This report aims to shed light on the key actors, processes and narratives that are shaping Iraq's foreign policy behaviour and options, at a time when the country is seeking to emerge from international sanctions and resume a more normal role in international affairs.

• Iraq's foreign relations are increasingly intertwined with the country's own divisions, and the increasing polarization of key Middle Eastern countries over Syria threatens to escalate Iraq's internal crisis.
   
• Syria has become the most divisive foreign policy issue facing Iraq, with little consensus on how to respond to the conflict. To protect against the risk of spillover from Syria, Iraq's political groupings must develop at least a basic agreement on their strategic response to the conflict.
   
• Western governments should caution their allies in the Gulf that the exploitation of sectarian discourses will have toxic effects that could last for at least a generation.

India's 16th general election in 2014 is shaping up to be a critical juncture in the evolution of the nation's politics. The speaker will discuss its significance, focusing particularly on the decisive emergence of regional leaders and parties as the dominant actors of India's democracy.

Kazakhstan has attracted international attention due to its energy resources, its relative openness to foreign investment and its proximity to Afghanistan, all of which influence its foreign policy. The withdrawal of ISAF forces from the region in 2014 and Kazakhstan's participation in a number of regional and international initiatives are also likely to play a role in shaping the country's foreign policy in the short to medium term.

Mr Idrissov will outline the main items on Astana's foreign policy agenda for approximately 15 minutes, followed by 45 minutes for questions and discussion.

Attendance is by invitation only. 

Moisés Naím will share his insights into the changing nature of power in the 21st century. He will articulate what he considers to be the shift and dispersal of power between traditionally dominant actors (such as large, stable governments, corporations and armies), and newly ascendant ‘micropowers’ (such as the Tea Party, WikiLeaks, and Somali pirates). 

Crucially, however, he will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest power is easier to acquire, but harder to use, and easier to lose. Coupled with this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. 

There will be a reception after the event.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.

The violence in South Sudan this week suggests there could be worse times to come for the country. It will exacerbate the deep-rooted inter- and intra-tribal tensions that have defined the political landscape in South Sudan since it gained independence in 2011. It could also create a refugee dilemma for the country’s neighbours.

The dynamics of the leadership struggle between President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and former vice president Riek Macher, a Nuer, colours politics throughout the country, illustrating the prevalence of political tribalism at the highest office. Following Kiir’s dismissal of Machar and the entire cabinet in July, neither this week’s attempted coup nor its heavy suppression will have come as a surprise to many in South Sudan.

The perception of Dinka domination pervading the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) by other ethnic groups is not new. But it has become increasingly marked in a country with a fragile economy, limited opportunities for employment and deep-rooted patrimonialism throughout all tiers of government.

While there is a long-standing rivalry for power between the Dinka and Nuer, South Sudan’s two largest tribal groups, others, such as the Equatorians, perceive both groups as monopolizing power. Addressing this perceived inequity within the government will be integral to move beyond political tribalism towards an inclusive system of government that guarantees minority representation. Without this change, discontent and frustrations within the disenfranchised rural communities that make up the majority of the population are liable to rise to the surface, as this week’s events demonstrate.

While government policies since independence have been careful to use the language of inclusivity, the reality is very different. Jonglei, the largest of South Sudan’s ten states and home of the Nuer, has seen severe fighting between the Dinka, Nuer and Murle, for example. In December 2011 tribal attacks and counterattacks between Nuer and Murle caused at least 1,000 deaths. 

These tensions have been further aggravated by the failure of the central government to provide even basic levels of local governance, made worse by systemic corruption and patrimonialism. The extent of corruption, and the government’s lack of control over it, was demonstrated in 2012 when President Kiir issued a somewhat plaintive call to his government officials to return stolen cash.

Government reforms and legislation have stripped traditional authorities of their former functions and roles within local society, without reintegrating them into new roles within the government apparatus or providing viable alternatives. This has resulted in inconsistent and disparate systems of local governance throughout South Sudan, contributing to existing perceptions of inequity. This is often assumed to be based on tribal factors, regardless of whether this is in fact the case.

With tensions appearing to be unabated in the capital, Juba, and with the dry season approaching, which will facilitate a more mobile population, there is significant potential for security to deteriorate further. And it may not recover for a long time. Disgruntled and marginalized, the tribal populations that have felt excluded from the political process, or in the case of the Nuer, undermined in that process, may use the current political turbulence to bring matters to a head and challenge the authority of South Sudan’s leading figures.

A lasting conflict in South Sudan would likely lead to further displacement of people, which would place an increased strain on host communities in neighbouring countries. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda already have a long history of accepting refugees from the Sudanese civil war. With the current flows of displaced populations from conflicts in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo however, an additional influx of South Sudanese refugees would have the potential to overburden and destabilize the region further.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

As Prime Minster Abe enters his second year in office, the speakers will consider future prospects for Japanese foreign policy and UK-Japan relations. 

This event is funded by the Nippon Foundation. It is held in partnership with the Nippon Foundation and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Is the news our society’s religion today?

In the developed economies, the news now occupies a position of power at least equal to that formerly enjoyed by the faiths. Matins has been transubstantiated into the breakfast bulletin, vespers into the evening report. It also demands that we approach it with some of the same deferential expectations we would once have harboured for the faiths. Here, too, we hope to receive revelations, learn who is good and bad, fathom suffering and understand the unfolding logic of existence. And here too, if we refuse to take part in the rituals, there could be imputations of heresy.

