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Coronavirus: Why might the R number be higher in Scotland?

The R-value is at the heart of decisions on easing the lockdown - so why might it be different north of the border?





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Regions and territories: Puntland

A profile of the Somali region which declared autonomy in 1998




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Virgin Atlantic puts advisers on standby as industry teeters

Virgin Atlantic Airways has put advisers on standby to handle a potential administration as it races to secure a £500m rescue that would enable Sir Richard Branson’s flagship company to survive the coronavirus pandemic.




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Three years ago it could barely walk. Now Atlas the humanoid robot is doing gymnastics.

Three years ago it was barely walking. Now, Atlas, the humanoid robot from Boston Dynamics is performing gymnastic routines that mimic professional athletes.




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oscon: Mobile UX Design & Development for Apps - learn to craft an app that’s functional and fun to use http://t.co/L8kTLaxbYH #oscon #tutorial

oscon: Mobile UX Design & Development for Apps - learn to craft an app that’s functional and fun to use http://t.co/L8kTLaxbYH #oscon #tutorial




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oscon: RT @jonobacon: working on my material for my community management training class - be sure to join me in Portland -...

oscon: RT @jonobacon: working on my material for my community management training class - be sure to join me in Portland -...




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oscon: RT @mark_grover: Attending #oscon at end of July in Portland? Come hear my talk on Apache Bigtop http://t.co/kkSdOyyY5a

oscon: RT @mark_grover: Attending #oscon at end of July in Portland? Come hear my talk on Apache Bigtop http://t.co/kkSdOyyY5a




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oscon: RT @build_cloud: Play poker w/ Apache #CloudStack's community members above Portland's city lights at #OSCON! Register now...

oscon: RT @build_cloud: Play poker w/ Apache #CloudStack's community members above Portland's city lights at #OSCON! Register now...




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Channel24.co.za | 'Little Women: Atlanta' star Ms Minnie, 34, dies

'Little Women: Atlanta' star, Ashley Ross, has died after sustaining injuries in a car accident.




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AT#166 - Travel to Scotland

The Amateur Traveler talks to Eden (an ambassador for Macallan Whiskey) about his home country of Scotland. Eden lays out a tour for Amateur Traveler listeners that starts in Edinburgh with its castle, royal mile and pubs and continues up to Saint Andrews (the home of golf) and the castles of Perthshire. We make sure to stop on the Whiskey trail of Speyside before continuing to the rugged countryside of the highlands. We also talk about special events, famous scotsmen and hagis.




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AT#230 - Travel to Portland, Oregon

The Amateur Traveler talks to Sean Keaner of the BootsNAll travel network about the city of Portland Oregon. Sean describes the independent character of the city that is expressed in its brew pubs, food carts and hip culture. It is also evident in the famous Powell’s bookstore. Portland has a reputation for being rainy but Sean tells us when to come to Portland, where to ride a bike and where to find some good Vegan food. If Vegan is not your style find out where to find a pork chop over 4 inches thick.




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AT#412 - Travel to Mazatlan, Mexico

Hear about travel to Mazatlan, Mexico as the Amateur Traveler talks again to Craig Zabransky about this Mexico seaport. Mazatlan is on the west coast of Mexico.




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AT#472 - Travel to Atlanta, Georgia

Hear about travel to Atlanta, Georgia as the Amateur Traveler talks to return guest Chris Willis about his hometown. Chris has been on the show talking about distant and exotic places but this time we talk about the land of Margret Mitchell and Coca-Cola.

 




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AT#549 - Travel to Scotland

Hear about travel to Scotland as the Amateur Traveler talks to Sarah from www.thegirlwiththemaptattoo.com about travel to this beautiful and historic country.




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AT#567 - Travel to the Hebrides in Scotland

Hear about travel to The Hebrides as the Amateur Traveler talks to Matt Higgs about his trip to these remote islands in Scotland.




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AT#549 - Travel to Scotland (Repeat)

Hear about travel to Scotland as the Amateur Traveler talks to Sarah from www.thegirlwiththemaptattoo.com about travel to this beautiful and historic country.




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Collective Defence and Common Security: Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance

10 June 2014

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House

Martin Butora, Ivo Daalder, Camille Grand, Ana Palacio, Roland Paris, Volker Perthes, Nathalie Tocci, Sinan Ülgen and Marcin Zaborowski

20140609NATOFoghRasmussenHagel.jpg

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, right, greets US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, center, before the start of their joint meeting at North Atlantic Council (NATO) on June 2 2014 in Brussels. Photo by Pablo Martinez Monsivais - Pool/Getty Images.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, is chair of the NATO Group of Policy Experts, tasked with providing NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the North Atlantic Council with ideas on how to strengthen the Alliance's transatlantic bond ahead of September's  NATO summit in Wales. 

The group's report Collective Defence and Common Security: Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance was published on 10 June for discussion at a NATO conference in Brussels on the transatlantic bond.

 

Executive Summary 

Key points from the Policy Experts report to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, released at the Conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond in Brussels on 10 June 2014:

  • Transatlantic security cannot be taken for granted. Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO needs to reaffirm its value around the twin objectives of collective defence and common security. 

Upholding peace and stability in Europe 

  • The commitment under NATO’s Article V to treat an attack against one as an attack against all must be credible, and NATO members should take concrete steps together to make it so. Tallinn should be as secure as Toronto. 

  • There can be no return to a ‘strategic partnership’ between NATO and Russia so long as Russia’s actions threaten European security.

  • European governments bear particular responsibility for ensuring their own territorial security. They must invest in the necessary R&D, equipment and deployable capabilities. No amount of ‘smarter’ defence will compensate for a failure to reverse falling defence spending.

  • NATO needs to develop effective responses to the ‘non-linear’ forms of aggression seen during the crisis in Ukraine. But the EU should take the lead in helping its members and neighbours embed good governance practices that will lessen their vulnerability to external destabilization.

  •  European countries should reduce their dependence on Russian energy. Russia’s main strength should no longer be Europe’s main vulnerability. 

  • NATO’s door should remain open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance. However, existing members must be ready, willing and able to extend the full benefits of Alliance membership to them, including those in Article V.

 Confronting international insecurity 

  • NATO should not turn inwards after 2014. Much of the Middle East, and North Africa face a decade of turmoil which will pose direct threats to NATO members. 

