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A Vision for the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship




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Undercurrents: Episode 21 - EU-US Relations after the Midterms, and Tackling the Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa




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Frosty Neighbours? Unpacking Narratives of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations




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The Transatlantic Relationship: Challenges and Opportunities




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Undercurrents: Episode 26 - China's Economy, and UK Relations with Saudi Arabia




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The Future of UK-China Relations




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Iceland and the Wellbeing Economy




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A Deeper Look at the Protests in Belarus




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Adipose differentiation-related protein is an ubiquitously expressed lipid storage droplet-associated protein

DL Brasaemle
Nov 1, 1997; 38:2249-2263
Articles




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Quantitation of atherosclerosis in murine models: correlation between lesions in the aortic origin and in the entire aorta, and differences in the extent of lesions between sexes in LDL receptor-deficient and apolipoprotein E-deficient mice

RK Tangirala
Nov 1, 1995; 36:2320-2328
Articles






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Police make arrest relating to bags of cash that allegedly fell from Beryllium vehicle

The police have arrested an individual in the probe surrounding two bags of cash that allegedly fell from a Beryllium security vehicle en route to the Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston last week. 




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Characterizing human {alpha}-1,6-fucosyltransferase (FUT8) substrate specificity and structural similarities with related fucosyltransferases [Protein Structure and Folding]

Mammalian Asn-linked glycans are extensively processed as they transit the secretory pathway to generate diverse glycans on cell surface and secreted glycoproteins. Additional modification of the glycan core by α-1,6-fucose addition to the innermost GlcNAc residue (core fucosylation) is catalyzed by an α-1,6-fucosyltransferase (FUT8). The importance of core fucosylation can be seen in the complex pathological phenotypes of FUT8 null mice, which display defects in cellular signaling, development, and subsequent neonatal lethality. Elevated core fucosylation has also been identified in several human cancers. However, the structural basis for FUT8 substrate specificity remains unknown.Here, using various crystal structures of FUT8 in complex with a donor substrate analog, and with four distinct glycan acceptors, we identify the molecular basis for FUT8 specificity and activity. The ordering of three active site loops corresponds to an increased occupancy for bound GDP, suggesting an induced-fit folding of the donor-binding subsite. Structures of the various acceptor complexes were compared with kinetic data on FUT8 active site mutants and with specificity data from a library of glycan acceptors to reveal how binding site complementarity and steric hindrance can tune substrate affinity. The FUT8 structure was also compared with other known fucosyltransferases to identify conserved and divergent structural features for donor and acceptor recognition and catalysis. These data provide insights into the evolution of modular templates for donor and acceptor recognition among GT-B fold glycosyltransferases in the synthesis of diverse glycan structures in biological systems.




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Lipid-tuned Zinc Transport Activity of Human ZnT8 Protein Correlates with Risk for Type-2 Diabetes [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Zinc is a critical element for insulin storage in the secretory granules of pancreatic beta cells. The islet-specific zinc transporter ZnT8 mediates granular sequestration of zinc ions. A genetic variant of human ZnT8 arising from a single nonsynonymous nucleotide change contributes to increased susceptibility to type-2 diabetes (T2D), but it remains unclear how the high risk variant (Arg-325), which is also a higher frequency (>50%) allele, is correlated with zinc transport activity. Here, we compared the activity of Arg-325 with that of a low risk ZnT8 variant (Trp-325). The Arg-325 variant was found to be more active than the Trp-325 form following induced expression in HEK293 cells. We further examined the functional consequences of changing lipid conditions to mimic the impact of lipid remodeling on ZnT8 activity during insulin granule biogenesis. Purified ZnT8 variants in proteoliposomes exhibited more than 4-fold functional tunability by the anionic phospholipids, lysophosphatidylcholine and cholesterol. Over a broad range of permissive lipid compositions, the Arg-325 variant consistently exhibited accelerated zinc transport kinetics versus the Trp-form. In agreement with the human genetic finding that rare loss-of-function mutations in ZnT8 are associated with reduced T2D risk, our results suggested that the common high risk Arg-325 variant is hyperactive, and thus may be targeted for inhibition to reduce T2D risk in the general populations.




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Why the Corrupt President of Belarus Deserves Sanctions

10 August 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Sanctions would be a wake-up call for those who oversaw this brutal and dirty election campaign.

2020-08-10-Belarus-Protest-Election

People protest at a rally of solidarity with political prisoners in Belarus. Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka deserves sanctions. This election campaign in Belarus, which culminated in a vote on Sunday is the most brutal and dirty in its history. But, so far, the EU, the UK and the US have only issued familiar-sounding and futile appeals to the Belarusian authorities condemning their actions. Not imposing sanctions is a de facto licence to continue with repression.

Despite all this, the West is unlikely to impose significant sanctions afterwards. There are several questionable reasons for this. First, Western policymakers fear sanctions against Lukashenko will make him more likely to genuflect to Russia. However, relations with Russia have already deteriorated as Belarus accuses Russia of trying to interfere with its domestic affairs.

Sanctions serve as a wake-up call. The Belarusian authorities then might seek - once again - to repair relations with the West and reduce repression for greater assistance in any direct confrontation with Russia.

Second, the West is reluctant to implement sanctions because it has already invested somewhat in warming relations with Belarusian authorities. Punishing Lukashenko could mean burying the - admittedly modest - achievements of a Belarus-West dialogue that started in 2014 after the conflict in Ukraine began.

Even US secretary of state Mike Pompeo met with Lukashenko in Minsk this year, after which Belarus replaced a small but symbolic amount of Russian oil for American. All the same, the West has its conscience to answer to if dialogue is won but repressions continue.

The third reason why the West may not resort to targeted economic sanctions and visa restrictions is a latent concern whether such measures have any effect on democratization processes at all. They may be appropriate punishment, but there is little evidence they ever change the nature of a regime.

According to this logic, if the West imposes sanctions, the Belarusian authorities will continue to crack down with repression because they will have nothing to lose. That said, in previous years, the Belarusian authorities have released political prisoners in response to sticks and carrots brandished by the West. If Belarusian political prisoners did not have a price tag, the authorities would most likely keep everyone in jail.

To be fair, there are reasonable arguments in favour of and against sanctions. But if the West fails to impose them - be it through lack of political will or out of genuine concern about their effectiveness - at least it should focus on helping ordinary Belarusians withstand Lukashenko’s repressions. After the vote, arrested and jailed Belarusian citizens might lack money for lawyers and arbitrarily imposed fines.

If repression spreads further, independent media and human rights organizations will need funds to keep their structures running in the heat of the crackdown. Many entrepreneurs might lose their companies for openly supporting free elections. Thus, if the West will not sanction Lukashenko, it should at least show solidarity with these Belarusians in peril.