What would you like the news to be?

It feels like there is always an infinite amount of news, so much is happening in the world every day. Yet after a while it becomes clear that the same kinds of event are recurring again and again. The details change, but all circle round the same archetypal story. Men in highly responsible positions are coming unstuck because their desires lead them to do things that, when made public, are shameful.

Identifying the underlying theme is more important in the long run than going through the details of every case. The news that matters is not so much that this MP or banker did what they did. What we need to address is why such things happen.

How do you keep the public interested in the news that does matter?

We cannot be collectively dragged into being more responsible through guilt. The Arctic ice is melting and this is going to have major, lasting implications for sea levels and weather around the world. A few people care a lot but, strangely, Taylor Swift’s legs are far more captivating. The starting point has to be indulgence towards the way our minds work. We are interested in Swift’s legs not because we are evil – but because we are wired in unhelpful ways. If we are going to be interested en masse in the defrosting poles, we need to take our fragilities on board and therefore get serious about trying to make important news not just ‘important’, but also beguiling. Then things stand a chance of changing.

You argue that we should set aside ‘neutral reporting’. Are you asking for more bias?

Many people imagine that what makes news organizations serious is their ability to provide us with information that is ‘unbiased’. But facts can only become meaningful and relevant to us when they slot into some picture of important or trivial, right or wrong. News organizations that vaunt their neutrality forget that neutrality is simply impossible. There is no risk-free, all-knowing sober set of answers to cling to. At heart, the word ‘bias’ simply alludes to the business of having a ‘take’ on existence. One may have a better or worse take, but one can’t make any sense of the flotsam of daily events in the news without having one. All of the figures we revere in history have been highly biased: each of them had a strong sense of what mattered and why, and their judgments were anything but perfectly balanced. They were just flavoured in the right way. We don’t need news stripped of bias, we need news presented to us with the best kinds of bias.

What is the purpose of foreign reporting?

Foreign reporting implicitly defers to the priorities of the state and of business, occupying itself almost exclusively with whom and where we should fight, trade or sympathize. But it should instead offer us a means by which to humanize the Other who instinctively repels, bores or frightens us and with whom we can’t, without help, imagine having anything in common.

Foreign countries also furnish a scale against which our own nation and ways of living can be assessed; they may help us to see our national oddities, blind spots and strengths. Stories from them may lead us to a fresh appreciation of the imperfect freedoms and comparative abundance of our homelands, which otherwise would be treated only as matters for grumbling or blame. Alternatively, problems with which we are all too familiar may be revealed to have been solved better elsewhere.

You mention the importance of historical perspective in reporting, so that we can respond to issues with context.

Contrary to what the news usually suggests, hardly anything is ever totally new, few things are truly amazing and very little is absolutely terrible. The economic indices are grim, but we have weathered comparable drops many times over the past century and even the worst scenarios only predict that we will return to a standard of living we had a few decades ago. A bad avian flu may disrupt international travel and defeat known drugs for a while, but research will eventually understand and contain it. The floods look dramatic, but in the end, they will affect merely a fraction of the population and recede soon.

How can photography change the way we report news?

There are now more images than ever before in the coverage we consume, but the problem lies in the lack of ambition behind their production and display. We might usefully divide news photographs into two genres. The first are images of corroboration, which do little other than confirm something we have learnt about a person or an event through an accompanying article. The second is a rarer kind of image, the photograph of revelation, whose ambition is not simply to back up what the text tells us but to advance our level of knowledge to a new point. It sets out to challenge cliché. We have lost any sense of photography’s potential as an information-bearing medium, as a force to properly introduce us to a planet that we keep conceitedly assuming that we know rather well already.

Do you feel oppressed by the news?

The pressure of not missing out makes one feel one has to care about a given topic, even when one doesn’t want to. Take Mandela’s funeral. One was supposed to care a lot, and yet, you don’t. You know the reasons why it is important, but they don’t grip you because you are focused elsewhere on subjects that, while tiny in the grand scheme of things, matter a lot within your context. It would be dangerous if hardly anyone paid attention to what the Government was doing, or what was happening to the environment. But it is not right to go from this to the demand that everyone should be interested in every item whenever the news machine calls. We badly need people whose attention is not caught up in the trends of the moment and who are not looking in the same direction as everyone else. We need people scanning the less familiar parts of the horizon.

Do you think we get the news we deserve?

Much of what we now take for granted as news has its origins in the information needed by those people taking major decisions or who are at the centre of national affairs. Ease of communication and a generous democratic impulse means that selections from the knowledge base, originally designed for decision-makers, now gets routinely sent via the media to very large numbers of people. It is as if a dossier which might properly arrive upon the desk of a Minister has accidentally been delivered to the wrong address and ends up on the breakfast table of an electrician in Pitlochry. Every day the news gives us stuff that is both interesting for some people and irrelevant to you. No wonder we’re sometimes a bit bored. It’s not our fault.

