ambition

Darvel’s Allan Mackenzie and Hurlford’s Marc McKenzie united by their Junior Cup ambitions

THEY are both strikers, share the same surname, and are expected to have key roles in the Macron Scottish Junior Cup quarter-finals, but that is where the similarities end for Darvel’s Allan Mackenzie and Hurlford United’s Marc McKenzie.




ambition

Marrying love and ambition, couples and careers

What are the crucial conversations every couple must have for their marriage AND their career to survive? Dual-career couples are now the rule rather than the exception - in Australia 65 per cent of couples with children both work.  Jennifer Petriglieri is a professor of organisational behaviour at INSEAD Business School and she shares her research on the crucial transitions couples must navigate to make sure they not just survive but thrive in love AND work. She covers the contract she and her now-husband signed at the start of their relationship, how to have the difficult conversations around career (often is more about a power struggle), Jennifer's book is Couples That Work. Thanks to our couple Scott and Laura, our anonymous doctor and Kate Bennett Ericksson for their time and honest insights.




ambition

Clippers' NBA title ambitions initiated by last year's trade deadline deals

While Kawhi Leonard and Paul George certainly helped the Clippers' transformation into an NBA title contender, the team's trades from a year ago played a big role too.




ambition

EU Security Ambitions Are Hostage to the Brexit Process

25 June 2019

Professor Richard G Whitman

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
The EU faces a fundamental contradiction in its goals to become more strategically autonomous in defence matters.

2019-06-20-Eurocorps.jpg

Soldiers of a Eurocorps detachment raise the EU flag at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Photo: Getty Images.

Three years ago, as the UK was holding its referendum on Brexit, the EU was rolling out its Global Strategy for a more cohesive and effective security and defence policy. Since then, EU member states have set impressive goals and, as significantly, taken important practical steps to make an EU defence capability a tangible proposition, despite differing collective defence commitments, traditions of neutrality among some member states and very different strategic cultures.

All of these developments have taken place with the UK as reluctant observer. The UK has been traditionally hostile to a deepening of defence collaboration within the EU (and consistent of the view that Europe’s military security was best provided through NATO). But the Brexit referendum vote has placed the UK as a bystander as EU security and defence initiatives have been pursued which have overridden the past red lines of British governments.

There is, however, a Brexit-related paradox in all these developments.

A central goal of the security and defence-related aspects of the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to have the capacity to act independently of the United States and, through indigenous defence industries, the ability to produce the means to make that possible.

With the UK outside the EU, and its opposition absent, it is easier to create a political consensus to push for more defence integration. But without the UK there are diminished collective defence capabilities which would make European strategic autonomy much harder to achieve.  

The May government has been an enthusiast for preserving close security and defence cooperation with the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration both seek to provide for a close EU–UK relationship post-Brexit.

However, the Article 50 negotiations have made clear that the EU’s institutions are hostile to special treatment for the UK beyond that normally accorded to a third country. Disagreements over the terms of the UK’s continuing participation in the Gailleo dual-use satellite system, which has a significant security and defence utility, have signalled that there is a strong lobby in Brussels and some national capitals seeking to significantly circumscribe collaboration with Britain.

The scale and capabilities of the UK’s military, its defence expenditure (notably on defence research and development) and its defence industrial base make any British decoupling from the EU’s security and defence a major issue. Disconnecting the UK from EU developments entirely would be a costly political choice for both sides.

And excluding the UK from new initiatives in defence R&D and new defence procurement arrangements would be suboptimal in delivering a stronger European defence, technological and industrial base. Duplicating existing UK capabilities, especially strategic enablers such as strategic airlift, target acquisition and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, would be an unnecessary squandering of already hard-pressed European defence budgets.

At present the common procurement and defence industry plans driven by the EU Global Strategy are embryonic. And significant defence capability decisions are taking place detached from the EU’s plans, which could reinforce a divide between the UK and other member states.

As illustrative, the formal agreement this week between France, Germany and Spain on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) to develop a next-generation stealth fighter is competing with the UK-supported Tempest project that shares the same objective. The 20-year timescales for the delivery of the FCAS and Tempest projects are a reminder that defence procurement decisions are of multi-decade significance.

As the EU’s ambitions are nascent, it is too early to fully assess what might be the impact of any decision by the EU and the UK to keep each other at an arms-length in security and defence cooperation. With a more detached relationship, the UK will have significant concerns if it sees the EU’s common procurement arrangements develop in a manner that actively discriminates against the UK defence industry.

Outside of procurement and defence issues there may be other areas of future concern for the UK – for example, the extent to which the EU might deepen and broaden cooperation with NATO in a manner that makes the collective influence of EU member states within NATO more apparent, or to which the footprint of future EU conflict and security activities in third countries starts to overshadow the activities of the UK.

As the UK has been grappling with Brexit domestically, the EU has been evolving its security and defence policy ambitions. These are developments that will impact on the UK and in which, therefore, it has a stake but as a departing member state it has a weakening ability to shape.

