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Pence — wearing face mask — heaps praise on workers while touring Kokomo facility

Vice President Mike Pence toured a GM facility making hospital ventilators for about an hour Thursday.

       




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ABB reports participation in Dividend Access Facility 2020

2020-03-23 -




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Cummins is using Wisconsin facility to aid respirator production during COVID-19 outbreak

Cummins is partnering with Minnesota-based 3M to make filters for use in respirators used during the COVID-19 outbreak.

       




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NBA says teams can reopen practice facilities Friday; what this means for the Pacers

Source: The Pacers will listen to the government and follow its lead before bringing players back

      




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NBA says teams can reopen practice facilities Friday; what this means for the Pacers

Source: The Pacers will listen to the government and follow its lead before bringing players back

       




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Coronavirus: Social distancing cuts public transport passenger capacity by 90%

The transport secretary warns social distancing will mean severely-reduced passenger capacity.




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Coronavirus: Isle of Wight reacts to contact-tracing app

Isle of Wight residents have mixed feelings about being used to test the government's new app.




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Andretti, Ganassi commit to electric SUV off-road racing series

Racing is scheduled for Greenland, Brazil, Nepal and Senegal, among other places.

       




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Sports Personality: 1961 racing driver Sir Stirling Moss

In 1961, F1 driver Sir Stirling Moss won the hearts of the nation to be crowned Sportsview Personality winner.




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'I want to put a smile on people's faces' - Leclerc on being a lockdown sim racing star

Even Ferrari's F1 drivers feel constrained by the lockdown, but Charles Leclerc wants to give people something to enjoy.




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Lewis Hamilton: Lack of racing leaves 'big void'

Lewis Hamilton says the lack of racing in Formula 1 so far this year has left him feeling "a big void".




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Coronavirus: Key workers to trial NHS tracing app

If the Isle of Wight trial is successful, the app could be ready nationwide within weeks, ministers say.




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Silicon Valley VCs have a new obsession that perfectly captures the grave danger facing startups : How long is your 'runway'?

Startups are facing what could become the worst economic downturn in several decades, and VCs are begging them to take drastic measures to improve their chances of making it through. 

Most Americans who lived through the 2008 financial crisis will know that a savings stockpile or rainy day fund can mean the difference between surviving and thriving during tough times, but as recent studies have shown, many tech startups and VC firms don't have a similar first-hand experience; many have only known boom times and are now venturing into uncharted waters.

One thing VCs agree on is that startups need to quickly rein in growth plans — ideally as soon as yesterday — and start scrutinizing expenses. Anything nonessential should be cut or suspended indefinitely, headcount should be reduced, and pricey office leases eliminated if possible, all with the goal of extending a startup's "runway."

In Silicon Valley, runway refers to how much cash a startup has on hand to put against its operating expenses. If, for example, a startup has roughly $100,000 in monthly operating expenses and has $1 million in the bank, they are looking at a 10-month runway, assuming revenue stays roughly flat.

In the days before the coronavirus pandemic, a startup's runway dictated when it had to start looking for additional funding. Instead of cutting expenses, the popular solution was to simply put more VC money in the bank. This helped high flying startups like Uber and Airbnb expand at a breakneck pace — VC dollars kept pouring in and the companies remained unprofitable as they chased growth at all costs.

But now, VCs are saying that's no longer an option. Founders Fund general partner Keith Rabois said on a podcast recently that profitability is now being rewarded much more than high-growth. 

For startups that aren't profitable, that means hunkering down and ensuring there are enough reserves to last through the crisis.

So how long does the runway need to be? 

Many VCs that Business Insider has spoken to are advising their startups to have at least 18 months of runway. But some VCs say startups should have upwards of 3 years' of expenses saved up. 

