With over 16 million people and nearly 8.6 million jobs, America's older industrial cities remain a vital-if undervalued-part of the economy, particularly in states where they are heavily concentrated, such as Ohio and Pennsylvania. They also have a range of other physical, economic, and cultural assets that, if fully leveraged, can serve as a platform for their renewal.

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Across the country, cities today are becoming more attractive to certain segments of society. Meanwhile, economic trends-globalization, the demand for educated workers, the increasing role of universities-are providing cities with an unprecedented chance to capitalize upon their economic advantages and regain their competitive edge.

Many cities have exploited these assets to their advantage; the moment is ripe for older industrial cities to follow suit. But to do so, these cities need thoughtful and broad-based approaches to foster prosperity.

"Restoring Prosperity" aims to mobilize governors and legislative leaders, as well as local constituencies, behind an asset-oriented agenda for reinvigorating the market in the nation's older industrial cities. The report begins with identifications and descriptions of these cities-and the economic, demographic, and policy "drivers" behind their current condition-then makes a case for why the moment is ripe for advancing urban reform, and offers a five-part agenda and organizing plan to achieve it.

Publications & Presentations
Connecticut State Profile
Connecticut State Presentation 

Michigan State Profile
Michigan State Presentation 

New Jersey State Profile
New Jersey State Presentation 

New York State Profile
New York State Presentation 

Ohio State Profile
Ohio State Presentation
Ohio Revitalization Speech

Pennsylvania State Profile 

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Louisville/Jefferson County is the principal city of America’s 42nd largest metropolitan area, a 13-county, bi-state region with a 2006 population estimated at 1.2 million. It is the largest city by far in Kentucky, but it is neither Kentucky’s capital nor its center of political power.

The consolidated city, authorized by voter referendum in 2000 and implemented in 2003, is home to 701,500 residents within its 399 square miles, with a population density of 4,124.8 per square mile.² It is either the nation’s 16th or its 26th largest incorporated place, depending on whether the residents of smaller municipalities within its borders, who are eligible to vote in its elections, are counted (as local officials desire and U.S. Census Bureau officials resist). The remainder of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population is split between four Indiana counties (241,193) and eight Kentucky counties (279,523). Although several of those counties are growing rapidly, the new Louisville metro area remains the MSA's central hub, with 57 percent of the population and almost 70 percent of the job base.

Centrally located on the southern banks of the Ohio River, amid an agriculturally productive, mineral rich, and energy producing region, Louisville is commonly described as the northernmost city of the American South. Closer to Toronto than to New Orleans, and even slightly closer to Chicago than to Atlanta, it remains within a day’s drive of two-thirds of the American population living east of the Rocky Mountains.

This location has been the dominant influence on Louisville’s history as a regional center of trade, commerce and manufacture. The city, now the all-points international hub of United Parcel Service (UPS), consistently ranks among the nation’s top logistics centers. Its manufacturing sector, though much diminished, still ranks among the strongest in the Southeast. The many cultural assets developed during the city’s reign as a regional economic center rank it highly in various measures of quality of life and “best places.”

Despite these strengths, Louisville’s competitiveness and regional prominence declined during much of the last half of the 20th Century, and precipitously so during the economic upheavals of the 1970s and ‘80s. Not only did it lose tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs and many of its historic businesses to deindustrialization and corporate consolidation, it also confronted significant barriers to entry into the growing knowledge-based economy because of its poorly-educated workforce, lack of R&D capacity, and risk-averse business culture.

In response, Louisville began a turbulent, two-decade process of civic and economic renewal, during which it succeeded both in restoring growth in its traditional areas of strength, most notably from the large impact of the UPS hub, and in laying groundwork for 21st century competitiveness, most notably by substantially ramping up university-based research and entrepreneurship supports. Doing so required it to overhaul nearly every aspect of its outmoded economic development strategies, civic relationships, and habits of mind, creating a new culture of collaboration.

Each of the three major partners in economic development radically transformed themselves and their relationships with one another. The often-paralyzing city-suburban divide of local governance yielded to consolidation. The business community reconstituted itself as a credible champion of broad-based regional progress, and it joined with the public sector to create a new chamber of commerce that is the region’s full-service, public-private economic development agency recognized as among the best in the nation. The Commonwealth of Kentucky embraced sweeping education reforms, including major support for expanded research at the University of Louisville, and a “New Economy” agenda emphasizing the commercialization of research-generated knowledge. Creative public-private partnerships have become the norm, propelling, for instance, the dramatic resurgence of downtown.

The initial successes of all these efforts have been encouraging, but not yet sufficient for the transformation to innovation-based prosperity that is the goal. This report details those successes, and the leadership, partnerships, and strategies that helped create them. It begins by describing Louisville’s history and development and the factors that made its economy grow and thrive. It then explains why the city faltered during the latter part of the 20th century and how it has begun to reverse course. In doing so, the study offers important lessons for other cities that are striving to compete in a very new economic era. 

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Chattanooga a few years ago faced what many smaller cities are struggling with today—a sudden decline after years of prosperity in the "old" economy. This case study offers a roadmap for these cities by chronicling Chattanooga's demise and rebirth.

Chattanooga is located in the southern end of the Tennessee Valley where the Tennessee River cuts through the Smoky Mountains and the Cumberland Plateau. The city’s location, particularly its proximity to the Tennessee River, has been one of its greatest assets. Today, several major interstates (I-24, I-59, and I-75) run through Chattanooga, making it a hub of transportation business. The city borders North Georgia and is less than an hour away from both Alabama and North Carolina. Atlanta, Nashville, and Birmingham are all within two hours travel time by car.

