The European Commission's president said the European Union could boost US liquified natural gas purchases in a deal with Trump.

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President-elect Donald Trump has chosen the next director of the CIA. Trump tapped former Texas congressman and director of national intelligence John Ratcliffe for the job. According to a statement […]

The post 'Warrior for Truth': Trump Has Chosen His Next CIA Director, Crediting Pick for 'Exposing Russian Collusion' Hoax appeared first on The Western Journal.

Total media ad spend in Russia to drop nearly 50%   March 30, 2022 (New York, NY) – Insider Intelligence expects the ongoing war in Ukraine to have a significant […]

Russia–China defence and security relations: Insights from the expert community 13 September 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

Experts share insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations. 

In the defence and security realms, Russia–China relations resemble more pragmatic cooperation based on shared, calculated interests than an alliance.

This event presents and discusses key findings from a recent expert survey conducted by Chatham House with the aim to gather insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations.

Survey responses helped identify areas of bilateral cooperation but also crucial friction points and obstacles that prevent the relationship from developing further, as well as policy pathways for the West.

Russia-China Defence and Security Relations

This project explores the military and security linkages between Russia and China.

The project seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of Russia-China relations in the defence and security realms.

It also seeks to understand Russian political and security perceptions regarding Chinese inroads into what Russia considers its ‘near abroad’, as well as other sources of irritation and tension in the bilateral relationship. It offers recommendations to guide NATO policy responses.

Russia and China in Antarctica: Implications for the Five Eyes 15 December 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 December 2022 Online

This event explores Russia’s and China’s postions on the Antarctic and offers a critical assessment of their actions in the region.

Ever since the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), signed at the height of Cold War, Antarctica has remained a demilitarized continent.

Today, even though the ATS is not in immediate danger of collapse, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are no longer insulated from wider geopolitical tension, with China and Russia posing challenges to regional governance. 
 
This event also discusses key recommendations for the Five Eyes regarding Russian and Chinese current and future efforts at undermining the ATS and Antarctic governance. 

The discussion is informed by Mathieu Boulègue’s paper ‘Russia and China in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: Implications for the Five Eyes’ published by the Sea Power Centre of the Royal Australian Navy.

Islamic radicalisation in Central Asia 18 September 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts analyse rising foreign recruitment, current counter-radicalisation efforts and challenge past Chatham House predictions made of the Central Asia region.

In 2014, Chatham House released a report titled The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalisation in the Central Asian Republics. At that time, a significant, Western-funded counter-radicalisation industry was addressing what was believed to be a major issue of Islamic violent extremism in the region.

Over the past decade, two key developments have occurred. First, Western interest in the region has declined in favour of traditional geopolitical concerns. Second, while violent extremism incidents within Central Asia remain rare, there has been a notable recruitment of Central Asians by foreign groups, with several attacks carried out by Central Asians overseas.

In this event, the original report’s authors, John Heathershaw and David Montgomery, will discuss whether the report’s arguments are still valid and how we might answer these questions today.

This raises several questions:

• What did the report accurately predict, and where did it fall short?
• How can we explain the lack of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) within Central Asia but the presence of Central Asians in VEOs abroad?
• Could repression by Central Asian states both domestically and transnationally have contributed to this issue?
• What, if anything, can the counter-radicalisation industry do today to address this problem more effectively?

Please note that in-person places are limited. Please wait for confirmation before participating. 

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of the Asian Development Bank 25 September 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The speaker will discuss development prospects in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Europe and the UK. He will outline prospects for the region’s growth, the impact of the current US-China trade conflict as well as other challenges faced by the region. He will also discuss the future role of the Asian Development Bank and how it plans to support the further development of the region.

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

Timothy J. Griffin
Apr 1, 2002; 1:323-333
Research

Sean R. Collins
Mar 1, 2007; 6:439-450
Research

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Russia's end games and Putin's dilemmas Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

As warnings from Washington and London intensify, the period of maximum danger in the Ukraine standoff has begun. Even if conflict is avoided, the status quo has gone.

There are several reasons to believe conflict over the Ukraine is imminent. The military build-up is complete. Russia has added tactical support elements, including medical units, to its already large and comprehensive array of troops and equipment deployed to the east, north, and south of Ukraine.

Additional naval units have entered the Black Sea, military exercises with Belarusian forces have begun and, along with those on Russian territory, these can all provide cover for an intervention of some sort.

