A number of policymakers and analysts in the United States have called for countries like China and India to “do more” in the Middle East. Arguably, both Beijing and Delhi are doing more—though perhaps not in the way these advocates of greater Asian engagement in the Middle East might have wanted. President Xi Jinping recently traveled to the region and India’s Prime Minister Modi will return there over the weekend. After quick trips to Brussels for the India-EU Summit and a bilateral, as well as to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will head to Riyadh tomorrow. The trip reflects not just the importance of Saudi Arabia for India but also the Middle East (or what India calls West Asia) and the opportunity this particular moment offers to Indian policymakers.

The Middle East has been crucial for India for decades. It’s been a source of energy, jobs, remittances, and military equipment, and holds religious significance for tens of millions of Indians. It’s also been a source of concern, with fears about the negative impact of regional instability on Indian interests. But today, as Modi visits, there’s also opportunity for Indian policymakers in the fact that, for a number of reasons, India is important to Saudi Arabia and a number of Middle Eastern countries in a way and to an extent that was never true before. 

It’s a two-way street

As it has globally, India has a diversified set of partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining and balancing its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Israel. The region remains India’s main source of imported oil and natural gas (58 percent of its oil imports and 88 percent of its liquefied natural gas imports in 2014-15 came from the Middle East). In addition, as of January 2015, there were 7.3 million non-resident Indians in the region (64 percent of the total). These non-resident Indians remitted over $36 billion in 2015 (52 percent of the total remittances to India). Add to that India’s Sunni and Shiite populations (among the largest in the world), counter-terrorism cooperation with some countries, India’s defense relationship with Israel, the desire to connect with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran, and the potential market and source of capital it represents for Indian companies, and it becomes clear why this region is important for India. 

But, with many Middle Eastern countries pivoting to Asia or at least giving it a fresh look, India arguably has more leverage than it has ever had in the past. There have been a number of reasons why these countries have been looking east recently: 

• traditional strategic partnerships in flux and questions about the U.S. role in the region; 
• the economic slowdown in Europe and the U.S. following the 2008 financial crisis; 
• changing global energy consumption patterns; 
• growing concerns about terrorism in the region; 
• And, in Israel’s case, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement. 

In this context, India has some advantages. Its economy is doing relatively well compared to that of other countries and offers a market for goods and services, as well as potentially an investment destination. India, for example, has become Israeli defense companies’ largest foreign customer. 

Crucially for the oil and natural gas-producing states in the region, India also continues to guzzle significant—and growing—quantities of both. But, today, Delhi has buyer’s power. Why? Because oil prices are relatively low and there’s a lot of gas on the market, traditional buyers are looking elsewhere for fossil fuels or looking beyond them to cleaner energy sources. India, too, has more options and has been diversifying its sources of supply (compare India’s 74 percent dependence on the Middle East for oil in 2006-07 to the lower 58 percent that it gets from there now). 

India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market.

Thus, India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market. This has altered dynamics—and India’s increased leverage has been evident, for example, in the renegotiated natural gas supply deal between Qatar’s RasGas and India’s Petronet, which came with lower prices and waived penalties. Even countries like Iran, which now have more options for partners and have not hesitated to point that out to Delhi, still have an interest in maintaining their India option. Regional rivalries might have made Delhi’s balancing act in the region more complicated, but it also gives each country a reason to maintain its relationship with India. 

And the Modi government has been looking to take advantage of this situation. While its Act East policy received a lot more attention over the last couple of years—from policymakers and the press—this region hasn’t been missing from the agenda or travel itineraries. For example, Modi has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, and the Indian president has traveled to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The Indian foreign minister has visited Bahrain, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE and also participated the first ministerial meeting of the Arab-India Cooperation Forum in Manama earlier this year. The Modi government has also hosted the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the Bahraini, Iranian, Omani, Saudi, Syrian, and UAE foreign ministers, as well as the Israeli defense minister to India.

China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action.

But there have been concerns that this engagement is not sufficient, particularly relative to that of some countries. For example, China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action. The Indian foreign secretary’s recent comment that “we are no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes” in this region also seemed to reflect the understanding that Delhi needs to be more proactive about deepening its relationships with the countries in the region, rather than waiting for them to take shape organically or just reacting to events as they occur. 

The Saudi connection

It is in this context that Modi travels to Riyadh. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the key pillars of India’s Middle East policy. A major source of oil, jobs, and remittances, it is also a destination for over 400,000 Indians who go to the country for Hajj or Umra every year. In addition, in recent years, there has been more security cooperation, with Riyadh handing over individuals wanted in India and the two countries working together on countering money laundering and terrorism financing. 

