The US−UK ‘Special Relationship’ is in decline, and a British decision to leave the EU would hasten its demise. As Great Britain increasingly becomes just one of America’s many strategic relationships, Brexit would speed the transfer of US attention and energy from the UK to the continent. This, however, does not need to be inevitable. The necessary ingredient to reverse this decline is stronger British leadership internationally.

The US government has made it abundantly clear that its preference is to see the UK remain in the European Union. In January 2013, when David Cameron had not yet committed to a referendum, Phil Gordon, the US assistant secretary of state for European affairs bluntly stated that it is in the American interest for the US ‘to see a strong British voice in that European Union.’ The fact that a senior US official would go so far – to be seen to intervene so early in a divisive domestic political issue – spoke volumes about how important this is to America. This week, President Obama will visit the UK to send an equally firm, if polite, message to the British public.

Why does the US want the UK to remain in Europe?

From the US perspective, there are three principal elements that the UK brings to the table in the bilateral relationship. The first stems from Britain’s capabilities, particularly in the military and intelligence arenas. US−UK intelligence sharing, the closest for both countries, has a long history dating back to the Second World War. For good or ill the UK has been among America’s leading allies in every major conflict the US has been involved in for the last quarter of a century – in the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the interventions in Libya as well as current operations against ISIS in Iraq and, belatedly, Syria.

The second relates to the political value of having a reliable partner in international engagements – and thereby avoiding the perception of acting unilaterally. Shared history and values, and thus often perspectives (as well as capabilities) have ensured that the UK has long been the first port of call for the US when seeking to solve international problems or build coalitions. At the same time, Britain’s historical global reach and diplomatic experience around the world (not least in areas of current concern such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, and Iraq) have provided American policy-makers with valuable input on foreign policy issues that has contributed to their own internal decision making.

The third area of added value for the US is Britain’s place in the EU. While British and US policy preferences may at times diverge, as they have recently on the Israel−Palestine issue, for example, their common outlooks and interests mean that Britain is the closest thing that the United States has to having a voice in the EU. At the same time, the US also sees the UK as the country most likely to support an open trade and investment agenda and a more proactive approach to dealing with the challenges in Europe’s neighbourhood, policies that leaders in both countries agree are necessary to make the EU a more effective actor and better partner to the US on the international scene.

The transition from US−UK ties to US−European ties

In recent years, however, the US has begun to diversify its relationships within Europe, in part as the UK has become unable or unwilling to step up and fulfil these three elements of paramount importance to the US.

Defence and intelligence

With regards to defence capabilities, it is no longer the UK that the United States inevitably looks to first. In Libya, the operation that started with the defence of Benghazi from Gaddafi’s forces in March 2012 (that eventually came to remove Gaddafi himself) was jointly led by the French and the British, although then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to be the driving force. More recently, it was the French with whom the US partnered in responding to the terrorist activities in Mali and who were first to support the US in action in Syria (following a UK parliamentary vote to stay out in August 2013 and a belated vote to act in December 2015). But in recent years others have worked more closely with the United States militarily as well, including in particular Poland and Denmark (although with the new government in Poland, the relationship might wither again).

This trend towards more diversified military engagement with other European states looks set to continue in the near term. Despite taking a tough position in the 2014 NATO Summit to reinforce the NATO commitment of two per cent of GDP spending on defence, the Cameron government came very close to falling below this line in 2015 (after five years of real defence cuts). The eventual decision to commit to meet this target, along with the newly released Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), have somewhat reassured American policy-makers of the UK’s continued ambition and capabilities. But there remains a lack of US confidence that this is only a temporary uptick in UK attention on defence. Meanwhile, America will continue to expand its horizons.

The story on intelligence sharing is slightly different, but here too obstacles have arisen in the close US-UK exchange of information. Since the end of the Second World War, the US and UK have been part of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance – with Australia, New Zealand and Canada – that allows the close sharing of intelligence. And arguably, within the Five Eyes, the links between the US and UK are the closest of all. However, more recently, tensions have emerged. Over the past five or so years, the British judicial system in particular has pushed back on US confidentiality rules in ways that make the US intelligence services nervous of continuing to share information; given the current close relationship, this could be more of an obstacle than it is for other countries sharing intel with the US.