This meeting will see the launch of the Chatham House-CAGE briefing paper ‘Human Development as Positive Freedom: A World View since 1870’. The author of the paper will argue that while substantial gains in world human development have been achieved since 1870, the main period of improvement actually occurred between World War I and 1970. He will further argue that, despite initial successes in lifting human development, the socialist experiments of the 20th century failed to sustain momentum and then (with the exception of Cuba) stagnated and fell behind prior to the socialist model's ultimate demise. Finally, he will contend that since 1970, while most OECD countries have experienced a second (later life) health transition, all developing regions have fallen behind in this dimension.

The briefing paper is the 12th publication in the Chatham House-CAGE series, published in partnership with the Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) at the University of Warwick.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Australia’s new foreign minister will reflect on the country’s relations and policy priorities within the Asia-Pacific region. The speaker will also discuss how Australia is working to build Asian regional architecture and to strengthen the international rules-based order.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to her during the event.

America is changing. So too is the rest of the world. But will America's internal changes carry broader implications for its role in the world, the influence and power it wields, and the foreign policy choices it makes?

While proving causality would be difficult, commonsense logic might suggest that a youthful America, one that has a more diverse ethnic and cultural makeup and that is more aware of its economic inequality, is also one that might hold more open, accepting (and perhaps liberal) views on a number of issues. However the record is mixed: while in some areas America is becoming more liberal, in others such as gun control and abortion, the trend seems to be towards the conservative.

But America is undergoing some fundamental transformations. America's demographics are changing. Unlike many in Asia and Europe, the US is remaining a relatively young country. It is also becoming more diverse. In 2011, there were more births in the US among minorities than Caucasians (minorities made up 50.4 per cent of the nation's population under one year old). Hispanics are the fastest growing segment of the population.

America, in common with many other countries, is also seeing a dramatic rise in the level of economic inequality. While the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement spread to 900 cities around the world, the US is perhaps exceptional in the speed with which the social gap is widening and its size. These populations are also swiftly urbanizing.

The number of Americans who do not identify with any religion is growing rapidly. According to Pew Research polling, one-fifth of the US public are religiously unaffiliated today, the highest numbers recorded by them. Younger adults are more likely to have no religious affiliation than their elders, suggesting that this trend is likely to continue.

These changes could be contributing to the possible trend towards more liberal views in the US, led for the main part by cities and states. For example, while federal law continues to ban cannabis, in the summer of 2013, two states – Washington and Colorado – legalized it. Since Massachusetts in 2004 made gay marriage legal, 16 other states (and the District of Columbia) have followed suit, with nine of these decisions taking place in 2013. And, at a federal level, after 18 years of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' (the law that prevented military personnel from disclosing that they were gay), the law was finally repealed in 2011 after years of debate.

One could also argue that the slow creep of some Republican platforms towards a more open social agenda is also an indication that, at least politically, some on the right recognize that to be reelected they need to move where they perceive the population to be (i.e. left of their position).

These demographic and political changes are taking place in a backdrop of some other important national trends. Over the past 10 years, the arrival of new technologies, most notably fracking, has led to an energy revolution in the United States. America's trend towards energy self-sufficiency is having a direct impact on the US economy and will have implications for its diplomacy. It is supporting 're-shoring' (the return of jobs to the US) which is rebuilding America's manufacturing and industrial base, and it is helping the US (along with the stimulus and other policies) climb out of recession faster than many of its European allies.

This is taking place in the context of the highest ever levels of political polarization (as measured by Congressional voting). For the first time last year, the most liberal Republican was to the right of the most conservative Democrat; the traditional overlap that facilitated the two political parties working together has now disappeared.

These trends are joined, and at times reinforced, by two other profound global factors: faster technological shifts and the dispersal of power.

As all these dynamics interact it will have implications for America's foreign policy and, as such, should be of interest to an international audience – with a caveat: Americans generally don't appear to care much about foreign policy and as such their impact on it is limited.

At a basic level, a youthful America is a productive one that is likely to retain relatively high growth rates. This is vital for its trading and investment partners, not least in Europe and Asia. While the US will soon have to deal with unaffordable entitlements (such as social security and health care) and needs to reenergize its early education, the fact that it still has a relatively low ratio of retirees to workers, means that it has a bit more time to manage this transition.

America's young and diverse population could also have an impact on America's soft power. The fact that increasing numbers of Americans affiliate as Asian-Americans or Hispanic-Americans (to name but two groups) could have profound effects on how the nation manages its relationships with these regions and is seen by their citizens. The proliferation of communications channels and the empowerment of the individual will only reinforce these tendencies.

The increase in people-to-people links likely to result is also a manifestation of the broader trend of the diffusion of power to other non-state actors. Over the long term, foreign policy is no longer going to be the exclusive right of the state, but other actors, from individuals to philanthropists and businesses, will play a role.

However at some level, while the young are taking advantage of new technologies to engage with their neighbours, and a more diverse population is linking with their families and friends overseas, the rising income inequality could be pushing the globalization agenda in the opposite direction. As those towards the bottom strata find technology taking away their jobs or corporates moving them overseas they are likely to push back. And their ability to be heard (individual empowerment once more) is only increasing.

Two regions in particular are likely to see specific foreign policy changes. In Latin America the inevitable shift on immigration (although it could still be some time in coming) will have potentially huge implications on migration of workers north. At the same time, America's 'war on drugs' has already begun to change under the Obama administration from a historically supply side driven policy to one that accepts (at least rhetorically) the need for addressing the demand side. This more nuanced policy could allow a more balanced policy agenda between the US and its southern neighbors.

