDER-Europe 2020. The Russian leadership criticized the exercise as an offensive ‘anti-Russian scenario’ but then used accompanying propaganda that it could actively facilitate the spread of COVID-19 across Europe because of the arrival and movement of large numbers of troops.

The large-scale drills were planned to involve 18 participating nations and should have taken place across ten European countries from April to May 2020. But the exercise has now been scaled down – as has the Russian disinformation targeting it.

And while the world is pre-occupied with managing COVID-19, Moscow is able to grow bolder in its provocations. Recent air incursions were reported into Irish controlled airspace as well as over the North Sea. Although this practice is - unfortunately - routine as part of Russian constant military sabre-rattling, it does increase the risk of tactical errors and miscalculation.

Self-isolation, Kremlin style

Meanwhile, just when a global response is needed to fight the pandemic, Moscow’s response has been, at best, self-serving. On March 22, Russian military reportedly started sending medical equipment and supplies to Italy. While the nature and the scope of this assistance can be doubted, it still represents a charm offensive for Russia to be brought back in from the cold in Europe - since successive Italian leaderships have been accommodating to the Kremlin. And sending virologists to Italy might also be a useful learning curve for Russia’s regime.

But within Russia itself, Vladimir Putin does have to face the problem that, on top of all the projected social and healthcare costs, the coronavirus is also having negative political consequences. On March 25, the ‘popular vote’ - a mock referendum designed to rubber-stamp Putin’s recent constitutional changes - was pushed back. And the Ministry of Communications has been forced to postpone a major exercise aimed at ensuring the ‘stable and safe operation of Runet’ - namely eliminating vulnerabilities in the Russian ‘sovereign’ internet to potential external threats.

Certainly it would be naive to believe Moscow will put self-interest to one side during this pandemic. ‘International distancing’ is not new for the Kremlin, and Russia has been practising self-isolation since at least 2008 through its own actions, most notably in Georgia and Ukraine.

Its self-perception as a ‘besieged fortress’ is being reinforced by this crisis and Russia will, at the very least, likely come out of the crisis feeling vindicated in its view that internationalism is dying or already dead.

With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.

COVID-19 provides a major intelligence-gathering opportunity for Moscow to learn how well others can implement wartime-like planning in peacetime. In a rapidly changing world, Russia is still Russia.




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Virtual Roundtable: Russia in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Invitation Only Research Event

1 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:30pm

Event participants

Mathieu Boulegue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Nikolai Petrov, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Ekaterina Schulmann, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

Politically speaking, Russia has been isolating itself from the West for some years now, feeding its citizens a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality. Its uniqueness, however, means its approach to - and outcome from - the COVID-19 pandemic will also be distinctive. 

This webinar will explore how Russia is adapting its internal politics and its international relations to the ‘new normal’ of today. 

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Virtual Roundtable: Russia in MENA

Invitation Only Research Event

3 April 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Event participants

Nikolay Kozhanov, Research Associate Professor, Gulf Studies Center,  Qatar University, Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Sanam Vakil, Senior Research Fellow, Project Director, Future Dynamics of the Gulf, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

Russia’s Middle East policy is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors (such as the ongoing confrontation with the West) and new trends. The Kremlin is keen to maintain its position as an influential external broker. However, it is not confident Russia would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other regional players. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and shape the agenda according to its needs and resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a challenging, but not impossible, task.

Nikolay Kozhanov will offer remarks on the changes that have taken place in Russia’s strategy since the publication of his research paper Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (2018), while Tim Eaton will explore Russia's increasing engagement in the Libyan conflict, and its now central role in Libya's diplomacy.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Can Ukraine’s Appeal to the International Courts Work?

3 April 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
First in a two-part series analysing why Ukraine’s attempts at international justice are worth taking - and outlining how the impact goes far beyond just the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Part one examines the response of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the possibility of holding Russia accountable as a state.

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Rally in support of keeping Crimea as part of Ukraine. Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images.

Russia’s ongoing occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and support of separatist hostilities in the eastern provinces of Donbas have resulted in 1.5 million internally displaced persons, 3,000 civilians killed, and a growing list of alleged violations of international law and socio-economic hardship.

But Ukraine is struggling in its efforts to hold Russia accountable – either as a state or through individual criminal responsibility - as it cannot unilaterally ask any international court to give an overall judgment on the conflict.

So it focuses on narrower issues, referring them to authorised adjudication and arbitration platforms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), European Court of Human Rights, UNCLOS arbitration, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). These options are limited, but still worth taking - and their relevance is proving to be far wider than the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Policy of cultural eradication

In 2017, Ukraine initiated proceedings against Russia at the ICJ on the basis of two international treaties: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), with regard to Crimea; and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT), with regard to Donbas.

Under the CERD, Ukraine alleges Russia has carried out a policy of cultural eradication of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea, including enforced disappearances, no education in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, and the ban of the Mejlis, the main representative body of the Crimean Tatars.

Under the ICSFT, Ukraine alleges Russia has supported terrorism by providing funds, weapons and training to illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine. In particular Ukraine alleges Russian state responsibility - through its proxies - for downing the infamous MH17 flight.

Both these treaties are binding upon Ukraine and Russia and entitle an individual state party to refer a dispute concerning them to the ICJ, but certain procedural pre-conditions must first be exhausted. These include a failed attempt to settle a dispute either through negotiations or the CERD Committee (for the CERD) or unsuccessful negotiations and arbitration (for the ICSFT).

Russia challenged Ukraine’s compliance with the pre-conditions, but the ICJ disagreed with Russia’s submission that Ukraine had to resort both to negotiations and to the CERD Committee. For the first time, the court clarified these procedures under the CERD were two means to reach the same aim, and therefore alternative and not cumulative.

Requiring states to avail of both procedures before going to the ICJ would undermine the very purpose of the CERD to eliminate racial discrimination promptly, and ensure the availability of effective domestic protection and remedies.

The relevance of this clarification transcends the Ukraine-Russia dispute. With the rise of discriminatory practices, from populist hate-filled rhetoric endangering vulnerable communities to large-scale persecution such as that of the Rohingyas, the UN’s principal judicial body is sending a clear larger message to the world: such practices are unacceptable and must be dealt with expeditiously and efficiently. If states fail to do so, there are now fewer procedural impediments to do it internationally.

The ICJ also confirmed Ukraine had complied with both procedural preconditions under the ICSFT and that it would give judgement on the alleged failure of Russia to take measures to prevent the financing of terrorism. The outcome of this will be of great importance to the international community, given the general lack of international jurisprudence on issues of terrorism.

The court’s interpretation of knowledge and intent in terrorism financing, as well as clarification of the term ‘funds’, is particularly relevant both for the Ukraine-Russia case and for international law.

As the final judgement may take several years, the ICJ granted some provisional measures requested by Ukraine in April 2017. The court obliged Russia to ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian and enable the functioning of the Crimean Tatar representative institutions, including the Mejlis.

When Russia contested Ukraine’s references to the alleged Stalin-ordered deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the rule of law in the Soviet Union being hypocritical, by arguing that history did not matter, the court disagreed.

In fact, Judge James Crawford emphasised the relevance of the ‘historical persecution’ of Crimean Tatars and the role of Mejlis in advancing and protecting their rights in Crimea ‘at the time of disruption and change’.

