Announcing Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis News Release sysadmin 1 June 2020

London Design Biennale and Chatham House announce Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis, which calls for action by designers around the world to create radical design solutions to critical problems across four key areas: Health, Environment, Society and Work.

Design In An Age of Crisis - Open Call News Release sysadmin 21 July 2020

Chatham House and London Design Biennale announce full details of 'Design In An Age of Crisis,' a global Open Call for radical design thinking.

Design in an Age of Crisis Launches News Release jon.wallace 13 January 2021

Design open call receives 500 submissions from over 50 countries across six continents.

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Feminist solutions to the climate crisis 8 March 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 March 2022 Online

This International Women’s Day panel explores intersectional feminist approaches to solving the climate crisis.

Gender inequality and climate change are closely intertwined. Due to their different and unequal social roles and status, women, girls and people of marginalised genders are disproportionately affected by climate change impacts, also differentiated by factors such as age, race, ability and location.

They are also leading innovative solutions to climate change at all levels, especially in frontline communities. Yet as the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement highlighted at COP26, there is still a lack of momentum for prioritising their knowledge, tools and leadership in climate policy and action.  

This panel considers what feminist approaches can bring to climate change communication and movement building, spotlighting a range of local and regional gender-responsive climate initiatives. It also discusses concrete examples of feminist and gender-responsive policies to address climate change, such as the Feminist Green New Deal.

The panel highlights the critically important work being carried out by diverse feminist activists and researchers, and how the audience can centre gender and social equality in their work on climate change.  

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

Putting the Hong Kong Crisis into Historical and Comparative Perspective 14 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This roundtable will focus on current events unfolding in Hong Kong, where the territory has been convulsed with protests for several months.

The speakers will examine how class, race and poverty play into the conflict. Taking a comparative approach, they will examine the generational divide, looking at the ideological gulf between the older, more conservative and pro-Beijing population versus the younger, more pro-democracy protesters. The discussion will also draw upon the erosion of trust between police and the wider public.

While acknowledging the unique features of this wave of unrest, the speakers will draw parallels, placing the current crisis in Hong Kong beside events that have occurred in other periods and other places.

Parallels to be explored include those with Shanghai struggles of the 1910s through 1980s and upheavals and crackdowns in the former Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

The Rohingya Crisis: Three Years On 17 September 2020 — 1:30PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2020 Online

Speakers examine the current situation of the Rohingya people and assess the threat that COVID-19 poses to the health and human rights of refugees and displaced people.

It has been three years since a military-led crackdown forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border into Bangladesh to escape collective punishment and violence in Myanmar.

Most refugees have sought shelter in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, where access to clean water is limited, sanitation facilities are lacking, and due to overcrowding, social distancing is impossible.

While the number of reported COVID-19 cases has so far been relatively low, testing capacity remains limited and anecdotal reports from humanitarians suggest that COVID-19 has spread extensively through the refugee camps and the Bangladeshi host community.

The speakers also consider the different approaches taken by neighbouring states, regional and international organizations in responding to the crisis.

What can be done to address the needs of refugees in the short term and how can fundamental human rights be restored and protected during the time of COVID-19? What aid provision has been successfully delivered within Rakhine State and in what ways?

Ahead of elections in Myanmar in November, how can the international community persuade the Myanmarese government into positive action? And what would a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis look like and what are the competing views over how such a solution should be delivered?

This event is held in partnership with The Atlantic Council.

13 July 2020

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

• After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
• Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
• The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
• Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
• Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
• Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
• Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
• Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
• Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
• Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

• Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

• Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Crisis in the international order 23 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

Why societies are challenging the international order?

Major global challenges, including the climate, refugee crises and the global pandemic, are increasingly revealing shortcomings in our international system and are bringing to the forefront calls for a more just world. But what is justice? 
 
Calls for justice come in many forms and from many directions - from the fair distribution of resources to the recognition of indigenous rights. While for some there is consensus on the importance of multilateral cooperation to tackle global issues, there is a sharp North/South divide at the centre of debates on issues such as the climate crisis, racial justice, and international law. Countries from the global South are demanding more equitable and redistributive solutions, for example in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, while the Global North seek the status quo. 
 
North/South division slows progress on reform. Some political actors are starting to challenge the very foundations of our global order, a move that could dramatically change the global system as we know it. 

Key questions to consider include:

• Why are there tensions between the global North and South?
• How can these issues be addressed?
• Does the global North ‘owe’ the global South some form of justice? Which form of justice?
• If these issues are not addressed, what are the implications for the current international order?

This event is held in conjunction with International Affairs.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Turkey Is on the Road to a Severe Economic Crisis Expert comment sysadmin 12 July 2018

The deteriorating state of the economy is President Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Fifteen days after Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed a new government under radically enhanced executive powers granted by the constitution. He chose 16 loyalists and partisan figures to ensure that he remains front and centre in decision-making and policy formation.

Most notably, Erdoğan sacrificed the former deputy prime minister and ex-Merrill Lynch chief economist Mehmet Şimşek in favour of his inexperienced son-in-law Berat Albayrak as finance and treasury minister to manage the fragile economy. Whether he has the competence to placate jittery financial markets and foreign investors is debatable.

Erdoğan will prioritize short-term growth at all costs to the detriment of macroeconomic and financial stability. That entails foregoing interest rate hikes needed to contain runaway double-digit inflation and to support a plummeting lira that depreciated nearly 20 per cent this year. It also means loosening the purse strings, flooding the markets with cheap credit and sponsoring rampant construction and mega-infrastructure projects.

True to his promise, he has appropriated to himself, by presidential decree, the right to hire the central bank governor, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year term. This completes the politicization of the once-respected and independent central bank and is in line with his unorthodox monetary views that higher interest rates equates with higher inflation.

Erdoğan associates progress with gleaming high-rise buildings, gargantuan infrastructure show-pieces and elevated growth rates. He is spiking the fuel to boost the speed of the sputtering mid-sized Audi-style Turkish economy to achieve superior Ferrari growth rates. As any mechanic knows, these tactics are unsustainable in the long term. Eventually, the engine will burn out.

He does not seem to appreciate that Turkey’s growth model requires an overhaul to join the league of rich economies. It is too reliant on consumer spending and government-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded by speculative financial flows rather than on sustained private investment and exports.

Net result: the corporate sector’s foreign-exchange liabilities have climbed to a record $328 billion as of the end of 2017. When netted against foreign-exchange assets, it is still a worrying $214 billion. Its US dollar and euro debt pile has more than doubled since 2008, 80 per cent of which is held by domestic banks. Given these acute balance-of-payments conditions, it is not farfetched that Turkey may impose capital controls in the short-to-medium term to restrict the outflow of foreign assets. At $50 billion, the current account deficit – defined as the sum of the trade balance and financial flows – is not even covered by the central bank’s net international reserves at nearly $45 billion.

Unsurprisingly, some major Turkish companies are negotiating with their bondholders to restructure their sizeable foreign loan obligations as lira devaluation increases the financial burden. Should a significant number of Turkish corporates default on their foreign obligations, this would reverberate across the Turkish economy, cause mass consumer panic, shake the confidence of international financial markets and potentially lead to a crisis within the Turkish financial system and to a deep and prolonged economic recession.

Revealingly, Erdoğan’s nationalist allies, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), refused to join his government. Perhaps Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, learned the lessons of the 2001 financial crisis as a member of a three-party government. So he is opting to project influence from the outside, rather than risk being tainted with responsibility for an economic downturn.

Turkey’s president is doubling down on his singular approach to governance irrespective of the fallout. Notwithstanding his current political dominance, the deteriorating state of the economy is his Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Amid a mounting mental health crisis among farmers, experts are working to make help more accessible

State leadership is on the ballot in dozens of states as they grapple with the pandemic's impact on schools, the economy, and their relationship to federal officials.

Social distancing is forcing school business to be conducted virtually, putting school boards in the difficult spot of making crucial decisions on spending and other issues without the same level of public input.

A major operation to distribute seeds and tools has been launched in the Central African Republic to support [...]

FAO’s responses to the crisis in Ukraine and its impacts on global food security: data analyses, policy recommendations, and actions on the ground.

Read the series on how FAO [...]

Read the series on how FAO increased efficiency, effectiveness and transparency to better support its Members in the transformation of agrifood systems.

Marc Edwards and Leeanne Walters | Smithsonian Magazine’s 2016 American Ingenuity Award Winners for Social Progress The duo joined forces to protect tens of thousands of people during the disastrous water crisis in Flint, Michigan. Walters, a Flint resident, grew suspicious when her tap water changed color and her family suffered odd maladies. Officials insisted that the problems were limited to her household, but she refused to accept that answer and sought out Edwards, a Virginia Tech civil engineering professor and a veteran of municipal water wars. Combining political action and scientific credibility, the testing initiative undertaken by Walters and Edwards showed that the city’s water supply was contaminated with toxic chemicals—an explosive finding that finally forced state and local officials to address the dangers. Read more about their work: http://smithmag.co/D4dIHy | #IngenuityAwards And more about the American Ingenuity Awards: http://smithmag.co/77xPqy

Tensions intensified between Cuba and the United States in October 1962 as they appear destined to plunge the planet in global war

What did analysts find in the recon photographs from the Cuban Missile Crisis? http://j.mp/RwFMbj Former CIA analyst Dino Brugioni was one of the first to spot missiles in Cuba in October 1962.

With P.E.I's only full-time blood oncologist leaving at the end of November, Health P.E.I. was planning to transfer his patients to Dr. Philip Champion. Now Champion says he intends to retire in the spring.

'American Graduate Day 2014' is a hodgepodge of entertainment, live interviews, and filmed segments about ways to raise high school graduation rates.

The miner says Transnet knows full well where its own inefficiencies lie and it needs to start addressing these.

The ANC is fully and entirely responsible for the crisis of electricity in South Africa for the past 17 years, and electricity minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa knows it, says Sikonathi Mantshantsha.

Very carefully, experts say, while understanding that federal laws governing special education were not written with online education in mind.

Sixty posts—including commentaries, videos and infographics—are listed, with practical advice for teachers dealing with remote teaching now and in the future.

WILMINGTON – Despite COVID-19, Family Crisis Therapists with the Delaware Children’s Department have continued to engage families with targeted early intervention programming to further social and development skills this summer. The K-5 Family Crisis Therapists (FCTs), through the Division of Prevention and Behavioral Health Services, work in elementary schools across our state helping children and […]

The article will provide strategies for effectively leveraging these tools to your advantage

Attorney General Kathy Jennings announced today a $150 million multistate settlement in principle with opioid manufacturer Hikma Pharmaceuticals (Hikma) for its role in fueling the opioid crisis. Hikma produces a range of generic opioid products and sells hundreds of millions of opioid doses every year. The attorneys general allege that from 2006 to 2021, Hikma […]

Delaware Attorney General Kathy Jennings today announced a multistate settlement in principle with opioid manufacturer Amneal Pharmaceuticals (Amneal) for its role in fueling the nationwide epidemic of opioid addictions and overdoses. Amneal produces several generic opioid products and was one of the largest manufacturers of opioids from 2006 to 2019, selling nearly nine billion pills. […]

Delaware Attorney General Kathy Jennings, alongside a bipartisan coalition of thirty state attorneys general, announced today the completion of the $1.37 billion settlement agreement with Kroger, addressing the grocery chain’s role in the opioid crisis. Delaware will receive over $2.7 million for opioid abatement, all of which will be overseen by the Prescription Opioids Settlement Distribution Commission. Payments are […]