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Your Home as a Learning Experience

Have you ever thought that your home might provide areas of learning experiences for your child? As a teacher of young children, I would ask parents to look at their homes as a unique way of engaging children with their immediate and daily environment. Doing so not only prepares the children for school academic learning, but also for physical, social and emotional growth.




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Home Learning for Young Children: A Daily Schedule

Establishing daily and weekly routines provides a structure for learning at home. Parents and children know how the day will unfold; routines create predictability and also anticipation for the fun and comforting things that will happen throughout the day. It can be helpful to identify a learning theme to explore together over the course of two weeks. You'll find a sample daily schedule below, with ideas for how to bring in the theme into every part of the day, from breakfast to read alouds to art and science activities. 




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Learning with laughter: an interview with Kevin McCloskey

Kevin McCloskey delivers fascinating information in digestible, user-friendly formats, which appeal to not only young readers but experienced ones as well.




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oscon: Mobile UX Design & Development for Apps - learn to craft an app that’s functional and fun to use http://t.co/L8kTLaxbYH #oscon #tutorial

oscon: Mobile UX Design & Development for Apps - learn to craft an app that’s functional and fun to use http://t.co/L8kTLaxbYH #oscon #tutorial




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Learning Java

If you’re new to Java—or new to programming—this best-selling book will guide you through the language features and APIs of Java 11. With fun, compelling, and realistic examples, authors Marc Loy, Patrick Niemeyer, and Daniel Leuck introduce you to Java fundamentals—including its class libraries, programming techniques, and idioms—with an eye toward building real applications.




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OReilly opens up learning platform access for all government agencies to help navigate the crisis




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AI and Machine Learning for Coders

If you’re looking to make a career move from programmer to AI specialist, this is the ideal place to start. Based on Laurence Moroney's extremely successful AI courses, this introductory book provides a hands-on, code-first approach to help you build confidence while you learn key topics.You’ll understand how to implement the most common scenarios in machine learning, such as computer vision, natural language processing (NLP), and sequence modeling for web, mobile, cloud, and embedded runtimes.




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Learning Dapr

Get the authoritative guide on Actions, the new distributed programming model that works with existing and new programming languages alike. Written by one of the model’s creators, this introduction shows you how Actions not only unifies stateless, stateful, and actor programming models but also runs everywhere—in the cloud or on the edge.




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Kubeflow for Machine Learning

If you’re training a machine learning model but aren’t sure how to put it into production, this book will get you there. Kubeflow provides a collection of cloud native tools for different stages of a model’s lifecycle, from data exploration, feature preparation, and model training to model serving. This guide helps data scientists build production-grade machine learning implementations with Kubeflow and shows data engineers how to make models scalable and reliable.




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Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) will deliver one of the biggest breakthroughs in AI over the next decade, enabling algorithms to learn from their environment to achieve arbitrary goals. This exciting development avoids constraints found in traditional machine learning (ML) algorithms. This practical book shows data science and AI professionals how to perform the reinforcement process that allows a machine to learn by itself.




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velocityconf: Free webcast from our friends at @citrix 5/29 http://t.co/IOeY4U0wUP Learn to consolidate 40 load balancers and ADCs into single platform

velocityconf: Free webcast from our friends at @citrix 5/29 http://t.co/IOeY4U0wUP Learn to consolidate 40 load balancers and ADCs into single platform




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News24.com | What can South Africa learn from the coronavirus?

What is needed is political will and proper governance in implementing these temporary measures and further planning in the event that the pandemic is prolonged or the possible eventuality of political risk in the near future.




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With Debate Months Away, It’s Clear Biden Isn’t Ready for a 1-on-1 with Trump

In just under five months, both President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden will, one assumes, step onto a debate stage at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana. It’s one heck of an assumption, and for more reasons than one. We don’t know if there are going to be debates…

The post With Debate Months Away, It’s Clear Biden Isn’t Ready for a 1-on-1 with Trump appeared first on The Western Journal.




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Learn to play the drums — without actually buying a drum set

TL;DR: You don't have to buy a drum set to learn how to play the drums. Instead, just grab the Senstroke by Redison bluetooth drum kit for $189.95, on sale for 5% off as of May 9.


If you want to learn how to play the drums, then a quality set may cost you upwards of $1,000. Not only is this a hefty price to play for individuals who aren't fully committed to the instrument yet, but their massive size may be impossible to fit inside your space. Or at least your housemates may not appreciate it.

