In this blog post, you can find a range of different ‘Buy Now’ buttons that can be used on a website as the ‘call-to-action’ button for a product or service you are trying to sell. There is a range of different size buttons, in a number of different colors to fit with the aesthetics of […]

The post Buy Now Button Graphics for eCommerce Websites appeared first on Tips and Tricks HQ.

Police revealed Tuesday they had infiltrated and taken down an encrypted chat app called Ghost used by criminals across the world.

Uber Safari is launching this week, offering riders in Cape Town the opportunity to go on a one-day game drive to a private reserve for $200.

If you have ever thought, "I wish I could play as an 8-bit version of Janet Weiss or Brad Majors," you are in luck. You can "Jump to the left and dodge to the right" in the upcoming video game adaptation of everyone's favorite midnight movie. — Read the rest

The post The Rocky Horror Picture Show is now a video game appeared first on Boing Boing.

When the Baby Boomers retire they are going to be taking their substantial knowledge with them. The younger generation to whom that knowledge should be transferred likes to consume video.  This has some very interesting implications for organizations that want to capture that knowledge, organize it, and make it easy for employees to find it and benefit from it.

Here is a link to a webcast on June 1 where Dan Rasmus, a technology strategist and author of Listening to the Future , will discuss the potential for video to serve as an all important medium for knowledge transfer and organizational learning.

Topics to be Covered:
• Knowledge Acquisition via Video
• Video as a Tool for Knowledge Management
• Use of Video or Operational Efficiency
• Practical Applications of Video for Learning in the Enterprise

Click here to register for the webcast

The following article, ‘Burn The System Down’: Democrats Now Face Charges They Are The Ones Trying To Destroy Democracy, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

Protecting democracy was a catch phrase that Democrats have used for years to explain their hatred of now President-elect Donald Trump. He was, after all, they said, a “Hitler.” He would be a dictator. He would use the military against his political opponents, jailing them and worse. The only salvation for America’s “democracy” would be …

Continue reading ‘Burn The System Down’: Democrats Now Face Charges They Are The Ones Trying To Destroy Democracy ...

The usual talking heads in the media are freaking out and making all kinds of wild claims. Those are the rage-y emotional reactions. What's a more sensible take on all of this?

The post Why Did Trump Win And What Happens Now? appeared first on Clash Daily.

A.F. Branco Cartoon – It’s been a lousy week for Kamala and a great week for Trump as he surges..

Carvana is America’s fastest-growing e-tailer   February 23, 2022 (New York, NY) – Americans have taken to buying cars online, so much so that ecommerce car dealer Carvana is now […]

June 22, 2022 (New York, NY) – Will Apple’s entry into the buy now, pay later (BNPL) space upend the already competitive industry? That’s the question many are trying to […]

Beijing briefing: is the Belt and Road going nowhere? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Scaling back infrastructure plans and investment in the Global South could cause China problems, says Yu Jie.

Over the past two decades, China specialists around the world have tried to analyze Beijing’s approach to developing countries in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Pacific islands.
 
China’s relationships with nations in these regions vary considerably. In some, ideology or geography are the biggest influencing factors; for others, economic and commercial gains matter most. However, many of Beijing’s recent engagements have attracted more criticism than praise. A domestic economic downturn means that Beijing has tightened its belt, spending less on overseas development.

When President Xi Jinping came to power, he was keen to highlight how China’s power could shape and dictate the global agenda across multilateral platforms. His vision was for China to project discursive power and become an agenda-setter rather than a rule-follower. The Global South is the route to fulfilling his proposal.

To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the latest Global Development Initiative are the means to Beijing’s ends. The former, launched in 2013, focuses on building physical infrastructure linking Global South countries; the latter aims to allow development through grants and capacity-building in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

China’s engagements with Africa and Latin America seem characterized by the rapid extension of Chinese finance to resource-rich African states, particularly oil producers, since the early 2000s. From 2003, for example, oil-backed infrastructure loans were made to the Angolan government for reconstruction after decades of civil conflict. By 2016, they totalled some $15 billion. 

However, Beijing’s appetite for offering cheap loans in exchange for natural resources has shrunk. It faces a dilemma between protecting the value of its investments while also defending its strategic interests and maintaining its self-image as a partner, not a predator, of Africa.

Beijing has historically preferred bilateral relationships for its development finance and investments over multilateral ones. This allows China control over the terms and conditions, while demonstrating its unwillingness to accept without question rules and frameworks devised years ago by western countries.

China has already realized that some elements of its engagements with the Global South are no longer the flavour of the day, partly because some of its programmes include serious climate and financial risks without proper third-party due diligence in place. 

