Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are replacements for many of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) currently being phased out under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Unlike those ozone-depleting substances (ODS), HFCs do not destroy the ozone layer, but they are very powerful greenhouse gases (GHGs) – up to thousands of times more damaging to the climate than carbon dioxide – and their use is currently growing faster than any other category of GHGs. Projections show HFC use increasing as much as 30-fold by 2050, adding up to 0.1°C of global average temperature rise by mid-century, and increasing up to five-fold, to 0.5°C, by 2100. This clearly makes it more difficult to limit the rise in global temperature to the internationally agreed ceiling of 2°C – and thereby avoid dangerous climate change – by the end of the 21st century.

As GHGs, HFCs fall under the purview of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and are explicitly listed under the UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which controls emissions of HFCs and other GHGs. They are not, however, subject to any specific measures under the climate agreements, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Accordingly, the last five years have seen proposals to amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of HFCs.

Such a step would have a number of advantages. Since substitutes already exist for almost all uses of HFCs, the consumption and production phase-out model of the Montreal Protocol is better suited to controlling HFCs than the emissions limits controls of the climate regime; and the individuals and organizations involved in implementing the Montreal Protocol have accumulated substantial experience and expertise in dealing with precisely those industrial sectors in which HFCs are used, including refrigeration and air-conditioning, foams, solvents and aerosols.

This paper, which draws on the discussions at a workshop held at Chatham House in April 2014, outlines the main issues around the question of how best to craft a fair and effective global response to the growth in HFC use. A number of key issues are central to the debate: the principle of equity between developed and developing countries; the availability of alternatives to HFCs; the need for financial support for developing countries; the legal relationship between the climate and ozone regimes; and, underlying all these, the need for political will to resolve these challenges.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade.

The Indonesian government has taken a number of important steps to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade, most notably with the ratification of the Indonesia–EU FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement in 2014. The process of negotiating this agreement has contributed to the introduction of a national timber legality verification system (SVLK), clarification of the relevant legal framework and significantly improved engagement with stakeholders in the forest sector. There have also been important developments in recognizing indigenous peoples’ tenure rights to forest land and resources.

However, implementation and enforcement challenges remain. In particular, progress is hampered by a poorly functioning decentralized governance system, persistent corruption and insufficient transparency of information.

The private sector has responded positively, with growing awareness of the issue of illegal logging. While uptake of voluntary legality verification has recently declined, with the need for this now circumvented by the introduction of the SVLK, the area of forest certified as being managed sustainably increased in 2012.

An analysis of data on timber production and consumption suggests that illegal logging has decreased since 2000, and the findings of the expert perceptions survey tend to confirm this for the period 2010 to 2013. In part, these findings reflect a shift towards plantations and away from natural forest harvesting. However, legal ambiguity over the permitting process for forest conversion may mean that levels of illegality are higher than these data suggest.

Building on the government’s response to illegal logging will require effective implementation of the SVLK including addressing identified shortcomings. Improved land-use planning to support effective control and monitoring of forest conversion is also needed. Increased resources and training for enforcement officials are required, while efforts to tackle corruption in the sector should be stepped up. The government should clarify the rights of indigenous peoples through concrete actions such as developing clear processes for mapping and registering their land claims.

Today Indonesia begins issuing the first ever FLEGT licenses for timber exports bound for the EU market. A major step in the battle against illegal logging and trade in illegal timber, these licenses are issued under a national system to verify the legality of all timber and timber products. A commitment to licensing its timber exports to Europe was made in the country’s Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU, although the licensing system applies to all exports and to the domestic market. The scale of this achievement can not be underestimated given the size of the country and of its forest sector – there are hundreds of thousands of forest enterprises ranging from large-scale concession holders and processing industries, to smallholders and micro-scale loggers, saw-millers and manufacturers.

It is also remarkable given the state of Indonesia’s forest sector at the turn of the century. Looking back to 2000, rule of law was all but absent and corruption was rife - with the allocation of concessions and timber industries closely tied with the country’s ruling elite. Widespread logging contributed to the high rates of deforestation seen at the turn of the century, which stood at over one per cent per year.