With the Senstroke by Redison Bluetooth Drum Kit and App Bundle, you can practice, play, and record on just about any surface for a much more affordable price — and it'll take up little to no space.  Read more...

More about Music, Online Learning, Mashable Shopping, Cool Gadgets, and Tech




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Sport24.co.za | New Bulls chief Rathbone can't wait to learn from Jake

The genial young administrator with a burgeoning reputation chuckles when it's pointed out to him that he can't seem to shake off 'working' for some of South Africa's biggest businessmen.




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9 Online Resources for Effective Learning

Technology is continuously leaving an indelible mark on many conceivable fields and industries, and education hasn’t been left behind either. Today, you no longer need to take admission classes and physically attend all your classes to earn a degree. All that is required of you is a working web connection and an incontestable thirst for […]

The post 9 Online Resources for Effective Learning appeared first on Dumb Little Man.




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Social Learning as a Way to Foster Productivity in the Workplace

In one way or another, social learning has been part of our lives for a long time. We spend a large amount of time at work. During this time, we are bound to learn from our colleagues and get a chance to talk on mutual topics of interest. Moreover, social media has given an outlet […]

The post Social Learning as a Way to Foster Productivity in the Workplace appeared first on Dumb Little Man.




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Article: Marketing in China: Can Machine Learning Solve the ROI Problem?

William Bao Bean, managing director of Chinaccelerator, explains how investments in artificial intelligence and machine learning are helping marketers improve user targeting and return on investment.




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School bus drivers take on a new role to help students with distance learning

School bus drivers in the Upper Grand District School Board are transporting school work instead of students.




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Campers must clear out of Oppenheimer Park by noon Saturday

With the eviction date looming for campers to leave Oppenheimer Park, B.C.'s social development minister says everyone is still expected to be out of the park by Saturday.




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Risk of serious cyber attacks on nuclear facilities underestimated, says new report

2 October 2015

20150930CyberSecurity.jpg

Workers at the Wolsong nuclear power plant participate in an anti-cyber attack exercise, Gyeongju, South Korea. Photo: Getty Images.

The risk of a serious cyber attack on civil nuclear infrastructure is growing, as facilities become ever more reliant on digital systems and make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, according to a major new report from Chatham House.

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks is the result of an 18-month study that draws on in-depth interviews with 30 leading industry practitioners based in more than eight countries. It found that the trend to digitization, when combined with a lack of executive-level awareness of the risks involved, means that nuclear plant personnel may not realize the full extent of their cyber vulnerability and are thus inadequately prepared to deal with potential attacks. 

Specific findings include:                

  • The conventional belief that all nuclear facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed, which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.
  • Search engines can readily identify critical infrastructure components with such connections.
  • Even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be breached with nothing more than a flash drive.
  • Supply chain vulnerabilities mean that equipment used at a nuclear facility risks compromise at any stage.
  • A lack of training, combined with communication breakdowns between engineers and security personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an understanding of key cyber security procedures.
  • Reactive rather than proactive approaches to cyber security contribute to the possibility that a nuclear facility might not know of a cyber attack until it is already substantially under way.

In the light of these risks, the report outlines a blend of policy and technical measures that will be required to counter the threats and meet the challenges. 

Recommendations include:

  • Developing guidelines to measure cyber security risk in the nuclear industry, including an integrated risk assessment that takes both security and safety measures into account.
  • Engaging in robust dialogue with engineers and contractors to raise awareness of the cyber security risk, including the dangers of setting up unauthorized internet connections.
  • Implementing rules, where not already in place, to promote good IT hygiene in nuclear facilities (for example to forbid the use of personal devices) and enforcing rules where they do exist.
  • Improving disclosure by encouraging anonymous information sharing and the establishment of industrial CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team).
  • Encouraging universal adoption of regulatory standards.

Editor's notes

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks, written by Caroline Baylon with Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, is embargoed until Monday 5 October 2015.

Caroline Baylon is the research associate in science, technology and cyber security at Chatham House. Roger Brunt was appointed the UK government's regulator for security in the civil nuclear industry as the director of the Office for Civil Nuclear Security after retiring from the British Army in 2004. David Livingstone is an associate fellow at Chatham House, where he has participated in a broad range of projects on national-level risk management, cyber security, counterterrorism, serious organized crime, nuclear security and space security.

