Robert McCann, University of Toronto, will receive the 2025 American Mathematical Society (AMS) - Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Norbert Wiener Prize in Applied Mathematics “in recognition of his groundbreaking contributions to optimal transport theory, and for pioneering deep applications to economics and physics,” according to the citation. McCann holds a Canada Research Chair in Mathematics, Economics, and Physics.

From the citation

Robert McCann has made fundamental contributions to optimal transport theory, reflecting remarkable technical abilities and amazing conceptual creativity. His discovery of displacement convexity and his solution to Monge’s (1746-1818) problem for different transportation costs were early, foundational advances that preceded by nearly 30 years the current enormous attention bestowed on optimal transport theory and its applications. Beyond these, McCann produced many important, unexpected results, linking optimal transport to new areas of application within and outside mathematics: different notions of curvature, new and hidden convexities in the economics of information, and a non-smooth theory of gravity based on the interaction of entropy with the Einstein field equation.

Response of Robert McCann

I am honored and humbled to have my work on optimal transportation and its applications to economics and physics recognized by the AMS-SIAM 2025 Norbert Wiener Prize (endowed by MIT). I think the whole optimal transport community can join me in taking pride in this acknowledgement of the impact and success of our efforts and can view this award as an incentive to further achievements. After singling out my PhD advisor, Elliott Lieb, who first taught me about the mines and the factories, I'd like to thank the many other mentors, collaborators, colleagues, and students – too numerous to name – who shared in my mathematical, physical, and economic adventures (and those who wrote letters to document!). Our interactions inspire and sustain me on my scientific journey; I could not have achieved these results without you, and my life is enriched by your presence. I try to pass it forward by giving as good as I got, and I encourage you to do the same. I also thank my family for their love and support, and their willingness to share me by putting up with my long hours of distraction and frequent travels. I hope this recognition helps to reassure them that their sacrifices are not for nought.

Biographical sketch of Robert McCann

Robert McCann studied engineering and physics before graduating with a degree in mathematics from Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario, and a doctorate from Princeton University. Following a Tamarkin appointment at Brown University and a postdoctoral fellowship at Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques (IHES), he became a professor of mathematics at the University of Toronto, where he now holds a Canada Research Chair in Mathematics, Economics, and Physics. He is an authority on optimal transportation and has played a pioneering role in its rapid development since the 1990s. In particular, the notion of displacement convexity introduced in his 1994 PhD thesis lies behind many of the area's myriad applications. He serves on the editorial board of various journals, and as editor-in-chief of the Canadian Journal of Mathematics since 2007 (with a hiatus from 2017-21). His research has been recognized by awards such as an invitation to lecture at the 2014 International Congress of Mathematicians in Seoul; election to the Royal Society of Canada in 2014; the 2017 Jeffery-Williams Prize of the Canadian Mathematical Society; and the 2023 W.T. and Idalia Reid Prize of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM).

About the prize

The AMS-SIAM Norbert Wiener Prize in Applied Mathematics is awarded every three years for an outstanding contribution to applied mathematics in the highest and broadest sense.The American Mathematical Society (AMS) and the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) award the prize jointly. Recipients must be a member of one of these societies. 

This prize was established in 1967 in honor of Professor Norbert Wiener and was endowed by a fund from the Department of Mathematics of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The endowment was supplemented further by a generous donor. The current award is $5,000.

The 2025 prize will be presented at the 2025 Joint Mathematics Meetings in Seattle.

Learn more about the prize and previous recipients.

Contact: AMS Communications

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The American Mathematical Society is dedicated to advancing research and connecting the diverse global mathematical community through our publications, meetings and conferences, MathSciNet, professional services, advocacy, and awareness programs.

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How is the war in Ukraine affecting perceptions of Russia in Africa? Explainer Video NCapeling 10 June 2022

Aanu Adeoye outlines how the invasion of Ukraine is affecting perceptions of Russia across the Africa region.