These conclusions are important reminders that the historical inheritance of injustices inflicted on vulnerable groups should be taken into account when nations address their imperial legacies.

The court’s provisional measures and Judge Crawford’s position are particularly relevant in light of Russia’s policy of the total - territorial, historical, cultural – ‘russification’ of Crimea, as they highlight the role of the historical background for assessing the alleged discriminatory and prosecutorial policy of Russia’s occupying authorities against the Crimean Tatars.

The ICJ’s judgement on the merits of this as well as other human rights, and terrorism issues of Crimea and Donbas will be an important consideration for the international community in its view of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict and the sanctions policy against Russia.

The development of this case also has a mutually catalysing impact on Ukraine’s efforts to establish those individually criminally responsible for atrocities in Crimea and Donbas, through domestic proceedings and through the International Criminal Court.

Ukraine’s attempts to seek individual criminal responsibility for gross abuses in Donbas and Crimea at the International Criminal Court (ICC) are assessed in part two of this series, coming soon.




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Sanctions on Russia: Will Asia Help?

Invitation Only Research Event

17 April 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am

Event participants

Maria Shagina, CEES Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Eastern European Studies, University of Zurich
Chair: Richard Connolly, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

It has been nearly six years since the West imposed sanctions on Russia, targeting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. The sanctions exposed Russia's key vulnerabilities - dependence on Western capital and advanced technology, with knock-on effects in other sectors.

In an effort to offset the impact of sanctions, Russia has attempted a diversification strategy to non-Western states. The Asia-Pacific has emerged as a new export market for hydrocarbons and weapons, and as the main alternative to Western capital. Russia's self-proclaimed 'turn to the East' is intended to alleviate the sanctions burden and buy valuable time to come up with long-term solutions; but it has come at a high cost. 

In this discussion, Maria Shagina will examine the ways in which Asian states have helped mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and the pitfalls associated with it, while assessing the implications of Russia's pivot to Asia on its import substitution policy, and the effectiveness of sanctions overall.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic

9 April 2020

Keir Giles

Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common.

2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia

An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.




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Online Study Group: All Lukashenka’s Men: The Belarusian Ruling Elite and Why It Matters

Invitation Only Research Event

22 April 2020 - 2:30pm to 4:00pm

Event participants

Ryhor Astapenia, Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

Soon after assuming power in 1994, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka turned his back on democratic norms and overpowered the Belarusian political elite. However, the influence of the governing elite in Belarus is growing again. It seems likely that the current governing class could rule the country after Lukashenka leaves. It is thus important to study Belarusian elites not only to understand the current regime, but also to better forecast and navigate the political system that will one day replace it. 

This study group aims to disentangle how the Belarusian political system works, outline the types of individuals that make up the Belarusian ruling elite, assess the interaction of the elite and institutions with the West, and suggest changes that Western political actors might make to their approach to the Belarusian ruling class.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Virtual Roundtable: The Impact of COVID-19 on the Wider FSU Region

Invitation Only Research Event

21 April 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am

Event participants

Christopher Davis, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Population Ageing, University of Oxford
Nino Evgenidze, Executive Director, EPRC
Katya Gorchinskaya, Journalist, former CEO of Hromadske.ua
Konstantin Sokulskiy, Head of Governance, UNDP, Kazakhstan
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

COVID-19 has put a serious strain on healthcare and economic systems around the world. This virtual roundtable will explore its impact on Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Through a comparative examination of government and society responses, this event will show how COVID-19 has laid bare the region’s broader social, economic and political challenges.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Belarusians Left Facing COVID-19 Alone

16 April 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Anaïs Marin

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The way the epidemic is being mismanaged creates a risk of political destabilisation and leaves the country exposed to external influence.

2020-04-16-Belarus-COVID-Football

Playing accordion in front of dummy football fans in Brest, Belarus as the country's championship continues despite the COVID-19 outbreak. Photo by SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images.

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.




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Dr Joanna Szostek

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Biography

Joanna became an associate fellow of the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme in April 2020.

She is a lecturer in political communication at the University of Glasgow and her research focuses on the mass media’s role in relations between states, particularly in the post-Soviet region.

Recently she has investigated the reception of competing political narratives among audiences in Ukraine, with funding from the European Commission. She is also working on a British Academy-funded project to explain why levels of engagement with local, national and foreign/transnational media vary within and across ‘peripheral’ Ukrainian regions.

Her research has been published in leading international peer-reviewed journals. Her professional experience includes several years at BBC Monitoring and many years of living and working in Russia and Ukraine.

She has also spent time on secondment with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and holds a doctorate in politics from the University of Oxford.

Areas of expertise

  • Political communication
  • Russian media
  • Ukrainian media
  • Strategic narratives and international influence

Past experience

2018 - presentLecturer in political communication, University of Glasgow
2015-18Marie Skłodowska-Curie research fellow, Royal Holloway University of London
2013-15Mellon fellow, UCL-SSEES




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Virtual Roundtable: Re-integration or Dis-integration: What Does the Future Hold for Occupied Donbas?

Invitation Only Research Event

28 April 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm

Event participants

Paul D’anieri, Professor of Public Policy and Political Science, University of California, Riverside
Vlad Mykhnenko, Associate Professor of Sustainable Urban Development, St Peter’s College, University of Oxford
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House

The armed conflict in Donbas has now entered its seventh year. President Zelenskyy, who came to power in May 2019, promised to end the war with Russia and bring peace to Ukraine.

Since assuming office, Zelenskyy has managed to revive the Normandy Format talks, complete military disengagement at three points along the line of contact and negotiate the release of over a hundred Ukrainians held as prisoners of war in Russia. However, ceasefire violations continue to occur frequently.

Looking at the origins of the armed conflict in Donbas and the region’s economic role in Ukraine’s economy, this event discusses the prospects for conflict resolution. Do the recent events signify an opportunity for peace? Does Zelenskyy have a viable plan for re-integrating Donbas or will the region be cut off from mainland Ukraine for the foreseeable future?

The speakers assess the strategy and track record of the Ukrainian government and its Western allies in bringing parts of the occupied Donbas under Kyiv’s control. They also review possible policy implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the conflict.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Webinar: Russian Disinformation's Golden Moment: Challenges and Responses in the COVID-19 Era

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm

Event participants

Anneli Ahonen, Head, StratCom East Task Force, European External Action Service
Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thomas Kent, Adjunct Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Senior Fellow, the Jamestown Foundation
Chairs:
James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House
Glen Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the ideal environment for malign influence to thrive as it feeds on fear and a vacuum of authoritative information. What are the current challenges posed by Russian disinformation, and how should Western nations be responding?
 
In this discussion, jointly hosted by the Jamestown Foundation and the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, the speakers will consider what best practice looks like in safeguarding Western societies against the pernicious effects of disinformation. 
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




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Victory and Memory: WW2 Narratives in Modern Day Russia and Ukraine

Invitation Only Research Event

11 May 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm
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Nina Tumarkin, Kathryn Wasserman Davis Professor of Slavic Studies; Professor of History; Director, Russian Area Studies Program, Wellesley College
Georgiy Kasianov, Head, Department of Contemporary History and Politics, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Chair: Robert Brinkley, Chairman, Steering Committee, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
In 2020 the world commemorates the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. The Russian government has organized a wide range of activities to mark the USSR’s victory, aiming to raise the already prominent role of the USSR to a new level. Moscow also uses its narrative about the war as a propaganda tool. Ukraine, which suffered disproportionally huge human losses and material destruction during WWII, is departing from its Soviet legacy by focusing commemorative efforts on honouring the victims of WWII rather than on glorifying victory. 
 