  • In Asia, unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities are driving dramatic rises in defence spending. It must be remembered that the Pacific Ocean is the western flank of NATO. 

  • In this context, it should not be left to the United States and a handful of others to deploy hard power beyond NATO’s borders. An over-reliance on US power projection will erode the foundations of the transatlantic bond over time. 

  • NATO and the EU must also cooperate closely to deliver their comprehensive range of capabilities to manage international crises, from market access and development assistance to military intervention and post-conflict civilian support. 

  • Completion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will strengthen the transatlantic community strategically as well as economically.

  • NATO needs to differentiate its approach to working with its international partners. In particular, it should develop long-term cooperative arrangements with the small number of countries in Europe and beyond which have contributed actively alongside NATO to international security in recent years. 

  • The NATO–Russia Council should continue to operate at ambassadorial and higher levels. This will help the two sides coordinate responses to international crises and potentially rebuild trust on European security. 

  • NATO publics are increasingly sceptical about the value of any form of external intervention. Political leaders need to communicate better the deterioration of the security situation in Europe; the importance of international security to their nations' welfare and prosperity; and the need to protect the core values that underpin the Alliance, especially democratic governance, open economies and the rule of law.  

Chatham House press release: Director of Chatham House to Chair New NATO Group of Policy Experts

 

NATO press release: NATO Secretary General to attend conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond




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The Transatlantic Business Response to Foreign Policy Challenges

Invitation Only Research Event

12 June 2014 - 8:00am to 9:15am

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Myron Brilliant, Executive Vice President and Head of International Affairs, US Chamber of Commerce
Chair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

The speaker will outline a number of foreign policy challenges facing transatlantic business, such as China’s increasing economic power, turmoil in the Middle East, and Russia’s recent actions in eastern Europe. He will examine how these issues can provide obstacles to cooperation and development, and restrict access to markets, and how they can be addressed. 

The event is part of our series on US and European Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges. Conducted with the support of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, this series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and the potentially differing perspectives from the US and across Europe. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Rory Kinane

+44 (0) 20 7314 3650




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Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership: Responding to a Revanchist Russia

Invitation Only Research Event

12 September 2014 - 8:45am to 5:00pm

Chatham House, London

The situation in Ukraine remains in flux and despite Europe and the US toughening sanctions on Russia, President Putin continues to increase the scope of Russia’s involvement in the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatists. It remains unclear how far Putin is willing to go, what his broader regional ambitions are, and what he will do if forced further into a corner by Western actions. In this time of uncertainty and instability it is therefore vital to assess how the transatlantic partners should respond to this increasingly precarious situation. 

At this all-day event, the group will discuss how US policy towards Russia is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attencance at this event is by invitation only.

The event is part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will come together to discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

Department/project

Rory Kinane

+44 (0) 20 7314 3650




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Transatlantic Trends 2014

Research Event

15 September 2014 - 2:00pm to 3:15pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund
Chair: Xenia Wickett, Project Director, US; Acting Dean, The Academy, Chatham House

During this event, Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller will discuss the findings of the Transatlantic Trends 2014 Survey. Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey measuring public opinion in the United States, Turkey, Russia, and 10 European Union member states. This year’s survey examines key issues facing the transatlantic community, such as European and US responses to the crisis in Ukraine, the state of the transatlantic relationship in the wake of the NSA scandal, the future of European integration, Russian foreign policy preferences, and views on major foreign policy issues like NATO’s future and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

Department/project

Rory Kinane

+44 (0) 20 7314 3650




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Transatlantic Economic Cooperation and the Global Economy

Members Event

13 February 2015 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Caroline Atkinson, Deputy Assistant to President Obama and Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics
Chair: Sebastian Mallaby, Paul A. Volcker Senior Fellow in International Economics, The Council on Foreign Relations

The speaker will outline the importance of economic cooperation in the transatlantic relationship and consider recent developments in the global economy.

Members Events Team




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Transatlantic Cooperation to Prevent and Stop Mass Atrocities

Invitation Only Research Event

16 February 2015 - 1:00pm to 5:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Ambassador Lee Feinstein, Founding Dean, School of Global & International Studies, Indiana University
Xenia Wickett, Project Director, US; Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy, Chatham House
Paul Arkwright, Director, Multilateral Policy, Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director, International Security Programme, Chatham House
Jonathan Prentice, Director, London Office & Senior Adviser for European Advocacy, International Crisis Group
Sir John Holmes, Director, The Ditchley Foundation

The international community is in urgent need of successful, cooperative strategies for both preventing mass atrocities before they begin and stopping those in progress. As recent crises have highlighted, effective international cooperation to save lives and preserve peace and security remains largely aspirational. Participants will discuss current thinking on mass atrocity prevention and intervention, and identify how transatlantic cooperation in this space could be more effective.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Department/project

Richard Gowing

Programme Administrator
+44 (0)20 7389 3270




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Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership: Transatlantic Security Policy Towards a Changing Middle East

Invitation Only Research Event

6 February 2015 - 8:45am to 4:30pm

Residence of the British Ambassador to France, Paris

With the Middle East in chaos and the future of many states increasingly uncertain, there is a large amount of attention as to how policy-makers in Europe and the US should respond. In particular, many in Europe are unsure of long-term US policy in light of competing American priorities, budgetary constraints and a public adverse to committing further resources abroad. In this context, it is important that European and American policy-makers understand each other’s positions.

At this all-day event, a group of experts will discuss how US policy towards the Middle East is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Paris.

Event attributes

External event

Department/project




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Exploring the Transatlantic Rift

27 August 2015

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
If the US and Europe drift apart, there will be grave consequences for Western global leadership.

20150827USBrandenburg.jpg

An American flag flies in front of the Brandenburg Gate, near the US embassy on 7 July 2014 in Berlin. Photo by Getty Images.

Is there a ‘crisis’ in the transatlantic relationship? Although the US and Europe are not irresistibly diverging, there are indications that governments and their populations on both sides of the Atlantic are becoming less aligned in their thinking and actions. And it is happening just when they need to become closer.

The ‘rise of the rest’, in which new emerging markets are coming to the fore, is creating a more competitive international environment. And the West is not putting on an adequate response. Unless the US and Europe want to relinquish leadership on building global norms and standards on key issues, their leaders once again need to work more collectively together.

