risks

Day 1 Unfair Dismissal Right Risks Diversity And Justice Aims

Ben Smith discusses a UK proposal to abolish the two-year qualifying period for employees to bring an unfair dismissal claim against their employer.

Law 360

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Tenable Tackles Emerging Cloud and AI Risks With the Launch of Data and AI Security Posture Management for Cloud Environments

Tenable®, the exposure management company, today announced new data security posture management (DSPM) and artificial intelligence security posture management (AI-SPM) capabilities for Tenable Cloud Security, the actionable cloud security solution. By extending exposure management capabilities to cloud data and AI resources, Tenable Cloud Security reduces risk to two of the biggest emerging threats.

Today’s cloud environments are more complex than ever. The challenge of managing this complexity has led to preventable security gaps caused by misconfigurations, risky entitlements and vulnerabilities, leaving sensitive data and AI resources vulnerable. In fact, Tenable Research found that 38% of organizations are battling a toxic cloud trilogy – cloud workloads that are publicly exposed, critically vulnerable and highly privileged. 

Tenable Cloud Security exposes risk from across hybrid and multi-cloud environments, including vulnerabilities, misconfigurations and excess privilege, that affects data and AI resources. Integrating DSPM and AI-SPM into Tenable Cloud Security enables users to automatically discover, classify and analyze sensitive data risk with flexible, agentless scanning. With Tenable Cloud Security’s intuitive user interface, security leaders can easily answer tough questions – such as “What type of data do I have in the cloud and where is it located?,” “What AI resources are vulnerable and how do I remediate the issue?” and “Who has access to my sensitive cloud and AI data?”

“Data is constantly on the move and new uses for data in today’s AI-driven world have created new risks,” said Liat Hayun, vice president of product management for Tenable Cloud Security. “DSPM and AI-SPM capabilities from Tenable Cloud Security bring context into complex risk relationships, so teams can prioritize threats based on the data involved. This gives customers the confidence to unlock the full potential of their data without compromising security.”

“The importance of cloud data has made communicating data exposure risk one of the biggest security challenges for CISOs,” said Philip Bues, senior research manager, Cloud Security at IDC. “Tenable is at the forefront of this emerging DSPM-CNAPP conversation, enabling customers to contextualize and prioritize data risk and communicate it, which is pertinent to almost every domain in CNAPP.”

AI-SPM features enable customers to confidently forge ahead with AI adoption by enforcing AI and machine learning configuration best practices and securing training data. With the combined power of AI-SPM and Tenable Cloud Security’s market-leading cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) and Cloud Workload Protection (CWP) capabilities, customers can manage AI entitlements, reduce exposure risk of AI resources, and safeguard critical AI and machine learning training data to ensure data integrity. 

Available to all Tenable Cloud Security and Tenable One customers, these new features enable customers to:

  • Gain complete visibility and understanding of cloud and AI data - Tenable Cloud Security continuously monitors multi-cloud environments to discover and classify data types, assign sensitivity levels and prioritize data risk findings in the context of the entire cloud attack surface. 
  • Effectively prioritize and remediate cloud risk - Backed by vulnerability intelligence from Tenable Research, context-driven analytics provides security teams with prioritized and actionable remediation guidance to remediate the most threatening cloud exposures.
  • Proactively identify cloud and AI data exposure - Unique identity and access insights enable security teams to reduce data exposure in multi-cloud environments and AI resources by monitoring how data is being accessed and used and detect anomalous activity. 