This event will analyze the evolution of the WWII narratives in Russia and Ukraine in recent years. The panellists will discuss the role of those narratives in shaping national discourses and their implications for the countries' respective futures.
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274

Department/project




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Virtual Roundtable: Land Reform in Ukraine: Is Zelenskyy's Government Getting it Right?

Invitation Only Research Event

14 May 2020 - 12:00pm to 1:30pm
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Ihor Petrashko, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Ukraine
Andriy Dykun, Chair, Ukrainian Agricultural Council
Vadim Tolpeco, Ukrlandfarming Plc
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
Ukraine is known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ thanks to its grain exports. On 31 March 2020, the Ukrainian parliament passed a landmark law ending a 19-year ban on the sale of privately owned agricultural land. Due to come into force in July 2021, the law applies to 41.5 million hectares of farmland and economists predict substantial economic gains from this liberalization.
 
This event will discuss the impact of the law on Ukraine’s agricultural sector and food security. How can the government best implement this reform and ensure that small and medium-sized agricultural companies increase their productivity? What does this change mean for Ukraine’s capacity to export grain? Can the country’s food supply withstand crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic? What role could foreign direct investors play in boosting production?
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Erratum: FTY720/fingolimod decreases hepatic steatosis and expression of fatty acid synthase in diet-induced nonalcoholic fatty liver disease in mice [Errata]




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Plasma membrane asymmetry of lipid organization: fluorescence lifetime microscopy and correlation spectroscopy analysis [Methods]

A fundamental feature of the eukaryotic cell membrane is the asymmetric arrangement of lipids in its two leaflets. A cell invests significant energy to maintain this asymmetry and uses it to regulate important biological processes, such as apoptosis and vesiculation. The dynamic coupling of the inner or cytoplasmic and outer or exofacial leaflets is a challenging open question in membrane biology. Here, we combined fluorescence lifetime imaging microscopy (FLIM) with imaging total internal reflection fluorescence correlation spectroscopy (ITIR-FCS) to differentiate the dynamics and organization of the two leaflets of live mammalian cells. We characterized the biophysical properties of fluorescent analogs of phosphatidylcholine, sphingomyelin, and phosphatidylserine in the plasma membrane of two mammalian cell lines (CHO-K1 and RBL-2H3). Because of their specific transverse membrane distribution, these probes allowed leaflet-specific investigation of the plasma membrane. We compared the results of the two methods having different temporal and spatial resolution. Fluorescence lifetimes of fluorescent lipid analogs were in ranges characteristic for the liquid ordered phase in the outer leaflet and for the liquid disordered phase in the inner leaflet. The observation of a more fluid inner leaflet was supported by free diffusion in the inner leaflet, with high average diffusion coefficients. The liquid ordered phase in the outer leaflet was accompanied by slower diffusion and diffusion with intermittent transient trapping. Our results show that the combination of FLIM and ITIR-FCS with specific fluorescent lipid analogs is a powerful tool for investigating lateral and transbilayer characteristics of plasma membrane in live cell lines.




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Functional recombinant apolipoprotein A5 that is stable at high concentrations at physiological pH [Methods]

APOA5 is a low-abundance exchangeable apolipoprotein that plays critical roles in human triglyceride (TG) metabolism. Indeed, aberrations in the plasma concentration or structure of APOA5 are linked to hypertriglyceridemia, hyperchylomicronemia, myocardial infarction risk, obesity, and coronary artery disease. While it has been successfully produced at low yield in bacteria, the resulting protein had limitations for structure-function studies due to its low solubility under physiological buffer conditions. We hypothesized that the yield and solubility of recombinant APOA5 could be increased by: i) engineering a fusion protein construct in a codon optimized expression vector, ii) optimizing an efficient refolding protocol, and iii) screening buffer systems at physiological pH. The result was a high-yield (25 mg/l) bacterial expression system that produces lipid-free APOA5 soluble at concentrations of up to 10 mg/ml at a pH of 7.8 in bicarbonate buffers. Physical characterization of lipid-free APOA5 indicated that it exists as an array of multimers in solution, and far UV circular dichroism analyses show differences in total α-helicity between acidic and neutral pH buffering conditions. The protein was functional in that it bound and emulsified multilamellar dimyristoyl-phosphatidylcholine vesicles and could inhibit postprandial plasma TG accumulation when injected into C57BL/6J mice orally gavaged with Intralipid.




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Metallopeptidase Stp1 activates the transcription factor Sre1 in the carotenogenic yeast Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous [Research Articles]

Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous is a basidiomycete yeast known as a natural producer of astaxanthin, a carotenoid of commercial interest because of its antioxidant properties. Recent studies indicated that X. dendrorhous has a functional SREBP pathway involved in the regulation of isoprenoid compound biosynthesis, which includes ergosterol and carotenoids. SREBP is a major regulator of sterol metabolism and homeostasis in mammals; characterization in fungi also provides information about its role in the hypoxia adaptation response and virulence. SREBP protease processing is required to activate SREBP pathway functions in fungi. Here, we identified and described the STP1 gene, which encodes a metallopeptidase of the M50 family involved in the proteolytic activation of the transcription factor Sre1 of the SREBP pathway, in X. dendrorhous. We assessed STP1 function in stp1 strains derived from the wild-type and a mutant of ergosterol biosynthesis that overproduces carotenoids and sterols. Bioinformatic analysis of the deduced protein predicted the presence of characteristic features identified in homologs from mammals and fungi. The stp1 mutation decreased yeast growth in the presence of azole drugs and reduced transcript levels of Sre1-dependent genes. This mutation also negatively affected the carotenoid- and sterol-overproducing phenotype. Western blot analysis demonstrated that Sre1 was activated in the yeast ergosterol biosynthesis mutant and that the stp1 mutation introduced in this strain prevented Sre1 proteolytic activation. Overall, our results demonstrate that STP1 encodes a metallopeptidase involved in proteolytic activation of Sre1 in X. dendrorhous, contributing to our understanding of fungal SREBP pathways.




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Effects of omega-O-acylceramide structures and concentrations in healthy and diseased skin barrier lipid membrane models [Research Articles]

Ceramides (Cers) with ultralong (~32-carbon) chains and -esterified linoleic acid, composing a subclass called omega-O-acylceramides (acylCers), are indispensable components of the skin barrier. Normal barriers typically contain acylCer concentrations of ~10 mol%; diminished concentrations, along with altered or missing long periodicity lamellar phase (LPP), and increased permeability accompany an array of skin disorders, including atopic dermatitis, psoriasis, and ichthyoses. We developed model membranes to investigate the effects of the acylCer structure and concentration on skin lipid organization and permeability. The model membrane systems contained six to nine Cer subclasses as well as fatty acids, cholesterol, and cholesterol sulfate; acylCer content—namely, acylCers containing sphingosine (Cer EOS), dihydrosphingosine (Cer EOdS), and phytosphingosine (Cer EOP) ranged from zero to 30 mol%. Systems with normal physiologic concentrations of acylCer mixture mimicked the permeability and nanostructure of human skin lipids (with regard to LPP, chain order, and lateral packing). The models also showed that the sphingoid base in acylCer significantly affects the membrane architecture and permeability and that Cer EOP, notably, is a weaker barrier component than Cer EOS and Cer EOdS. Membranes with diminished or missing acylCers displayed some of the hallmarks of diseased skin lipid barriers (i.e., lack of LPP, less ordered lipids, less orthorhombic chain packing, and increased permeability). These results could inform the rational design of new and improved strategies for the barrier-targeted treatment of skin diseases.