This article was originally published in The Telegraph.




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Belarus Policy: Time to Play Hardball

12 August 2020

James Nixey

Director, Russia-Eurasia and Europe Programmes
Predictably, Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime has betrayed its people and the West’s trust yet again. A new, tougher approach is now the only option, and sanctions are only one of several actions that should be taken.

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Women take part in an event in support of detained and injured participants in mass protests against the results of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election. Photo by Natalia FedosenkoTASS via Getty Images.

Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s 26-year rule — one of the world’s longest — is itself testament to his regime’s unwillingness to change. Most of Belarus’s immediate neighbours — particularly Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland — are far more prosperous. Now, with the farce of last week’s vote and the subsequent renewed violence that Minsk is willing to use on its citizens, Belarus finds itself at the very bottom of the post-Soviet legitimacy league table. But others share a portion of blame for this saga. The West — and the EU in particular — have failed the people of Belarus.

Russia — as ever in its relationships with the Soviet Union’s other successor states — has much to answer for. Like a drug pusher, it made a loss-leading investment in getting Belarus hooked on subsidised energy with meaningless security guarantees thrown in. Lukashenka may not have been the most compliant of post-Soviet leaders — especially recently — but he is still preferred by the Kremlin over any other potential contender, especially the reforming ones currently at the fore. ‘A son-of-a-bitch, but our son-of-a-bitch’ is Russia’s take.

But if Russia is the pusher, Western countries have been the enablers. Lukashenka has played them — and played them off against Russia — by frequently rejecting the offers of one and getting closer to the other, then switching and doing the same. The inability or unwillingness to recognize — and act on — evidence of the regime’s insincerity and its propensity to inflict harm on its own citizens has encouraged Minsk’s worst excesses. At the time of writing, more than 3,000 are reported to have been arrested and many tortured.

The EU bears special responsibility for this enabling. Ever since Belarus’s independence almost 30 years ago, it has offered plenty of carrots but few meaningful sticks. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that ‘harassment & violent repression of peaceful protesters has no place in Europe’, but statements alone are inadequate. The Belarusian people are risking their freedoms and their lives on the streets of Minsk while the EU simply ‘calls on’ the Belarusian authorities to respect the democratic process.

Never too late

There is plenty that can be done. Sanctions are a much-touted first step and they have been proven to change the calculus, if not the character, of a regime. The EU, the UK and the US should act decisively and in unison to impose them immediately. Included in this would be the immediate halting of direct EU support to state entities.

But — as with Russia — it is lazy to limit responses to sanctions alone. Expulsion from international groups and values-based organizations should also be expedited. The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) project with Belarus and five other countries is a prime example of supposedly conditional offers of financial assistance having been accepted, claimed and then defaulted on, time and again. It is time to make an example of Belarus and expel it from the EaP since it is abundantly clear it has no intention of adopting the values demanded of it.

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) was invited by the Belarusian authorities too late to observe last Sunday’s vote-rigging, so why, in the face of such obvious obstruction, is Belarus even a member? The OSCE often claims its strength is its inclusivity, but this has rarely stood up to scrutiny. Inclusivity may have advantages, but one should also acknowledge its propensity to dilute effectiveness. Belarus should be expelled from here too.

The same goes for the IMF, the World Bank group, and its WTO observer status. It is time to make an example of this regime.

There should be less diplomatic nicety. It is natural that foreign service officials are hard-wired to want to make things better through their undoubted skills of sensitivity and tact, and sometimes this is the right answer. But not always. It would be better in some instances, such as this one, to give a tougher message — making it clear this regime is no longer seen as legitimate and that, where possible, western countries will seek relationships with more representative figures. This is neither easy nor especially pleasant, but it is not the same as breaking off diplomatic relations entirely, which is not wise as sometimes the organs of power must be dealt with.

And in terms of immediate practical help, the EU has an obligation to open its borders to Belarusian refugees who will surely come its way as conditions deteriorate. Lithuania is already showing the way in this regard.

Belarus is not one of the more difficult countries. It has no influence, no natural resources and therefore no leverage. It could resort to even more brutal repression of its citizens, but it should be made clear that such a desperate move by the authorities would entail even greater sanction. A common argument against a tougher approach is that it will drive Belarus into the arms of Russia. But this is to fall into the same trap — blackmail in reality — that we have seen for 20 years. In fact, it would be a good litmus test for a similar policy towards other ‘abuser countries’, such as Hungary.

Russia is certainly watching closely right now, and the last thing it wants is another colour revolution. The probability is that it will get this wish for now, as the demonstrations will surely cool off and key opposition figures not already in jail have been forced to flee. But western quiescence, as it always does, encourages Russia to act with further impunity. No invasion needed this time though if it already has most of what it wants — Union State notwithstanding — and the West stands aside.

A Chinese proverb maintains that ‘the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second-best time is now’. This holds true for dealing with Belarus. It is not too late to act decisively and play hardball. In doing so, the EU would help repair its reputation for hand-wringing and the people of Belarus might look at the EU with a respect they have lost.




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Watching Belarus Means Watching Russia Too

13 August 2020

Keir Giles

Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Protesters in Belarus face a dilemma, as being too successful in confronting the Belarusian regime could mean they end up having to reckon with Russian forces as well.

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Russian president Vladimir Putin and Belarus president Aliaksandr Lukashenka skiing in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia. Photo by SERGEI CHIRIKOV/AFP via Getty Images.

Amid outrage and revulsion at Belarus’s fraudulent election and the subsequent savage repression of protests, Western responses must be planned with half an eye on Russia. Not just for what is often described as the risk of ‘driving Belarus into Russia’s arms’ but also for the danger of unilateral Russian action, with or without Belarusian acquiescence.

In the past six years, there have been endless discussions of what might prompt another Russian military intervention in Europe after Ukraine. In many of these scenarios, it is precisely the situation currently unfolding in Belarus that has been top of the list, with all the wide-ranging implications for security of the continent as a whole that would follow.

Just as with Ukraine, Russia is considered likely to intervene if it seemed to Moscow there was a danger of ‘losing’ Belarus to the West. If the situation in Belarus becomes more unstable and unpredictable, assertive Russian action could aim to assert control by different possible means - either propping up Lukashenka as a paper-thin proxy for Russian power, or installing a different, more compliant leadership as a pretence at legitimacy.

New facts on the ground

Leadership and support for a Western response to events in Belarus might previously have been expected from the United States which, like the UK, had been actively pushing forward relations with Belarus. But besides its preoccupation with internal affairs, US criticism of the election and ‘detentions of peaceful protesters and journalists’ looks tenuous in the light of the current administration’s behaviour over its own recent domestic issues.