Growth through gigantic infrastructure investments of the sort that drove China’s own economic miracle is not a panacea applicable everywhere. Nor is relentlessly seeking endorsements from its neighbours and other countries from afar.

China wants to be a ‘brother’ to the Global South

Ideologically, China wants to be seen and respected as a leader of the Global South. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has maintained a ‘brotherly’ relationship with developing countries, notably in the UN context, where it remains a member of the G77 group of developing nations. 

The West has responded to China’s development agenda with its own infrastructure programmes, such as Washington’s Build Back Better World and the European Union’s Global Gateway. 

Great power rivalry should not be ignored, but it shouldn’t blind world powers to the need for collaboration in tackling global poverty and sustainable development. Nor should Beijing’s efforts to adjust its diplomatic and aid programmes to become a likeable partner of choice in search of a better economic future, be disregarded.

Since launching BRI, China has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into building infrastructure in the Global South. And many developing countries hope that advanced economies and China can continue to act to alleviate poverty. But the brakes have been applied to Beijing’s spree as a result of China’s domestic economic slowdown. It has no wish to continue spending its foreign reserves.

To go forward, China must remain open to what others want – or fear – from Beijing’s development initiatives and infrastructure investments. Many developing countries, facing insurmountable costs and damage exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, crave meaningful assistance rather than diplomatic rhetoric. 

The ultimate test of Beijing’s economic statecraft is whether it can engage with the Global South beyond relationships built on financial resources and political capital. It must also become more self-aware of how its words and deeds are received – and then act accordingly. Showering dollars and renminbi is not always guaranteed to win hearts and minds. In this respect, Beijing has more bridges to build.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

Redefine the Commonwealth now to safeguard its future Expert comment NCapeling 6 October 2022

Although seen as one of the Queen’s greatest legacies, the Commonwealth must provide tangible benefits to its citizens in an era of geopolitical competition.

The Commonwealth’s breadth allows a wide diversity of countries of different sizes, geographies, cultures, and values to be members – it is both rich and poor, north and south, and ethnically diverse. This makes it more interesting than many other multilateral institutions such as the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU).

But it suffers from an unclear purpose. Since its inception, successive UK governments have grappled with its role – whether it is a preferential trading bloc or merely a source of most of Britain’s post-war immigration.

This lack of purpose – and structure – has left the Commonwealth impotent in dealing with a host of bilateral difficulties between the UK, its overseas territories, and Commonwealth partners in recent years.

Brexit could induce Britain to re-prioritize the Commonwealth, but so far the UK has only signed two new trade deals with Commonwealth members – Australia and New Zealand – while development aid, one of the most tangible ways the UK worked with many Commonwealth countries, has been cut and the UK’s defence focus has pivoted towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe’s Eastern front.

The UK also suffered embarrassing and overwhelming defeats in both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of its continued occupation of the Chagos Islands and has avoided directly challenging India’s tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the hope of securing a trade deal.

At the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), Boris Johnson reportedly attempted to depose Baroness Scotland, the Commonwealth’s Secretary General, but suffered a humiliating defeat in a vote of Commonwealth members.

These challenges are likely to continue, especially in the wake of the death of HM The Queen which could be seen by republican movements as an opportune time to rally support. Australia and New Zealand’s leaders, both republicans, downplayed the idea of a poll on the monarchy immediately after the Queen’s death, but it would be a mistake to assume this has gone quiet forever. Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister has already said there will be a referendum on becoming a republic within three years.

Defining a new vision for the future

A concrete vision for the Commonwealth is long overdue and there is no better time to cast one than now. HM The Queen was more than just a figurehead for the Commonwealth and it remains unknown exactly what role King Charles III will see for himself.

But, unlike his mother who was a young, modern Queen heralding a post-imperial future, Charles takes the throne at a later age and at a time when important questions need to be addressed in an increasingly fractured world.

Most importantly the UK should avoid the temptation to define the Commonwealth in terms of shared principles and values. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all abstained on the United Nations (UN) motion condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Commonwealth members are likely to be similarly divided over China’s territorial claims, the US-China conflict, the net-zero agenda, and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Commonwealth’s breadth – its greatest strength – means consensus is often impossible, and so should not be the goal. Instead the Commonwealth should focus on tangible areas of cooperation where there is mutual interest such as trade, aid, and migration.

The UK and its allies may find that diplomatic efforts – such as condemning China or Russia for human rights abuses – are more successful if they have listened to and acted on fellow Commonwealth countries’ concerns, from post-COVID vaccine provision to climate financing. Boosting the aid budget and opening borders may prove more important in engaging developing country partners than traditional diplomatic avenues.