Fore more information, or to request an interview with the authors, contact the press office

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




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High Resolution Clear Native Electrophoresis for In-gel Functional Assays and Fluorescence Studies of Membrane Protein Complexes

Ilka Wittig
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1215-1225
Research




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Learning the ABCs of ATP release [Signal Transduction]

ATP plays important roles outside the cell, but the mechanism by which it is arrives in the extracellular environment is not clear. Dunn et al. now show that decreases in cellular cholesterol levels mediated by the ABCG1 transporter increase ATP release by volume-regulated anion channels under hypotonic conditions. Importantly, these results may imply that cells that handle cholesterol differently might experience differential extracellular ATP release during hypotonicity.




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What Europe Can Learn From the Law and Justice Party’s Victory in Poland

15 October 2019

Dr Angelos Chryssogelos

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
The EU must remain vigilant about threats to liberal democracy in Poland, but European leaders must also accept that PiS’s electoral success is reflective of its ability to deliver on things that other political parties in Europe have long neglected.

2019-10-15-PiS.jpg

The button of a PiS supporter on election day. Photo: Getty Images.

The Polish election on 13 October resulted, as expected, in a victory for of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS).

But despite again securing a slim majority in parliament, it has not been wholly a triumph for PiS. And though there continue to be concerns about the party’s authoritarian tendencies, the election has illuminated some important nuances to its support and appeal, which hold lessons for politics across Europe.

Even though some opinion polls had suggested PiS were close to winning a supermajority in parliament that would have allowed it to pursue constitutional changes, the party fell short of that target, while it lost its majority in the Senate. Thus, while PiS may well renew its efforts to consolidate its control over the state apparatus and the media or meddle with the justice system, it becomes much more difficult with the opposition controlling the Senate and being able to scrutinize laws or have a say in the appointment of public officials.

Most importantly, the election result has shown that while Polish citizens were willing to reward a party that delivered on promises of economic growth and redistribution, they were not ready to hand a blank cheque for full-blown institutional realignment to PiS. Tellingly, many moderate candidates in PiS lists performed quite well among the party’s voters. 

Even though they rewarded a party that at times employed harsh rhetoric against Brussels, Polish voters have long expressed some of the strongest rates of support for EU membership, according to Eurobarometer surveys. The government has also faced massive protests against its most radical initiatives, such as reform of the judicial system and a law to almost completely ban abortion that was ultimately scrapped. It is therefore more likely that the party’s radicalism kept it from increasing its share, rather than helping it to secure victory.

This is not to say that the threat of illiberalism does not remain alive in Poland. But it shows that the degree of PiS dominance in Poland has never been comparable to that of Fidesz in Hungary, with which it is often compared.

This was reflected in the party’s own rhetoric. In the election campaign the government mostly focused on its economic record, recognizing that much of its support is conditional on conventional measures of political success like voter welfare. PiS may not give up on its ambition to establish a ‘new Polish republic’, but the elections have made it clear that economic stability rather than political radicalism will ensure its longevity in power – with the latter perhaps even being a liability as the party experiences fatigue in office.

Similarly, despite the government’s antagonistic stance towards the EU on various issues, PiS never entertained ideas of withdrawing from the EU, as some of its critics feared earlier in its term. With the Polish economy deeply entwined with the European market and Poland expecting – probably for the last time – to receive substantial subsidies from the next EU budget, EU membership is a necessary precondition for the economic success for which PiS is claiming credit.

With the pro-European left returning to parliament but also an extreme party of the right winning representation, the next government will have a difficult balancing act as it tries to draw on the benefits of EU membership while maintaining its defiant image towards Brussels.

Ultimately, beneath the rhetoric and the posturing, PiS is a party that has shrewdly combined popular policies from the left and right, fulfilling promises of both cultural sovereignty and economic redistribution. Its reelection should not come as a surprise given that it fulfilled its electoral pledges by delivering some of the things that many voters in western Europe also crave but that mainstream parties there have largely failed to provide.




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How Can the EU Learn the Language of Power?

3 December 2019

Vassilis Ntousas

Stavros Niarchos Foundation Academy Fellow, Europe Programme
The new EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has an eye-catching declaration of intent. But what does it mean in practice?

2019-12-03-Borrell.jpg

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy Josep Borrell answers the questions of members of the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission has finally started its work this week. In a world increasingly defined by great power competition and deprived of the certainties of a strong transatlantic partnership, this might well be the first commission where foreign and security policy issues will be equally important to internal EU ones.

Amid an escalating Sino-American rivalry, there is a growing realization in Brussels that something has to change in the way the EU thinks and acts internationally.

Charting a more successful path forward will not be easy. Josep Borrell, the EU’s new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, during his confirmation hearing, offered a hint as to what might be needed to get there: ‘The EU has to learn to use the language of power.”’