Chattanooga is Tennessee’s fourth largest city, with a population in 2000 of 155,554, and it covers an area of 143.2 square miles. Among the 200 most populous cities in the United States, Chattanooga—with 1,086.5 persons per square mile—ranks 190th in population density.2 It is the most populous of 10 municipalities in Hamilton County, which has a population of 307,896, covers an area of 575.7 square miles, and has a population density of 534.8 persons per square mile.

With its extensive railroads and river access, Chattanooga was at one time the “Dynamo of Dixie”—a bustling, midsized, industrial city in the heart of the South. By 1940, Chattanooga’s population was centered around a vibrant downtown and it was one of the largest cities in the United States. Just 50 years later, however, it was in deep decline. Manufacturing jobs continued to leave. The city’s white population had fled to the suburbs and downtown was a place to be avoided, rather than the economic center of the region. The city lost almost 10 percent of its population during the 1960s, and another 10 percent between 1980 and 1990. It would have lost more residents had it not been for annexation of outlying suburban areas.

The tide began to turn in the 1990s, with strategic investments by developing public-private partnerships—dubbed the “Chattanooga way.” These investments spurred a dramatic turnaround. The city’s population has since stabilized and begun to grow, downtown has been transformed, and it is once again poised to prosper in the new economy as it had in the old.

This report describes how Chattanooga has turned its economy around. It begins with a summary of how the city grew and developed during its first 150 years before describing the factors driving its decline. The report concludes by examining the partnerships and planning that helped spur Chattanooga’s current revitalization and providing valuable lessons to other older industrial cities trying to ignite their own economic recovery. 

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Part of the larger Northeast Ohio regional economy, the Akron metropolitan area is composed of two counties (Summit and Portage) with a population of just over 700,000, and is surrounded by three other metropolitan areas. Akron is located approximately 40 miles south of Cleveland, 50 miles west of Youngstown, and 23 miles north of Canton. The Cleveland metro area is a five-county region with a population of 2.1 million. The Youngstown metro area includes three counties, extending into Pennsylvania, and has a population of 587,000. Canton is part of a two-county metropolitan area with a population of 410,000.

The adjacency of the Akron and Cleveland Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) is an important factor in the economic performance of the Akron region. The interdependence of economies of the two MSAs is evidenced by the strong economic growth of the northern part of Summit County adjacent to the core county of the Cleveland metropolitan area. This part of Summit County beyond the city of Akron provides available land, access to the labor pools of the two metropolitan areas, and proximity to the region’s extensive transportation network.

Although affected by economic activity in the larger region, the fate and future of Akron and its wider region are not solely determined by events in these adjacent areas. While sharing broad economic trends with its neighbors, the Akron metro area has been impacted by a different set of events and has shown different patterns of growth from other areas in Northeast Ohio.

This study provides an in-depth look at Akron’s economy over the past century. It begins by tracing the industrial history of the Akron region, describing the growth of the rubber industry from the late 1800s through much of following century, to its precipitous decline beginning in the 1970s. It then discusses how the “bottoming out” of this dominant industry gave rise to the industrial restructuring of the area. The paper explores the nature of this restructuring, and the steps and activities the city’s business, civic, and government leaders have undertaken to help spur its recovery and redevelopment. In doing so, it provides a series of lessons to other older industrial regions working to find their own economic niche in a changing global economy. 

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In an era of fluid geopolitics and geoeconomics, challenges to the global order abound: from ever-changing terrorism, to massive refugee flows, a stubbornly sluggish world economy, and the specter of global pandemics. Against this backdrop, the question of whether leader summitry—either the G-7 or G-20 incarnations—can supply needed international governance is all the more relevant. This question is particularly significant for East Asia this year as Japan and China, two economic giants that are sometimes perceived as political rivals, respectively host the G-7 and G-20 summits. 

On April 18, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Project on International Order and Strategy co-hosted a discussion on the continued relevancy and efficacy of the leader summit framework, Japan’s and China’s priorities as summit hosts, and whether these East Asian neighbors will hold parallel but completely separate summits or utilize these summits as an opportunity to cooperate on issues of mutual, and global, interest.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #G7G20Asia

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• Japan’s G-7 and China’s G-20 chairmanships: Bridges or stovepipes in leader summitry?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160418_g7g20_transcript

Stock buybacks are an important explanation for both the concentration of income among the richest households and the disappearance of middle-class employment opportunities in the United States over the past three decades. Over this period, corporate resource-allocation at many, if not most, major U.S. business corporations has transitioned from “retain-and-reinvest” to “downsize-and-distribute,” says William Lazonick in a new paper.

Under retain-and-reinvest, the corporation retains earnings and reinvests them in the productive capabilities embodied in its labor force. Under downsize-and-distribute, the corporation lays off experienced, and often more expensive, workers, and distributes corporate cash to shareholders. Lazonick’s research suggests that, with its downsize-and-distribute resource-allocation regime, the “buyback corporation” is in large part responsible for a national economy characterized by income inequity, employment instability, and diminished innovative capability.

Lazonick also challenges many of the notions associated with maximizing shareholder value, an ideology that has come to dominate corporate America. Lazonick calls for a decrease, or even a ban, in stock buybacks so companies will be able to use these funds to finance capital expenditures but more importantly to attract, train, retain, and motivate its career employees. And some of the funds made available by a buyback ban can even flow to the government, he argues, as tax revenues for investments in infrastructure and human knowledge that can underpin the next generation of innovation.  

