Melania Trump will not be traveling with her husband to Washington on Wednesday when President-elect Donald Trump and President Joe Biden have a formal transition meeting, according to multiple reports. […]

The post Melania Trump to Give Jill Biden the Cold Shoulder This Week: Report appeared first on The Western Journal.

Shortly after President-elect Donald Trump appointed Tom Homan as “border czar,” the immigration hardliner’s hilarious 2019 smackdown of Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York went viral on social media. […]

The post Flashback: Video of Tom Homan Taking Down AOC Resurfaces, Showing Why Trump Picked Him appeared first on The Western Journal.

To a large extent, President-elect Donald Trump’s winning coalition came together around one absolute truth. In sum, Americans do not have a self-governing constitutional republic if we also have a […]

The post Trump Shares His 10-Step Plan to 'Shatter the Deep State' and It Will Give You Chills appeared first on The Western Journal.

Americans will only achieve healthy public discourse when we agree on basic principles and start telling the truth. As it stands, however, too many elected officials engage in hypocrisy by […]

The post Dem Lawmaker Says the Quiet Part Out Loud as She Suddenly Changes Her Tune on the Senate Filibuster appeared first on The Western Journal.

New York Judge Juan Merchan — who is overseeing President-elect Donald Trump’s business records case — agreed to freeze the case until Nov. 19. There was to be a hearing […]

The post Judge Juan Merchan Grants Request from Trump's Legal Team and DA in NY Hush Money Case appeared first on The Western Journal.

A Chicago-area Democrat hurled an insult at police Sunday after being charged with drunken driving, according to local news reports. Samantha Steele represents the Second District on the Cook County […]

The post Democratic Politician Crashes Her Car While Allegedly Drunk, Hurls Vile Insults at Responding Officer: Police Report appeared first on The Western Journal.

President-elect Donald Trump is reportedly considering lawyer Alina Habba to be the White House press secretary. Habba often spoke to the media while she was on the legal team representing […]

The post Report Shows New Front-Runner for Trump's Press Secretary Spot: The Media Should Be Terrified appeared first on The Western Journal.

The rare feat of winning both the Two Oceans and Soweto marathons has marked Onalenna Khonkhobe’s breakthrough season, establishing him as one of South Africa’s rising road-running stars.

Sir Kenny Dalglish hailed nine-time Major champion Gary Player and expressed his delight at Liverpool's position at the top of the Premier League during his visit to South Africa this weekend.

As captain, Aiden Markram is allowed a long rope from a wonky form perspective, but how long can that rope be as the run river continues to shrivel, asks Khanyiso Tshwaku.

Proteas all-rounder Marco Jansen, while acknowledging that spin has been a challenge for them in the ongoing T20 series against India, reckons things could be a bit different for Wednesday's third T20 in Centurion.

Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos has welcomed the number of young players who are given a chance and backed in the premier division, but has warned that to build on their progress, agents must prioritise players' development over their personal enrichment.

Rassie Erasmus' 7-1 variation of the Bomb Squad used against Scotland on Sunday set off a few tremors in the north, with Times writer Stephen Jones the latest to criticise the "dangerous" and "arrogant" tactic.

Late injection Johan Grobbelaar may find himself more than simply an “extra” on the Bok tour, writes Rob Houwing.

Springbok team doctor Jerome Mampane says that injured utility back Sacha Feinberg-Mngomezulu is recovering well.

Total media ad spend in Russia to drop nearly 50%   March 30, 2022 (New York, NY) – Insider Intelligence expects the ongoing war in Ukraine to have a significant […]

Xi Jinping shows the world he is taking a tougher line Expert comment NCapeling 16 October 2022

Xi opens the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party with a political report which demonstrates both change and continuity in the approach of his leadership.

The 20th Party Congress report is significantly shorter than the 19th, which is a clear indication of Xi’s success in centralizing power. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. A shorter political report would seem to represent fewer factions now seeking consensus.

In the 20th Party Congress report, the language on Taiwan has been revised, reflecting the changes in tone and the policies of the CCP senior leadership. In addition to the conventional ‘peaceful reunification’ term, there is also an addition of more hawkish language on Taiwan to ‘not exclude the use of force as a last resort’.