At the same time, with the ISIS-inspired resurgence in the terrorist threat in both Europe and the US, it is becoming increasingly clear that the close intelligence sharing between the US and UK must take place much more widely. The current systems – through NATO or INTERPOL – have proven too slow and ineffective, as the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels have made clear. Sharing among the US and UK, or even among the Five Eyes, is insufficient – increasingly the relationships will have to be broadened.

Partnership

The US is also looking elsewhere for partnership in its international engagements, including on some of the issues that are at the top of the inbox for the American president.

On responding to Russian actions in Ukraine, it is clear that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in the lead, both in corralling Europeans to maintain the sanctions but also in negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was highlighted in the creation of the Normandy format in the summer of 2014, a group encompassing Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine (but not the UK or the US), to resolve the situation in the east of Ukraine. On another issue of significant import to the United States, European economic prosperity and stability, Merkel is again the leading actor in Europe.

In the case of targeted bombing in Syria, it was not the British that were first to join the United States in the offensive against ISIS, but instead the French. President Francois Hollande also proved far more proactive after Syrian President Assad crossed the chemical weapons ‘redline’ in 2013, although in the end France was left hanging when President Obama decided to step back from military action after the failure of the British parliamentary vote to authorize UK involvement.

Finally, on at least one issue of great import to the US – China – the UK appears to be diverging meaningfully. The most recent case – the UK decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015 – is perhaps the starkest example of such differing policy positions that have caused significant frustration in the US.

Influence in the European Union

With regards to Europe, even before the referendum was formally announced, it was increasingly clear that the UK was less inclined to engage proactively in the EU. A number of factors have ensured that, particularly since 2010, the UK has become less influential there.

British influence has been diminished through actions by the Cameron government that have, perhaps unnecessarily, antagonized many across the Channel. Many European conservatives became frustrated early in Cameron’s tenure when he decided to take the Conservative Party out of the principal conservative group in the European parliament, the European People’s Party. This sentiment only worsened in recent years as, albeit for perhaps understandable domestic political reasons, Cameron conducted an adversarial negotiation with his European partners in an effort to secure reforms to the EU and changes in Britain’s terms of membership.

The UK also no longer sends its best and brightest to EU institutions. Many of the leading British officials who once occupied high offices there have left and been replaced by other continental Europeans. This deprives Britain of an important source of influence within the EU.

It is clear that if the US wants influence in the EU, it needs more partners there than just the UK. Britain is still important, and would be a strong driver to make the institution more efficient, but as its influence declines it is no longer sufficient. A Leave vote would immediately dispose of that influence entirely.

The UK is ‘one among many’ for the US

What is clear is that increasingly the UK is not ‘first among equals’ in Europe but ‘one among many’ for the United States. America is diversifying its relationships. More and more the US can find other allies and friends to fulfil the needs in which the UK no longer has interest.

If the UK leaves the European Union, the pace of this trend will only quicken. In addition to needing to find alternative partners to address these policy gaps, the UK will likely no longer have the time to devote to the United States that it does today. If Brexit takes place, Whitehall will find itself inundated with issues which had previously been managed by the EU, from trade deals with third parties to negotiating constant market access adjustments with the EU. Thus, very quickly, British resources are likely to be pulled from the US portfolio, and issues of common concern will get drowned out by other agendas. At least for a while, the US will likely get short shrift.

America’s response then can only be to hasten its search for other partners both in Europe and beyond. And there lies an inevitable negative spiral for the Special Relationship.

Can anything be done to save the Special Relationship?

There is no question that the US and UK will continue to have a strong and positive relationship, but it is clear that, without action, either in or out of Europe, its ‘specialness’ will decline. As the arguments above lay out, the only question is how fast this demise takes place. But there is something that could not only halt, but also reverse this trend.

