Alin Bostan, Xavier Caruso and Julien Roques
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 61 (), 609-658.
Abstract, references and article information

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Ana Caraiani, Royal Society University Research Fellow and professor of pure mathematics, Imperial College London, has been awarded the 2025 Ruth Lyttle Satter Prize in Mathematics by the American Mathematical Society (AMS). She has been honored for contributions to arithmetic geometry and number theory: in particular, the Langlands program.

From the citation

Ana Caraiani’s work is characterized by a combination of novel ideas and a fearlessness in the face of technical obstacles that would daunt almost any other researcher. This has enabled her to prove several fundamental theorems in the Langlands program.

In the joint paper with Scholze, titled “On the generic part of the cohomology of non-compact unitary Shimura varieties” (Annals of Math., 2024), Caraiani proved very general results about the torsion cohomology classes in non-compact Shimura varieties, strengthening the early results in their 2017 paper in the compact case. The proof is a tour de force, combining perfectoid spaces, a mastery of the trace formula, and a new theory of perverse sheaves in p-adic geometry. These results are of intrinsic interest (for example, they give the first indications of a characteristic p version of Arthur’s conjectures), but they also have many applications throughout the Langlands program. One spectacular application of these results is in her joint paper, “Potential automorphy over CM fields” (with Allen, Calegari, Gee, Helm, Le Hung, Newton, Scholze, Taylor, and Thorne, Annals of Math., 2023), which among other results proves the Ramanujan conjecture for Bianchi modular forms, a problem that had been thought of as being completely out of reach.

The Ramanujan conjecture is of analytic nature, asserting a bound on the eigenvalue of a certain differential operator, but the only way in which cases of it have been proved is via algebraic geometry. In particular, the original Ramanujan conjecture for modular forms was proved by Deligne in the 1970s, as a consequence of his proof of the Weil conjectures. However, in the case of Bianchi modular forms there is no direct relationship with algebraic geometry, and it seems to be impossible to make any direct deductions from the Weil conjectures. Langlands (also in the 1970s) suggested a strategy for proving the Ramanujan conjecture as a consequence of his functoriality conjecture. Caraiani and her coauthors’ proof of the Ramanujan conjecture for Bianchi modular forms proceeds via a variant of Langlands’ strategy, and in particular does not use the Weil conjectures.

Most recently with James Newton, in the paper “On the modularity of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields” (arXiv: 2301.10509), Caraiani has improved upon these results and applied them to the modularity of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields. They come close to completely solving it, with only a small number of exceptions (which constitute 0% of cases).

Response of Ana Caraiani

First, I would like to thank Joan Birman and the AMS for establishing an award that recognizes research contributions by women mathematicians. This is particularly meaningful to me because I looked to many of the previous recipients of the Satter Prize for inspiration at challenging moments in my career. It is a great honour to be selected as a recipient!

I am indebted to my many collaborators, mentors and colleagues who have generously shared their mathematical ideas with me over the years and supported me in different but crucial ways. Special thanks go to Peter Scholze for the wonderful opportunity to collaborate with him on understanding a part of the geometry and cohomology of Shimura varieties, to Richard Taylor for initiating the "ten author" collaboration, which was much more successful than we had originally expected, and to James Newton for our joyful exploration of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields. I also particularly want to acknowledge Jessica Fintzen and Toby Gee for their longstanding friendship and moral support.

Finally, I want to thank my family, especially my husband, Steven, my mother, Zoe, and my daughter, Nadia.

Biographical sketch of Ana Caraiani

Ana Caraiani was born in Bucharest, Romania, in 1984. She received a bachelor's degree in mathematics from Princeton University in 2007 and completed her PhD at Harvard University in 2012. After temporary positions at the University of Chicago, Princeton and the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), and the University of Bonn, she moved to Imperial College London in 2017, where she is currently a Royal Society University Research Fellow and Professor of Pure Mathematics. She is a Fellow of the AMS, a recipient of an EMS Prize and a New Horizons Prize in Mathematics and was an invited speaker at the 2022 ICM. 

About the prize

Awarded every two years, the Ruth Lyttle Satter Prize in Mathematics recognizes an outstanding contribution to mathematics research by a woman in the previous six years. The prize was established by Joan Birman in honor of her sister, Ruth. The 2025 prize will be recognized during the 2025 Joint Mathematics Meetings in January in Seattle.

Read more and see the list of past recipients.

Contact: AMS Communications

* * * * *

The American Mathematical Society is dedicated to advancing research and connecting the diverse global mathematical community through our publications, meetings and conferences, MathSciNet, professional services, advocacy, and awareness programs.

