chine

BHCS MRI Machine Now Fully Operational

Bermuda HealthCare Services [BHCS] announced that their MRI machine is “now fully operational following recent recovery efforts after Hurricane Ernesto’s impact.” A spokesperson said, “With essential services restored, BHCS is ready to accept clients for MRI procedures.” Dr. Ewart Brown, Chairman of BHCS, remarked, “We are delighted to inform the community that our MRI services […]




chine

Assorted Calibers Podcast Ep 311: Machine Guns For Every Owl

In This Episode Erin and Weer’d discuss court cases involving: machine guns being ruled as bearable arms; California required to issue Non-Resident Carry permits; another challenge to the Maryland assault weapons ban. David brings us an interview with Jan Wolbrecht … Continue reading




chine

Tracing the Line: the art of drawing machines and pen plotters

Tracing the Line is a book of plotter art available for preorder now, coming out this November. Many of our featured artists are included in the book, and AxiDraw makes several appearances in the video teaser. Looks like it will be fantastic!




chine

machine that makes fucks

Today on Married To The Sea: machine that makes fucks


This RSS feed is brought to you by Drew and Natalie's podcast Garbage Brain University. Our new series Everything Is Real explores the world of cryptids, aliens, quantum physics, the occult, and more. If you use this RSS feed, please consider supporting us by becoming a patron. Patronage includes membership to our private Discord server and other bonus material non-patrons never see!





chine

Exclusive-Chinese giant CATL pushes beyond batteries into power grids, EV platforms

Robin Zeng, the billionaire founder of CATL, aims to reinvent the world’s largest battery maker as a green-energy provider and to slash the cost of developing electric vehicles, upending the economics of the industry that has powered its growth. Zeng told Reuters in an interview that he expects…




chine

Tesla's Chinese Battery Supplier CATL 'Open Minded' About US Expansion If Trump Welcomes Chinese Investments

Amid the evolving landscape of U.S.-China trade relations, CATL, one of the world’s largest battery manufacturer, has expressed interest in establishing a manufacturing plant in the United States. What Happened: Robin Zeng, the founder and chairman of CATL, shared this perspective in a recent…




chine

FBI Seeks Public Help to Identify Chinese Hackers Behind Global Cyber Intrusions

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has sought assistance from the public in connection with an investigation involving the breach of edge devices and computer networks belonging to companies and government entities. "An Advanced Persistent Threat group allegedly created and deployed malware (CVE-2020-12271) as part of a widespread series of indiscriminate computer intrusions designed




chine

Adarsh Shah on "Continuous Delivery for Machine Learning" (September NYCDEVOPS Meetup)

Come one, come all! nycdevops does its first virtual meetup! All are invited!

Hope to see you there!




chine

Does Machine Quilting Enhance Quilts that are otherwise Hand-Sewn?

Oh dear, I'm sorry to have neglected posting here for so long. Although many suitable topics and photos have passed through my mind and camera, there just hasn't seemed to be a nice chunk of time available for putting it all together. Today is the day to begin again!

Inspired by Alice, by Marilyn Lidstrom Larson of Willow City, ND (detail of border)

For the past two months, it's been all about quilts and quilting for me, with beading taking a bit of a back seat for a while. My quilt and travel buddy, Lunnette, and I flew to Ontario, California for The Road to California, which is a ginormous quilt show with more than 1,000 quilts on exhibition and over 200 vendors. We gawked (and spent all of our allotted budget) for 3 whole days, barely noticing our fatigue and sore footies.

There are several intriguing subjects to cover, inspired by our experiences there. Today's post is about traditional applique and machine quilting.

Inspired by Alice, by Marilyn Lidstrom Larson of Willow City, ND
photo credit (for this photo only): Road 2 CA

Inspired by Alice, by Marilyn Lidstrom Larson, detail showing back

Inspired by Alice, by Marilyn Lidstrom Larson, detail of center

Inspired by Alice, by Marilyn Lidstrom Larson, detail of center quilting
Inspired by Alice, shown in the photos above, won the first prize of $1,000 in the Traditional, Wall, Applique category of the main (judged) exhibit! Take a moment to study the pictures, click on them to enlarge them, notice the way the applique and machine quilting compliment each other. Also think about what this might have looked like if the maker, Marilyn Lidstrom Larson, had hand-quilted her work the way Alice, her grandmother (and inspiration for the central portion of the quilt), would have done. I love this quilt, totally love it, and believe it deserved the award it received.