He says the voting patterns at the United Nations (UN) shows that the majority of African countries are unhappy about Russia’s actions, but there is not a united voice as there is in the European Union (EU) and North America.

Certain countries are heavily influenced by historical ties with Russia going back to the Soviet era and their own struggles for liberation, while others tend to remain non-aligned whenever possible.

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio,  when you add  Reply- node variable values in the Define Value dialog box, you might notice that two identically labeled data-grid variables are

Synaptic transmission leading to release of neurotransmitters in the nervous system is a fast and highly dynamic process. Previously, protein interaction and phosphorylation have been thought to be the main regulators of synaptic transmission. Here we show that sialylation of N-linked glycosylation is a novel potential modulator of neurotransmitter release mechanisms by investigating depolarization-dependent changes of formerly sialylated N-linked glycopeptides. We suggest that negatively charged sialic acids can be modulated, similarly to phosphorylation, by the action of sialyltransferases and sialidases thereby changing local structure and function of membrane glycoproteins. We characterized site-specific alteration in sialylation on N-linked glycoproteins in isolated rat nerve terminals after brief depolarization using quantitative sialiomics. We identified 1965 formerly sialylated N-linked glycosites in synaptic proteins and found that the abundances of 430 glycosites changed after 5 s depolarization. We observed changes on essential synaptic proteins such as synaptic vesicle proteins, ion channels and transporters, neurotransmitter receptors and cell adhesion molecules. This study is to our knowledge the first to describe ultra-fast site-specific modulation of the sialiome after brief stimulation of a biological system.

Co-fractionation MS (CF-MS) is a technique with potential to characterize endogenous and unmanipulated protein complexes on an unprecedented scale. However this potential has been offset by a lack of guidelines for best-practice CF-MS data collection and analysis. To obtain such guidelines, this study thoroughly evaluates novel and published Saccharomyces cerevisiae CF-MS data sets using very high proteome coverage libraries of yeast gold standard complexes. A new method for identifying gold standard complexes in CF-MS data, Reference Complex Profiling, and the Extending 'Guilt-by-Association' by Degree (EGAD) R package are used for these evaluations, which are verified with concurrent analyses of published human data. By evaluating data collection designs, which involve fractionation of cell lysates, it is found that near-maximum recall of complexes can be achieved with fewer samples than published studies. Distributing sample collection across orthogonal fractionation methods, rather than a single high resolution data set, leads to particularly efficient recall. By evaluating 17 different similarity scoring metrics, which are central to CF-MS data analysis, it is found that two metrics rarely used in past CF-MS studies – Spearman and Kendall correlations – and the recently introduced Co-apex metric frequently maximize recall, whereas a popular metric—Euclidean distance—delivers poor recall. The common practice of integrating external genomic data into CF-MS data analysis is also evaluated, revealing that this practice may improve the precision and recall of known complexes but is generally unsuitable for predicting novel complexes in model organisms. If studying nonmodel organisms using orthologous genomic data, it is found that particular subsets of fractionation profiles (e.g. the lowest abundance quartile) should be excluded to minimize false discovery. These assessments are summarized in a series of universally applicable guidelines for precise, sensitive and efficient CF-MS studies of known complexes, and effective predictions of novel complexes for orthogonal experimental validation.