As President Obama made starkly clear in his interviews with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic, what he wants most from partners and allies is for them to step up – to show more leadership (a sentiment that the Republican candidates for president would push even further). With the perceived failure of interventions over the last 15 years – from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya –many politicians and publics have become wary of foreign military intervention. This is true in Europe and the US; but Americans have often felt that they have been left holding both the bag and the blame.  

It should be noted that more leadership does not necessarily mean more military engagement. Or even, necessarily, more spending on foreign policy tools (whether diplomatic, military or development). But it does mean a willingness to step up and take responsibility for trying to guide international events and for promoting common interests.

In the UK’s SDSR released towards the end of 2015, the government stated its intention to remain fully engaged globally; however, its actions belie this. Where Asia is concerned – an issue that is front and centre for the US – the UK joins other European powers in arguing that its lack of resources in the region makes it unable to contribute meaningfully to maintaining stability. Even closer to home, in the Middle East, the UK has been wary of leading.

It is understandable why the UK is hesitant to take such a leadership role, even as part of a coalition, in some of the larger strategic challenges the world faces. There are few benefits. Merely finding the human capital to coordinate an international response is difficult. The complexity of these problems ensures they rarely work out as hoped, and more often lead to international contempt rather than approbation. Thus it is no great surprise that the UK, along with much of the rest of the world, resists the temptation to be out in front. But there are opportunities – two issues that the US would likely welcome greater British leadership on would be building support in Europe for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and taking a more active role in maintaining stability in Asia. Further, having a stronger European partner on issues in the Middle East (from Yemen to Syria) – Europe’s near abroad – is something that many American policy-makers have suggested. 

But the UK would not have to stand alone. With a little leadership from the UK, the US would provide support, as would many others currently loath to take the lead but with very strong interests in the outcomes. But someone has to start; as Obama made clear, there needs to be less ‘free riding’.

If the UK wants to reverse the decline of the Special Relationship, it will need to show more leadership internationally. This should not be as hard as it might seem. Not only does it conform to the government’s own strategy (as laid out in the SDSR) but public concern over further interventions is weaker than one might imagine. Such a leadership role would once again show to the United States the value of the Special Relationship.

This article has also been published by Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

A British exit from the EU would add to growing strains on the United States’ relations with Britain and the rest of Europe, but by itself would not lead to a breakdown in transatlantic relations due to the scale of shared ideas and interests, institutional links, international pressures and commitments by individual leaders. It would, however, add to pressures on the US that could change the direction of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of Washington, Britain risks becoming an awkward inbetweener, beholden more than ever before to a wider transatlantic relationship where the US and EU are navigating the challenges of an emerging multipolar world. The article outlines developments in the UK, EU, Europe and the US in order to explain what Brexit could mean for the United States’ approaches to transatlantic relations. By doing so the article moves beyond a narrow view of Brexit and transatlantic relations that focuses on the future of UK–US relations. In the conclusion we map out several ways in which US views of the transatlantic relationship could be changed.

With Britain’s decision to leave the EU, the clouds of uncertainty hanging over the proposed US-EU free trade deal (known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP) have become darker. The negotiations were formally launched three years ago and have stalled because of transatlantic differences (for instance over issues of investor protections and public procurement) as well as growing public opposition. For now, both the US and the EU negotiators are determined to weather the storm and continue talks when they meet in Brussels from 11-15 July.

The result of the UK’s EU referendum will blow a strong wind into the face of TTIP negotiators on three fronts. First, the Brexit vote will delay the TTIP talks as EU officials will focus their attention and political capital on the future UK-EU relationship. Once the UK government triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, both sides have two years to sort out the separation proceedings. Only after it has become clear what Britain’s relationship with the EU will look like will the European side stop navel-gazing. The TTIP negotiations will likely continue in the meantime, but will be put on the back-burner.