At the same time, it saddens me that in all the juried/judged shows I've seen (and entered) recently, there is no category specifically for hand sewn quilts... quilts which are hand-pieced, hand-appliqued, hand-embroidered, and/or hand-embellished, and finished with hand-quilting. Nope, hand-sewn quilts are judged right along with machine-sewn quilts. In my observation, machine-quilted pieces are the ones that win almost all the prizes, even in the traditional categories. Why is that? Is hand-quilting considered passe, a thing of our grandmothers' time? Is it because machine-quilting has more pizzazz in the viewers' and makers' eyes? Is it because the machine manufacturers are huge financial supporters of these shows and providers of much of the prize money? Is it because the machine manufacturers run the training programs for judges?

OK, let's look into this subject a bit more. Later, I'll tackle the subject of the influence of the machine manufacturers. For now let's consider this question:

Does machine-quilting enhance quilts that are otherwise hand-sewn?

Interestingly, at Road to California this year, there was a small exhibit of hand-sewn quilt tops, made long ago (most of them in the early 1900s) that were not quilted or layered with back and batting by the maker. These tops were given to modern machine quilters to finish, and the results were displayed. Studying them gave me a greater perspective on the above question.

I found myself looking at them through the imagined eyes of the original maker. Would she have been pleased with the finished quilt?  As you look at some of the quilts below (and in a few cases, detail shots), ask yourself, if you had hand-sewn the top, would you have liked the way it looks today? Does the machine quilting enhance the work of the original maker? I've numbered the quilts (in no particular order), so you can respond (regarding specific quilts) in the comments if you wish. As always, you can click on the photos to enlarge them.
#1 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting

#1 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting, detail

#2 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting

#3 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting

#3 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting, detail

#3 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting, detail

#4 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting

#5 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting

#5 - Vintage Top with Modern Machine Quilting, detail
What do you think of these? Which tops are enhanced by the machine quilting? Are there any that don't look right to you? If so, why not?

Since there is quite a difference looking at the photos as opposed to seeing the actual quits, my responses to these questions might be different than yours. To my eyes, #1 offers a believable connection and balance between the quilting and the original applique or piecing. It felt like the original maker would have done something very similar, only by hand.

I didn't want the quilting to overpower the original as it does in #3 and #5. Both of these were so stiff from the dense quilting, that it would be like sleeping under a piece of cardboard. Both of them made me feel disjointed. The lovely charm and grace of the original work seemed lost. I'm not sure why, but the background color created by machine quilting with colored thread in #5 seems almost weird... maybe because it's such an unlikely choice for the period.

Number 4 has the look of a chenille bedspread, both pretty and more-or-less "of the period." It works for me, even though the quilting is dense. The same is true for #2.

More from Road to California coming soon...




chine

Guided tour of "Monsters and Machines: Caricature, Visual Satire, and the Twentieth-Century Bestiary"

A 30-minute guided tour of the latest exhibition in the Milberg Gallery in Firestone Library at Princeton University. Tours meet in the lobby of Firestone Library. The exhibition is open Monday to Friday from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., and 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturday and Sunday in the Milberg Gallery, Firestone Library. Open to the public. “Monsters and Machines: Caricature, Visual Satire, and the Twentieth-Century Bestiary” will focus on the use of bestiary – animal or zoological motifs – in visual satire during the period between World War I and the end of the Cold War. Drawing from PUL’s rich collections of 20th-century posters, illustrated periodicals, and ephemera from North America, Europe, Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East, the exhibition will look at works of weaponized visual humor created by and aimed at exponents of different national cultures and ideologies. The exhibition will run from September 12 to December 8, 2024.






chine

Megan Fox expecting first child with Machine Gun Kelly

Fans congratulate the Transformers star, who's spoken about a previous pregnancy ending in miscarriage.




chine

Biden’s Nitwit Dept. of Defense Uses Photo of Chinese Jet in Veterans Day Message

Joe Biden’s stupid, corrupt regime can’t even get a simple Veterans Day message right. As the nation came together to celebrate those who served out country, Biden’s Department of Defense pushed out a social media message telling Americans “Veterans Day, honoring all who served.” While, that is a perfectly fine message, the DoD added a […]