After ejaculation, mammalian spermatozoa must undergo a process known as capacitation in order to successfully fertilize the oocyte. Several post-translational modifications occur during capacitation, including sialylation, which despite being limited to a few proteins, seems to be essential for proper sperm-oocyte interaction. Regardless of its importance, to date, no single study has ever identified nor quantified which glycoproteins bearing terminal sialic acid (Sia) are altered during capacitation. Here we characterize sialylation during mouse sperm capacitation. Using tandem MS coupled with liquid chromatography (LC–MS/MS), we found 142 nonreductant peptides, with 9 of them showing potential modifications on their sialylated oligosaccharides during capacitation. As such, N-linked sialoglycopeptides from C4b-binding protein, endothelial lipase (EL), serine proteases 39 and 52, testis-expressed protein 101 and zonadhesin were reduced following capacitation. In contrast, mitochondrial aconitate hydratase (aconitase; ACO2), a TCA cycle enzyme, was the only protein to show an increase in Sia content during capacitation. Interestingly, although the loss of Sia within EL (N62) was accompanied by a reduction in its phospholipase A₁ activity, a decrease in the activity of ACO2 (i.e. stereospecific isomerization of citrate to isocitrate) occurred when sialylation increased (N612). The latter was confirmed by N612D recombinant protein tagged with both His and GFP. The replacement of Sia for the negatively charged Aspartic acid in the N612D mutant caused complete loss of aconitase activity compared with the WT. Computer modeling show that N612 sits atop the catalytic site of ACO2. The introduction of Sia causes a large conformational change in the alpha helix, essentially, distorting the active site, leading to complete loss of function. These findings suggest that the switch from oxidative phosphorylation, over to glycolysis that occurs during capacitation may come about through sialylation of ACO2.

As the capability of mass spectrometry-based proteomics has matured, tens of thousands of peptides can be measured simultaneously, which has the benefit of offering a systems view of protein expression. However, a major challenge is that with an increase in throughput, protein quantification estimation from the native measured peptides has become a computational task. A limitation to existing computationally-driven protein quantification methods is that most ignore protein variation, such as alternate splicing of the RNA transcript and post-translational modifications or other possible proteoforms, which will affect a significant fraction of the proteome. The consequence of this assumption is that statistical inference at the protein level, and consequently downstream analyses, such as network and pathway modeling, have only limited power for biomarker discovery. Here, we describe a Bayesian model (BP-Quant) that uses statistically derived peptides signatures to identify peptides that are outside the dominant pattern, or the existence of multiple over-expressed patterns to improve relative protein abundance estimates. It is a research-driven approach that utilizes the objectives of the experiment, defined in the context of a standard statistical hypothesis, to identify a set of peptides exhibiting similar statistical behavior relating to a protein. This approach infers that changes in relative protein abundance can be used as a surrogate for changes in function, without necessarily taking into account the effect of differential post-translational modifications, processing, or splicing in altering protein function. We verify the approach using a dilution study from mouse plasma samples and demonstrate that BP-Quant achieves similar accuracy as the current state-of-the-art methods at proteoform identification with significantly better specificity. BP-Quant is available as a MatLab ® and R packages at https://github.com/PNNL-Comp-Mass-Spec/BP-Quant.

Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West Book sysadmin 17 January 2019

Keir Giles surveys Russia’s history and the present day to explain why its current leadership feels it has no choice but to challenge and attack the West. Recognising and accepting that this will not change in the near future will help the West find a way of dealing with Russia without risking a deeper conflict.

This book is for anyone that cannot understand why Russia and its leaders behave as they do.

The relationship between Russia and the West is once again deep in crisis. A major reason is that Western leaders have too often believed or hoped that Russia sees the world as they do — but things look very different from Moscow. This book shows that efforts at engagement with Russia that do not take this into account are a key reason for repeated disappointment and crisis.

In confronting the West, Russia is implementing strategic and doctrinal approaches that have been consistent for centuries. The roots of current Russian behaviour and demands can be traced not just to the Soviet era, but back into Tsarist foreign and domestic policy, and further to the structure and rules of Russian society. But this also gives the US and the West pointers for how to behave — and how not to — in order to manage the challenge of Russia effectively, based on past experience of both successful and unsuccessful engagement with Moscow.

The book recognizes the reality of confrontation and provides an essential introduction to grasping why Russia sees it as inevitable. Consequently, it offers a basis for building a less crisis-prone relationship with Russia.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Praise for Moscow Rules

About the author

Keir Giles is a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He also works with the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security with a particular focus on the wide range of security challenges coming from Russia.