Xi also suggested that ‘resolving Taiwan Question should be in hands of the Chinese’, sending a further warning to the US and other Western allies which are perceived as interfering in Taiwan affairs.

In his remarks, Xi suggested the ‘zero-COVID’ strategy has worked for China although he gave no clear timeline on when the policy will end. He also proposed building a healthcare system able to cope with future pandemics. This implies that China is still in short supply of sufficient healthcare resources to cope with a disease like COVID.

Economic policy reveals anxiety

On economic policy, much of the emphasis is given to the extent to which security and economic growth should go hand in hand, which illustrates Beijing’s deep anxieties on supply chains and the high-tech sector. These supply chains need to become more ‘self-determined, self-controlled’, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Also, he expected the Common Prosperity Initiative will further adjust uneven income distribution to increase the amount of middle-income population. He gave little favours for financial services and fin-tech companies but insisted that China should remain as a manufacturing-led economy with qualitative growth. That implies Beijing will tolerate much slower growth so long as the income gap between the rich and poor is closing.

On foreign affairs, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new types of great power relations’ – instead he has stressed that China should further develop its ties with the Global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

Shaping modern Britain: the role of African and Caribbean communities 24 October 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

As part of Black History Month, this event celebrates the enduring contributions of African and Caribbean communities to the UK.

When British colonial rule ended, newly independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean retained influences such as the English language and governance systems modelled on that of the UK. Initially, these post-independence relations were largely marked by the UK’s soft power, shaping the nation-building processes in these regions.

Over time, however, this influence has become a two-way exchange. African and Caribbean cultures have profoundly shaped modern Britain – from music and food to sports, arts, literature and beyond. These evolving dynamics have not only enriched the UK’s cultural landscape but also provided significant benefits for diaspora communities, fostering a sense of belonging and promoting cultural exchange. Diaspora groups and civil society organizations have adeptly utilised these connections to advocate for their communities and advance their interests.

At this event, speakers will explore how African and Caribbean influences rose to prominence in the UK and how this cultural momentum can be harnessed to build stronger, forward-looking partnerships. By highlighting the shared histories and more vibrant present-day exchanges, this event will explore how these ties can be used to break down stereotypes, promote social cohesion, and contribute to a more inclusive future.

This event forms part of our series of events celebrating Black History Month, including a photo exhibition and drinks reception.

Belt and Road Is Not a (Completely) Closed Shop Expert comment sysadmin 22 March 2018

Though the infrastructure initiative will continue to be led in many places by Chinese investment, where there are benefits of scale, effectiveness and risk management, outside participation will be welcome.

First announced in 2013, President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative promises, at a minimum, to improve infrastructure and connectivity between China and the rest of Eurasia. Any bold plan to finance infrastructure on a large-scale across so many low-income economies deserves a sympathetic ear and a positive reception. But many wonder how large the role can be for non-Chinese players in what is clearly an initiative of the Chinese government.

So far, Chinese state and policy banks account for the overwhelming majority of the financing – and this money then flows to Chinese enterprises, mainly state-owned. One study found that 89% of the work went to Chinese contractors on China-funded projects.

Yet, recently in Paris, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the Belt and Road was a ‘sunshine initiative’ that was open and for all to benefit from. He declared that there were to be ‘no backroom deals. There is openness and transparency.’ The Belt and Road Initiative will ‘respect international rules’ and ‘will run according to market rules’.

There are some notable instances of Belt and Road projects changing to conform more to international rules as they develop. For example, work on the Belgrade–Budapest high speed rail link originally ran into problems. Contracts were allegedly awarded to Chinese companies without following the EU-mandated competitive procurement processes. Now, the most recent round of contracts is to be awarded by tender.

Such a switch perhaps does not herald the unrestricted ‘market rules’ that Wang speaks of, but it does highlight that China is willing to turn Belt and Road towards openness in certain instances. These will be cases where it clearly brings benefits for China – but also where private sector players can be convinced of good commercial returns. These benefits are most likely to lie in three areas: scale and access, effectiveness and risk management.