What might this mean in practice?

Four issues illustrate some of the key dilemmas ahead for the EU and its new executive.

Hard power

The most revealing of these concerns hard power.

For a union so addicted to the US security guarantee, and so used to the softer approaches of exercising its influence, this was always going to be a difficult discussion. The recent disagreement between Germany and France over the future of NATO gave a taste of how fraught and complex this discussion can be.

Underpinning it are three fundamental questions. If the EU has to enhance its capacity to defend its interests with military power, how (and how quickly) is it to move ahead, how much additional responsibility will that mean and to what degree will this responsibility need to be shouldered autonomously, potentially distancing itself from NATO or Washington? Moving forward with this agenda while balancing the competing interests of member states and preserving the fragile progress already achieved with initiatives such as PESCO will not be easy.

Discussion and debate among member states should not be discouraged, but the new commission has a role to play in ensuring that such discussion is constructive. Distracting talks about an EU army or a nuclear ‘Eurodeterrent’ should be shelved, with the focus as much as possible on acquiring tangible capabilities, getting the defence architecture right, ensuring operational readiness and spending defence budgets smartly.

How to use power

Great powers have traditionally been able to cooperate in certain areas while competing in others. Given their wide reach, powers like the US have generally not allowed disagreement on one issue to interfere with the ability to work together on others.

If the EU aspires to be a more assertive global player, it will need to grow comfortable with this compartmentalization. For example, if Brussels wants to stand up to Beijing regarding human rights, the South China Sea or issues of acquisition of European infrastructure, this should not mean that cooperation on areas such as peacekeeping, arms control or climate change needs to be blocked.

Footing the bill

Ursula von der Leyen, the new commission president, has announced that she wants an increase of 30% for external action in the 2021–27 Multi-annual Financial Framework (the EU budget). But with the Brexit budget gap looming, and little appetite to increase contributions or reduce the funds allocated to costly schemes, like the Common Agricultural Policy, compromises will have to be made for this to happen.

This will be one of the first key tests for the new commission. Power costs money, not just gestures, and therefore specific commitments already made under the Juncker mandate regarding the European Defence Fund or the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument need to be guaranteed, if not expanded.

Internal politics

None of these steps are possible if the internal workings of the EU become too dysfunctional. A stronger stance internationally would make the sometime incoherence of internal EU management more of a liability to the bloc’s credibility. For example, how can the EU advocate for the rule of law beyond its borders while some of its own member states violate the same principles? 

And there remains the perpetual question of how much more power member states are willing to cede – if any – to deliver faster and more efficient decision-making. If the bloc’s reflexes – often slow, consensual and risk averse – are out of place with the role of a modern great power, how does the commission envision introducing decision-making mechanisms, like qualified majority voting, in foreign and security policy matters?

Borrell’s résumé shows his extensive experience in handling critical policy dossiers. He is also expected to travel less than his predecessor, being mindful of the even heavier institutional work ahead, not least in working with a more politically fragmented European Council and a more politicized European Parliament.

Ultimately, learning the language of power might mean that the EU finally deals with the basics of international affairs as a coherent and cohesive actor, rather than as an occasional ensemble. This endeavour clearly lacks a fixed path or destination. But the new commission seems to be mindful that the EU will have to find new ways to use power as the world changes around it. In doing so, it should keep in mind that the language of power is best articulated not with words, but with actions.




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Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

20 April 2020

Nuclear deterrence theory, with its roots in the Cold War era, may not account for all eventualities in the 21st century. Researchers at Chatham House have worked with eight experts to produce this collection of essays examining four contested themes in contemporary policymaking on deterrence.

Dr Beyza Unal

Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme

Dr Patricia Lewis

Research Director, Conflict, Science & Transformation; Director, International Security Programme

Dr John Borrie

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Dr Jamie Shea

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Peter Watkins

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Dr Maria Rost Rublee

Associate Professor of International Relations, Monash University

Cristina Varriale

Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, RUSI

Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Dr Andrew Futter

Associate Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester

Christine Parthemore

Chief Executive Officer, Council on Strategic Risks (CSR)

2020-04-20-NuclearDeterrence.jpeg

Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarine HMS Vigilant returning to HMNB Clyde after extended deployment. The four Vanguard-class submarines form the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent force. Photo: Ministry of Defence.