Join the upcoming Tenable webinar, “Know Your Exposure: Is Your Cloud Data Secure in the Age of AI?” on October 22, 2024 at 10 am BST and 11 am ET, by registering here

Read today’s blog post, “Harden your cloud security posture by protecting your cloud data and AI resources” here

With a Net Promoter Score of 73, Tenable Cloud Security helps customers around the world expose and close priority threats. More information about DSPM and AI-SPM capabilities available in Tenable Cloud Security is available at: https://www.tenable.com/announcements/dspm-ai-spm

About Tenable

Tenable® is the exposure management company, exposing and closing the cybersecurity gaps that erode business value, reputation and trust. The company’s AI-powered exposure management platform radically unifies security visibility, insight and action across the attack surface, equipping modern organizations to protect against attacks from IT infrastructure to cloud environments to critical infrastructure and everywhere in between. By protecting enterprises from security exposure, Tenable reduces business risk for approximately 44,000 customers around the globe. Learn more at tenable.com

###

Media Contact:

Tenable

tenablepr@tenable.com





risks

The Moth Radio Hour: Taking Risks

In this hour, stories of diving in head first and putting it all on the line. Unconventional gifts, apex predators, and stock car racing. This episode is hosted by Moth producer and director Jodi Powell. The Moth Radio Hour is produced by The Moth and Jay Allison of Atlantic Public Media.

Hosted by: Jodi Powell

Storytellers:

Andrew McGill learns more about his father than he bargained for.

Aspiring primate veterinarian Estella Z Jones has a shift in perspective about her own life after seeing animals in the wild.

Ashamed of not knowing how to ride a bike, Francesca Hays attempts to learn in secret.

Michael Corso enters a stock car race for blind drivers.




risks

Risks Digest 34.35

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Jul 11

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 11 Jun 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 35

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.35>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.36

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Jul 21

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Sunday 21 Jul 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 36

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.36>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.37

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Jul 25

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 25 Jul 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 37

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.37>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.38

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Jul 29

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 29 Jul 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 38

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.38>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.39

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Aug 03

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Saturday 3 Aug 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 39

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.39>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.40

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Aug 14

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Wednesday 14 Aug 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 40

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.40>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.41

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Aug 24

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Saturday 24 Aug 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 41

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS
(comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats,
etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.41>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.42

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Aug 26

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 26 Aug 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 42

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.42>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.43

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Aug 29

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 29 Aug 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 43

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.43>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.44

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Sep 08

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Sunday 8 Sep 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 44

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.44>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.45

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Sep 14

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Saturday 14 Sep 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 45

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.45>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




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Risks Digest 34.46

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Oct 01

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tuesday 1 Oct 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 46

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.46>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.47

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Oct 17

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 17 Oct 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 47

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.47>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

Risks Digest 34.48

Posted by RISKS List Owner on Nov 08

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Friday 8 Nov 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 48

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/34.48>
The current issue can also be found at
<...




risks

SE Radio 606: Charlie Jones on Third-Party Software Supply Chain Risks

Charlie Jones, Director of Product Management at ReversingLabs and subject matter expert in supply chain security, joins host Priyanka Raghavan to discuss tackling third-party software risks. They begin by defining different types of third-party software risks and then take a deep dive into case studies where third-party components and software have had cascading effects on downstream systems. They consider some frameworks for secure software development that can be used to evaluate third-party software and components – both as a publisher or as a consumer – and end by discussing laws and regulations with final advise from Charlie on how enterprises can tackle third-party software risks. Brought to you by IEEE Computer Society and IEEE Software magazine. This episode is sponsored by WorkOS.





risks

Ethical Framework Aims to Counter Risks of Geoengineering Research

Record heat, devastating storms, punishing drought. Our world continues to see the unrelenting impacts of climate change. It clearly requires urgent action but as the research community increasingly investigates climate intervention methods to address this challenge, we see an alarming lack of ethical guidance.   This is why, powered in partnership and driven by broad collaboration, AGU facilitated the Ethical Framework Principles for Climate Intervention Research. Through a two-year process that included an open …

The post Ethical Framework Aims to Counter Risks of Geoengineering Research appeared first on AGU Blogosphere.




risks

OSCE supports workshop on risks-oriented approach in combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in Kyrgyzstan

ISSYK-KUL, Kyrgyzstan, 8 July 2016 – A five-day training course supported by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek on a risk-oriented approach in supervising activities related to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism concluded today in Bosteri village, in the Issyk-Kul region.