Divides in the Atlantic community

The structures put together in the first half of the 20th century by the Atlantic community (such as NATO, the UN, the WTO/GATT, the IMF and the World Bank) provided the architecture and norms by which everyone functioned – and thereby primed the international context in their favour.

However, these institutions have become increasingly dysfunctional or unfit for purpose, and are increasingly ignored (like the UN) or replaced (as China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB] is arguably attempting to do). That contextual advantage has gone. And there are many other good reasons to be concerned.

Shared values are a notable aspect of the strong and longstanding relationship between the US and Europe. But now, although the US does appear to be coming closer to Europe on some measures (Pew polling suggests America is becoming less religious and more liberal on gay rights and recreational drugs, for instance), there is clear evidence that differences of opinion are becoming more entrenched.

Policy divides between the US and Europe are commonplace, but recently the list of differences (and the degree of difference of opinion) appears to be growing. The split over joining the AIIB is the most recent of these, being a visible symptom of a larger fundamental difference of opinion on Asia. But other issues that divide include actions in Libya in 2011, Syria today, Russia, support for NATO, energy independence and what to do about climate change.

The study on elite perceptions conducted by Chatham House’s US Project in 2014 made clear how important Europeans perceived America’s traditional values to be, but also raised the concern that the US was losing sight of them (citing, for example, the lack of universal healthcare and attitudes towards the death penalty and gun laws). The visceral response of the German public to the Snowden revelations is a stark example of the divide in attitudes.

Special relationships

Anecdotally, the evidence is also not good. Over the past four years the general tone of conversations in Europe about the US has changed, due to huge uncertainty about whether the US is going to continue to play the same role it has in the past or whether it will leave Europe to face its challenges alone. Meanwhile, in the US the conversation around whether Europe will step up (particularly in security) has heightened tremendously. Four years ago, no one thought to question the transatlantic relationship. Today, on both sides, there is a lack of confidence.

The US-UK relationship has a special part in this – it has long been and still remains the centre-point of the transatlantic relationship. From a realpolitik perspective, the US sees the UK as valuable for three principal reasons: A) its role in the EU promoting common UK/US interests; B) the assets it brings to the table (particularly defence and intelligence); and C) its external perspective and its support internationally (ensuring the US is rarely alone). However, in the coming years A might go away and B is declining with falling defence spending, leaving only C. And a weak US-UK relationship could cause significant trouble for the wider US-Europe relationship.

It is all too easy to forget the importance of the transatlantic relationship. For many it is increasingly irrelevant – the emerging powers such as China and Brazil are far more interesting. And for others it is just an ever-present reality – the Atlantic allies have been so close and through so much that nothing can change it.

Neither of these is right. The transatlantic relationship is vital part of addressing global challenges and it is something that, if continued to be treated either with either contempt or ignorance, will be lost before we know it. For these reasons, the US Project is beginning new research that looks at the transatlantic relationship and asks whether there is a rift. If yes, we hope to explore what can be done to mitigate it – before it is too late.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance

John C Whitehead Lecture Members Event

29 October 2015 - 1:30pm to 2:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Condoleezza Rice, Director of the Global Center for Business and the Economy, Stanford University; United States Secretary of State (2005-09)
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett CMG, Director, Chatham House

Against the backdrop of continuing conflict in Libya, the Middle East and Ukraine and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Condoleezza Rice will discuss the importance of reenergizing NATO capabilities and ensuring a strong transatlantic alliance.

The ballot for entries to this event has now closed. Successful registrants will be sent e-tickets on Monday 26 October.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 13:30 BST on Thursday 29 October.

ASK A QUESTION: We endeavour to put questions from our online audience, as well as from those in the auditorium,  to the speaker. Questions can be submitted in advance to questions@chathamhouse.org or asked during the event on Twitter using #CHEvents.

 

About the John C Whitehead Lecture

The annual John C Whitehead Lecture has been a fixture of the Chatham House schedule for over a decade, honouring the many contributions Mr Whitehead made to Anglo-American relations in the public and private sectors.

Mr Whitehead was US deputy secretary of state to George Shultz and was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by Ronald Reagan. He was a chairman emeritus of the Brookings Institution and served as chairman of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, the organization responsible for rebuilding and rejuvenating New York following the 2001 terrorist attacks. John C Whitehead sadly passed away in February of this year but the annual lecture at Chatham House will continue to provide a forum for prominent and distinguished speakers to address the subject of transatlantic relations.

Event attributes

Livestream

Members Events Team




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Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership: Global Institutions and the Economy of the Future

Invitation Only Research Event

10 June 2015 - 8:45am to 4:30pm

Bertelsmann Foundation, Berlin, Germany

Europe and the United States have dominated global institutions for over 70 years. However, as the emerging markets take up a greater share of the global economy it is becoming increasingly difficult for the transatlantic powers to maintain the current system. This event will examine the changes needed in order to avoid a collapse of the current system.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Bertelsmann Foundation. 

Event attributes

External event

Department/project

US and Americas Programme




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Transatlantic Rifts: Asia-Pacific Scenario Case Study

3 February 2016

Drawing on the findings of a recent workshop exploring a potential conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands, this paper suggests there are significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

Dr Jacob Parakilas

Former Deputy Head, US and the Americas Programme

2016-02-03-transatlantic-rift.jpg

A Japanese activist on board a boat is silhouetted at sunrise as it approaches the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 19 August 2012. Photo by Getty Images.

Summary

  • Chatham House brought together European, Asian and American policy-makers and experts over the course of a two-day scenario workshop in November 2015. The participants were asked to take part in a structured role-playing exercise imagining a potential near-future conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands.
  • The findings of the workshop, and the actions of participants in the simulation, suggested significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the perception was that the European Union and its member states consider challenges from their ‘near abroad’ as more tangible than those emanating from Asia, and that they focus on commercial opportunities in the region. In contrast, US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific is seen as emphasizing strategic and geopolitical challenges.
  • In terms of military capabilities, Europeans view themselves as having few assets to bring to bear in Asia. European, American and Asian observers are largely unaware of French and British military capabilities in or near the region.
  • Beyond the military, Europe’s other tools of leverage – diplomatic, development, economic and other soft-power instruments – are also ignored. Europeans are often unaware of the activities of their own governments in the region. This is equally true in reverse – Japan’s engagement vis-à-vis European interests (such as with respect to Russia or Syria) is little recognized by Europeans.
  • European nations prefer to engage unilaterally with Asia on trade and multilaterally, through the EU, on security and geopolitical issues. However, no ideal forum for multilateral coordination exists (given the fact that the EU is not a member of most Asian regional organizations).
  • The US’s greater engagement in Asia reflects the fact that the US, unlike its European counterparts, is a Pacific nation. But it can also be explained by greater domestic public support for such engagement. This reflects the presence of significant numbers of US troops in Asia and the relatively high proportion of ethnic Asians in the US compared with the EU.