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Endocytosis of very low-density lipoproteins: an unexpected mechanism for lipid acquisition by breast cancer cells [Research Articles]

We previously described the expression of CD36 and LPL by breast cancer (BC) cells and tissues and the growth-promoting effect of VLDL observed only in the presence of LPL. We now report a model in which LPL is bound to a heparan sulfate proteoglycan motif on the BC cell surface and acts in concert with the VLDL receptor to internalize VLDLs via receptor-mediated endocytosis. We also demonstrate that gene-expression programs for lipid synthesis versus uptake respond robustly to triglyceride-rich lipoprotein availability. The literature emphasizes de novo FA synthesis and exogenous free FA uptake using CD36 as paramount mechanisms for lipid acquisition by cancer cells. We find that the uptake of intact lipoproteins is also an important mechanism for lipid acquisition and that the relative reliance on lipid synthesis versus uptake varies among BC cell lines and in response to VLDL availability. This metabolic plasticity has important implications for the development of therapies aimed at the lipid dependence of many types of cancer, in that the inhibition of FA synthesis may elicit compensatory upregulation of lipid uptake. Moreover, the mechanism that we have elucidated provides a direct connection between dietary fat and tumor biology.­.




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A nematode sterol C4{alpha}-methyltransferase catalyzes a new methylation reaction responsible for sterol diversity [Research Articles]

Primitive sterol evolution plays an important role in fossil record interpretation and offers potential therapeutic avenues for human disease resulting from nematode infections. Recognizing that C4-methyl stenol products [8(14)-lophenol] can be synthesized in bacteria while C4-methyl stanol products (dinosterol) can be synthesized in dinoflagellates and preserved as sterane biomarkers in ancient sedimentary rock is key to eukaryotic sterol evolution. In this regard, nematodes have been proposed to convert dietary cholesterol to 8(14)-lophenol by a secondary metabolism pathway that could involve sterol C4 methylation analogous to the C2 methylation of hopanoids (radicle-type mechanism) or C24 methylation of sterols (carbocation-type mechanism). Here, we characterized dichotomous cholesterol metabolic pathways in Caenorhabditis elegans that generate 3-oxo sterol intermediates in separate paths to lophanol (4-methyl stanol) and 8(14)-lophenol (4-methyl stenol). We uncovered alternate C3-sterol oxidation and 7 desaturation steps that regulate sterol flux from which branching metabolite networks arise, while lophanol/8(14)-lophenol formation is shown to be dependent on a sterol C4α-methyltransferse (4-SMT) that requires 3-oxo sterol substrates and catalyzes a newly discovered 3-keto-enol tautomerism mechanism linked to S-adenosyl-l-methionine-dependent methylation. Alignment-specific substrate-binding domains similarly conserved in 4-SMT and 24-SMT enzymes, despite minimal amino acid sequence identity, suggests divergence from a common, primordial ancestor in the evolution of methyl sterols. The combination of these results provides evolutionary leads to sterol diversity and points to cryptic C4-methyl steroidogenic pathways of targeted convergence that mediate lineage-specific adaptations.­­




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Lipid droplet-associated kinase STK25 regulates peroxisomal activity and metabolic stress response in steatotic liver [Research Articles]

Nonalcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) and nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) are emerging as leading causes of liver disease worldwide and have been recognized as one of the major unmet medical needs of the 21st century. Our recent translational studies in mouse models, human cell lines, and well-characterized patient cohorts have identified serine/threonine kinase (STK)25 as a protein that coats intrahepatocellular lipid droplets (LDs) and critically regulates liver lipid homeostasis and progression of NAFLD/NASH. Here, we studied the mechanism-of-action of STK25 in steatotic liver by relative quantification of the hepatic LD-associated phosphoproteome from high-fat diet-fed Stk25 knockout mice compared with their wild-type littermates. We observed a total of 131 proteins and 60 phosphoproteins that were differentially represented in STK25-deficient livers. Most notably, a number of proteins involved in peroxisomal function, ubiquitination-mediated proteolysis, and antioxidant defense were coordinately regulated in Stk25–/– versus wild-type livers. We confirmed attenuated peroxisomal biogenesis and protection against oxidative and ER stress in STK25-deficient human liver cells, demonstrating the hepatocyte-autonomous manner of STK25’s action. In summary, our results suggest that regulation of peroxisomal function and metabolic stress response may be important molecular mechanisms by which STK25 controls the development and progression of NAFLD/NASH.




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Quantification of bile acids: a mass spectrometry platform for studying gut microbe connection to metabolic diseases [Research Articles]

Bile acids (BAs) serve multiple biological functions, ranging from the absorption of lipids and fat-soluble vitamins to serving as signaling molecules through the direct activation of dedicated cellular receptors. Synthesized by both host and microbial pathways, BAs are increasingly understood as participating in the regulation of numerous pathways relevant to metabolic diseases, including lipid and glucose metabolism, energy expenditure, and inflammation. Quantitative analyses of BAs in biological matrices can be problematic due to their unusual and diverse physicochemical properties, making optimization of a method that shows good accuracy, precision, efficiency of extraction, and minimized matrix effects across structurally distinct human and murine BAs challenging. Herein we develop and clinically validate a stable-isotope-dilution LC/MS/MS method for the quantitative analysis of numerous primary and secondary BAs in both human and mouse biological matrices. We also utilize this tool to investigate gut microbiota participation in the generation of structurally specific BAs in both humans and mice. We examine circulating levels of specific BAs and in a clinical case-control study of age- and gender-matched type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) versus nondiabetics. BAs whose circulating levels are associated with T2DM include numerous 12α-hydroxyl BAs (taurocholic acid, taurodeoxycholic acid, glycodeoxycholic acid, deoxycholic acid, and 3-ketodeoxycholic acid), while taurohyodeoxycholic acid was negatively associated with diabetes. The LC/MS/MS-based platform described should serve as a robust, high-throughput investigative tool for studying the potential involvement of structurally specific BAs and the gut microbiome on both physiological and disease processes.




