Hasta el último momento se especuló sobre quién de las dos mujeres de la Corona británica presidiría los actos en honor a los caídos del Remembrance Day, debido a la delicada salud de ambas. Esta vez fue Kate Middleton quien rindió a un auditorio entregado. Leer

Segunda aparición pública de Kate Middleton en menos de 24 horas. A pesar del cansancio, la princesa de Gales ha estado en el balcón del Foreign Office para seguir los homenajes del Remembrance Day en el Cenotafio. Leer

UAE opens summit as energy industry weathers Middle East concerns

Library - Art Library, Location - OSIZ, Call number - FOLIO TR820.6 .A34 2016

Location: Electronic Resource- 

Location: Electronic Resource- 

Location: Electronic Resource- 

Location: Electronic Resource- 

The Situation of Christians in the Middle East -- A Declaration of Concern

Middle Eastern Christians and Europe Historical Legacies and Present Challenges

Will Middle East’s Aramaic language survive?

Left Exposed By Middle Eastern Upheaval, Christians Are Fleeing Region

Middle East Christians Suffer Still

In the first released video, the Duchess of Cambridge adorably corrects her husband's pronunciation when he spoke the Irish language for their 2021 St. Patrick's Day greeting.

The 'I'll Be Missing You' hitmaker announces that he finally changed his middle name legally by proudly showing off his new driver's license and a legal document from the court.

In his legal papers, Paul Phillips claims that the doctors' lack of care during his initial admission at Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches led to him suffering brain damage.

In the first released video, the Duchess of Cambridge adorably corrects her husband's pronunciation when he spoke the Irish language for their 2021 St. Patrick's Day greeting.

Pedal power replaces horse power on London 2 Paris charity bike ride.

Indian fragrance and flavour company Sacheerome aims to achieve 30-40 per cent annual growth in the Middle East market. The company plans to make Dubai its second home and establish an R&D center in the city. With significant growth potential in the MEA sector, Sacheerome also targets expansion in Asia-Pacific, focusing on Malaysia.

The incoming Senate Republican Conference will meet Wednesday morning to elect the successor of Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky.

The CIA on Thursday was forced to walk back an assertion by Director Mike Pompeo, who incorrectly said U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that Russian efforts to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election were unsuccessful. Asked at a security conference in Washington, D.C., on Thursday whether he could say with absolute certainty that the November vote was not skewed by Russia, Pompeo replied: "Yes. Intelligence community's assessment is that the Russian meddling that took place did not affect the outcome of the election." In a later clarification, the head of the CIA's office of public affairs, Dean Boyd, said: "The intelligence assessment with regard to Russian election meddling has not changed, and the Director did not intend to suggest that it had." U.S. intelligence concluded in a January assessment that "the senior-most officials" in Russia had authorized hacks into the Democratic National Committee and officials connected with the Clinton campaign. And then

Last Tuesday I played in a fairly eclectic line up which included girl-punk band Whorepaint, noise rockers HexMap, and hip-hop group Immigrant.  I’d forgotten how great it is to play at a venue with a legit sound system and a keen sound engineer. Check out the video below for some pretty sweet button mashing.  Mike G […]

I don't care about the Royal Family, but the Kate Middleton (Princess of Wale) story is wild: - In high school, she and her sister (Pippa) were called the "Wisteria Sisters" for being shameless social climbers.   - She got into a relatively prestigious college (Edinburgh) and then switched to a less prestigious school (St. Andrews) after it was announced that Prince William would be attending. - She delayed starting by a year to be in the same class as William, and then changed her major to Art History to match his.  - She dumped her boyfriend after being told that Prince William said she was "hot." - Her mom gave William an ultimatum that he needed to propose, which Kate then helped plan.  Mission accomplished.

"Donald Trump is not a politician who guards his words carefully to avoid offending anyone. But we don't need a politician now." -- Angie Many, Eckert

Toddler's stepfather arrested after her body was found

Warwick Academy won the Middle School Girls Six-a-Side Tournament with a 1-0 victory over BHS in a tense final. A spokesperson said, “Warwick Academy followed their Primary School team in winning the Middle School Girls six a side tournament after defeating BHS 1-0 in a tense final. The lone goal of the match was scored […]

The Sandys Boat Club ‘Paddle for PALS’ event was held this weekend in the west end, with participants dressing in costumes and bringing “your brooms, flotations, paddleboards, kayaks, and non-motorized floaties”, with the event aiming to raise funds for the PALS cancer care charity. Related Stories Photos & Video: Dockyard Fall Festival Photos: Tree Tops […]

1. Kate Middleton sparks doubts whether she even had cancer?  Geo News
2. ‘Played us all’: Vicious Kate theory takes hold  news.com.au
3. Kate Middleton Yet Again Trapped In Conspiracy Theories While Battling Cancer? Find Out As Royal Reporter Questions Princess’ Diagnosis  PINKVILLA

Do you take pleasure in converting old doors into coffee tables or old coffee tables into pallets? Do you spend a lot of time carefully crafting email responses? Does grabbing a beer or two at the local Chili's after a Sunday at Home Depot sound appealing to you? If you answered yes to any of these questions, then you might get a kick out of these neat memes by novelty memelord @middleclassfancy. We're big fans of this hilarious account and love to share these tongue-in-cheek gems every chance we get.