Nevertheless, for NATO and for the United States as its primary guarantor, what happens in Belarus remains critically important precisely because of the possible response by Russia. Unpredictability increases the risk of Russia declaring it has received a ‘request for assistance from the legitimate government of Belarus’ and moving military forces into the country.

Once the immediate challenge of suppressing dissent had been dealt with, the presence of Russian forces in Belarus – along with the air and missile forces they could be expected to bring with them - would substantially alter the security situation for a wide area of central Europe. Popular scenarios for Russian military adventures such as a move on the Suwałki gap - the strip of Polish-Lithuanian border separating the exclave of Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia - would no longer be several geopolitical steps away.

Ukraine would be forced to rapidly re-orient its defence posture to face a new threat from the north, while Belarus’s other neighbours would need to adjust to having effectively a direct border with Russia. In particular, NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) contingents in Poland and Lithuania would become the focus of intense political attention, facing calls both for their rapid expansion, and their complete removal as destabilizing factors.

Examining Russia's options

NATO and the US’s European Command must now be watching Russia just as intently as Russia is watching Belarus. For now, Russia may be reassured by what it has seen. While the protests in Belarus are far more widespread than those in Ukraine which led to its former president Viktor Yanukovych fleeing the country, Aliaksandr Lukashenka is showing no signs of similarly losing his nerve.

The viciousness of the repression combined with more or less effective suppression of communications over the internet may mean unrest will soon be subdued. Even if there were a transfer of power, the current Belarusian opposition has not declared a policy of greater integration with the West - and Russia might feel it could constrain the options available to any replacement as effectively as it has done Lukashenka’s.

Perversely, continued international apathy could even work to Belarus’s benefit by providing reassurance to Russia. If a palpable lack of interest helps the Kremlin believe the discontent in Belarus is purely organic and spontaneous, and is not other countries ‘mobilizing the protest potential of the population’ in order to bring about a ‘colour revolution’, this would be a strong argument against a need to act in order to head off Western encroachment.

But the options facing ordinary Belarusians do remain bleak. Passivity means acceptance of continuing stagnation under Lukashenka, with his rule extended indefinitely. Active opposition means a very real risk of arrest with the possibility of serious injury. Unsuccessful protest means the cause may once again soon be forgotten by the outside world. Successful protest carries the ever-present risk of Russia stepping in with an offer of ‘fraternal assistance’ and Belarus becoming effectively a province of Russia rather than an independent country with – in the long term - the opportunity to choose its own future.




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Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine: An Opportunity for Gender-Sensitive Policymaking?

18 August 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Meaningful change is needed in Ukraine’s response to the conflict-related sexual violence, which affects both women and men.

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Ukrainian feminists and human rights activists carry posters at an International Women's Day protest in Kyiv, Ukraine on 8 March 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

The virus of violence

According to the UN (para. 7) and the International Criminal Court (ICC, para. 279), conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is quite prevalent in hostilities-affected eastern Ukraine. Both sexes are subjected to sexualized torture, rape, forced nudity, prolonged detention in unsanitary conditions with members of the other sex and threats of sexual violence towards detainees or their relatives to force confessions. Men are castrated. Women additionally suffer from sexual slavery, enforced and survival prostitution, and other forms of sexual abuse. Women are more exposed to CRSV: in the hostilities-affected area, every third woman has experienced or witnessed CRSV as opposed to every fourth man.

COVID-19 has redirected funding priorities, affecting the availability of medical and psychological help for CRSV survivors worldwide. In Ukraine, the very reporting of such violence, stigmatized even before the pandemic, has been further undermined by the country-wide quarantine-induced restrictions on movement and the closure of checkpoints between the government-controlled and temporarily uncontrolled areas.

Addressing CRSV in Ukraine

The stigma of CRSV, the patchy domestic legislation, and the unpreparedness of the criminal justice system to deal with such cases prevent the authorities from properly helping those harmed in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine armed conflict.

CRSV is equally traumatizing yet different in nuance for men and women. Female victims often choose not to report the violence. Women avoid protracted proceedings likely to cause re-traumatization and the disclosure of their experience, which could be particularly excruciating in small communities where everybody knows everyone.

Men also struggle to provide their accounts of CRSV. Their suppressed pain and shame of genital mutilation and other CRSV result in sexual and other health disfunctions. Combined with the post-conflict mental health struggles, this has been shown to lead to increased domestic violence and even suicide.

The very investigation of CRSV in Ukraine is challenging. Certain tests and examinations need to be done straight after an assault, which in the context of detention and grey zones of hostilities is often impossible. Specialized medical and psychological support is lacking. Investigators and prosecutors are hardly trained to deal with CRSV to the point that they do not ask questions about it during the interviews. Burdened by trauma and stigma, survivors are inclined to report torture or inhuman treatment, but not the sexualized aspects thereof.

Seven years into the conflict, the state still has not criminalized the full spectrum of CRSV in its domestic law. Ukraine’s Criminal Code contains a brief list of the violations of the rules and customs of warfare in article 438. It prohibits the inhuman treatment of civilians and POWs but does not list any types of CRSV.

The article has an open-ended reference to Ukraine’s ratified international treaties, from which the responsibility for other armed conflict violations may be derived. For the more detailed norms on CRSV, Ukraine should refer at least to Geneva Convention IV protecting civilians and two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, to which it is a party.

However, the novelty of the war context for Ukrainian investigators, prosecutors and judges and their overcautiousness about the direct application of international conventions mean that in practice, observing the treaty or jurisprudential instruction on CRSV has been slow.

Use of the Criminal Code’s articles on sexual violence not related to an armed conflict is not viable. Such provisions fail to reflect the horrible variety and complexity of CRSV committed in hostilities. They also envisage lesser punishment than a war crime of sexual violence would entail. Cumulatively, this fails to account for the intention of a perpetrator, the gravity of the crime and the trauma of its victims.

The lack of public debate and state action on CRSV understates its magnitude. Ukraine should break its silence about CRSV in Donbas and make addressing this violence part of its actionable agenda - in law and in implementation.

Ukraine should incorporate all war crimes and crimes against humanity of CRSV in its domestic legislation; ensure a more gendered psychological and medical support for both sexes; establish rehabilitation and compensation programmes for CRSV survivors; create special victims and witness protection schemes; consider the different stigmatizing effects of CRSV on men and women in criminal proceedings and engage the professionals of the same sex as the victim; map CRSV in the bigger picture of other crimes in Donbas to better understand the motives of the perpetrators; submit more information about CRSV to the ICC and educate the public to destigmatize the CRSV survivors.

The drafters of Ukraine’s transitional justice roadmap should ensure that it highlights CRSV, adopts a gendered approach to it and endorses female participation as a crucial component of reconciliation and broader policymaking.