Second, any progress on TTIP will require clarity on what both sides are bringing to the negotiating table. But until the final nature of the UK-EU relationship is known, it will be difficult for the American side to assess exactly how valuable the access to the remaining EU market is. This raises the question of whether American negotiators will put forth their best offers if they don’t know what benefits they will obtain for making concessions.

Third, with Britain’s vote to leave the EU, TTIP has just lost one of its greatest cheerleaders. French and German officials are increasingly expressing concerns about TTIP. Within three days of the Brexit vote, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls dismissed the possibility of a US-EU trade deal, stating TTIP was against ‘EU interests’. In addition, 59 per cent of Germans oppose TTIP – up from 51 per cent – according to the most recent Eurobarometer survey. Britain’s voice for further trade liberalization will be sorely missed by American negotiators eager to strike a deal.

Despite the dark Brexit clouds on the TTIP horizon, there might be a silver lining. Britain’s decision to leave the EU could bring some benefits to the US-EU trade talks in two ways. First, financial services regulation might no longer be a sticking point in the TTIP negotiations. Given London’s role as a financial centre, the UK had insisted on including a financial services chapter in the trade deal. The US, however, has resisted this. The removal of this friction could help move the TTIP negotiations along.

Second, European trade negotiators will no longer have to address British fears that TTIP could put the National Health Service (NHS) at risk. Much of the TTIP-debate in Great Britain has focused on how this deal might impact the NHS. Opponents of TTIP have argued that including healthcare in the agreement could lead to privatization and ultimately the death of the NHS. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström spent resources and energy in correcting these misconceptions. UK withdrawal from the EU means that she can now focus on fighting other myths surrounding TTIP, which could potentially help advance the trade deal.

For now and the immediate future, Britain will remain a member of the EU and the European Commission will continue to negotiate trade deals on behalf of all 28 member states. Both the US and EU negotiators are committed to advancing the trade deal despite Brexit. The British decision to leave the EU has not weakened the case for TTIP. Speaking on the outcome of the EU referendum, United States Trade Representative Michael Froman said ‘the economic and strategic rationale for TTIP remains strong’. And his counterpart Cecilia Malmström went even further, saying that the British decision to leave the EU creates more of an impetus for TTIP to be finished this year.

Though this timeline is unlikely to be met, TTIP is likely to survive the British decision to leave the EU. However, Brexit is a serious blow that will probably push back the conclusion of TTIP by at least two years. Any deal will need to take into account the future nature of the UK-EU trade deal, which may not be known before 2018. Meanwhile, elections in Germany and France (two countries with strong public opposition to TTIP) will take place in 2017. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US presidential election adds yet another layer of uncertainty as the trade policy of the next administration remains unknown. When US and EU trade negotiators meet again this week, they should not be too worried about the Brexit storm but rather the changing climate for TTIP in France, Germany and the US.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

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Even though President Barack Obama cautioned that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ for a trade agreement with the US if the country chose to leave the EU, in the post-Brexit world a deal might be struck more swiftly. Various ideas for bringing the UK and US into a formal trade arrangement have been floated – ranging from a bilateral UK-US trade deal, or the UK joining NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico), to the UK becoming a part of the TPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership that the US is pursuing with 11 other countries along the Pacific Rim). However, one option stands out: opening the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US and EU are currently negotiating, to the UK after Brexit.

Good reasons for Britain in TTIP

First, from the perspective of the UK, signing up to TTIP would mean a more comprehensive deal with the US than a bilateral UK−US trade agreement. For instance, Britain is very keen to include financial services regulation in any trade agreement with America, but given Washington’s reluctance, this ambition might only be achievable if other countries like France and Germany throw their financial weight into the negotiations.

Second, continuing involvement in the TTIP negotiations allows London to begin securing its trade position with the US now. Though its influence in the EU may weaken as it heads for the exit, Britain could make the best use of influencing the EU position on TTIP while it is still a member. It could then accept the terms of TTIP and accede as a third party relatively quickly after exiting the EU. Official negotiations on a UK−US-only deal would have to wait until the UK has left the EU, as trade talks fall under the exclusive competence of the EU.