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In an era of fluid geopolitics and geoeconomics, challenges to the global order abound: from ever-changing terrorism, to massive refugee flows, a stubbornly sluggish world economy, and the specter of global pandemics. Against this backdrop, the question of whether leader summitry—either the G-7 or G-20 incarnations—can supply needed international governance is all the more relevant. This question is particularly significant for East Asia this year as Japan and China, two economic giants that are sometimes perceived as political rivals, respectively host the G-7 and G-20 summits. 

On April 18, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Project on International Order and Strategy co-hosted a discussion on the continued relevancy and efficacy of the leader summit framework, Japan’s and China’s priorities as summit hosts, and whether these East Asian neighbors will hold parallel but completely separate summits or utilize these summits as an opportunity to cooperate on issues of mutual, and global, interest.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #G7G20Asia

Audio

• Japan’s G-7 and China’s G-20 chairmanships: Bridges or stovepipes in leader summitry?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160418_g7g20_transcript

On July 5, the results from the first year of the world’s first development impact bond (DIB) for education in Rajasthan, India, were announced. The Center for Universal Education hosted a webinar in which three stakeholders in the DIB shared their perspective on the performance of the intervention, their learnings about the DIB process, and their thoughts for the future of DIBs and other results-based financing mechanisms.

Approximately 3 million girls ages 6 to 13 were out of school in India according to most recent data, 350,000 of which are in the state of Rajasthan. Child marriage is also a large issue in the state; no state-specific data exists, but nationwide 47 percent of girls ages 20 to 24 are married before age 18. According to Educate Girls, a non-governmental organization based in Rajasthan, girls’ exclusion is primarily a result of paternalistic societal mindsets and traditions. Given the evidence linking education and future life outcomes for girls, this data is greatly concerning.

The DIB finances a portion of the services provided by Educate Girls, which has been working to improve enrollment, retention, and learning outcomes for girls (and boys) in Rajasthan since 2007. The organization trains a team of community volunteers ages 18 to 30 to make door-to-door visits encouraging families to enroll their girls in school and to deliver curriculum enhancement in public school classrooms. Their volunteers are present in over 8,000 villages and 12,500 schools in Rajasthan. The DIB was launched in March of 2015 to finance services in 166 schools, which represents 5 percent of Educate Girls’ annual budget. The DIB is intended to be a “proof of concept” of the mechanism using this relatively small selection of beneficiaries.

The investor in the DIB is UBS Optimus Foundation, who has provided $238,000 in working capital to fund the service delivery. ID Insight, a non-profit evaluation firm, will evaluate the improvement in learning of girls and boys in the treatment schools in comparison to a control group and will validate the number of out of school girls enrolled. The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation serves as the outcome funder, and has agreed to pay UBS Optimus Foundation 43.16 Swiss francs ($44.37) for each unit of improved learning and 910.14 francs ($935.64) for every percentage point increase in the enrollment of girls out of school. Instiglio, a non-profit impact bond and results-based financing intermediary organization, provided technical assistance to all parties during the design of the DIB and currently provides performance management assistance to Educate Girls on behalf of UBS Optimus Foundation. 

The outcomes will be calculated in 2018, at the end of three years; however, preliminary results for the year since the launch of the DIB (representing multiple months of door-to-door visits and seven weeks of interventions in the classroom) were released last week. The payments for the DIB were structured such that the investor, UBS Optimus Foundation, would earn a 10 percent internal rate of return (IRR) on their investment at target outcome levels, which were based on Educate Girls’ past performance data. The table below presents the metrics, target outcome level, year-one result, and the progress toward the target. 

Table 1: Educate Girls DIB Results from first year of services

The DIB was challenging to implement and required DIB stakeholders to be resourceful.

First, the reliability of government data was a challenge, which necessitated flexibility in the identification of the target population and metrics. Second, given the number of stakeholders engaged and the novelty of this approach, the transaction costs were higher than they would have been for a traditional grant. This meant that strong and regular communication was crucial to the survival of the project.

The role of the outcome funder and investor were significantly different versus a grant.

The outcome funder spent more resources on defining outcomes, but spent fewer resources on managing grant activities. The investor utilized risk management and monitoring strategies informed by the activities in their commercial banking branch, which they have not used for other grants.

The DIB has changed the way the service provider operates.

In the video below, Safeena Husain from Educate Girls’ highlights the ways in which financing a portion of their program through a DIB differs from financing the program through grants. Safeena describes that in a grant, performance data is reported up to donors, but rarely makes it back down to frontline workers. The DIB has helped them to develop mobile dashboards that ensure performance data is reaching the front line and helping to identify barriers to outcomes as early as possible.

Based on the learnings from the implementation of the first DIB for education, this tool can be used to improve the value for money for the outcome funder and strengthen the performance management of a service provider. As the panelists discussed in the webinar, DIBs and other outcome-based financing mechanisms can help differentiate between organizations that are adept at fundraising and those that excel at delivering outcomes. However, service providers must be sufficiently prepared for rigorous outcome measurement if they plan to participate in a DIB; otherwise the high-stakes environment might backfire. In our research, we have closely examined the design constraints for impact bonds in the early childhood sector.

There are countless lessons to be learned from the stakeholder’s experience in the first DIB for education. We applaud the stakeholders for being transparent about the outcomes and true challenges associated with this mechanism. This transparency will be absolutely critical to ensure that DIBs are implemented and utilized appropriately moving forward.