The relationship has not been without problems from Delhi’s perspective. Just to list a few: 

• the Saudi-Pakistan relationship; 
• diaspora-related issues, including the treatment of Indian workers in-country and efforts towards Saudization that might limit employment opportunities for Indian expatriates;
• ideology-related concerns, particularly funding from Saudi Arabia for organizations in India, which might be increasing the influence of Wahhabism in the country; and
• regional dynamics, including Saudi Arabia’s rising tensions with Iran that has had consequences for Indian citizens, for example, in Yemen from where Delhi had to evacuate 4,640 Indians (as well as 960 foreigners).

More recently, incidents involving Saudi diplomats in India have also negatively affected (elite) public perceptions of the country, though the broader impact of this, if any, is unclear. Over the medium-to-long term, there are also concerns about potential instability within Saudi Arabia.

During Modi’s trip, however, the emphasis will be on the positives—not least in the hope that these might help alleviate some of the problems. The prime minister will be hosted by King Salman, who visited India as crown prince and defense minister just before Modi took office. He will also meet a slate of Saudi political and business leaders. The Indian wish-list will likely include diversification of economic ties, greater two-way investment, as well as more and better counter-terrorism cooperation. 

There will not be a large diaspora event—as Modi has done in Australia, Singapore, the UAE, United Kingdom, and the United States—but the prime minister will engage privately with members of the Indian community. He will also meet with Indian workers employed by an Indian company that is building part of the Riyadh metro. It is not hard to assess the reason for this particular engagement, given increased sensitivity in India (particularly in the media) about the treatment of citizens abroad, as well as the government’s interest in making a pitch for Indian companies to get greater market access. But, with Riyadh’s interest in creating jobs for Saudis, Modi will also try to highlight that Indian companies are contributing to the training and employment of locals (especially women) by visiting another Indian company’s all-female business process service center.

This will reflect the broader theme of highlighting to Riyadh and Saudis that it is not just India that benefits from the relationship—they do too. Some in India hope this has an additional effect: of giving Riyadh a reason not to let its relationship with Pakistan limit that with India, and perhaps occasionally making it willing to use some of its leverage with that country to India’s benefit. Despite recent irritants in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, however, Delhi is realistic about the limits of weaning Riyadh away from Islamabad.

So does all this mean India will “do more” in the Middle East? For all the reasons mentioned above, the country has been involved in the region for a number of years—though, as the Indian foreign secretary has noted, this involvement was not in large part the product of active state policy. Indian interests in the region will likely increase in the future and, thus, so will its corporate and official engagement. But that engagement might not be what some American observers have in mind. As India’s capabilities grow, it might do more in terms of providing maritime security, intelligence sharing, evacuating expatriates when necessary, and contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It could also potentially do more in terms of capacity building within these countries with the support of the host governments. There might also be scope for India to expand its West Asia dialogue with countries like the United States. But it will likely remain wary of picking sides or getting involved in non-U.N.-sanctioned military interventions in the region unless its interests are directly affected (the previous BJP-led coalition government did briefly consider—and then reject—joining the United States coalition in the Iraq war, for instance).

Next week, Americans will be looking westward to the Tuesday Democratic primary in California. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Obama and then the U.S. Congress will host someone very familiar with electoral politics: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

This will be the third Modi-Obama summit since the Indian prime minister took office two years ago. Since their first phone call on May 16, 2014, the two leaders have also met multiple times at regional and global gatherings or on the sidelines of those summits. This frequency has been a departure from the past and has even led some—particularly in the Indian media—to ask: why is Modi visiting the United States again? A simple answer would be “because he was invited,” and there are a few reasons why the White House extended that invitation and why Modi accepted.

At a time when [Obama] is being criticized for not having done enough or for doing the wrong thing on foreign policy, he can point to the U.S.-India relationship as a success.

Achievements logged

For President Obama, there’s the legacy issue. At a time when he is being criticized for not having done enough or for doing the wrong thing on foreign policy, he can point to the U.S.-India relationship as a success, particularly in the context of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. U.S. popularity is up in India according to polls and three-quarters of those surveyed in India last year expressed confidence in Obama on world affairs. 

President George W. Bush left office after having signed the historic civil nuclear deal with India. Obama can claim to have put quite a few more runs on the board. At a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Biswal indeed laid out some key developments in the relationship in the Obama era: 

Strengthening friendships

For Prime Minister Modi and the Indian government, the visit represents another chance to strengthen India’s partnership with a country that Modi has called “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible, influential world power.” The United States is India’s largest trading partner and a crucial source of capital, technology, knowledge, resources, remittances, and military equipment. It can also help ensure multi-polarity in Asia, which is a crucial goal for Indian policymakers. 