And for Europeans, the young increasingly don't remember the Cold War and the importance of the Alliance in and after World War II (Obama is the first US president who didn't live through it). The ties that bind could in time weaken. This is only being reinforced by immigration trends; fewer citizens from Europe come to the US than from any other region of the world.

America is not, as some assert, becoming isolationist. 'Nation-building at home' may be Obama's focus, but this does not precipitate an abandonment of international engagement. These trends suggest instead that America might become more nuanced and collaborative in its relationships. America's diversity has always been a strength and as it increases, will continue to be one. America, more than any other nation, truly continues to be the global melting pot.

This article was originally published by the Huffington Post.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Summary points:

• Substantial gains in world human development have been achieved since 1870, but research shows that the main improvement actually occurred between the First World War and 1970.
   
• Across-the-board advances took place in life expectancy and education between 1920 and 1950, a phase during which there was a major backlash against economic globalization. This is evidence of a development puzzle: economic growth and human development do not always go hand in hand.
   
• Between 1913 and 1970 the absolute gap between most countries in the OECD and the rest of the world widened, with different regions experiencing mixed success in catching up. Since the 1970s the performance of developing regions has varied greatly.
   
• Despite initial successes in lifting human development, the socialist experiments of the 20th century failed to sustain momentum and then (with the exception of Cuba) stagnated and fell behind prior to the socialist model’s ultimate demise.
   
• Education has been the driving force behind the limited catching-up of developing regions in terms of long-term human development. In terms of life expectancy,these regions achieved significant gains only during the first (early-life) health transition. Since 1970, while most OECD countries have experienced a second (later-life) health transition, all developing regions have fallen behind.

Launch event

Human Development as Positive Freedom: A World View Since 1870
26 February 2014

The landlocked southern African nation of Lesotho faces a number of domestic challenges in 2014. Reducing reliance on the agricultural sector, containing the prevalence of HIV and improving service delivery are all important issues that must be addressed to ensure sustainable growth. However, social achievements including literacy rates and levels of gender parity among the highest in Africa, the country’s potential for electricity exports, and the booming relationship between its textile industry and the United States, could mean Lesotho is well-placed for future growth and development. 

HE Prime Minister Tom Thabane will discuss how his government seeks to address the Lesotho’s domestic issues and how the country seeks to exert its influence in the regional Southern African Development Community.

From intimidation to restrictive laws and curbs on information, media outlets and individual journalists face a variety of threats to maintaining their independence and integrity in print and online. The panel will outline key challenges to international media freedoms, and Yavuz Baydar will share his experiences as a journalist in Turkey, a country that has faced growing criticism from the international community following a crackdown on social media sites, an increased pressure on its press and high numbers of detained journalists. 

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed for members only. The live stream will be made available here at 18:30 BST on Tuesday 20 May.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speakers by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to them during the event.

This event will be followed by a reception.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.

In 2010 the UK government became the first in the world to create a dedicated Behavioural Insights Team, commonly known as ‘the nudge unit’. The team apply insights from a range of academic disciplines, such as behavioural economics, psychology and social anthropology, to public policy and services, arguing this enables them to design policies or interventions that encourage people to make better decisions by presenting choices in different ways. When the unit advised the HMRC to change the wording on income tax letters, for example, it resulted in an extra £200 million being collected on time. 

Dr David Halpern, who leads the team, will explain how the process works, why he considers it a valuable approach to policy making, and what future he envisages for the unit. 

This event will be followed by a reception.

Three years on from the Arab uprisings, many of the goals of the protests remain unmet. However, the spirit of collaboration which was nurtured during this time lives on and has resulted in an expansion of grassroots organizations, tech startups and artists’ collectives. At this roundtable, Maryam Jamshidi, author of The Future of the Arab Spring: Civic Entrepreneurship in Politics, Art, and Technology Startups, will argue that the Middle East’s ‘civic entrepreneurs’ continue to apply their talents to rebuilding their countries’ political, economic and social fabrics.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

The mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War continue to be a divisive and highly politicized issue. The mixed reactions to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's message of condolence on 23 April highlighted the obstacles standing in the way of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. This event will explore whether the upcoming centenary of the genocide represents an opportunity for improvement. The speakers will offer initial remarks for approximately 10 minutes each, followed by an hour for questions and discussion.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Loss of territory to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the mass executions of Shia have undoubtedly had an impact on the mobilization of fighters inside Iraq opposing the group. But after the capture of Mosul and Tikrit by ISIS, a message from the group’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, highlighted the power of religion as a mobilizing force in armed conflict. In the audio message Adnani addressed Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as ‘Rafidi’, a derogatory term for Shia meaning rejectionist. He pledged that ‘the settling of debts will not be in Samarra and Baghdad, rather in Karbala al-munajjasah [Karbala the defiled] and Najaf al-ashrak [Najaf the most polytheistic]’.

His use of the words ‘munajjasah’ and ‘ashrak’ was a sectarian play on words referring to the two cities viewed by the Shia as being the most important cities in Islam after Mecca and Medina. Karbala is also known as Karbala al-Muqaddasa (Karbala the Holy), and contains the mausoleum of the third Shia Imam, Hussein ibn Ali. Najaf is commonly referred to as Najaf al-Ashraf (Najaf the Most Honourable), and contains the mausoleum of the first Shia Imam and fourth ‘rightly guided’ caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Threats against Karbala and Najaf have prompted an immediate reaction from Shia both inside Iraq and beyond its borders. When a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential living Shia religious authority, called on all able-bodied Iraqis to ’confront and fight the terrorists’, Sistani was compelled to reiterate that the subject of his call were Iraqis, and not just Shia. Ayatollah Fadhil al-Milani, Sistani’s representative in London, also released a video message clarifying that there was no need for Shia outside of Iraq to confront ISIS.

Fighters are already mobilized in Syria on the basis that Shia shrines in Damascus such as the Sayyidah Zainab Mosque are under threat from extremist ‘Takfiri’ militant groups intent on destroying these holy sites. The narrative of protecting Zainab’s shrine is a potent one: militias in the country bear names such as the Brigade of Zainab’s Protector and the Abu al-Fadhl Abbas Brigades. In 2013, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah warned that the destruction of Zainab’s shrine would ‘carry with it grave consequences’, and that ‘countries supporting these groups [would] be held responsible for this crime if it takes place.’ Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani has also stated unequivocally on live television that ‘regarding the holy Shia shines in Karbala, Najaf, Khadhimiya and Samarra, we announce to the killers and terrorists that the big Iranian nation will not hesitate to protect holy shrines’.

Understanding sacred geography in conflict

The explicit threat against the sacred geography of Najaf and Karbala has the potential to escalate the crisis in Iraq from a domestic to transnational conflict, drawing in fighters from around the world. For this reason, there should be a greater attempt to understand how sacred geography can transform the stakes of armed conflict.

In 2001, UN General Assembly Resolution 55/254 called upon states to ‘exert their utmost efforts to ensure that religious sites are fully respected and protected’ and ‘adopt adequate measures aimed at preventing […] acts or threats of violence’. Just what these ‘adequate measures’ should be remains unclear. Armed forces across the world often need to operate in religious sites but at the risk of undermining long-term relations with the local population; and those making the calculations are often unaware of the repercussions.

This is not to assert that sacred geography is the only factor to look at when assessing militant mobilization in Iraq and elsewhere. Nevertheless, incorporating a less secular lens for analysing international security would be useful and working through the practical implications of the UN resolution – and setting firmer guidelines − should therefore become a priority.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

This expert-level meeting will bring together policy-makers, analysts and Chatham House experts to discuss the crisis in Syria from the perspective of Syrian Kurds. 

Salih Muslim is a prominent member of the Kurdish opposition in Syria and chairman of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which controls Rojava, an autonomous administration area in northern Syria. He is also the deputy coordinator of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. At this roundtable he will discuss the movement for a political settlement and prospects for a Kurdish democratic model in Syria.

To enable as open a debate as possible, the question and answer session will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Ahead of the referendum on Scottish independence, the speaker will set out his vision for Scotland to remain as an integral and full member of the United Kingdom. He will explain that Scotland’s global influence and international reach – in terms of diplomacy, peacekeeping and aid relief – is significantly enhanced by being part of a bigger, stronger and more powerful state such as the UK.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available here at 18:00 BST on Tuesday 02 September.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to him during the event.

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) turns 21 years old this month and has cause to celebrate. The insurgent party won a national election in May and last week enjoyed the most significant coup in its history when Conservative MP Douglas Carswell defected to UKIP and announced a forthcoming by-election. Given that his coastal seat of Clacton is UKIP’s most demographically favourable seat in the country, Carswell has almost certainly handed the party its first elected member of parliament.

The events in Clacton will be seen by many as validating one of the oldest myths about UKIP; that it is nothing more than a second home for disgruntled Conservatives. Carswell’s defection will be especially welcomed on the left, where many argue UKIP is dividing the right and clearing the path for Labour’s return to power in 2015. This is dangerously misguided.

To understand why, we can start with Clacton. The seat has the largest concentration of the 'left behind' demographic; older, white, blue-collar voters who lack qualifications, felt excluded from Britain’s economic transformation long before the crisis, are cut adrift from politics, and are intensely anxious over the cultural as well as economic effects of migration.

But as a Conservative-held seat, Clacton is also an outlier. For our book, Revolt on the Right, Robert Ford and I ranked all seats according to their demographic receptiveness to UKIP. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, most are in Labour territory where MPs are battling with the same cocktail as Carswell: economic stagnation, unease over migration, an entrenched anti-politics consensus and anxieties over rapid social change. Of the 20 seats most demographically receptive to UKIP, 18 have Labour incumbents. Of the top 50, Labour holds 42. Of course, demography alone is not necessarily destiny. Aside from a receptive local population, UKIP also needs a favourable political context. Unlike Conservative-held seats that are at genuine risk from UKIP, Labour’s heartland seats are currently protected by large majorities.

But a cursory glance at the recent European parliament results reveals the direction of travel. UKIP comfortably won the popular vote in a swath of Labour territory, and talks ambitiously of becoming the main rival to Labour in northern England. It appears to be succeeding. Across 39 local authorities in the northwest, UKIP won more votes than Labour in 13 and finished as its main rival in 23. It is similarly bleak in the northeast; across 12 authorities UKIP won the popular vote in five and finished second to Labour in seven.