The latest BLS employment report showed remarkable strength in the U.S. job market even as global financial markets were trembling. Employers added 292,000 to their payrolls in December. Upward revisions in previous BLS estimates also boosted gains in October and November. In the last quarter of 2015, payrolls increased at a rate of 284,000 per month, a remarkable performance in the face of rising uncertainty about prospects for the world economy. U.S. employers added a total of 2.65 million jobs in 2015, the second best calendar-year gain of the current recovery. (Gains were stronger in 2014 but smaller in earlier years of the recovery.)

As usual, private employers accounted for an overwhelming share of the job gains. Ninety-seven percent of the gains in the fourth quarter and 96 percent of the gains last year occurred as a result of employment gains in the private sector. Whatever the uncertainty of the world economic outlook, U.S. employers have enough confidence in their own prospects to keep adding to their payrolls at a healthy clip. Public employment remains about 375,000 (1.7 percent) lower than it was at the onset of the Great Depression. Though government payrolls are now growing, in percentage terms they have been rising much more slowly that private payrolls.

Voters and policy makers bemoan our crumbling roads, airports, and public transit systems, but few jurisdictions do much about it. The odd thing is that historically low interest rates now make it cheap to fix or improve our public facilities. The mystery is why decision makers have passed on this opportunity.

The sorry state of the nation’s roads, bridges, and public infrastructure has been widely reported. Every few years the American Society of Civil Engineers draws up a report card on U.S. infrastructure, highlighting its strengths and shortcomings in a variety of areas—drinking water systems, wastewater, dams, roads, bridges, inland waterways, ports. The report card spotlights areas where spending on maintenance falls short of the amount needed to keep our infrastructure functioning efficiently. For many kinds of infrastructure, a bigger population and heavier utilization require us to invest in brand new facilities. In its latest report card, the ASCE awards our public infrastructure a grade of D+.

It’s hard to think of a time more attractive for public investment than years when total demand for goods and services is depressed. The Treasury’s borrowing cost for investment funds is near historical lows. Since 2011, the interest rate on 10-year government bonds has averaged 2.3 percent. Savers buying inflation-protected bonds have been willing to lend funds to the federal government at a real interest rate of just 0.22 percent.

So long as there is excess unemployment, especially in the building trades, the labor resources needed to fix or improve public facilities should be abundant and relatively inexpensive. Employment in the construction industry has rebounded as home building and business investment have improved. Nonetheless, construction employment has recovered only half the loss it experienced between its pre-recession peak in 2006 and its post-recession low in 2011. Skilled labor is not nearly as abundant as it was in 2011, but the trend in wage inflation does not suggest employers are bidding up worker salaries.

The federal government’s failure to use fiscal policy and, in particular, public investment policy to bring the nation closer to full employment represents a notable lapse in policymaking, perhaps the most grievous lapse since the crisis began. It unnecessarily prolonged the suffering of the nation’s long-term unemployed and it wasted a rare opportunity to rebuild the nation’s public infrastructure at relatively low cost.

Why did this failure occur? One reason is that policy makers were too optimistic when the financial crisis took place back in 2008. Most public and private forecasts at the time understated the severity of the economic fallout from the bank meltdown. Decision makers in Congress and the Administration may have believed infrastructure investment would be unhelpful in the recovery. Well-conceived infrastructure projects take many months to design and many years to complete. Policy makers may have believed the economic crisis would be over by the time federally infrastructure spending reached its peak.

When forecasters and Democratic policy makers recognized their error, voters had elected a Congress that supported only one kind of fiscal policy to deal with the crisis—big tax cuts focused on high-income tax payers. Whether or not such a policy could have been effective, it would not make additional funds available for infrastructure projects.

Harvard’s Lawrence Summers and Rachel Lipset recently pointed to another reason voters have failed to back a big program to boost infrastructure investment—government ineptitude. In the Boston Globe they documented the painfully slow progress of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation in overhauling a bridge across the Charles River. The bridge, which was built over 11 months back in 1912, has so far required four years for its reconstruction. No end date is in sight. In addition to the over-budget cost of the project, the overhaul has also caused massive and highly visible inconvenience for drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians trying to move between Boston and Cambridge.

Few readers can be under the illusion Boston’s experience is exceptional. Many of us pass near or use public facilities that are being rebuilt or repaired. We often see bafflingly little progress over a span of months or even years. As Summers and Lipset note, the conspicuous failure of public managers to complete capital projects speedily and on budget undermines voters’ confidence that infrastructure projects can be worthwhile.

Despite wide agreement the nation’s infrastructure needs to be modernized, we have made little progress toward that goal. On the contrary, government capital spending has shrunk significantly as a share of the economy. In 2014, net government investment spending on items other than defense dipped to a 60-year low when spending is measured as a percent of GDP. Using this indicator, net government investment has shrunk almost half compared with its level in the first decade of the century. For many reasons this is a good time to fix our public infrastructure. It is also an excellent time to overhaul public management of government capital projects.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Inside Sources.

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The financial crisis is now eight years behind us, but its legacy lingers on. Many Americans are concerned about their financial security and are particularly worried about whether they will have enough for retirement. Guaranteed benefit pensions are gradually disappearing, leaving households to save and invest for themselves. What role could equities play for retail investors?

Another concern about the lingering impact of the crisis is that business investment and overall economic growth remains weak compared to expectations. Large companies are able to borrow at low interest rates, yet many of them have large cash holdings. However, many small and medium sized enterprises face difficulty funding their growth, paying high risk premiums on their borrowing and, in some cases, being unable to fund investments they would like to make. Equity funding can be an important source of growth financing.