The length of time can vary depending on the startup, one investor told Business Insider, pointing to the startup's age and industry as important factors. An early-stage company with a handful of employees and low-overhead costs might easily stretch a $500,000 seed check, whereas a growth-stage biotech startup with hundreds of employees, expensive hardware, and pricey office space might struggle to make tens of millions of dollars in funding make it through 12 months. Those that can't cut costs will be forced to fundraise with poor terms and risk the dreaded downround

"You can always easily dial back up the aggressiveness and risk profile if we get more optimistic visibility, but if you don't take action right away — to preserve capital, cut your burn rate, have fundamentally attractive unit economics, edit the product to make more sense in the new world order — if you don't do those right away, the opportunity to do those things and survive is probably lost forever," Rabois said in the April Talkshow broadcast.

Rabois is in the camp of pessimists, generally speaking, who think the economic downturn will not only drag on through 2020, but could eventually turn into an economic depression the likes of which could rival the Great Depression of the 1930s. He said that his VC peers are starting to rein in the freewheeling deal-making that has defined the last two decades of the Silicon Valley startup ecosystem, and are now treading cautiously. It's time that startups do the same, he said.

SEE ALSO: Lower valuations and a long wait for funding: Two top early-stage VCs dish on how they are counseling startups to withstand long-term economic uncertainty

Join the conversation about this story »

NOW WATCH: Pathologists debunk 13 coronavirus myths




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Trump’s immigration policies speak louder than his racist, xenophobic words

Sadly, the most recent horrors are not an aberration.




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Fin24.com | EXPLAINER | 5 questions about virus 'tracing' by smartphone

Can an app contain the pandemic? Interest is growing in smartphone technology as a potential key to ending lockdowns and reopening economies around the world.




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Google surfacing more local COVID news content to satisfy massive search demand

Local news publishers have struggled to monetize spike in consumer interest.

Please visit Search Engine Land for the full article.




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AT#135 - Through Hiking the Pacific Crest Trail at 10

Through Hiking the Pacific Crest Trail at 10




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AT#195 - Travel to Niue in the South Pacific

The Amateur Traveler talks to Nick from Iowa about his stay on the remote tropical island of Niue in the South Pacific. Niue is a coral atoll which is affiliated with New Zealand. This country has only 100 square miles and around 1500 people so this is a place to get away from it all and explore some of the striking scenery such as the coral formations of Togo Chasm, Vaikona Chasm and the Limu pools. Nick stayed in Alofi at Kololi’s Guesthouse and explored the island on motorcycle.




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AT#257 - Travel to Glacier National Park and Western Montana

The Amateur Traveler talks to Karl Anders who returns to the show to talk about travel to Western Montana and in particular to the majestic Glacier National Park. Karl encourages us to drive the Going to the Sun Highway but then to get off the blacktop and hick some of the back country of the park (preferably in a group large enough to discourage the curiosity of bears). He describes some of his favorite hikes such as the trail to Hidden Lakes. Glacier is often rated as one of the top places in the United States to hike or backpack. The valleys of Glacier are carved by glacial activity although there aren't as many glaciers still in the park. Karl also talks about some nearby destinations like the National Bison Refuge, Bitterroot Valley and nearby Missoula with its museum to Smokejumpers.




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Facing Concerns of Meat Shortages, More Americans Turn to Hunting

Between having had more than enough of the not-so-great indoors and realizing that the grocery store might not always have meat, Americans are increasingly looking to feed themselves by hunting. “People are thinking about where they get their food and how they get their food,” Land Tawney, president of the advocacy group Backcountry Hunters and…

The post Facing Concerns of Meat Shortages, More Americans Turn to Hunting appeared first on The Western Journal.




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News: Glaciers surge to ocean

Part of the Antarctic diary promo for the BBC UK Homepage




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Death toll hits 25 in Simcoe Muskoka as senior's facilities continue to struggle with virus

A woman in her 90s living at the Bradford Valley Care Community is the latest coronavirus victim in the region.




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Asia-Pacific security is about more than just China and the US

21 September 2015

20150924AsiaPacific.jpg

Photo: Jacob Parakilas/Chatham House.

Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

  • Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
  • The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
  • Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

  • Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
  • Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
  • If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

  • The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
  • Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

Editor's notes

Read the report The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative from Chatham House.

For all enquiries, including requests to speak with the authors of this paper, please contact the press office.

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




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Risk of serious cyber attacks on nuclear facilities underestimated, says new report

2 October 2015

20150930CyberSecurity.jpg

Workers at the Wolsong nuclear power plant participate in an anti-cyber attack exercise, Gyeongju, South Korea. Photo: Getty Images.

The risk of a serious cyber attack on civil nuclear infrastructure is growing, as facilities become ever more reliant on digital systems and make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, according to a major new report from Chatham House.

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks is the result of an 18-month study that draws on in-depth interviews with 30 leading industry practitioners based in more than eight countries. It found that the trend to digitization, when combined with a lack of executive-level awareness of the risks involved, means that nuclear plant personnel may not realize the full extent of their cyber vulnerability and are thus inadequately prepared to deal with potential attacks. 

Specific findings include:                

  • The conventional belief that all nuclear facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed, which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.
  • Search engines can readily identify critical infrastructure components with such connections.
  • Even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be breached with nothing more than a flash drive.
  • Supply chain vulnerabilities mean that equipment used at a nuclear facility risks compromise at any stage.
  • A lack of training, combined with communication breakdowns between engineers and security personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an understanding of key cyber security procedures.
  • Reactive rather than proactive approaches to cyber security contribute to the possibility that a nuclear facility might not know of a cyber attack until it is already substantially under way.

In the light of these risks, the report outlines a blend of policy and technical measures that will be required to counter the threats and meet the challenges. 

Recommendations include:

  • Developing guidelines to measure cyber security risk in the nuclear industry, including an integrated risk assessment that takes both security and safety measures into account.
  • Engaging in robust dialogue with engineers and contractors to raise awareness of the cyber security risk, including the dangers of setting up unauthorized internet connections.
  • Implementing rules, where not already in place, to promote good IT hygiene in nuclear facilities (for example to forbid the use of personal devices) and enforcing rules where they do exist.
  • Improving disclosure by encouraging anonymous information sharing and the establishment of industrial CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team).
  • Encouraging universal adoption of regulatory standards.

Editor's notes

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks, written by Caroline Baylon with Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, is embargoed until Monday 5 October 2015.

Caroline Baylon is the research associate in science, technology and cyber security at Chatham House. Roger Brunt was appointed the UK government's regulator for security in the civil nuclear industry as the director of the Office for Civil Nuclear Security after retiring from the British Army in 2004. David Livingstone is an associate fellow at Chatham House, where he has participated in a broad range of projects on national-level risk management, cyber security, counterterrorism, serious organized crime, nuclear security and space security.

Fore more information, or to request an interview with the authors, contact the press office

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




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Transatlantic Rifts: Asia-Pacific Scenario Case Study

3 February 2016

Drawing on the findings of a recent workshop exploring a potential conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands, this paper suggests there are significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

Dr Jacob Parakilas

Former Deputy Head, US and the Americas Programme

2016-02-03-transatlantic-rift.jpg

A Japanese activist on board a boat is silhouetted at sunrise as it approaches the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 19 August 2012. Photo by Getty Images.