The visit is also an opportunity for Modi to engage with legislators and the American private sector—two key constituencies that can help determine the pace of progress in the relationship. House Speaker Paul Ryan has invited the Indian leaders to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, and Modi will be the fifth Indian prime minister to do so (India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave back-to-back speeches to the House and Senate separately in 1949). But it’ll likely hold special significance for the prime minister and his supporters, given that from 2005 to 2014, then Gujarat Chief Minister Modi was denied entry into the United States. 

A busy calendar

Modi’s has a packed schedule in Washington. On June 6, he’ll visit Arlington National Cemetery, meet with the heads of think tanks, and participate in an event involving the recovery and return of stolen Indian antiquities. On June 7, he’ll meet with President Obama, who will also host a lunch for him, and then Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. That will be followed by meetings with business leaders and an address to the U.S.-India Business Council. Expect to see Modi highlight and defend his government’s two-year record on the economy and make a pitch for U.S. businesses to increase their involvement in India—and particularly some of Modi’s flagship initiatives such as Make in India and Digital India.

Expect to see Modi highlight and defend his government’s two-year record on the economy and make a pitch for U.S. businesses to increase their involvement in India.

June 8 will be devoted to Congressional engagement, including the joint address, a lunch hosted by Speaker Ryan, and a reception hosted by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, as well as the India Caucus. Modi will acknowledge the legislature’s role and significance in developing the U.S.-India relationship, and will likely highlight the democratic values the two countries share, as well as how India and Indians have contributed to the United States, global growth, and the international order. Importantly, in an election year, Modi will likely note the bipartisan nature of the relationship—there’s no indication yet that he will or wants to meet any of the presidential candidates on this visit, though the sessions potentially offer opportunities for him to do so. Republican members of Congress will also seek to highlight their role in the development of the partnership. The interactions on Capitol Hill will also be a chance for Modi to address some Congressional concerns—such as human rights, Iran, non-proliferation, the investment climate—and for Modi to call for the two countries to “accommodat[e] each other’s concerns.”

Do not, however, expect to hear the word “Pakistan”—the Indian government wants to avoid hyphenation and get Americans to think of India beyond India-Pakistan terms. Nor should you expect to hear the word “China,” though there might be subtle attempts to note the contrast with that other Asian giant and make the case for the United States to support the rise of a large Asian democracy that can demonstrate that democracy and development aren’t mutually exclusive.

Parting glance between Modi and Obama

And what’s on the agenda for the Modi-Obama meeting? In one sense, the last few years have signaled a regularization of U.S.-India leader-level summits (with bilateral meetings in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016). Over the last two years, high-level meetings have been effective as action-forcing events. This time, officials have been managing expectations, broadly describing the visit as “part of consolidating and celebrating the relationship.” So this is a chance to recognize the steps that the other side has taken to increase the run-rate of the relationship—particularly on defense and security fronts—and tie up some loose ends with an eye towards sustaining momentum into the next administration (without necessarily tying its hands). 

In terms of focus areas, the governments have emphasized (to varying degrees) economic ties, energy and climate change, as well as defense and security cooperation. The Obama administration would like to India ratify the Paris agreement, for instance—unlike in the United States, India doesn’t require legislative approval. Indian officials recognize the importance of this issue to Obama, but are also concerned about U.S. policy continuity given the presumptive Republican nominee’s stand on the issue. Delhi, in turn, is partly using the shared desire for India to meet its clean energy commitments to make the case for an American full-court press to facilitate Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—similar to the Bush administration’s efforts to help India get an NSG waiver in 2008. The U.S. position has been that India is ready for NSG membership and meets requirements for membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and it has supported Indian application and eventual membership of both, as well as two other nonproliferation and export control regimes. Asked if Modi would ask Obama to “go to bat for India” with others on this, the Indian foreign secretary didn’t answer directly but noted: “countries that feel we’re doing the right thing...if they take it upon themselves to…articulate their positions and talk to others, this is what friends do for each other.” Modi himself will visit two other NSG members (Switzerland and Mexico) just before and after the U.S. visit partly to make the case for India’s membership.

The visit will also be a chance to cement and highlight cooperation in and on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In addition, observers will be watching to see whether the two countries will sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)—the logistics support agreement that the Indian defense minister said in April that Secretary Carter and he had “agreed in principle to conclude”—or whether there’ll be further announcements with regard to the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative. There’ll also be interest in whether the countries get serious talks restarted on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and whether Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India can finalize an agreement to set up reactors in India. Overall, there is a desire to take the relationship to the “next level” but not necessarily in terms of a big deal; rather there’s a search for ways to deepen, operationalize, and institutionalize cooperation—such as through arrangements to share information in the counterterrorism space—and facilitate interaction between an increasing number of stakeholders.

While highlighting areas of convergence, both sides will likely also discuss the divergences that remain—perhaps including the east-west divergence related to Pakistan, the north-south divergence related to Russia, the security-economic divergence with more progress in the partnership on the former than the latter, and the potential expectations-reality divergence. And while the direction of the U.S.-India relationship is likely to remain the same in the near future, how the two countries deal with these divergences will determine the trajectory and the pace of the relationship.