On Friday, April 15, the Initiative on Business and Public Policy at Brookings examined what role equity markets can play for individual retirement security, small business investment and whether they can help jumpstart American innovation culture by fostering the transition from startups to billion dollar companies.

You can join the conversation and tweet questions for the panelists at #EquityMarkets.

Video

• Keynote address by Richard G. Ketchum
• Panel Discussion
• Keynote address by Roger Ferguson

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• Not just for the professionals? Understanding equity markets for retail and small business investors

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• Equity Markets Retirement Security 2016 Apr 15 (2)
• 20160415_equity_markets_transcript

A major oil spill will result in cleanup spending that boosts GDP, but no one thinks oil spills are good. Oil spills and other forms of pollution are examples of negative externalities — harm caused to others by the economic activity of a firm or industry. These externalities represent a failure of the market, and unless there is corrective action, their presence means that there is too much production of something that causes negative spillovers.

That criticism can be applied to the financial services industry. Many say that it grew too large, triggered a financial crisis and damaged the rest of the economy. Is that still the case, and is financialization spoiling the economy? Despite the alarmist rhetoric around today’s finance sector, the answer is generally “no” because of changes made to financial regulation.

First, a check on the facts: How large is the industry and how much has it grown? The broad definition of the financial sector includes finance, insurance and real estate, known by the acronym “FIRE.” It was 17.5 percent of gross domestic product in 1990 and rose to 20.0 percent in 2014, but that figure is misleading as it includes office and apartment rents and leases — stuff that has little to do with Wall Street.

Finance and insurance separately peaked well before the financial crisis at 7.7 percent of GDP, which was up from 5.8 percent in 1990. In 2014, it was 7.0 percent of GDP. Employment in finance and insurance has been on a downtrend since 2003 and is currently 4.25 percent of total nonfarm payrolls. Most of those jobs are in offices and bank branches around the country. (The output data given here are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP by Industry data. The employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Payroll Employment data. Author’s calculations.)

Still, salaries and bonuses at the top are extremely attractive, so perhaps the externality plays out by drawing the best and brightest away from other more productive activities. The Harvard Crimson reported that in 2007, 23 percent of graduating Harvard seniors said they planned to enter finance. That is an impressive number, but things turned around sharply, with the 23 percent figure falling to 11.5 percent in 2009 after the financial crisis. At this point, the financial industry really isn’t large enough to crowd out other parts of the economy.

Meanwhile, the insurance industry serves an important social purpose providing life, property, and casualty insurance. AIG got into trouble in the crisis because it strayed into providing very risky financial services, not because of its main insurance business. Likewise, the core value of banks is financial intermediation between savers and investors, giving savers relatively secure and liquid assets while also funding investment.

There are critics of how well our banking industry serves this core purpose, a quality that is hard to determine. My judgment is that it does the job pretty well compared to most other countries. As the IMF reported in September 2015, the non-performing loan problem among European banks remains severe, whereas most U.S. banks now have strong balance sheets. Good financial intermediation means that most of the savings dollars are transferred to investors and are not lost through inefficient bank operations. A 2002 study that I participated in found bank productivity higher in the United States than in France or Germany.

The parts of the financial sector that give rise to the most concern are market-making, deal-making and the creation and trading of derivatives on Wall Street. The volume of market trading has increased exponentially because of the increased speed of computers and communications. Up to a certain point, the increased volume is helpful because it adds to the liquidity of markets, but the advent of high-frequency trading has taken us over the top. As Michael Lewis describes in his book Flash Boys, the high speed traders are finding ways to shave milliseconds off the time needed to make trades. That is thoroughly wasteful. As for deal-making, it has been going on for a long time — indeed the go-go years for deals were in the 1980s — so it is hard to blame the recent slowing of economic growth on this activity.

Still, the explosion of derivatives and other overly-complex instruments was problematic, and it is crystal clear that the mortgage market became too opaque and removed accountability from the system. The layering of complex derivatives on top of lousy mortgages (and other shaky assets) distorted the economy, resulted in the overbuilding of houses, and caused the financial crisis. There are plenty of people at fault besides the bankers, but the smart people on Wall Street were driving the process, and they should have known better. The excessive financialization obscured the reality of loans that depended upon ever-rising home prices and thus were never going to be paid back. There was an externality because the private calculations of potential profit ignored the risks being imposed on society.

Is that still the situation today? No. Things have changed. Banks and other financial institutions that create risks for the whole economy are now required to hold sufficient capital to cover losses even in periods of economic and financial stress, plus a liquidity buffer (they must pass “stress tests” administered by the Federal Reserve). The screws have been turned pretty tight, and the owners of large financial institutions will bear the costs of future failures — not taxpayers. This brings private incentives in line with the public interest, getting rid of the externality that gave us too much financialization in the first place. But to keep the future safe, we’ll have to make sure no one forgets what happened in the last crisis, and ensure that new risks are not created in other, less-regulated parts of the industry.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in the Washington Post.

Even before the eruption of anti-Muslim rhetoric in the past several weeks, I had a privileged position from which to observe the deep current of Islamophobia that ran beneath the crust of mainstream politics over the fourteen years since 9/11. Because I work on Islamist extremism, my dad often forwards emails about Americans Muslims he receives from friends to ask if they are true. I don’t blame him for asking: they’re truly scary. Muslims imposing Sharia law over the objections of their fellow Americans. Muslims infiltrating the U.S. government to subvert it. And so on.