The aim of the workshop, which was organized by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFIS) in partnership with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was to update the relevant State agencies and financial institutions on the practical aspects of a risks-oriented approach in their work. Some 46 officials from law enforcement agencies, supervisory agencies and financial institutions took part.

“A risks-oriented approach is the process which allows the countries to identify, assess and understand risks to effectively combat money laundering and financing of terrorism,” said Nana Baramidze, Senior Economic and Environmental Officer at the OSCE Centre. “The OSCE Centre in Bishkek fully supports the efforts of the Kyrgyz Government in its attempt to establish effective systems to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism.”

Chyngyz Kenenbayev, Head of the Organizational and Legal department of the SFIS, said: “We are holding this educational seminar to train representatives of national authorities and the private sector so that we can successfully pass the second round of the evaluation by the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG). In order to fulfil international obligations under the EAG, the Kyrgyz Republic is to conduct a mutual assessment of its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism system. From 28 November to 9 December 2016, a visiting mission of EAG evaluators will conduct this assessment within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) initiative."

The training course, which was conducted by two IMF experts and three SFIS officials, was part of the OSCE assistance to the Kyrgyz Government in preparing for the second round of the FATF evaluation.

Related Stories




risks

OSCE supports workshop on risks-oriented approach in combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in Kyrgyzstan

ISSYK-KUL, Kyrgyzstan, 8 July 2016 – A five-day training course supported by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek on a risk-oriented approach in supervising activities related to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism concluded today in Bosteri village, in the Issyk-Kul region.

The aim of the workshop, which was organized by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFIS) in partnership with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was to update the relevant State agencies and financial institutions on the practical aspects of a risks-oriented approach in their work. Some 46 officials from law enforcement agencies, supervisory agencies and financial institutions took part.

“A risks-oriented approach is the process which allows the countries to identify, assess and understand risks to effectively combat money laundering and financing of terrorism,” said Nana Baramidze, Senior Economic and Environmental Officer at the OSCE Centre. “The OSCE Centre in Bishkek fully supports the efforts of the Kyrgyz Government in its attempt to establish effective systems to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism.”

Chyngyz Kenenbayev, Head of the Organizational and Legal department of the SFIS, said: “We are holding this educational seminar to train representatives of national authorities and the private sector so that we can successfully pass the second round of the evaluation by the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG). In order to fulfil international obligations under the EAG, the Kyrgyz Republic is to conduct a mutual assessment of its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism system. From 28 November to 9 December 2016, a visiting mission of EAG evaluators will conduct this assessment within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) initiative."

The training course, which was conducted by two IMF experts and three SFIS officials, was part of the OSCE assistance to the Kyrgyz Government in preparing for the second round of the FATF evaluation.

Related Stories




risks

HSTP.DLT-Risk - DLT-based application development risks and their mitigations

HSTP.DLT-Risk - DLT-based application development risks and their mitigations





risks

Rewards and Risks of Alternative Roofing Materials

Roofing contractors sought alternatives during a spate of challenges, a pandemic followed by supply chain disruptions and capped by a spike in inflation. But was it at a price?




risks

Major Risks in Your Roofing Exit

These six exit strategy pitfalls could create financial risks before and during your exit and retirement. Learn how to navigate one of the largest financial events in your lifetime




risks

Digital transformation confusion risks paralysing SME manufacturers, says Made Smarter

Confusion around digital transformation is risking paralysis among SME manufacturers, says Made Smarter. Donna Edwards, director of the North West adoption programme, says businesses are hesitant to commit to change because they lack the confidence with technology and digital skills among leaders and employees.




risks

Off-Brand Ozempic, Zepbound and Other Products Carry Undisclosed Risks

As the demand for weight loss injectables soars, so too does the market for off-brand alternatives, some of which may not be safe or effective.




risks

Managing financial risks of Sukuk structures

Location: Law Electronic Resource- 




risks

Risks of artificial intelligence

Location: Engineering Library- TA347.A78M85 2016




risks

Earthquake risks and rising costs: The price of operating California's last nuclear plant