Purchase

• UK (via Amazon)
• Rest of world (via Brookings Institution Press)
• Students (via Browns Books)

Healthy Diets from Sustainable Production: Indonesia Research paper sysadmin 24 January 2019

Indonesia has an uncommon chance to bypass the negative trajectory of diets in other emerging economies and build a healthy and sustainable food system.

Summary

• Indonesia is approaching a key point on its development pathway. Rapidly declining poverty, a growing and urbanizing middle class with increased purchasing power and consumption patterns, and a diminishing contribution of agriculture to overall GDP are all set to fundamentally reorient much in society.
• Dietary change is at the heart of the public health and environmental challenges now facing Indonesia. Rates of obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as type 2 diabetes are on the increase, while high levels of childhood undernutrition persist. This double burden of malnutrition presents a critical challenge for the future of Indonesian public health.
• At the same time, shifts in diet are placing increased pressure on the environment, threatening biodiversity and species loss and rapidly increasing risks for land-use change, climate change and freshwater use. In Indonesia, these environmental impacts of agriculture are driven both by domestic consumption of food and biofuels, and by a focus on export-led agricultural growth – particularly palm oil, rubber, coffee and cocoa.
• A core political focus on achieving national self-sufficiency in five strategic commodities – soy, rice, maize, sugar and beef – which has led to some price distortion, and the growing influence of modernized retail are potentially at odds with a transition to healthy diets from sustainable production.
• The components to support an ambitious national food strategy already exist, but are either underutilized or misdirected. Indonesia’s national dietary guidelines and examples of successful food-based social services, together with the country’s potential to lead the sustainable production and consumption agenda, both regionally and internationally, and its commitments under both the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change, can all be harnessed to foster improved diets.
• There is a need to align high-level policy strategies across environment, public health and food issues. Mainstreaming the principles of a healthy diet within existing food policy and partnering with food providers and local pioneers to champion these efforts can help to ensure that healthy diets, produced sustainably, become the norm.
• Between now and 2020, when Indonesia embarks on the final five-year tranche of its National Long-Term Development Plan, there is an important window of opportunity to take decisive action that will influence the future trajectory of the population’s health and that of its environment, as well as contribute substantively to the global fight against climate change and biodiversity loss.
• 2019 will, meanwhile, be a critical election year in Indonesia, with both presidential and legislative elections due. Signals from Indonesian media and civil society organizations indicate that poverty reduction and social equity – including affordability of good food and healthcare – will be among the flagship issues for voters.
• The moment is thus ripe for a bold new vision for a sustainable food system that supports healthy diets for all. In choosing to act now, Indonesia could lay the foundations for a more resilient and equitable development pathway that prioritizes improved public health while at the same time safeguarding some of the world’s most important ecosystems for future generations.

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

• After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
• Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
• The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
• Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
• Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
• Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
• Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
• Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
• Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
• Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

• Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

• Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)

Russia and Eurasia

Research on the former Soviet region explores geopolitics of various states, the domestic, foreign and security policy of Russia, and the conflict in Ukraine.

Key projects currently include examining Russia’s military mobilization, Ukraine’s reforms, the foreign policy of smaller states such as Armenia, oligarchy, and broader inter-state relations.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is a globally recognised focal point for analysis on how developments in this region impact on other states and institutions. 

Russia's war on everybody 6 December 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts discuss the methods Moscow has employed to exert influence around the world over recent decades.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine has reminded the world about the threat it faces from Moscow. But that’s not the only war that Russia has been fighting and Ukraine is not the only target.

Long before February 2022, Russia was already engaged in semi-covert campaigns across Europe and around the world, using any means possible to expand its power and influence and leaving a trail of destruction along the way.

In his new book Russia’s War on Everybody, Chatham House associate fellow Keir Giles examines what this longer war means for us all. Instead of talking only to diplomats, politicians and generals, Giles has looked instead at the effect of Russia’s ambition on ordinary people.

Interviewing 40 eyewitnesses from four continents, he has tried to tell the stories the world doesn’t hear about the impact of Russia’s hostility on individuals and societies that may not even realize they are a target.