The post Biden’s Nitwit Dept. of Defense Uses Photo of Chinese Jet in Veterans Day Message appeared first on The Lid.




chine

Coding for #AI and #machinelearning – online course/workshop

Coding for #AI and #machinelearning – online course/workshop We are exploring a new way to learning how to code for AI and Machine Learning by applying ideas of  deliberate practise Starting Oct 2018 – the workshop has limited places Please contact info@futuretext.com if you want to sign up for our online workshop (300 USD)   [...]




chine

News24 Business | Internet Archive, Wayback Machine hit by 'catastrophic' cyberattack, data breach

The Internet Archive, an online repository of web pages, was offline Thursday after its founder confirmed a major cyberattack that exposed the data of millions of users and left the site defaced.




chine

INTERNal Stupidity: Pentagon Interns Post Pic of Chinese Plane on Veteran’s Day

The following article, INTERNal Stupidity: Pentagon Interns Post Pic of Chinese Plane on Veteran’s Day, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

A knock-off Chinese plane similar to the US F-35 was inadvertently posted by the F-35 JPO (Joint Program Office) on Veteran’s Day. Somebody needs to help this administration figure out some basics …oh wait, a new administration is coming in January. Good. The JPO Strike Force account had no clue what they did until an …

Continue reading INTERNal Stupidity: Pentagon Interns Post Pic of Chinese Plane on Veteran’s Day ...




chine

A guide to the Chinese Communist Party's National Congress

A guide to the Chinese Communist Party's National Congress The World Today rescobales.drupal 21 September 2022

In the first of a three-part series examining the global importance of the CCP’s 20th National Congress, Yu Jie explains how it makes its big decisions.

Why does the CCP National Congress matter?

The world’s most populous country and its smallest state have little in common with one exception: how they select their leader. Like the Vatican, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shrouds its leadership selection process in secrecy.

Every five years, a week-long conclave – the Party Congress – is held and at its end a new cohort of leaders is presented that will steer the world’s second largest economy for the next five years.

October’s Congress will reveal the depth and breadth of Xi Jinping’s power

The congress is the most important date in China’s political calendar. It not only selects China’s leadership team but acts as a signpost indicating the direction the country will be heading in the near future, with implications for decades to come. It also reveals the breadth and depth of power held by Xi Jinping, the party’s general-secretary.

The 20th CCP National Congress, opening on October 16 and expected to last a week, is taking place during unsettling times. While Xi Jinping is expected to embark on his third term as general-secretary of the party after the removal of a two-term limit in February 2018, it is hardly a crowning glory. Xi’s China is battling an economic maelstrom at home while juggling fraught foreign relations abroad.

What does the National Congress do?

Quite simply, the CCP National Congress is the gathering that defines China’s political leadership and sets the tone for its relationship with the rest of the world.

It serves to fulfil three primary functions:

First, it sets the party’s principal agenda across all policy sectors, from macroeconomics to the price of food. During the week, it draws up a consensus-based evaluation of the party’s work over the past five years, which includes a detailed examination of the party’s current situation.

Second, it introduces any revisions to the party constitution deemed necessary, for instance on changes to the criteria for leadership recruitment or amendments to the party’s ‘guiding ideology’.

Third, it selects the leadership team that will steer China for the next five years, a function that attracts the most international attention but is not the sole purpose of the congress.

How is the party leadership team chosen?

The congress comprises 2,300 delegates representing all levels of the party hierarchy across 34 provinces and regions – from the governors of towns and cities, to Olympic champions, astronauts, and even the odd stand-up comedian to mark the ‘inclusiveness’ of the party.

The votes that decide the next cohort of party leaders come from three committees only: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with 205 members and 171 alternate members (alternate members are simply substitutes to replace a member if they die, retire or are dismissed); the Central Committee, with 204 members; and the Politburo, with 25 members, only one of whom is a woman.

Unlike multiparty elections in liberal democracies, neither the full 25 members of the Politburo nor the seven members of its Standing Committee are nominated by or directly voted for by constituents.

