Soon after assuming power in 1994, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka turned his back on democratic norms and overpowered the Belarusian political elite. However, the influence of the governing elite in Belarus is growing again. It seems likely that the current governing class could rule the country after Lukashenka leaves. It is thus important to study Belarusian elites not only to understand the current regime, but also to better forecast and navigate the political system that will one day replace it. 

This study group aims to disentangle how the Belarusian political system works, outline the types of individuals that make up the Belarusian ruling elite, assess the interaction of the elite and institutions with the West, and suggest changes that Western political actors might make to their approach to the Belarusian ruling class.

The recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to consider grave crimes allegedly perpetrated in its territory has led to the ICC Prosecutor’s preliminary examination identifying a wave of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

There are claims of persecution, forced conscription, deportation, sham trials, enforced disappearances, and property seizure - in Crimea. As well as killings, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and indiscriminate shelling - in Donbas. The court now needs to decide whether to open a full investigation which could lead to charges against specific individuals, as in the trial currently taking place in the Netherlands over MH-17.

However, the ICC does remain a court of last resort as Ukraine retains the principal power to prosecute grave violations perpetrated in its eastern regions and Crimea, with the court only stepping in if Ukraine (or another court with jurisdiction) is either unwilling or unable to do so.

As the evidence mounts up, Ukrainian investigators, prosecutors and judges are becoming more open to cooperation with foreign experts, law firms, human rights NGOs and younger domestic professionals - a significant proportion of whom are women.

Transformation shows determination

This is an unusual shift, given the rigid hierarchical nature of post-Soviet institutions, with elderly males in most of the top positions. The transformation shows the determination to see perpetrators of crimes in Crimea and Donbas tried by the ICC, with joint professional development trainings and joint communications about the alleged crimes.

Ukraine has also been strengthening its institutions. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has been improving quality control of its war crime proceedings, and has taken a strong pro-ICC stance. The Office of the Prosecutor General established a special department to monitor the armed conflict proceedings, and two specialised war crime units have been formed in Donbas.

Although too early to assess progress - given recent prosecution reform and that much-needed legislation on international crimes is still pending – these are promising signs of Ukraine’s intent to take a specialised approach to armed conflict violations. And Ukrainian civil society organisations are also playing a more important role, documenting alleged crimes and sending evidence to the ICC.

Any intervention by the ICC in Ukraine also has a considerable impact on the wider dynamics of addressing international crimes, further extending the court’s reach beyond a focus on Africa which has attracted widespread criticism since it began in 2002.

The ICC has already opened investigations in Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Afghanistan, with preliminary examinations in Colombia, Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Palestine, and The Philippines. But the Ukrainian case would further develop the European subtleties of the court’s jurisprudence.

Although the ICC is currently investigating the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the active phase of that armed conflict lasted for just five days whereas Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine has been ongoing for the six years. The temporal difference in no way diminishes the suffering of victims and the necessity for the proper investigation, prosecution and compensation in the Georgian context.

And yet, going by even the preliminary findings of the ICC prosecutor, the spectrum of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated in Ukraine is much wider. Some incidents, such as the illegal construction of the Crimean Bridge, is an amalgam of the violations against property, cultural heritage and the environment. Cumulatively, the Ukrainian and Georgian cases would substantially contribute to the development of the court’s emerging European lenses.

The Russia-Ukraine armed conflict is also the first instance of armed hostilities of such magnitude and duration in Europe since World War II and the Yugoslav Wars. The ICC’s readiness to take on such geopolitically challenging cases which leave itself open to attack will be tested.

But by examining new contexts - including Ukraine - the ICC would develop a more layered reading of the nature and scope of the crimes it works on. For example, alleged indoctrination and use of children by armed groups in eastern Ukraine is likely to differ from the known practices of abducting and recruiting child soldiers in Africa.