Any aspect of future EU–UK cooperation is hostage to the vagaries of how the Brexit endgame concludes.




ambition

Unfulfilled Ambitions: the State of Democracy in Africa




ambition

The Challenge of Ambition? Unlocking Climate Action and the Outcomes of COP24




ambition

The Climate Briefing: Episode 2 - European Climate Ambitions




ambition

COP26 Diplomatic Briefing: Climate Ambition in Europe and its Potential Global Impact

17 February 2020 - 8:30am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Jacob Werksman, Principal Adviser to Directorate General for Climate Action, European Commission
Imke Lübbeke, Head of EU Climate and Energy Policy, WWF European Policy Office 
Simon Petrie, Head of International Climate Strategy - Europe, UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Jen Austin, Policy Director, We Mean Business Coalition
Chair: Jill Duggan, Associate Fellow, Chatham House

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has declared that she wants Europe to become ‘the first climate-neutral continent by 2050’, and in December 2019, the Commission presented the European Green Deal in order to achieve this objective. However, even though greenhouse gas emissions from the EU have fallen by more than 20 per cent since 1990, the Union remains the third largest emitter in the world, after the United States and China.

What are the opportunities and challenges for raising climate ambition in Europe?  Will the EU increase its Nationally Determined Contribution and what impact might this have globally? How might Brexit affect climate action in the EU and the UK?  The second event in the Chatham House COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series will address these critical questions.

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ambition

CBD News: Message from the Executive Secretary: "The shift of ambition towards 1.5 degrees will make a big difference, particularly for the most vulnerable ecosystems such as coral reefs and polar ecosystems."




ambition

China Expands Its Global Governance Ambitions in the Arctic

15 October 2018

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme
Beijing wants to present itself as a responsible power with a role to play in Arctic governance, as part of a broader ambition to become a shaper of global rules and institutions.

2018-10-15-Xuelong.jpg

The Xuelong 2 icebreaker is christened in Shanghai on 10 September. Photo via Getty Images.

As polar ice melts, the Arctic will become increasingly important for its untapped oil, gas and minerals as they become more accessible, as well for its shipping routes, which will become increasingly cost efficient for cargo as parts of the routes become ice-free for extended periods. 

A number of countries, including Russia and China, are also exploring the possibilities around overflights, commercial fishing, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and scientific research.

Earlier this month, China announced the launch of its first domestically built conventionally-powered polar icebreakerXuelong 2, or Snow Dragon 2. Like its (foreign-built) predecessor,Snow Dragon, this vessel’s purpose is framed as scientific research into polar ice coverage, environmental conditions, and biological resources. 

It has not gone unnoticed, though, that China’s new icebreakers are also useful in testing the feasibility of moving cargo across the Arctic. China’s plans for a Polar Silk Road, as part of its ambitious multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, include developing Arctic shipping routes. China recently invested in Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas project in the northern port of Sabetta and signed a framework agreement for Chinese and Russian banks to co-finance up to 70 joint projects in the Arctic region.

But China’s interest in the Arctic extends beyond the purely economic: it is also pressing for a greater role in its governance. Compared to the Antarctic – where governance is heavily institutionalized, governance of the Arctic is much less developed, largely due to their distinctly different natures. 

The Antarctic, which is predominantly landmass, is governed by a treaty with 53 states parties, freezing territorial claims and preserving this region for peaceful scientific purposes. By contrast, the Arctic Council was only established in 1996 and comprises the eight Arctic states that claim sovereignty over the landmass in the Arctic Circle, a region which consists largely of frozen ocean and which hosts indigenous populations. 

The legal framework is a patchwork affair, drawn from various treaties of global application (including the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), the Svalbard Treaty(recognizing Norway’s sovereignty over the eponymous Arctic archipelago), as well as customary international law and general principles of law. So far, the Arctic Council has been the forum for the conclusion of only three legally binding agreements.

China sees a gap for new ideas, rules and participants in this space. A white paper released by the government in January contains sophisticated and detailed analysis of the international legal framework applicable to the Arctic and demonstrates China’s increasing knowledge and capability in this area, as reflected in the growing number of Chinese international lawyers specializing in Arctic matters. 

The white paper seeks to justify China’s involvement in Arctic affairs as a ‘near Arctic state’, noting that the Arctic’s climate, environment and ecology are of concern for all states. The white paper uses familiar phrases from China’s vision for its foreign policy – such as the ‘shared future of mankind’ and ‘mutual benefit’ – to argue for a pluralist (i.e. global, regional and bilateral) approach to Arctic governance. 

China is sensitive to the risks of overreaching when it comes to states with territorial claims in the Arctic, especially as resource competition hots up. The white paper positions China as a responsible and peaceful power, whose participation in Arctic affairs is based on ‘respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability’.

China was admitted as an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013, along with four other Asian states (including Japan, which is taking an equally keen interest in opportunities for Arctic rule-making) and Italy. As an observer state, China has very limited rights in the council, but has been creatively using other routes to influence Arctic governance, including active engagement within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Seabed Commission. 

China participated in the formation of the IMO’s Polar Code of January 2017, which sets out rules for ships operating in polar waters. China was also one of ten states involved in the recent adoption of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, which took place outside the umbrella of the Arctic Council. 

At a recent roundtable in Beijing co-hosted by Chatham House, Chinese experts noted China’s aspirations to develop the international rule of law in the Arctic through playing an active role in developing new rules in areas currently under (or un-) regulated, for example, through a treaty to strengthen environmental protection in the region. It was also suggested that China may also seek to clarify the meaning of existing rules through its own practice. 

China also has ambitions to contribute to the research of the Arctic Council’s Working Groups, which develop proposals for Arctic Council projects and rules. It remains to be seen to what extent Arctic states, protective of theirown national interests in an increasingly fertile area, will cede space for China to participate.

