During his address at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy graduation this week, President Obama highlighted climate change as “a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to (U.S.) national security.” Is President Obama right? Are the national security threats from climate change real?

When I listen to the “know-nothing” crowd and their front men in Congress who actively ignore ever-stronger scientific evidence about the pace of climate change, I want to quit my day job and organize civic action to close them down. The celebration of anti-knowledge, the denial of science, the treatment of advanced education as a mark of ignominy rather than the building block of American innovation and citizenship—these are as grave a threat to America’s future as any I can identify. So I’m sympathetic to the Obama administration’s desire to take a bludgeon to climate deniers. But is “national security” the right stick to move the naysayers forward? 

The Danger of Overstating for Effect

The White House’s report on the national security implications of climate change is actually pretty measured and largely avoids waving red flags, but it overstates for effect, as do the President’s remarks to the Coast Guard Academy. 

The report gets right the notion that climate change will hit hardest where governance is weakest and that this will exacerbate the challenge of weak states; but it’s a pre-existing challenge and almost all weak states are already embroiled in forms of internal war—climate change may exacerbate this problem, but it certainly won’t create it. The White House report also asserts a link to terrorist havens, and of course there are risks here—but it’s far from a 1:1 relationship, and there’s little evidence that the countries where climate will hit governance worst are the places where the terrorism problem is most serious. 

The report also highlights the Arctic as a region most dramatically effected by climate change, and that is true—but so far what we’re seeing in the Arctic is that receding ice is triggering commercial competition and governance cooperation; not conflict. The security challenge from the Arctic is modest: the climate challenge of melting ice caps and potential release of trapped greenhouse gases is potential very serious indeed. 

Then there are the domestic effects. The report highlights that the armed services may be drawn in more to dealing with coastal flooding and similar crises, and that’s a fair point—though it’s a National Guard point more than its an armed forces point. That is to say, it’s about the question of whether we have enough domestic disaster response capacity: an important question, not obviously a national security question. And it oddly passes over what’s likely to be the most important consequence of climate change in the United States, namely declining agricultural productivity in the American heartland. America’s farmers, not just its coastal cities, are in the front lines here. 

All of these are real issues and the U.S. government will have to plan for lots of them, including in the armed services; all fair. But is national security really the right way to frame this? Is linking it directly to the capacities needed for America’s armed services the right way to mobilize support for more serious action on climate change? 

Of course the term “security” has been evolving, and has long since extended beyond the limited purview of nuclear risks and great power conflict. Civil wars and weak governance and rising sea leaves are certainly a security issue to somebody, and we’re sure to be involved—whether it’s in dealing with refugee flows, or more acute crises where severe impacts overlay on pre-existing tensions. These are global security issues for someone, to be sure; I’m not sure they are “immediate risks to our national security.

Words Matter

Why does the rhetoric matter? Am I glad that we have a President who cares about climate change? Yes. Do I want the Obama administration to be focusing on mobilizing the American public on this? Yes. So why does it bother me if they use a national security lens? A national security framework implicitly does several things: it invokes a sense of direct threat, which I think distorts the nature of the challenge; it puts military responses front forward, which is the wrong emphasis; and although the report doesn’t get into this question, if the President highlights the immediate national security risk from climate, it displaces other security threats that we confront and truly require U.S. strategic planning, preparedness, and resources. None of this is totally wrong, but surely there are other ways to mobilize the American public to an erosion of our natural and agricultural environment than to invoke the security frame? 

Every piece of evidence I’ve seen about the state of temperature change; the real pathway we are on in terms of carbon-based fuels consumption (despite optimistic pledges in the lead up to the Paris climate conference); realistic projections of growth in renewable energies; and demand growth in the developing world (especially India) tells me that we’re rapidly blowing past the two degree target for limiting the rise in average global temperatures, and we’re well on our way to a four degree shift. 

We need urgently to pivot our scientific establishment away from the now well-trod field of predicting temperature shift to getting a much more granular understanding about the ways in which changing temperature will affect water sources, agricultural productivity, biodiversity, and dramatic weather events. And we need to treat those who willfully deny science—in climate and other areas—as a serious threat to our nation’s  future. I’m just not convinced that national security is the right or best way to frame the arguments and mobilize the America public’s will around this critically important issue.

Was the Iran nuclear deal, signed last summer, a prelude to proliferation across the Middle East? This is a question that Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn and Non-resident Senior Fellow Richard Nephew explore in a new report. At an event to discuss their findings—moderated by Brookings Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney and with panelists Derek Chollet and H.E. Yousef Al Otaiba—Einhorn and Nephew argued that none of the Middle East’s “likely suspects” appears both inclined and able to acquire indigenous nuclear weapons capability in the foreseeable future. They also outlined policy options for the United States and other members of the P5+1.