Quoting Walt Whitman in his speech to a joint meeting of Congress last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared: “there is a new symphony in play.” He was referring to the relationship, but there were some new themes in his speech as well, in addition to a few familiar, predictable ones.

The old

Shared Democratic Values. Modi’s speech covered some of the same ground on shared democratic values as his predecessors. Referring to Congress as a “temple of democracy”—a phrased he’s used in the past for the Indian parliament—and to India’s constitution as its “real holy book,” he stressed that freedom and equality were shared beliefs. In a section that elicited laughter, he also commented that the two countries shared certain practices—legislatures known for bipartisanship and operating harmoniously. Also par for the course was Modi’s emphasis on India’s diversity. An implicit response to critics of India on human rights (including minority rights), freedom of the press, and tolerance of dissent, Modi noted that India’s constitution protected the equal rights of all citizens and enshrined freedom of faith. Echoing former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s words on unity in diversity, he asserted “India lives as one; India grows as one; India celebrates as one.” 

Terrorism. Like Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh before him, Modi highlighted the challenge of terrorism, stressing it was globally the “biggest threat.” Acknowledging existing India-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation, he called for more, including an approach “that isolates those who harbor, support and sponsor terrorists; that does not distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists; and that delinks religion from terrorism.” Like his predecessors, Modi did not explicitly mention Pakistan, but alluded to it. He asserted that while it was a global problem, terrorism was “incubated” in India’s neighborhood. In what seemed like a reference to the Congressional hold on the subsidized sale of F-16s to Pakistan, the Indian prime minister also lauded that body for “sending a clear message to those who preach and practice terrorism for political gains. Refusing to reward them is the first step towards holding them accountable for their actions.” 

The Indian Economy. From Jawaharlal Nehru onward, prime ministers have outlined their domestic objectives in speeches to Congress, highlighting the reforms they’ve undertaken. Modi did too, highlighting India’s growth rate and economic opportunities, while acknowledging that much remained to be done. And there were also subtle responses to criticisms of Indian economic policy: for example, the remark about legislative gridlock suggested that American policymakers should understand why some reforms in India are taking time; the quip about India not claiming intellectual property rights on yoga was a rejoinder to those who give India a hard time about intellectual property rights (especially in the pharmaceutical sector). He also noted that in the past “wagers were made on our failure,” and yet Indians have time and again found a way to survive and succeed.

The new

Anti-Declinism. For those promising to make America great again, Modi had a message: it already is. In a speech to the U.S.-India Business Council the day before, he exuded optimism—not just about India, but the United States as well, asserting that, to him, “America is not just a country with a great past; it is a country with an exciting future.” In his speech to Congress, he referred to the U.S. as “great” at least four times and spoke of its “innovative genius.” Recalling that he’d thus far visited half of all American states, he noted what he believed was the United States’ “real strength”: Americans’ ability to dream big and be bold. 

In an election year when the nature and extent of American engagement with the world is being debated, Modi acknowledged the country’s global contributions and called for a continued U.S. role in the world. He applauded—and led members of Congress in a round of applause—for “the great sacrifices of the men and women from ‘The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave’ in service of mankind.” With the exception of Nehru, who paid his respects at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Indian premiers have tended not to mention American troops—partly a result of differing views on the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq wars. Modi, on the other hand, explicitly mentioned U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, where “the sacrifices of Americans have helped create a better life.” 

In a more challenging, complex, and uncertain world, he asserted that U.S.-Indian engagement could make an impact, by “promoting cooperation not dominance; connectivity not isolation; respect for global commons; inclusive not exclusive mechanisms; and above all adherence to international rules and norms.” (No prizes for guessing the country that went unnamed). 

The Open Embrace. Modi-Obama hugs have fueled many a tweet. But the speech signaled and reflected a much broader embrace—an India-U.S. one that has been in the works for at least the last 17 years but has become much more visible in the last two. In 2000, addressing Congress, Vajpayee called for the two countries to “remove the shadow of hesitation that lies between us and our joint vision.” Not all his compatriots will agree, but Modi declared: “Today, our relationship has overcome the hesitations of history” and recalled Vajpayee labeling the two as “natural allies.” Listing the ways the relationship had grown closer, he emphasized that this “remarkable story” was not a partisan effort: “[t]hrough the cycle of elections and transitions of administrations the intensity of our engagements has only grown.” He also talked about what the two countries could do together, and stressed that the relationship was good for India. While he’s previously called the United States “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible, influential world power,” he went further this time, stating: “In every sector of India’s forward march, I see the U.S. as an indispensable partner.” 