Summary

  • This collection of essays explores, from the perspectives of eight experts, four areas of deterrence theory and policymaking: the underlying assumptions that shape deterrence practice; the enduring value of extended deterrence; the impact of emerging technologies; and the ‘blurring’ of the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons.
  • Nuclear deterrence theory, with its roots in the Cold War era, may not account for all eventualities in security and defence in the 21st century, given the larger number of nuclear actors in a less binary geopolitical context. It is clear that a number of present factors challenge the overall credibility of ‘classical’ nuclear deterrence, meaning that in-depth analysis is now needed.
  • Uncertainty as to the appetite to maintain the current nuclear weapons policy architecture looms large in discussions and concerns on global and regional security. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, doubts over the potential extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, heightened regional tensions in Northeast and South Asia, together with the current and likely future risks and challenges arising from global technological competition, making it all the more urgent to examine long-held assumptions in the real-world context.
  • Extended deterrence practices differ from region to region, depending on the domestic and regional landscape. Increased focus on diplomatic capabilities to reduce risks and improve the long-term outlook at regional level, including by spearheading new regional arms-control initiatives, may be a viable way forward. Addressing the bigger picture – notably including, on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang’s own threat perception – and the links between conventional and nuclear missile issues will need to remain prominent if long-term and concrete changes are to take hold.
  • Most states have long held nuclear weapons to be ‘exceptional’: their use would represent a dramatic escalation of a conflict that must never be attained. Latterly, however, some officials and scholars have made the case that the impact of the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon would not be entirely distinct from that of a large-scale conventional attack. This blurring of lines between conventional and nuclear deterrence strips nuclear weapons of their exceptional nature, in a context in which states are faced with diverse, complex and concurrent threats from multiple potential adversaries that are able to synchronize non-military and military options, up to and including nuclear forces. The use of nuclear weapons risks becoming a ‘new normal’, potentially reducing the threshold for use – to cyberattacks, for example. This has direct implications for discussions around strategic stability. 
  • While emerging technologies may offer tremendous opportunities in the modernization of nuclear weapons, they also present major risks and destabilizing challenges. Artificial intelligence, automation, and other developments in the cyber sphere affect dynamics on both the demand and supply sides of the nuclear deterrence equation. States and alliance such as NATO must adapt their deterrence thinking in light of these technological developments, and define their primary purpose and priorities in this shifting security context. Resilience planning, adaptation to the evolving security environment, threat anticipation, and consistent crisis management and incident response – as well as thinking about the mitigation measures necessary to prevent conflict escalation should deterrence fail – will all be critical in upholding nuclear deterrence as both policy and practice.




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Nuclear Tensions Must Not Be Sidelined During Coronavirus

1 May 2020

Ana Alecsandru

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
Although the pandemic means the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is postponed, the delay could be an opportunity to better the health of the NPT regime.

2020-05-01-Iran-Peace-Nuclear

Painted stairs in Tehran, Iran symbolizing hope. Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.




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Nuclear Tensions Must Not Be Sidelined During Coronavirus

1 May 2020

Ana Alecsandru

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
Although the pandemic means the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is postponed, the delay could be an opportunity to better the health of the NPT regime.

2020-05-01-Iran-Peace-Nuclear

Painted stairs in Tehran, Iran symbolizing hope. Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.




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Nuclear Tensions Must Not Be Sidelined During Coronavirus

1 May 2020

Ana Alecsandru

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
Although the pandemic means the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is postponed, the delay could be an opportunity to better the health of the NPT regime.

2020-05-01-Iran-Peace-Nuclear

Painted stairs in Tehran, Iran symbolizing hope. Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.




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Human Hepatocyte Nuclear Factor 4-{alpha} Encodes Isoforms with Distinct Transcriptional Functions [Research]

HNF4α is a nuclear receptor produced as 12 isoforms from two promoters by alternative splicing. To characterize the transcriptional capacities of all 12 HNF4α isoforms, stable lines expressing each isoform were generated. The entire transcriptome associated with each isoform was analyzed as well as their respective interacting proteome. Major differences were noted in the transcriptional function of these isoforms. The α1 and α2 isoforms were the strongest regulators of gene expression whereas the α3 isoform exhibited significantly reduced activity. The α4, α5, and α6 isoforms, which use an alternative first exon, were characterized for the first time, and showed a greatly reduced transcriptional potential with an inability to recognize the consensus response element of HNF4α. Several transcription factors and coregulators were identified as potential specific partners for certain HNF4α isoforms. An analysis integrating the vast amount of omics data enabled the identification of transcriptional regulatory mechanisms specific to certain HNF4α isoforms, hence demonstrating the importance of considering all isoforms given their seemingly diverse functions.




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