Summary

  • Chatham House brought together European, Asian and American policy-makers and experts over the course of a two-day scenario workshop in November 2015. The participants were asked to take part in a structured role-playing exercise imagining a potential near-future conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands.
  • The findings of the workshop, and the actions of participants in the simulation, suggested significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the perception was that the European Union and its member states consider challenges from their ‘near abroad’ as more tangible than those emanating from Asia, and that they focus on commercial opportunities in the region. In contrast, US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific is seen as emphasizing strategic and geopolitical challenges.
  • In terms of military capabilities, Europeans view themselves as having few assets to bring to bear in Asia. European, American and Asian observers are largely unaware of French and British military capabilities in or near the region.
  • Beyond the military, Europe’s other tools of leverage – diplomatic, development, economic and other soft-power instruments – are also ignored. Europeans are often unaware of the activities of their own governments in the region. This is equally true in reverse – Japan’s engagement vis-à-vis European interests (such as with respect to Russia or Syria) is little recognized by Europeans.
  • European nations prefer to engage unilaterally with Asia on trade and multilaterally, through the EU, on security and geopolitical issues. However, no ideal forum for multilateral coordination exists (given the fact that the EU is not a member of most Asian regional organizations).
  • The US’s greater engagement in Asia reflects the fact that the US, unlike its European counterparts, is a Pacific nation. But it can also be explained by greater domestic public support for such engagement. This reflects the presence of significant numbers of US troops in Asia and the relatively high proportion of ethnic Asians in the US compared with the EU.

Department/project




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Stable Isotope Labeling by Amino Acids in Cell Culture, SILAC, as a Simple and Accurate Approach to Expression Proteomics

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research




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Biochemical and structural insights into how amino acids regulate pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 [Enzymology]

Pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 (PKM2) is a key glycolytic enzyme involved in ATP generation and critical for cancer metabolism. PKM2 is expressed in many human cancers and is regulated by complex mechanisms that promote tumor growth and proliferation. Therefore, it is considered an attractive therapeutic target for modulating tumor metabolism. Various stimuli allosterically regulate PKM2 by cycling it between highly active and less active states. Several small molecules activate PKM2 by binding to its intersubunit interface. Serine and cysteine serve as an activator and inhibitor of PKM2, respectively, by binding to its amino acid (AA)-binding pocket, which therefore represents a potential druggable site. Despite binding similarly to PKM2, how cysteine and serine differentially regulate this enzyme remains elusive. Using kinetic analyses, fluorescence binding, X-ray crystallography, and gel filtration experiments with asparagine, aspartate, and valine as PKM2 ligands, we examined whether the differences in the side-chain polarity of these AAs trigger distinct allosteric responses in PKM2. We found that Asn (polar) and Asp (charged) activate PKM2 and that Val (hydrophobic) inhibits it. The results also indicate that both Asn and Asp can restore the activity of Val-inhibited PKM2. AA-bound crystal structures of PKM2 displayed distinctive interactions within the binding pocket, causing unique allosteric effects in the enzyme. These structure-function analyses of AA-mediated PKM2 regulation shed light on the chemical requirements in the development of mechanism-based small-molecule modulators targeting the AA-binding pocket of PKM2 and provide broader insights into the regulatory mechanisms of complex allosteric enzymes.




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An enzyme-based protocol for cell-free synthesis of nature-identical capsular oligosaccharides from Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serotype 1 [Enzymology]

Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (App) is the etiological agent of acute porcine pneumonia and responsible for severe economic losses worldwide. The capsule polymer of App serotype 1 (App1) consists of [4)-GlcNAc-β(1,6)-Gal-α-1-(PO4-] repeating units that are O-acetylated at O-6 of the GlcNAc. It is a major virulence factor and was used in previous studies in the successful generation of an experimental glycoconjugate vaccine. However, the application of glycoconjugate vaccines in the animal health sector is limited, presumably because of the high costs associated with harvesting the polymer from pathogen culture. Consequently, here we exploited the capsule polymerase Cps1B of App1 as an in vitro synthesis tool and an alternative for capsule polymer provision. Cps1B consists of two catalytic domains, as well as a domain rich in tetratricopeptide repeats (TPRs). We compared the elongation mechanism of Cps1B with that of a ΔTPR truncation (Cps1B-ΔTPR). Interestingly, the product profiles displayed by Cps1B suggested processive elongation of the nascent polymer, whereas Cps1B-ΔTPR appeared to work in a more distributive manner. The dispersity of the synthesized products could be reduced by generating single-action transferases and immobilizing them on individual columns, separating the two catalytic activities. Furthermore, we identified the O-acetyltransferase Cps1D of App1 and used it to modify the polymers produced by Cps1B. Two-dimensional NMR analyses of the products revealed O-acetylation levels identical to those of polymer harvested from App1 culture supernatants. In conclusion, we have established a protocol for the pathogen-free in vitro synthesis of tailored, nature-identical App1 capsule polymers.