The plant supplies 6% of California's power, yet critics charge the facility is too expensive and too dangerous to continue operating.




risks

Opinion: The risks of sharing your DNA with online companies aren't a future concern. They're here now

Turmoil at 23andMe, and a lawsuit alleging that GEDmatch shares data with Facebook, highlights how far your genetic information could travel without your consent.




risks

Cassidy Hutchinson’s Testimony Highlights Legal Risks for Trump

The former White House aide’s revelations about Jan. 6 chipped away at any potential defense that Donald J. Trump was merely expressing well-founded views about election fraud.




risks

Vietnam weighs new tech law that risks irking U.S. under Trump

HO CHI MINH CITY -- Vietnam is mulling data consent and foreign transfer rules for the technology sector that critics say threaten to stifle innovation and widen the trade imbalance with America, at a time when the incoming U.S. president is expected to strike out at trade rivals. Vietnam, which…




risks

China vows to tackle 'risks at source' after devastating Zhuhai attack

HONG KONG/WASHINGTON -- China has vowed to strengthen security after a hit-and-run attack in the southern city of Zhuhai killed 35 people, shocking the nation and highlighting what some experts see as an alarming pattern. On Tuesday evening, authorities revealed the scope of the devastation left…




risks

Interval Funds Are Hot. Do Investors Understand the Risks?




risks

RISKS




risks

Managing Risks Along the Belt and Road

Managing Risks Along the Belt and Road 27 March 2018 — 8:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ offers potential benefits in connectivity, infrastructure and trade, through significantly increased Chinese engagement across many different countries. However, many of these countries face internal tensions and have relatively underdeveloped market structures, legal systems and governance frameworks. While Belt and Road investments can make positive contributions in host countries, there is also the potential for these investments to exacerbate tensions and risks.

This roundtable, held in partnership with the Security & Crisis Management International Centre (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences-UNITO), will seek to examine risk management along the Belt and Road, differentiating between roles that can be played by public sector and private sector actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




risks

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

This deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the (Diego Garcia) base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.




risks

Tectonic Politics: Navigating New Geopolitical Risks




risks

Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space

27 July 2020

Dr Beyza Unal

Deputy Director, International Security Programme

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
With negotiations in Vienna between the US and Russia hoping to prevent the weaponization of space, how much do Russia’s satellites pose a threat to the peaceful use of outer space, ask Beyza Unal and Mathieu Boulègue?

GettyImages-1209576417.jpg

Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, during a video link with cosmonauts on the International Space Station (ISS). Photo: Getty Images.

Days before the publication of last week’s report into Russian activity in the UK, and the subsequent call from several UK parliamentarians for a swift response to the ‘Russian threat’, Russia tested a new anti-satellite weapon capability releasing a small projectile from its Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite.

Kosmos-2543, a small satellite contained inside a larger satellite, Kosmos-2542, and 'birthed’ into orbit in late 2019, recently came under scrutiny in January 2020 when it was reportedly caught ‘buzzing’ US spy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

By releasing a small projectile from the Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite, the US claims that Russia has launched a new projectile into orbit with relatively high speed – estimated at around 500 km per hour – leading to concerns about the potential of Russia to develop this technology as a weapon to target foreign satellites.

It is not the first time Moscow has relied on a Russian doll – or matryoshka – approach to launching satellites into outer space. In October 2017, a sub-satellite, Kosmos-2521, was ejected from its main satellite, Kosmos-2519, into a high-speed object in low orbit.

The Russian Ministry of Defence has declared that its latest activity is just for ‘routine’ inspections and surveillance of Russia’s other space assets, with the government’s official statement avoiding recognizing the existence of the new object while, at the same time, Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, recalling Russia’s commitment for the ‘complete demilitarization’ of space.

While it is possible that Russia’s matryoshka satellites have indeed been developed to carry out routine repairs of Russia’s space fleet, they also have the potential to interfere with, and destroy, other satellites with such action needing to be considered a threat until Russia demonstrates otherwise.