Third, for the US and EU, having the UK as a party to TTIP would ensure the scale of the deal is not reduced, and thereby maintain the strategic appeal and ability to set global standards. At the moment, the UK is the EU’s second-largest economy, accounting for approximately 18 per cent of GDP. With Britain in TTIP, the sheer size of the transatlantic market space will have more pull for other countries to adopt the common transatlantic rules in order to gain market access.

Fourth, the UK joining TTIP as a third party would establish the agreement as an ‘open platform’ that is available for other countries to join. Michael Froman, the United States trade representative, has characterized TTIP as being such an open agreement. EU representatives have been more ambivalent, though this is starting to change in the wake of Brexit. David O’Sullivan, the current EU ambassador to the US, recently said that as ‘we’ve always seen TTIP as a potential open platform, [the] UK could still benefit [from it] even not as a member of the European Union’. While now might not be the right time to expand the TTIP bloc beyond its original participants given that negotiations are already complex and drawn out, it would be beneficial for the negotiating partners to send a strong message that countries that are willing and able to commit to the high TTIP standards will be welcomed later on.

Obstacles to Britain in TTIP

But before the UK could be added to TTIP after Brexit, major hurdles will have to be jumped and crucial questions answered. The first obstacle is actually getting a TTIP deal, which will require significant efforts by political leaders and negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, selling the ‘UK in TTIP option’ to Brexiteers will not be an easy task. After all, Leave campaigners argued that the US−EU deal might undermine the NHS and was thus presented as one of the reasons to cut loose from Brussels. As the major rationale behind TTIP is regulatory harmonization, if the UK were to sign up to TTIP it would still have to apply many EU rules. This, however, would go counter to the arguments for leaving the EU in the first place.

Third, it will be a challenging job for the UK to untangle its trade relationship with the EU while at the same time negotiating TTIP together with the EU. It would be easiest if the UK decided to remain a member of the EU customs union. Britain would then be required to impose the EU’s external tariffs on countries like the US. This would fit seamlessly with the ‘UK in TTIP’ option. But as the UK will most likely pull out of the customs union, it will be more complicated than that.

Finally, the timing of Brexit and the TTIP negotiations could cause complications. In the unlikely event that a US-EU free trade deal is concluded and ratified while the UK is still a member of the EU, the agreement (or the parts of it that fall under national competence) would most likely continue to apply to Britain after Brexit without the need for accession. If the TTIP negotiations continue beyond Brexit, then the UK would move from negotiating as part of the EU bloc to becoming a third party. This raises the issue of whether the UK and EU continue to negotiate as one bloc vis-à-vis the US.

Special economic relationship

Still, the depth of the economic ties between the US and UK means that the TTIP option is likely to be welcomed favourably by both countries. The US is the most important single export market for the UK, with goods and services worth £45 billion shipped in 2015. Last year, the US ranked third (after Germany and China) as a source for UK imports. With nearly $1 trillion invested in each other’s economies, the US and the UK are also each other’s largest investors. Given this special economic relationship, Britain is unlikely to be at the ‘back of the queue’ in any event. But the TTIP option is the best path to preserving and strengthening the relationship post-Brexit while also realizing the wider strategic benefits of a transatlantic trade agreement.

A version of this article appeared on Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Air pollution has been classified as a cancer-causing agent with evidence showing an increased risk of lung cancer associated with increasing levels of exposure to outdoor air pollution and particulate matter.

Air pollution is also known to increase risks for other diseases, especially respiratory and heart diseases, and studies show that levels of exposure to air pollution have increased significantly in some parts of the world - mostly in rapidly industrializing countries with large populations.

In coordination with London Global Cancer Week partner organizations, this event outlines the evidence linking air pollution and cancer rates in London and other major cities.