23 July 2020

18 August 2020

War in Ukraine: The world reaction - Brazil and Africa Audio NCapeling 9 June 2022

The ninth episode of our podcast mini-series examines perspectives from Brazil and the Africa region and the impact on their relations with Russia.

How have Brazil and Africa reacted to the war in Ukraine? With impending elections in Brazil, how is President Bolsonaro’s relationship with Putin received by the public? How will food insecurity affect African nations’ response to the war?

This episode was produced by David Dargahi and Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

How is the war in Ukraine affecting perceptions of Russia in Africa? Explainer Video NCapeling 10 June 2022

Aanu Adeoye outlines how the invasion of Ukraine is affecting perceptions of Russia across the Africa region.

He says the voting patterns at the United Nations (UN) shows that the majority of African countries are unhappy about Russia’s actions, but there is not a united voice as there is in the European Union (EU) and North America.

Certain countries are heavily influenced by historical ties with Russia going back to the Soviet era and their own struggles for liberation, while others tend to remain non-aligned whenever possible.

PREAMBLE

The Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging (SNMMI) is an international scientific and professional organization founded in 1954 to promote the science, technology, and practical application of nuclear medicine. The European Association of Nuclear Medicine (EANM) is a professional nonprofit medical association that facilitates communication worldwide between individuals pursuing clinical and research excellence in nuclear medicine. The EANM was founded in 1985. The EANM was founded in 1985. SNMMI and EANM members are physicians, technologists, and scientists specializing in the research and practice of nuclear medicine.

The SNMMI and EANM will periodically define new guidelines for nuclear medicine practice to help advance the science of nuclear medicine and to improve the quality of service to patients throughout the world. Existing practice guidelines will be reviewed for revision or renewal, as appropriate, on their fifth anniversary or sooner, if indicated.

Each practice guideline, representing a policy statement by the SNMMI/EANM, has undergone a thorough consensus process in which it has been subjected to extensive review. The SNMMI and EANM recognize that the safe and effective use of diagnostic nuclear medicine imaging requires specific training, skills, and techniques, as described in each document. Reproduction or modification of the published practice guideline by those entities not providing these services is not authorized.

These guidelines are an educational tool designed to assist practitioners in providing appropriate care for patients. They are not inflexible rules or requirements of practice and are not intended, nor should they be used, to establish a legal standard of care. For these reasons and those set forth below, both the SNMMI and the EANM caution against the use of these guidelines in litigation in which the clinical decisions of a practitioner are called into question.

The ultimate judgment regarding the propriety of any specific procedure or course of action must be made by the physician or medical physicist in light of all the circumstances presented. Thus, there is no implication that an approach differing from the guidelines, standing alone, is below the standard of care. To the contrary, a conscientious practitioner may responsibly adopt a course of action different from that set forth in the guidelines when, in the reasonable judgment of the practitioner, such course of action is indicated by the condition of the patient, limitations of available resources, or advances in knowledge or technology subsequent to publication of the guidelines.

The practice of medicine includes both the art and the science of the prevention, diagnosis, alleviation, and treatment of disease. The variety and complexity of human conditions make it impossible to always reach the most appropriate diagnosis or to predict with certainty a particular response to treatment.

Therefore, it should be recognized that adherence to these guidelines will not ensure an accurate diagnosis or a successful outcome. All that should be expected is that the practitioner will follow a reasonable course of action based on current knowledge, available resources, and the needs of the patient to deliver effective and safe medical care. The sole purpose of these guidelines is to assist practitioners in achieving this objective.

Researchers use dynamic PET imaging with target-selective tracer molecules to probe molecular processes. Kinetic models have been developed to describe these processes. The models are typically fitted to the measured PET data with the assumption that the brain is in a steady-state condition for the duration of the scan. The end results are quantitative parameters that characterize the molecular processes. The most common kinetic modeling endpoints are estimates of volume of distribution or the binding potential of a tracer. If the steady state is violated during the scanning period, the standard kinetic models may not apply. To address this issue, time-variant kinetic models have been developed for the characterization of dynamic PET data acquired while significant changes (e.g., short-lived neurotransmitter changes) are occurring in brain processes. These models are intended to extract a transient signal from data. This work in the PET field dates back at least to the 1990s. As interest has grown in imaging nonsteady events, development and refinement of time-variant models has accelerated. These new models, which we classify as belonging to the first, second, or third generation according to their innovation, have used the latest progress in mathematics, image processing, artificial intelligence, and statistics to improve the sensitivity and performance of the earliest practical time-variant models to detect and describe nonsteady phenomena. This review provides a detailed overview of the history of time-variant models in PET. It puts key advancements in the field into historical and scientific context. The sum total of the methods is an ongoing attempt to better understand the nature and implications of neurotransmitter fluctuations and other brief neurochemical phenomena.