Russia’s use of outer space

Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. 

For example, in April 2020, Russia launched and tested into low orbit the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in July 2019, are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is reported that these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometre from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris.

Russia’s space strategy

By exploiting asymmetric advantages in space, Russia seeks to leverage its capabilities against competitors in space and in other domains, falling in line with its wider military strategy as well as its current Federal Space Programme for 2016 to 2025.

Russian space activities also have a cyber and electronic warfare angle. With the help of remote-sensing capabilities, Russian spy satellites potentially seek to disrupt military and civilian satellite communications and navigation systems. Indeed, in 2018, French authorities publicly accused Russia of seeking to intercept communication satellites for French and Italian armed forces putting data transmission through Western civilian and military satellites at risk of interception.

Furthermore, earlier this year, both Kosmos-2542 and 2543 came within 160 kilometres of a US spy satellite, US KH-11, similarly to Russia ‘buzzing’ around the British Isles or submarine surveillance that Norway and Sweden have been subjected to recently.

Shadowing and tailing in space is regarded as spying and this recent anti-satellite weapon test is part of a trend which demonstrates Russia’s persistent space strategy for close-proximity operations with foreign countries.

Orbital hypocrisy

Despite Russia’s calls for a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, there remains little international trust in Russia’s behaviour in space so far with a US-Russia Space Security Exchange meeting scheduled to take place in Vienna on 27 July to discuss outer space stability and security.

This is amid a backdrop of bilateral nuclear arms control talks on the extension of the extant nuclear weapons reduction treaty, New START, which is scheduled to expire in February 2021. There is no guarantee, however, that the talks will achieve anything especially since the future of outer space requires a wider multilateral dialogue with all parties involved – including China.

Anti-satellite tests (ASATs) are a particularly dangerous form of weapon. Not only do they create major vulnerabilities in a domain where so much of humanity depends on for navigation, communications and environmental monitoring, they are also primarily a target for destabilization and undermining global positioning information in times of crisis.

And, perhaps most significantly, they possess the highly destructive potential to create even more space debris in Earth’s orbits that endanger the peaceful use of satellites and could do serious damage to large parts of the economies of developed and developing countries.

Avoiding space warfare

Space is for all but there is a risk that it is being hijacked by a few. It is time to re-assert and reinforce the rules, principles and norms of responsible state behaviour in outer space enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its associated international agreements.

And, because the treaty specifically prohibits stationing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, it is necessary to build on it to ban other types of weapons in space.

Space has been militarized since 1957 with the launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik. But the increasing weaponization of space adds more uncertainty, and unveils more vulnerabilities, that states need to address before space warfare becomes a reality.




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Rage Against the Algorithm: the Risks of Overestimating Military Artificial Intelligence

27 August 2020

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
Increasing dependency on artificial intelligence (AI) for military technologies is inevitable and efforts to develop these technologies to use in the battlefield is proceeding apace, however, developers and end-users must ensure the reliability of these technologies, writes Yasmin Afina.

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F-16 SimuSphere HD flight simulator at Link Simulation in Arlington, Texas, US. Photo: Getty Images.

AI holds the potential to replace humans for tactical tasks in military operations beyond current applications such as navigation assistance. For example, in the US, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently held the final round of its AlphaDogfight Trials where an algorithm controlling a simulated F-16 fighter was pitted against an Air Force pilot in virtual aerial combat. The algorithm won by 5-0. So what does this mean for the future of military operations?

The agency’s deputy director remarked that these tools are now ‘ready for weapons systems designers to be in the toolbox’. At first glance, the dogfight shows that an AI-enabled air combat would provide tremendous military advantage including the lack of survival instincts inherent to humans, the ability to consistently operate with high acceleration stress beyond the limitations of the human body and high targeting precision.