At this event, Giles introduces the book at Chatham House. He is joined by experts to talk about the human impact of Russia’s campaigns waged through leveraging corruption and cyber offensives respectively.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Russia's war: How will it shape the region's future? 1 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2022 Chatham House and Online

This conference takes a deep-dive into the implications of the war for the wider region.

You will receive an email in advance of the conference with further details on accessing the event.

The video on this page is of the opening session only. To view all the session videos, please visit the conference playlist on YouTube.

How will Russia’s war shape the region’s future?

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine is on such a scale that it will have a seismic effect on all the countries that once formed the Soviet empire. Vladimir Putin’s decisions have accelerated trends across the region leading to unintended consequences.

Now it is more crucial than ever – not only for those concerned with the region’s economic and democratic development, but for all those with a stake in the future security of Europe.

For some states, this will mean a faster break from the legacy of the USSR and from Russia’s ‘Geopathological embrace‘ while, for others, maybe even a fresh start at democracy and good governance.

In isolated cases, the war will conceivably hasten assimilation with Russia. But the two principal combatants, Ukraine and Russia, will diverge even further. Ukraine, though fighting for its survival now, will at least get the opportunity to ‘build back better’ if it achieves some form of victory.

Whatever the course of the war, however, Russia’s aspirations to be a global power again are doomed as it is gradually deglobalized from Western structures.

This conference analyses:

• How Russia’s war will affect the broader regional economy and whether this will hasten Vladimir Putin’s exit
• What to hope for, what to fear and the key trends that will dominate the region going forward.
• Unique expertise in an independent forum on what’s at stake for Europe. 

Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2022

The attitude of Russia’s elite – and wider population – to the states which used to constitute the USSR needs to change in order to solve the Russia challenge.

Although the reverberations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly stretch around the globe, the strongest shocks are – and will continue to be – felt by those countries Moscow used to directly rule.

These countries struggle to shrug off a Soviet legacy as, to varying degrees – linguistically, technologically, culturally, and politically – they bear psychological and physical scars of Russia’s colonial past and its present mentality.

It does not help that these countries lack an appropriate collective descriptor. Over the years there has been ‘Newly Independent States’ – hardly appropriate after 31 years – the now-defunct ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, the ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘Former Soviet Union’ which both reference the past, and simply ‘Eurasia’ which is hardly appropriate for either Ukraine or Turkmenistan.

Some of these former ‘colonies’ are as badly governed and as sinister – albeit not as lethal beyond their borders – as Russia itself. Others, most notably the Baltic states, are modern, liberal, affluent societies, but Moscow’s shadow still looms.

There is a strong mindset in most of Russia’s citizens that, because that it used to rule these other countries, it either still has privileged rights over them or they are not real countries at all – but instead historical aberrations to be extinguished.

What is past is gone

As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, whatever the wrongs of Putin’s ‘history-based’ assertions about the ‘return of historic lands’, all historical claims are bunkum anyway. If the past brings validity, almost no land border on earth would be beyond dispute. It is agreements which count, and Russia signed away the other successor states in 1991.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House has, for the last 31 years, always taken as a starting position that these countries are as sovereign as any other. This of course this means they can choose to be in Russia’s embrace if they wish. But none do because Russia is insufficiently attractive. Some have better relationships with Moscow than others – mainly the more autocratic ones – but no former slave goes back to their master willingly.

At the recent Chatham House conference Russia’s war: How will it shape the region’s future? (note the avoidance of a specific descriptor), the overwhelming consensus was that Russia must lose, that Ukraine must be reconstructed and planning for that must start now, and that the regional economy is convulsing.

But another key view was that, in Russia, rent seeking and buying loyalty are likely to lead to the separation of the Russian people and the regime, especially as the population ages and young men being sent to die at the front. Putin may still be popular in some places in Russia, but not in others – although popularity can rise and fall fast in Russia. However, few at the conference foresaw the disintegration of Russia any time soon.

With continued skill, determination, and more weaponry, Ukraine may well vanquish Russia on the battlefield, and this remains a necessary pre-requisite for European security. But even a Ukraine victory will not erase malign intent.

The Russian imperial itch is so deeply embedded, it must be excised not just from Russian capability but from the intention and mindset of elites and in the popular imagination. That is hard to achieve when so many believe in it as fervently as a religion – even the Russian Orthodox Church invokes a messianism in Russia’s imperial ‘rights’.

The wider region is suffering

Getting Russians to look upon their neighbours as equals requires widescale self-reassessment in a post-Putin Russia. But, for now, the wider region will surely be looking to simply neuter Russia’s destructive capacities.

How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe.

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war?

The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options?

The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions?

Turkey-Russia Relations: A Marriage of Convenience? 26 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2020 Chatham House

Speakers discuss the complex but, so far, durable ties between Putin and Erdogan and the perspectives of each leader. Other issues will include the impact of the Biden presidency and the unfolding situation in Nagorny Karabakh.

This is an online only event

Russia-Turkey relations are governed by a unique dynamic between presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They pursue contrasting objectives in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus and Ukraine; yet they have managed to compartmentalize their differences to avoid any spill-over into diplomatic, military and economic cooperation.

Erdogan purchased the Russian S400 missile defence system at the cost of ejection from the US-led fourth generation F35 stealth fighter programme; and at the risk of sanctions by Washington. Russia is also proceeding with the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant near Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

Ukraine launched a massive drone attack on Moscow overnight, the largest on the Russian capital since the Russian invasion more than two years ago, forcing three airports to divert traffic and causing casualties.

Ukraine's military intelligence has intercepted what it claims are radio communications between North Korean soldiers in Russia, amid media reports of a massive troop buildup ahead of an attack in the Kursk region.

North Korea ratified a defense treaty with Russia, state media reported Tuesday, formally deepening military cooperation that has seen Pyongyang send thousands of troops to help Moscow in its war against Ukraine.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Ukraine continues to have U.S. support against Russian aggression and is free to decide its own foreign policy during a visit to Kyiv Tuesday. 

President Joe Biden will hold a White House meeting with President Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia on Tuesday to celebrate 75 years of U.S.-Indonesian relations and discuss ways to strengthen their countries' cooperation.

A federal judge has blocked a new bill in Louisiana that would require the Bible's Ten Commandments to be displayed in the state's publicly-funded schools.

Billionaire financier John Paulson has declined a likely appointment as U.S Treasury Secretary by President-elect Donald Trump, he announced.

Several states this year sought to replace their funding formulas, a monumental fiscal and political feat, but only a handful of legislatures have been able to get proposals to their governors' desks.

New Hampshire's education commissioner nominee Frank Edelblut, a businessman, Republican and school choice proponent, has been criticized throughout the state for his lack of education experience.

The pilot, which was initially one of the most buzzed about pieces of ESSA, allows states to try out new forms of testing in a handful of districts, with the goal of eventually taking them statewide.

The Lady Vols beat Middle Tennessee 89-75 on Tuesday at Food City Center. Talaysia Cooper led Tennessee with 18 points

Fadel Zeidan
Nov 18, 2015; 35:15307-15325
BehavioralSystemsCognitive

The work, now on view at the Smithsonian American Art Museum, tells the story of two characters on the island—the last people alive in the world

In a letter addressed to the Director-General, the Ambassador of Malaysia to FAO, on behalf of the Chair of the Asia Group, has announced the endorsement of the [...]

Rome - The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Grow Asia, a multi-stakeholder partnership platform that brings together farmers, the private sector, governments, [...]

by Qu Dongyu, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Information Note.

The story within Handels famous piece is what drives its enduring popularity, and it is also what keeps D.C.s Metropolitan Chorus excited for their annual performance. Read more at: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-glorious-history-of-handels-messiah-148168540/