Embracive policymaking

Although ‘the discriminatory line almost inevitably hurts women,’ 'every gender discrimination is a two-edged sword’, Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously argued before the US Supreme Court. This could not be more relevant for Ukraine. The conflict - and lockdown-related violence has reverberated deeper within Ukrainian society, raising fundamental questions about the roles of both sexes and gender equality.

The failure to address CRSV and its different stigmas for both sexes mirrors the general lack of sustainable gender lenses in Ukraine's policymaking. It is no coincidence that a June 2020 proposal for gender parity in political parties coincided with another spike of sexist remarks by top officials. While women get access to more positions in the army, sexual harassment in the military is investigated slowly. Despite all the impressive female professionals, no woman made it to the first four-member consultative civic group in the Minsk process. Such lack of diversity sends an unfortunate message that women are not important for Ukraine’s peace process.

Ginsburg said, ‘women belong in all places where decisions are being made.’ CRSV against either sex won’t be addressed properly until both sexes contribute with their talents and their grievances to all pillars of Ukraine’s state governance and strategy. Ukraine should look to engage professional women - and there are plenty - to join its public service not just in numbers, but as the indispensable equal voices of a powerful choir.




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Can the International Criminal Court Help Belarus?

26 August 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
A referral of election violence in Belarus to the International Criminal Court could enhance the support for the Belarusian people at other crucial platforms.

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A protester carries a former Belarusian flag during an opposition rally by the Minsk Hero City Obelisk. Photo by Valery SharifulinTASS via Getty Images.

Making the case

The recent election results in Belarus have triggered revolution in yet another post-Soviet country and Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s response has been devastatingly brutal. However, the Belarusian people’s resilience and Western sanctionsadopted on 14 August – have proved effective. As some of the 6,700 jailed protesters were released, accounts of horrific treatment by law enforcement emerged: overcrowded cells, no food, torture, forced confessions, severe beatings , and threats of rape.

With reports of mounting violence, Polish MEP Radosław Sikorski warned Lukashenka to expect not just sanctions but also the possible intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), an idea supported by the opposition-led Belarus’ National Salvation. While there are significant impediments to the Court’s involvement, the impact of such an initiative could be ground-breaking.

Legal framework

The ICC considers criminal responsibility of top civilian or military leaders for only the most serious atrocities - war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and, in certain cases, the crime of aggression. In the context of Belarus, the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity might be relevant. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty, crimes against humanity include widespread or systematic abuses directed against a civilian population. Atrocities relevant to Belarus include arbitrary imprisonment, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and enforced disappearances.

The ICC is a last resort. It can intervene only if states are unable or unwilling to properly investigate and prosecute serious crimes themselves. Although Belarus’s Criminal Code punishes crimes against humanity, as Lukashenka himself is implicated, impartial trials in the country are impossible while he is still in power. Other countries may investigate specific atrocities in Belarus under the universal jurisdiction principle. Universal jurisdiction greenlights investigations into the most serious crimes regardless of where they are perpetrated. German, Swedish and French proceedings on Syria are illustrative examples of this. Protesters may also file individual complaints of abuse to UN bodies under the protocols of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The European Court of Human Rights is not an option for the protesters because Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe.

As the UN mechanisms are yet to be triggered and there has not yet been any talk of universal jurisdiction proceedings, the question of recourse to the ICC remains. But as Belarus is not party to the Rome Statute, the only way to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction is a referral by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Even though it would be vetoed by Russia –  and, almost certainly, China – it could be worth pursuing.

The importance of symbolism

So far, the UNSC has referred to the ICC two situations in non-party states – Sudan and Libya. But for cases that do not end up being referred to the Court, the UNSC debates are as significant for what they manage to agree upon as they are for what they do not. Regarding Belarus, two impeded UNSC accountability initiatives are relevant: on Syria and MH17.

In 2014, Russia and China vetoed the referral of cases of violence in Syria to the ICC. In 2015, Russia was the only country to block the creation by the UNSC of a special tribunal to investigate Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, downed by a Russian missile over war-affected eastern Ukraine. In both cases, the vetoes delayed justice, but they did not prevent it. For Syria, special independent mechanisms to collect evidence for adjudication were developed. Although justice has yet to be done, except in states like Germany, the evidence is ready for any future court. For MH17, a proceeding at a domestic Dutch court became an alternative. Parallel to that, new evidence of Russia’s role in both Syria and the downing of MH17 emerged - contextualising its UNSC vetoes.

Russia’s stakes in the Belarusian elections are probably even higher: the victory of democracy in Belarus will deprive it of one of its closest and most dependent post-Soviet allies.

Even if Russia destroys any chance of Belarusian citizens using the ICC, the attempted ICC-Belarus discussion will not have been in vain. Russia’s opposition to the respective UNSC resolution would be a self-defeating validation of Lukashenka’s atrocities against his own people, unashamedly restated at one of the world’s top diplomatic negotiation tables. Similar to Syria and MH17, the UNSC would reconfirm its self-imposed impotency to defend basic human rights amid political conjuncture. This would bring more attention to the issue and catalyse action through other platforms, including the discussions across UN bodies and the consideration of Belarusians’ individual complaints of abuse, and could lead to tougher sanctions. It could also further make the case for universal jurisdiction proceedings in other countries.      

Supporting civil society

Belarusian civil society will need stronger support from democratic governments and human rights organizations in reporting and documenting the crimes. Other countries, neighbouring states in particular, should be ready to welcome Belarusian protesters through refugee schemes, so they are able to continue their activities from abroad.

When nationwide strikes enveloped Belarus, singers from the Minsk Opera supported protesters by singing Va, pensiero, the famed chorus of the Hebrew slaves from Verdi’s Nabucco – and a symbol of united Italy’s revival. The people of Belarus also want to live in a democratic state ‘where the mind is without fear and the head is held high’. And they deserve all the support they can get. The inevitable fall of Lukashenka’s regime might take time but it should not take more lives.




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Seven Ways the West Can Help Belarus

10 September 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Outlining the key steps that government, international institutions, and NGOs can take to bring an end to the suffering of the Belarus people.

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Opposition supporters hold white-red-white flags at a Minsk protest in support of Belarusian opposition activist Maria Kolesnikova. Photo by Natalia FedosenkoTASS via Getty Images.

1. Acknowledge the new reality

A huge number of Belarusians across all levels of society simply no longer recognize Lukashenka as their legitimate president. The unprecedented size and persistence of protests against his regime and the sheer scale of reports of repressive actions, torture, and even murder, mean Belarus will never be the same again.

However, current paralysis in EU policy and the absence of a comprehensive US policy are both serving as a de facto licence for Lukashenka to deepen the political crisis. The sooner policymakers realize this and act with more responsibility and confidence, the quicker the increasing repression can be reversed.