The Foreign Ministry summoned the ambassador of Russia, but also the chargé d'affaires of Georgia, for comments by country's prime minister it said called into question the integrity of Moldova's polls.

Middle-Earth Shadow of War: Definitive Edition PC

In this episode I'm joined by Alex Moneypenny from The Different Knock to chat about the international break, and concerns over the fitness of Bukayo Saka and Gabriel Martinelli. There's more discussion of the Brazilian and his role, a chat about Gabriel Jesus and what we can get out of him this season, how full backs like Jurrien Timber and Riccardo Calafiori offer tactical variety, Mikel Merino, how the Interlulls prevent early-season rhythm and lots more.

Find The Different Knock on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@DiffKnock

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Peter Berkowitz, Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State from 2019 to 2021 will discuss Middle East regional security.

Hot’s Bad Boy debuts Nov. 21, joined by Daum's Life is a Difficult Age, Crystal’s Before, and Armageddon Time on Netflix.

As heads of Arab and Islamic states meet in Riyadh, Trump's victory raises questions for the region.

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.

Will the next US president invest in Middle East stability or walk away? Expert comment LToremark 17 October 2024

Harris and Trump look set to continue US deprioritization of the region, but they would do better to enlist the support of their partners.

When stability in the Middle East feels so distant, it is much to the dismay of America’s partners that conflict management in the region has fallen down the list of US priorities. As Israel’s war in Gaza has reached its tragic one-year milestone, a new front has opened in Lebanon and further direct escalation between Israel and Iran seems imminent, it is hoped that the next US president will take a bolder role.

Namely, leaders in the UK, Europe and the Middle East are looking to whoever is in the White House to do more to restrain Israel, deliver self-determination – if not a peace process – for Palestine, and contain Iran’s interventionist regional role and nuclear programme.

While it is naive to expect either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump to prioritize conflict management in the Middle East above immigration, the economy, the war in Ukraine or competition with China, the past year has shown the danger of ignoring or sidestepping cascading and glaring regional challenges. 

For Harris or Trump to have a more sustainable impact in the region, they must enlist the support of European, British and Middle Eastern partners and work collectively to build multilateral processes that can set a stronger foundation for regional stability.

Repercussions of deprioritization

The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, led many to believe that a new era of integration was possible in the Middle East. To some, it also vindicated the US decision to deprioritize the region that had started with Barack Obama’s presidency and his drawing down from ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that approach, encouraging America’s partners in the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for regional stability. Notably, neither renewed negotiations with Iran despite both committing to deliver a stronger deal with Tehran.

The shock of the 7 October attacks shattered that view, and the longer overhang of the US decision to deprioritize the region has visibly played out over the past twelve months. 

While the Biden administration marshalled full political and military support for Israel and there is not – yet – a direct regional war with Iran, the US has been unsuccessful in multiple areas: delivering a ceasefire agreement, securing the release of hostages, maintaining regular humanitarian relief and producing a so-called ‘day after’ plan of action.  

Moreover, the US temporary arrangement with Iran to prevent nuclear acceleration in exchange for marginal sanctions relief has also shown the limits of compartmentalization when managing a portfolio of issues with Tehran.  

No new approach

Trump and Harris’s policy approaches to conflict in the region further show their limited intent to change course on the Middle East. Both leaders are aware that Middle East politics, particularly on Israel–Palestine and Iran – the key issues requiring urgent attention – has become a US partisan minefield that could alienate voters. Despite their different plans, with Trump inclined to be more unilateral, they will both continue the trend of gradually deprioritizing conflict management in favour of greater burden sharing by those in the region.  

President Trump has promised a tougher approach aimed at curtailing conflict and advancing US interests. On Iran, Trump has made clear that he would return to a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, perhaps to come to new agreement with Tehran or alternatively to constrain Iran even further.  He has championed his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Trump has argued that this approach put economic strain on Iran and reduced its ability to fund proxy groups. 

His advisers have also indicated that they would extend this pressure campaign and provide maximum support to the Iranian opposition and activists. Yet without clear goals or a willingness to negotiate with Tehran to contain further nuclear advancements, the result may well be another round of instability.  

Should he return to office, Trump has indicated that he would immediately put an end to the war in Gaza, though how remains unclear. More broadly, he would likely double down on the agreements to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization and attempt to bypass the Palestinian leadership, focusing on broader regional normalization. But sidestepping Palestinian self-determination, which since 7 October has been the condition for broader Arab normalization, will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to sell to its broader, now politicized, public.  

Many Middle East leaders, including those from the Arabian peninsula, might welcome the return of a Trump presidency, but Trump’s ‘America First’ policy did not provide Arab Gulf leaders, especially Riyadh, with protection from Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities seen in September 2019.  

Trump also promised without success to deliver a bigger, better Iran deal that would extend the JCPOA and include compromises on Tehran’s support for proxy groups and constraints on its missile programme. Rather than imposing his previous strategy, a second Trump presidency would be more effective if it worked collaboratively with transatlantic and regional partners on regional security issues pertaining to Israel–Palestine and Iran.  

Continuation and reinforcement?

Despite her recent tough talk on Iran, it is expected that Harris will reinforce the current wave of diplomatic efforts to deescalate and manage tensions with Tehran, rather than advocate for ‘maximum pressure’.  

Harris would likely build on efforts to revive a new paradigm that could contain Iran’s nuclear programme. She is expected to emphasize a strategy of engagement combined with pressure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while addressing its regional activities.   

Now that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, it is clear that Tehran’s transfer of lethal aid needs an urgent response beyond continued reliance on sanctions. Harris’s team would be wise to pursue a multilateral negotiation process bringing together Europe and the UK, who are already discussing these issues, to collectively engage Tehran on a broader deal.

Moreover, winning support from Israel and the Gulf is a necessary condition to build a more sustainable Iranian agreement. 

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

Assessing the trajectory of the Middle East conflict 4 November 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Online

Experts examine how the conflict may develop and what we can expect from regional and international actors.

A year on, the war in Gaza has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine with escalation across the region intensifying.

Recent weeks have seen Israel deepening its military offensive on Lebanon and keeping the north of the Gaza strip under siege, while leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have been successfully targeted by its forces. Israel also launched an unprecedented assault against Iran in response to Tehran’s missile attacks on Israeli territory earlier in October.

Against this backdrop, regional states, particularly in the Gulf, in line with their overall approach to the conflict, are prioritizing diplomacy over escalation. They maintain their neutrality on the hostility between Israel and Iran and its aligned groups from the axis of resistance.

The strength of old alliances is being tested while new alignments are uncovered that may reshape the geopolitical landscape of the region, particularly following the US presidential election.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What are Israel’s calculations at this stage and how have the domestic political dynamics changed over recent weeks?
• What are the impacts of the war on Iran and its aligned actors and what can we expect from Tehran and groups from the axis of resistance?
• How are the wars in Gaza and Lebanon connected and would ending one stop the other?
• What is the response from regional states, particularly in the Gulf, and what role can they play?
• What are the possible scenarios for a post-election US policy on Israel and the Middle East?

Expert

Middle East and North Africa

Research on the Middle East and North Africa region focuses on changes to politics and society, economics, and security issues.

This is a turbulent period for the region following the Arab Spring, with conflict in Syria continuing to impact its neighbours, governance in Libya under scrutiny, and increasing pressures on the Gulf monarchies, especially around human rights.   

Key research areas include the Gulf States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the future of the state, mapping the region’s war economies, the Yemen conflict, Iraq’s reconstruction, and the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Middle East and great power competition 28 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts discuss how the Middle East is changing in a fast-moving geopolitical environment.

The war in Ukraine and great power competition define not only global politics but also regional ones. The Middle East is a microcosm for observing how the great power rivalry informs regional affairs.

OPEC+’s decision to reduce oil supply to international markets and many regional states’ balancing act between the West and Russia, for that matter China as well, are only a few recent policy choices that clearly illustrate how the global and regional levels interact with each other.

Plus this is now a region in which the US has downsized its security commitments, whereas Russia has increased its footprint in regional security and China in economy.

This event tries to unpack how the great power rivalry and the war in Ukraine affect regional politics and how the Middle East adjusts itself to this new phase in global politics.

Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 14 May 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey is cooperating closely with Russia to secure its border with Syria and to encourage a long-term political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Its efforts have staved off a humanitarian catastrophe in the northern Syrian province of Idlib and initiated the trilateral ‘Astana Process’ with Russia and Iran as the primary framework to settle the future of Syria.

By contrast, Turkey and the US disagree on a range of important issues including Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air missile defence systems and American support for the PKK-affiliated Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.

In this session, the speaker will outline Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and share his country’s perspectives on the US and Russian policies in that region.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Loopholes in international laws governing the use of incendiary weapons in warfare are allowing warring parties in Ukraine and the Middle East to exploit the use of such weapons without adequately protecting civilians.