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A single amino acid substitution uncouples catalysis and allostery in an essential biosynthetic enzyme in Mycobacterium tuberculosis [Enzymology]

Allostery exploits the conformational dynamics of enzymes by triggering a shift in population ensembles toward functionally distinct conformational or dynamic states. Allostery extensively regulates the activities of key enzymes within biosynthetic pathways to meet metabolic demand for their end products. Here, we have examined a critical enzyme, 3-deoxy-d-arabino-heptulosonate 7-phosphate synthase (DAH7PS), at the gateway to aromatic amino acid biosynthesis in Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which shows extremely complex dynamic allostery: three distinct aromatic amino acids jointly communicate occupancy to the active site via subtle changes in dynamics, enabling exquisite fine-tuning of delivery of these essential metabolites. Furthermore, this allosteric mechanism is co-opted by pathway branchpoint enzyme chorismate mutase upon complex formation. In this study, using statistical coupling analysis, site-directed mutagenesis, isothermal calorimetry, small-angle X-ray scattering, and X-ray crystallography analyses, we have pinpointed a critical node within the complex dynamic communication network responsible for this sophisticated allosteric machinery. Through a facile Gly to Pro substitution, we have altered backbone dynamics, completely severing the allosteric signal yet remarkably, generating a nonallosteric enzyme that retains full catalytic activity. We also identified a second residue of prime importance to the inter-enzyme communication with chorismate mutase. Our results reveal that highly complex dynamic allostery is surprisingly vulnerable and provide further insights into the intimate link between catalysis and allostery.




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The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China's responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Feng Liu

In response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia, both China and the United States attempt to alter the regional order in their own favour, both in the economic and security realms. This article shows how diverging views on future arrangements are leading to strategic shifts and increasing tension between these two Great Powers. As part of its quest for Great-Power status, China has been actively pushing its regional initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as adopting assertive security policies towards its neighbours. In contrast, in order to counter China's growing influence America's regional strategy is undergoing a subtle shift from ‘rebalancing to Asia’ to focusing on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. However, amid an intensifying trade war and other challenges facing the region, China has chosen to moderate its proactive foreign policy-orientation in the past few years. In particular, China has made attempts to downplay its domestic rhetoric, rebuild strategic relationship with India and Japan, and to reassure ASEAN states in the South China Sea. In response to the Indo-Pacific strategy, it would be more effective for China to articulate a more inclusive regional vision and promote an institutional framework that also accommodates a US presence in the region.




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Non-traditional security cooperation between China and south-east Asia: implications for Indo-Pacific geopolitics

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Xue Gong

The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP.




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Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kei Koga

Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.




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Evasive balancing: India's unviable Indo-Pacific strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Rajesh Rajagopalan

India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.




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Is Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Brendan Taylor

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a ‘dependent ally’ tradition and a ‘middle power’ approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, ‘pragmatic’ Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours.




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Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Indonesia has taken a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in drafting a common outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept. The widening of Indonesia's geostrategic canvas from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is in line with President Joko Widodo's intent to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In view of the rivalry between the US and China and the emergence of various Indo-Pacific initiatives from other countries, Indonesia believes that ASEAN must try to maintain its centrality. The draft of Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region was submitted for considerations by ASEAN, and after 18 months of intensive lobbying by Indonesia the concept was finally adopted at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The ASEAN outlook promotes the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international law and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes a building-block approach, seeking commonalities between existing regional initiatives in which ASEAN-led mechanisms will act as a fulcrum for both norm-setting and concrete cooperation. Rather than creating a new regional architecture, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is proposed as the platform for advancing the Indo-Pacific discourse and cooperation. Indonesia's ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks its renewed foreign policy activism as a middle power and underlines the continuing importance that Indonesia places on ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, emphasising ASEAN's centrality as the primary vehicle for managing relations with the major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.