Mutual benefits

Firstly, scale and access. Belt and Road can achieve greater scale if additional financing comes in alongside the current Chinese state and policy bank lending. This can come both by working together with multilateral institutions and with private sector institutions. This will in turn require defining projects or structuring financing with attractive risk-return trade-offs. In some cases, this will be feasible – in others not.

Getting bigger also necessitates initiating meaningful Belt and Road activity in more countries. As the Belgrade–Budapest rail experience has shown, approaches vary in terms of competitive tendering requirements and consideration of non-Chinese bidders. An approach that works in, say, Tajikistan, may not be effective in Poland. This is a pragmatic recognition of context that is quite separate from debates on what the ‘right’ approach to these standards should be. Both these elements suggest that a more open Belt and Road will be a larger and more far-reaching one.

Secondly, effectiveness. Despite extensive experience building infrastructure within China, many Chinese companies are much less familiar operating outside of China. Western, Japanese and Korean companies can bring their own experience to the table and help the success of these projects. By doing so, they also put competitive pressure on Chinese companies to improve and upgrade, while providing opportunities to learn. This in turn creates a stronger, more productive Chinese economy.

Beyond physical hardware, the ‘software’ is also critical to success. Again foreign companies have much to contribute. Areas such as maintenance, training, legal and accounting services are all in demand. Indeed, many such British and other companies are already actively engaged in working on projects with Chinese companies to help in these areas.

Finally, risk management. Beyond the usual project management risk of large projects, Belt and Road brings additional challenges. Many countries have weak governance, internal divisions and security issues, all within distinctively different cultures and traditions. Chinese companies with little experience of local conditions will struggle. Going it alone may provide what is an illusion of control, but exposure to social and political dynamics can rebound on China in unexpected ways.

Cooperating with others who have a history of in-country experience is a way to manage these risks. Examples would include British and Chinese cooperation both at company and governmental level in engaging in particular African countries, in partnership with the relevant country government.

Mixed system

Mechanisms that encourage competitive choices and restrain corruption are positive, but mechanisms that slow decision-making to a crawl also prevent countries from getting benefits of infrastructure projects. Conversely, continuing along the current path of Chinese-led investment does have some clear attractions in certain settings, at least to those directly involved. It combines the ability of Chinese policy banks to provide large-scale funding in even high-risk environments with the relevant experience and production capacity of Chinese state-owned businesses. It allows for government-to-government deals, pragmatic negotiations and all-encompassing accords, at times out of the public eye. In many cases, it is hard to make a commercial case for the investments.

But in cases where there is mutual benefit, engagement and will, there will be a role for international partnerships.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

Read a summary

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

Read a summary report and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

Read a summary and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

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America’s vote shows a desire for stability and calm Expert comment NCapeling 11 November 2022

Joe Biden has presided over the best midterm election results by a party in power in two decades, but the future for the Republican Party leadership is now uncertain.

For a president continually struggling with low approval ratings, the midterms provided a stunning result as the widely anticipated Republican red wave failed to materialize.

Although Democrats look set to lose their majority in the House, it is by a much smaller margin than either history or today’s pollsters anticipated. Democrats have maintained their majority in the Senate, a result that was confirmed four days after election day when Senator Catherine Cortez Masto won reelection. The final Senate seat will be decided by a 6 December run-off in the state of Georgia. 

The midterm elections were not good for the Republican party but were especially bad for Donald Trump who has until now managed to defy expectations and maintain his grip on the party even after his 2020 defeat at the polls.

Trump managed to win the presidency once but he lost the popular vote twice and at no stage during his time in office did his approval ratings go above 40 per cent. Now, after six years of the most divisive and disruptive leadership the US has ever seen, he has presided over the worst midterm results a party out of power has suffered in two decades.

Trump’s influence is on the wane

Many of the candidates endorsed by the former president – including in battleground states such as Pennsylvania and Arizona – lost. In Georgia, the Republican governor and Trump GOP rival won, despite Trump’s opposition, and the candidate he endorsed for the US Senate has come up short of the 50 per cent needed to get over the line in the first round.