Not a Free-Rider. But throughout the speech, Modi asserted that this relationship benefited both countries “in great measure,” with a “positive impact on the lives” of people in each. Echoing Singh, he noted that many members of Congress indeed believed that “a stronger and prosperous India is in America’s strategic interest.” Modi made the case that India is not a free rider—that through its businesses, market, talent, and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society. The day before, in his speech to business leaders, he stressed that India was also “poised to contribute as a new engine of global growth” (and made a pitch for support to such “democratic” engines).

Modi furthermore highlighted Indian contributions to global and regional peace and prosperity, noting, for example, that its “soldiers too have fallen in distant battlefields” for freedom and democracy (alluding to the millions that fought in the World Wars). He also highlighted India’s efforts in Afghanistan, its troop contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations, its role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and its evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued Americans as well. In addition, Modi noted India’s contributions of ideas, whether yoga or non-violent protest. And he stressed that India would be a responsible stakeholder and security provider—one that, in partnership with the United States, could “anchor peace, prosperity and stability from Asia to Africa and from Indian Ocean to the Pacific. It can also help ensure security of the sea lanes of commerce and freedom of navigation on seas.” But he also called for international institutions to reflect this role and “the realities of today.”

Members of Congress, for their part, will look to see whether and how Modi’s rhetoric will translate into reality. The prime minister suggested that it won’t always be the way the United States would like. He didn’t use the term “strategic autonomy,” but talked of “autonomy in decision-making”—while noting that it, as well as “diversity in our perspectives,” weren’t bad things for the partnership. And, as is his preferred style, he came up with 3Cs to characterize the state of the relationship: “comfort, candor, and convergence.” Whether they remain characteristic of the partnership, and to what degree, will partly depend on who is the next U.S. president and how she or he sees the U.S. role in the world and India’s place in it.

Some quick thoughts on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's trip to China thus far, following the release of the Joint Statement, and Modi’s remarks at the Great Hall of the People, at Tsinghua University, and at a bilateral forum of state and provincial leaders:  

1. Candid Modi. In his statement to the media, Modi noted that the bilateral discussions had been “candid, constructive and friendly.” He was definitely more candid in his remarks about Indian concerns than is normal for Indian leaders during China-India summits. While senior Indian policymakers often downplay the bilateral differences during visits (incoming and outgoing) and focus more on cooperative elements, in two speeches and in the joint statement released, Modi mentioned them repeatedly. He talked about the relationship being “complex,” as well as about issues that “trouble smooth development of our relations” and held back the relationship. He urged China to think strategically (and long-term) and “reconsider its approach” on various issues. First and foremost: its approach toward the border, but also visas and trans-border rivers, as well as the region (read China’s relations with Pakistan among others). China’s approach on economic questions was also put on the table, with Modi stating that, in the long-term, the partnership was not sustainable if Indian industry didn’t get better access to the Chinese market. The joint statement acknowledged that the level of the trade imbalance (in China’s favor) was not sustainable either. Modi also made clear that India wants China’s support for a greater role in international institutions. He specifically highlighted that China’s support for a permanent seat for India at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) and Indian membership of export control regimes would be helpful to the relationship (interestingly, he explained India’s desire for UNSC permanent membership as stemming from the same logic as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—part of Asia “seeking a bigger voice in global affairs.” In the joint statement, however, China continued just to recognize India’s aspirations for a greater UNSC role. It did though include mention of India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group aspiration.

There was also an overall message from Modi that these issues couldn't be set aside and that progress was necessary: “…if we have to realise the extraordinary potential of our partnership, we must also address the issues that lead to hesitation and doubts, even distrust, in our relationship.”

2. The Border. Modi put the border at the top of the list of such issues, stating “we must try to settle the boundary question quickly.” Seeming to add a parameter to any potential solution, he stated that the two countries should settle this question “in a manner that transforms our relationship and [will] not cause new disruptions.” In the meantime, he noted that the mechanisms managing the border were working fine, but asserted that it was important to clarify the Line of Actual Control since otherwise there was a persisting “shadow of uncertainty.” He noted that he’d proposed a resumption of “the process of clarifying it.” The joint statement stated a desire for enhanced exchanges between the militaries to better communication on the border and an exploration of whether/how to increase trade at the border.

As is wont for Indian leaders in China, Modi didn’t explicitly assert India’s claim to the state of Arunachal Pradesh, but for those of us who read between the lines, he mentioned the number of states India had, referring to “30 pillars comprising the Central Government and all our States”—those 29 states include Arunachal Pradesh.

3. Economics. Modi’s day in Shanghai on May 16 will feature the economic relationship more. He did note the “high level of ambition” the two sides had for the relationship and his hope to see increased Chinese investment in infrastructure and manufacturing in India. China and India agreed that bilateral trade was “skewed” and likely unsustainable if that didn’t change.