China’s push to be a rule shaper in the Arctic fits into a wider pattern of China seeking a more influential role in matters of global governance. This trend is particularly apparent in areas where the rules are still emerging and thus where China feels more confident than in areas traditionally dominated by Western powers.

A similar assertiveness by China is increasingly visible in other emerging areas of international law, such as the international legal framework applicable to cyber operations and international dispute settlement mechanisms relating to trade and investment.

China’s approach to Arctic governance offers an interesting litmus test as to how far China intends to deploy international law to assert itself on governance issues with significant global economic, environmental, and security implications – along with the degree to which it will be perceived as acting in the common interest in doing so.




ambition

Climate Change: Raising Ambition, Delivering Results

Conference

3 November 2014 - 9:30am to 4 November 2014 - 1:15pm

Chatham House, London

Overview

Agenda

Speakers

Pricing

Media partners

Sponsors

Audience profile

Venue and accommodation

Press registration

Climate change is climbing the political agenda. Extreme weather has raised questions in public discourse about the role of anthropogenic warming and concerns about its future impacts; slowdowns in emerging economies and sluggish recoveries in the developed world mean debates about the impact of climate policies on energy bills and competitiveness have assumed particular significance. Against this background, governments are gearing up for a crucial series of agreements in 2015 with climate change at their core. The international community must agree new global sustainable development goals, a new framework on disaster risk reduction and, at the 21st UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP 21) in Paris, a new global deal on climate change. 

The 18th Annual Chatham House Conference on Climate Change will take stock of developments in 2014, including the latest science, the findings of high-level commissions, initiatives from the business community and the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Summit at the end of September. Looking forward to COP 20 in Lima and beyond, this conference will examine opportunities to raise ambition and convert this into results.

In particular, it will:

  • Review the latest science on climate risk and the implications for business, society and politics 
     
  • Examine the benefits of a low carbon economy, and assess the costs of climate action and where they fall 
     
  • Discuss concrete measures to decarbonize key sectors and the barriers to action
     
  • Identify the critical path to the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in 2015, and look at whether, and how, support for ambitious action can be built among publics, business and politicians


The Chatham House Rule
To enable as open a debate as possible, this conference will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Twitter
Suggested hashtag: #CHclimate

DAY ONE
Monday 3 November

Session One
Taking Stock and Mapping the Road Ahead
09:30-11:15

  • What was achieved at the UN Secretary General’s High Level Summit in September? 
  • What is the outlook for COP 20 in Lima, and how can ambition be increased?
  • How will success at COP 21 in Paris be defined?

Chair
Rob Bailey, Acting Research Director, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

Keynote Address
Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, Minister of State for the Environment, Peru; President, COP 20, UN Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (on the record)

Amber Rudd MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom (on the record)

Questions and Discussion

Chair
Jennifer Morgan, Director, Climate and Energy Programme, World Resources Institute (WRI) 

Speakers

Selwin Hart, Director, Secretary-General's Climate Change Support Team, United Nations

Dr Halldór Thorgeirsson, Director for Strategy, UN Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Leena Srivastava, Executive Director, The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI) 

Paul Watkinson, Head of Climate Negotiation Team, Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, France

Questions and Discussion

11:15-11:45 Refreshments

Session Two
Low Carbon Economy: Costs and Benefits
11:45-13:00 

  • What are the economic and social opportunities and benefits of a low carbon economy? Where do these occur? How much are they worth?
  • What are examples of leadership among governments and business? What is needed to accelerate the transition and translate ambition into results?
  • What has been the impact of climate policies on economic competitiveness? Which economies and sectors have been most affected? How has this influenced national and international climate politics?
Chair's Opening Remarks
Marianne Fay, Chief Economist, Climate Change Group, The World Bank
Keynote Panel Discussion

Jeremy Oppenheim, Programme Director, New Climate Economy, Global Commission on the Economy and Climate 

Jos Delbeke, Director General for Climate Action, European Commission 

Dr Qi Ye, Director, Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy; Professor of Environmental Policy and Management at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management

Jeremy Bentham, Vice President, Global Business Environment, Shell

Questions and Discussion

13:00-14:00 Lunch

Session Three
Concrete Steps to Action: Finance and Achieving Net Zero 

There is growing interest in the concept of net zero carbon emissions, for businesses, sectors and even countries. This session will examine the feasibility of net zero for the power and transport sectors, and for buildings and cities.

Chair
Shane Tomlinson, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

Opening Discussion
Manfred Konukiewitz, Co-Chair, the Green Climate Fund 

Matthew Kotchen, Professor of Economics, Yale University 

Farhana Yamin, Associate Fellow, Chatham House

Power and Transport
14:45-15:45

  • What do decarbonization roadmaps for the power and transport sectors look like? Is net zero feasible? If so, by when and how? What are the challenges posed by increasing renewable penetration, and how can they be managed? What are the implications of vehicle electrification for the power sector?
  • What are the implications for infrastructure and investment?

Chair
Shane Tomlinson, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

Speakers
Abyd Karmali, Managing Director, Climate Finance, Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Dries Acke, Policy Manager, European Climate Foundation (Belgium) 

Olivier Paturet, General Manager,  Zero Emissions Strategy, Nissan Europe

Stefan Raubenheimer, Co-Founder and Director, South South North;  Co-Director, MAPS Programme 

Questions and Discussion

15:45-16:15 Refreshments

Buildings and Cities
16:15-17:15

  • What is the state of the art for low carbon building; how can this be rolled out at scale? 
  • How can decarbonization objectives be incorporated into urban planning and regulation?
  • How are the challenges and needs different for developed and developing countries? 