Trump’s nemesis, Ron DeSantis, the Republican governor of Florida, won a second four-year term in a landslide. Trump is suffering attacks from his own party and many loyal media supporters, such as Fox News, the New York Post, and the Wall Street Journal. None of this bodes well for the prospect of Trump leading the party through the 2024 presidential election.

After six years of chaos, this upset has been delivered with remarkably little chaos and, so far, no violence in a win for democracy and stability in the US which will reverberate beyond the US shores.

The system has worked, with multiple elections held across all 50 states. Hotly contested seats were decided peacefully even when the margins were thin. The midterm elections were also a win for democracy. In every battleground state, election deniers that were nominated to run for offices that would control state election systems, including in the 2024 presidential elections, have been defeated.

For a country with a polarized electorate and a radical Republican leader who has continued to spread disinformation and sought to rile his base, this election has been surprisingly normal.

This means the debate about the future of America’s international leadership is postponed. Biden is still in the saddle and, instead of a battle for control inside the Democratic party, it is the Republicans who look set to descend into internal conflict and recrimination.

The unofficial contest to win the Republican nomination for president has already begun. Donald Trump has signalled loudly that he plans to run. If he does, it could impact Republican prospects in the 6 December runoff for the final seat in the Senate. DeSantis may also run and could be followed by several aspiring Republican candidates. A disrupted party facing a period of significant change seems likely. 

Inflation and the economy proved key factors

As always, foreign policy barely featured in the elections but the result promises a period of continuity. Instead of facing dangerous sniping on Ukraine from an emboldened Republican House leadership, the Biden administration looks set to hold to its Ukraine policy.

Biden’s increasingly hard-line policy on China will continue to be qualified by a clear-headed determination – however hard – to cooperate on climate. Trade policy will remain stuck, as will US policy in the developing world.

Exit polls show Democrats were motivated to vote by the reversal of Roe vs Wade and the restrictions on abortion rights that followed, while Republicans voted against inflation.

But Democrats at the national level continually failed to effectively communicate the positive impacts of Biden’s legislative agenda for ordinary Americans, or to deliver a clear economic message.

The national leadership veered from abortion rights to the Inflation Reduction Act, to the future of democracy in the US – all of which proved too complicated to cut through.

The state level shows a more complex picture because inflation and the economy – which could have swept Republicans to victory – were blunted by dogged local campaigning from Democrats who knew their voters and spoke to the cost-of-living concerns which were top of their minds.

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

SVB collapse shows interest rate financial stability threat Expert comment LJefferson 15 March 2023

Governments must resist pressure to relax post-financial crisis regulation, while central banks should moderate their attack on inflation if financial stability is at risk.

The collapse of California’s Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on 10 March has triggered a wave of volatility in global bank equity prices, raised questions about whether US bank regulation and its tech industry funding model are fit for purpose, and forced a rethink on the extent and pace of monetary policy tightening appropriate for the US and other advanced economies.

SVB was the US’s 16th largest bank with total assets of $212bn at the end of 2022 and a presence in eight countries around the world, including the UK. Since it was founded 40 years ago, it has maintained a strong focus on the technology sector, claiming recently that nearly half of all US venture-backed technology and life science companies banked with it. Partly as a consequence, some 95 per cent of its deposits came from corporates and hedge funds, far higher than the one-third typical of similarly sized banks.

What led to SVB’s collapse?

Ironically, SVB’s failure did not result from its core business model of serving a relatively high-risk and fast-growing sector, but rather from a dramatic failure in liquidity management. During the pandemic, SVB saw a very large inflow of corporate deposits. But rather than disincentivizing depositors or investing the funds attracted in assets of matching maturity, it chose to invest them in low credit risk, but long maturity bonds attracted by a small pick-up in return over shorter-term assets. 

When US interest rates began to rise rapidly in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the value of SVB’s long-term bond portfolio declined sharply. It was left facing a large capital loss of some $15bn, roughly equivalent to its total shareholder funds. The management attempted to repair SVB’s balance sheet last week by crystalizing some of the loss and raising new capital.

But when this failed, the US supervisory authorities had no choice but to step in and close the institution.  This action was quickly followed by emergency action from other regulators vis-a-vis SVB subsidiaries and offices around the world.