Department/project




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The Future of US Global Leadership: Implications for Europe, Canada and Transatlantic Cooperation

10 May 2016

As the United States’ international engagement changes, Canada and Europe should increase coordination with it to prevent power vacuums from emerging.

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

Rory Kinane

Former Manager, US and the Americas Programme

2016-05-06-future-us-global-leadership.jpg

Marine One, carrying US President Barack Obama, departs the White House on 26 August 2014, Washington DC. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • The United States’ transatlantic allies need to appreciate how its global leadership is changing and what this means for their interests, and respond accordingly. Notions of US decline have been overstated, but the country is not going to play the same international role in the future that it has previously.
  • As the United States’ international engagement changes, Canada and Europe should increase coordination with it to prevent power vacuums from emerging. The transatlantic allies should work together to build greater links at all stages of the policy process, from perceptions of threat, prioritization, analysis, threat definition and policy formation to implementation and action.  
  • As the United States’ capabilities adapt to its changed circumstances and role, so too must those of its allies. This adjustment must go far beyond military aspects to enhancing diplomatic, energy, economic, intelligence and other resources.
  • In addition to the challenges around differing interests, priorities and capabilities inherent in any alliance, Europe appears to have lost its confidence. In part this is due to its growing disengagement and introspection. But Europe retains huge potential for influence if it uses its resources effectively. There is much that European states can do, individually and together, to take more control over advancing their strategic interests. Equally, by working together they can do much to nudge the United States in helpful directions to support the mutual interests of all parties.
  • The conversation on reforming global institutions such as the IMF must move beyond the need for change per se towards articulating the actual shape of such changes. Europe and Canada will likely need to push the United States into accepting reform of these institutions to better reflect today’s reality and tomorrow’s challenges. Global institutions need more diversified leaderships if they are to ensure their long-term legitimacy and influence. This will be difficult to push through politically in the United States, but by working with new regional and global powers to propose reforms, Europe and Canada can help find an acceptable solution.
  • The use of ad hoc coalitions does not necessarily damage the efficacy of broader consensus institutions such as NATO. In fact, flexible coalitions may often be desirable when solutions to new challenges need to be developed and agreed quickly.
  • Canada and Europe should consider partnering with other actors besides the United States where necessary. This may be expedient for meeting individual objectives, and would have the secondary benefit of demonstrating to emerging powers that the West does not exclude cooperation with others out of an arbitrary loyalty to the United States.
  • Europe needs to appreciate the potentially dire consequences of failing to adapt to changing US leadership and an increasingly complex world. There is a real chance that the European project could unravel in the next few years due to external and internal pressures. While many European policy-makers display an understanding of these challenges in private, in public there is little appetite for taking the decisions necessary to bring long-term stability to the continent. 

Department/project




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Transatlantic Rifts: Stress-Testing the Iran Deal

18 May 2016

Based on an exercise which modelled violations of the Iran nuclear deal, this paper finds that the deal's framework enabled the transatlantic partners to remain united but domestic factors in the US and Europe could, in future, make this increasingly hard.

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

Dr Jacob Parakilas

Former Deputy Head, US and the Americas Programme

2016-05-18-transatlantic-rifts-iran.jpg

Signed agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action) following E3/EU+3 negotiations, 14 July 2015 in Vienna, Austria. Photo via Getty Images.
  • Chatham House brought together 32 participants over a two-day period in February 2016 to discuss the US and European responses to a simulated scenario in which alleged actions by Iran threaten the sustainability of the nuclear deal. This was the second of four scenario roundtables (the first involved a conflict between China and Japan).
  • Despite the inherent challenges in the initial scenario the transatlantic partners in the simulation were able to retain a strong joint position in their negotiations with Iran throughout the scenario. The principal factor enabling the US and Europe to maintain their joint negotiating position was the framework of conditions provided by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which mandated specific actions, responses and timelines if events threatened the agreement. When in doubt, all parties in the simulation reverted to the agreed framework.
  • The Europeans in the simulation seemed to view any indirect consequences of the nuclear deal as mostly positive whereas the Americans largely saw the externalities as negative. Equally, the scenario showed Iran as having different approaches towards the US and Europe respectively: willing to engage with the latter, while keeping the former in the cold.
  • The greatest tensions occurred between EU member states, mainly in relation to differences over process rather than policy. Domestic factors in the US and Europe could, in the future, make maintaining a joint position towards Iran increasingly hard. In particular, potential stumbling blocks include immigration and social policies in response to the migration crisis in Europe; and, in the US, the significant political polarization around the E3/EU+3 deal.

Department/project




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Transatlantic Rifts: Averting a Turkey/Russia Conflict

5 August 2016

Based on a workshop which played out a scenario of rising tensions between Turkey and Russia, this paper finds that the situation would have to escalate dramatically to threaten transatlantic unity.

Xenia Wickett
Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

Dr Jacob Parakilas

Former Deputy Head, US and the Americas Programme

2016-08-04-transatlantic-rift-russia-turkey.jpg

A protester waves Turkey's national flag in front of the Russian consulate during a demonstration against Russia's Syria policy on 24 November 24 2015 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Chatham House brought together 22 participants over a two-day period in May 2016 to discuss US and European responses to a potential conflict between Turkey and Russia. This was the third of four scenario roundtables (the first two involved a conflict between China and Japan and a potential breakdown in the Iran nuclear deal, respectively).
  • The scenario was designed and the roundtable took place before a number of crucial subsequent developments, including the partial restoration of Turkish/Russian relations, the British vote to leave the European Union (EU), and the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This paper should be read and understood in that context.
  • In our simulation, the United States and Europe worked closely together, with cooperation particularly in evidence between the US and Germany. While the US was slightly more willing than Europe to threaten sanctions against Russia, transatlantic unity was not seriously threatened by a Turkey/Russia conflict.
  • Western states were wary of bringing NATO into the picture for fear that this would be perceived as militarizing an already tense situation. The EU was also sidelined in favour of more ad hoc negotiating strategies.
  • Russia was effective in using international law to defend its position, even as it took steadily more aggressive action in Syria. Neither the West nor Turkey deployed an effective countermeasure to this tactic.

Department/project




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Economic Populism: A Transatlantic Perspective

Invitation Only Research Event

30 November 2016 - 9:00am to 5:15pm

Chatham House, London

Economic populism is on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have made protectionist arguments and appealed to voters who feel left behind by globalization. In Europe, left-wing groups like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain as well as far-right groups like France’s Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the UK Independence Party are capitalizing on the anti-globalization mood.

Manifestations of the current anti-trade and anti-globalization movements include opposition to trade initiatives like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as populist calls for an end to the austerity measures and economic reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro crisis. There have been questions regarding whether capitalism can respond to the rise in inequality seen in many Western states. Many populists also share a distrust of those they perceive as elite policy-makers and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty from international institutions. Thus, the rise of populism could have far-reaching consequences for trade and economic policy-making and the existing trade and broader economic architectures.

The US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung will convene an expert roundtable to provide insight and analysis geared towards examining key drivers behind the rise of economic populism, its implications for the international economic system, and possible ways to mitigate the effects of populism in the economic arena.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

The Chatham House Rule

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

US and Americas Programme




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Driving 21st Century Growth: The Looming Transatlantic Battle Over Data

Corporate Members Event

29 March 2017 - 12:15pm to 1:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Christopher Smart, Whitehead Senior Fellow, Chatham House; Senior Fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School; Special Assistant to President Obama, International Economics, Trade and Investment (2013-15)

Chair: Kenneth Cukier, Senior Editor of Digital Products, The Economist

As US and European governments grapple with the challenges of reinforcing their economic relationships, traditional negotiations over tax and trade policy may soon be overwhelmed by a far thornier issue: the regulation of data storage, protection and analysis. As traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly.

Christopher Smart will outline the economic promise of data analytics to drive dramatic productivity gains, particularly for industry and financial services. He will explore contrasting political debates in the United States and Europe over personal privacy and national security and analyse how these have influenced many of the assumptions that drive the regulation of data flows. 

This event is open to coporate members only.

This event will be preceded by an informal, welcome reception from 12:15.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule

Members Events Team




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A Transatlantic Strategy for 2020: The Political Dimension

Invitation Only Research Event

2 May 2017 - 12:00pm to 1:15pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Robin Niblett CMG, Director, Chatham House
Chair: Xenia Wickett, Head, US and the Americas Programme and Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, Chatham House

The transatlantic partnership has provided the backbone to the liberal international order ever since the end of the Second World War. The tumultuous political events of 2016 denote a brutal rupture from the dominant global position of the transatlantic partnership and threaten to undermine the partnership itself. Only by understanding that the current problems facing the transatlantic relationship have deep structural roots will it be possible to find ways to prevent further erosion, sustain the benefits of the existing partnership and build opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in the future. 

Ahead of the publication of his new paper, Robin Niblett, will join us to share his thoughts on the challenges, opportunities and potential strategies towards securing the future of the transatlantic relationship. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Courtney Rice

Senior Programme Manager, US and the Americas Programme
(0)20 7389 3298




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Regulating the Data that Drive 21st-Century Economic Growth - The Looming Transatlantic Battle

28 June 2017

This paper examines how governments on both sides of the Atlantic are establishing frameworks that attempt to govern the commercial uses of data. It covers areas such as data analytics driving productivity and growth, the 'industrial internet of things', and the policy context and political forces shaping data rules in the US and Europe.

Dr Christopher Smart

Former Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme

2017-06-23-TsystemsData.jpg

Data centre for T-Systems, a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom. Photo by: Thomas Trutschel/Photothek/Getty Images

Summary

  • As the US government and European governments once again grapple with the challenges of reinforcing and expanding the transatlantic economic relationship, traditional negotiations over trade or tax policy may soon be upstaged by a far thornier and more important issue: how to regulate the storage, protection and analysis of data.
  • Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.
  • While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.
  • A global consensus on data regulation is currently well out of reach, but given the expanding importance of data in so many areas, basic agreement on regulatory principles is crucial between the US and the EU. This paper proposes a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’, which could help shape a common understanding. While it would hardly resolve all concerns – or indeed contradictions – around the prevailing traditions on both sides of the Atlantic, it could provide the basis for better cooperation and establish a framework to protect the promise of the digital age amid an unpredictable and emotional debate.




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Why We Need a Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility

28 June 2017

Dr Christopher Smart
Former Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme
Setting common guidelines for data flows is crucial both to protect the goods and services that already depend on big data and to support the next generation of productivity gains and business opportunities.

2017-06-23-TsystemsData.jpg

Data centre for T-Systems, a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom. Photo by: Thomas Trutschel/Photothek/Getty Images

While trade and tax remain at the heart of the difficult economic conversations between Europe and the US, a new issue has emerged as a potential source of even greater friction: data.

Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of those data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.

The rules that govern the collection, transmission and storage of data are perhaps one of the more surprising controversies in the transatlantic relationship. Similar liberal democracies with similar geostrategic interests might be expected to approach the handling of personal, corporate and government data in more or less the same way. And yet the US and its key European partners have struck different balances in the trade-offs between national security and citizens’ rights, between freedom of expression and personal privacy, and between free enterprise and market regulation.

While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.

This makes more determined efforts by US and European policymakers to agree basic principles that will guide the usage and protection of personal and commercial data all the more important. While common regulations or even greater alignment among regulators seem out of reach, a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ would provide a set of principles for more specific rules amid political landscapes and technological developments that are evolving rapidly. It could also provide the basis for firms, whether in manufacturing or financial services or health care, to draft their own voluntary standards on how they protect data even as they develop new algorithms that improve productivity, safety and customer satisfaction.

Embarrassing leaks, careful denials and endless lawsuits will continue to shape the awkward efforts of policymakers to find common ground around issues like cyberespionage, defence of common networks and the sharing of personal data with law enforcement. Cyberattacks with the aim of disrupting government operations or influencing election campaigns will add still further pressures. These will all serve as a noisy backdrop to a related but separate debate over how commercial firms should exploit the opportunities of global networks and ‘big data’ analytics while protecting national interests and privacy.

Yet, setting common guidelines for commercial data transmission and storage remains crucial both to protect the goods and services that already depend on sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, and to support the next generation of productivity gains and business opportunities.

Global firms yearn for clarity and predictability as they organize themselves to make the most of the data revolution. Neither is likely to become a reality soon. The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation will take effect in 2018, but its implementation will inevitably be coloured by the fact that American firms currently dominate the information technology business. Last year’s ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement between the US and the EU renews the permission for firms with transatlantic business interests to transfer data, subject to compliance with basic standards of protection, but the agreement remains vulnerable to European court challenges. Britain’s decision to leave the EU adds a further complication, as it establishes its own set of data protection rules that may not easily align with either European or US requirements. Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization continues to debate new rules for digital trade, even as markets like China, Russia and Brazil make up their own.

If this ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ were adopted bilaterally, say as part of the annual reviews of the US–EU Privacy Shield agreement, it could form the basis for broader cooperation on these issues, helping to drive progress in the G7 and G20 and ultimately perhaps in trade agreements under the WTO. It would hardly secure complete alignment on these questions, but it could help establish the framework for a debate that all too often lurches to extremes and risks damaging a fundamental alliance for global stability – along with a fundamental driver of 21st-century economic progress.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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The End of the Transatlantic Era?

Corporate Members Event

5 October 2017 - 2:30pm to 7:00pm

Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, US

Event participants

Ivo H. Daalder, President, Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Bryon G. Ehrhart, Global Head of Strategic Growth & Development, Aon
Laura Haim, Political Journalist; Former Spokesperson for the Presidential Campaign of Emmanuel Macron
João Vale de Almeida, Ambassador of the European Union to the United Nations; Former Ambassador of the European Union to the United States
Thomas Raines, Research Fellow and Programme Manager, Europe Programme, Chatham House
Charles A. Kupchan, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Thomas Wright, Director, Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution
Shawn Donnan, World Trade Editor, Financial Times
Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission
Laura Lane, President of Global Public Affairs, UPS

Further speakers TBC

The US and the EU face many of the same challenges today: they must maintain economic growth in the face of global competition, harness and manage rapid technological change and respond to diverse security threats. Yet a transatlantic alliance that has endured since the end of the Second World War now appears increasingly divided over how to respond.  

The 2016 Brexit referendum and the US presidential election resulted in victories for populist campaigns that questioned the core values and institutions of this alliance. More recent elections in Europe have bolstered centrist candidates, and helped to rejuvenate the EU. But on questions of trade, security, climate change and relations with Russia, Europe’s leaders have frequently been at odds with the Trump administration. On these and other critical issues, an opportunity and impetus has arisen for the EU to assume a global leadership role that many feel the US is abandoning.

Are the EU and the US on divergent paths? How are changing geopolitical and economic realities transforming the transatlantic alliance? And how committed is this alliance to defending the global institutions and rules it created? Chatham House and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs will convene policy experts, journalists and practitioners for a half-day event to chart these trends and consider their implications.

Please note, this event will take place in Chicago between 2.30pm and 7pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

Chatham House members will be able to follow a livestream of the event here on the day.

This event is being co-hosted with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.




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Supporting the US Economy by Improving the Mobility of High-skilled Labour Across the Atlantic

27 September 2017

US policymakers should give special consideration to a more open immigration policy for highly skilled professionals from the EU. This would ultimately benefit the US economy.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

Senior Research Fellow, US and the Americas Programme

2017-09-25-labour-mobility-us-economy.jpg

Businessman on bicycle passing skyline of La Defense business district in Paris, France. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • The United States and the European Union are deeply integrated economically in terms of movement of goods, services and capital across the Atlantic, but this is not matched by the mobility of labour. Freer movement of high-skilled workers across the Atlantic has a potentially critical role to play in maintaining and strengthening the bilateral economic relationship.
  • Both the US and EU seek to attract high-skilled labour through the use of temporary visa programmes. Various routes are available for highly skilled workers from the EU to temporarily work in the US (for instance, through the H-1B visa for foreign nationals in ‘specialty occupations’, as well as other visa categories for treaty traders and investors, intra-company transferees, and international students seeking work authorization in the US before or after graduation). The main ways for highly skilled workers from the US to temporarily work in EU member states are through EU-wide schemes that apply in 25 out of the 28 member states (for holders of EU Blue Cards or intra-company transferees); or via member states’ parallel national schemes.
  • The experiences of US and EU employers and workers under the US H-1B programme and the EU’s Blue Card scheme differ greatly. The EU Blue Card scheme avoids many of the drawbacks of the H-1B visa. It does not have an annual cap on the number of visas issued. It also grants greater autonomy to the worker by not requiring the employer to sponsor long-term residence, by providing greater flexibility to switch employment, and by having a longer grace period for visa-holders to find new employment after dismissal.
  • The US visa system hampers America’s economic growth. Restrictive policies such as an annual limit on the number of H-1B visas issued, and the associated uncertainty for employees and employers, hinder the ability of US companies to expand and innovate. The complex and costly visa application process is a particular burden for small and medium-sized enterprises. Problems around the timely availability of visas frustrate investors both from the US and from abroad (including from the EU). European firms face difficulties in acquiring visas for intra-company transferees, and not all EU member states have access to the treaty trader and treaty investor visa categories. At times, this impedes foreign direct investment and restricts US job creation. In addition, current policies hinder the economy’s retention of EU and other graduates of US universities. This is of particular concern given that skilled graduates have a critical role to play in addressing the US’s growing shortage of workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields.
  • Given the comparability of US and EU wages and labour markets, US concerns about foreign workers ‘stealing’ their jobs or depressing wages generally do not apply to EU citizens. On the contrary, a more open immigration policy for high-skilled workers – in particular for EU citizens – would benefit the US economy.
  • Efforts to reform visa systems for high-skilled labour are under way in both the US and EU. In order to facilitate the movement of highly skilled workers across the Atlantic, this research paper recommends (1) creating a special visa for highly skilled EU citizens to work temporarily in the US; (2) extending the availability of treaty trader and investor visas to all EU member states; and (3) increasing efforts to eliminate fraud and abuse in the H-1B system. These measures could potentially help to create more investment, jobs and economic growth in the US.




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One Year of Donald Trump: Assessing the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

Members Event Webinar

18 January 2018 - 11:30am to 12:00pm

Online

Event participants

Xenia Wickett, Head, US and the Americas Programme; Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, Chatham House

Events over the past 18 months, in particular with the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump, have elevated concerns among many Europeans and Americans over the health of the transatlantic relationship. With the EU looking inward and President Trump’s rejection of a number of historically common US-European interests, such as NATO, the JCPOA on Iran, and the Paris Agreement, the continuation of close transatlantic collaboration is in question.

Xenia Wickett will discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship. Is there a clear structural divergence between the US and the UK or is the partnership merely going through a temporary hiccup? She will explore the importance of recent events as well as structural, long-term factors that affect the US and Europe similarly. And what actions, if any, can be taken to mitigate differences and best manage the current situation of uncertainty?

Please note, this event is online only. Members will be able to watch the webinar from a computer or other internet-ready device and do not need to come to Chatham House to attend.




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Toward a Comprehensive Atlas of the Physical Interactome of Saccharomyces cerevisiae

Sean R. Collins
Mar 1, 2007; 6:439-450
Research




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A Human Protein Atlas for Normal and Cancer Tissues Based on Antibody Proteomics

Mathias Uhlén
Dec 1, 2005; 4:1920-1932
Research




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The Rise of China and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

29 July 2019

The growth of China's wealth and military power represents an epochal change in international politics. This briefing argues that China’s rise has worrying implications for the liberal international order and explores how this will affect the transatlantic relationship.

Jennifer Lind

Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme and Asia-Pacific Programme (based in the US)

2019-07-29-RiseOfChina.jpg

Teams from France, Great Britain, the US, China, Australia and Japan race against each other during the SailGP on 4 May 2019 in San Francisco, California. Photo: Getty Images

Summary

  • The stakeholders in the transatlantic relationship – the US, Canada and Europe – have long sought to stabilize international politics and economies by spreading support for the liberal goals of free markets, democracy and human rights. As their own commitment to this agenda appears to waver, China is becoming wealthier and more assertive. This briefing explores the extent to which these goals – along with the unity of the transatlantic relationship – are now in jeopardy.
  • Great uncertainty surrounds this question, including over the direction of US foreign policy, risks to European cohesion and slowing growth in China. However, two decades of revisionist behaviour by the authorities in Beijing show that China’s values and interests already conflict with transatlantic goals in trade, cyberspace, international development, security and human rights.
  • On trade, China pursues protectionist policies while engaging actively in intellectual property theft. China’s military modernization and its view of maritime law challenge the territorial status quo in East Asia and raise the risk of military crisis there. China lends unconditionally to countries that abuse human rights and are corrupt, undermining efforts by Western governments to promote good governance and human rights.
  • Defending liberal goals is complicated by asymmetric interests among the transatlantic partners, especially over security. China also uses ‘wedge’ strategies to pick off potential allies, thus diluting the power and will of any counterbalancing effort.
  • This briefing argues that China’s rise has worrying implications for the liberal international order. In response, the US should recognize its own strong interest in European unity, while Europeans must be ready to align more with the US (and East Asian allies) in order to temper Chinese behaviour.




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What Boris Johnson’s Big Win Means for Brexit and Scotland

13 December 2019

Thomas Raines

Director, Europe Programme

Jason Naselli

Senior Digital Editor
Thomas Raines tells Jason Naselli about the impact the large Conservative majority will have on the next phase of Brexit negotiations and Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom.

2019-12-13-Johnson.jpg

Boris Johnson speaks after the Conservatives secured a majority in the UK general election. Photo: Getty Images.

What does the UK election result mean for Brexit and forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU?

The most important thing is that it means Brexit will definitely happen. Since the referendum, we’ve had three-and-a-half years of continued uncertainty where all outcomes were still possible. We now know that Brexit will become irreversible from 31 January.

That’s the biggest thing, because I think that will have a big psychological impact on politics, both in the UK and also on the EU side. The EU has been working with a partner that has been unsure about its direction, and perhaps some had still hoped that the process might still be reversed, but that direction is now completely clear.

Obviously the first order of business is to pass the withdrawal agreement, which should be pretty straightforward given the majority that the Conservatives have. That’s a formality now.

Then, the question becomes about the level of ambition for the next year. It is an exceptionally ambitious timetable to negotiate, ratify and implement a new relationship before the end of the transition period in December 2020.

What is achievable by the end of next year?

I think there are three possible outcomes here. One: that timetable doesn’t work and Boris Johnson follows through on his pledge to leave the transition period anyway, leading to a ‘no trade deal’ outcome.

Two: the negotiations are able to deliver something by the end of 2020, either because the depth and ambition of any agreement is relatively low level (what Michel Barnier has called a ‘vital minimum’)  and/or because they come up with some type of compromise on the process which is not called an extension, but something else: a type of temporary agreement or a new implementation period.

This is a situation where you might have a bare-bones agreement for the end of the transition period, but with an extended period of negotiation for different unresolved issues. The EU will probably insist upon level playing field guarantees and fishing access rights as a component of any such agreement.

Three: Boris Johnson breaks his manifesto pledge not to extend the transition. Now, he has stared down the barrel of leaving with no deal before and he made a political judgment that it was better to make significant compromises on his negotiating position than to follow through with ‘no deal’. I suspect he might make that same judgment again.

No option is ideal. The first is the most economically disruptive, the second means the EU will be in an even stronger position to dictate terms and the third means breaking a manifesto pledge.

How important is that end of transition deadline now? It was an important issue for the Brexit Party and hardliners in the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. But given the size of a majority, he may need to worry less about them. Is the transition deadline that important to people who voted Conservative, especially if he can show that he has taken the UK out of the EU by the end of January?

I think there may indeed be some political space for Johnson here, given the size of his majority and given that the first phase of Brexit will have been done, along with the debate about withdrawal.

There will be a lot of difficult, technical negotiations in all sorts of areas, some of which I think will become quite rancorous, but won’t necessarily become front page news in the way some of the first phase of negotiations has, not least because you won’t have the theatre of a hung parliament.

Hopefully, there will be more focus on the substance of the agreement, and the debate will be about the consequences of divergence versus staying more aligned with the EU, which is basically the central question now about the future relationship.

I still think for UK prime ministers to pick arbitrary dates, and then to make domestic political promises based around them, actually undermines the UK’s negotiating position. It would be in Britain’s interest to have more flexibility rather than a ticking clock.

Moving to the other big story from the night, the SNP won 48 of 59 seats in Scotland. How does the debate over Scotland’s future in the United Kingdom play out from here?

The SNP has really strengthened its position, more than many expected. This is now set up for a huge constitutional struggle over the future of the United Kingdom.

I think there is a key dilemma for Scottish independence supporters, which is that on the one hand Brexit greatly strengthens the political case for independence. The difference between the political preferences in Scotland and the rest of the UK, particularly in England, is a perfect demonstration of that.

At the same time, once the UK has left the EU, independence becomes much more difficult technically and economically. There will be many of the same difficulties that there have been in discussing Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland. There will be a difficult debate over the currency. There are all sorts of challenges to creating a trade or regulatory border between England and Scotland. This is particularly true if there is a harder Brexit outcome, where Britain leaves the EU without a large amount of regulatory alignment.

On demands for a second independence referendum, I think in the first instance Boris Johnson will simply refuse to hold one. It’s probably not in his short-term interest to do anything else. Theresa May played it this way in 2017, repeatedly saying ‘now is not the time’.

In a similar way I think Johnson will just try to ride the pressure out, to the point where the SNP will need to face the challenges of advocating independence with the UK outside the EU. The next flashpoint will be the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2021.

Ultimately, though, it will become a democratically unsustainable position if Scotland continues to vote for the SNP, and refusing to sanction a second independence referendum might only reinforce that sentiment.

Follow Chatham House Twitter for more election coverage




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Transatlantic Dialogue on China

A joint Chatham House-RUSI project that focuses on strengthening common understanding across the Atlantic and develop new ideas for how the US and Europe can better engage with and respond to China’s rise.

This will be done through examining transatlantic approaches and responses to China through the lens for four key themes (digital technology; trade and investment; governance of global commons; and climate change and the environment) that have been identified as crucial to developing effective policy responses and fostering collaboration.

The project will strengthen national, regional and international responses to the risks and opportunities posed by China’s changing role within the global economy and international rules-based order.

Department contact

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
020 795 75748

More on Transatlantic Dialogue on China




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A Transatlantic Partnership for WTO Reform in the Age of Coronavirus

Webinar Research Event

28 April 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Event participants

Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director, Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission; European Union Visiting Fellow, Oxford University
Jennifer Hillman, Senior Fellow for Trade and International Political Economy, Council on Foreign Relations; Member, WTO Appellate Body, 2007 - 11
Chair: Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, Senior Research Fellow, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

Global trade and the WTO – which has been at the heart of the rules-based international trade system since its creation in 1995 – faced a critical moment even before COVID-19. The Appellate Body’s demise in December 2019 led to a renewed focus on the future of the WTO. But the challenges facing the WTO run deeper than that – the organization has lost relevance as a negotiation forum, resulting in the global trade rules not having kept pace with changes in technology and the rise of China. While the WTO provides a forum for international cooperation to address the trade fallout from COVID-19, what implications will the pandemic have for the long-term reform of the global trade system?

Both the US and EU have proposed various WTO reform strategies and taken steps towards collaboration, but is a transatlantic partnership for WTO reform feasible? Do the US and EU believe that a rules-based international trade system is in their interest – especially in light of COVID-19? What are the biggest issues dividing the US and EU on reforming the WTO, and is there a common assessment of the key problems? What steps can the US and EU take to address the dispute settlement function of the WTO and to modernize the trade rules? Are there broader issues, such as environmental and social sustainability, that should be included in a transatlantic agenda for WTO reform?

This event is  part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.




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Scotland's Place in the World

Members Event

2 September 2014 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Rt Hon Danny Alexander MP, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, UK
Chair: Faisal Islam, Political Editor, Sky News 

Ahead of the referendum on Scottish independence, the speaker will set out his vision for Scotland to remain as an integral and full member of the United Kingdom. He will explain that Scotland’s global influence and international reach – in terms of diplomacy, peacekeeping and aid relief – is significantly enhanced by being part of a bigger, stronger and more powerful state such as the UK.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available here at 18:00 BST on Tuesday 02 September.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to him during the event.

Event attributes

Livestream

Members Events Team




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A Transatlantic Partnership for WTO Reform in the Age of Coronavirus

Webinar Research Event

28 April 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Event participants

Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director, Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission; European Union Visiting Fellow, Oxford University
Jennifer Hillman, Senior Fellow for Trade and International Political Economy, Council on Foreign Relations; Member, WTO Appellate Body, 2007 - 11
Chair: Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, Senior Research Fellow, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

Global trade and the WTO – which has been at the heart of the rules-based international trade system since its creation in 1995 – faced a critical moment even before COVID-19. The Appellate Body’s demise in December 2019 led to a renewed focus on the future of the WTO. But the challenges facing the WTO run deeper than that – the organization has lost relevance as a negotiation forum, resulting in the global trade rules not having kept pace with changes in technology and the rise of China. While the WTO provides a forum for international cooperation to address the trade fallout from COVID-19, what implications will the pandemic have for the long-term reform of the global trade system?

Both the US and EU have proposed various WTO reform strategies and taken steps towards collaboration, but is a transatlantic partnership for WTO reform feasible? Do the US and EU believe that a rules-based international trade system is in their interest – especially in light of COVID-19? What are the biggest issues dividing the US and EU on reforming the WTO, and is there a common assessment of the key problems? What steps can the US and EU take to address the dispute settlement function of the WTO and to modernize the trade rules? Are there broader issues, such as environmental and social sustainability, that should be included in a transatlantic agenda for WTO reform?

This event is  part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.




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Undercurrents: Episode 2 – The Calabrian Mafia and Transatlantic Relations




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A Vision for the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship




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The Transatlantic Relationship: Challenges and Opportunities