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Macrophage polarization is linked to Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2{beta}-derived lipids and cross-cell signaling in mice [Research Articles]

Phospholipases A2 (PLA2s) catalyze hydrolysis of the sn-2 substituent from glycerophospholipids to yield a free fatty acid (i.e., arachidonic acid), which can be metabolized to pro- or anti-inflammatory eicosanoids. Macrophages modulate inflammatory responses and are affected by Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2 (PLA2)β (iPLA2β). Here, we assessed the link between iPLA2β-derived lipids (iDLs) and macrophage polarization. Macrophages from WT and KO (iPLA2β–/–) mice were classically M1 pro-inflammatory phenotype activated or alternatively M2 anti-inflammatory phenotype activated, and eicosanoid production was determined by ultra-performance LC ESI-MS/MS. As a genotypic control, we performed similar analyses on macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice with selective iPLA2β overexpression in β-cells. Compared with WT, generation of select pro-inflammatory prostaglandins (PGs) was lower in iPLA2β–/–, and that of a specialized pro-resolving lipid mediator (SPM), resolvin D2, was higher; both changes are consistent with the M2 phenotype. Conversely, macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice exhibited an opposite landscape, one associated with the M1 phenotype: namely, increased production of pro-inflammatory eicosanoids (6-keto PGF1α, PGE2, leukotriene B4) and decreased ability to generate resolvin D2. These changes were not linked with secretory PLA2 or cytosolic PLA2α or with leakage of the transgene. Thus, we report previously unidentified links between select iPLA2β-derived eicosanoids, an SPM, and macrophage polarization. Importantly, our findings reveal for the first time that β-cell iPLA2β-derived signaling can predispose macrophage responses. These findings suggest that iDLs play critical roles in macrophage polarization, and we posit that they could be targeted therapeutically to counter inflammation-based disorders.




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Novel GPR120 agonist TUG891 modulates fat taste perception and preference and activates tongue-brain-gut axis in mice [Research Articles]

GPR120 is implicated as a lipid receptor in the oro-sensory detection of dietary fatty acids. However, the effects of GPR120 activation on dietary fat intake or obesity are not clearly understood. We investigated to determine whether the binding of TUG891, a novel GPR120 agonist, to lingual GPR120 modulates fat preference in mice. We explored the effects of TUG891 on obesity-related hormones and conducted behavioral choice tests on mice to better understand the physiologic relevance of the action of TUG891. In cultured mouse and human taste bud cells (TBCs), TUG891 induced a rapid increase in Ca2+ by acting on GPR120. A long-chain dietary fatty acid, linoleic acid (LA), also recruited Ca2+ via GPR120 in human and mouse TBCs. Both TUG891 and LA induced ERK1/2 phosphorylation and enhanced in vitro release of glucagon-like peptide-1 from cultured human and mouse TBCs. In situ application of TUG891 onto the tongue of anesthetized mice triggered the secretion of pancreatobiliary juice, probably via the tongue-brain-gut axis. Furthermore, lingual application of TUG891 altered circulating concentrations of cholecystokinin and adipokines, associated with decreased circulating LDL, in conscious mice. In behavioral tests, mice exhibited a spontaneous preference for solutions containing either TUG891 or LA instead of a control. However, addition of TUG891 to a solution containing LA significantly curtailed fatty acid preference. Our study demonstrates that TUG891 binds to lingual GPR120 receptors, activates the tongue-brain-gut axis, and modulates fat preference. These findings may support the development of new fat taste analogs that can change the approach to obesity prevention and treatment.




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Worming our way toward multiple evolutionary origins of convergent sterol pathways [Commentary]




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Separation of postprandial lipoproteins: improved purification of chylomicrons using an ApoB100 immunoaffinity method [Methods]

Elevated levels of triglyceride-rich lipoproteins (TRLs), both fasting and postprandial, are associated with increased risk for atherosclerosis. However, guidelines for treatment are defined solely by fasting lipid levels, even though postprandial lipids may be more informative. In the postprandial state, circulating lipids consist of dietary fat transported from the intestine in chylomicrons (CMs; containing ApoB48) and fat transported from the liver in VLDL (containing ApoB100). Research into the roles of endogenous versus dietary fat has been hindered because of the difficulty in separating these particles by ultracentrifugation. CM fractions have considerable contamination from VLDL (purity, 10%). To separate CMs from VLDL, we produced polyclonal antibodies against ApoB100 and generated immunoaffinity columns. TRLs isolated by ultracentrifugation of plasma were applied to these columns, and highly purified CMs were collected (purity, 90–94%). Overall eight healthy unmedicated adult volunteers (BMI, 27.2 ± 1.4 kg/m2; fasting triacylglycerol, 102.6 ± 19.5 mg/dl) participated in a feeding study, which contained an oral stable-isotope tracer (1-13C acetate). We then used this technique on plasma samples freshly collected during an 8 h human feeding study from a subset of four subjects. We analyzed fractionated lipoproteins by Western blot, isolated and derivatized triacylglycerols, and calculated fractional de novo lipogenesis. The results demonstrated effective separation of postprandial lipoproteins and substantially improved purity compared with ultracentrifugation protocols, using the immunoaffinity method. This method can be used to better delineate the role of dietary sugar and fat on postprandial lipids in cardiovascular risk and explore the potential role of CM remnants in atherosclerosis.




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High density lipoprotein and its apolipoprotein-defined subspecies and risk of dementia [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Whether HDL is associated with dementia risk is unclear. In addition to apoA1, other apolipoproteins are found in HDL, creating subspecies of HDL that may have distinct metabolic properties. We measured apoA1, apoC3, and apoJ levels in plasma and apoA1 levels in HDL that contains or lacks apoE, apoJ, or apoC3 using a modified sandwich ELISA in a case-cohort study nested within the Ginkgo Evaluation of Memory Study. We included 995 randomly selected participants and 521 participants who developed dementia during a mean of 5.1 years of follow-up. The level of total apoA1 was not significantly related to dementia risk, regardless of the coexistence of apoC3, apoJ, or apoE. Higher levels of total plasma apoC3 were associated with better cognitive function at baseline (difference in Modified Mini-Mental State Examination scores tertile 3 vs. tertile 1: 0.60; 95% CI: 0.23, 0.98) and a lower dementia risk (adjusted hazard ratio tertile 3 vs. tertile 1: 0.73; 95% CI: 0.55, 0.96). Plasma concentrations of apoA1 in HDL and its apolipoprotein-defined subspecies were not associated with cognitive function at baseline or with the risk of dementia during follow-up. Similar studies in other populations are required to better understand the association between apoC3 and Alzheimer’s disease pathology.




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Nonsynonymous SNPs in LPA homologous to plasminogen deficiency mutants represent novel null apo(a) alleles [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Plasma lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] levels are largely determined by variation in the LPA gene, which codes for apo(a). Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) have identified nonsynonymous variants in LPA that associate with low Lp(a) levels, although their effect on apo(a) function is unknown. We investigated two such variants, R990Q and R1771C, which were present in four null Lp(a) individuals, for structural and functional effects. Sequence alignments showed the R990 and R1771 residues to be highly conserved and homologous to each other and to residues associated with plasminogen deficiency. Structural modeling showed both residues to make several polar contacts with neighboring residues that would be ablated on substitution. Recombinant expression of the WT and R1771C apo(a) in liver and kidney cells showed an abundance of an immature form for both apo(a) proteins. A mature form of apo(a) was only seen with the WT protein. Imaging of the recombinant apo(a) proteins in conjunction with markers of the secretory pathway indicated a poor transit of R1771C into the Golgi. Furthermore, the R1771C mutant displayed a glycosylation pattern consistent with ER, but not Golgi, glycosylation. We conclude that R1771 and the equivalent R990 residue facilitate correct folding of the apo(a) kringle structure and mutations at these positions prevent the proper folding required for full maturation and secretion. To our knowledge, this is the first example of nonsynonymous variants in LPA being causative of a null Lp(a) phenotype.