Liz Truss’s British International Investment project could be a valuable vehicle for financing, especially if it leverages private sector funding, but many Commonwealth countries are feeling the more immediate impact of the UK’s aid cuts. In these circumstances many have already turned to Chinese infrastructure financing.

This is where the Commonwealth could be valuable. In the Pacific, it links certain island nations to the UK, Australia, and New Zealand at a time of renewed geopolitical competition with China in the Pacific. The fact the Commonwealth is not explicitly about promoting a particular ideology or countering China is helpful.

Commonwealth should be less UK-centric

There is also no reason why all the Commonwealth operations need to be based in London, which is not only expensive but also reinforces an approach to governance that assumes everything must be decided by civil servants in London. As the world’s largest democracy, India is an obvious alternative candidate although its reluctance to condemn Russia’s invasion and its domestic political tensions may count against it.

It is also important the Commonwealth’s wealthier members – the UK, Canada, and Australia – provide financing for countries such as India to take on extra responsibilities. The Commonwealth Games is a good place to start – despite having 72 competing nations and territories, the games have only been held three times outside the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Commonwealth also needs to be forward-looking and one of its most exciting assets is its demographic youthfulness. Europe, China, and the US have ageing populations whereas Nigeria, India, and Bangladesh have some of the world’s largest young populations.

COP27: What was achieved, and what needs to happen now Expert comment NCapeling 20 November 2022

Chatham House environment experts give their initial reaction to the end of COP27, examining how much progress was achieved, and the key issues still to be worked on.

Loss and Damage fund is a historic moment

Anna Aberg

COP27 will go down in history as the UN climate change conference where the Loss and Damage fund was agreed. After decades of pushing, this is a momentous victory for climate-vulnerable developing countries.

The shift in the conversation – and in the positions of developed countries – since COP26 is remarkable. It is critical parties continue to build on the positive momentum created in Sharm as challenging discussions on how the new loss and damage fund will work – and who will contribute to it financially – ensue.

Tim Benton

Overall COP27 was a hectic, sometimes chaotic, event. The COP advanced some matters but on others failed to drive ambition towards the sort of climate action required to keep alive the possibility of restricting climate change within the envelope of the Paris agreement.

Loss and Damage progressed but, especially in week two, the risk was of going backwards in this COP relative to COP26 in Glasgow. The final cover declaration managed to avoid the worst, but also avoided the best.

Notably disappointing was that, although food systems were much in debate unlike in previous COPs, there was still significant political resistance to fully adopting a systems approach. Globally, food systems emit about one-third of all greenhouse gasses, while poor diets – in rich and poor countries alike – are arguably the single biggest factor in ill-health and early death.

COP27 maintained a firm focus on supply-side solutions to tackle food insecurity, avoiding the politically more contentious demand-side issues of ensuring nutritious and sustainable diets for all.

Start of implementation phase demands renewed urgency

Bernice Lee

It has often been said climate action is moving from target-setting into the implementation phase. What COP27 shows is that, as the implementation phase begins, integrity and accountability will be ever more critical, as the voices of the vulnerable economies and the youth remind the world time and time again.

This compromised outcome is also a reminder that the delivery of climate action begins at home, as does the bread-and-butter politics of money and influence. It is significant the link between fossil energy and climate impacts has now been openly made in the international arena, regardless of whether it appeared in the final cover agreement.

As the dust settles, there will be many questions and reflection over tactics chosen by different parties and actors, and much to be learned that can help those pushing for more breakthrough moments at COP28.

Antony Froggatt

There was insufficient progress on the energy transition both in and around COP27. Few countries followed through on their promises to increase the ambition of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), although Australia and the European Union (EU) were rare exceptions among the developed countries.

Higher fossil fuel prices, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can and should have resulted in an accelerated energy transition. Yet the language in the final decision around carbon reductions and energy at best repeats the language of COP26 and does not reflect the renewed urgency of the situation, stemming from accelerating climate impacts and the weaponization of fossil fuels in Russia’s conflict.

At COP28, parties to the UNFCCC will finalize a Global Stock Take which will include a review of national progress in meeting carbon abatement targets. This will be a key moment and unfortunately is likely to highlight once again how much faster the world needs to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel discussions show failure of imagination

Glada Lahn

Overshadowed by the pain of developing country fuel importers and European attempts to replace Russian gas, discussion of fossil fuels was fraught. The text, which called for accelerating the ‘phasedown of unabated coal’ use for the first time only last year, failed to expand to include oil and gas, despite calls to do so from India, the US, EU, and UK. Gas use also appeared to gain a pass via the inclusion of ‘low emission’ energy alongside renewables.