Since 2010, UKIP has grown fastest among the groups in which Labour is struggling most: the over-65s, the working-class and those who left education early. UKIP is tearing off this section of the electorate, creating a fundamental divide in British politics between those with the skills, education and resources to adapt, and those who have little and feel intensely angry. This is why some Ukippers talk of a '2020 strategy' and plot further advances under an Ed Miliband-led post-2015 government.

Those who compare the party to earlier attempts to redraw the political map, such as the Social Democratic Party in the 1980s, or populist crusaders like the French Poujadists in the 1950s, miss a crucial point. UKIP is anchored in modern Britain’s most socially distinctive support base; it is the most working-class movement since Michael Foot’s Labour Party. Labelling UKIP as 'populist' implies that it appeals across society. It does not. Its strength is concentrated in the 'left behind', who cluster in specific geographical areas. Crucially, this is essential for success under first-past-the-post.

Labour should be under no illusion. UKIP is attracting the Carswells of this world but it is also emerging as the main opposition in many northern heartlands, where it benefits from the toxicity of the Tories, moribund Labour machines that have not had to compete for decades, and the short-sightedness of some close to Ed Miliband who think only of the impact UKIP might have in 2015, and not beyond. Should UKIP’s insurgency continue, not only will it cause a rupture on the centre right, but also bring back into play Labour constituencies that have not been competitive for generations.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Viacheslav Chirikba will offer his perspective on the situation in Abkhazia following the recent presidential elections, and the developments in Abkhazia's relations with other regional players. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This event will discuss the rise of the culture of world development. It will examine the post-war reconstruction and development projects of the 1940s through to the 1960s, including those devised at Chatham House. The speaker will argue that these projects hold valuable lessons that still apply to the current economic environment. The speaker will also discuss the key role played by Eugene R Black (1898-1992), the third president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), who was one of the main architects of post-war reconstruction and development projects and a promoter of a ‘culture of development’.

This expert-level workshop will bring together around 30 Gulf scholars, experts and practitioners from a variety of professional and academic backgrounds to share their analysis and research on the role of Islam in social and political movements in the GCC countries, as well as alternatives to Islamism. It will place political Islam in historical context, explore the differences between different strands of political Islam and the ways in which different country contexts have shaped the behaviour of movements that claim to have religious legitimacy, such as the institutions and legal regulations governing political movements.

This event is part of Chatham House’s Future Trends in the GCC research project, and is held in partnership with Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Center in Doha, Qatar.

Jocelyn Ford will share her experiences and insights from documenting the struggles of a widowed Tibetan facing ethnic discrimination in Beijing and gender discrimination in her village. The panel will then have a wider discussion about national identity and the issues facing ethnic minorities in China.  

This discussion coincides with the UK screening of Nowhere to Call Home: A Tibetan in Beijing and will include clips from the film.

The speaker will argue that Japan’s economic problems are exacerbated by the fact that its social and employment policies favour age over youth, and men over women. In order for its economy to improve, Japan will need to loosen its rigid labour laws, encourage greater mobility and improve women’s career opportunities. Until Japan begins rewarding creativity and productivity in the workplace rather than longevity, Abenomics will fail to have the desired effect.

This event is funded by the Nippon Foundation and held in partnership with them and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation.

In March 2014, Russian forces seized Crimea from Ukraine in a move that was condemned internationally but welcomed by many in Crimea’s Russian majority community. A team from Channel 4’s Unreported World will show their upcoming film, Miss Crimea, which follows a young Crimean Tatar competing in the Miss Crimea beauty contest and examines how the Crimean Tatar community has been affected by the Russian takeover. Against this backdrop, the panel will explore how the issue of ethnicity has become more politically charged since the annexation and the impact that this has had on ordinary citizens from different ethnic groups.

This is an Under 35s Forum event. The event will be followed by a reception.

The event is held in association with Channel 4.

The international community’s response to the Syria crisis has been unsatisfactory on many fronts, and humanitarian aid and development is no exception. While there has been renewed emphasis by development organizations on the importance of engaging local actors − notably highlighted in the new Sustainable Development Goals − the reality is this has been woefully lacking in practice. And Syria is simply one example of many where the failure of UN agencies and other humanitarian actors to partner with local actors has hampered the response to humanitarian crises.

Double standards

The problem is that international agencies usually have high and unfair expectations from Syrian individuals and organizations, requiring them to speak the ‘language’ of development, meet international standards, and demonstrate a wide range of expertise. However, these demands are not reciprocated by international organizations and experts being expected to have the same depth of knowledge of the local context in which they are operating. In addition, while Syrian actors are expected to be neutral, impartial and politically unaffiliated, foreign aid appears to be driven − explicitly and unashamedly − by the political objectives of the donor countries.

There is a double standard at work. In many cases, international ‘experts’ on Syria have little local knowledge, but there are no channels to measure or question their level of expertise. At the same time, including local Syrians in decision-making is seen as a threat to predetermined objectives, rather than as an asset.