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Exon 9-deleted CETP inhibits full length-CETP synthesis and promotes cellular triglyceride storage [Research Articles]

Cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) exists as full-length (FL) and exon 9 (E9)-deleted isoforms. The function of E9-deleted CETP is poorly understood. Here, we investigated the role of E9-deleted CETP in regulating the secretion of FL-CETP by cells and explored its possible role in intracellular lipid metabolism. CETP overexpression in cells that naturally express CETP confirmed that E9-deleted CETP is not secreted, and showed that cellular FL- and E9-deleted CETP form an isolatable complex. Coexpression of CETP isoforms lowered cellular levels of both proteins and impaired FL-CETP secretion. These effects were due to reduced synthesis of both isoforms; however, the predominate consequence of FL- and E9-deleted CETP coexpression is impaired FL-CETP synthesis. We reported previously that reducing both CETP isoforms or overexpressing FL-CETP impairs cellular triglyceride (TG) storage. To investigate this further, E9-deleted CETP was expressed in SW872 cells that naturally synthesize CETP and in mouse 3T3-L1 cells that do not. E9-deleted CETP overexpression stimulated SW872 triglyceride synthesis and increased stored TG 2-fold. Expression of E9-deleted CETP in mouse 3T3-L1 cells produced a similar lipid phenotype. In vitro, FL-CETP promotes the transfer of TG from ER-enriched membranes to lipid droplets. E9-deleted CETP also promoted this transfer, although less effectively, and it inhibited the transfer driven by FL-CETP. We conclude that FL- and E9-deleted CETP isoforms interact to mutually decrease their intracellular levels and impair FL-CETP secretion by reducing CETP biosynthesis. E9-deleted CETP, like FL-CETP, alters cellular TG metabolism and storage but in a contrary manner.




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Deficiency in ZMPSTE24 and resulting farnesyl-prelamin A accumulation only modestly affect mouse adipose tissue stores [Research Articles]

Zinc metallopeptidase STE24 (ZMPSTE24) is essential for the conversion of farnesyl–prelamin A to mature lamin A, a key component of the nuclear lamina. In the absence of ZMPSTE24, farnesyl–prelamin A accumulates in the nucleus and exerts toxicity, causing a variety of disease phenotypes. By ~4 months of age, both male and female Zmpste24–/– mice manifest a near-complete loss of adipose tissue, but it has never been clear whether this phenotype is a direct consequence of farnesyl–prelamin A toxicity in adipocytes. To address this question, we generated a conditional knockout Zmpste24 allele and used it to create adipocyte-specific Zmpste24–knockout mice. To boost farnesyl–prelamin A levels, we bred in the "prelamin A–only" Lmna allele. Gene expression, immunoblotting, and immunohistochemistry experiments revealed that adipose tissue in these mice had decreased Zmpste24 expression along with strikingly increased accumulation of prelamin A. In male mice, Zmpste24 deficiency in adipocytes was accompanied by modest changes in adipose stores (an 11% decrease in body weight, a 23% decrease in body fat mass, and significantly smaller gonadal and inguinal white adipose depots). No changes in adipose stores were detected in female mice, likely because prelamin A expression in adipose tissue is lower in female mice. Zmpste24 deficiency in adipocytes did not alter the number of macrophages in adipose tissue, nor did it alter plasma levels of glucose, triglycerides, or fatty acids. We conclude that ZMPSTE24 deficiency in adipocytes, and the accompanying accumulation of farnesyl–prelamin A, reduces adipose tissue stores, but only modestly and only in male mice.




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Monitoring the itinerary of lysosomal cholesterol in Niemann-Pick Type C1-deficient cells after cyclodextrin treatment [Research Articles]

Niemann-Pick disease type C (NPC) disease is a lipid-storage disorder that is caused by mutations in the genes encoding NPC proteins and results in lysosomal cholesterol accumulation. 2-Hydroxypropyl-β-cyclodextrin (CD) has been shown to reduce lysosomal cholesterol levels and enhance sterol homeostatic responses, but CD’s mechanism of action remains unknown. Recent work provides evidence that CD stimulates lysosomal exocytosis, raising the possibility that lysosomal cholesterol is released in exosomes. However, therapeutic concentrations of CD do not alter total cellular cholesterol, and cholesterol homeostatic responses at the ER are most consistent with increased ER membrane cholesterol. To address these disparate findings, here we used stable isotope labeling to track the movement of lipoprotein cholesterol cargo in response to CD in NPC1-deficient U2OS cells. Although released cholesterol was detectable, it was not associated with extracellular vesicles. Rather, we demonstrate that lysosomal cholesterol trafficks to the plasma membrane (PM), where it exchanges with lipoprotein-bound cholesterol in a CD-dependent manner. We found that in the absence of suitable extracellular cholesterol acceptors, cholesterol exchange is abrogated, cholesterol accumulates in the PM, and reesterification at the ER is increased. These results support a model in which CD promotes intracellular redistribution of lysosomal cholesterol, but not cholesterol exocytosis or efflux, during the restoration of cholesterol homeostatic responses.




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The citrus flavonoid nobiletin confers protection from metabolic dysregulation in high-fat-fed mice independent of AMPK [Research Articles]

Obesity, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, the increasingly common metabolic syndrome, are risk factors for CVD and type 2 diabetes that warrant novel therapeutic interventions. The flavonoid nobiletin displays potent lipid-lowering and insulin-sensitizing properties in mice with metabolic dysfunction. However, the mechanisms by which nobiletin mediates metabolic protection are not clearly established. The central role of AMP-activated protein kinase (AMPK) as an energy sensor suggests that AMPK is a target of nobiletin. We tested the hypothesis that metabolic protection by nobiletin required phosphorylation of AMPK and acetyl-CoA carboxylase (ACC) in mouse hepatocytes, in mice deficient in hepatic AMPK (Ampkβ1–/–), in mice incapable of inhibitory phosphorylation of ACC (AccDKI), and in mice with adipocyte-specific AMPK deficiency (iβ1β2AKO). We fed mice a high-fat/high-cholesterol diet with or without nobiletin. Nobiletin increased phosphorylation of AMPK and ACC in primary mouse hepatocytes, which was associated with increased FA oxidation and attenuated FA synthesis. Despite loss of ACC phosphorylation in Ampkβ1–/– hepatocytes, nobiletin suppressed FA synthesis and enhanced FA oxidation. Acute injection of nobiletin into mice did not increase phosphorylation of either AMPK or ACC in liver. In mice fed a high-fat diet, nobiletin robustly prevented obesity, hepatic steatosis, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, and it improved energy expenditure in Ampkβ1–/–, AccDKI, and iβ1β2AKO mice to the same extent as in WT controls. Thus, the beneficial metabolic effects of nobiletin in vivo are conferred independently of hepatic or adipocyte AMPK activation. These studies further underscore the therapeutic potential of nobiletin and begin to clarify possible mechanisms.