Einhorn described the incentives and capabilities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates for acquiring nuclear weapons. He argued that, while both Saudi Arabia and the UAE a) consider Iran a direct military threat, b) have concerns about the U.S. commitment to the security of the region, and c) have sufficient financial resources, they recognize that they have no choice but to rely on the United States for their security and are unwilling to jeopardize that relationship by seeking nuclear weapons. Einhorn also said that both Egypt and Turkey do not view Iran as a direct military threat and are more preoccupied with instability on their borders and internal security, concerns that cannot be addressed by possession of a nuclear weapons capability.

Nephew outlined policy recommendations, including measures to ensure strict implementation of the JCPOA, greater intelligence sharing and security cooperation with Middle East allies, and means of fostering IAEA-supervised regional arrangements that would encourage peaceful nuclear energy development and limit potentially destabilizing nuclear activities. Nephew also asserted that some elements of the JCPOA, such as online monitoring of nuclear facilities, could be applied to other nuclear energy programs in the region to enhance transparency. 

Derek Chollet of the German Marshall Fund argued the United States must deter Iran and reassure U.S. allies by maintaining a robust military presence in the region, planning a range of U.S. responses to destabilizing Iranian activities, and ensuring that U.S. forces have the weapons systems and personnel required for scenarios involving Iran. He suggested that the United States and its Middle East allies continue regular summit meetings on security and broader partnership issues, and possibly formalize security cooperation by establishing a dedicated regional security framework. 

Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba emphasized that, to many of the countries in the region, Iran poses a threat wider than just its nuclear activities. He suggested that the JCPOA will be judged on the degree to which the United States and its allies address Iran’s destabilizing behavior outside of the nuclear file, such as Tehran’s support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as its ballistic missile activities. Al Otaiba said that, though he has seen some efforts by the Obama administration to push Iran on its regional behavior, it has sent a mixed message overall, with senior U.S. officials also encouraging European banks to invest in Iran. The ambassador asserted that rigorous enforcement of the JCPOA will be critical to convincing Iran not to eventually proceed to build nuclear weapons.

On Saudi Arabia, Einhorn noted that although the Obama administration supported the Saudi military campaign in Yemen, there was a risk that the Kingdom would overreact to its regional security challenges. He suggested that the United States pursue a dual-track approach: counter provocative Iranian behavior and defend the security interests of its regional partners, while at the same time seeking a resolution of regional disputes and encouraging Saudi Arabia and Iran to find ways of reducing tensions between them.

On the possibility that Iran would rapidly scale up its enrichment program, Einhorn acknowledged that while Tehran can legally do so under the JCPOA in 10 to 15 years, it will not have a strong civil nuclear rationale since it will be able to acquire nuclear fuel from Russia and other suppliers. Furthermore, Iran’s progress in centrifuge research and development may not be as rapid as Iran currently anticipates. Moreover, even if Iran elects to ramp up its enrichment program down the line, the JCPOA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will bar it from pursuing nuclear weapons, and monitoring arrangements still in place will provide warning and enable the United States to intervene and prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons.

On reaching a regional accommodation that includes Iran, Al Otaiba indicated that the UAE would have much to gain, especially economically, from a better relationship with Tehran. He said the UAE and others in the region would like to try to engage with Iran to reduce tensions—but Iran, for its part, seems unwilling.

On prospects for a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, Einhorn said that progress on such an agreement has stalled due to Saudi reluctance to formally renounce enrichment, something the United States has so far insisted on. He suggested that Washington should be prepared to relax the so-called “gold standard” (i.e., a formal renunciation of on enrichment and reprocessing) and instead accept an approach that would still discourage Saudi fuel cycle programs, such as giving Riyadh the right to pursue enrichment but allowing the United States to cease its nuclear cooperation if the Kingdom exercised that right. On the UAE’s civil nuclear program, Al Otaiba affirmed that the Emiratis continue to value the “gold standard” barring enrichment which is enshrined in the U.S.-UAE civil nuclear agreement, and have no plans to change their position on enrichment.

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China’s economy has achieved astonishing growth over the past three decades, but it may be undergoing its most serious test of the reform era. In his newly published book, “China’s Guaranteed Bubble,” Ning Zhu argues that implicit Chinese government guarantees, which have helped drive economic investment and expansion, are also largely responsible for the challenges the country now faces. As growth slows, corporate earnings decline, and lending tightens for small and medium-sized businesses, the leverage ratios of China’s government and its corporations and households all have increased in recent years. How desperate is China’s debt situation, and what can be done to avert a major crisis?