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Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

See Seng Tan

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.




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The institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: problems and prospects

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kai He and Huiyun Feng

Although the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become popular in the foreign policy discourse of some countries, we have yet to see any significant institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region. Borrowing insights from functional institutionalism and political leadership studies of international regimes, we introduce a ‘leadership–institution’ model to explore the problems and prospects of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific. Through a comparative case study of the institutionalization of the Asia–Pacific vs the Indo-Pacific, we argue that two crucial factors contributed to the slow institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as a regional system in world politics: the lack of ideational leadership from an epistemic community and the weak executive leadership from a powerful state. While ideational leaders can help states identify and expand common interests in cooperation, executive leadership will facilitate states to overcome operational obstacles in cooperation, such as the ‘collective action’ problem and the ‘relative gains’ concern. The future of institution-building in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether and how these two leadership roles are played by scholars and states in the region. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific and highlight China as a wild card in the future of Indo-Pacific regionalism.




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The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security competition

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Mingjiang Li

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.




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Developmental peace in east Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Ling Wei

This article adopts a constructive approach to examining the problem of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through reflection on the east Asian experience, it proposes an analytical framework of developmental peace as a constellation of international practices, which means that the more economic development is prioritized by states in regional processes, the more likely it is that a sustainable peace will be achieved. States participating in regional integration comprise a community of practice. On the basis of a shared understanding that development is of overriding importance and underpins security and state legitimacy, the community takes economic development as the anchoring practice; this practice embodies and enacts constitutive rules and fundamental norms for a broader set of practices in regional processes, such as peaceful coexistence and non-interference. The more economic development is prioritized on domestic and regional agendas, the more likely it is that conflicts in the security realm will be relaxed or even resolved to protect security interests. The author draws some useful implications from the developmental peace in east Asia for the Indo-Pacific construct, among which the most important include building shared understandings on the prioritization of economic development, taking advantage of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and using the code of conduct process as a vehicle and best practice to facilitate rule-making for the maritime order. Finally, the author briefly discusses the contributions of the study and limitations of the model.




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Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond

6 November 2019 , Volume 96, Number 1

The first issue of International Affairs in 2020 explores the geopolitics of the 'Indo-Pacific' region.

Kai He and Mingjiang Li

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.




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Regulation of stearoyl-CoA desaturase by polyunsaturated fatty acids and cholesterol

James M. Ntambi
Sep 1, 1999; 40:1549-1558
Reviews




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Cytochrome P450 and arachidonic acid bioactivation: molecular and functional properties of the arachidonate monooxygenase

Jorge H. Capdevila
Feb 1, 2000; 41:163-181
Reviews




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The role of short-chain fatty acids in the interplay between diet, gut microbiota, and host energy metabolism

Gijs den Besten
Sep 1, 2013; 54:2325-2340
Reviews




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Marked reduction in bile acid synthesis in cholesterol 7{alpha}-hydroxylase-deficient mice does not lead to diminished tissue cholesterol turnover or to hypercholesterolemia

Margrit Schwarz
Sep 1, 1998; 39:1833-1843
Articles




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Gene expression regulation by retinoic acid

James E. Balmer
Nov 1, 2002; 43:1773-1808
Reviews




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Role of the peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor (PPAR) in mediating the effects of fibrates and fatty acids on gene expression

K Schoonjans
May 1, 1996; 37:907-925
Reviews




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Preparation of fatty acid methyl esters and dimethylacetals from lipids with boron fluoride--methanol

William R. Morrison
Oct 1, 1964; 5:600-608
Articles




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Drugs and Organized Crime: The Challenges Facing Southeast Asia




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Managing the Real and Perceived Challenges Facing the World




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Podcast: International Law, Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific