Summary

• The United States and the European Union are deeply integrated economically in terms of movement of goods, services and capital across the Atlantic, but this is not matched by the mobility of labour. Freer movement of high-skilled workers across the Atlantic has a potentially critical role to play in maintaining and strengthening the bilateral economic relationship.
• Both the US and EU seek to attract high-skilled labour through the use of temporary visa programmes. Various routes are available for highly skilled workers from the EU to temporarily work in the US (for instance, through the H-1B visa for foreign nationals in ‘specialty occupations’, as well as other visa categories for treaty traders and investors, intra-company transferees, and international students seeking work authorization in the US before or after graduation). The main ways for highly skilled workers from the US to temporarily work in EU member states are through EU-wide schemes that apply in 25 out of the 28 member states (for holders of EU Blue Cards or intra-company transferees); or via member states’ parallel national schemes.
• The experiences of US and EU employers and workers under the US H-1B programme and the EU’s Blue Card scheme differ greatly. The EU Blue Card scheme avoids many of the drawbacks of the H-1B visa. It does not have an annual cap on the number of visas issued. It also grants greater autonomy to the worker by not requiring the employer to sponsor long-term residence, by providing greater flexibility to switch employment, and by having a longer grace period for visa-holders to find new employment after dismissal.
• The US visa system hampers America’s economic growth. Restrictive policies such as an annual limit on the number of H-1B visas issued, and the associated uncertainty for employees and employers, hinder the ability of US companies to expand and innovate. The complex and costly visa application process is a particular burden for small and medium-sized enterprises. Problems around the timely availability of visas frustrate investors both from the US and from abroad (including from the EU). European firms face difficulties in acquiring visas for intra-company transferees, and not all EU member states have access to the treaty trader and treaty investor visa categories. At times, this impedes foreign direct investment and restricts US job creation. In addition, current policies hinder the economy’s retention of EU and other graduates of US universities. This is of particular concern given that skilled graduates have a critical role to play in addressing the US’s growing shortage of workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields.
• Given the comparability of US and EU wages and labour markets, US concerns about foreign workers ‘stealing’ their jobs or depressing wages generally do not apply to EU citizens. On the contrary, a more open immigration policy for high-skilled workers – in particular for EU citizens – would benefit the US economy.
• Efforts to reform visa systems for high-skilled labour are under way in both the US and EU. In order to facilitate the movement of highly skilled workers across the Atlantic, this research paper recommends (1) creating a special visa for highly skilled EU citizens to work temporarily in the US; (2) extending the availability of treaty trader and investor visas to all EU member states; and (3) increasing efforts to eliminate fraud and abuse in the H-1B system. These measures could potentially help to create more investment, jobs and economic growth in the US.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

Case Study of Preparedness: South Korea By 2007, South Korea had established the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and, in 2016, the KCDC Center for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response had established a round-the-clock Emergency Operations Center with rapid response teams. KCDC is responsible for the distribution of antiviral stockpiles to 16 cities and provinces that are required by law to hold and manage antiviral stockpiles.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

Case Study of Preparedness: United States The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established PERRC – the Preparedness for Emergency Response Research Centers - as a requirement of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which required research to ‘improve federal, state, local, and tribal public health preparedness and response systems’. The 2006 Act has since been supplanted by the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. This created the post of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) and authorised the development and acquisitions of medical countermeasures and a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy. The 2019 Act also set in place a number of measures including the requirement for the US government to re-evaluate several important metrics of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program, and a requirement for a report on the states of preparedness and response in US healthcare facilities.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Case Study of Preparedness: The UK The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 as part of the undertakings laid out in the National Security Strategy (the UK also published the Biological Security Strategy in July 2018). Now entitled the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies it has been updated regularly to analyse the risks of major emergencies that could affect the UK in the next five years and provide resilience advice and guidance. The latest edition - produced in 2017 when the UK had a Minister for Government Resilience and Efficiency - placed the risk of a pandemic influenza in the ‘highly likely and most severe’ category. It stood out from all the other identified risks, whereas an emerging disease (such as COVID-19) was identified as ‘highly likely but with moderate impact’. However, much preparatory work for an influenza pandemic is the same as for COVID-19, particularly in prepositioning large stocks of PPE, readiness within large hospitals, and the creation of new hospitals and facilities. One key issue is that the 2017 NHS Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza was dependent on pre-positioned ’just in case’ stockpiles of PPE. But as it became clear the PPE stocks were not adequate for the pandemic, it was reported that recommendations about the stockpile by NERVTAG (the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group which advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses) had been subjected to an ‘economic assessment’ and decisions reversed on, for example, eye protection. The UK chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies, when speaking at the World Health Organization about Operation Cygnus – a 2016 three-day exercise on a flu pandemic in the UK – reportedly said the UK was not ready for a severe flu attack and ‘a lot of things need improving’. Aware of the significance of the situation, the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in 2019 on ‘Biosecurity and human health: preparing for emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons’ which intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats. But the inquiry had to postpone its oral hearings scheduled for late October 2019 and, because of the general election in December 2019, the committee was obliged to close the inquiry.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

Case Study of Preparedness: South Korea By 2007, South Korea had established the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and, in 2016, the KCDC Center for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response had established a round-the-clock Emergency Operations Center with rapid response teams. KCDC is responsible for the distribution of antiviral stockpiles to 16 cities and provinces that are required by law to hold and manage antiviral stockpiles.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

Case Study of Preparedness: United States The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established PERRC – the Preparedness for Emergency Response Research Centers - as a requirement of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which required research to ‘improve federal, state, local, and tribal public health preparedness and response systems’. The 2006 Act has since been supplanted by the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. This created the post of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) and authorised the development and acquisitions of medical countermeasures and a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy. The 2019 Act also set in place a number of measures including the requirement for the US government to re-evaluate several important metrics of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program, and a requirement for a report on the states of preparedness and response in US healthcare facilities.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Case Study of Preparedness: The UK The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 as part of the undertakings laid out in the National Security Strategy (the UK also published the Biological Security Strategy in July 2018). Now entitled the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies it has been updated regularly to analyse the risks of major emergencies that could affect the UK in the next five years and provide resilience advice and guidance. The latest edition - produced in 2017 when the UK had a Minister for Government Resilience and Efficiency - placed the risk of a pandemic influenza in the ‘highly likely and most severe’ category. It stood out from all the other identified risks, whereas an emerging disease (such as COVID-19) was identified as ‘highly likely but with moderate impact’. However, much preparatory work for an influenza pandemic is the same as for COVID-19, particularly in prepositioning large stocks of PPE, readiness within large hospitals, and the creation of new hospitals and facilities. One key issue is that the 2017 NHS Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza was dependent on pre-positioned ’just in case’ stockpiles of PPE. But as it became clear the PPE stocks were not adequate for the pandemic, it was reported that recommendations about the stockpile by NERVTAG (the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group which advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses) had been subjected to an ‘economic assessment’ and decisions reversed on, for example, eye protection. The UK chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies, when speaking at the World Health Organization about Operation Cygnus – a 2016 three-day exercise on a flu pandemic in the UK – reportedly said the UK was not ready for a severe flu attack and ‘a lot of things need improving’. Aware of the significance of the situation, the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in 2019 on ‘Biosecurity and human health: preparing for emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons’ which intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats. But the inquiry had to postpone its oral hearings scheduled for late October 2019 and, because of the general election in December 2019, the committee was obliged to close the inquiry.

Is the news our society’s religion today?

In the developed economies, the news now occupies a position of power at least equal to that formerly enjoyed by the faiths. Matins has been transubstantiated into the breakfast bulletin, vespers into the evening report. It also demands that we approach it with some of the same deferential expectations we would once have harboured for the faiths. Here, too, we hope to receive revelations, learn who is good and bad, fathom suffering and understand the unfolding logic of existence. And here too, if we refuse to take part in the rituals, there could be imputations of heresy.

What would you like the news to be?

It feels like there is always an infinite amount of news, so much is happening in the world every day. Yet after a while it becomes clear that the same kinds of event are recurring again and again. The details change, but all circle round the same archetypal story. Men in highly responsible positions are coming unstuck because their desires lead them to do things that, when made public, are shameful.

Identifying the underlying theme is more important in the long run than going through the details of every case. The news that matters is not so much that this MP or banker did what they did. What we need to address is why such things happen.

How do you keep the public interested in the news that does matter?

We cannot be collectively dragged into being more responsible through guilt. The Arctic ice is melting and this is going to have major, lasting implications for sea levels and weather around the world. A few people care a lot but, strangely, Taylor Swift’s legs are far more captivating. The starting point has to be indulgence towards the way our minds work. We are interested in Swift’s legs not because we are evil – but because we are wired in unhelpful ways. If we are going to be interested en masse in the defrosting poles, we need to take our fragilities on board and therefore get serious about trying to make important news not just ‘important’, but also beguiling. Then things stand a chance of changing.

You argue that we should set aside ‘neutral reporting’. Are you asking for more bias?

Many people imagine that what makes news organizations serious is their ability to provide us with information that is ‘unbiased’. But facts can only become meaningful and relevant to us when they slot into some picture of important or trivial, right or wrong. News organizations that vaunt their neutrality forget that neutrality is simply impossible. There is no risk-free, all-knowing sober set of answers to cling to. At heart, the word ‘bias’ simply alludes to the business of having a ‘take’ on existence. One may have a better or worse take, but one can’t make any sense of the flotsam of daily events in the news without having one. All of the figures we revere in history have been highly biased: each of them had a strong sense of what mattered and why, and their judgments were anything but perfectly balanced. They were just flavoured in the right way. We don’t need news stripped of bias, we need news presented to us with the best kinds of bias.

What is the purpose of foreign reporting?

Foreign reporting implicitly defers to the priorities of the state and of business, occupying itself almost exclusively with whom and where we should fight, trade or sympathize. But it should instead offer us a means by which to humanize the Other who instinctively repels, bores or frightens us and with whom we can’t, without help, imagine having anything in common.

Foreign countries also furnish a scale against which our own nation and ways of living can be assessed; they may help us to see our national oddities, blind spots and strengths. Stories from them may lead us to a fresh appreciation of the imperfect freedoms and comparative abundance of our homelands, which otherwise would be treated only as matters for grumbling or blame. Alternatively, problems with which we are all too familiar may be revealed to have been solved better elsewhere.

You mention the importance of historical perspective in reporting, so that we can respond to issues with context.

Contrary to what the news usually suggests, hardly anything is ever totally new, few things are truly amazing and very little is absolutely terrible. The economic indices are grim, but we have weathered comparable drops many times over the past century and even the worst scenarios only predict that we will return to a standard of living we had a few decades ago. A bad avian flu may disrupt international travel and defeat known drugs for a while, but research will eventually understand and contain it. The floods look dramatic, but in the end, they will affect merely a fraction of the population and recede soon.

How can photography change the way we report news?

There are now more images than ever before in the coverage we consume, but the problem lies in the lack of ambition behind their production and display. We might usefully divide news photographs into two genres. The first are images of corroboration, which do little other than confirm something we have learnt about a person or an event through an accompanying article. The second is a rarer kind of image, the photograph of revelation, whose ambition is not simply to back up what the text tells us but to advance our level of knowledge to a new point. It sets out to challenge cliché. We have lost any sense of photography’s potential as an information-bearing medium, as a force to properly introduce us to a planet that we keep conceitedly assuming that we know rather well already.

Do you feel oppressed by the news?

The pressure of not missing out makes one feel one has to care about a given topic, even when one doesn’t want to. Take Mandela’s funeral. One was supposed to care a lot, and yet, you don’t. You know the reasons why it is important, but they don’t grip you because you are focused elsewhere on subjects that, while tiny in the grand scheme of things, matter a lot within your context. It would be dangerous if hardly anyone paid attention to what the Government was doing, or what was happening to the environment. But it is not right to go from this to the demand that everyone should be interested in every item whenever the news machine calls. We badly need people whose attention is not caught up in the trends of the moment and who are not looking in the same direction as everyone else. We need people scanning the less familiar parts of the horizon.

Do you think we get the news we deserve?

Much of what we now take for granted as news has its origins in the information needed by those people taking major decisions or who are at the centre of national affairs. Ease of communication and a generous democratic impulse means that selections from the knowledge base, originally designed for decision-makers, now gets routinely sent via the media to very large numbers of people. It is as if a dossier which might properly arrive upon the desk of a Minister has accidentally been delivered to the wrong address and ends up on the breakfast table of an electrician in Pitlochry. Every day the news gives us stuff that is both interesting for some people and irrelevant to you. No wonder we’re sometimes a bit bored. It’s not our fault.

Signs of growing anger at the restrained denunciation of Pennsylvania-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen - whose followers are thought to have played a key role in the attempted coup - are being vocalised more and more, but this criticism only shows part of the true picture.

It is true that prominent liberal Turkish intellectual Soli Ozel spoke for many when he criticised EU politicians and Western media for failing to recognise the “invaluable democratic resistance shown by all political parties in a parliament bombed by war planes”, as well as demonstrating “a lack of sensitivity, empathy and solidarity that cannot be easily digested” by not sending anyone from an EU institution to offer solidarity with the Turkish parliament.

The criticism is reasonable - officials from Western governments and regional institutions such as the Council of Europe exhibited unconditional solidarity with Ukraine during its bitter feud with Russia, which leads some to believe that Muslim-majority Turkey does not apparently deserve the same treatment as its neighbours also experiencing an unlawful attempt to seize control of the state.

Moral authority at risk

It is also right that the West should have censured the coup plotters more forcefully and built upon Turkey’s fragile unity to encourage the country to pursue further democratic reform. To quote former Swedish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt: “Europe risks losing its moral authority if it does not appear particularly engaged in dealing with the coup itself.”

In addition, the EU’s strong criticism of Turkey but not France, for imposing a state of emergency and for temporarily suspending the European Convention on Human Rights, undeniably, smacks of double-standards.

However, some of the criticism falls short. To begin with, the West’s tepidity can be explained (though not wholly justified) by Erdogan’s abrasive behaviour at home and towards Western and international media.

Just three days after the coup, Erdogan threatened in his characteristically defiant tone to revive the controversial construction plans that sparked the 2013 Gezi Park protests, saying: “If we want to preserve our history, we must rebuild this historic [Ottoman-era barracks] structure, [and] we will rebuild it.”

It is also fair for Turkey to be reproached for the widespread crackdown against tens of thousands of suspected Gulenists in the aftermath of the coup. Even if it is conceivable that all 1,577 university deans who were forced to resign were Gulenists, this action will also have a lasting negative impact on the reputations and career prospects of academics unconnected to Gulen.

Fervour against Gulenism

The vigilance by the West is understandable given the Turkish government’s fervour against Gulenism in the immediate post-coup period. It would make no sense for the West to attack the coup and yet, at the same time, equivocate on flagrant violations of due process and human rights. Both efforts are mutually inclusive and identifying such violations has the greatest potential to encourage policy reversals or corrective measures.

Similarly understandable is the attention on Erdogan himself. He is the most formidable and powerful figure in a hierarchical and top-down political system, able to make fateful decisions with few effective checks and balances. He single-handedly replaced Ahmet Davutoglu as prime minister with Binali Yildirim in a clear breach of the Turkish constitution.

Despite Erdogan’s tactical attempts at embracing all the opposition parties apart from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), his refusal to renounce his ambition to transform Turkey into a powerful executive presidency indicates that this fragile political unity will not last.

Only the West has the wherewithal to moderate his policies by continuing to express its friendship with Turkey, whilst not shying away from closely monitoring, scrutinising and commenting on the post-coup developments.

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This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.