Given that extracting and burning oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and leaders agree on the need for ‘deep, rapid and sustained’ emission cuts, that language is beyond logical argument. However, current dependencies, fears of stranded investments, and a failure of imagination won out.

Stronger than usual oil and gas industry presence led to a higher number of meetings focused on decarbonization of the sector. Major producer countries such as Canada and Saudi Arabia were keen to emphasize technologies to ‘clean up’ rather than phase down their fuels as the future.

Not all developing country governments with hydrocarbon reserves see the ‘phase down’ text as conflicting with their economic interests. Large oil and gas exporter Colombia supported the inclusion of ‘all fossil fuels’ and Kenya, a country which had been pursuing oil and coal prospects, became a friend of the high ambition Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance which seeks a ‘managed phase out of oil and gas supply’.

A vocal contingent of African civil society meanwhile railed against health and ecology-damaging oil and gas projects and investments that would lock them into a high emissions future.

With stronger resolve to reorient finance towards net zero both in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the concurrent G20 summit in Bali, the practicalities of economic adaptation to the shift out of fossil fuels – including just transition for workers – rose up the agenda. These issues will overtake the wrangle over wording in the run up to COP28.

Adaptation must now move to the forefront

Ruth Townend

There are three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. This year progress was made on mitigation and loss and damage but, to avoid wild spiralling of the latter, adaptation must have its day in the sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at COP28 next year.

Adaptation lacks a concrete goal, akin to the 1.5 degree limit, and few countries have set out plans to adapt to climate change. Momentum will come when the promised ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA) is finally defined, to help mobilize finance and spur implementation.

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh (GLASS) work programme to achieve this has so far lacked focus. At COP27, parties decided to define a framework to measure the goal’s achievement and enable reviews of progress over the next year.

Some concrete progress on adaptation was seen at the COP: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for worldwide extreme weather early warning systems within the next five years, while the Adaptation Fund received more than $230 million for the most climate-vulnerable in 2022.

The call from Glasgow to double adaptation finance was repeated, but overall, progress was muted, when parties really needed to come together for implementation of this crucial element of climate action.

Not enough done for agriculture and food security

Richard King

It is welcome that the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture – adopted in 2017 as the first and only formal UNFCCC agenda item focusing on agriculture and food security – has concluded in a decision to implement a new four-year work programme focused on implementing solutions.

While this has an objective of promoting holistic approaches to addressing climate impacts both on and from agriculture and food security, it disappointingly falls short of taking a food systems lens that includes all activities and actors from farm to fork.

There is now a small window of opportunity until March 2023 for governments and civil society to shape and broaden this agenda for the next four years. If not in the negotiating halls, then certainly in the myriad side events and discussions focusing on the issue, this year’s COP has clearly demonstrated a growing appreciation of the imperative of tackling food systems in their entirety.

An overarching and integrated approach to sustainable food production, distribution, and retail; nutrition and dietary shifts; and addressing food loss and waste will be vital to making comprehensive headway in addressing climate change and other planetary and social challenges.

It is important the parties at COP28 in the UAE seize this rising momentum to become the first climate negotiations to make tangible progress on transforming food systems towards sustainability, equitability, and resilience.

Rainforest leadership challenges traditional aid

Thiago Kanashiro Uehara

COP27 served well as a business fair for entrepreneurs wishing to benefit from new carbon markets. But forests, peatlands, and nature-based solutions did not receive the attention they deserve in guaranteeing climate security.

The good news is the COP26 pledges on forest finance, for the Congo basin, and for indigenous peoples (IP) and local communities’ (LC) forest tenure are pretty much alive, with disbursement rates at decent levels, albeit rarely directly to IP and LC-led organizations. The bad news is the financialization of forest governance and voluntary sustainability standards in global supply chains are solution ‘myths’ and were exposed by scientists as such at the conference.

On the second day of COP27, there was a last-minute launch led by the Global North, with Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron announcing the ‘forests and climate leaders’ partnership’. One week later, at the G20 Bali summit, ministers from Indonesia, DR Congo, and Brazil announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – referred by some as the ‘OPEC of forests’ – challenging traditional forms of top-down international aid.

The climate crisis is one symptom of the inequality crisis engulfing our world at present. The African COP represented a step forward in addressing climate justice, an improvement over COP26 in Glasgow, where the issue was virtually denied.