But as with most Internet rumors circulated over email, the vast majority of the scary reports aren’t true. Take a peek at the “25 Hottest Urban Legends” on the rumor-busting website Snopes and you’ll see what I mean. The 11th on the list is about Muslim passengers on an AirTran flight that attempted a dry run to bring down a plane (they didn’t). The 15th is about an American Muslim who oversees all U.S. immigration (she just coordinates special naturalization ceremonies). The underlying message is that American Muslims are not to be trusted because of their religion.

One reason these rumors have currency is that most Americans don’t know many of their Muslim neighbors. For all the worry of a Muslim takeover, there are only around 4 million in this country, a little over 1 percent of the total population. Most of them do not live in Republican strongholds, where they are most feared.

[A]s with most Internet rumors circulated over email, the vast majority of the scary reports aren’t true.

Of course, familiarity does not always lessen fears or tensions. But it does complicate easy stories about an unfamiliar culture and those who identify with it. For example, because I’ve worked on counterterrorism in the U.S. government, I’ve never bought the story that American Muslims are infiltrating the U.S. government to subvert it. I’ve simply met too many Muslims in the government working impossible hours to keep this country and its Constitution safe.

American Muslims have their own easy stories to tell about non-Muslims that could use some complicating. Several of my Muslim friends have been surprised at the number of non-Muslim strangers who’ve come up to them and voiced their support. They’re surprised, presumably, because they assume that most non-Muslims in this country agree with Trump's rhetoric, which they don’t.

Some American Muslims view Islamophobia a natural outgrowth of white American racism, religious bigotry, and xenophobia. That easy story may account for some Islamophobia but it ignores something major: actions by Muslims to deliberately set non-Muslims against them. Jihadist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS carry out attacks in this country to create popular backlash against Muslims in hopes of recruiting those who are angered by the backlash. 

Even though most Muslims reject the siren call of the jihadists, the backlash still leads some Muslims to expect the worst of nonbelievers and of the American government. Like the anti-Muslim rumor mill, they spread half-truths about Christian vigilante violence and government plots. For example, at least one prominent religious leader in the American Muslim community has insinuated that the San Bernardino attackers were patsies in a government conspiracy against Muslims. 

My hope is that we’ll all try to be a little less suspicious of one another’s motives and a little more suspicious of the easy stories we tell.

Since it’s the holiday season, I shall indulge in a wish for the New Year. My hope is that we’ll all try to be a little less suspicious of one another’s motives and a little more suspicious of the easy stories we tell. I know the wish is fanciful given the current political climate but I’ve been struck by the number of Americans—Muslim and non-Muslim—who have been willing to confront their biases over the past few weeks and see things from the other side. If our enemies succeed by eroding our empathy for one another, we will succeed by reinforcing and expanding it.

For Europe, it has been a rough year, or perhaps more accurately a rough decade. The terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, and elsewhere have taken a toll, as did the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. But things really got tough beginning with the Great Recession—and its prolonged duration for Europe, including grave economic crises in much of the southern part of the continent. That was followed by Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as the intensification of the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni conflicts with their tragic human consequences, including massive displacement of people and the greatest flow of refugees since World War II. The recent attacks in Paris and Brussels have added to the gloom and fear. This recent history, together with the advent of nationalistic and inward-looking policies in virtually all European Union member states, makes it easy to get despondent—and worry that the entire European project is failing.

To be sure, these are not the best of times. Europe is perceived by some, including Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, as failing to invest enough in its own security, since NATO allies spend less than 1.4 percent of GDP on their armed forces while the United States spends twice that. However, we must not lose sight of the key structural advantages—and the important policy successes—that have brought Europe where it is today. For example, Europe’s recent progress in energy policy has been significant—good not only for economic and energy resilience, but also for NATO's collective handling of the revanchist Russia threat. 

[W]e must not lose sight of the key structural advantages—and the important policy successes—that have brought Europe where it is today.

For many years, analysts and policymakers have debated the question of Europe's dependence on natural gas from Russia. Today, this problem is largely solved. Russia provides only one-third of Europe’s gas. Importantly, Europe’s internal infrastructure for transporting natural gas in all desired directions has improved greatly. So have its available storage options, as well as its possibilities to import alternatives either by pipeline or in the form of liquefied natural gas. As a result, almost all member states are currently well-positioned to withstand even a worst-case scenario. 

Indeed, European Commission analyses show that even a multi-month long supply disruption could be addressed, albeit at real economic cost, by diversification and fuel switching. Progress in energy efficiency and renewable energy investments also help. There is more to do to enhance European energy security, but much has been done already. The Europeans have shown that, with ups and downs, they can address energy security themselves.

Already this energy success has contributed to a strategic success. Europe has been heavily criticized for not standing up more firmly to Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In fact, all EU member states have agreed to keep economic sanctions in place against Moscow. In addition, lifting the sanctions has been firmly attached to the implementation of the Minsk II agreement—and despite recent cracks in European solidarity, we hope that this stance will hold going forward. 

The notion that Europe is weak and dependent on Russian natural gas is a relic from the past.

The notion that Europe is weak and dependent on Russian natural gas is a relic from the past. Europe has a strong regulatory framework with which commercial entities, including Gazprom, have to abide. For those who doubt the impact of these regulations, just ask Google or Microsoft. With the end of so-called destination clauses, natural gas can be re-sold whenever required, as long as sufficient infrastructure is in place. Just last year, Germany re-exported over 30 billion cubic meters of gas, mostly Russian, in particular to Central and Eastern Europe (including Ukraine). That volume exceeds the annual consumption of every European state with the exceptions of Germany, Italy, France, and Britain.

In theory, Europe could even substantially wean itself off Russian gas if need be. To be sure, that would come at a major expense: over 200 billion euros of additional investments over a period of two years or more, and then an annual 35 billion euros, according to some calculations. That will almost surely not happen. But as a way of bounding the worst-case scenario, it is still informative. One might say that Europe has escalation dominance over Russia; the latter needs to export to Europe more than Europe need Russian hydrocarbons.

The internal energy market is not finished, but Europe’s energy security has significantly improved in recent years. Even though world markets are currently awash in resources, there is no time for complacence, and European leaders should finish the job, foremost by safeguarding the swift construction of the so-called Projects of Common Interest (key energy infrastructure projects that address the remaining bottlenecks in the EU market), so that the U.S. State Department can take new infrastructure projects like Nord Stream 2 off its priority list, and make energy policy another true European success story. It is already much of the way there, and Western security is the better for it.

The U.S.-Japan alliance continues to struggle with the issue of reducing and relocating the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa.  In a new op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Mike Mochizuki (of The George Washington University) and I—recognizing the potential seriousness of this problem for the alliance, as well as the fact that the current plan to reduce and/or relocate has been straitjacketed by Japanese and Okinawan politics—propose a more significant set of changes. Our proposal would scale back the peacetime presence of the Marines on Okinawa even further than now planned, but it would preserve or even improve U.S. military responsiveness throughout the Western Pacific region in times of crisis or conflict.

Event Information

By most metrics, the 1991 Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was a huge and rapid success for the United States and its allies. The mission of defeating Iraq's army, which invaded Kuwait the year prior, was done swiftly and decisively. However, the war's impact on soldiers who fought in it was lasting. Over 650,000 American men and women served in the conflict, and many came home with symptoms including insomnia, respiratory disorders, memory issues and others attributed to a variety of exposures – “Gulf War Illness."

On June 16, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings and Georgetown University Medical Center co-hosted a discussion on Desert Storm, its veterans, and how they are faring today. Representative Mike Coffman (R-Col.), the only member of Congress to serve in both Gulf wars, delivered an opening address before joining Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, for a moderated discussion. Joel Kupersmith, former head of the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Veterans Affairs, convened a follow-on panel with Carolyn Clancy, deputy under secretary for health for organizational excellence at the Department of Veterans Affairs; Adrian Atizado, deputy national legislative director at Disabled American Veterans; and James Baraniuk, professor of medicine at Georgetown University Medical Center.

Audio

• Desert Storm after 25 years: Confronting the exposures of modern warfare

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160616_desert_storm_transcript

Last week, CNN ran a back-to-school story on homework with the headline, “Kids Have Three Times Too Much Homework, Study Finds; What’s the Cost?” Homework is an important topic, especially for parents, but unfortunately, CNN’s story misleads rather than informs. The headline suggests American parents should be alarmed because their kids have too much homework. Should they? No, CNN has ignored the best evidence on that question, which suggests the opposite. The story relies on the results of one recent study of homework—a study that is limited in what it can tell us, mostly because of its research design. But CNN even gets its main findings wrong. The study suggests most students have too little homework, not too much.

The study that piqued CNN’s interest was conducted during four months (two in the spring and two in the fall) in Providence, Rhode Island. About 1,200 parents completed a survey about their children’s homework while waiting in 27 pediatricians’ offices. Is the sample representative of all parents in the U.S.? Probably not. Certainly CNN should have been a bit leery of portraying the results of a survey conducted in a single American city—any city—as evidence applying to a broader audience. More importantly, viewers are never told of the study’s significant limitations: that the data come from a survey conducted in only one city—in pediatricians’ offices by a self-selected sample of respondents.

The survey’s sampling design is a huge problem. Because the sample is non-random there is no way of knowing if the results can be extrapolated to a larger population—even to families in Providence itself. Close to a third of respondents chose to complete the survey in Spanish. Enrollment in English Language programs in the Providence district comprises about 22 percent of students. About one-fourth (26 percent) of survey respondents reported having one child in the family. According to the 2010 Census, the proportion of families nationwide with one child is much higher, at 43 percent.^[i] The survey is skewed towards large, Spanish-speaking families. Their experience with homework could be unique, especially if young children in these families are learning English for the first time at school.

The survey was completed by parents who probably had a sick child as they were waiting to see a pediatrician. That’s a stressful setting. The response rate to the survey is not reported, so we don’t know how many parents visiting those offices chose not to fill out the survey. If the typical pediatrician sees 100 unique patients per month, in a four month span the survey may have been offered to more than ten thousand parents in the 27 offices. The survey respondents, then, would be a tiny slice, 10 to 15 percent, of those eligible to respond. We also don’t know the public-private school break out of the respondents, or how many were sending their children to charter schools. It would be interesting to see how many parents willingly send their children to schools with a heavy homework load.

I wish the CNN team responsible for this story had run the data by some of CNN’s political pollsters. Alarm bells surely would have gone off. The hazards of accepting a self-selected, demographically-skewed survey sample as representative of the general population are well known. Modern political polling—and its reliance on random samples—grew from an infamous mishap in 1936. A popular national magazine, the Literary Digest, distributed 10 million post cards for its readers to return as “ballots” indicating who they would vote for in the 1936 race for president. More than two million post cards were returned! A week before the election, the magazine confidently predicted that Alf Landon, the Republican challenger from Kansas, would defeat Franklin Roosevelt, the Democratic incumbent, by a huge margin: 57 percent to 43 percent. In fact, when the real election was held, the opposite occurred: Roosevelt won more than 60% of the popular vote and defeated Landon in a landslide. Pollsters learned that self-selected samples should be viewed warily. The magazine’s readership was disproportionately Republican to begin with, and sometimes disgruntled subjects are more likely to respond to a survey, no matter the topic, than the satisfied.

Here’s a very simple question: In its next poll on the 2016 presidential race, would CNN report the results of a survey of self-selected respondents in 27 pediatricians’ offices in Providence, Rhode Island as representative of national sentiment? Of course not. Then, please, CNN, don’t do so with education topics.

Let’s set aside methodological concerns and turn to CNN’s characterization of the survey’s findings. Did the study really show that most kids have too much homework? No, the headline that “Kids Have Three Times Too Much Homework” is not even an accurate description of the study’s findings. CNN’s on air coverage extended the misinformation. The online video of the coverage is tagged “Study: Your Kids Are Doing Too Much Homework.” The first caption that viewers see is “Study Says Kids Getting Way Too Much Homework.” All of these statements are misleading.

In the published version of the Providence study, the researchers plotted the average amount of time spent on homework by students’ grade.^[ii] They then compared those averages to a “10 minutes per-grade” guideline that serves as an indicator of the “right” amount of homework. I have attempted to replicate the data here in table form (they were originally reported in a line graph) to make that comparison easier.^[iii]

Contrary to CNN’s reporting, the data suggest—based on the ten minute per-grade rule—that most kids in this study have too little homework, not too much. Beginning in fourth grade, the average time spent on homework falls short of the recommended amount—a gap of only four minutes in fourth grade that steadily widens in later grades.

A more accurate headline would have been, “Study Shows Kids in Nine out of 13 Grades Have Too Little Homework.” It appears high school students (grades 9-12) spend only about half the recommended time on homework. Two hours of nightly homework is recommended for 12^th graders. They are, after all, only a year away from college. But according to the Providence survey, their homework load is less than an hour.

So how in the world did CNN come up with the headline “Kids Have Three Times Too Much Homework?” By focusing on grades K-3 and ignoring all other grades. Here’s the reporting:

The study, published Wednesday in The American Journal of Family Therapy, found students in the early elementary school years are getting significantly more homework than is recommended by education leaders, in some cases nearly three times as much homework as is recommended.

The standard, endorsed by the National Education Association and the National Parent-Teacher Association, is the so-called "10-minute rule"— 10 minutes per-grade level per-night. That translates into 10 minutes of homework in the first grade, 20 minutes in the second grade, all the way up to 120 minutes for senior year of high school. The NEA and the National PTA do not endorse homework for kindergarten.

In the study involving questionnaires filled out by more than 1,100 English and Spanish speaking parents of children in kindergarten through grade 12, researchers found children in the first grade had up to three times the homework load recommended by the NEA and the National PTA.

Parents reported first-graders were spending 28 minutes on homework each night versus the recommended 10 minutes. For second-graders, the homework time was nearly 29 minutes, as opposed to the 20 minutes recommended.

And kindergartners, their parents said, spent 25 minutes a night on after-school assignments, according to the study…

CNN focused on the four grades, K-3, in which homework exceeds the ten-minute rule. They ignored more than two-thirds of the grades. Even with this focus, a more accurate headline would have been, “Study Suggests First Graders in Providence, RI Have Three Times Too Much Homework.”

Homework is a controversial topic. People hold differing points of view as to whether there is too much, too little, or just the right amount of homework. That makes it vitally important that the media give accurate information on the empirical dimensions to the debate.  The amount of homework kids should have is subject to debate. But the amount of homework kids actually have is an empirical question. We can debate whether it’s too hot outside, but the actual temperature should be a matter of measurement, not debate. It’s impossible to think of a rational debate that can possibly ensue on the homework issue without knowing the empirical status quo in regards to time. Imagine someone beginning a debate by saying, “I am arguing that kids have too much [substitute “too little” here for the pro-homework side] homework but I must admit that I have no idea how much they currently have.”

Data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) provide the best evidence we have on the amount of homework that kids have. NAEP’s sampling design allows us to make inferences about national trends, and the Long-Term Trend (LTT) NAEP offers data on homework since 1984. The latest LTT NAEP results (2012) indicate that the vast majority of nine-year-olds (83 percent) have less than an hour of homework each night. There has been an apparent uptick in the homework load, however, as 35 percent reported no homework in 1984, and only 22 percent reported no homework in 2012. MET Life also periodically surveys a representative sample of students, parents, and teachers on the homework issue. In the 2007 results, a majority of parents (52 percent) of elementary grade students (grades 3-6 in the MET survey) estimated their children had 30 minutes or less of homework.

The MET Life survey found that parents have an overwhelmingly positive view of the amount of homework their children are assigned. Nine out of ten parents responded that homework offers the opportunity to talk and spend time with their children, and most do not see homework as interfering with family time or as a major source of familial stress. Minority parents, in particular, reported believing homework is beneficial for students’ success at school and in the future.^[iv]

That said, just as there were indeed Alf Landon voters in 1936, there are indeed children for whom homework is a struggle. Some bring home more than they can finish in a reasonable amount of time. A complication for researchers of elementary age children is that the same students who have difficulty completing homework may have other challenges—difficulties with reading, low achievement, and poor grades in school.[v] Parents who question the value of homework often have a host of complaints about their child’s school. It is difficult for researchers to untangle all of these factors and determine, in the instances where there are tensions, whether homework is the real cause. To their credit, the researchers who conducted the Providence study are aware of these constraints and present a number of hypotheses warranting further study with a research design supporting causal inferencing. That’s the value of this research, not CNN’s misleading reporting of the findings.