Panellists provide a 360° picture of the impact of the rising incidence of cancer across the world, the challenges the cancer pandemic poses to the implementation of universal health coverage and the existing UK contribution to strengthening capacity in cancer management and research in developing countries.

Three years ago, as the UK was holding its referendum on Brexit, the EU was rolling out its Global Strategy for a more cohesive and effective security and defence policy. Since then, EU member states have set impressive goals and, as significantly, taken important practical steps to make an EU defence capability a tangible proposition, despite differing collective defence commitments, traditions of neutrality among some member states and very different strategic cultures.

All of these developments have taken place with the UK as reluctant observer. The UK has been traditionally hostile to a deepening of defence collaboration within the EU (and consistent of the view that Europe’s military security was best provided through NATO). But the Brexit referendum vote has placed the UK as a bystander as EU security and defence initiatives have been pursued which have overridden the past red lines of British governments.

There is, however, a Brexit-related paradox in all these developments.

A central goal of the security and defence-related aspects of the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to have the capacity to act independently of the United States and, through indigenous defence industries, the ability to produce the means to make that possible.

With the UK outside the EU, and its opposition absent, it is easier to create a political consensus to push for more defence integration. But without the UK there are diminished collective defence capabilities which would make European strategic autonomy much harder to achieve.  

The May government has been an enthusiast for preserving close security and defence cooperation with the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration both seek to provide for a close EU–UK relationship post-Brexit.

However, the Article 50 negotiations have made clear that the EU’s institutions are hostile to special treatment for the UK beyond that normally accorded to a third country. Disagreements over the terms of the UK’s continuing participation in the Gailleo dual-use satellite system, which has a significant security and defence utility, have signalled that there is a strong lobby in Brussels and some national capitals seeking to significantly circumscribe collaboration with Britain.

The scale and capabilities of the UK’s military, its defence expenditure (notably on defence research and development) and its defence industrial base make any British decoupling from the EU’s security and defence a major issue. Disconnecting the UK from EU developments entirely would be a costly political choice for both sides.

And excluding the UK from new initiatives in defence R&D and new defence procurement arrangements would be suboptimal in delivering a stronger European defence, technological and industrial base. Duplicating existing UK capabilities, especially strategic enablers such as strategic airlift, target acquisition and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, would be an unnecessary squandering of already hard-pressed European defence budgets.

At present the common procurement and defence industry plans driven by the EU Global Strategy are embryonic. And significant defence capability decisions are taking place detached from the EU’s plans, which could reinforce a divide between the UK and other member states.

As illustrative, the formal agreement this week between France, Germany and Spain on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) to develop a next-generation stealth fighter is competing with the UK-supported Tempest project that shares the same objective. The 20-year timescales for the delivery of the FCAS and Tempest projects are a reminder that defence procurement decisions are of multi-decade significance.

As the EU’s ambitions are nascent, it is too early to fully assess what might be the impact of any decision by the EU and the UK to keep each other at an arms-length in security and defence cooperation. With a more detached relationship, the UK will have significant concerns if it sees the EU’s common procurement arrangements develop in a manner that actively discriminates against the UK defence industry.

Outside of procurement and defence issues there may be other areas of future concern for the UK – for example, the extent to which the EU might deepen and broaden cooperation with NATO in a manner that makes the collective influence of EU member states within NATO more apparent, or to which the footprint of future EU conflict and security activities in third countries starts to overshadow the activities of the UK.

As the UK has been grappling with Brexit domestically, the EU has been evolving its security and defence policy ambitions. These are developments that will impact on the UK and in which, therefore, it has a stake but as a departing member state it has a weakening ability to shape.

Any aspect of future EU–UK cooperation is hostage to the vagaries of how the Brexit endgame concludes.

With the new leader of the Conservative party due to be announced on 23 July, what are the prospects for the party and the country?