The time has come for Global North constituents to work together with self-fashioned ‘solution countries’, such as the DRC now and Brazil after 2023. An ‘implementation COP’ will be successful only after establishing a new framework of co-leadership in climate action based on principles of justice and strong sustainability.

Outcomes of an African COP

Christopher Vandome

Africa’s contribution to the global energy transition cannot be at the expense of its own industrialization.

While pledges of increased financing for adaptation and the landmark establishment of a fund for loss and damage are important steps, the reality of under-disbursement and delivery of promised funds is causing many African leaders to rethink their engagement with multilateral climate initiatives.

African leaders are intent on advancing their own strategies for energy generation and adaptation that deliver on national priorities of job creation, sustainable growth, and environmental protection.

Many countries strategies involve exploiting gas reserves. But with mounting global pressures against further hydrocarbon extraction, African leaders need to demonstrate to international partners that these operations are part of a long-term transition away from other fossil fuels and contribute towards poverty alleviation.

Leaders need to be coordinated in their demands to international partners on how to phase out over time as well as de-risk potential stranded assets. President Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the investment plan for the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was a significant mark of progress to unlocking the $8.5 billion pledge for lowering the economy’s reliance on coal.

While progress has at times faltered over the past year, it has been critical that South Africa articulate its own needs and desired energy mix, rather than this be internationally prescribed. It has also demonstrated to other African nations that bilateral not multilateral initiatives may offer a fast-track route to green finance.

Where is Georgia now heading? 28 October 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

After pivotal elections, experts discuss what the declared results and reactions mean for Georgia.

Following a year marked by protests over the controversial ‘Foreign Agents’ bill and broader concerns over democratic backsliding, Georgia faces pivotal parliamentary elections on 26 October. Regardless of the outcome, the results are expected to be contested as well as consequential.

In the wake of the election, experts will discuss the immediate and longer-term consequences.

Key questions:

• These were the first fully-proportional elections in Georgia. How much difference did it make
• What will the election results, as we currently understand them, mean for Georgia’s path to European integration? How will they affect Georgia’s foreign policy priorities?
• What role should the EU play? Is Georgia a test case for the EU as an aspiring geopolitical power?
• Is the oligarchic grip likely to be tightened or loosened? What role for undue influence now?
• Has Russia done all it can for now in Georgia? Or is there more it can do?

Loss and damage: Where are we now and what happens next? 25 January 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

This event discusses the progress of the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations. 

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.

While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June.

The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date. This first event outlines the key debates and discuss what progress has been made on advancing the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations to date.

The second event focuses on solutions and possible ways forward, looking ahead to the COP27 negotiations in Egypt later in 2022, where loss and damage is expected to be a high-profile agenda item.

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

‘Hong Kong is now in the hands of its people – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now.’ Expert comment sysadmin 29 June 2017

Kerry Brown on ‘one country, two systems’, the UK’s diminishing influence and the territory’s future, 20 years after the handover.

1 July marks the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Kerry Brown speaks with Jason Naselli about what the future holds for the territory.

How sustainable is the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? Will the arrangement last the full 50 years (until 2047) as originally envisioned?

It is questionable whether the arrangement that exists today was the one envisioned in 1997 when the handover happened. It was always a very abstract, flexible system, granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, meaning it could maintain its capitalist system. Of course, in the lead up to 1997 all these things were broadly seen as being in Beijing’s interests to preserve.

But these days, the one thing that few said in 1997 has come to pass – the People’s Republic has maintained one-party rule as a political system, but become one of the world’s great economies. It has been so far a huge success.

Hong Kong therefore has diminished in importance over the years to the point that maintaining at least some semblance of one country, two systems is almost like an act of charity. It has been nibbled at, compromised and seems to grow weaker by the day. Most in Hong Kong would say there is a system: one country, one system. That’s the deal.

The central government’s deepening involvement in the territory’s politics is a subject of growing controversy in Hong Kong. Does the Chinese government need to alter its approach?

Not particularly. It doesn’t want to see Hong Kong fail as an economy. That doesn’t suit its interests at all. But nor does it want a truculent, disobedient polity that is meant to be part of its sovereign territory.

So it has increasingly set political parameters. Hong Kong can have its unique system – as long as it is obedient. And on the whole, that is the deal that all of the city’s chief executives until now have internally understood perfectly.

As part of the 1997 handover, the UK has ‘a continuing moral and political obligation’ to Hong Kong. How will this relationship play out as Brexit shifts Britain’s place in the world?

