Brookings today releases a report USAID’s Public-Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review of Business Engagement, which will be the subject of a public discussion on March 8 featuring a panel of Jane Nelson (Harvard University), Ann Mei Chang (U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)), Johanna Nesseth Tuttle (Chevron Corp.), and Sarah Thorn (Wal-Mart Stores Inc.).

The report is based on USAID’s database of 1,481 public-private partnerships (PPPs) from 2001 to 2014 and a series of corporate interviews.

The value of those partnerships totals $16.5 billion, two-thirds from non-U.S. government sources – private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and non-U.S. public institutions. Over 4000 organizations have served as resource partners in these PPPs.  Fifty-three percent are business entities, 32 percent are from the non-profit world, and 25 percent are public institutions. Eighty-five organizations have participated in five or more PPPs, led by Microsoft (62), Coca Cola (36), and Chevron (33).

The partnerships are relatively evenly distributed among three major regions—Africa, Latin American/Caribbean, and Asia—but 36 percent of the value of all PPPs is from partnerships that are global in reach.

In analyzing the data, the researchers found that 77 percent of PPPs included one or more business partner, and that 83 percent of these partnerships are connected to a business partner’s commercial interest (either shared value or more indirect strategic interest). In almost 80 percent of those PPPs, the business partner contributes some form of corporate expertise to the partnership.

The purpose of the March 8 panel discussion is to examine the report but also to go beyond by addressing outstanding questions like: how should the impact of public-private partnerships be identified, measured, and evaluated? Is shared value the Holy Grail linking corporate interest to public goods and achieving sustainable results? Where do public-private partnerships fit in USAID’s strategy for engaging the private sector in development, particularly in light of the emphasis on the role of business in advancing the new set of Sustainable Development Goals?

We hope you can join us for what should prove to be an engaging discussion.

Despite the undeniable benefits of education to society, the educational needs, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, remain strikingly great. There are more than 67 million children not enrolled in primary school around the world, millions of children who are enrolled in school but not really learning, and too few young people are advancing to secondary school (van der Gaag and Adams 2010). Consider, for instance, the number of children unable to read a single word of connected text at the end of grade two: more than 90 percent in Mali, more than 50 percent in Uganda, and nearly 33 percent in Honduras (USAID n.d.).

With more young people of age 12 to 24 years today than ever before who are passing through the global education system and looking for opportunities for economic and civic participation, the education community is at a crossroads. Of the 1.5 billion young people in this age group, 1.3 billion live in developing countries (World Bank 2007). The global community set the goal of achieving universal primary education by 2015 and has failed to mobilize the resources necessary, as UNESCO estimates that $16.2 billion in external resources will be need to reach this goal.

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Read the executive summary »

Results from this report were presented at an April 6 Center on Universal Education event at the Brookings Institution.

Learn more about the launch event »

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A clamor is rising against "short termism"—judging a company by its performance over the past quarter, rather than the past few years. BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink and Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, for example, recently joined the Business Roundtable and others in decrying the strong pressures for short-term results exerted by daily stock traders and activist hedge funds. Critics claim that these pressures prevent executives from making long-term investments needed for sustainable corporate growth.

There are pressures on and incentives for corporate leaders to put the short term ahead of the long term, but not necessarily from activist hedge funds or stock trading. And some proposed remedies for short-termism would undermine the economic interests of shareholders.

The current attack on short termism is premised on the sharp increase in the average daily trading volume of stocks over the past few decades. The primary cause has been a relatively small group of day traders, including the notorious high-frequency traders who buy millions of shares and sell them a millisecond later. These traders care not a whit about corporate fundamentals or business plans; they are trying to exploit slight pricing anomalies that arise because of technical differences in securities markets. Thus corporate executives should not be pressured by higher daily trading volumes to avoid good long-term investment spending.

Critics of short-termism are even more alarmed about activist hedge funds that may lobby corporations to pay higher dividends, for example, or sell unprofitable divisions. They claim these funds push for a quick boost in corporate earnings in order to sell their shares for a quick profit.

The data do not support this uniformly negative view. Activist hedge funds display a broad array of strategies and time horizons. On average, they hold a company's stock for one or two years, according to various empirical studies. Yet according to a recent McKinsey study of 400 activist campaigns over the past decade, the median campaign was launched when the company was on the decline and led to higher shareholder returns relative to peers for at least three years.

To win proxy contests, activist hedge funds must persuade other shareholders to support the changes they advocate. The funds usually hold a relatively small percentage of a company's shares; the overwhelming majority are owned by institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension plans.

Activist hedge funds have won roughly half of the proxy contests they've entered, as institutional investors have carefully distinguished among long-term plans depending on a company's specific circumstances. These institutions backed activist campaigns to increase dividends at companies like Apple with huge hoards of cash. But they've also supported multi-year research programs of biotech firms like Amgen that have shown they can deliver.