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Role of angiopoietin-like protein 3 in sugar-induced dyslipidemia in rhesus macaques: suppression by fish oil or RNAi [Research Articles]

Angiopoietin-like protein 3 (ANGPTL3) inhibits lipid clearance and is a promising target for managing cardiovascular disease. Here we investigated the effects of a high-sugar (high-fructose) diet on circulating ANGPTL3 concentrations in rhesus macaques. Plasma ANGPTL3 concentrations increased ~30% to 40% after 1 and 3 months of a high-fructose diet (both P < 0.001 vs. baseline). During fructose-induced metabolic dysregulation, plasma ANGPTL3 concentrations were positively correlated with circulating indices of insulin resistance [assessed with fasting insulin and the homeostatic model assessment of insulin resistance (HOMA-IR)], hypertriglyceridemia, adiposity (assessed as leptin), and systemic inflammation [C-reactive peptide (CRP)] and negatively correlated with plasma levels of the insulin-sensitizing hormone adropin. Multiple regression analyses identified a strong association between circulating APOC3 and ANGPTL3 concentrations. Higher baseline plasma levels of both ANGPTL3 and APOC3 were associated with an increased risk for fructose-induced insulin resistance. Fish oil previously shown to prevent insulin resistance and hypertriglyceridemia in this model prevented increases of ANGPTL3 without affecting systemic inflammation (increased plasma CRP and interleukin-6 concentrations). ANGPTL3 RNAi lowered plasma concentrations of ANGPTL3, triglycerides (TGs), VLDL-C, APOC3, and APOE. These decreases were consistent with a reduced risk of atherosclerosis. In summary, dietary sugar-induced increases of circulating ANGPTL3 concentrations after metabolic dysregulation correlated positively with leptin levels, HOMA-IR, and dyslipidemia. Targeting ANGPTL3 expression with RNAi inhibited dyslipidemia by lowering plasma TGs, VLDL-C, APOC3, and APOE levels in rhesus macaques.




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Alirocumab, evinacumab, and atorvastatin triple therapy regresses plaque lesions and improves lesion composition in mice [Research Articles]

Atherosclerosis-related CVD causes nearly 20 million deaths annually. Most patients are treated after plaques develop, so therapies must regress existing lesions. Current therapies reduce plaque volume, but targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins with intensive combinations that include alirocumab or evinacumab, monoclonal antibodies against cholesterol-regulating proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 and angiopoietin-like protein 3, may provide more benefit. We investigated the effect of such lipid-lowering interventions on atherosclerosis in APOE*3-Leiden.CETP mice, a well-established model for hyperlipidemia. Mice were fed a Western-type diet for 13 weeks and thereafter matched into a baseline group (euthanized at 13 weeks) and five groups that received diet alone (control) or with treatment [atorvastatin; atorvastatin and alirocumab; atorvastatin and evinacumab; or atorvastatin, alirocumab, and evinacumab (triple therapy)] for 25 weeks. We measured effects on cholesterol levels, plaque composition and morphology, monocyte adherence, and macrophage proliferation. All interventions reduced plasma total cholesterol (37% with atorvastatin to 80% with triple treatment; all P < 0.001). Triple treatment decreased non-HDL-C to 1.0 mmol/l (91% difference from control; P < 0.001). Atorvastatin reduced atherosclerosis progression by 28% versus control (P < 0.001); double treatment completely blocked progression and diminished lesion severity. Triple treatment regressed lesion size versus baseline in the thoracic aorta by 50% and the aortic root by 36% (both P < 0.05 vs. baseline), decreased macrophage accumulation through reduced proliferation, and abated lesion severity. Thus, high-intensive cholesterol-lowering triple treatment targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins regresses atherosclerotic lesion area and improves lesion composition in mice, making it a promising potential approach for treating atherosclerosis.




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Role of pyruvate kinase M2 in oxidized LDL-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation [Research Articles]

Pyruvate kinase M2 (PKM2) links metabolic and inflammatory dysfunction in atherosclerotic coronary artery disease; however, its role in oxidized LDL (Ox-LDL)-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation is unknown and therefore was studied. In recombinant mouse granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor-differentiated murine bone marrow-derived macrophages, early (1–6 h) Ox-LDL treatment induced PKM2 tyrosine 105 phosphorylation and promotes its nuclear localization. PKM2 regulates aerobic glycolysis and inflammation because PKM2 shRNA or Shikonin abrogated Ox-LDL-induced hypoxia-inducible factor-1α target genes lactate dehydrogenase, glucose transporter member 1, interleukin 1β (IL-1β) mRNA expression, lactate, and secretory IL-1β production. PKM2 inhibition significantly increased Ox-LDL-induced ABCA1 and ABCG1 protein expression and NBD-cholesterol efflux to apoA1 and HDL. PKM2 shRNA significantly inhibited Ox-LDL-induced CD36, FASN protein expression, DiI-Ox-LDL binding and uptake, and cellular total cholesterol, free cholesterol, and cholesteryl ester content. Therefore, PKM2 regulates lipid uptake and efflux. DASA-58, a PKM2 activator, downregulated LXR-α, ABCA1, and ABCG1, and augmented FASN and CD36 protein expression. Peritoneal macrophages showed similar results. Ox-LDL induced PKM2- SREBP-1 interaction and FASN expression in a PKM2-dependent manner. Therefore, this study suggests a role for PKM2 in Ox-LDL-induced aerobic glycolysis, inflammation, and macrophage foam cell formation.




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Hepatic PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation during fasting [Research Articles]

Lipid droplets (LDs) are energy-storage organelles that are coated with hundreds of proteins, including members of the perilipin (PLIN) family. PLIN5 is highly expressed in oxidative tissues, including the liver, and is thought to play a key role in uncoupling LD accumulation from lipotoxicity; however, the mechanisms behind this action are incompletely defined. We investigated the role of hepatic PLIN5 in inflammation and lipotoxicity in a murine model under both fasting and refeeding conditions and in hepatocyte cultures. PLIN5 ablation with antisense oligonucleotides triggered a pro-inflammatory response in livers from mice only under fasting conditions. Similarly, PLIN5 mitigated lipopolysaccharide- or palmitic acid-induced inflammatory responses in hepatocytes. During fasting, PLIN5 was also required for the induction of autophagy, which contributed to its anti-inflammatory effects. The ability of PLIN5 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation were dependent upon signaling through sirtuin 1 (SIRT1), which is known to be activated in response to nuclear PLIN5 under fasting conditions. Taken together, these data show that PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent FA-induced inflammation as a means to maintain hepatocyte homeostasis during periods of fasting and FA mobilization.




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Serum amyloid A is not incorporated into HDL during HDL biogenesis [Research Articles]

Liver-derived serum amyloid A (SAA) is present in plasma where it is mainly associated with HDL and from which it is cleared more rapidly than are the other major HDL-associated apolipoproteins. Although evidence suggests that lipid-free and HDL-associated forms of SAA have different activities, the pathways by which SAA associates and disassociates with HDL are poorly understood. In this study, we investigated SAA lipidation by hepatocytes and how this lipidation relates to the formation of nascent HDL particles. We also examined hepatocyte-mediated clearance of lipid-free and HDL-associated SAA. We prepared hepatocytes from mice injected with lipopolysaccharide or an SAA-expressing adenoviral vector. Alternatively, we incubated primary hepatocytes from SAA-deficient mice with purified SAA. We analyzed conditioned media to determine the lipidation status of endogenously produced and exogenously added SAA. Examining the migration of lipidated species, we found that SAA is lipidated and forms nascent particles that are distinct from apoA-I-containing particles and that apoA-I lipidation is unaltered when SAA is overexpressed or added to the cells, indicating that SAA is not incorporated into apoA-I-containing HDL during HDL biogenesis. Like apoA-I formation, generation of SAA-containing particles was dependent on ABCA1, but not on scavenger receptor class B type I. Hepatocytes degraded significantly more SAA than apoA-I. Taken together, our results indicate that SAA’s lipidation and metabolism by the liver is independent of apoA-I and that SAA is not incorporated into HDL during HDL biogenesis.