The Foreign Office offers a six-monthly report to Parliament, updating on how the handover deal is going. As the years go on, however, it becomes increasingly illusive how the UK has any real locus to say much about the situation on Hong Kong. It did say, rightly, that the detainment of one of the booksellers taken in in 2015 was a violation of the treaty because he was British. This was the strongest wording that has ever appeared from an official British source. But with dependence on creating a new kind of relationship with China now foremost in people’s minds because of Brexit and other economic pressures, it is not surprising that the priority increasingly lies elsewhere.

With direct management of Hong Kong gone, the UK was always going to be more and more irrelevant. That has happened. And in any case, relations with China have had to become more complex and multifaceted. Hong Kong was always the tail wagging the dog for the UK relations with China. Now there has been a rebalancing, the calculation always has to be how much unilaterally supporting Hong Kong will damage relations with Beijing. This has become an increasingly asymmetrical question: in a playoff, preserving links with Beijing will always prevail. That’s just the reality of the new world we are seeing come into being.

Hong Kong has played an important financial role for China over the past 20 years, but where will it fit as markets and financial institutions on the mainland mature?

It maintains is role as a major RMB hub, and as a finance centre. But it is surrounded by competition. Singapore, and Sydney, and other places in the region have RMB deals. Shanghai and Tianjin aspire to be portals for entry to the domestic Chinese market. Hong Kong every day has to think of new ways to maintain its relevance and beat back competition. So far, it has done well. But this is an issue it can never be complacent about.

What has been the most significant change in Hong Kong society since 1997?

The rising cultural and linguistic influence of the mainland on Hong Kong. Hong Kong has maintained its difference – but it has had to change. It is clear that Hong Kong is now in the hands of Hong Kongese – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now. The culture, identity and future of the territory are in their hands. In that sense, they have autonomy.

Now is the moment to launch an African vaccine industry The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The continent plans to make 60 per cent of its vaccines by 2040. After the failure of the world to help in the pandemic, it’s high time, says Ngozi Erondu.

The lack of an African vaccine industry has been a glaring concern for decades. Before the pandemic, 99 per cent of Africa’s vaccines were manufactured outside the continent. As well as endangering the lives of millions, this situation has inhibited social and economic progress on the continent.

In response, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has undertaken an ambitious plan, outlined in the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) Framework for Action, to develop the nascent African vaccine manufacturing sector into an end-to-end industry by 2040. The framework aims to raise the share of African-manufactured vaccines used across the continent to 60 per cent by 2040, or the equivalent to up to 1.7 billion doses annually.

Seven of every 10 vaccines used in Africa are currently donated through Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Most are administered within childhood immunization programmes and are largely manufactured either in India, or by  multinational vaccine manufacturers in North America or Japan.

Vaccine donations have inhibited the development in Africa of vaccines and other countermeasures against diseases.

Though the Ebola virus was discovered in Central Africa in 1976, vaccine development was not adequately funded until it emerged in Europe in 2014. Human monkeypox resurfaced in Nigeria in 2017, yet the global Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations only targeted it for vaccine development in July this year.

The pandemic highlighted Africa’s fatal dependency on imported vaccines. Only 20 per cent of Africans are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, due to the failure of countries in the Global North to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines via the COVAX facility to 40 per cent of the world’s most vulnerable people. 

The pandemic also confirmed that Africa could not rely on fellow states of the Global South. At the height of the Delta variant outbreak in early 2021, India halted vaccine exports to Africa, where only 1.5 per cent of the population had at that time received any vaccine doses.

After decades of discussions, there are signs that Africa could soon succeed in creating its own vaccine industry. First, the 55-member African Union is in the process of establishing the African Medicines Agency, a regional regulatory body. 
 

‘The new public health order’

Additionally, the African Export-Import Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) have established a foundation to provide financial and strategic support for the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the consolidation of regional vaccination programmes in Africa (the foundation would potentially negotiate intellectual property rights and licensing issues but that remains to be seen).

Second, studies show there is an emerging middle class in Africa. In a 2011 report by the AfDB, this was estimated at some 56 million households. Potentially, this means many people will be able to buy vaccines and medicines made in Africa.

About a third of African countries currently pay for their vaccine needs. According to PAVM forecasts, the value of the total African market could reach between $3 billion and $17 billion by 2040.

The recent entry into effect of the African Continental Free Trade Area should also prove conducive to African vaccine development. Through economic integration, free movement and harmonized regional standards, countries that invest in their biopharmaceutical and medical technology sectors may attract employees, regional and international businesses, and investment. Further, the pandemic has encouraged people to relocate to countries with, or planning for, universal healthcare.