Investigating evidence of Russia’s persecution of pro-Ukrainian activists - forcing them out of Crimea - coupled with the creation of favourable conditions for Russian citizens to relocate to Crimea could lead to proving the existence of a policy of mass colonisation of the peninsula - adding new layers to the court’s jurisprudence on population displacement. And previously under-prosecuted crimes may come to the fore, such as attacks on cultural property or causing the destruction of the environment.

Although the ICC proceedings on Ukraine – along with those being held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) - are unlikely to bring immediate results, Ukraine has developed an international adjudication strategy based on the available viable options and what can be practically delivered.

The simple act of a reputed international court outlining Russia’s alleged violations in Crimea and Donbas and naming those individually responsible would be an impactful achievement in itself, regardless of whether Russia pays any attention or compensation.

And any international judgments or those of domestic courts such as the Dutch MH-17 proceedings and Russia’s response - predicted to be non-compliance - is an important argument for continuing sanctions against Russia over its conduct in Ukraine.

The mutually reinforcing effect of both the Crimea and Donbas proceedings within Ukraine and at international courts should not be underestimated. These investigations into war crimes, terrorism and human rights issues are deeply relevant - not only for the conflict itself, but also for the development of international law.

Part One of this series assesses Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable as a state at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

As the international community looks to the period beyond the UN Copenhagen agreements on climate change, attention is focusing on the finance for implementing global emissions reductions on the ground. The requirement for significantly scaled-up investment into the solutions to climate change is a central issue, often characterized as investment flows into 'low carbon technologies'.

This paper draws on five years of insights from mainstream financiers leading the exponential growth in renewable energy investment, and key issues for policy-makers seeking to foster conditions for even greater investment are identified.

This event is organized by Chatham House and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Keynote speaker:

• Lindene Patton, Climate Product Officer, Zurich Financial Services

Other speaker highlights:

• Alexis Livanos, Northrop Grumman
• Sir David King, University of Oxford
• Barend Van Bergen, KPMG
• Mike Keebaugh,Raytheon
• Peter Stott, UK Met Office
• Trevor Maynard, Lloyd's
• Shree Khare, Risk Management Solutions
• Giovanni Rum, Group on Earth Observations
• Greg Withee, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
• Man Cheung, Marsh Ltd

Lord Tu'ivakano, will deliver a keynote address on the development of the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM), which plans for 50% of the country's energy to come from renewable energy sources by 2020. 

The Kingdom of Tonga is highly susceptible to both climate change as well as changes in global energy prices due to its high dependency on imported oil. The TERM has required both ground-breaking whole-of-sector institutional changes in Tonga as well as innovative coordination across a range of development partners, including the World Bank, ADB and the UN. Key players in the international community have closely watched the development and implementation of the TERM as it presents a complete change in the aid paradigm that is not just specific to Tonga, or the energy sector. 

Registration for this event has now closed.

Following the conclusion of the Paris climate negotiations, this expert roundtable will examine the critical elements of the final agreement and what this means for the future of energy and climate policy in key countries.

The discussion will examine what the agreement means for keeping global average temperatures below two degrees Celsius and assess whether ambition will be ratcheted over time. It will also look at the primary implications of the outcome for key regions and countries such as the EU, United States, China and India. Finally, the session will also consider the next steps in terms of implementing the agreement. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Summary

• Plans for an EU-wide Energy Union are taking shape, following the European Commission’s adoption in February 2015 of a ‘Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’. The strategy underlines the EU’s ambition to attain ‘secure, sustainable, competitive, affordable energy for every European’.
• The initiative seeks to transform energy markets and energy/climate policy across the EU. Its goals include cross-border coordination and integration in energy security, supply, market operations, regulation, energy efficiency, low-carbon development, and research and innovation.
• There is an important foreign policy aspect to the Energy Union, given the imperative of managing security and supply risks in Europe’s neighbourhood and further afield. By addressing structural divisions between member states, the Energy Union could have a marked beneficial effect on the EU’s capacity to conduct a unified and effective foreign policy.
• Development of the Energy Union presents abundant challenges, however. Policy and legislative changes will need to be coordinated across 28 countries. Variations in EU member states’ attitudes to security and energy policy may lead to differences in, or clashes between, priorities. The wider context is also complicated. Interrelated challenges rooted in broader policy issues include the partial transition to low-carbon energy, and concerns over competitiveness relative to other major economies.
• The current EU approach to energy security and infrastructure focuses on natural gas. This ‘gas first’ approach risks crowding out other responses to the energy security challenge. It could result in the creation of ‘stranded assets’, if the future gas demand on which investments are predicated does not match projections. A narrow focus on new gas infrastructure could also impede development of other dimensions of the Energy Union.
• The markets for coal, oil, gas and renewables are changing significantly. The shale oil and gas ‘revolution’ in the United States has altered the economics of hydrocarbon fuels, and the plunge in oil prices since mid-2014 is causing energy businesses in the EU to reassess investment plans.
• The EU is rapidly expanding the use of renewable energy. Dramatically falling prices for renewables will challenge traditional energy utility business models. How the Energy Union enables market access for new business models will be key to determining future energy trajectories.

Summary

• Over the last 30 years the EU has played a central role in addressing the competitiveness, security and climate dimensions of energy policy among its member states. The UK has been critical in driving forward integration of the European energy market, and has been a strong advocate of liberalized energy markets and some climate change mitigation policies.
• If, at the June 2016 referendum, the UK does vote to leave the EU, energy and climate policy will be part of the overall package of issues to be negotiated, as it is unlikely that each sector will be treated separately. The model of relations for energy and climate may well be determined by political and public sentiment on higher-profile issues such as freedom of movement, rather than by what is best for the UK in these policy areas.
• The UK is increasingly reliant on imports, including from and through continental Europe, and its energy market is deeply integrated with that of its European neighbours. As a growing share of the UK’s electricity is exchanged with EU partners, it would be neither possible nor desirable to ‘unplug’ the UK from Europe’s energy networks. A degree of continued adherence to EU market, environmental and governance rules would be inevitable.
• This paper reviews the risks and trade-offs associated with five possible options for a post-exit relationship. Of these, the Norway or the Energy Community models would be the least disruptive, enabling continuity in energy market access, regulatory frameworks and investment; however, both would come at the cost of accepting the vast majority of legislation while relinquishing any say in its creation. The UK would thus have less, rather than more, sovereignty over energy policy.
• The Switzerland, the Canada and the WTO models offer the possibility of greater sovereignty in a number of areas, such as buildings and infrastructure standards as well as state aid. None the less, each would entail higher risks, with greater uncertainty over market access, investment and electricity prices. These models would reduce or even eliminate the UK’s contribution to the EU budget, but would also limit or cut off access to EU funding mechanisms.
• All five Brexit models would undermine the UK’s influence in international energy and climate diplomacy. The UK would no longer play any direct role in shaping the climate and energy policies of its EU neighbours, at a time when the EU’s proposed Energy Union initiatives offer the prospect of a more integrated and effective European energy sector. A decision to leave the EU would make it easier for a future UK government to change direction on climate policy, since only a change in domestic legislation would be required.
• ‘Brexit’ could affect the balance of energy policy among the remaining member states. In its absence, the centre of gravity for EU energy policy might shift away from market mechanisms and result in weaker collective action on greenhouse gas reduction targets.
• In the field of energy and climate change policy, remaining in the EU offers the best balance of policy options for Britain’s national interests: the UK would continue to benefit from the integrated energy market, while maintaining influence over its direction and minimizing uncertainty for crucial investment.

In May 2016, Chatham House published a research paper that assessed the options for the UK’s climate and energy policy in the event of a British vote to leave the EU. It determined that:

• The UK’s energy market is deeply integrated with that of its European neighbours and that it would be neither possible nor desirable to ‘unplug’ the UK from Europe’s energy networks. A degree of continued adherence to EU market regulations, energy efficiency standards of appliances, environmental and governance rules would be inevitable. 
• The EU’s collective negotiation on international climate issues has given the UK greater political weight than any member state has alone.
• The EU’s coordinated approach in engaging with major fossil fuel producers such as Russia and countries in the Middle East has helped support price stability and security of supply, including through infrastructure investment to make existing pipeline systems more efficient and improve storage and capacity.   

In light of the decision to leave, Chatham House is hosting a roundtable to reassess the options for a future UK-EU energy and climate change partnership. The meeting will bring together those experienced on UK and EU policy in both climate change and energy and explore the short and medium-term climate and energy policy considerations. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The US Department of Defense regards climate change as an ‘accelerant of instability and conflict’. A former head of the US Pacific Command described it as the most significant long-term security threat in his region. US federal agencies have recently been mandated to fully consider the impacts of climate change in the development of national security policy. This step-change in the US approach reflects the Pentagon’s conclusion that climate impacts are a ‘threat multiplier’ for security concerns – not just for the future – but which pose ‘an immediate risk to national security’.

A new documentary from the US, The Age of Consequences, explores the links between climate change and security, including in current events in Syria, Egypt, the Sahel and Bangladesh. Our high-level panel will reflect on key sections from the documentary, which will be screened during the event, and explore whether security strategists, militaries and policy-makers in nations other than the US are fully cognisant of the risks posed by a changing climate, and whether they are ready to anticipate and respond to its potentially destabilizing effects.

The panel discussion will be followed by a Q&A.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Chatham House’s recent paper, Woody Biomass for Power and Heat: Impacts on the Global Climate, highlights how the use of wood for electricity generation and heat in modern (non-traditional) technologies has grown rapidly in recent years, and has the potential to continue to do so. EU member states’ national targets for renewable energy generation agreed in 2009 have helped ensure that the EU is now the world’s largest producer and consumer of wood for energy. And although other member states use wood more extensively for heat, the UK is the EU’s largest user for electricity generation, mostly sourced from the US and Canada.

Wood for energy often has a positive image: a natural product of growing forests. The biomass energy industry, which has grown rapidly on the back of government subsidies, likes to contrast it with dirty coal or oil. They point to the government’s sustainability criteria, which notionally guarantee a reduction of at least 60 per cent in greenhouse gas emissions compared to the fossil fuels the biomass replaces.

The problem with this happy picture, however, is that in fact biomass, when burnt, emits more carbon per unit of energy than most fossil fuels. The exact amount varies with the type of biomass and the type and age of the power plant, but figures from the Drax power station, Europe’s largest consumer of wood pellets, show that in 2013 it emitted about 13 per cent more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated from biomass than from coal.

How is this consistent with meeting the government’s requirement for a 60 per cent reduction in emissions? Only by completely ignoring the carbon emitted when the wood is burnt; the sustainability criteria measure only supply-chain emissions from harvesting, processing and transporting the wood. (Direct land-use change – for example, clearance of the forest for agriculture or urban development – also falls outside the criteria, but biomass for energy generally originates from existing forests.)

This treatment of combustion emissions as zero – and thus, the awarding to wood the same kind of financial and regulatory support as other renewables such as solar PV and wind – is justified on the basis that the carbon contained in woody biomass is part of the natural forest cycle. The carbon released during combustion was absorbed by forest growth in the past and will be reabsorbed by forest growth in the future; in contrast, fossil fuels originate outside this cycle and their combustion adds carbon to the atmosphere.

But this argument rests on a basic fallacy. Carbon is carbon, wherever it comes from, and if you burn wood for energy, you increase carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere (by more than if you had used fossil fuels), and thereby contribute to climate change. The fact that the carbon emitted was absorbed by growing trees in the past is simply irrelevant. After all, when it’s harvested you don’t have to burn it; you could use it for construction or furniture or window frames or a host of other uses, fixing the carbon in wood products rather than emitting it to the atmosphere.

Climate impacts

It is true that continued forest growth will absorb carbon in the future, but the process is a long one, taking decades or even centuries if whole trees are harvested and burnt. Replacing large mature trees, with plentiful leaf cover absorbing large volumes of carbon dioxide, with small young ones mean that the rate of carbon uptake will be far lower for years. On top of that, the impact of harvesting itself releases soil carbon into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change.