On Brexit, the new prime minister faces most of the same challenges and constraints as Theresa May. The leadership contenders have outlined their ambitions for a revised deal, but with the EU insisting negotiations are over, their room for manoeuvre appears to be limited. Furthermore, even with a new leader at the helm, important divisions remain among voters about what shape Brexit and the future UK-EU relationship should take. If the EU won’t change the deal, and parliament won’t accept it, how can the deadlock be broken? Is a 'No Deal' Brexit politically deliverable? Or could there be a general election later in 2019? Can the Conservative party survive a pre-Brexit election intact?

Beyond Brexit, what are the other choices, in both domestic and foreign policy, facing the next prime minister? How might the decisions he makes affect the future of the party and British politics more broadly?

In this session, the speaker will share his reflections on the likely result of the leadership election, and what lies beyond it.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

When we look back on Brexit, what will it tell us about Europe? Will it simply be that an insular UK was always different and destined to never fit in? Will it be that the UK's decision to leave revealed deeper problems with the EU? Or will it be that the threat created by the UK's withdrawal united the continent and saved the European project?

The speaker will explore Brexit through the prism of biblical and ancient Greek mythology. She will examine the reasons behind Britain’s decision to leave the EU and imagine a ‘better Europe’ that has learnt the lessons of the past and reconciled the divisions exposed by the Brexit vote. How can the EU reinvent itself and re-engage its citizens? And where does a post-Brexit UK fit?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

On 12 December 2019, the United Kingdom will hold one of its most crucial elections in the 21st century. The result will have a direct impact on the Brexit process and will most likely determine the country’s future direction for years to come.  

Yet the final outcome is far from predictable. It seems quite certain that the 2019 election is unlikely to produce a clear two-party share of the vote as happened back in 2017. Public trust in politicians is low and party loyalty is looser than ever. Polls show that Brexit it overwhelmingly considered as the main issue among the electorate alongside a deep concern about the future of public services. This raises multiple questions: can the 2019 election represent a chance to unite the country and move on? Will cross-party identities of ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ translate to how people vote in the election? And what will the outcome mean for Brexit and the future of party politics in Britain? 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

What does the UK election result mean for Brexit and forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU?

The most important thing is that it means Brexit will definitely happen. Since the referendum, we’ve had three-and-a-half years of continued uncertainty where all outcomes were still possible. We now know that Brexit will become irreversible from 31 January.

That’s the biggest thing, because I think that will have a big psychological impact on politics, both in the UK and also on the EU side. The EU has been working with a partner that has been unsure about its direction, and perhaps some had still hoped that the process might still be reversed, but that direction is now completely clear.

Obviously the first order of business is to pass the withdrawal agreement, which should be pretty straightforward given the majority that the Conservatives have. That’s a formality now.

Then, the question becomes about the level of ambition for the next year. It is an exceptionally ambitious timetable to negotiate, ratify and implement a new relationship before the end of the transition period in December 2020.

What is achievable by the end of next year?

I think there are three possible outcomes here. One: that timetable doesn’t work and Boris Johnson follows through on his pledge to leave the transition period anyway, leading to a ‘no trade deal’ outcome.

Two: the negotiations are able to deliver something by the end of 2020, either because the depth and ambition of any agreement is relatively low level (what Michel Barnier has called a ‘vital minimum’)  and/or because they come up with some type of compromise on the process which is not called an extension, but something else: a type of temporary agreement or a new implementation period.

This is a situation where you might have a bare-bones agreement for the end of the transition period, but with an extended period of negotiation for different unresolved issues. The EU will probably insist upon level playing field guarantees and fishing access rights as a component of any such agreement.

Three: Boris Johnson breaks his manifesto pledge not to extend the transition. Now, he has stared down the barrel of leaving with no deal before and he made a political judgment that it was better to make significant compromises on his negotiating position than to follow through with ‘no deal’. I suspect he might make that same judgment again.

No option is ideal. The first is the most economically disruptive, the second means the EU will be in an even stronger position to dictate terms and the third means breaking a manifesto pledge.