Building an African pharmaceutical industry from the ground up could take much longer than two decades and cost tens of billions of dollars. Nevertheless, the moment seems ripe, and timely support has been forthcoming from influential regional actors, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, and private sector business executives, including the Zimbabwean-born billionaire Strive Masiyiwa.

With a pandemic treaty embedding equity in prevention, preparedness and response some way off, and given the limitations surrounding the recent World Trade Organization compromise on the TRIPS waiver – which temporarily waives Covid-19 vaccine patent protections for poorer countries – it is doubly important for Africa to build up its own pharmaceutical industry and emergency systems. 

In 2021, John Nkengasong, then director of Africa CDC, wrote of the necessity of a post-pandemic ‘new public health order’ for Africa. Such a change may threaten the global health organizations, industries and institutes who derive payment from ‘saving Africa’ during emergencies. Additionally, through strengthening Africa CDC, other actors such as the World Health Organization may find that they have a diminished strategic role on the continent.
 
While Africa should not dismiss these valuable and long-standing partnerships, it must take the opportunity to advance its interests and to assume leadership in this important area.

Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability After Iraq and Snowden Book sysadmin 15 January 2020

How can democratic governments hold intelligence and security agencies to account when what they do is largely secret? Jamie Gaskarth explores how intelligence professionals view accountability in the context of 21st century politics.

Using the UK as a case study, this book provides the first systematic exploration of how accountability is understood inside the secret world. It is based on new interviews with current and former UK intelligence practitioners, as well as extensive research into the performance and scrutiny of the UK intelligence machinery.

The result is the first detailed analysis of how intelligence professionals view their role, what they feel keeps them honest, and how far external overseers impact on their work.

The UK gathers material that helps inform global decisions on such issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, and breaches of international humanitarian law. On the flip side, the UK was a major contributor to the intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war in 2003, and its agencies were complicit in the widely discredited U.S. practices of torture and ‘rendition’ of terrorism suspects. UK agencies have come under greater scrutiny since those actions, but it is clear that problems remain.

Secrets and Spies is the result of a British Academy funded project (SG151249) on intelligence accountability. The book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for Secrets and Spies

About the author

Jamie Gaskarth is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at The Open University. He was previously senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham where he taught strategy and decision-making. His research focused on the ethical dilemmas of leadership and accountability in intelligence, foreign policy, and defence. He is author/editor or co-editor of six books and served on the Academic Advisory panel for the 2015 UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Purchase

• UK (via Amazon)
• Rest of world (via Brookings Institution Press)
• Students (via Browns Books)

Phillies president Andy MacPhail opened a 28-minute press conference on Friday afternoon at Spectrum Field with facts and figures about investments the organization made the past few seasons as the team wallowed at the bottom of the National League. Then MacPhail talked a lot about Bryce Harper and Manny Machado as well as manager Gabe Kapler.

The 2019 MLB season feels so close now. Spring Training has begun. Players are taking the field. So it's time to rank the best of the best.

Brexit: Then, now and the future 2 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

How has Britain’s negotiations with the EU set it on a post-EU path?

The Brexit negotiations went down to the wire between the UK and the EU in December 2020. By January 2021, the UK’s departure from the EU had taken place, but the new relationship was by no means stable. The UK and EU have since clashed on trade, migration and the Northern Ireland Protocol which are all left unresolved. 

This year, both sides have had to deal with domestic political instability, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a global energy crisis that has changed the dynamics of its relationship. In the years ahead, both sides will need to address shared challenges, from the rise of China and climate change to security on the European continent. 

This discussion includes those who were in the room during the Brexit negotiations, including Michel Barnier’s adviser, to get an inside look on how the UK and EU negotiated Brexit. Combining insight from the new book, Inside the Deal – How the EU Got Brexit Done, with expert analysis the panel assesses where the post-Brexit negotiations are today.

Key questions include:

• What issues in the deal still need to be fixed?

• How has the EU evolved since Brexit?

• How would a future Labour government approach the UK-EU relationship?