The outcome of these trials, however, does not mean that this technology is ready for deployment in the battlefield. In fact, an array of considerations must be taken into account prior to their deployment and use – namely the ability to adapt in real-life combat situations, physical limitations and legal compliance.

Testing environment versus real-life applications

First, as with all technologies, the performance of an algorithm in its testing environment is bound to differ from real-life applications such as in the case of cluster munitions. For instance, Google Health developed an algorithm to help with diabetic retinopathy screening. While the algorithm’s accuracy rate in the lab was over 90 per cent, it did not perform well out of the lab because the algorithm was used to high-quality scans in its training, it rejected more than a fifth of the real-life scans which were deemed as being below the quality threshold required. As a result, the process ended up being as time-consuming and costly – if not more so – than traditional screening.

Similarly, virtual environments akin to the AlphaDogfight Trials do not reflect the extent of risks, hazards and unpredictability of real-life combat. In the dogfight exercise, for example, the algorithm had full situational awareness and was repeatedly trained to the rules, parameters and limitations of its operating environment. But, in a real-life dynamic and battlefield, the list of variables is long and will inevitably fluctuate: visibility may be poor, extreme weather could affect operations and the performance of aircraft and the behaviour and actions of adversaries will be unpredictable.

Every single eventuality would need to be programmed in line with the commander’s intent in an ever-changing situation or it would drastically affect the performance of algorithms including in target identification and firing precision.

Hardware limitations

Another consideration relates to the limitations of the hardware that AI systems depend on. Algorithms depend on hardware to operate equipment such as sensors and computer systems – each of which are constrained by physical limitations. These can be targeted by an adversary, for example, through electronic interference to disrupt the functioning of the computer systems which the algorithms are operating from.

Hardware may also be affected involuntarily. For instance, a ‘pilotless’ aircraft controlled by an algorithm can indeed undergo higher accelerations, and thus, higher g-force than the human body can endure. However, the aircraft in itself is also subject to physical limitations such as acceleration limits beyond which parts of the aircraft, such as its sensors, may be severely damaged which in turn affects the algorithm’s performance and, ultimately, mission success. It is critical that these physical limitations are factored into the equation when deploying these machines especially when they so heavily rely on sensors.

Legal compliance

Another major, and perhaps the greatest, consideration relates to the ability to rely on machines for legal compliance. The DARPA dogfight exclusively focused on the algorithm’s ability to successfully control the aircraft and counter the adversary, however, nothing indicates its ability to ensure that strikes remain within the boundaries of the law.

In an armed conflict, the deployment and use of such systems in the battlefield are not exempt from international humanitarian law (IHL) and most notably its customary principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. It would need to be able to differentiate between civilians, combatants and military objectives, calculate whether its attacks will be proportionate against the set military objective and live collateral damage estimates and take the necessary precautions to ensure the attacks remain within the boundaries of the law – including the ability to abort if necessary. This would also require the machine to have the ability to stay within the rules of engagement for that particular operation.

It is therefore critical to incorporate IHL considerations from the conception and throughout the development and testing phases of algorithms to ensure the machines are sufficiently reliable for legal compliance purposes.

It is also important that developers address the 'black box' issue whereby the algorithm’s calculations are so complex that it is impossible for humans to understand how it came to its results. It is not only necessary to address the algorithm’s opacity to improve the algorithm’s performance over time, it is also key for accountability and investigation purposes in cases of incidents and suspected violations of applicable laws.

Reliability, testing and experimentation

Algorithms are becoming increasingly powerful and there is no doubt that they will confer tremendous advantages to the military. Over-hype, however, must be avoided at the expense of the machine’s reliability on the technical front as well as for legal compliance purposes.

The testing and experimentation phases are key during which developers will have the ability to fine-tune the algorithms. Developers must, therefore, be held accountable for ensuring the reliability of machines by incorporating considerations pertaining to performance and accuracy, hardware limitations as well as legal compliance. This could help prevent incidents in real life that result from overestimating of the capabilities of AI in military operations. 




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Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

If NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.




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Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.




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The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict

Information Note.




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