Chair
Farhana Yamin, Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

Speakers
Ed Mazria, Founder and CEO, Architecture 2030

Tony Mallows, Director, Masdar City 

Questions and Discussion

17:15 Close of day and drinks reception

DAY TWO
Tuesday 4 November

Session Four 
Climate Impacts
9:30-11:15 

Chair
Sir David King, Foreign Secretary's Special Representative for Climate Change, United Kingdom

Keynote Addresses
HE Belete Tafere, Minister, Ministry of Environment Protection and Forestry, Ethiopia (on the record)

Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Founding Director, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (on the record)

  • What climate impacts are already being witnessed? Are these in line with expectations? What is the current state of attribution analysis?
  • What are the implications for climate politics?
  • What are the expected social, economic and environmental impacts under different climate scenarios? What is the most recent science since the deadline for Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report?  
  • Which countries and sectors are most vulnerable? What are governments and businesses doing to adapt?


Chair
Sir David King, Foreign Secretary's Special Representative for Climate Change, United Kingdom

Speakers
Chris Field, Founding Director, Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution of Science, Co-Chair of Working Group II of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report 

Professor Myles Allen, Leader of ECI Climate Research Programme and Professor of Geosystem Science, University of Oxford 

Nick Mabey, Director, E3G 

Oilver Bettis, Chair, Resource and Environment Board, Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

Questions and Discussion

11:15 - 11.45 Refreshments

Session Five
The Conditions for Action
11:45 - 13:00

  • What is the current state of public support for climate action? What shapes attitudes and beliefs? How does this vary by country? 
  • What can create political ambition, nationally and internationally?
  • What role can different stakeholders play in catalysing climate action?
  • What immediate obstacles need to be overcome and what lessons can be learned from recent success? 
Chair
Simon Maxwell, Executive Chair, Climate Development Knowledge Network
Keynote Address
Bill McKibben, President and Co-Founder, 350.org (on the record)

Panel Discussion
Antonio Hill, Executive Director, Global Campaign for Climate Action

Michael Jacobs, Senior Adviser on International Climate Policy, The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations  

Jennifer Morgan, Director, Climate and Energy Programme, World Resources Institute (WRI) 

Sergio Margulis, National Secretary of Sustainable Development, Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of Brazil 

Sir David King, Foreign Secretary's Special Representative for Climate Change, United Kingdom

Questions and Discussion

Closing remarks
Rob Bailey, Acting Research Director, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

1
3:10 End of conference and lunch

 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2014

Keynote Speakers

Speakers

Dries Acke

Policy Manager, European Climate Foundation (Belgium)

Myles Allen

Coordinating Lead Author, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C; Professor of Geosystem Science, University of Oxford

Oliver Bettis

Chair, Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' Resource and Environment Board

Marianne Fay

Chief Economist, Climate Change Group, The World Bank

Chris Field

Founding Director, Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution of Science

Selwin Hart

Director, Secretary-General's Climate Change Support Team, United Nations

Antonio Hill

Executive Director, Global Campaign for Climate Action

Michael Hogan

Senior Adviser, Regulatory Assistance Project

Professor Michael Jacobs

Senior Adviser on International Climate Policy, The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations

Abyd Karmali

Managing Director, Climate Finance, Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Sir David King

Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative for Climate Change

Manfred Konukiewitz

Co-Chair, The Green Climate Fund

Matthew Kotchen

Professor of Economics, Yale University

Nick Mabey

Co-Founding Director and Chief Executive, E3G

Antony Mallows

Director, Masdar City

Sergio Margulis

National Secretary of Sustainable Development, Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency, Brazil

Simon Maxwell

Executive Chairman, Climate and Development Knowledge Network

Edward Mazria

Founder and CEO, Architecture 2030

Jennifer Morgan

Executive Director, Greenpeace International

Olivier Paturet

General Manager, Zero Emissions Strategy, Nissan Europe

Stefan Raubenheimer

Co-Founder and Director, South South North; Co-Director, MAPS Programme

Jose-Manuel Sanoval

Coordinator, Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy (CLCDS) and Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS)

Leena Srivastava

Hony. Executive Director (Operations), The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI)

Halldór Thorgeirsson

Director for Strategy, UN Framework for the Convention on Climate Change

Paul Watkinson

Head of Climate Negotiation Team, Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, France

Farhana Yamin

Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

[node:event_chair]

Pricing

For any questions about rates, please call +44 (0)20 7314 2782.

                      FULL RATE
EXCL. VATINCL. VAT
Major corporate member rates
All organizations£595£714 
Corporate member rates
Commercial organizations£1,295£1,554
Government departments£775£930
NGOs and academics£495£594
Standard rates
Commercial organizations£1,445£1,734 
Government departments£845£1,014
NGOs and academics£550£660

This conference will offer a unique opportunity to network with senior officials from businesses, government, NGO's and academic institutions.