2. Do not recognize Lukashenka as president

If the international community stops recognizing Lukashenka as president, it makes him more toxic to others, including Russia and China, both of which will be reluctant to waste resources on someone who is seen as the main cause of Belarusian instability. Even if Russia still decides to save Lukashenka and financially support him, ignoring Lukashenka decreases the legitimacy of any agreements he signs with the Kremlin on collaboration or integration.

Demanding a re-run of the presidential election should also remain firmly on the agenda as functionaries within Lukashenka's system should know this international pressure is not going away until a truly transparent vote takes place.

3. Be present on the ground

In order to curb repression and establish ties with actors within Belarus, a monitoring group should be organized under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE or other international organizations to establish a presence on the ground, and to stay in the country as long as it is needed, and is possible. Governments and parliaments can send their own missions, while staff from international media and NGOs should be encouraged to report on what is actually happening inside the country.

The bigger the visible presence of the international community is in Belarus, the less brutal Lukashenka’s agencies can be in persecuting protestors, which in turn would then allow more substantial negotiations to take place between the democratic movement and Lukashenka.

4. Announce a package of economic support for a democratic Belarus

The Belarusian economy was already in bad shape before the election, but the situation is going to get much worse. The only way out is support from the international community with a ‘Marshall Plan for a democratic Belarus’. States and international financial institutions should declare they will provide significant financial assistance through grants or low-interest loans, but only if there is democratic change first.

It is essential to make this economic package conditional on democratic reform, but also that it will have no geopolitical strings attached. If a democratically-elected government decides it wants to improve relations with Russia, it should still be able to count on an assistance package.

This would send a strong signal to economic reformers who remain inside Lukashenka's system, giving them a genuine choice between a functioning Belarusian economy or sticking with Lukashenka, whose leadership is seen by many as to be responsible for ruining the country’s economy.

5. Introduce targeted political and economic sanctions

The Lukashenka regime deserves tough sanctions internationally, but so far only selective visa restrictions or account freezes have been imposed, which have little to no effect on what is actually happening on the ground. Visa sanction lists need to be expanded but, more importantly, there should be increased economic pressure on the regime. Companies which are the most important to Lukashenka's business interests should be identified and targeted with sanctions, all their trading activity halted, and all their accounts abroad frozen.

Governments should also persuade their own country’s large companies to reconsider working with Belarusian producers. It is shameful that international corporations continue to advertise in media controlled by Lukashenka and appear to be ignoring the reports of human rights violations at Belarusian companies they do business with.

Moreover, there should be a deadline set to halt all repression, or broader economic sanctions will be imposed. This would send a strong message to Lukashenka and also his entourage, many of whom would then become more convinced he has to go.

6. Support NGOs to investigate allegations of torture

There are few legal mechanisms to prosecute those thought to be involved in election fraud and acts of brutality. Nevertheless, all reports of torture and falsifications should be properly documented by human rights defenders, including identifying those alleged to have taken part. Gathering evidence now prepares the ground for investigations, targeted sanctions, and leverage on law enforcement officials in the future.

But, given that such an investigation is not possible in Belarus right now, international human rights activists should be enabled to start the process outside the country with support from Belarusian NGOs.

7. Support known victims of the regime

Even with an unprecedented campaign of solidarity among Belarusians, many people need support, especially those alleged to have suffered torture. Some media outlets claim to have lost a significant amount of revenue because advertisers were forced to pull out, and journalists arrested. Human rights defenders need funds to keep organizations running in the heat of this crackdown.

Supporting all these people and organizations will cost tens of millions of euros, but it would significantly ease the huge financial burden facing those who have opposed the regime.




ela

Novichok Poisons Germany's Relations with Russia

14 September 2020

John Lough

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The conclusion of a specialist German military laboratory that Alexey Navalny was poisoned with the nerve agent novichok has shocked Germany’s political class and is forcing the government to re-assess relations with Russia.

2020-09-14-Nord-Stream-2-Pipe

A worker at the construction site of a section of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline near Kingisepp, Leningrad Region. Photo by Alexander DemianchukTASS via Getty Images.

When Chancellor Angela Merkel offered to provide medical care for Navalny in Germany after he fell ill from suspected poisoning in Russia, she could have hardly expected her humanitarian gesture would trigger a crisis in her country’s relations with Russia.

Merkel has used uncharacteristically blunt words to condemn the apparent attempt on Navalny’s life, saying the use of novichok raises serious questions that only the Russian government could answer. She described Navalny as being the ‘victim of a crime’ which was a violation of the ‘basic values and basic rights’ that Germany and its allies were committed to. Her tone and body language certainly showed how strongly she felt about the issue.

Germany’s Social Democrat foreign minister Heiko Maas then followed up by suggesting Russia’s response might force Germany to change its position on the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline which aims to double Germany’s direct gas imports from Russia under the Baltic Sea.

This is a dramatic change of position since his party has been a staunch supporter of the controversial project. Two Christian Democrat candidates for the Chancellorship called for a stop to the pipeline together with representatives from the Greens, who could be part of a government coalition after the 2021 federal election.

Claims of hostile provocation

The Russian foreign ministry shot back with a statement condemning Berlin’s ‘unsubstantiated accusations and ultimatums’ and claiming Germany was using Navalny’s hospitalisation to discredit Russia internationally. It demanded Germany share data and test results with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office, saying any failure to comply would be ‘a crude hostile provocation against Russia’ that risked consequences for the bilateral relationship as well as ‘serious complications in the international situation’.

Such strong language from Moscow towards Germany has not been seen for over 30 years, and is all the more remarkable as Putin has personally invested heavily in the relationship with Germany in view of its economic and political importance, and its strong desire for constructive ties with Russia. Until 2014, Russian analysts viewed Germany as Russia’s ‘lobbyist’ in Europe.

Berlin is now trying to downplay the situation, claiming the Navalny poisoning is not actually a Germany-Russia matter and referring it to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By consulting with its EU and NATO allies, Berlin is further internationalising the issue to reduce impact on the bilateral relationship.

Such a forceful reaction to the poisoning reflects Germany’s increasing frustration with the Kremlin. The murder in broad daylight in Berlin in August 2019 of a Chechen wanted by the Russian authorities has been traced to the FSB. And the publication of a report in May 2020 into the hacking of the German parliament in 2015, including Merkel’s parliamentary office, was a further reminder of how far Russia had deviated from the course of partnership that Berlin believed the two countries had established in the 1990s.

Merkel described the cyberattack as ‘monstrous’, saying it was part of a strategy of hybrid warfare that includes ‘disorientation’ and ‘manipulation of facts’. Further tension has been added since the recent Belarus election as Moscow is supporting Lukashenka’s presidency whereas the EU does not recognise him as the legitimate president.

This accumulation of events is forcing German policymakers to recognise the Russian leadership is a menace to its own citizens, its neighbours and to Germany itself. Although Berlin abandoned several of its illusions about partnership with Russia in 2014 when it led the EU response to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine, it still hoped that the Kremlin would see reason and adjust its policies.

It combined sectoral economic sanctions with continuing dialogue and a joint effort to help settle the conflict in Donbas despite the obvious fact that Russia was a party to the conflict. It still believed that Moscow had an interest in finding a compromise. Instead, experience so far suggests Russia has a greater interest in keeping the conflict ‘semi-frozen’ as a way of forcing Ukraine to compromise.

Controversially, Germany also saw the need to expand energy relations with Russia in a bid to stabilise ties and draw Russia closer to Europe. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline initiated in September 2015 by Gazprom and five European companies – two of them German – is a monument to this policy.

Even though this project lacked an overall economic rationale, the German government supported it – much to the consternation of the Baltic States, Poland and others who objected to what they saw as Berlin’s insistence on a ‘Russia-first’ policy that undercut the interests of Ukraine. This was because the pipeline’s purpose is to re-route gas flows away from Ukraine, depriving it of transit revenues and a lever of influence in its relations with Moscow.

It now appears the German government is finally waking up to the fact that its attempts to encourage better Russian behaviour have failed. Policy looks set to become tougher and a moratorium on Nord Stream 2 now appears a real possibility if Russia fails to investigate the Navalny poisoning and provide adequate answers.

However, sanctioning the new pipeline is likely to provoke counter-measures against German business interests in Russia. If Berlin is determined to pursue this tougher line, it could end up facing an uncomfortable dilemma and being forced to consider alternative ways to signal displeasure at Russia’s criminal actions.




ela

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan Audio bhorton.drupal 9 April 2022

This episode of Africa Aware examines the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ahmed Soliman provides an overview of the Africa Programme’s work on cross-border conflict as part of the XCEPT project.

First, we speak to Kholood Khair on the steady deterioration in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Then Abel Abate Demissie discusses how recent political developments in Ethiopia and Sudan have impacted relations between the two countries.

This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

It is also part of a series of outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.




ela

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

  • How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
  • Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
  • What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
  • How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.




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China-Africa relations

China-Africa relations Explainer jon.wallace 18 January 2023

What are China’s objectives in Africa, how valid is the concept of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, and what are China’s military ambitions in the region?

A brief history of China-Africa relations

Africa has been crucial to China’s foreign policy since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1947. China supported several African liberation movements during the Cold War, and for every year since 1950 bar one, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has first visited an African country.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang visited five African countries and the African Union in January 2023. Wang Yi, the former foreign minister, visited 48 African countries and premier Xi Jinping undertook 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.

China-Africa relations are the bedrock of China’s foreign policy.
 

Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, speaking in December 2022

In 1971, the votes of African countries were instrumental in winning the PRC control of China’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council – displacing representatives from Chinese nationalist forces, who had been defeated in the civil war and now governed Taiwan.

In the following decades, China’s focus in Africa switched to eliminating all remaining recognition for Taiwan’s government. Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, Senegal and others all switched their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Eswatini is the only African nation still to recognize Taiwan’s government in 2023.

In 1999 China created its ‘Going Out’ strategy, which encouraged Chinese companies to invest beyond China.

The strategy was a statement of China’s growing economic might and created a new wave of Chinese engagement in Africa. It was also an important source of employment for Chinese citizens working on new infrastructure projects.

In November 2003 the first tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing. FOCAC was created to improve cooperation between China and African states and signalled China’s growing strategic initiative in Africa.

Chinese president Xi Jinping delivers his speech during the November 2021 China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Dakar, Senegal, pledging to offer one billion COVID-19 vaccine doses to Africa. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images.

In 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Xi Jinping, featuring an ambition to reinvigorate the old silk trading route along the East African coast. This should theoretically have seen Chinese investment concentrated in East Africa, but many other African states also sought opportunities through the BRI, making the initiative quickly expand in scope and ambition.

The BRI saw a huge number of signature infrastructure projects built across Asia and Africa, funded by Chinese loans whose size, nature and origin were often opaque. Some African countries became badly exposed to Chinese lending during this period. 

Chinese investment peaked around 2016. Since then, Chinese loans to African governments declined significantly, falling from $28.4 billion in 2016 to $1.9 billion in 2020 – partly due to changing priorities in domestic Chinese politics, and partly due to the apparent difficulty African countries had repaying loans.

China’s investment in Africa

China has taken a position contrary to Western governments in its African investment. It characterizes its loans as mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries, promising not to interfere in the internal politics of those it loans to.

In this respect it presents itself in contrast to Western countries, who are accused by China and some African governments of arrogant, democratic posturing – often by former colonial powers that looted African resources during the 18th and 19th centuries.

China has learned by doing, and the reality of large-scale investments taught Chinese investors the limits of their approach. For instance, during the South Sudanese civil war, China had to deal with representatives of various forces opposed to the government to maintain the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended, claiming that Chinese communism could not be replicated outside of China.

However, ideological links exist between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the rulers of a state like Ethiopia, whose Prosperity Party has origins in ‘revolutionary democracy’ and Marxist-Leninism.

China’s National People’s Congress has formal relations with 35 African parliaments and the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) has relations with 110 political parties in 51 African countries.

Western politicians have increasingly voiced fears that China’s intentions in Africa are predatory, intended to create a network of African states that are obliged to service their debts by offering China access to resources, trade opportunities and locations for military bases.

Debt trap diplomacy

US commentators often describe Chinese policy in Africa as a ‘debt trap’, part of a deliberate strategy to loan unmanageable sums to African countries, draw them into China’s sphere of influence, and force unfair commitments upon them.

Some African nations do have extensive Chinese loans and are suffering from out-of-control debt, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and high interest rates. But their situations cannot be entirely blamed on Chinese loans. States including Kenya and Zambia have poorly managed their debt to all creditors, not only China.

Meanwhile, other African countries have created realistic, manageable debt arrangements with China without the tremendous risk and uncertainties that characterized some major BRI projects.

China also faces significant problems due to its extensive loans made during the BRI boom period, as it will struggle to force repayment while maintaining its image as a friend of developing nations.

BRI projects were largely uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit offered by competing Chinese lenders. This contradicts the idea of a coherent ‘debt trap’ policy by China.

However, the idea that China may use debt strategically, to expand its influence in the African content and secure access to resources, cannot be completely dismissed. China is an emerging superpower in strategic competition with the US. Building stronger economic relationships in Africa would be a logical step in its aspirations to be a global power.




ela

A Comprehensive Gender-related Secretome of Plasmodium berghei Sexual Stages

Felicia Grasso
Dec 1, 2020; 19:1986-1996
Research




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Novel Proteomic Profiling of Epididymal Extracellular Vesicles in the Domestic Cat Reveals Proteins Related to Sequential Sperm Maturation with Differences Observed between Normospermic and Teratospermic Individuals

Tricia Rowlison
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2090-2103
Research




ela

Interspecies differences in proteome turnover kinetics are correlated with lifespans and energetic demands

Kyle Swovick
Dec 28, 2020; 0:RA120.002301v1-mcp.RA120.002301
Research




ela

WITHDRAWN: The Fundamental And Pathological Importance Of Oxysterol Binding Protein And Its Related Proteins [Thematic Reviews]

This article has been withdrawn by the authors as part of this review overlapped with the contents of Pietrangelo A and Ridgway ND. 2018. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences. 75; 3079-98.




ela

Zika related microcephaly may appear after birth, study finds




ela

Prognostic utility of triglyceride-rich lipoprotein-related markers in patients with coronary artery disease [Research Articles]

TG-rich lipoprotein (TRL)-related biomarkers, including TRL-cholesterol (TRL-C), remnant-like lipoprotein particle-cholesterol (RLP-C), and apoC-III have been associated with atherosclerosis. However, their prognostic values have not been fully determined, especially in patients with previous CAD. This study aimed to examine the associations of TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III with incident cardiovascular events (CVEs) in the setting of secondary prevention of CAD. Plasma TRL-C, RLP-C, and total apoC-III were directly measured. A total of 4,355 participants with angiographically confirmed CAD were followed up for the occurrence of CVEs. During a median follow-up period of 5.1 years (interquartile range: 3.9–6.4 years), 543 (12.5%) events occurred. Patients with incident CVEs had significantly higher levels of TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III than those without events. Multivariable Cox analysis indicated that a log unit increase in TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III increased the risk of CVEs by 49% (95% CI: 1.16–1.93), 21% (95% CI: 1.09–1.35), and 40% (95% CI: 1.11–1.77), respectively. High TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III were also independent predictors of CVEs in individuals with LDL-C levels ≤1.8 mmol/l (n = 1,068). The addition of RLP-C level to a prediction model resulted in a significant increase in discrimination, and all three TRL biomarkers improved risk reclassification. Thus, TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III levels were independently associated with incident CVEs in Chinese CAD patients undergoing statin therapy.




ela

Interleukin 6 reduces allopregnanolone synthesis in the brain and contributes to age-related cognitive decline in mice [Research Articles]

Cognitive decline with age is a harmful process that can reduce quality of life. Multiple factors have been established to contribute to cognitive decline, but the overall etiology remains unknown. Here, we hypothesized that cognitive dysfunction is mediated, in part, by increased levels of inflammatory cytokines that alter allopregnanolone (AlloP) levels, an important neurosteroid in the brain. We assessed the levels and regulation of AlloP and the effects of AlloP supplementation on cognitive function in 4-month-old and 24-month-old male C57BL/6 mice. With age, the expression of enzymes involved in the AlloP synthetic pathway was decreased and corticosterone (CORT) synthesis increased. Supplementation of AlloP improved cognitive function. Interestingly, interleukin 6 (IL-6) infusion in young animals significantly reduced the production of AlloP compared with controls. It is notable that inhibition of IL-6 with its natural inhibitor, soluble membrane glycoprotein 130, significantly improved spatial memory in aged mice. These findings were supported by in vitro experiments in primary murine astrocyte cultures, indicating that IL-6 decreases production of AlloP and increases CORT levels. Our results indicate that age-related increases in IL-6 levels reduce progesterone substrate availability, resulting in a decline in AlloP levels and an increase in CORT. Furthermore, our results indicate that AlloP is a critical link between inflammatory cytokines and the age-related decline in cognitive function.




ela

{beta}-Carotene conversion to vitamin A delays atherosclerosis progression by decreasing hepatic lipid secretion in mice [Research Articles]

Atherosclerosis is characterized by the pathological accumulation of cholesterol-laden macrophages in the arterial wall. Atherosclerosis is also the main underlying cause of CVDs, and its development is largely driven by elevated plasma cholesterol. Strong epidemiological data find an inverse association between plasma β-carotene with atherosclerosis, and we recently showed that β-carotene oxygenase 1 (BCO1) activity, responsible for β-carotene cleavage to vitamin A, is associated with reduced plasma cholesterol in humans and mice. In this study, we explore whether intact β-carotene or vitamin A affects atherosclerosis progression in the atheroprone LDLR-deficient mice. Compared with control-fed Ldlr–/– mice, β-carotene-supplemented mice showed reduced atherosclerotic lesion size at the level of the aortic root and reduced plasma cholesterol levels. These changes were absent in Ldlr–/–/Bco1–/– mice despite accumulating β-carotene in plasma and atherosclerotic lesions. We discarded the implication of myeloid BCO1 in the development of atherosclerosis by performing bone marrow transplant experiments. Lipid production assays found that retinoic acid, the active form of vitamin A, reduced the secretion of newly synthetized triglyceride and cholesteryl ester in cell culture and mice. Overall, our findings provide insights into the role of BCO1 activity and vitamin A in atherosclerosis progression through the regulation of hepatic lipid metabolism.




ela

Novel Proteomic Profiling of Epididymal Extracellular Vesicles in the Domestic Cat Reveals Proteins Related to Sequential Sperm Maturation with Differences Observed between Normospermic and Teratospermic Individuals [Research]

Extracellular vesicles (EVs) secreted by the epididymal epithelium transfer to spermatozoa key proteins that are essential in promoting motility and subsequent fertilization success. Using the domestic cat model, the objectives were to (1) characterize and compare protein content of EVs between segments of the epididymis, and (2) compare EV protein compositions between normo- and teratospermic individuals (producing >60% of abnormal spermatozoa). Epididymal EVs from adult cats were isolated and assessed via liquid chromatography tandem MS. Both male types shared 3008 proteins in total, with 98 and 20 EV proteins unique to normospermic and teratospermic males, respectively. Expression levels of several proteins changed between epididymal segments in both male types. Several proteins in both groups were related to sperm motility (e.g. hexokinase 1, adenylate kinase isoenzyme) and zona pellucida or oolemma binding (e.g. disintegrin and metalloproteinase domain proteins, zona binding proteins 1 and 2). Interestingly, seven cauda-derived EV proteins trended downward in teratospermic compared with normospermic males, which may relate to poor sperm quality. Collective results revealed, for the first time, EV proteins related to sequential sperm maturation with differences observed between normospermic and teratospermic individuals.




ela

A Comprehensive Gender-related Secretome of Plasmodium berghei Sexual Stages [Research]

Plasmodium, the malaria parasite, undergoes a complex life cycle alternating between a vertebrate host and a mosquito vector of the genus Anopheles. In red blood cells of the vertebrate host, Plasmodium multiplies asexually or differentiates into gamete precursors, the male and female gametocytes, responsible for parasite transmission. Sexual stage maturation occurs in the midgut of the mosquito vector, where male and female gametes egress from the host erythrocytes to fuse and form a zygote. Gamete egress entails the successive rupture of two membranes surrounding the parasite, the parasitophorous vacuole membrane and the erythrocyte plasma membrane. In this study, we used the rodent model parasite Plasmodium berghei to design a label-free quantitative proteomic approach aimed at identifying gender-related proteins differentially released/secreted by purified mature gametocytes when activated to form gametes. We compared the abundance of molecules secreted by wild type gametocytes of both genders with that of a transgenic line defective in male gamete maturation and egress. This enabled us to provide a comprehensive data set of egress-related molecules and their gender specificity. Using specific antibodies, we validated eleven candidate molecules, predicted as either gender-specific or common to both male and female gametocytes. All of them localize to punctuate, vesicle-like structures that relocate to cell periphery upon activation, but only three of them localize to the gametocyte-specific secretory vesicles named osmiophilic bodies. Our results confirm that the egress process involves a tightly coordinated secretory apparatus that includes different types of vesicles and may put the basis for functional studies aimed at designing novel transmission-blocking molecules.




ela

WITHDRAWN: Quantitative mass spectrometry analysis of PD-L1 protein expression, N-glycosylation and expression stoichiometry with PD-1 and PD-L2 in human melanoma [Research]

This article has been withdrawn by the authors. We discovered an error after this manuscript was published as a Paper in Press. Specifically, we learned that the structures of glycans presented for the PD-L1 peptide were drawn and labeled incorrectly. We wish to withdraw this article and submit a corrected version for review.




ela

Interspecies differences in proteome turnover kinetics are correlated with lifespans and energetic demands [Research]

Cells continually degrade and replace damaged proteins. However, the high energetic demand of protein turnover generates reactive oxygen species (ROS) that compromise the long-term health of the proteome. Thus, the relationship between aging, protein turnover and energetic demand remains unclear. Here, we used a proteomic approach to measure rates of protein turnover within primary fibroblasts isolated from a number of species with diverse lifespans including the longest-lived mammal, the bowhead whale. We show that organismal lifespan is negatively correlated with turnover rates of highly abundant proteins. In comparison to mice, cells from long-lived naked mole rats have slower rates of protein turnover, lower levels of ATP production and reduced ROS levels. Despite having slower rates of protein turnover, naked mole rat cells tolerate protein misfolding stress more effectively than mouse cells. We suggest that in lieu of rapid constitutive turnover, long-lived species may have evolved more energetically efficient mechanisms for selective detection and clearance of damaged proteins.




ela

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

  • After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
  • State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
  • Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
  • The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
  • 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
  • While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
  • Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
  • The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
  • Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
  • In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
  • More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
  • Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
  • If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
  • Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
  • 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings




ela

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

  • After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
  • Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
  • The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
  • Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
  • Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
  • Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
  • Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
  • Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
  • Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
  • Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)




ela

Patient related outcome measures (PROMs) in long term conditions—is it time to bring them into routine clinical practice?




ela

A new transatlantic relationship?

A new transatlantic relationship? 4 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

US senator Jeanne Shaheen examines the implications of new UK leadership, the war in Ukraine, and NATO expansion for the US–UK relationship.

In recent weeks, the UK has ushered in a new prime minister and a new monarch. The US will hold potentially power-shifting mid-term elections in November after nearly two years of the Biden presidency that promised to bring the US ‘back’ as a global leader in international affairs.

These leadership changes come at a time when Europe is at war, NATO is expanding and US–China competition is re-ordering long-held alliances. Old assumptions about foreign policy are in flux in the midst of huge international challenges.

Democratic senator Shaheen, a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explores how these changes might influence the US–UK ‘special’ relationship.

  • How will the trajectory of Russia’s war on Ukraine influence the bilateral relationship? What leadership is needed now?

  • What does Russia’s war on Ukraine mean for NATO in responding to other pressing security challenges?

  • What domestic constraints might limit the US’s power to reinsert itself as a global leader?

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from the members drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 




ela

Black perspectives on international relations

Black perspectives on international relations 27 October 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can black perspectives help the world tackle global challenges and expand our understanding of international relations?

As social boundaries change, the viewpoints of black academics, thought leaders and policymakers have grown in both influence and strength worldwide, challenging western and institutional norms. 

However, many institutions and organizations, long established with the exclusion of black voices, have to adapt if there is to be greater inclusion and diversity of thought when tackling major global issues.

Growing reflection on the legacy of colonialism and the importance of the power of diversity may be needed for today’s problems.

The search for global racial equality has seen a growing commitment to ensuring the black experience is at the heart of geopolitical discussions.

This panel discussion looks at what changes are occurring now and how is the conversation shifting. It also examines the challenges posed by the increasing politicization of race and culture issues in the current political environment.

Key questions discussed by the panel include:

  • What is the importance of black voices in international relations and where are the main challenges to greater incorporation?

  • What are some of the leading perspectives, approaches and beliefs within Africa and across the black diaspora regarding international relations?

  • To what extent are governments, businesses and leading global institutions making efforts to include more black voices in decision-making?

  • How are black academics changing wider geopolitical conversations and to what extent can deeper conversations lead to change?

  • Will an ‘African Century’ bring black perspectives on international relations to the fore of the geopolitical agenda?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 




ela

The future of the Russia-China relationship

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

  • How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
  • What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
  • How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.




ela

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

Now is the time for a robust strategy aimed at preventing what is currently a rogue state from turning into an outright terrorist regime

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.




ela

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ela

Turkey-Russia Relations: A Marriage of Convenience?

Turkey-Russia Relations: A Marriage of Convenience? 26 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2020 Chatham House

Speakers discuss the complex but, so far, durable ties between Putin and Erdogan and the perspectives of each leader. Other issues will include the impact of the Biden presidency and the unfolding situation in Nagorny Karabakh.

This is an online only event

Russia-Turkey relations are governed by a unique dynamic between presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They pursue contrasting objectives in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus and Ukraine; yet they have managed to compartmentalize their differences to avoid any spill-over into diplomatic, military and economic cooperation.

Erdogan purchased the Russian S400 missile defence system at the cost of ejection from the US-led fourth generation F35 stealth fighter programme; and at the risk of sanctions by Washington. Russia is also proceeding with the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant near Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.




ela

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