How important is that end of transition deadline now? It was an important issue for the Brexit Party and hardliners in the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. But given the size of a majority, he may need to worry less about them. Is the transition deadline that important to people who voted Conservative, especially if he can show that he has taken the UK out of the EU by the end of January?

I think there may indeed be some political space for Johnson here, given the size of his majority and given that the first phase of Brexit will have been done, along with the debate about withdrawal.

There will be a lot of difficult, technical negotiations in all sorts of areas, some of which I think will become quite rancorous, but won’t necessarily become front page news in the way some of the first phase of negotiations has, not least because you won’t have the theatre of a hung parliament.

Hopefully, there will be more focus on the substance of the agreement, and the debate will be about the consequences of divergence versus staying more aligned with the EU, which is basically the central question now about the future relationship.

I still think for UK prime ministers to pick arbitrary dates, and then to make domestic political promises based around them, actually undermines the UK’s negotiating position. It would be in Britain’s interest to have more flexibility rather than a ticking clock.

Moving to the other big story from the night, the SNP won 48 of 59 seats in Scotland. How does the debate over Scotland’s future in the United Kingdom play out from here?

The SNP has really strengthened its position, more than many expected. This is now set up for a huge constitutional struggle over the future of the United Kingdom.

I think there is a key dilemma for Scottish independence supporters, which is that on the one hand Brexit greatly strengthens the political case for independence. The difference between the political preferences in Scotland and the rest of the UK, particularly in England, is a perfect demonstration of that.

At the same time, once the UK has left the EU, independence becomes much more difficult technically and economically. There will be many of the same difficulties that there have been in discussing Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland. There will be a difficult debate over the currency. There are all sorts of challenges to creating a trade or regulatory border between England and Scotland. This is particularly true if there is a harder Brexit outcome, where Britain leaves the EU without a large amount of regulatory alignment.

On demands for a second independence referendum, I think in the first instance Boris Johnson will simply refuse to hold one. It’s probably not in his short-term interest to do anything else. Theresa May played it this way in 2017, repeatedly saying ‘now is not the time’.

In a similar way I think Johnson will just try to ride the pressure out, to the point where the SNP will need to face the challenges of advocating independence with the UK outside the EU. The next flashpoint will be the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2021.

Ultimately, though, it will become a democratically unsustainable position if Scotland continues to vote for the SNP, and refusing to sanction a second independence referendum might only reinforce that sentiment.

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Please note this an online-only event.

According to a previously agreed timetable for phase two of Brexit talks, negotiations on the future EU-UK trade relations were scheduled to begin in March. Then a global pandemic hit. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, the UK government insists that the Brexit negotiations are on track and there are currently no plans to extend the transition period beyond 2020.

However, the original timetable for trade talks was already widely seen as extremely constrained. Can negotiations still be done in time? With the decision on any possible extension to be made by July at the latest, can the two sides make sufficient progress by that point? Or would the ongoing public health crisis make requesting an extension to the transition period more politically viable for the UK government? Finally, if there is no extension, could Britain still leave the EU with no deal?

In this webinar, the speaker will discuss how the need to manage other challenges, such as the current COVID-19 outbreak, might affect the government’s approach to the negotiations with the EU. He will also share his insights on what to expect from the second phase of negotiations and on the most important lessons from phase one. 

The end of 2018 was a monumental year for Latin America’s two biggest economies. In December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was inaugurated as Mexico’s 58th president. The following month saw another political shift further south, as Jair Bolsonaro became Brazil’s 38th president. While sitting on opposite ends of the political spectrum, both AMLO and Bolsonaro were considered to be political outsiders and have upended the status quo through their election to office. 

To what extent does the election of AMLO in Mexico and Bolsonaro in Brazil represent a shift in those countries’ definitions of national interest and foreign policy priorities? How will this affect these states’ policies regarding international commitments and cooperation on issues such as human rights, environment and climate change, migration, and trade? To what extent do possible shifts reflect changing domestic opinions?  Will any changes represent a long-term shift in state priorities and policies past these administrations?

This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.  Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events