On July 11, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted Ning Zhu, deputy dean and professor of finance at the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University. Zhu presented key findings from his research into Chinese sovereign, corporate, and household debt, and also introduced potential remedies to return China to the path of long-term sustainable growth. Following the presentation, Senior Fellow David Dollar moderated a discussion with Zhu before taking questions from the audience.

 Follow @BrookingsChina to join the conversation.

Video

• China’s economic bubble: Government guarantees and growing risks

Audio

• China’s economic bubble: Government guarantees and growing risks

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• China guaranteed bubble
• 20160711_china_economic_bubble_transcript

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Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, the FDA has the authority to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for drugs or biologics that carry serious potential or known risks. Since that time, the REMS program has become an important tool in ensuring that riskier drugs are used safely, and it has allowed FDA to facilitate access to a host of drugs that may not otherwise have been approved. However, concerns have arisen regarding the effects of REMS programs on patient access to products, as well as the undue burden that the requirements place on the health care system. In response to these concerns, FDA has initiated reform efforts aimed at improving the standardization, assessment, and integration of REMS within the health care system. As part of this broader initiative, the agency is pursuing four priority projects, one of which focuses on improving provider-patient benefit-risk counseling for drugs that have a REMS attached.

Under a cooperative agreement with FDA, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings held an expert workshop on July 24 titled, “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Building a Framework for Effective Patient Counseling on Medication Risks and Benefits”. This workshop was the first in a series of convening activities that will seek input from stakeholders across academia, industry, health systems, and patient advocacy groups, among others. Through these activities, Brookings and FDA will further develop and refine an evidence-based framework of best practices and principles that can be used to inform the development and effective use of REMS tools and processes.

Event Materials

• REMS_PBRC_Meeting_Agenda
• REMS BR Speaker Bios
• REMS BenefitRisk Meeting Summary
• REMS BenefitRisk communication white paper

Businesses, citizens, and law enforcement officials are discovering innovative new uses for drones every day. Drones have a distinctively menacing reputation because TV footage typically depicts them flying over a faraway battlefield launching missiles. In the popular imagination, drones have replaced the black helicopters of the 1990s and the satellite images of the 2000s as the primary surveillance tool. For this reason many perceive the drone as a threat to civil rights and safety in the United States. Privacy advocates have called upon lawmakers to pass legislation that keeps drones out of American skies. Others see a potentially beneficial role from drones if effective regulations are developed. In a recent paper titled Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations For Legislators, Gregory McNeal proposes a model for how Congress should regulate drones.

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China’s outbound investment is expected to increase by leaps and bounds in the next decade. Chinese companies are poised to become a major economic force in the global economy. Outbound direct investment by Chinese companies presents unprecedented opportunities for both Chinese companies and their global partners.

The relatively brief history of Chinese companies’ outbound investment indicates, however, that Chinese outbound FDI faces many hurdles both at home and in the destination countries. How can we assess the regulatory, financial, labor, environmental and political risks faced by Chinese multinational companies? What remedies can mitigate such risks for the Chinese firms, for the host countries of Chinese investment and for the Chinese government and people?

The Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy co-hosted with the 21st Century China Program at UC San Diego, and in collaboration with the Enterprise Research Institute and Tsinghua’s School of Public Policy and Management, a two-day conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, on September 23 and 24, 2013. The conference gathered leading experts, policy makers and corporate leaders to examine the latest research on trends and patterns of Chinese outbound direct investments; the regulatory framework and policy environment in China and destination countries (particularly, but not only in the U.S.); and the implications of Chinese outbound direct investment for China’s economic growth and the global economy. Keynote speakers of each day were Jin Liqun, chairman of China International Capital Corporation, and Gary Locke, U.S. ambassador to China. Mr. Jin suggested that China’s foreign direct investment companies should cooperate with local firms and be willing to talk to the local governments about their problems. Ambassador Locke, on the other hand, introduced the advantages of the U.S. as an investment destination country. He also agreed that investors were supposed to get local help to achieve success.

The audiences included major Chinese companies, service providers in the area of overseas direct investment, policy makers and scholars.

Read more about the speakers and the conference agenda »

Video

• Overview of China's Overseas Investments: Trends, Patterns and Comparison
• Chinese ODI: Motivation and Policy Environment
• Risk Management in Chinese ODI
• China's Outbound Direct Investment - Gary Locke Keynote Address
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Non-U.S.)
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Focusing on the U.S.)
• Labor, Environment, and Community Relations in Destination Countries

Transcript

• Keynote speech of U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Remarks of Ambassador Locke
• Brian Beglin slides
• Daniel Levine slides
• Jiang Heng slides
• LIU Qian
• Matt Ferchen slides
• Steve Olson slides
• Tang Xiaoyang slides
• Thilo Hanemann slides
• Weiyi Shi slides
• Kang Rongping slides
• Duan Zhirong slides