Our previous Climate Change conferences saw delegates from companies and institutions such as:

Accenture
AEA Energy & Environment
Agulhas
ArcelorMittal
Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA)
Atkins Ltd
Bank of America Merrill Lynch
BASF plc
Bayerngas Norge AS
Beetle Capital
BG Group plc
BHP Billiton
BIRA-IASB
BirdLife
Booz & Co
BP plc
British Council
BT Group plc
CAFOD
Cairn Energy plc
Cambridge Centre for Energy Studies
Cambridge Programme for Sustainable Leadership
Carbon Capture and Storage Association
Carbon Leapfrog
Carbon Trust
Caritas Internationalis
Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD)
CH2M Hill
Chevron Ltd
Chubu Electric Power Co Inc
City of London
ClientEarth
Clifford Chance LLP
Climate & Development Knowledge Network (CDKN)
Climate Action Network (CAN)
Climate and Health Council
Climate Secure
Coalition for an International Court for the Environment (ICE Coalition)
Compassion in World Farming (CIWF)
Conocophillips (UK) Ltd
Control Risks
Co-operative Group
Cranfield University
Deloitte Consulting LLP
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS)
Department for International Development (DFID)
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
Ecofys UK Ltd
Ecologic Institute
EDF Energy
Energy Charter Secretariat
Energy Technologies Institute
Eni S.p.A
Environment Agency
Environmental Law Foundation (ELF)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Environmental Resources Management (ERM)
ENWORKS
Ernst & Young
Ethical Investment Research Services Ltd (EIRIS)
European Bank For Reconstruction & Development
European Commission (Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry)
European Parliament
ExxonMobil International Ltd
Fauna & Flora International
FIA Foundation for the Automobile and Society
Finnish Forest Association
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Forestry Commission
Friends of the Earth
Genesis Investment Management LLP
GLG Partners LP
Global CCS Institute
Global Humanitarian Forum
Global Sustainability Institute
Global Witness
Globeleq Ltd
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, LSE
Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce
Greenpeace International
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP
HM Treasury
Imperial College London
INPEX Corporation
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC)
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
International Council on Mining and Metals
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
Joseph Rowntree Foundation
JPMorgan
King's College London
KPMG
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
London Assembly
London Metropolitan University
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Maersk Group
Massey University
McKinsey & Company
Met Office
METREX
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, France
Ministry of Defence (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Mitsubishi Corporation
National Farmers' Union
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy
Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO)
NEXUS Singapore
Nordic Council
Office of National Assessments
Ogilvy
Open Society Foundation
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Oxford University
Plan UK
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Privy Council Office
Progressio
Quaker Peace and Social Witness
Québec Government Office
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)
Renewable Energy Systems Ltd (RES)
Rolls-Royce International Ltd
RWE Power AG
Save the Children UK
SCA, Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
Shell
Standard Chartered Bank plc
Statoil (UK) Ltd
SustainAbility Ltd
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Task Consult
Texas A&M University
The 40 Foundation
The Climate Group
The Gold Standard Foundation
The Norwegian Institute for Nature Research
The Open University
The Prince of Wales Corporate Leader Group
The Royal Society
The Saudi Fund For Development
Tokyo Electric Power Company
Total Holdings UK Ltd
UK Chamber of Shipping
UK Collaborative on Development Sciences (UKCDS)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
University College London (UCL)
University of Cambridge
University of East Anglia (School of Environmental Sciences)
University of Edinburgh
University of Oxford (Department of Politics and International Relations)
US Department of State
USAID
Warwick Business School
WaterAid
World Coal Association
World Coal Institute
World Economic Forum
World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA)
World Vision UK
WWF-UK
Xynteo Ltd
Yorkshire Forward

Venue

Chatham House
10 St James's Square
London
SW1Y 4LE
UK

conferences@chathamhouse.org

Telephone: +44 (0)20 7957 5729
Fax: +44 (0)20 7957 5710

If you wish to book the venue for your event please phone +44 (0)20 7314 2764


Directions

The nearest tube station is Piccadilly Circus which is on the Piccadilly and the Bakerloo Underground lines. From Piccadilly follow Regent Street southwards towards Pall Mall and take the first road on the right called Jermyn Street. Duke of York Street is the second road on the left and leads to St James's Square. Chatham House is immediately on your right.

Map

Accommodation

Although we cannot book accommodation for delegates, we have arranged a reduced rate at some nearby hotels, where you can book your own accommodation. Please inform the hotel that you will be attending a conference at Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) to qualify for the Institute's reduced rate.

Please note all rates are subject to availability.

Flemings Mayfair
Half Moon Street
Mayfair
London W1J 7BH
Tel: + 44 (0)20 7499 2964
Fax: + 44 (0)20 7499 1817
Standard Single from £199 + VAT

The Cavendish London
81 Jermyn Street
London
SW1Y 6JF
Tel: + 44 (0)20 7930 2111
Fax: + 44 (0)20 7839 2125
Standard Single £205 + VAT

To book The Cavendish online

The Stafford London by Kempinski
St James's Place
London
SW1A 1NJ
Tel: 020 7518 1125
Fax: 020 7493 7121
Standard Single £230 +VAT

This conference will be held under the Chatham House Rule. Information for journalists
Press can request a press pass.


Chatham House Conferences

+44 (0)20 7957 5729




ambition

COP26 Diplomatic Briefing: Climate Ambition in Europe and its Potential Global Impact

17 February 2020 - 8:30am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Jacob Werksman, Principal Adviser to Directorate General for Climate Action, European Commission
Imke Lübbeke, Head of EU Climate and Energy Policy, WWF European Policy Office 
Simon Petrie, Head of International Climate Strategy - Europe, UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Jen Austin, Policy Director, We Mean Business Coalition
Chair: Jill Duggan, Associate Fellow, Chatham House

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has declared that she wants Europe to become ‘the first climate-neutral continent by 2050’, and in December 2019, the Commission presented the European Green Deal in order to achieve this objective. However, even though greenhouse gas emissions from the EU have fallen by more than 20 per cent since 1990, the Union remains the third largest emitter in the world, after the United States and China.

What are the opportunities and challenges for raising climate ambition in Europe?  Will the EU increase its Nationally Determined Contribution and what impact might this have globally? How might Brexit affect climate action in the EU and the UK?  The second event in the Chatham House COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series will address these critical questions.

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ambition

Chad: Between Ambition and Fragility

Ahead of Chad’s presidential election on 10 April popular discontent is rising amid a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks. The regime that portrays itself as spearheading the fight against regional jihadism could see all sorts of violent actors gain influence at home if it pursues exclusionary politics and denies its people a viable social contract.




ambition

Nordic Council: keep ambition high on post-2020 chemicals framework

'Necessary' for sustainable recovery after Covid-19 pandemic




ambition

Mobility expertise boosts Braunschweig's ambitions

Despite nurturing its R&D capacity, the city of Braunschweig lags its German peers in attracting FDI. Now it hopes a focus on the mobility sector will mean its technical skills are matched with investment.




ambition

Endesa Chile outlines Latin American hydropower ambitions

Endesa Chile has unveiled a plan to develop 36 projects, amounting to 6300 MW of power in Brazil, Chile, Peru and Colombia. The board of directors are looking at hydroelectric power in particular for the bulk of the new capacity.




ambition

The Dark Horse in the Global Solar Race: India’s 100-GW Solar Ambition

A "dark horse" is defined as a little-known entity that emerges to prominence in the face of competition — a contestant that seems unlikely to succeed. I borrow the term from a conversation last week, wherein India was referred to as the dark horse in the global race to go solar.




ambition

Manyama holds the keys to Kaizer Chiefs' PSL title ambitions - Matsi

The Amakhosi forward continues to receive rave reviews with his former Cape Town City teammate joining in the praises ......





ambition

London tops global ambition league with Crossrail – Chairman

Roman skulls and ancient burial grounds – some of the history unearthed by Europe’s largest infrastructure project. We talk to chairman Terry Morgan as the project makes its final tunnel push.




ambition

Boris Johnson sets 'ambition' of 200,000 coronavirus tests a day by end of month

Boris Johnson has set out a new target of 200,000 coronavirus tests a day by the end of May, as he admitted he "bitterly regrets" the crisis in care homes.




ambition

'A Freudian nightmare': Madonna's Blond Ambition tour turns 30

Three decades on, the controversy-courting concert tour is still shaping the ways female artists express their sexuality

In Toronto, Madonna simulated masturbation on a velvet bed under the watchful eye of the Canadian police, who threatened her with arrest if her show went ahead. In Italy, unions called for a general strike if Madonna performed, and Pope John Paul II declared her concert “one of the most satanic shows in the history of humanity”. The Blond Ambition tour, which turned 30 years old last month, remains among the most controversial tours of all time.

Related: The Guide: Staying In – sign up for our home entertainment tips

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ambition

Love Island's Paige Turley reveals post-lockdown singing career ambitions

Turley and her boyfriend Finn Tapp are currently staying with her parents in Scotland




ambition

Phil Neville had ambitions of succeeding Gareth Southgate before England Women's slump

Phil Neville harboured genuine ambitions of succeeding Gareth Southgate before his reign as England Women's manager began to unravel.




ambition

Tony Adams says Arsenal's transfer ambition helped keep him from Man United, but things have changed

Arsenal legend Tony Adams has told of how the club's transfer market ambition in the 1990s helped convince him to turn down Manchester United – and revealed his frustration at the difference in attitude today.




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

Green Ambitions, Brown Realities: Making Sense of Renewable Investment Strategies in the Gulf

Gulf countries have hailed their investments in renewable energy, but some basic questions remain about the extent to which it makes sense for GCC states to invest aggressively in renewables. The sheer magnitude of such investments will require these countries to mobilize significant public resources.  Therefore, such an assessment requires these countries to focus on national interests, not just a desire to be perceived as constructive participants in the global transition away from carbon energy. 

This report starts by identifying four common strategic justifications for investing in renewable energy in GCC countries. Each of these rationales highlights a different aspect of renewable energy investments. In addition, each rationale is based on different assumptions about the underlying drivers of such investments, and each rationale is based on different assumptions about the future of energy. 
 




ambition

6 elements of a strategy to push back on Iran’s hegemonic ambitions

Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant, to Iraq and Bahrain on the Gulf, to Yemen on […]

      
 
 




ambition

Dark Clouds Gather over Greenland's Mining Ambitions


In September 2014, we released a study on mineral and energy resources in Greenland and were honored to have Aleqa Hammond, then the Premier of Greenland, with us at Brookings for the launch event. Since gaining political autonomy from the Kingdom of Denmark in 2009, successive governments in Greenland have been aggressively promoting the development of a mining industry as a solution to its deep and worsening economic woes. Our study concluded that Greenland was likely to develop large-scale mining and energy projects eventually, but that the pace of development would be much slower than the government of Greenland anticipated due to steep declines in iron ore prices and unrealistic expectations of demand for rare earth elements.

A lot has changed since then, but our original conclusions still hold. While there has been progress on smaller mines such as the Aappaluttoq ruby and sapphire project in southwest Greenland, it appears increasingly unlikely that any of the large-scale mining and energy projects that Greenland has been counting on will get off the ground in the near term. Global events beyond Greenland’s control have conspired in recent months to reduce the incentives for investment in mining and offshore oil and gas projects.

Political Crisis in Nuuk, But Siumut Remains in Control

Following her trip to Washington, Premier Hammond became embroiled in a political scandal concerning the misuse of public funds. She resigned from office and an election was called. Hammond’s incumbent Siumut party, now under the leadership of former Environment Minister Kim Kielsen, held on to power against its main rival by a tiny margin of 326 votes.

All major political parties in Greenland support the development of a mining industry, but the two main parties are divided on the issue of uranium mining, with the opposition Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party opposed on environmental grounds. However, following the election Siumut successfully negotiated a coalition government, bringing together rival parties (the Democrat party and Atassut) that support uranium mining.

Ebola Outbreak Leads London Mining to Bankruptcy

Global events continued to conspire against Greenland’s efforts to develop a mining industry. Just before the November elections London Mining, the British company developing the Isua iron ore mine, went bankrupt and was placed into receivership after incurring heavy losses at its Sierra Leone mine due to the Ebola crisis.

As we noted in our report, London Mining’s project in Greenland sought to attract investments, labor and engineering support from Chinese partners, but the company was not successful in its efforts to secure that support given the high costs of the project (estimated at about $2 billion) and the unique engineering challenges associated with the project. Nevertheless, the company’s plan to bring nearly two thousand foreign workers to Greenland along with the government of Greenland’s efforts to pass legislation that would exempt workers on large projects from Greenland’s minimum labor standards sparked an enormous controversy in Denmark over the scope of Greenland’s autonomy. It also led some commentators in Denmark and elsewhere to suggest that this investment was part of a larger strategic plan by Beijing to establish a foothold in the Arctic region. We concluded in our study that there was no evidence of any such geopolitical connection and emphasized that, contrary to many reports, there was in fact no Chinese investment in Greenland.

Last week, London Mining’s Greenland operations were purchased by a Chinese investment and trading group based in Hong Kong. Like London Mining, the project’s new owners are unlikely to develop the Isua project unless they can locate a major Chinese mining company willing to provide capital, labor and engineering. This would seem unlikely in the near term given the precipitous drop in iron ore prices since 2012 and increased production by the international mining majors.

The buyer, General Nice, is a privately held trading and investment conglomerate with subsidiaries in mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore and South Africa. The company’s corporate background is unclear. It was founded in 1992, but a quick search reveals no information about the group’s activities prior to 2006, when General Nice acquired Singapore-listed Abterra. This listed subsidiary has reportedly come under scrutiny in Singapore for its lack of transparency concerning unusual investments in coal mines in Shanxi province. General Nice has made a handful of financial investments in overseas mines, all in partnership with major mining companies from mainland China. The company does not appear to have experience operating iron mines.

China Cancels Its Rare Earth Production Quotas

China’s decision last week to drop export quotas on rare earth elements is another bad sign for Greenland’s plans to develop mining projects. Investment in rare earth projects outside of China has largely been driven by expectations of limited supply from China, where production capacity has been restricted by quotas on both production and export. The removal of the export quotas may reduce interest in international rare earth projects, including the two projects in Greenland.

Security concerns expressed in Denmark over the mining of uranium and rare earth have not yet been resolved. A working group established in early 2014 between Greenland and the Danish government to resolve these issues was scheduled to conclude in late 2014, but these talks have been interrupted by the change in government. While the new coalition supports uranium mining, these issues will have to be worked out before mining can move forward. This is particularly important for the development of the Kvanefjeld rare earth project, which contains significant levels of uranium, but may also be a factor for the Kringlerne rare earth project—which does not contain uranium – as Denmark has reserved the right to reject proposed rare earth projects on security grounds regardless of uranium content.

In addition, several rare earth element projects outside China (but not in Greenland) have in fact moved ahead, further reducing the urgency to develop a project in Greenland.

Falling Oil Prices

Oil extraction was always at best a long-term prospect for Greenland due to harsh conditions, limited infrastructure and the wide availability of cheaper alternative supplies. As oil prices started falling in June 2014 and global demand growth slowed, arguably the need for exploration in high-cost areas like Greenland further diminished. Thus, in September we concluded that under the most optimistic scenario it would take at least ten years before commercial oil production would take place in Greenland. Oil prices have continued to fall, and if prices remain low the timeline for exploration in Greenland is likely to be further extended.

Dim Economic Prospects

None of this is good news for Greenland, which has hoped to meet anticipated budget shortfalls with revenue from new mines. This week the new government publicly acknowledged the difficulty in securing major investments in the near term and will place more emphasis on developing infrastructure to support the tourism industry, which now appears to be Greenland’s best hope for economic development. One such project is a proposed new airport serving the tourist hub Illulissat. Any such measures will be important as the government faces a growing gap between expenses and the annual block grant from Denmark, which is likely to increase further as the population ages.

Authors

     
 
 




ambition

Raising The Global Ambition for Girls' Education


The Girls’ Education Imperative

In 1948, the world’s nations came together and agreed that “everyone has a right to education,” boys and girls and rich and poor alike. This vision set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been reinforced over the decades and today the girls who still fight to be educated are not cases for charity but actively pursuing what is rightfully theirs. In recent years, girls’ education has also received attention because, in the words of the United Nations, “education is not only a right but a passport to human development.” Evidence has been mounting on the pivotal role that educating a girl or a woman plays in improving health, social, and economic outcomes, not only for herself but her children, family, and community. Educating girls helps improve health: one study published in The Lancet, the world’s leading medical journal, found that increasing girls’ education was responsible for more than half of the reduction in child mortality between 1970 and 2009. The economic benefits are clear: former chief economist at the World Bank and United States Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers concluded that girls’ education “may well be the highest-return investment available in the developing world” due to the benefits women, their families and societies reap. And because women make up a large share of the world’s farmers, improvements in girls’ education also lead to increased agricultural output and productivity.