A procedure known as ‘democratic recommendation’ is essentially a straw poll that includes all congress participants. They are then given a ballot listing the names of around 200 Politburo candidates in stroke order – the Chinese equivalent to alphabetical order. This short-listing process is completed in the run-up to the congress. Some pundits asserted that this process was put on hold after 2017, yet this has not been formally confirmed within the party constitution.

A few senior delegates may express their preferences to their colleagues anonymously during this process. All the shortlisted candidates must meet the criteria for Politburo membership, which means serving at either a ministerial rank or above or in the People’s Liberation Army at military region level or above and being younger than 62.

Based on the result of this straw poll, and more importantly on the preferences of current Politburo members, the incumbent Politburo and its Standing Committee will approve the nominees, conclude the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Party Congress and call for the 20th Congress. The delegates at the Party Congress then ceremonially cast their votes for the Politburo at the Party Congress although the result is pre-agreed, a procedure somewhat similar to the US Electoral College.

What are the rules for choosing Politburo members?

The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) consists of between five and nine members, with seven selected at the 19th Congress. It is the supreme decision-making body of the Communist Party as well as the People’s Republic of China.

If the 20th Congress follows convention, there are three de-facto rules to be followed:

First, Politburo and Standing Committee members must retire at 68. This age limit is known as ‘Eight down, Seven up’.

Second, new appointments to the PSC are drawn exclusively from regular Politburo members. The only exceptions to this rule have been Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who were appointed at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

Standing Committee members must retire at 68, but it is highly unlikely that 69-year-old Xi Jinping will stand down

This exception follows the third convention, under which PSC appointees are among the youngest senior party leaders eligible. Potentially three vacancies could arise in 2022, as Xi himself is 69 but it is highly unlikely that he would step down. That would be a radical departure from past precedents.

The extent to which past procedure is applied could act as a signal as to whether Xi Jinping is consolidating his power, while the size of the standing committee will be scrutinized to assess how much power Xi wields.

If the procedure for leadership appointments at the 20th Congress deviates from these conventions, it could indicate two things. First, the CCP faces a new set of challenges and requires the introduction of new rules to shape the top leadership. Or, second, Xi has gained substantial personal power that allows him to bypass the collective leadership system endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and choose appointees to suit his own taste. There has thus far been little evidence from the official media to reflect on any changes.

Changes in party institutional constraints, however, raise the danger of undermining governance at home and China’s relations abroad.

Read the two further articles in this series: the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.   

 




chine

Book preview: Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022

Book preview: Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022 20 October 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 28 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Join authors David Sandalow and Michal Meidan to discuss their upcoming book.

China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a key player in tackling the global climate crisis. Its stated climate policies, namely its high-level targets to peak emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, are significant.

But while national-level ministries, local governments and businesses are setting climate roadmaps, implementation is challenging at times. In the current context of the global energy market and geopolitical turmoil, China’s need to maintain energy security can seem at odds with its climate pledges.

The authors will present the book, which examines Chinese emissions, the impacts of climate change in China, as well as China’s domestic and international climate change policies and the main implementation challenges these policies face.




chine

Climate justice with Chinese characteristics?

Climate justice with Chinese characteristics? Expert comment NCapeling 7 November 2022

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), claims to be making sustainability a key feature of the programme.

Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has regularly unveiled a grand new strategic concept every four years or so.

Each has been deeply rooted in the Chinese political system and communicated via ambitious slogans, such as A Harmonious World, or New Types of Great Power Relations. And all have reliably generated both excitement and confusion abroad and within China.

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), is no exception. When Chinese president Xi Jinping introduced it at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, it made hardly any splash in the West, perhaps because China has already signalled its determination to shape international development in the post-COVID era.

But the GDI is more than just a new label for an ongoing project. One of its core political functions is to deflect some of the fierce criticism directed at its older sibling, the gigantic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a tarnished reputation for being neither transparent nor sufficiently ‘green’.

Focus on grants and capacity-building

According to the Chinese government’s initial description of the GDI, sustainability is a key feature of the programme. Unlike the BRI, the GDI will focus less on physical infrastructure projects – such as roads, bridges, digital networks, and coal-fired power plants – and more on sustainable-development grants and capacity-building.

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad

In his remarks about GDI in 2021, Xi placed special emphasis on advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helping developing countries manage the transition to a low-carbon economy.

On paper, then, the GDI appears a laudable initiative. While ongoing geopolitical tensions have deepened divisions between China and the US, derailing collaboration on combatting climate change, China at least is adjusting its diplomacy and aid programmes to position itself as a more attractive partner for those seeking climate security.

Since launching the GDI, it has already created the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre to help some of the world’s most vulnerable countries mitigate the damage from climate change.

But the GDI is still very much in line with China’s past grand initiatives. Its implementation is opaque and there is considerable flexibility in how it will deliver projects and offer grants. This approach is well understood and frequently practiced by Chinese political elites, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform ethos of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

Xi has clearly adopted this approach in introducing the GDI. But whereas Deng was steering China’s domestic economy during a period of isolation after the Cultural Revolution, Xi needs to involve many other countries in his vision. That will not be easy now that Russia’s war in Ukraine and other recent developments have complicated many of China’s international relationships.

China’s leaders recognize the BRI was not warmly received in global development circles, owing partly to its role in increasing both climate and financial risks. In implementing the GDI, they need to rethink some basic assumptions. Although gigantic infrastructure investments drove China’s own economic miracle, the same approach is not necessarily applicable everywhere.

Nor should China’s development aid be relentlessly used to seek diplomatic endorsement from other countries. Instead, producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility.

Consider Xi’s recent pledge to add $1 billion to the $3.1 billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which will be renamed the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. If China is serious about the GDI’s green credentials, this money should go towards supporting the clean-energy transition in response to the current oil and gas price crunch.

But the GDI’s success ultimately depends on how China deploys not just financial but political capital. It needs to show it can cooperate constructively with countries in the ‘GDI Friends Group’ launched at the UN in January 2022.

Producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility

For many group members, the pandemic showed that existing development assistance programs urgently need to be updated to account for their recipients’ specific interests and priorities. After years of hollow diplomatic rhetoric, there is a craving for more meaningful assistance to help countries build resilience against climate-driven natural disasters and other growing threats.

China could help meet this demand, but it also will need to manage expectations. Many in the Global South assume a grand-concept policy such as the GDI will be meticulously planned from within Xi’s cabinet and thus executed to deliver large-scale, rapid results. But the GDI will require broad coordination across a wide range of ministries, agencies, and state-owned banks.

One party but not one voice

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad.

Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has showered the Global South with hundreds of billions of dollars in physical infrastructure investment. With the global climate debate increasingly focusing on the need to mobilize international financing for climate mitigation and adaptation in low and middle-income countries, many will be looking to both China and the advanced economies to provide the necessary support.




chine

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

If China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

This could result in critical minerals supply chains becoming the issue which splits the current consensus of the West over Ukraine

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.




chine

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives.

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.




chine

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order?




chine

China’s Dream: The Chinese Communist Party’s Culture, Resilience and Power




chine

Undercurrents: Episode 33 - Chinese Millennials, and Attacks on Infrastructure in Gaza




chine

Climbing out of the Chinese debt trap

Climbing out of the Chinese debt trap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Beijing must play a pivotal role in soothing African economic distress, says Alex Vines.

Poorer countries across the world – including many in Africa – are facing $35 billion in debt-service payments in 2022. According to the World Bank, around 40 per cent of this total is owed to China.

Across the African continent, the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic have increased rates of extreme poverty and inequality. Since early 2022 the situation has worsened even further, due to the knock-on effects of spiking inflation and interest rates following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Shortages of fuel and foodstuffs have caused prices to leap upwards. Urban unrest is on the rise, and African governments are having to make tough economic choices as their budgets are squeezed ever more tightly.

Across the continent, progress on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is being jeopardized, and non-energy-producing lower and lower-middle income African governments are struggling to repay their loans.

During the Covid pandemic, the G20 assisted 31 out of 36 eligible African countries with its Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). Established in May 2020, the DSSI helped countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable people before it expired at the end of 2021. From 2022, it has been replaced by the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments.

As the second-largest economy in the world after the United States, and the dominant lender for many African states, China has an important role to play in such initiatives. Beijing still tries to keep a low profile and renegotiate its terms on a bilateral basis – although it did support Angola’s early call for G20 action on an initiative that would fulfil what the DSSI delivered. The challenge is to encourage more consistency and trust in such initiatives, as Chinese officials consider them to be too western-oriented. 
 

China’s lending to Africa peaked in 2016

Contemporary views of Chinese lending in Africa remain coloured by the rapid expansion of Chinese finance from the early 2000s to resource-rich African states, and oil producers in particular. The reality is that much of China’s lending has evolved, and is neither intrinsically predatory nor problematic for African partners – and China increasingly prefers to do business with states it considers to be better run.

In fact, as commodity prices and growth rates declined from 2015, Chinese lending to Africa fell significantly, from a peak of $29.5 billion in 2016 to $7.6 billion in 2019. The socio-economic impact of the pandemic has made this situation worse.

Over the past two decades, Chinese finance has contributed to an infrastructure boom in many African countries

That China has attracted criticism is often due to a lack of transparency in its investments, especially those in Kenya and Zambia. This reputation has not been helped by opaque lending arrangements imposed by Chinese state-owned banks, requiring borrowers to prioritize them for repayment. This could lead to cutbacks in key areas of social spending, with direct impacts on African communities.

Over the past two decades, Chinese finance has contributed to an infrastructure boom in many African countries. Angola, for example, was able to undertake a rapid post-conflict reconstruction of its infrastructure, with new roads and bridges being built across the country. New models of financing are being developed: in Kenya, the new Nairobi expressway was constructed under a $600 million Build-Operate-Transfer model that provides for ownership to revert to the national government after a 30-year concession period.

Chinese companies have helped African countries build and upgrade over 10,000km of railway, around 100,000km of highway, 1,000 bridges and 100 ports, as well as power plants, hospitals and schools.

China’s involvement in African debt has varied considerably between countries and over time. Although in recent years this involvement has been framed in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, it has for the most part been uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit being offered by competing lenders with links to different elements of the Chinese state.

In recent years, as reports have emerged around the poor quality of some of China’s past lending, the authorities in Beijing have sought greater control over new development lending and have imposed new sustainability requirements. At the same time, African countries have sought to diversify sources of supply for infrastructure contracts beyond China. Loans are generally now on a smaller, more manageable scale.

With the introduction of its Global Development Initiative in September 2021, there are indications that China is moving to a ‘new development paradigm’, with the emphasis on providing flows of foreign direct investment rather than loans and a focus on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, human capital investments and green development.
 

African debt distress

A paper drawing on expertise from Chatham House’s Africa, Asia and Global Economy and Finance experts will be published before the G20 summit in Bali in November 2022. It examines seven African countries that the World Bank deemed in 2020 to be in most debt distress or at risk of debt distress because of their Chinese stock – Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia. Two countries – Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa – have received new loans from China and are not in any distress.

The paper observes that a lack of transparency over the nature of the terms agreed by these African governments has led to intense domestic criticism and international accusations that China is seeking control over strategic assets.

China may have fallen into its own debt trap through profligate and uncoordinated lending to Angola and Zambia


In fact, in Angola and Zambia, China may have accidently fallen into its own debt trap through profligate and uncoordinated lending.

Zambia became the first pandemic-era default in 2020 and is seeking relief on $17 billion of external debt. After holding general elections in August 2022, Angola and Kenya will also seek additional debt relief, but both may also seek more funds from the private commercial market because of the slow progress of the G20’s Common Framework – something flagged as a concern by China.

All seven of the countries that are most indebted to China are actively seeking to reduce this financial reliance on Beijing in the future.

China has a pivotal role to play in finding effective solutions to these and other African countries’ debt distress. Improved coordination and cooperation between creditors in China and in other parts the world could enhance the positive impact of multilateral initiatives, such as the Common Framework, which has aimed to bring China and India to the negotiating table along with the IMF, the Paris Club group of creditor nations and private creditors.

So far, Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia are the only African countries to have signed up to the framework since its launch in 2020. Although China is suspicious of the IMF, if African states collectively encouraged Beijing to engage with the Common Framework, it could be improved so as to provide debt relief to those African countries finding it difficult to repay their loans.




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Genetic susceptibility, dietary cholesterol intake, and plasma cholesterol levels in a Chinese population [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Accompanied with nutrition transition, non-HDL-C levels of individuals in Asian countries has increased rapidly, which has caused the global epicenter of nonoptimal cholesterol to shift from Western countries to Asian countries. Thus, it is critical to underline major genetic and dietary determinants. In the current study of 2,330 Chinese individuals, genetic risk scores (GRSs) were calculated for total cholesterol (TC; GRSTC, 57 SNPs), LDL-C (GRSLDL-C, 45 SNPs), and HDL-C (GRSHDL-C, 65 SNPs) based on SNPs from the Global Lipid Genetics Consortium study. Cholesterol intake was estimated by a 74-item food-frequency questionnaire. Associations of dietary cholesterol intake with plasma TC and LDL-C strengthened across quartiles of the GRSTC (effect sizes: –0.29, 0.34, 2.45, and 6.47; Pinteraction = 0.002) and GRSLDL-C (effect sizes: –1.35, 0.17, 5.45, and 6.07; Pinteraction = 0.001), respectively. Similar interactions with non-HDL-C were observed between dietary cholesterol and GRSTC (Pinteraction = 0.001) and GRSLDL-C (Pinteraction = 0.004). The adverse effects of GRSTC on TC (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.51, 0.82, 1.21, and 1.31; Pinteraction = 0.023) and GRSLDL-C on LDL-C (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.66, 0.52, 1.12, and 1.56; Pinteraction = 0.020) were more profound in those having higher cholesterol intake compared with those with lower intake. Our findings suggest significant interactions between genetic susceptibility and dietary cholesterol intake on plasma cholesterol profiles in a Chinese population.




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One Other resource sysadmin 29 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Look: Megan Fox, Machine Gun Kelly expecting child together

Actress Megan Fox and musician Machine Gun Kelly are expecting a child together.




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Sign up to receive updates on publications in English, Chinese and French

The monthly publications updates produced by the Publications branch of the FAO Office of Communications are now available in English, Chinese and French.  

The newsletters highlight key publications available in the respective [...]




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Sign up now to receive monthly updates on FAO publications in English, French and Chinese!

The monthly FAO publications updates produced by the Publications Branch of the FAO Office of Communications are available in English, French and Chinese.

The newsletters highlight key publications available [...]




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Celebrating Chinese Language Day

FAO is committed to linguistic diversity, producing numerous publications across several languages, including Chinese. This demonstrates FAO's commitment to reaching Chinese-speaking audiences, ensuring that valuable information and resources are accessible in this [...]




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Sign up now to receive monthly updates on FAO publications in English, French and Chinese!

The monthly FAO publications updates produced by the Publications Branch of the FAO Office of Communications are available in English, French and Chinese.

The newsletters highlight key publications available [...]




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Charles Babbage's Difference Machine No. 2

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Felder accelerates design of woodworking machines with SolidWorks software and 3DVIA Composer

Austrian manufacturer also optimizes creation of assembly documentation and related bills of material




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Solutions Catch Problems Early and Drive Cost Out of Designs




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Ramac Analyzes Design With SolidWorks SustainabilityXpress, Finds Alternatives That Consume Fewer Resources




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Concrete equipment leader standardizes on SolidWorks to streamline machine engineering process

Besser Company has significantly compressed its mold design cycle




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Meikle Automation purchases 55 licenses of SolidWorks software for multi-industry machine design

Software will foster supply chain efficiency through better customer, partner, supplier communication




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German machine maker LSW Maschinenfabrik switches to SolidWorks software

Company purchases 80 licenses of SolidWorks after benchmark testing demonstrates 3x to 7x performance advantage




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MooBella to dish out delicious ice cream from machine designed in SOLIDWORKS

Customers will be able to pick a flavor and a mix-in and walk off with fresh dessert in less than a minute




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Longtime SOLIDWORKS and COSMOS customer reduces costs and time to market




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Two senior presidential campaign officials' iPhones maybe hacked by Chinese group

Evidence suggests that the earlier Chinese Salt Typhoon breach of American telecoms may have led to the potential hacking of two presidential campaign officials' iPhones.


iPhones potentially breached

Whether the hack actually happened, what data might have been obtained, or which officials were breached have not been revealed. The FBI is investigating claims by a security startup called iVerify that tie the events together.

According to a report from Forbes, iVerify flagged anomalous behavior on two iPhones belonging to senior officials for one of the presidential candidates. Settings had been changed on the iPhones in "patterns that are not observed on healthy devices."


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