In 2016, the forest sector is vastly different – there are much higher levels of accountability and legal compliance, the result of the considerable effort and resources that have been put into enforcement and anti-corruption efforts. The sector is also much more open, reflected both in the significant improvements in the availability of forest data and legislation as well as the increased space that has been made available to civil society to participate both in policy processes and in monitoring of the sector.

These improvements are the result in large part of the reform processes that have been enabled and supported by the VPA process, for which negotiations began in 2007. However, the process is far from complete and the issuance of FLEGT licences is best viewed as a marking point in an ongoing trajectory towards establishing a legal and sustainable sector.

If we take 2000 as the starting point of this trajectory, with FLEGT licensing as the midway point, this brings us to just beyond 2030, the target date for the UN’s global agenda for sustainable development of which the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) are an integral part. The SDGs provide a broader framework for considering what further progress is needed in the coming years both to improve legality and to ensure that the forest sector makes a positive contribution towards achieving widespread sustainable development in Indonesia.

There are a number of factors that risk the achievement of these aims. Key challenges that remain in the country’s forest sector include the high levels of informality in the small-scale sector, corruption, limited transparency and pressure on forests from other sectors (as highlighted in the report 'Illegal Logging and Related Trade. The Response in Indonesia').

As noted, there are hundreds of thousands of forest enterprises in the country, many of which – particularly small-scale businesses – operate informally. Further concerted efforts are needed to ensure that these enterprises are not excluded from the formal market, but are able to contribute to a thriving economy – for example, through continued support for certification, as well as much greater investment in the provision of extension services and further reforms to establish a policy framework that facilitates the growth of small businesses (see 'Improving Legality Among Small-Scale Forest Enterprises'). This will make an important contribution to the achievement of SDG 8, to enable ‘decent work and economic growth’, this including the target [8.3] to encourage the growth of small enterprises.

Both corruption and limited transparency also need to be addressed if widespread legality and sustainability are to be achieved in the forest sector. Transparency has improved greatly in the forest sector, with significant improvements to the availability of information and the establishment of independent monitoring by civil society. However, further progress is needed to improve the accessibility of information, not least to ensure that NGOs are able to fulfil this monitoring role. In relation to corruption, the anti-corruption agency has made good progress, but it remains under threat and needs to be strengthened. Improving governance is a priority under the SDGs, Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) including targets to reduce corruption, develop transparent institutions and ensure public access to information.  

The progress made in these areas also needs to be replicated outside the forest sector. A major threat to Indonesia’s forests comes from conversion to other land-uses, in particular agricultural plantations. Effective land-use planning, including transparent and participatory decision-making, is needed if the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources is to be achieved and deforestation slowed – as set out under SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production) and SDG 15 (life on land).

An important means to drive progress is to ensure close monitoring of progress as well as the evaluation of the measures being adopted. A framework for monitoring the impact of FLEGT licences, as well as the related measures being implemented under the VPA, is under development. This will need to link up to national efforts to monitor progress towards the SDGs – both to contribute towards the monitoring of these goals and to facilitate communication of the progress and lessons being learnt in the forest sector.

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There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

What role does the EU want to play in a world characterised increasingly by power politics? The new European Commission has explicitly stated its ambition for the EU to become a stronger geopolitical actor. Is it capable of becoming a third pole in an enduring US-China stand-off?

From climate change to trade policy and security, the next 5 years may prove decisive in proving the EU can be a strong player both in its neighbourhood and globally. Given what is at stake, what are the Commission’s strategic and policymaking priorities for the next five years? With the discussions on the future EU budget ongoing, what areas will be prioritized when member states come to make decisions between competing objectives? Does the way the EU is perceived externally depend on its member states’ ability to put on a united front when it comes to the most pressing global challenges?

Finally, is this ambitious geopolitical vision deliverable within the EU’s existing structures? If not, are member states ready to give up more control for a stronger Europe at the EU level?

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.

Finance plays a key role in enabling climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is also a contested issue in the UN climate negotiations. The fourth event in the Chatham House COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series will explore the politics of climate finance in the context of the COP, and provide a comprehensive update of the main climate finance-related negotiation items and processes. The topic is particularly timely given that the UK Government has made climate finance one of its top thematic priorities for COP26 and that 2020 constitutes the deadline for developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion per year to support climate action in developing countries.