At his speech at Tsinghua he linked both Mumbai’s rise to trade with China and the evolution of silk tanchoi sarees to skills learnt by Indians from Chinese weavers—thus both pointing out that the trade relationship is an interrupted one and (to his domestic critics) that India stands to gain from this engagement.

4. Building Trust & (People-to-People) Ties. There was a major emphasis in Modi’s remarks on building trust, and improving communication and connectivity, with a special emphasis on enhancing people-to-people ties. On the latter, he stated frankly, “Indians and Chinese don't know each other well, much less understand each other.” Various polls and surveys also show that, what they do know, they often don’t like.

This lack of trust, knowledge, and even interest could limit policymakers’ options (including in settling the border question) down the line. Thus, Modi asserted that China and India “must build more bridges of familiarity and comfort between our people.” To increase travel to India (and bring in tourism revenue), he announced that India’s e-visa facility will be made available to Chinese nationals. The two countries also agreed to establish consulates in Chennai and Chengdu. For greater learning about each other, there were decisions to set up an annual bilateral Think Tank Forum, to institutionalize the High-Level Medium Forum, and establish a Centre for Gandhian and Indian Studies at Fudan University.

Modi also noted that, at the end of the day, improving opportunities for interaction wasn’t sufficient. China would also have to do its bit to shape perceptions of itself in India—since even “small steps can have a deep impact on how our people see each other.”

There was also an emphasis on moving beyond Delhi, including through the establishment of the State and Provincial Leaders' Forum, with a desire to increase and facilitate engagement at the state and city levels.

On the central level, there were decisions announced to enhance or institutionalize engagement at the leaders level, as well as between the foreign policy and planning bureaucracies, as well as the defense establishments. Modi also especially highlighted “Our decision to enhance strategic communication and coordination on our region…”

5. Regional and Global Issues. While there was mention of continuing cooperation towards the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, if Beijing was looking for an endorsement of its One Belt, One Road initiatives, it wasn’t forthcoming. Modi noted that both China and India were “trying to strengthen regional connectivity and seeking ‘to connect a fragmented Asia.’” But he distinguished between two types of projects: “There are projects we will pursue individually. There are few such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor that we are doing jointly.”

There was special mention of shared interests in West Asia and Afghanistan, as well as counterterrorism and climate change—the latter even got a separate joint statement. The main joint statement had an interesting reference to the two countries broadening cooperation in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation—China is not a member, but many believe that it would like to be (India’s traditionally been hesitant for China to go beyond its observer role).

Modi also highlighted a “resurgent Asia” that offers “great promise, but also many uncertainties” and “an unpredictable and complex environment of shifting equations.”

Modi acknowledged China and India’s “shared neighbourhood,” where they were both increasing engagement. He also seemed to admit that this could cause concern and thus “deeper strategic communication to build mutual trust and confidence” was essential. Perhaps pointing to China’s relations with Pakistan and others in India’s neighborhood, Modi stressed, “We must ensure that our relationships with other countries do not become a source of concern for each other.” However, this also acknowledged Chinese anxieties about India’s evolving relationships.

For those in China concerned about India’s relations with the United States and if it was designed to contain China, Modi had a message: “If the last century was the age of alliances, this is an era of inter-dependence. So, talks of alliances against one another have no foundation. In any case, we are both ancient civilizations, large and independent nations. Neither of us can be contained or become part of anyone's plans.”

6. The Image of a Confident India. Modi’s remarks seemed intended to exude confidence about India and its role in the world. He stated that in an age of many transformations, “the most significant change of this era is the re-emergence of China and India.” Laying out why India, in his perspective, is the next big thing, he seemed to suggest that it was in China’s interest to get on board the India train. He noted the political mandate he had, the steps his government had taken, and that “no other economy in the world offers such opportunities for the future as India's.” The Indian prime minister asserted, “We are at a moment when we have the opportunity to make our choices.” He seemed to want to make clear that enhancing engagement with India would be the right one for China.

Bonus Takeaways

Winner: Social media—it's been ubiquitous, from Modi joining China's Weibo to the Modi selfie with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to the continuation of the Modi-looking-at-things meme.

Loser: Panchsheel. It'd been a bit odd that India had continued to choose to mention Panchsheel and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—principles that are remembered by many in India as being honored by China in the breach than in the observance in the late 1950s and early 1960s. There was even a shout-out to it in the Modi-Xi joint statement in September 2014. But it's missing in action in the 2015 joint statement and seems to have been replaced by this:

The leaders agreed that the process of the two countries pursuing their respective national developmental goals and security interests must unfold in a mutually supportive manner with both sides showing mutual respect and sensitivity to each other’s concerns, interests and aspirations. This constructive model of relationship between the two largest developing countries, the biggest emerging economies and two major poles in the global architecture provides a new basis for pursuing state-to-state relations to strengthen the international system.