To thwart the perceived threats of short-termism, critics have proposed measures that would reduce the legal rights and economic interests of all shareholders. Martin Lipton, a prominent opponent of activist hedge funds, has recommended that U.S. corporate law adopt a new norm—that corporate directors be elected to five-year terms, rather than the usual one-year term. Such long tenure, combined with existing anti-takeover defenses, would effectively insulate the leadership of chronically under-performing companies.

There is a better approach: Boards should measure and reward the efforts of corporate executives and portfolio managers by looking at the organization's performance over the past three years. At present, most firms distribute cash bonuses and stock grants on the basis of the prior year's results. This approach does encourage top executives to favor short-term results over long-term growth.

At the same time, the top executives at both public companies and asset managers should be required to retain for three to five years half of the shares they receive through stock grants and options. At present, these people can usually sell all their shares as soon as they vest or the options are exercised. This is an inducement for top executives and managers to push up the company's stock price for a few months so they can sell at a temporary high.

While there are reasonable concerns about corporate short-termism, their remedies should be narrowly tailored. Most of these concerns can be addressed by adopting longer periods for executive compensation. But we should not overreact to day traders or hedge funds by dramatically reducing the legitimate rights and financial interests of all shareholders.

By 2020, Millennials will comprise more than one of three adult Americans. It is estimated that by 2025 they will make up as much as 75 percent of the workforce.  Millennials’ desire for pragmatic action that drives results will overtake today’s emphasis on ideology and polarization as Boomers finally fade from the scene. Thus, understanding the generation’s values offers a window into the future of corporate America.

Morley Winograd and Michael Hais outline the cultural force of the Millennial generation on the economy as Millennials increasingly dominate the nation’s workplaces and permeate its corporate culture. Winograd and Hais argue that the current culture on Wall Street is becoming increasingly isolated from the beliefs and values of America’s largest adult generation. The authors also include data on Millennials’ ideal employers, their financial behaviors, and their levels of institutional trust in order to provide further insight into this important demographic.

Key Millennial values shaping the future of the American economy include:

• Interest in daily work being a reflection of and part of larger societal concerns.
• Emphasis on corporate social responsibility, ethical causes, and stronger brand loyalty for companies offering solutions to specific social problems.
• A greater reverence for the environment, even in the absence of major environmental disaster.
• Higher worth placed on experiences over acquisition of material things.
• Ability to build communities around shared interests rather than geographical proximity, bridging otherwise disparate groups.

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When the head of the world’s largest investment fund raises fundamental questions about U.S. corporations, we should all pay attention.

In a letter earlier this week to the Fortune 500 CEOs, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink criticized the short-term orientation that he believes shapes too much of today’s corporate behavior. “It concerns us,” he declared, that “in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too many have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.” And he concluded, “When done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, [returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.”

Fink is correct on all counts. In a new Brookings paper out today, University of Massachusetts economist William Lazonick states that the 454 companies listed continuously in the S&P 500 index between 2004 and 2013 used 51 percent of their earnings to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. An additional 35 percent went to dividends. “Buybacks represent a withdrawal of internally controlled finance that could be used to support investment in the company’s productive capabilities,” he said.

This is bad for the economy in two ways. As the growth of the U.S. workforce slows dramatically, economic growth will depend increasingly on improved productivity, must of which comes from raising capital investment per worker. Failing to make productivity-enhancing capital investments will doom our economy to a new normal of slow growth.

Many business leaders say that they are reluctant to make long-term investments without reasonable expectations of growing demand for their products. That brings us to the second way in which corporate short-termism is bad for the economy. Most consumer demand comes from wages. If employers refuse to share gains with their employees, growth in demand is bound to be anemic.

Although he clearly cares about his country, Fink is also acting as the steward of $4.8 trillion in investments. In an article published by McKinzie earlier this month, he warns that although the return of cash to shareholders is juicing equity markets right now, investors “will pay for it later when the ability to generate revenue in the long term dries up because of the lack of investment in the future.”

Unlike most other corporate leaders who express concerns about these developments, Fink is unwilling to rely on moral suasion alone. Because current incentives are so perverse, he argued, “It is hard for even the most dedicated CEO to buck this trend.” The constant pressure to produce quarterly results forces executives to go along—or risk losing their jobs. That pressure comes from investors who are, in Fink’s words, “renters, not owners, who are going to trade your stock as soon as they can pocket a quick gain.”

This logic leads BlackRock’s chairman to propose changing the tax code by lengthening to three years the the period needed to qualify for capital gains treatment while taxing trading gains at an even higher rate than ordinary income for investment held less than six months. To encourage truly patient capital, the capital gains rate would be stepped down to zero over a period of ten years.

In our latest 21st Century Capitalism initiative paper, "What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production," author Margaret M. Blair explores how the share value maximization norm (or the “short-termism” malady) came to dominate, why it is wrong, and why the “team production” approach provides a better basis for governing corporations over the long term.

Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Blair demonstrates how the team production theory recognizes that creating wealth for society as a whole requires recognizing the importance of all of the participants in a corporate enterprise, and making sure that all share in the expanding pie so that they continue to collaborate to create wealth.

Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms:

1. Legal personality
2. Limited liability
3. Transferable shares
4. Management under a Board of Directors
5. Indefinite existence

Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive.

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Last June, Brookings senior fellow Elaine Kamarck and I published a paper laying out the rise of short-term thinking in U.S. corporations. We argued that this trend was bad for the economy, and we suggested policies that would at least slow it down and diminish its effects.

Since then, additional research on short-termism has emerged, and an increasing number of corporate leaders are expressing concern about the trajectory of U.S. firms. Last November, for example, the Boston Consulting Group documented a worrisome decline in the corporate activities and investments designed to discover and nurture future growth opportunities. This turn away from exploratory activities may not immediately affect investors, said the BCG report: in the short term, companies can maintain earnings and shareholder returns by “cutting costs, increasing dividends, and pursuing share buybacks.” (As Kamarck and I showed, this is what is happening across our economy.) But in the long run, BCG researchers found, firms that invest in exploration boost revenues and total returns far faster than do those who are content to exploit their existing lines of business and return most of their earnings to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks.

A few days ago, Laurence Fink, the chief executive of the world’s largest investment fund and a long-time foe of short-termism, sent a letter to the heads of S & P 500 companies and large European corporations. He noted that in the twelve months ending September 30 2015, buybacks had risen by 27 percent over the previous year, when buybacks already stood at record levels. “Today’s culture of quarterly earning hysteria,” he declared, is “totally contrary to the long-term approach we need.” And he warned corporate executives that in the absence of well-considered long-term plans for investment and growth, they would expose their firms “to the pressures on investors focused on maximizing near-term profit at the expense of long-term value.”

Many influential investors agree with Fink, and they are joining forces. On February 1, the Financial Times reported that since last summer, the world’s largest asset managers—Warren Buffett, Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, and the heads of BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, and Capital Group, among others—have been holding secret meetings to frame proposals that would encourage longer-term investments while reducing friction with shareholders. These proposals, which are reportedly some months away from final agreement and publication, may well involve changes in boards of directors, executive compensation, and shareholder rights.

The summit participants plan to support these changes for the companies in which they invest. Given the pools of funds they control, which amount to many trillions of dollars, their coordinated action may well represent a turning-point in the struggle to reorient corporate strategy toward the long term.

In 2005, billionaire hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert acquired a large portion of Sears Holdings, the parent company of Sears and Kmart, among other brands. In 2008, Lampert reorganized the company into 30 autonomous business units that would operate like independent businesses, with their own IT contracts, marketing officers, and most importantly, annual financial statements. The idea was that having each unit compete for resources would drive better decision-making and boost profits overall. The exact opposite happened. The divisions turned against one another, making decisions that benefited their divisions at the expense of others. In the year after Lampert’s acquisition of Sears, the company thrived, but two years later, profits tanked, the share price plummeted, and hundreds of stores were closed. As Jillian Popadak explains in a new paper about corporate culture and firm value, erosion of corporate culture may be to blame.

It’s not the case that decentralization is always bad—some large technology companies take this approach—but in Sears’s case, the reorganization changed the norms and culture for employees, dis-incentivizing collaboration at the expense of the overall firm. Popadak notes that former Sears employees speak to this: they said the change created a “warring-tribes culture” that lacked cooperation, and “the result was confusing to the customer.” Media accounts tell a similar story. Accounts detail managers cutting floor staff to save money, intense rivalries over the space in the weekly circular, resulting in nonsense product combinations, and a paltry one percent investment in capital expenditures. Popadak argues this is an example of how important implicit norms can be when they are working to create value at the company. When the explicit emphasis on performance was introduced, it “overpowered the implicit values to collaborate, satisfy the customer, and not act selfishly.”

How can you tell if a firm’s culture creates long-term value, or even measure something so seemingly unquantifiable? Popadak argues that while corporate governance measures are designed to change the explicit rules at a company, the culture is a set of implicit rules that govern employee behavior: the expectations employees have about what it takes to be successful at the firm. In her paper, Popadak collected millions of reviews from job sites like Glassdoor.com, Payscale.com, and CareerBliss.com by year and firm, and then used the text of the reviews to create measures of firm culture based on six categories: adaptability, collaboration, customer-orientation, detail-orientation, results-orientation, and integrity. She then assessed how these measures changed when a firm underwent a governance change.

Popadak writes of this graphic, “The figure shows that firms with stronger shareholder governance exhibited statistically significant increases in results-orientation but decreases in customer-orientation, integrity, and collaboration in the year following the governance change.” In the short term, a move to results-orientation boosts sales growth and payout in the short term, but in the long term, there are “significant declines in intangible value, customer satisfaction and brand value.” Ultimately, Popadak concludes that sacrificing corporate culture for short-term payoff may not be worth it.