Far from being comforting, comments by Vladimir Putin and his entourage that it will not be Russia provoking a conflict are ominous. Russian media has ramped up domestic programming about the ‘imminent Ukrainian fascist threat’ to the motherland. And a recent US intelligence briefing alleges sophisticated preparations by Russian intelligence include releasing a video of a staged attack on Russian-speaking civilians in northern Ukraine.

Should Russia attack, its ‘fortress economy’ could weather a new round of sanctions for several years, not least given the growth in Russia’s hard currency reserves to $630 billion, under 20 per cent of which are now held in US dollars, and the high demand for – and global price of – oil and gas.

What does Putin really want?

Diplomacy is in high gear but, as Putin and other senior Russian figures have made clear, the US and European offers of new security confidence-building measures do not address Russia’s two core, stated demands – namely to withdraw US and NATO forces close to its borders in former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, and to end NATO’s ‘open door’ policy to future enlargement.

For the Kremlin, enlargement to Ukraine would remove a critical buffer between Russia and the NATO alliance. If Putin’s objective, therefore, was simply to put down an unambiguous marker that Ukrainian membership of NATO is a red line, he has made progress.

He has reminded the world and Ukraine’s leadership of that country’s strategic vulnerability. US president Joe Biden and his European counterparts have stated NATO will not commit forces to defend Ukraine if it is attacked. And although they remain resolute on the ‘open door’ policy, there have been reminders NATO does not accept new members who risk importing a pre-existing conflict into the alliance.

If another Putin objective was to refocus US and, to a lesser extent, European attention away from China and back onto Russia and its security interests, he has succeeded. NATO has offered some new confidence-building measures around the conduct of military exercises and deployment of forces, while the US may be willing to enter negotiations for a new treaty with Russia to limit nuclear missiles deployed in Europe.

This would mean setting aside the growing threat posed by Chinese missiles that had partly motivated the Donald Trump administration to withdraw unilaterally from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

But there is another scenario to consider – that although these two issues are both important, neither are Putin’s core objective, which instead is to right once and for all the historical ‘wrong’ of Ukraine’s separation from Russia in 1991.

As Putin made clear in a lengthy essay in July 2021, he sees an independent, sovereign Ukraine as a historical aberration, and he blames the US for the deepening discord and animosity between ‘brotherly’ Ukraine and Russia.

Not stated in the essay is that the emergence of a more democratic and functional Ukraine poses an existential threat to Putin’s own control over Russia. In contrast, reincorporating Ukraine into a ‘greater Russia’ would underpin his now constitutionally-mandated opportunity to reign until 2036, as well as being his biggest legacy.

The problem is it seems impossible to bring Ukraine permanently back into Russia’s sphere of influence without some form of new military intervention.

Putin’s options

Putin’s strategy to date has been limited to ensuring the breakaway Ukrainian portions of Donetsk and Lugansk gain a legal right to block any future efforts by the central Ukrainian government to join either the European Union (EU) or NATO.

The Kremlin sees expansive interpretation and implementation of the 2014-15 Minsk protocols allowing self-governance for these areas currently under Russian military control as a potential route to this outcome. But for Volodomyr Zelensky or any future Ukrainian president to accept this would be political suicide, and Kyiv has already resisted French and German pressure to make this concession under the Normandy Format of meetings they share with Russia.

If Putin has now decided to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty more explicitly, he can order a limited military intervention further into these occupied territories – and perhaps areas adjacent to them and Crimea – under the pretext of ‘protecting’ Russian-speaking communities there.

This would be relatively easy to achieve and, combined with a blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, could successfully destabilize the government in Kyiv. But such steps would trigger international economic sanctions and drive Ukraine even further towards the West.

A 21st century ‘blitzkrieg’ to take Ukrainian territory as far as the Dnipro River including Kyiv and all points east, would come closer to achieving Putin’s territorial and historic legacy. And this is now a feasible option given Russia’s military superiority. But how easily Russia could then hold the territory and consolidate its political control would be doubtful, and these moves also bring high-risk, long-term economic and diplomatic costs to Russia and to him personally.

No return to the status quo

On balance, Russian military intervention in the coming days or weeks is still less rather than more likely. Putin may yet accept a new, visible, bilateral accommodation with the US on the future of European security.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

India–Russia relations Explainer LToremark 14 October 2024

Explaining the history and current state of the relationship between India and Russia, its geopolitical significance, the importance of trade and defence cooperation, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What is the history of India’s relationship with Russia? 

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1947, shortly before India gained independence. India was on a quest to achieve economic self-sufficiency, so the then-Soviet Union was an important partner in terms of providing support for the country’s heavy industry, with investment in mining, energy and steel production. India’s economic planning model was also based on the Soviet five-year plan.

There is a high degree of historical affinity towards Russia in India, particularly among the older generation of policy elites. This is because the Soviet Union supported India during the Cold War, notably during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, in which the US and China sided with Pakistan. This was arguably the peak of the Indo–Soviet relationship and also the year that the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

But even before that, the Soviet Union had supported India. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the USSR played a mediating role and hosted the so-called Tashkent summit in 1966 where a peace treaty was signed.

The Soviet Union also used its UN Security Council veto several times in support of India, half a dozen times between 1957 and 1971. This was usually on the issue of Kashmir and once with respect to India’s military intervention in Goa to end Portuguese rule. It was also routine for the Indian prime minister to stop over in Moscow on the way back from Washington.

The relationship has continued into the post-Cold War period. Annual summits have been held since 2000, when a strategic partnership was signed (and subsequently upgraded in 2010). India and Russia have also been holding so-called 2+2 meetings – joint meetings with foreign and defence ministers – since 2021.

India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to the India–Russia relationship as the one constant in global politics over the last half century.

What is the current relationship between India and Russia? 

Russia remains a key strategic partner for India for both practical and ideological reasons. On the practical side, India benefits significantly from access to discounted Russian crude oil, which has increased from less than 2 per cent of India’s total imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to over 40 per cent in June 2024. Indian companies have also benefitted from exporting refined Russian oil products, some of which have found their way onto Western markets.

But energy cooperation is not confined to oil. It also includes cooperation in the nuclear space, where there is a strong historical foundation. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Soviet Union did not shun cooperation with India – unlike the US. Compared to the US, Russia has also been able to better navigate India’s civil nuclear liability law, which was put in place in 2010. In February 2024, India and Russia upgraded an agreement to build six civil nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The other area of practical cooperation is defence. Russia accounts for over 50 per cent of India’s in-service military platforms. India is also the largest recipient of Russian arms exports, including the S400 missile defence system. There has been joint production of several platforms, such as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has been exported to third countries, starting with the Philippines. 

Russia has been a preferred arms supplier for India for many years because it provides arms at reasonable prices without end user constraints, and is often able to supply sensitive technologies, which other countries are not.

There is also a long-standing economic relationship. India and Russia aim to increase bilateral trade from $68 billion to $100 billion by the end of this decade. Connectivity initiatives include the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

There are regular interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin have met 17 times in the last decade and have held annual summits since 2000, with a few exceptions – and a notable gap following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is also a push to try and negotiate bilateral visa free access for Indians to increase people-to-people and tourism exchanges between the two countries.

There is also an ideological component to the relationship, which is often overlooked. One aspect is that India has a long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system – including Russia. There is also the aforementioned historical affinity due to Soviet support for India during the Cold War.

But the relationship is undergoing a managed decline. It does not have the same level of strategic importance as it did during the Cold War.

Although India still depends on Russia for a large proportion of its military hardware, since the 1990s there has been a push to diversify. As part of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is an attempt to strengthen domestic defence production as well as diversify to other countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 76 per cent of India’s arms imports were from Russia, but this has dropped to 36 per cent between 2019 and 2023 according to SIPRI.

While this trend predates the war in Ukraine, it has been accelerated by the war. There has been a delay in the delivery of several defence platforms, most notably the S400 missile defence system, as well as spare parts for fighter jets. The prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine has also undermined Indian confidence in some Russian military hardware.

There is decline on the ideological side too. India is trying to project a world view that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. This puts it out of sync with Russia’s world view, and that of countries like China and Iran. 

India is increasingly aloof or estranged from forums where Russia plays a prominent role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Modi did not attend the July 2024 SCO summit. When India held the presidency of the SCO in 2023 it was a low-profile presidency and there was a virtual summit. In contrast, India’s high-profile G20 presidency in 2023 was framed as the country’s ‘coming out party’.

While Modi and Putin met in July 2024, it was the first time that they had met since September 2022, a significant gap.

What is more, their economic interactions are highly skewed. There is roughly $68 billion in trade between the two countries but $60 billion of that is oil imports. India’s large share of Russian crude imports also means that Russia holds a surplus of Indian rupees, which has caused some friction in terms of rouble-rupee trade.

On the Indian side, there have also been concerns about a number of Indian nationals that have been duped into fighting for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

But although the relationship is not what it once was, Russia will remain a key strategic partner for India for the foreseeable future.

Does India support Russia’s war on Ukraine? 

India has neither condoned nor condemned Russia’s actions. The Indian government has been vocal in expressing its displeasure of the war and Modi has said that now is ‘not an era of war’. He has also expressed sorrow for the bombing of a children’s hospital, hit by Russian airstrikes in July 2024. During his August 2024 visit to Ukraine, Modi said that India’s position is not neutral, but that it stands on the side of peace.

But there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. India in fact maintains quite a neutral position. It has abstained in UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. It did not endorse the joint communique produced at a peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024, which Modi also did not attend. And the G20 leaders’ declaration that was concluded under India’s G20 presidency had no mention of Russian actions in Ukraine.

India has also emerged as the second-biggest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (behind China), helping to fuel Russia’s war machine.

This reflects India’s practical or pragmatic considerations, including its dependence on Russian military hardware and access to discounted Russian crude. But there is also a degree of sympathy in New Delhi for the Russian narrative of the war, that Moscow’s actions were sparked by NATO expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence.

In theory, India is well positioned to play the role of a potential mediator. It maintains close ties with both Moscow and Washington, unlike other countries that have close relations with Russia, such as China, Iran or North Korea. The West has been understanding of India’s strategic constraints in terms of its dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy needs. But so far, India’s actions have been largely driven by self-interest. Despite its statements, it has not made any peace proposals like those of Turkey or China.

Indian symbolism over substance was also clear in Modi’s summer 2024 meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy.

Modi visited Putin in July 2024 – a visit that coincided with Russian airstrikes in Ukraine. Zelenskyy called the meeting a devastating blow to peace efforts. And the optics of Modi hugging Putin while a Ukrainian children’s hospital was bombed prompted a degree of damage control by New Delhi, leading to Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024.

His visit to Ukraine was an attempt to reaffirm India’s position of neutrality on the war and its long-standing position of strategic autonomy. It was also an attempt at a course correction in India’s relationship with Ukraine. Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1993.

How does China impact India–Russia relations? 

China is an important consideration in terms of India’s strategic calculations towards Russia. One of the reasons New Delhi is eager to maintain engagement with Russia is fears that Moscow is becoming increasingly beholden to Beijing following its invasion of Ukraine. India wants to provide Russia with strategic options as it becomes increasingly isolated and wants to deter it from becoming a client state of China. In parts of the West, that is already seen as a foregone conclusion, but Russia is not yet seen as a lost cause in India.

The other point to keep in mind is that China and India largely see eye to eye on the Ukraine war. Neither see their close relationship with Moscow as translating into overt support for Russian actions in Ukraine. Both countries believe they are playing a constructive role through their purchase of discounted Russian crude, which is helping to control global energy prices.

But a key watch point is what would Russia’s position be on possible future hostilities between China and India. Historically, Moscow has played a relatively neutral position and has occasionally offered to play a mediating role. It has even leaned in India’s favour on occasion and has provided it with more advanced military platforms than it has provided China. 

The fear in New Delhi is that this could be shifting and in the future Moscow could side with China in a potential conflict or tensions with India. That would be a game changer for India and would prompt it to rethink its relationship with Russia.

Addressing Russia’s use of forced displacement in Ukraine 7 November 2024 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts consider the role international law could play in responding to Russia’s forcible movement of people during its war against Ukraine.

In the two and a half years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evidence has emerged of Russia’s use of forced deportation and forcible transfer. Russia has also employed arbitrary detention as a tool of war and occupation.

Much attention has been on the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and his children’s commissioner Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. These warrants were issued in relation to the alleged war crimes concerning the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia and the unlawful transfer of thousands of children from occupied areas of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian citizens are being arrested and sent to Russia to serve prison sentences. They are often detained without charge and conviction.

This panel discussion explores:

• What evidence is emerging of Russia using unlawful deportation and transfer of children, and the arbitrary detention of civilians?
• What is the role and significance of international law on these issues?
• What challenges might these practices create for later peace negotiations, as well as the securing of justice?
• What is the process of releasing illegally detained Ukrainians, and Ukrainian children in particular, and reuniting them with their families? How do Russian volunteers inside Russia cooperate with Ukrainian NGOs to facilitate family reunification?

The event includes a screening of part of the documentary After the Rain: Putin’s Stolen Children. 

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Chatham House

Threat assessment and practical solutions.

Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?

Key questions:

• How resilient is Europe to the challenge posed by Russia?
• What more can be done to defend EU candidate states?
• What will be the impact of the US election results?
• What deters Russia? What have we learnt from Russia’s war on Ukraine?
• Are the current approaches sufficient?

This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.

This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.

Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.

Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia? Audio john.pollock 31 October 2024

Orysia Lutsevych, Edward Howell and Yossi Mekelberg discuss North Korean troops fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, as well as the issue of military conscription.

On this episode

North Korea is sending troops to Russia, but what is Kim Jong-Un hoping to get from Vladmir Putin for this military assistance against Ukraine? The panel also discuss the role military conscription plays in Israel, South Korea and Ukraine’s defence.

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation fellow at Chatham House, Orysia Lutsevych, the head of our Ukraine Forum and Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

The regional and international implications of restrictions to online freedom of expression in Asia 25 March 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 March 2021 Online

Panellists discuss the latest developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

In recent years, state-led clampdowns on online freedom of expression have become widespread in several countries across Asia, further intensified by the COVID-19 crisis.

The reasons for this are complex and diverse – drawing upon history, culture and politics, in addition to external influences. Across the region, governments have been accused of silencing online criticism and failing to uphold rights to free speech.

Individuals have been arrested, fined or attacked for the alleged spread of ‘fake news’, raising concern among human rights organizations. In some countries, this has culminated in the imposition of new social media rules, which could require social media companies to censor posts and share decrypted messages.

In China, the government’s restrictive online regime has relied on a combination of legal, technical and manipulation tactics to manage control of the internet, and now includes attempts at censorship beyond its borders.

Panellists will discuss the latest regional developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region, and will consider the broader regional and international implications for technology governance.

This webinar launches the publication Restrictions on online freedom of expression in China: The domestic, regional and international implications of China’s policies and practices.

Battle lines being drawn over online freedoms in Asia Expert comment NCapeling 22 March 2021

Social media giants are increasingly clashing with Asian governments over free expression and censorship as the region lurches towards digital authoritarianism.

Freedom of expression was subject to significant restrictions in Asia even before the pandemic, with several governments having enacted laws that stifle online debate. But since COVID-19, restrictions have increased even further due to a rash of so-called ‘emergency measures’ introduced by governments across the region.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam have all put new laws into place, and many restrictions are already being applied in a draconian fashion, such as in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

As outlined in a new Chatham House research paper, one inspiration behind this trend is China, home to the world’s most sophisticated and restrictive system of internet control. The Chinese government’s restrictive online regime, which has tightened further under COVID-19, relies on a combination of legal regulations, technical controls, and proactive manipulation of online debates.

This model was an inspiration for Vietnam’s cybersecurity law, as well as Myanmar’s new draft cybersecurity bill, proposed by the Military-run State Administration Council in the wake of the military coup last month, which would give the military there extensive powers to access individuals’ data, restrict, or suspend access to the internet.

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model of internet governance is also gaining impetus through China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative, under which the Chinese government is exporting both its technology – such as through the establishment of smart cities, the installation of AI, and surveillance technology – and its vision of how the internet should be governed.

In November 2020, Xi Jinping pledged to further deepen cooperation with ASEAN through the Digital Silk Road, and the pandemic has expanded the appeal of Chinese surveillance technologies and data collection platforms to governments both in Asia and beyond. China’s Health Silk Road, which aims to promote global health cooperation, is centered on the Chinese government’s high-tech model under which civic freedoms are sacrificed in the name of public health.

An alternative model

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model is increasingly at odds with the more ‘human-centric’ model of tech governance favoured by many democratic states, Western social media companies, and international institutions, especially the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU).

Although this emerging model also involves regulation, it is regulation which aims to be inclusive, risk-based, and proportionate – balancing the need for protection against online harms with the need to preserve freedom of expression. It is a multi-stakeholder, rights-based approach which brings together not just governments but also representatives of the private sector, civil society, and academia. The EU’s draft Digital Services Act and the UK’s proposals for an Online Safety Bill are both reflective of this approach.

Western social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter have recently introduced new policies which seek to identify and mitigate online harms, such as hate speech and disinformation. Industry bodies such as the Global Network Initiative, independent oversight bodies such as the Oversight Board established by Facebook, and civil society advocacy and initiatives such as the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation are also an important part of the picture.

Admittedly, these various digital governance initiatives are in some cases embryonic, and are by no means a silver bullet solution to the complex problem of online content moderation, which continues to be hotly debated in democratic societies. But they are at least underpinned by the same philosophy – that international human rights law standards must continue to apply even during emergencies such as COVID-19. With the Biden administration in the US prioritizing tech governance in its policy agenda, there is added momentum to the international leadership behind this model.

A clash of ideology

These conflicting philosophies are playing out in debates on technology governance at the UN, with one group of countries led by China and Russia advocating for greater government control of the internet, and many Western democracies emphasizing the need for an open, global internet that protects human rights.

These differing ideologies are also creating tensions between Western social media companies operating in Asia and the various governments in that region which have increased restrictions on online expression. And the gulf between the two appears to be widening.

In 2017, the Thailand government threatened Facebook with legal action unless it agreed to remove content critical of Thailand’s royal family and, in 2020, Facebook announced it had been ‘forced to block’ such material. Also in 2020, the Vietnam government pressured state-owned telecom companies to throttle internet traffic to Facebook, effectively restricting access to the platform, until Facebook agreed to take down content the government deemed to be anti-state.

Platforms refuse to silence legitimate criticism

However, Silicon Valley’s social media companies have also been pushing back. Facebook restricted the accounts of Myanmar’s military on the basis of ‘spreading misinformation’ in the wake of the military’s imposition of an internet shutdown that blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. And Twitter resisted requests by the Indian government to block accounts involved in protests by farmers.

Twitter stated that while it would block any accounts which it felt incited violence, it would not take action on accounts belonging to news media entities, journalists, activists, and politicians because it believed that would ‘violate the fundamental right to free expression under the Indian law’. The Indian government responded by fast-tracking stringent new social media regulations heavily criticized by rights groups for increasing government power over content on social media platforms, including online news.

So how can social media companies find avenues for operating in Asia and beyond without being co-opted into the lurch towards digital authoritarianism? There are no easy answers here, but collaboration is key. Cooperation between tech companies and local civil society partners can help companies better understand risks to human rights in the country concerned and how they might be mitigated. And tech companies are more effective in alliance with each other than acting on their own, such as the refusal by Facebook, Google, Telegram, and Twitter to hand over data on protestors to the Hong Kong police.

The fact that in many countries in Asia there are no alternatives to Western social media companies – unlike China, where platforms such as WeChat are part of the government’s internet control apparatus – gives the companies concerned some leverage. In February 2020, Facebook, Google, and Twitter together – through the Asia Internet Coalition – threatened to leave Pakistan in response to the government’s draconian proposals to regulate social media. Along with pressure and lawsuits from civil society, this forced the government into retreat, although the tussle over the new rules, introduced in November, continues.

At a time when illiberalism was already on the rise in Asia (including in democracies – Freedom House has just downgraded India’s status from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’), COVID-19 has made tighter state control of online freedom of expression even more attractive to many governments. As it seems increasingly unlikely that restrictions enacted under the guise of pandemic-related emergency measures will be repealed once the COVID-19 crisis ends, it is even more important that tech companies work with civil society on the ground to minimize the censorship of citizen voices.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Expert

Expert

Expert

Expert

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Combatting Human Trafficking: The Situation in East Asia 16 September 2019 — 10:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2019 Taipei, Taiwan

In 2017, there were an estimated 40.3 million victims of modern slavery worldwide. The prevalence for individuals to fall victim to forced labour practices is highest in the Asia-Pacific region where four out of every 1,000 people have been found to be victims of forced labour and labour trafficking. Many of these victims end up in the more developed economies of East Asia as destination countries of labour trafficking. Such cases are, however, often under-reported and under-detected, largely owing to a lack of a coherent response to trafficking across the sub-region.

At this roundtable, organized in partnership with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and the University of Portsmouth, participants will discuss emerging anti-trafficking practices from a regional perspective including legal and policy frameworks and the role of business and recruitment agencies.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Asia-Pacific

Research explores geopolitics, population and migration, technology and its impact, conflict, and promoting sustainable development.

Covering the region from Afghanistan to Australia, the region is a major centre of geostrategic interest, with factories in the Far East and South East Asia exporting manufactured products, while importing energy and raw materials, and half of the world’s maritime trade passing through the Indonesian Straits of Sunda, Lombok and Malacca.

The competition to establish control and supremacy over these trade routes has seen major regional powers such as China, Japan and India try to expand their presence in the south China Sea and the Indian Ocean - in the face of a massive US military presence in the area to contain Chinese expansion.

Territorial disputes also loom large on land. In addition to the dispute between North and South Korea, the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea cause regional tension, as does a growing Australia-Japan defence relationship. 

Key issues covered include China’s influence in the region and globally, the UK and Japan’s relationship in a changing world, and the economic relationship between the EU and China over the coming decade.

Webinar: On the Front Line: The Impact of COVID-19 on Asia's Migrant Workers 21 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 2:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 May 2020

Asia’s army of migrant workers are on the frontline in confronting the health and economic effects of COVID-19. Lacking formal safety nets, health care access, and facing social dislocation, hundreds of millions across the region are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus lockdown. Asian governments have scrambled to come up with an effective health and humanitarian response, exposing public apathy and significant shortcomings in public policy.

Is better regional coordination necessary to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 on migrant labourers? Is the private sector in Asia part of the problem or part of the solution?

In this webinar, the speakers will discuss the likely implications of lasting economic damage on the livelihoods of Asia’s migrant workers, as well as responses and measures to effectively mitigate the impact.

Claudio Macci and Barbara Pacchiarotti
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 21-43.
Abstract, references and article information

Shengyu Tang
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5381-5394.
Abstract, references and article information

Kenta Suzuki of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is awarded the 2025 American Mathematical Society (AMS)-Mathematical Association of America (MAA)-Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Frank and Brennie Morgan Prize for his extraordinary research in the representation theory of $p$-adic groups. His papers, including two solo works, represent significant progress in different areas of the field.

From the citation

Suzuki worked on deep problems in representation theory, and he has authored and coauthored six research papers. In particular, he has made important contributions to the representation theory of $p$-adic groups. His results include asymptotics for the dimension of spaces fixed by a congruence subgroup in an admissible representation of $GL(n).$ His joint works include working out the local Langlands correspondence for several rank two $p$-adic groups, and the determination of canonical bases in the subregular quotient of the affine Hecke algebra and its antispherical module, along with their “coherent” categorifications.

Response of Kenta Suzuki

It is an honor for me to receive the Frank and Brennie Morgan Prize. I thank the Morgan family and the AMS, MAA, and SIAM for their generosity. I thank my mentors throughout the years, Toshihiko Nakazawa, Li Li, Michael Zieve, and Colin Hinde, for kindling my interest in mathematics. Toshihiko Nakazawa patiently explored mathematics with me from a young age and continues to inspire me with his insights. I thank Roman Bezrukavnikov, Wei Zhang, Zhiwei Yun, Ivan Losev, Vasily Krylov, and Calder Morton-Ferguson for further stimulating my interest in mathematics at MIT and introducing me to the many wonders of representation theory. Wei Zhang’s unwavering support has motivated me to explore many areas of mathematics. I leave every conversation with Roman Bezrukavnikov with new ideas, and he has helped me grow as a researcher by encouraging me to pursue even my most ambitious ideas. The mathematical community at MIT and Harvard have been supportive and taught me so much, both mathematical and nonmathematical. Finally, I thank my parents, particularly my mother, for supporting me throughout my journey in every possible way. She has been my role model and is one of the most intelligent and charismatic people I know.

Biographical sketch of Kenta Suzuki

Kenta Suzuki is a fourth-year undergraduate at MIT from Tokyo, Japan, and Plymouth, Michigan. Suzuki’s work focuses on the representation theory of $p$-adic groups and geometric representation theory. Suzuki is particularly interested in applying geometric methods to solve problems of representation theory. In his free time, he runs, reads, and is (slowly) learning how to cook.

About the prize

The AMS-MAA-SIAM Frank and Brennie Morgan Prize for Outstanding Research in Mathematics by an Undergraduate Student is awarded annually to an undergraduate (or students for joint work) for outstanding research in mathematics. The prize recipient's research can include more than one paper, however, the paper or papers to be considered for the prize must be completed while the student is an undergraduate. Publication of research is not required.

Established in 1995, the prize is entirely endowed by a gift from Mrs. Frank (Brennie) Morgan. The current prize amount is $1,200.

The prize will be presented at the 2025 Joint Mathematics Meetings in Seattle.

Learn more about the prize and previous recipients.

Contact: AMS Communications

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