Progress in Girls’ Education


Given the importance of girls’ education, for girls’ own dignity and rights and for a broad sweep of development outcomes, it is no surprise that global agendas have focused heavily on it. For more than two decades, girls’ education has been recognized as a global priority and incorporated into development targets, which has rallied governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations and international organizations. From the 1990 Education for All (EFA) Goals to the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and to the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), girls’ education has been a priority, particularly in international development communities. Perhaps the most influential of these has been the MDGs, which reinforce parts of the EFA goals by focusing two of their eight goals on education, namely on achieving universal primary education and achieving gender parity in both primary and secondary school.

Progress in enrolling children, especially girls, into primary school is seen by many as a development success story. Indeed there is much to celebrate. Since 1990, the number of girls in low-income countries enrolling in primary school has increased two-and-a-half times, from 23.6 million to nearly 63 million in 2012. This has translated into a large increase in the girl-boy ratio in low-income countries, from 82 to 95 girls per 100 boys in primary school. For low- and lower-middle-income countries combined, the number of girls enrolled reached over 200 million girls in 2012, an almost 80 percent increase, and globally two-thirds of countries have near-equal numbers of boys and girls enrolled at the primary level. 

In 1990, in South and West Asia, there were only 74 girls enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys, but by 2012 the region had achieved equal numbers of boys and girls in school.

This progress was largely made by the leadership of developing country governments that prioritized expansion of primary schooling opportunities and by the global community’s support of governments focused on reaching the MDGs. Some of the biggest gains have been in regions struggling the most. In 1990, in South and West Asia, there were only 74 girls enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys, but by 2012 the region had achieved equal numbers of boys and girls in school. Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa, which had the lowest levels of girls in school in 1990, has experienced marked improvement, with the girl-boy ratio increasing from 83 to 92 girls per 100 boys in primary school.

The focus on getting girls into school has helped close gender gaps in relation to other factors too, such as wealth and location of residence. The fact that family income and urban or rural locality are now the most likely indicators of school enrollment is a big victory for girls’ education. The World Inequality Database on Education (WIDE) shows that in India, for example, 38 percent of girls and 25 percent of boys of primary school age were not in school in 1992. By 2005, that gap had narrowed to 24 percent of girls and 22 percent of boys. However, today the gap between the richest and poorest children’s attendance is much starker—37 percent of children from the poorest 20 percent of families versus just 11 percent of the richest 20 percent are out of school. And in many areas, girls actually outpace boys, especially at higher levels of education. In one third of countries, there are now more girls than boys enrolled in secondary school. Also, girls often do better once in school, with boys making up 75 percent of grade-repeaters in primary school.

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ambition

Global China’s advanced technology ambitions

In this special edition of the Brookings Cafeteria Podcast, Lindsey Ford, a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in Foreign Policy, interviews two authors of the most recent release of papers in the Global China series focused on China's aspiration to be a global technology leader. Saif Khan and Remco Zwetsloot are both research fellows at the…

       




ambition

It’s the Family, Stupid? Not Quite…How Traditional Gender Roles Do Not Affect Women’s Political Ambition

In April of 2014, media outlets speculated whether Hillary Clinton’s future grandchild would impact her potential presidential campaign in 2016. Jennifer Lawless addresses the question of whether family roles and responsibilities affect a potential candidate’s political career. Lawless analyzes both female and male candidates and finds that traditional roles and responsibilities have little influence on candidates’ decision to run for office. 

      
 
 




ambition

Danger ahead? Taiwan’s politics, China’s ambitions, and US policy

It is a great honor for me to speak today at the Hamilton Lugar School, not only because I worked for Congressman Lee Hamilton for two and a half years, but also because he and Senator Lugar have represented something very important about the politics of U.S. foreign policy. They were in their time two…

       




ambition

Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement


From 2006 to 2011, Qatar was highly active as a conflict mediator within the greater Middle East, seeking political consensus in Lebanon as well as securing a key peace agreement regarding the Darfur conflict. What were the drivers of Qatari mediation during this time, and how successful were Qatari negotiators in their efforts? How has Qatar’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring affected its ability to act as a mediator? How might Qatar expand its mediation capacity in the future?

In an Analysis Paper, Sultan Barakat weighs the prospects for renewed Qatari mediation efforts in a changing regional landscape. He holds that Qatar’s turn towards a more interventionist foreign policy during the Arab Spring shifted the country’s focus away from mediation, while backlash against the country’s positions has limited its ability to engage with the region’s conflicts.

Drawing on interviews with government officials, Barakat concludes that Qatar’s efforts were much aided by financial resources and wide-ranging political ties which helped drive initial mediation efforts, yet were hampered by a lack of institutional capacity to support and monitor such mediation.

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Authors

Publication: The Brookings Doha Center
Image Source: © Mohamad Dabbouss / Reuters
     
 
 




ambition

6 elements of a strategy to push back on Iran’s hegemonic ambitions

Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant, to Iraq and Bahrain on the Gulf, to Yemen on […]