Event Information

On May 26, 2014, after the Bharatiya Janata Party won a convincing majority in India’s national elections, Narendra Modi took office as prime minister. The first Indian premier to be born after independence, he formed the first majority government in India in more than 25 years. Over the past 12 months, policymakers, corporate leaders, analysts, and the media in India and abroad have been watching closely to see whether Modi can deliver on the promises of growth, good governance, greater role and respect on the world stage, and getting things done.

On May 20, the India Project at Brookings hosted an event to assess the Modi government’s first year in office. The panel considered developments over the last year in the economic, social, energy, and foreign policy realms, as well as in domestic politics. Panelists discussed their perspectives of the government’s performance, where they see continuity vs. change, what has surprised them, what we might expect to see in the future, and key developments to look for over the next year.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #ModiYearOne

Video

• The Modi government in India turns one: An assessment

Audio

• The Modi government in India turns one: An assessment

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150520_modi_government_transcript

Event Information

On September 23, 2015, close on the heels of the U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive in New York on his second trip to the United States in that role. Along with his presence at the U.N. General Assembly opening and bilateral meetings, his trip will also include a visit to California. His agenda there will include meetings with several technology companies and interactions with the Indian diaspora.

On September 25, The India Project at Brookings hosted an event to discuss Modi’s visit and assess developments in India and the U.S.-India relationship in the year, his last U.S. visit. The panel explored the state of the Indian economy and foreign policy, the political landscape, and how the Modi government is perceived at home and abroad. Panelists will also outline the next few months in terms of Indian domestic politics and policy, as well as its foreign policy.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #ModiInUS

Video

• Prime Minister Modi returns to the U.S.

Audio

• Prime Minister Modi returns to the U.S.

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150925_modi_india_us_transcript

A number of policymakers and analysts in the United States have called for countries like China and India to “do more” in the Middle East. Arguably, both Beijing and Delhi are doing more—though perhaps not in the way these advocates of greater Asian engagement in the Middle East might have wanted. President Xi Jinping recently traveled to the region and India’s Prime Minister Modi will return there over the weekend. After quick trips to Brussels for the India-EU Summit and a bilateral, as well as to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will head to Riyadh tomorrow. The trip reflects not just the importance of Saudi Arabia for India but also the Middle East (or what India calls West Asia) and the opportunity this particular moment offers to Indian policymakers.

The Middle East has been crucial for India for decades. It’s been a source of energy, jobs, remittances, and military equipment, and holds religious significance for tens of millions of Indians. It’s also been a source of concern, with fears about the negative impact of regional instability on Indian interests. But today, as Modi visits, there’s also opportunity for Indian policymakers in the fact that, for a number of reasons, India is important to Saudi Arabia and a number of Middle Eastern countries in a way and to an extent that was never true before. 

It’s a two-way street

As it has globally, India has a diversified set of partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining and balancing its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Israel. The region remains India’s main source of imported oil and natural gas (58 percent of its oil imports and 88 percent of its liquefied natural gas imports in 2014-15 came from the Middle East). In addition, as of January 2015, there were 7.3 million non-resident Indians in the region (64 percent of the total). These non-resident Indians remitted over $36 billion in 2015 (52 percent of the total remittances to India). Add to that India’s Sunni and Shiite populations (among the largest in the world), counter-terrorism cooperation with some countries, India’s defense relationship with Israel, the desire to connect with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran, and the potential market and source of capital it represents for Indian companies, and it becomes clear why this region is important for India. 

But, with many Middle Eastern countries pivoting to Asia or at least giving it a fresh look, India arguably has more leverage than it has ever had in the past. There have been a number of reasons why these countries have been looking east recently: 

• traditional strategic partnerships in flux and questions about the U.S. role in the region; 
• the economic slowdown in Europe and the U.S. following the 2008 financial crisis; 
• changing global energy consumption patterns; 
• growing concerns about terrorism in the region; 
• And, in Israel’s case, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement. 

In this context, India has some advantages. Its economy is doing relatively well compared to that of other countries and offers a market for goods and services, as well as potentially an investment destination. India, for example, has become Israeli defense companies’ largest foreign customer. 

Crucially for the oil and natural gas-producing states in the region, India also continues to guzzle significant—and growing—quantities of both. But, today, Delhi has buyer’s power. Why? Because oil prices are relatively low and there’s a lot of gas on the market, traditional buyers are looking elsewhere for fossil fuels or looking beyond them to cleaner energy sources. India, too, has more options and has been diversifying its sources of supply (compare India’s 74 percent dependence on the Middle East for oil in 2006-07 to the lower 58 percent that it gets from there now). 

India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market.