Visual Abstract

Sophos X-Ops unveils five-year investigation tracking China-based groups targeting perimeter devices

Alba Simats
Dec 1, 2020; 19:1921-1935
Research

Montgomery Blencowe
Dec 23, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000713v1-jlr.RA120000713
Research Articles

Douglas A. Andres
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1537-1537
Images in Lipid Research

Mendelian randomization (MR) of lipid traits in coronary artery disease (CAD) has provided evidence for causal associations of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) and triglycerides (TG) in CAD, but many lipid trait genetic variants have pleiotropic effects on other cardiovascular risk factors that may bias MR associations. The goal of this study was to evaluate pleiotropic effects of lipid trait genetic variants and to account for these effects in MR of lipid traits in CAD. We performed multivariable MR using inverse variance-weighted (IVW) and MR-Egger methods in large (n ≥ 300,000) GWAS datasets. We found that 30% of lipid trait genetic variants have effects on metabolic syndrome traits, including body mass index (BMI), type 2 diabetes (T2D), and systolic blood pressure (SBP). Nonetheless, in multivariable MR analysis, LDL-C, high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C), TG, BMI, T2D, and SBP are independently associated with CAD, and each of these associations is robust to adjustment for directional pleiotropy. MR at loci linked to direct effects on HDL-C and TG suggests locus- and mechanism-specific causal effects of these factors on CAD.

Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have implicated ~380 genetic loci for plasma lipid regulation. However, these loci only explain 17-27% of the trait variance and a comprehensive understanding of the molecular mechanisms has not been achieved. In this study, we utilized an integrative genomics approach leveraging diverse genomic data from human populations to investigate whether genetic variants associated with various plasma lipid traits, namely total cholesterol (TC), high and low density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL and LDL), and triglycerides (TG), from GWAS were concentrated on specific parts of tissue-specific gene regulatory networks. In addition to the expected lipid metabolism pathways, gene subnetworks involved in ‘interferon signaling’, ‘autoimmune/immune activation’, ‘visual transduction’, and ‘protein catabolism’ were significantly associated with all lipid traits. Additionally, we detected trait-specific subnetworks, including cadherin-associated subnetworks for LDL, glutathione metabolism for HDL, valine, leucine and isoleucine biosynthesis for TC, and insulin signaling and complement pathways for TG. Finally, utilizing gene-gene relations revealed by tissue-specific gene regulatory networks, we detected both known (e.g. APOH, APOA4, and ABCA1) and novel (e.g. F2 in adipose tissue) key regulator genes in these lipid-associated subnetworks. Knockdown of the F2 gene (Coagulation Factor II, Thrombin) in 3T3-L1 and C3H10T1/2 adipocytes reduced gene expression of Abcb11, Apoa5, Apof, Fabp1, Lipc, and Cd36, reduced intracellular adipocyte lipid content, and increased extracellular lipid content, supporting a link between adipose thrombin and lipid regulation. Our results shed light on the complex mechanisms underlying lipid metabolism and highlight potential novel targets for lipid regulation and lipid-associated diseases.

Cognitive decline with age is a harmful process that can reduce quality of life. Multiple factors have been established to contribute to cognitive decline, but the overall etiology remains unknown. Here, we hypothesized that cognitive dysfunction is mediated, in part, by increased levels of inflammatory cytokines that alter allopregnanolone (AlloP) levels, an important neurosteroid in the brain. We assessed the levels and regulation of AlloP and the effects of AlloP supplementation on cognitive function in 4-month-old and 24-month-old male C57BL/6 mice. With age, the expression of enzymes involved in the AlloP synthetic pathway was decreased and corticosterone (CORT) synthesis increased. Supplementation of AlloP improved cognitive function. Interestingly, interleukin 6 (IL-6) infusion in young animals significantly reduced the production of AlloP compared with controls. It is notable that inhibition of IL-6 with its natural inhibitor, soluble membrane glycoprotein 130, significantly improved spatial memory in aged mice. These findings were supported by in vitro experiments in primary murine astrocyte cultures, indicating that IL-6 decreases production of AlloP and increases CORT levels. Our results indicate that age-related increases in IL-6 levels reduce progesterone substrate availability, resulting in a decline in AlloP levels and an increase in CORT. Furthermore, our results indicate that AlloP is a critical link between inflammatory cytokines and the age-related decline in cognitive function.

Stroke remains a leading cause of death and disability worldwide. Despite continuous advances, the identification of key molecular signatures in the hyper-acute phase of ischemic stroke is still a primary interest for translational research on stroke diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. Data integration from high-throughput -omics techniques has become crucial to unraveling key interactions among different molecular elements in complex biological contexts, such as ischemic stroke. Thus, we used advanced data integration methods for a multi-level joint analysis of transcriptomics and proteomics data sets obtained from mouse brains at 2 h after cerebral ischemia. By modeling net-like correlation structures, we identified an integrated network of genes and proteins that are differentially expressed at a very early stage after stroke. We validated 10 of these deregulated elements in acute stroke, and changes in their expression pattern over time after cerebral ischemia were described. Of these, CLDN20, GADD45G, RGS2, BAG5, and CTNND2 were next evaluated as blood biomarkers of cerebral ischemia in mice and human blood samples, which were obtained from stroke patients and patients presenting stroke-mimicking conditions. Our findings indicate that CTNND2 levels in blood might potentially be useful for distinguishing ischemic strokes from stroke-mimicking conditions in the hyper-acute phase of the disease. Furthermore, circulating GADD45G content within the first 6 h after stroke could also play a key role in predicting poor outcomes in stroke patients. For the first time, we have used an integrative biostatistical approach to elucidate key molecules in the initial stages of stroke pathophysiology and highlight new notable molecules that might be further considered as blood biomarkers of ischemic stroke.

Le ventre est l’une des parties du corps où il est plus difficile de perdre de la graisse. Souvent, la meilleure solution pour arriver à perdre de la graisse à cet endroit précis du corps consiste à manger sainement et équilibré. Cependant, quels sont les aliments qui brûlent les graisses du ventre sans danger pour la […]

L’article Quels sont les aliments qui brûlent rapidement les graisses du ventre ? est apparu en premier sur Ortho Doc France.

Recent advances in MS-based proteomics have vastly increased the quality and scope of biological information that can be derived from human samples. These advances have rendered current workflows increasingly applicable in biomedical and clinical contexts. As proteomics is poised to take an important role in the clinic, associated ethical responsibilities increase in tandem with the impact on the health, privacy, and well-being of individuals. Here we conducted and report a systematic literature review of ethical issues in clinical proteomics. We add our perspectives from a background of bioethics, the results of our accompanying paper extracting individual-sensitive results from patient samples, and the literature addressing similar issues in genomics. The spectrum of potential issues ranges from patient re-identification to incidental findings of clinical significance. The latter can be divided into actionable and unactionable findings. Some of these have the potential to be employed in discriminatory or privacy-infringing ways. However, incidental findings may also have great positive potential. A plasma proteome profile, for instance, could inform on the general health or disease status of an individual regardless of the narrow diagnostic question that prompted it. We suggest that early discussion of ethical issues in clinical proteomics is important to ensure that eventual regulations reflect the considered judgment of the community as well as to anticipate opportunities and problems that may arise as the technology matures further.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

It's almost time for Spring Training yet again, as Angels pitchers and catchers report to their Spring Training complex in Tempe, Ariz. on Feb. 12.

Right-hander Matt Harvey sustained a glute strain while participating in agility drills on Wednesday and will be out for roughly a week and a half, Angels manager Brad Ausmus said Thursday.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. 

Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism.

The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone.

This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts:

The panel considers:

• How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built?

• What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms?

• In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace?

• How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights.

Read the transcript.

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

From Iraq to Ukraine: What did governments learn? 20 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

What were the main lessons for today’s conflicts from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?

This March marks the 20th anniversary of the US and UK-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. Based primarily on unfounded fears Iraq’s WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capability was buidling up in the absence of UN inspection and constraints on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, the decision to go to war has reverberated throughout the Middle East, the intelligence communities, and Western political decision-making ever since.

In the 2002–03 period when UN inspectors were allowed back into Iraq, Hans Blix, chairman of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, were at the centre of a storm in which they were put under huge pressure to agree with the US/UK narrative on the ‘missing’ WMD.

Their problem was that the evidence they were uncovering did not support the claims, but the war went ahead – and Saddam was overthrown – despite these UN findings.

Much has changed since 2003. As the geopolitical landscape has shifted, so have geopolitics and capabilities. Today’s Russia’s war against Ukraine which includes WMD threats, cyberattacks, and an assertive disinformation campaign has opened up new ways of thinking about communicating information from open source and government intelligence analysis.

This panel explores the experiences of people involved with decision-making at the UN and in the UK in 2003 and how things have changed today.

• What were the lessons from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?
• How has that influenced the way in which NATO has responded to Russia’s wars against Ukraine?
• How should information be communicated within governments and to the public?
• How to deal with disinformation campaigns in the days of open source information and social media?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

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