The US entity has formally been taken over by the FDIC and a bridge bank established. All depositors have had their funds guaranteed, going beyond the normal federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 per customer. However, bond holders and equity holders have been wiped out. The authorities have said that any loss will be covered by the industry as a whole via the FDIC.

In the UK, the Bank of England was able to sell the ring-fenced UK subsidiary of SVB to HSBC for £1 over the weekend, so that all its depositors and other liability holders have effectively had their funds guaranteed. In contrast to previous Bank of England rescues (such as Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984, the ‘small banks’ crisis in 1991 and the global financial crisis in 2008-9) no public money has been put at risk.

Four key questions

SVB’s rapid collapse raises four central questions:

First, how was it that the bank was able to take on such a risky interest rate maturity mismatch in its US operations? Maturity transformation is standard banking industry practice, but it is usually closely monitored by regulators who place limits on the extent of interest rate maturity mismatch and require liquidity buffers to offset the risk of deposit flight and forced asset sales.

SVB’s very high concentration of corporate deposits as compared to ‘sticky’ retail deposits, means that the risk of deposit flight was unusually high and so the bank should have been more, not less, cautious in its liquidity policy. SVB was classed as a regional bank in the US which means that it did not have to meet international regulatory standards under Basle III. And in 2018, the Trump administration approved legislation removing the post-financial crisis requirement that banks with assets under $250bn submit to stress testing and relaxing liquidity buffer requirements.

But it is still hard to understand why regulators allowed SVB to commit such a classic banking error. On Monday, the Federal Reserve ordered an inquiry into what it has correctly described as a regulatory failure. This should look at the role played by all the elements of the oversight system including the auditors, KPMG.

Second, does SVB’s failure reflect a much bigger underlying risk in the US banking sector, and potentially other banking systems around the world, built up over the prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates? SVB’s collapse was followed by the failure of the $110bn Signature Bank in New York, as well as sharp falls in US regional bank stock prices – by close of play on 14 March, the S&P Regional Bank Index was down 22 per cent on a week before, with some individual bank stocks seeing much sharper falls.  

To the extent that banks have been covered by international bank regulatory requirements, the risk of a much broader problem should be limited because stress testing and other regulatory tests would have looked at precisely the scenario that has happened. Even where large market losses have been incurred, capital buffers should be sufficient to cover them. But as SVB has shown, there are some large banks that are seemingly not required to follow international rules, while the latest developments at Credit Suisse indicate that market concerns may still arise when other factors are in play.

Third, how far, in the light of the potential vulnerability in banking systems, should central banks in advanced countries moderate their efforts to squeeze out inflationary pressures? While inflation already appears to have peaked in many economies and the pace of interest rate rises was expected to slow, inflation is far from vanquished, as recent data in the US has demonstrated.

Fourth, does the failure of SVB tell us something new about the financial risks facing the high technology sector?  It was remarkable that a single (and not particularly large, by international standards) financial institution could have played such a central role in the tech sector in both the US and UK. 

Why was this the case and does it reflect special features of the tech/start-up sector (e.g. the need for substantial cash deposits to cover relatively large negative cash flows in the early years of operation, or the need for highly specialized lending expertise). If so, should governments take steps to mitigate such risks, given the outsized importance of this sector in many national economic strategies? 

Alexey I. Nesvizhskii
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1419-1440
Tutorial

William M. Old
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1487-1502
Research

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

Europe should become the top priority for Liz Truss Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

Liz Truss has the chance to be a better prime minister than Boris Johnson was, not least in the UK’s foreign policy.

For all the smoke-and-mirrors talk now commonplace about Brexit opportunities, there is real potential that Liz Truss could extract from the aftermath of that upheaval as well as from the turmoil in the world.

But the approach and priorities she revealed during her one year as a better UK foreign secretary than Boris Johnson was – although he did set a low bar – as well as the past three months campaigning for the leadership of her party contain a warning.

She has shown a willingness to aggravate relationships with allies in pursuit of the support of her party faithful, and of a vision of British independence as well as a tendency to dismiss economic analysis when it inconveniently questions her assertions about favoured policies.

At the heart of her political identity is a notion which is both a strength and a potentially calamitous weakness – a love of the notion of being a disrupter which injects a deliberate unpredictability into her approach towards a world in extreme flux.

If she indulges this without good judgment, she could do real damage to Britain’s prospects and standing in the world.

Ukraine and the energy crisis

In foreign policy, Europe should be her starting point and the opportunity here for the UK is clear. The war in Ukraine and crisis in the cost of energy gives it a role – despite having left the European Union (EU) – in talking to EU governments about the future of the continent on many fronts.

Johnson’s emphatic support of President Zelensky gave the UK a position of moral and strategic clarity which Truss can build on through what will be an exceptionally difficult winter for Europe’s governments.

She is in a position to persuade European leaders to remain united in Ukraine’s support while planning better how they are going to source energy. She could expand on that to help the EU find a way through its many other problems, such as upholding democratic values throughout the bloc or finding a response to migration.

There is also a chance for the UK to shape Europe’s thinking on the development and regulation of digital technology and medicine, energy, and the environment.

Truss’s declaration that the UK should now spend three per cent of its GDP on defence could help her in taking that kind of role. However this campaign declaration is not yet credible, given the pressures on the national finances and her silence so far on support for households on energy costs.

But that is the opportunity in theory and the signs are this is not her approach to Europe. Her provocative and opportunistic comment that the ‘jury’s out’ on whether President Macron (and France) was a friend or foe shocked both Britain’s allies and opponents.

For those keen to see divisions among democracies, it gave unexpected, heady encouragement, and to those within those countries, it injected a doubt about shared values which was deeply damaging. The chilly poise of Macron’s response – that the UK and France would always be allies – showed how far she had departed from normal protocol.

The episode encapsulated one of the sources of unease about the Truss style – improvisation under the banner of ‘disruption’ without thought of consequences.

However, she has shown consistency over the Northern Ireland Protocol with little sign of compromise, and that alone could cause much unnecessary damage to UK interests. It also puts her on a collision course with the EU and the UK House of Lords, due to consider controversial legislation again in early October after the Conservative party conference.

There is huge opposition in the Lords to two aspects of the legislation. The first target is the intention of the Johnson government – likely to be repeated by a Truss government – to use the bill to jettison aspects of the protocol, which many argue breaks international law. The second is the delegated power the bill would give ministers.

The cost of a new, serious clash – or worse, a full trade war – with the EU is high. There is the loss of trade, the increase in friction for business, which is consistently underestimated by the UK government, and the loss of scientific and research partnerships.

More than that, though, there is the weakening of ties to a set of allies with common values sharing an increasingly troubled neighbourhood.

US, China, and others remain important

And to say Europe should come first is not to dismiss other claims on the UK’s foreign policy. Her instinctive liking for the US will help Truss in relations with Washington at a difficult time, and her apparent intention to designate China as ‘a threat’ will support that relationship too.

Independent Thinking: Rishi Sunak and the UK, John Kerry on COP27 Audio NCapeling 28 October 2022

The second episode of our new podcast examines the changes in the UK government as Rishi Sunak become prime minister and looks ahead to COP27 with John Kerry.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests discuss the arrival in Number 10 of Rishi Sunak, the UK’s youngest prime minister of modern times as well as its third of 2022, alongside analysing the Chatham House event with US Special Presidential Envoy on Climate John Kerry. 

Bronwen’s guests from Chatham House are John Kampfner, executive director of the UK in the World Initiative, Hans Kundani, associate fellow with the Europe programme, and Anna Åberg, research associate with the Environment and Society programme.

They are joined by Sir Simon Fraser, formerly of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Chatham House’s deputy chairman. 

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours. 

Harris and Trump's shared goal masks a fundamental AI policy divide Expert comment rgold.drupal 3 November 2024

Both presidential candidates will pursue US tech dominance but differ on the means to achieve it.

There remain some differences between the US presidential candidates’ positions on the governance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology, notably around competition. 

But under either future administration, US decision-making looks set to be heavily influenced by growing securitization, the aims of the US technology industry and broader competition with China. 

‘Safe’ AI development 

Vice President Kamala Harris attended the inaugural Global AI Safety summit in the UK in 2023, where she announced President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on AI. This significant move by the federal government sought to define national and cyber security guidelines for AI developers and outline privacy and transparency guarantees. It also committed the federal government to a review of the National Security implications of this emerging technology, which was published last week.

In her remarks at the summit, Harris was clear that her definitions of safety extended beyond catastrophic risk mitigation to societal and personal harm. She noted the corrosive effects of some algorithmic decision-making and disinformation on democracy, appealing for AI that is developed ‘in the service of the public interest’.

A number of initiatives developed during the Biden administration have attempted to steer emerging technology as it takes root in society. This includes the establishment of the US AI Safety Institute, various schemes on global AI governance and investment in Public AI projects like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR).

The US public is largely supportive: polling by the AI Policy Institute (AIPI) points to a majority preference for safety standards governing the US effort to lead in AI, rather than pedal-to-the-metal development. Investment in public options on AI and the infrastructure required to develop and sustain it is a bold direction that the incoming administration should consider expanding.

Biden’s Executive Order on AI has come under fire by the Trump campaign. At a rally in Iowa, Trump explained that he would cancel the order ‘on day one’, echoing a Republican platform that described it as imposing ‘Radical Leftwing ideas’ . 

Trump does, however, have his own track record in technology policy. During his first presidency, his administration passed an Executive Order on AI, stressing that ‘continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States’. The tools and institutions announced as part of the order – including AI research investment, national AI research institutes and AI regulatory guidance including on federal use of AI – echo those of the current administration. 

Four years is a long time in AI, however. As the power of this technology is revealed, talk of safety may give way to talk of security. While the candidates may disagree on the role of the federal government in setting standards, there will be close alignment on the central need for US supremacy in national security. Neither administration seems likely to erect barriers to securitization of AI should it emerge as a critical strategic asset.

AI regulation at home 

American industry will remain the pivotal force shaping the US AI ecosystem, particularly as America jostles for position as the maker of the global rules governing AI. A notable aspect of Biden’s AI Executive Order was where it staked responsibility. Reports by AI and Cloud companies on the safety of their tools and infrastructure are sent to the Department of Commerce.

Under Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose star continues to rise, the department has become significantly more engaged with technology companies. In the absence of any other legal authority, AI governance has therefore sat under the purview of a secretary who herself has noted that they are ‘not a regulator’. 

The trend of industry leaders driving the government agenda on AI is replicated in other departments. There was an outcry over the composition of the new Department of Homeland Security advisory panel, the Artificial Intelligence and Security Board, with civil society groups concerned about the preponderance of industry voices: the 22-member panel includes the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA, IBM, AWS, Adobe, Microsoft and Alphabet.

Under a Harris presidency, these trends seem likely to continue. Plus with deadlock in Congress probable, establishing new legal authorities for emerging technology will be difficult. That will likely mean emerging tech governance remains heavily influenced by the Department for Commerce. 

Like Harris, Trump has his allies in industry. While the Biden administration has courted the CEOs of AI companies who have historically spoken out in favour of regulation, Trump’s allies tend towards a more deregulatory agenda. 

Silicon Valley billionaires Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen have backed Trump’s plans to minimize AI regulation, lauding his support for ‘little tech’. They have also backed reported plans for so-called ‘Manhattan Projects’ to develop military technology, stewarded by ‘industry-led’ agencies. Trump’s aversion to strong regulatory institutions may mean an end to Biden’s anti-trust efforts, benefitting the biggest voices in the room, though his VP pick may disagree. JD Vance has somewhat surprisingly come out strongly in defence of the current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and her anti-trust efforts targeting US big tech.

Regardless, business interests will likely shape either a Harris or Trump administration’s approach as the US grapples with balancing the ambitions of its industry with an increasingly protectionist stance towards its biggest import market, China.

Competition abroad

China looms large in the imaginations of both campaigns. 

The US has signalled to its allies that American AI standards should replace Chinese standards. Export controls on semiconductors were expanded in September this year, with key voices in the industry – notably the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea – describing the restrictions as ‘economically motivated’ despite nominally being tied to national security by the US. 

The election shows that Trumpism is here to stay Expert comment rgold.drupal 7 November 2024

World leaders must engage with the new president’s view of America’s priorities and accept that the US has changed.

In a landslide victory, former President Donald Trump has been elected to be the 47th president of the United States. This election was laden with the expectation that a dead heat would lead to delay, legal challenge, extremism, and possible violence. It has instead passed quickly, decisively, and peacefully.  More than 67 million Americans who voted for Kamala Harris have demonstrated restraint and accepted the result. By this measure, democracy in the United States has prevailed. 

Across Asia and Latin America, leaders have been preparing for a second Trump term. They are pragmatic and resolute in their belief that they can work with the once and 

also future US president. In Europe, leaders have been less certain. They have oscillated between two approaches. The first, of ‘Trump-proofing’ – an instinct if not a strategy  that builds on the quest for strategic autonomy, championed by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. The second, a calculation by some, not least the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, that they can present themselves as top-tier partners to the US in a new approach to transatlantic security. 

Trumpism is not an aberration

For eight years, world leaders and foreign policy experts have been debating whether President Trump was the cause of a radical change in the US, or merely a symptom of powerful trends in the American body politic: rising inequality, a loss of manufacturing jobs – a demographic defined by white male non-college-educated voters who feel left behind – a deeply engrained anti-elitism, and a society in desperate need of a new kind of political leadership. 

In Trump’s first term, many leaders acted on the basis that he was an aberration, not a symptom. That meant that foreign leaders assumed his policies might disappear with his future electoral defeat, and short-term strategies designed to ‘work around’ Trump were a good bet. 

The next US president would return to a familiar agenda (free trade, market access, strong alliances, a commitment to climate action, extended nuclear deterrence and deepening transatlantic ties) and so America’s friends could wait this out. Indeed, civil servants frequently pointed to the strength of bilateral working relations, despite an often disruptive high-level political style. 

President Joe Biden’s commitment to multilateralism, the transatlantic partnership and Ukraine seemed to confirm the view that Trump’s policies were an anomaly and that America had reverted to normal. Gradually, though, Biden’s policies began to chip away at this assumption. He continued Trump’s tariffs, executed a reckless and unilateral exit from Afghanistan with little consultation, and pushed through a transformative but also protectionist climate investment bill in the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Fast forward to this election result. A stunning – many would say shocking – victory must put to rest any assumption that Trump is an aberration. It may have started that way, but today it appears there is no going back. The world is now confronted with a president that has had time to sharpen and hone his instincts, to prioritise loyalty in appointing a close circle of advisers, and to lay the foundation for his Vice President JD Vance to carry forward his vision once his second term ends. 

First moves

What will Trump do first? Several things are in store: A sharp immigration policy including deportations is likely to be top of Team Trump’s agenda in its first 100 days. This may prove to be inflationary – deporting millions of undocumented migrants would shrink the labour supply – but that is unlikely to restrain Trump in the short-term. A 2.0 version of his so-called ‘Muslim ban’ could also feature. And immigrants will continue to take a hit rhetorically, labelled as outsiders and as criminals. 

The punishment for noncompliance could also be harsh. If Mexico does not demonstrate its willingness to cooperate, retaliation might take the form of tariffs, or a tough review or even renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2026. 

The return to tariffs as the front line of trade policy  is virtually certain. Trump has telegraphed this for months. China can expect far harsher tariffs. What is more difficult to discern is whether these will be a bargaining tool with conditions attached, or a ratcheting up towards a new level of protectionism. 

For Asia, there is grave uncertainty. No one can be sure what Trump’s strategy will be towards Taiwan. Investment in the latticework of mutually-reinforcing partnerships across the region may take a back seat. But how Trump will manage North Korea’s nuclear threat is unclear. So too is the question of whether under his watch, US nuclear deterrence will continue to provide enough assurance to prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons. 

Still, it is Europe that is likely to face the sharpest edge of Trump’s second term. Tariffs in search of reciprocal market access and reducing America’s trade deficit with Europe are more likely than not. But it will be the existential and enduring shift in America’s commitment to Europe and its security that will hit hardest.