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Model systems for studying the assembly, trafficking, and secretion of apoB lipoproteins using fluorescent fusion proteins [Research Articles]

apoB exists as apoB100 and apoB48, which are mainly found in hepatic VLDLs and intestinal chylomicrons, respectively. Elevated plasma levels of apoB-containing lipoproteins (Blps) contribute to coronary artery disease, diabetes, and other cardiometabolic conditions. Studying the mechanisms that drive the assembly, intracellular trafficking, secretion, and function of Blps remains challenging. Our understanding of the intracellular and intraorganism trafficking of Blps can be greatly enhanced, however, with the availability of fusion proteins that can help visualize Blp transport within cells and between tissues. We designed three plasmids expressing human apoB fluorescent fusion proteins: apoB48-GFP, apoB100-GFP, and apoB48-mCherry. In Cos-7 cells, transiently expressed fluorescent apoB proteins colocalized with calnexin and were only secreted if cells were cotransfected with microsomal triglyceride transfer protein. The secreted apoB-fusion proteins retained the fluorescent protein and were secreted as lipoproteins with flotation densities similar to plasma HDL and LDL. In a rat hepatoma McA-RH7777 cell line, the human apoB100 fusion protein was secreted as VLDL- and LDL-sized particles, and the apoB48 fusion proteins were secreted as LDL- and HDL-sized particles. To monitor lipoprotein trafficking in vivo, the apoB48-mCherry construct was transiently expressed in zebrafish larvae and was detected throughout the liver. These experiments show that the addition of fluorescent proteins to the C terminus of apoB does not disrupt their assembly, localization, secretion, or endocytosis. The availability of fluorescently labeled apoB proteins will facilitate the exploration of the assembly, degradation, and transport of Blps and help to identify novel compounds that interfere with these processes via high-throughput screening.




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Composition-function analysis of HDL subpopulations: influence of lipid composition on particle functionality [Research Articles]

The composition-function relationship of HDL particles and its effects on the mechanisms driving coronary heart disease (CHD) is poorly understood. We tested the hypothesis that the functionality of HDL particles is significantly influenced by their lipid composition. Using a novel 3D-separation method, we isolated five different-sized HDL subpopulations from CHD patients who had low preβ-1 functionality (low-F) (ABCA1-dependent cholesterol-efflux normalized for preβ-1 concentration) and controls who had either low-F or high preβ-1 functionality (high-F). Molecular numbers of apoA-I, apoA-II, and eight major lipid classes were determined in each subpopulation by LC-MS. The average number of lipid molecules decreased from 422 in the large spherical α-1 particles to 57 in the small discoid preβ-1 particles. With decreasing particle size, the relative concentration of free cholesterol (FC) decreased in α-mobility but not in preβ-1 particles. Preβ-1 particles contained more lipids than predicted; 30% of which were neutral lipids (cholesteryl ester and triglyceride), indicating that these particles were mainly remodeled from larger particles not newly synthesized. There were significant correlations between HDL-particle functionality and the concentrations of several lipids. Unexpectedly, the phospholipid:FC ratio was significantly correlated with large-HDL-particle functionality but not with preβ-1 functionality. There was significant positive correlation between particle functionality and total lipids in high-F controls, indicating that the lipid-binding capacity of apoA-I plays a major role in the cholesterol efflux capacity of HDL particles. Functionality and lipid composition of HDL particles are significantly correlated and probably both are influenced by the lipid-binding capacity of apoA-I.




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A human-like bile acid pool induced by deletion of hepatic Cyp2c70 modulates effects of FXR activation in mice [Research Articles]

Bile acids (BAs) facilitate intestinal absorption of lipid-soluble nutrients and modulate various metabolic pathways through the farnesoid X receptor (FXR) and Takeda G-protein-coupled receptor 5. These receptors are targets for therapy in cholestatic and metabolic diseases. However, dissimilarities in BA metabolism between humans and mice complicate translation of preclinical data. Cytochrome P450 family 2 subfamily c polypeptide 70 (CYP2C70) was recently proposed to catalyze the formation of rodent-specific muricholic acids (MCAs). With CRISPR/Cas9-mediated somatic genome editing, we generated an acute hepatic Cyp2c70 knockout mouse model (Cyp2c70ako) to clarify the role of CYP2C70 in BA metabolism in vivo and evaluate whether its activity modulates effects of pharmacologic FXR activation on cholesterol homeostasis. In Cyp2c70ako mice, chenodeoxycholic acid (CDCA) increased at the expense of βMCA, resulting in a more hydrophobic human-like BA pool. Tracer studies demonstrated that, in vivo, CYP2C70 catalyzes the formation of βMCA primarily by sequential 6β-hydroxylation and C7-epimerization of CDCA, generating αMCA as an intermediate metabolite. Physiologically, the humanized BA composition in Cyp2c70ako mice blunted the stimulation of fecal cholesterol disposal in response to FXR activation compared with WT mice, predominantly due to reduced stimulation of transintestinal cholesterol excretion. Thus, deletion of hepatic Cyp2c70 in adult mice translates into a human-like BA pool composition and impacts the response to pharmacologic FXR activation. This Cyp2c70ako mouse model may be a useful tool for future studies of BA signaling and metabolism that informs human disease development and treatment.




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Tissue-specific analysis of lipid species in Drosophila during overnutrition by UHPLC-MS/MS and MALDI-MSI [Research Articles]

Diets high in calories can be used to model metabolic diseases, including obesity and its associated comorbidities, in animals. Drosophila melanogaster fed high-sugar diets (HSDs) exhibit complications of human obesity including hyperglycemia, hyperlipidemia, insulin resistance, cardiomyopathy, increased susceptibility to infection, and reduced longevity. We hypothesize that lipid storage in the high-sugar-fed fly’s fat body (FB) reaches a maximum capacity, resulting in the accumulation of toxic lipids in other tissues or lipotoxicity. We took two approaches to characterize tissue-specific lipotoxicity. Ultra-HPLC-MS/MS and MALDI-MS imaging enabled spatial and temporal localization of lipid species in the FB, heart, and hemolymph. Substituent chain length was diet dependent, with fewer odd chain esterified FAs on HSDs in all sample types. By contrast, dietary effects on double bond content differed among organs, consistent with a model where some substituent pools are shared and others are spatially restricted. Both di- and triglycerides increased on HSDs in all sample types, similar to observations in obese humans. Interestingly, there were dramatic effects of sugar feeding on lipid ethers, which have not been previously associated with lipotoxicity. Taken together, we have identified candidate endocrine mechanisms and molecular targets that may be involved in metabolic disease and lipotoxicity.




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ANGPTL3, PCSK9, and statin therapy drive remarkable reductions in hyperlipidemia and atherosclerosis in a mouse model [Commentary]




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Is CYP2C70 the key to new mouse models to understand bile acids in humans? [Commentary]




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Erratum: Unequivocal evidence for endogenous geranylgeranoic acid biosynthesized from mevalonate in mammalian cells [Errata]