The impact on the climate of using sawmill or forest residues for energy rather than whole trees is undoubtedly lower, since these tend to be wastes from other industries which harvest trees for their own purposes, and do not imply any additional harvesting. Sawmill wastes which, if left to themselves, would rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere in a matter of months or years, are in many ways the ideal feedstock; it makes sense to use them for energy rather than leave them to decay. However, mill residues are already intensively used and there seems little room for expansion; a survey in the US in 2011 found that over 99 per cent of mill residues were already used, mainly for energy and wood products such as particleboard.

Forest residues are the parts of harvested trees that are left in the forest after log products have been removed, including stumps, tops and small branches, and pieces too short or defective to be used; these can amount to as much as 40–60 per cent of the total tree volume. Their impact on the climate if used for energy varies significantly. While the smallest pieces tend to rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere quite quickly, if left in the forest, they are generally not suitable for use for energy, as they contain too much dirt and ash to be burnt cleanly. Larger pieces are more suitable but take much longer to decay; burning them for energy instead of leaving them in the forest thereby increases carbon concentrations in the atmosphere for years or decades. And on top of that, a portion of the carbon and other substances contained in the residues is transferred to the soil as they decay; their removal from the forest for energy may reduce both soil carbon and the levels of the nutrients trees need to grow, again with negative impacts on the climate.

The biomass industry generally likes to claim that it uses mainly mill and forest residues, though on closer inspection the categories they report often contain whole trees, perhaps classified as ‘unmerchantable’ or similar. (This is not helped by the fact the categories used by Ofgem, for example, to whom UK biomass users have to report, are confusing and potentially overlapping.) Several independent studies, however, have concluded that the use of mill and forest residues is in reality substantially lower; pellet plants in the US – the UK’s main source of supply – in fact source about 75 per cent whole trees.

Setting aside these arguments about feedstock, however, can it be safely assumed that future forest growth allows us to treat biomass as carbon-neutral? If the trees would have grown anyway, even in the absence of the biomass energy industry, it cannot be assumed that their future absorption of carbon cancels out the carbon emitted when wood is burnt. If the rate of carbon absorption in forests remains the same whether or not some of the harvested wood is burnt, then clearly, the best outcome for the climate in the short and probably medium term is not to burn it, but to use it for wood products or leave it to decay slowly in the forest. This is not an academic argument: the current global rate of emissions of greenhouse gases is incompatible with the aims of the Paris Agreement and may risk triggering irreversible tipping points in the Earth’s climate system. We need to reduce carbon emissions now, not in several decades’ or centuries’ time.

The biomass industry likes to point to the expansion of US forests in recent decades to show that forests overall have been absorbing more carbon even while increasing volumes are burnt for energy – sometimes implying that this forest growth has been encouraged by the demand for energy. But in fact US forest expansion started in the 1950s, decades before European subsidies stimulated the expansion of the modern biomass industry. And there is little evidence of recent overall forest growth in the US southeast, the location of almost all the pellet plants supplying European demand. In any case, the point is not whether US (or European) forests are expanding, but whether they would have grown at a different rate if part of their wood had not been burnt for energy. If they would have grown at the same rate, or faster, in the absence of biomass energy use then it cannot be assumed that using wood for biomass is good for forests, or the climate.

Redirecting public money

There is no question that renewable energy policy and forest policy both have a critical role to play in the mitigation of climate change. But governments have limited resources to deploy in their support, which is why the Chatham House paper questions whether it is really a good use of public money to subsidise activities which release stored forest carbon into the atmosphere, thereby increasing carbon emissions and accelerating climate change.

I argue instead that support should be limited to those feedstocks which genuinely reduce carbon emissions over the short term – i.e. mill residues and post-consumer wood waste. This would not only have a positive direct impact on the climate but would also release more resources for genuine zero-carbon technologies, such as solar, wind or tidal – and perhaps also for programmes encouraging afforestation and the more extensive use of wood in buildings and products. Use it, don’t burn it.

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