Syrians could add an indispensable source of knowledge and context to international agencies, as well as add local credibility. But too often they are brought on board to be part of the humanitarian and development picture or to get their simple feedback for evaluation and needs assessment reports to satisfy donors’ requirements, rather than employed as an integral component of designing and implementing projects. Though some of this is down to a pretext of lack of capacity, it raises the question of whether there is an international political willingness and genuine organizational courage to involve Syrians at programming, decision and policy making-levels.

The importance of local

The Syrian example is not isolated. While there is now a debate to encourage engaging local actors, this does not happen in practice. The Local to Global Protection Initiative study reported that local and national humanitarian actors received only 0.2% of the overall direct global humanitarian response in 2013.

Moreover, the international humanitarian and development systems are designed, together with foreign aid policy, to be self-contained and to exclude local actors. This allows donor governments to use the systems as political tools for leveraging control. It is equally difficult for both outsiders as well as insiders to understand how the system really functions. The UN-led coordination structure is one example of the heavy international architecture that remains unable to reform itself, learn from its previous mistakes, or to engage with local actors.

And that engagement matters. The Independent Research Forum emphasized in its brief in February 2014 how engaging local researchers and implementing bottom-up participatory learning can make countries better prepared to achieve the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Those goals, as well as the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit, highlight the importance of including local actors in the humanitarian and development responses.

Moving forward

Fortunately, such initiatives are creating a momentum within the development community to make radical changes through bottom-up approaches that put sustainability into practice. But if the Sustainable Development Goals want to affect real change, there will have to be a significant drive to move from rhetoric and ‘intentions’ to reality and actions. Currently it seems that the international community prefers to simply maintain the current status quo. It only takes a brief reflection on how many Syrians are included in every project or programme and how many Syrians are in positions to contribute at the policy and decision-making levels to realise the scale of the impetus required to change this system. To make that change might provide an opportunity for Syrians to restore some of the ownership to the outcomes and decisions of their conflict.

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This roundtable will explore the role of and the challenges faced by both the international community and local civil society in countering sectarian narratives in the Middle East and North Africa region. Speakers will draw on their experiences working with communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt to discuss potential contributions that can be made at the local, national, and international level in tackling the root causes of religious division and facilitating positive community relations.

This inaugural Asfari Forum is sponsored by the Asfari Foundation.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

In 2011, many Syrians took to the streets of Damascus to demand the overthrow of the government of Bashar al-Assad. Today, much of Syria has become a warzone and many worry that the country is on the brink of collapse.

Drawing on first-hand testimonies from opposition fighters, exiles and human rights activists, the panel will explore the complicated reality of life in present-day Syria. Looking at the militarization of the uprising, the rise of the Islamists and sectarian warfare, and the role of Syria’s government in the conflict, the speakers will discuss the issues from the grassroots to the geopolitical, including the role of the international community in bringing to an end the bloodshed.

This event is now full and registration has closed. An audio recording will be made available shortly after the event has taken place.

This panel will discuss the phenomenon of settlement and the role of settlers in modern conflicts, drawing from recently published work on Israel and the West Bank, Turkish settlers in Cyprus and government run farmer settlement schemes in Sri Lanka.

The panelists, experts in the respective cases, will analyse the role of settlers in mobilization and violence, the conceptual framing of settlement during negotiations and the clash of legal principles versus pragmatism for the resolution of these conflicts. Looking beyond these specific cases, the panel will also raise larger questions about settlers and settlement in international politics.

Following 21 years since the adoption of the Beijing declaration by 189 states, China has the opportunity to lead the way in prioritizing gender-inclusive growth policies on the G20 agenda, as it is hosting the G20 this year.

This roundtable will examine specific challenges in China, a country with a high heterogeneity in the labour force and among its population. The event will bring together representatives of government, business and civil society to continue the dialogue that Chatham House started one year ago in Beijing. Taking stock of the progress achieved so far, the participants will analyse what type of recommendations can have a positive impact in both rural and high- density populated areas.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Chatham House Rule 

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. 

The digital age has seen an extraordinary transformation in how individuals can exercise their right to freedom of expression. What are the proper limits of state interference in online communication in pursuit of national security and public order? What does this mean for privacy? And away from the digital world, to what extent is free speech being affected by counterterrorism measures and actions to prevent hate crimes? How do all of these challenges affect the space for civil society action?

Signs of growing anger at the restrained denunciation of Pennsylvania-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen - whose followers are thought to have played a key role in the attempted coup - are being vocalised more and more, but this criticism only shows part of the true picture.

It is true that prominent liberal Turkish intellectual Soli Ozel spoke for many when he criticised EU politicians and Western media for failing to recognise the “invaluable democratic resistance shown by all political parties in a parliament bombed by war planes”, as well as demonstrating “a lack of sensitivity, empathy and solidarity that cannot be easily digested” by not sending anyone from an EU institution to offer solidarity with the Turkish parliament.

The criticism is reasonable - officials from Western governments and regional institutions such as the Council of Europe exhibited unconditional solidarity with Ukraine during its bitter feud with Russia, which leads some to believe that Muslim-majority Turkey does not apparently deserve the same treatment as its neighbours also experiencing an unlawful attempt to seize control of the state.

Moral authority at risk

It is also right that the West should have censured the coup plotters more forcefully and built upon Turkey’s fragile unity to encourage the country to pursue further democratic reform. To quote former Swedish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt: “Europe risks losing its moral authority if it does not appear particularly engaged in dealing with the coup itself.”