Thus, India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market. This has altered dynamics—and India’s increased leverage has been evident, for example, in the renegotiated natural gas supply deal between Qatar’s RasGas and India’s Petronet, which came with lower prices and waived penalties. Even countries like Iran, which now have more options for partners and have not hesitated to point that out to Delhi, still have an interest in maintaining their India option. Regional rivalries might have made Delhi’s balancing act in the region more complicated, but it also gives each country a reason to maintain its relationship with India. 

And the Modi government has been looking to take advantage of this situation. While its Act East policy received a lot more attention over the last couple of years—from policymakers and the press—this region hasn’t been missing from the agenda or travel itineraries. For example, Modi has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, and the Indian president has traveled to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The Indian foreign minister has visited Bahrain, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE and also participated the first ministerial meeting of the Arab-India Cooperation Forum in Manama earlier this year. The Modi government has also hosted the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the Bahraini, Iranian, Omani, Saudi, Syrian, and UAE foreign ministers, as well as the Israeli defense minister to India.

China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action.

But there have been concerns that this engagement is not sufficient, particularly relative to that of some countries. For example, China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action. The Indian foreign secretary’s recent comment that “we are no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes” in this region also seemed to reflect the understanding that Delhi needs to be more proactive about deepening its relationships with the countries in the region, rather than waiting for them to take shape organically or just reacting to events as they occur. 

The Saudi connection

It is in this context that Modi travels to Riyadh. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the key pillars of India’s Middle East policy. A major source of oil, jobs, and remittances, it is also a destination for over 400,000 Indians who go to the country for Hajj or Umra every year. In addition, in recent years, there has been more security cooperation, with Riyadh handing over individuals wanted in India and the two countries working together on countering money laundering and terrorism financing. 

The relationship has not been without problems from Delhi’s perspective. Just to list a few: 

• the Saudi-Pakistan relationship; 
• diaspora-related issues, including the treatment of Indian workers in-country and efforts towards Saudization that might limit employment opportunities for Indian expatriates;
• ideology-related concerns, particularly funding from Saudi Arabia for organizations in India, which might be increasing the influence of Wahhabism in the country; and
• regional dynamics, including Saudi Arabia’s rising tensions with Iran that has had consequences for Indian citizens, for example, in Yemen from where Delhi had to evacuate 4,640 Indians (as well as 960 foreigners).

More recently, incidents involving Saudi diplomats in India have also negatively affected (elite) public perceptions of the country, though the broader impact of this, if any, is unclear. Over the medium-to-long term, there are also concerns about potential instability within Saudi Arabia.

During Modi’s trip, however, the emphasis will be on the positives—not least in the hope that these might help alleviate some of the problems. The prime minister will be hosted by King Salman, who visited India as crown prince and defense minister just before Modi took office. He will also meet a slate of Saudi political and business leaders. The Indian wish-list will likely include diversification of economic ties, greater two-way investment, as well as more and better counter-terrorism cooperation. 

There will not be a large diaspora event—as Modi has done in Australia, Singapore, the UAE, United Kingdom, and the United States—but the prime minister will engage privately with members of the Indian community. He will also meet with Indian workers employed by an Indian company that is building part of the Riyadh metro. It is not hard to assess the reason for this particular engagement, given increased sensitivity in India (particularly in the media) about the treatment of citizens abroad, as well as the government’s interest in making a pitch for Indian companies to get greater market access. But, with Riyadh’s interest in creating jobs for Saudis, Modi will also try to highlight that Indian companies are contributing to the training and employment of locals (especially women) by visiting another Indian company’s all-female business process service center.

This will reflect the broader theme of highlighting to Riyadh and Saudis that it is not just India that benefits from the relationship—they do too. Some in India hope this has an additional effect: of giving Riyadh a reason not to let its relationship with Pakistan limit that with India, and perhaps occasionally making it willing to use some of its leverage with that country to India’s benefit. Despite recent irritants in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, however, Delhi is realistic about the limits of weaning Riyadh away from Islamabad.

So does all this mean India will “do more” in the Middle East? For all the reasons mentioned above, the country has been involved in the region for a number of years—though, as the Indian foreign secretary has noted, this involvement was not in large part the product of active state policy. Indian interests in the region will likely increase in the future and, thus, so will its corporate and official engagement. But that engagement might not be what some American observers have in mind. As India’s capabilities grow, it might do more in terms of providing maritime security, intelligence sharing, evacuating expatriates when necessary, and contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It could also potentially do more in terms of capacity building within these countries with the support of the host governments. There might also be scope for India to expand its West Asia dialogue with countries like the United States. But it will likely remain wary of picking sides or getting involved in non-U.N.-sanctioned military interventions in the region unless its interests are directly affected (the previous BJP-led coalition government did briefly consider—and then reject—joining the United States coalition in the Iraq war, for instance).

On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.

On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.