• What are the best and worst case scenarios for UK-EU relations in 2030?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

Cancer of unknown primary (CUP) represents a heterogeneous group of metastatic tumors for which standardized diagnostic work-up fails to identify the primary site. We aimed to describe the Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre experience with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT in extracervical CUP with respect to detection of a primary site and its impact on management. A secondary aim was to compare overall survival (OS) in patients with and without a detected primary site. Methods: CUP patients treated between 2014 and 2020 were identified from medical oncology clinics and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT records. Information collated from electronic medical records included the suspected primary site and treatment details before and after ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT. Clinicopathologic details and genomic analysis were used to determine the clinically suspected primary site and compared against 2 independent masked reads of ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT images by nuclear medicine specialists to determine sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and the rate of detection of the primary site. Results: We identified 147 patients, 65% of whom had undergone molecular profiling. The median age at diagnosis was 61 y (range, 20–84 y), and the median follow-up time was 74 mo (range, 26–83 mo). Eighty-two percent were classified as having an unfavorable CUP subtype as per international guidelines.¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT demonstrated a primary site detection rate of 41%, resulted in a change in management in 22%, and identified previously occult disease sites in 37%. Median OS was 16.8 mo for all patients and 104.7 and 12.1 mo for favorable and unfavorable CUP subtypes, respectively (P < 0.0001). Median OS in CUP patients when using ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, clinicopathologic, and genomic information was 19.8 and 8.5 mo when a primary site was detected and not detected, respectively (P = 0.016). Multivariable analysis of survival adjusted for age and sex remained significant for identification of a potential primary site (P < 0.001), a favorable CUP (P < 0.001), and an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group status of 1 or less (P < 0.001). Conclusion: ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT plays a complementary role in CUP diagnostic work-up and was able to determine the likely primary site in 41% of cases. OS is improved with primary site identification, demonstrating the value of access to diagnostic ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT for CUP patients.

SANTA CLARA, Calif., Oct. 25, 2024 — ServiceNow has announced that enterprise software industry veteran Amit Zavery will join the company as president, chief product officer (CPO), and chief operating officer […]

The post Google Cloud and Oracle Veteran Amit Zavery to Spearhead Product and Engineering at ServiceNow appeared first on HPCwire.

BARCELONA, Spain, Nov. 7, 2024 — Codee, a provider of software developer tools for automated code review and testing specializing in correctness, modernization and optimization of Fortran/C/C++ code, is pleased […]

The post Do IT Now and Codee Partner to Enhance Code Correctness, Modernization and Optimization appeared first on HPCwire.

Kevin Costner says he didn't know about his "Yellowstone" character John Dutton's death until after the episode aired on Sunday.

We can blame capitalism for worsening the climate crisis, says journalist Akshat Rathi, but we can also use it to create the solutions we need for the mess we're in. He details how “climate capitalism” — the strategic use of market forces and government policies to make polluting the planet cost more than advancing climate solutions — can flip the script and actually make sustainability profitable.

Did you grow up in a world void of social media platforms? Then, you’re probably the last ‘lucky’ generation. A part of Generation Y and most of Generation Z have been raised alongside the internet and social media. Individuals belonging to the latter have practically been raised by such platforms, as they interact with strangers […]

The post Sacrificing the Human Psyche at the Altar of Social Media? 4 Concerning Ill-Effects to Know first appeared on What is Psychology?.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling was a victory, but it doesn’t take away the hurt of losing my students in a cold February, writes Brett Bigham.

Maryland's announcement Wednesday that school buildings won't reopen this academic year marked a a sobering milestone in the disruption to American education caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

The principal advice column takes on communicating district decisions you disagree with, optimizing virtual lunch bunches, and more.

What goes on behind all the closed doors in politics? Most teachers never get a chance to find out, writes teacher-turned-politician John Waldron.

An increasing number of schools are replacing snow days with remote learning, but some plan to stick with the snow day tradition for now.

Board members didn't act on a resolution to revoke Alabama's version of the Common Core State Standards.

Data on the usage of educational technology tools can provide districts with a helpful road map for improving student engagement under remote, in-person, or hybrid learning conditions. See how school districts are using such data to make smart, strategic decisions.

Some districts are scrambling to account for thousands of devices—a task made more urgent by the uncertainty over when students will be able to return to school buildings full-time.

Education Secretary Betsy DeVos has finally OK'd Florida's plan to implement the Every Student Succeeds Act. That means that single state, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, has gotten the go-ahead for its plan.

Gov. Erik Greitens has resigned and the board doesn't have enough governor-appointed members to form a quorum. Important tasks have been piling up.

Data on the usage of educational technology tools can provide districts with a helpful road map for improving student engagement under remote, in-person, or hybrid learning conditions. See how school districts are using such data to make smart, strategic decisions.

An Alaskan high school exchange program works to promote understanding between the state's urban centers and its remote Native Villages and communities.

Where did Texas A&M land in the latest CFP bracket? Here’s the College Football Playoff picture for the Aggies and their path to the championship.

Miami landed 9th in the latest CFP bracket. Here’s the College Football Playoff picture for the Hurricanes and path to the championship.