In addition, the EU’s strong criticism of Turkey but not France, for imposing a state of emergency and for temporarily suspending the European Convention on Human Rights, undeniably, smacks of double-standards.

However, some of the criticism falls short. To begin with, the West’s tepidity can be explained (though not wholly justified) by Erdogan’s abrasive behaviour at home and towards Western and international media.

Just three days after the coup, Erdogan threatened in his characteristically defiant tone to revive the controversial construction plans that sparked the 2013 Gezi Park protests, saying: “If we want to preserve our history, we must rebuild this historic [Ottoman-era barracks] structure, [and] we will rebuild it.”

It is also fair for Turkey to be reproached for the widespread crackdown against tens of thousands of suspected Gulenists in the aftermath of the coup. Even if it is conceivable that all 1,577 university deans who were forced to resign were Gulenists, this action will also have a lasting negative impact on the reputations and career prospects of academics unconnected to Gulen.

Fervour against Gulenism

The vigilance by the West is understandable given the Turkish government’s fervour against Gulenism in the immediate post-coup period. It would make no sense for the West to attack the coup and yet, at the same time, equivocate on flagrant violations of due process and human rights. Both efforts are mutually inclusive and identifying such violations has the greatest potential to encourage policy reversals or corrective measures.

Similarly understandable is the attention on Erdogan himself. He is the most formidable and powerful figure in a hierarchical and top-down political system, able to make fateful decisions with few effective checks and balances. He single-handedly replaced Ahmet Davutoglu as prime minister with Binali Yildirim in a clear breach of the Turkish constitution.

Despite Erdogan’s tactical attempts at embracing all the opposition parties apart from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), his refusal to renounce his ambition to transform Turkey into a powerful executive presidency indicates that this fragile political unity will not last.

Only the West has the wherewithal to moderate his policies by continuing to express its friendship with Turkey, whilst not shying away from closely monitoring, scrutinising and commenting on the post-coup developments.

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The void in governance created by the ongoing Syrian conflict has been capitalized upon by warlords, militias and extremist groups to expand and consolidate their power – but has also helped to generate activism, with new leaders born as a reaction to authoritarian governance and conflict limitations.

As public social services have been taken over as war tools, local coordination committees, local councils, humanitarian support groups, citizen journalist networks, women’s groups, and more, have mushroomed across all of Syria. But this new civil society continues to be threatened by many challenges.

It remains hindered by structural weakness and limited capacity - largely as a result of the legacy of Ba’athist policies, which did not allow civil society to exist in the so-called Damascus Spring, but only under the umbrella of the Government, First Lady Asma al-Assad and business NGOs (GoNGOs, FLNGOs and BoNGOs). Beyond this, civil society was limited to purely charitable and religious causes, known as “moujtamaa ahli”.

In addition, Syrian civil society is often a victim of counter-terrorism legislation, with laws and regulations across many countries and institutions prohibiting Syrians from registering an organization and opening bank accounts.  This makes it difficult to secure financial support in an environment where funding has already been dwindling due to a “Syria fatigue” among potential donors, and where any money available is mainly directed at large, often international, NGOs.

Trust, hope and legitimacy

To reach funds, many organizations have to submit to this “NGOization” process. But even this rarely allows for civil society to foster its own interests through core funding. Civil society in Syria is treated more as a “project” with strict indicators, deals and deadlines, when working under conflict necessitates building relationships of trust with a community over time and often has to cover the direct needs on the ground to gain local legitimacy and increase effectiveness. Trust, hope and legitimacy are not aspects you can report against or cover in a sophisticated proposal.

But despite such obstacles, activists and civil society groups continue to volunteer for various causes, ensuring many have not had to seek refuge elsewhere. And their work has included challenging authoritarian and extremist governance.

In Aleppo in 2014, it was civil society with the support of a military faction of Jaish Al Mujahideen that helped expel ISIS. Local councils have since been providing services ranging from humanitarian aid and garbage collection to re-establishing order and resolving local conflicts, thus challenging the legitimacy of jihadist institutions.

NGOs such as the Civil Defense Forces (known as the White Helmets) continually risk their lives to save others by rescuing people from bombed out buildings. On September 19, when a UN sanctioned aid convoy was attacked in Aleppo – reportedly by Russian aircraft – it was the White Helmets that responded, before then coming under attack themselves.

Human rights activists, meanwhile, persist in documenting human rights abuses in the hope that the perpetrators will eventually be held accountable.

However, a Syrian civil society tragedy is unfolding as their work is struggling to survive. To give but one example, Kesh Malek, one of the biggest groups running home-based schooling for children in Aleppo, has already had to close some of its schools.

Lacking international protection, the fate of these children in relation to arms and radicalization is all the more alarming.  Several local councils have also been much weakened, especially vis-à-vis warlords, authoritarian and/or extremists actors.

At its best, the current bombing campaign serves to kill any potential alternatives to an authoritarian regime, and only boosts human suffering, radicalization and displacement.

If this situation is to be reversed, international actors need to ensure security at the local Syrian level, showing that Syrian security is as important as that of Europe.

This means financial security through a deeper and more sustainable capacity building and funding to civil society, and it means protecting civilians and civil society groups though the creation of a safe haven.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback