Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023 Audio NCapeling 13 January 2023

Episode ten discusses Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent, and how the world should be responding to the major conflicts of 2023.

The first episode of 2023 examines Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent as a new Chatham House report highlights 22 African countries suffering from debt distress with Beijing a key creditor to many of them.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang is also touring several African states this week and next, with visits planned to Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, and the headquarters of the African Union (AU).

This week Chatham House also hosted Dr Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, to discuss ten conflicts to watch in 2023. The panel examines some of the key conflicts mentioned and how the world is responding to them.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week from Chatham House are Dr Alex Vines, director of the Africa programme, Creon Butler, director of the Global Economy and Finance programme, Dr Yu Jie, senior fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme, and Armida van Rij, research fellow with the International Security programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

China-Africa relations Explainer jon.wallace 18 January 2023

What are China’s objectives in Africa, how valid is the concept of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, and what are China’s military ambitions in the region?

A brief history of China-Africa relations

Africa has been crucial to China’s foreign policy since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1947. China supported several African liberation movements during the Cold War, and for every year since 1950 bar one, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has first visited an African country.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang visited five African countries and the African Union in January 2023. Wang Yi, the former foreign minister, visited 48 African countries and premier Xi Jinping undertook 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.

In 1971, the votes of African countries were instrumental in winning the PRC control of China’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council – displacing representatives from Chinese nationalist forces, who had been defeated in the civil war and now governed Taiwan.

In the following decades, China’s focus in Africa switched to eliminating all remaining recognition for Taiwan’s government. Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, Senegal and others all switched their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Eswatini is the only African nation still to recognize Taiwan’s government in 2023.

In 1999 China created its ‘Going Out’ strategy, which encouraged Chinese companies to invest beyond China.

The strategy was a statement of China’s growing economic might and created a new wave of Chinese engagement in Africa. It was also an important source of employment for Chinese citizens working on new infrastructure projects.

In November 2003 the first tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing. FOCAC was created to improve cooperation between China and African states and signalled China’s growing strategic initiative in Africa.

In 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Xi Jinping, featuring an ambition to reinvigorate the old silk trading route along the East African coast. This should theoretically have seen Chinese investment concentrated in East Africa, but many other African states also sought opportunities through the BRI, making the initiative quickly expand in scope and ambition.

The BRI saw a huge number of signature infrastructure projects built across Asia and Africa, funded by Chinese loans whose size, nature and origin were often opaque. Some African countries became badly exposed to Chinese lending during this period. 

Chinese investment peaked around 2016. Since then, Chinese loans to African governments declined significantly, falling from $28.4 billion in 2016 to $1.9 billion in 2020 – partly due to changing priorities in domestic Chinese politics, and partly due to the apparent difficulty African countries had repaying loans.

China’s investment in Africa

China has taken a position contrary to Western governments in its African investment. It characterizes its loans as mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries, promising not to interfere in the internal politics of those it loans to.

In this respect it presents itself in contrast to Western countries, who are accused by China and some African governments of arrogant, democratic posturing – often by former colonial powers that looted African resources during the 18th and 19th centuries.

China has learned by doing, and the reality of large-scale investments taught Chinese investors the limits of their approach. For instance, during the South Sudanese civil war, China had to deal with representatives of various forces opposed to the government to maintain the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended, claiming that Chinese communism could not be replicated outside of China.

However, ideological links exist between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the rulers of a state like Ethiopia, whose Prosperity Party has origins in ‘revolutionary democracy’ and Marxist-Leninism.

China’s National People’s Congress has formal relations with 35 African parliaments and the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) has relations with 110 political parties in 51 African countries.

Western politicians have increasingly voiced fears that China’s intentions in Africa are predatory, intended to create a network of African states that are obliged to service their debts by offering China access to resources, trade opportunities and locations for military bases.

Debt trap diplomacy

US commentators often describe Chinese policy in Africa as a ‘debt trap’, part of a deliberate strategy to loan unmanageable sums to African countries, draw them into China’s sphere of influence, and force unfair commitments upon them.

Some African nations do have extensive Chinese loans and are suffering from out-of-control debt, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and high interest rates. But their situations cannot be entirely blamed on Chinese loans. States including Kenya and Zambia have poorly managed their debt to all creditors, not only China.

Meanwhile, other African countries have created realistic, manageable debt arrangements with China without the tremendous risk and uncertainties that characterized some major BRI projects.

China also faces significant problems due to its extensive loans made during the BRI boom period, as it will struggle to force repayment while maintaining its image as a friend of developing nations.

BRI projects were largely uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit offered by competing Chinese lenders. This contradicts the idea of a coherent ‘debt trap’ policy by China.

However, the idea that China may use debt strategically, to expand its influence in the African content and secure access to resources, cannot be completely dismissed. China is an emerging superpower in strategic competition with the US. Building stronger economic relationships in Africa would be a logical step in its aspirations to be a global power.

Sophos X-Ops unveils five-year investigation tracking China-based groups targeting perimeter devices

China's Regions in an Era of Globalization Book sysadmin 14 May 2018

The rise of China has been shaped and driven by its engagement with the global economy. This engagement cannot be understood at the level of national policymaking alone, but requires analysis of the differences in participation in the global economy across China’s regions.

China is a continent-sized economy and society with substantial diversity across its different regions. This book traces the evolution of regional policy in China and its implications in a global context.

Detailed chapters examine the trajectory of what is now becoming known as the Greater Bay Area in southern China, the inland mega-city of Chongqing, and the role of China’s regions in the globally focused Belt and Road Initiative launched by the Chinese government in late 2013.

It will be of interest to practitioners and scholars engaging with contemporary China’s political economy and international relations.

This book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization

About the author

Tim Summers works on the political economy and international relations of contemporary China. He is a Lecturer at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a (non-resident) Senior Consulting Fellow on the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was British consul general in Chongqing from 2004 to 2007.

This book is published in collaboration with Routledge.

Purchase

• Worldwide (via Routledge)
• Students (via Browns Books)

How Influential Is China in Zimbabwe? Expert comment sysadmin 20 November 2017

A trip to Beijing by Zimbabwe’s military chief was a ‘normal military exchange’, China’s foreign ministry said after the army seized power in Harare. Alex Vines examines the extent of China’s influence in Zimbabwe.

The news that General Constantino Chiwenga had visited China only a few days before the military takeover in Zimbabwe was a coincidence that did not go unnoticed. There was also speculation after China said it was closely watching developments, but stopped short of condemning President Robert Mugabe’s apparent removal from power.

China is Zimbabwe’s fourth-largest trading partner and its largest source of investment - with stakes worth many billions of pounds in everything from agriculture to construction. Zimbabwe is the dependent partner - with China providing the largest market for its exports and much needed support to its fragile economy.

China’s relations with Zimbabwe are deep, starting during the Rhodesian Bush War. Robert Mugabe failed in 1979 to get Soviet backing, so turned to China, which provided his guerrilla fighters with weapons and training. Both countries formally established diplomatic relations at Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and Mugabe visited Beijing as prime minister the following year. He has been a regular visitor since.

For years, Zimbabwe’s officials have tried to play off China against the West, advocating the country’s ‘Look East’ strategy, particularly following the introduction of EU sanctions in 2002. Indeed, a decade ago, Mugabe told a packed rally at the Chinese-built national sports stadium in Harare: ‘We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.’

China’s military engagement also deepened during Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ era. Significant purchases were made, including Hongdu JL-8 jet aircraft, JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, vehicles, radar and weapons. However, following a controversy about a shipment of arms in 2008, Beijing decided to list Zimbabwe for ‘limited level’ military trading.

Despite Zimbabwe’s efforts, the ‘Look East’ strategy did not bring the investment flood hoped for and a decade later, in August 2015, Mugabe openly asked for Western re-engagement in his ‘state of the nation’ address.

Now, the reality is that increasingly Chinese and Western interests - particularly those of the UK - have become aligned. Not far from each other in the outer suburbs of Harare, two of the biggest embassies in Zimbabwe are the British and the Chinese. As other embassies scaled down or closed, Beijing’s expanded. Whereas British diplomats were well connected with business, civil society and opposition figures, the Chinese invested in ‘technical support’ of the party of government Zanu-PF, including state security and the presidency. When it came to Zanu-PF politics and factionalism, Chinese diplomats were well connected and insightful and, like their Western colleagues, concerned about stability, a better investment climate and adherence to the rule of law.

President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe in 2015 and President Mugabe visited Beijing in January 2017. In public, the Chinese leader said his country is willing to encourage capable companies to invest in Zimbabwe. But in private, the message was that there would be no more loans until Zimbabwe stabilized its economy.

In 2016 trade between the two countries amounted to $1.1 billion, with China the biggest buyer of Zimbabwean tobacco and also importing cotton and various minerals. In return Zimbabwe imported electronics, clothing and other finished products. Chinese state construction firms have also been active, building infrastructure including Zimbabwe’s $100 million National Defence College. And last year China agreed to finance a new 650-seat parliament in Harare.

But Chinese diplomats and many businesses are waiting for better days in Zimbabwe. Some companies have found the investment climate challenging - being burned on diamonds, for example - and have looked for alternative markets. A couple of weeks ago I was in China, attending a meeting on China-Africa relations and Zimbabwe was not mentioned once. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan, or Angola that are strategic partners, or big markets like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe is far from being Beijing’s new priority.

So, Beijing’s interest is in a better investment climate in Zimbabwe. A clear transitional arrangement resulting in elections for a legitimate government in Harare is as much in Beijing’s interest as London’s.

The ‘Look East’ and the ‘Re-engagement with the West’ strategies have not brought about the confidence and investment that Zimbabwe needs. What Zimbabwe requires is stable and accountable government - then investors from Asia, America and Europe will seriously consider that Zimbabwe has an investment future. This was the message that Mugabe received in Beijing in January. And the one which Zimbabwe’s military chief also was given last week.

This article was originally published by BBC News.

Chatham House Primer: Inside China’s government 30 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House

How are decisions made in Beijing, across China and where does the CCP fit in?

Still little is known in Western circles about the inner workings of China’s government. In power since 1949, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has evolved over decades to its current embodiment under President Xi Jinping.

The need for a better understanding of China’s government has been heightened, particularly as the country navigates post-COVID troubles, global economic downturns, wars in Europe, climate change and heightened tension with the United States.

This Primer has been prepared to pull back the veil on the Chinese government. Key issues to be tackled include:

• What is the decision-making process in China’s government?

• How is the party–government relationship best explained?

• How has the party evolved in recent years with new forms of governance and leadership?

• How has China’s government evolved in recent years, particularly in a globalized environment?

• A description of the central government–province dynamic?

• How are citizens engaged in the political process?

• What are the major centres of power in the Chinese political system?

• Has the COVID-19 pandemic altered attitudes towards and the operation of government?

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said the branch is looking toward confronting China, as well as unity in its ranks, and added that the service needs to retire older aircraft and programs -- and focus on ones that work.

The Biden administration is reportedly considering capping sales of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) chips from US-based manufacturers like AMD and Nvidia to certain countries, including those in the Middle East.  The […]

The post White House Mulls Expanding AI Chip Export Bans Beyond China appeared first on HPCwire.

A man drove a vehicle into a crowd at a sports center in Zhuhai, China, killing 35 people and injuring 43 others, police said.

A new trio of Chinese astronauts reached the Tiangong space station on Wednesday, starting a handover from the current crew already on the orbiting laboratory.

Three Chinese astronauts returned to Earth early Monday after six months in space as part of its Shenzhou-18 mission at its orbiting space station.

FAO and China have signed a two-year tripartite cooperation agreement worth about N$10.5 million (US$1.5 million) that will boost the efforts of local farmers in Namibia. The agreement, which is [...]

Three sites in China - an ancient tea-producing area, a nomadic livestock-rearing region and a rain-fed stone terrace farming system - were formally recognised  as Globally Important Agricultural Heritage [...]

Read more at http://blogs.smithsonianmag.com/aroundthemall/2009/12/tai-shan-will-return-to-china/ Visitors to the National Zoo have enjoyed watching their baby panda grow up over the last four years.

Scientists converted the patient’s own cells into blood sugar-regulating cell clusters before injecting them back into her abdomen—and one year later, she still doesn't need insulin injections

"Transforming Energy," the artist's first museum show in China, focuses on "artworks and objects that actively engage the audience"

Hundreds of artifacts have been unearthed at a burial mound in the city of Chifeng, but researchers are particularly intrigued by the six-inch-long object

Many of the buns sold at China Pastry are classics you would find in bakeries in Hong Kong and Chinatowns all over the world. It's taken decades of hard work, but owners Sally and Tony Wong say they've established a nice flow together over the years.

A driver killed 35 people and severely injured another 43 when he deliberately rammed his car into people exercising at a sports centre in the southern Chinese city of Zhuhai, police said Tuesday.

The impact of Donald Trump's election win on Nov. 5 will be felt globally, especially in China — one of the world's emerging superpowers and one of the United States' biggest trading partners. The relationship could also affect Canada.

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China's economic stimulus in 2009 unleashed a bull market among commodities. Will its 2024 stimulus have the same impact?

China is trying to revive its economy from a COVID-era slump, but is it doing too little, too late?

The rand slumped more than 2% on Monday as renewed concerns about China’s prospects hit metal prices and investors fretted about a possible trade war under US President-elect Donald Trump.

Trump’s expected choice of Sen. Marco Rubio and Rep. Mike Waltz indicates China is going to be at the center of U.S. foreign policy, deepening U.S.-China tensions.

China Evergrande has pledged to repay its debt this year, as the property giant faces a restructuring following Beijing's crackdown on excessive borrowing and rampant speculation in the real estate sector.

China's second fifth-generation stealth fighter jet is making a debut at its largest air show, taking centre stage at the event and becoming the second nation in the world after the US to have more than one fifth-generation fighter jet.

In leaning on hawks Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, Donald Trump is setting the stage for an existential battle against China -- although, as always, the president-elect's knack for dealmaking may intervene.

China's second fifth-generation stealth fighter jet is making a debut at its largest air show, taking centre stage at the event and becoming the second nation in the world after the US to have more than one fifth-generation fighter jet.

The US order, which is being reported for the first time, comes just weeks after TSMC notified the Commerce Department that one of its chips had been found in a Huawei AI processor, as Reuters reported last month.

In leaning on hawks Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, Donald Trump is setting the stage for an existential battle against China -- although, as always, the president-elect's knack for dealmaking may intervene.

This November, the engineering and simulation community is set to converge in China for an event that promises to be nothing short of revolutionary. The 2024 BETA CAE Systems China Open Meeting, taking place in the vibrant cities of Beijing and Shanghai on November 5 and 7 , respectively, is a must-attend for anyone looking to stay at the forefront of technological innovation in simulation solutions. Prepare to be inspired by Ben Gu , the visionary Corporate VP of Research and Development at Cadence. He will lead both meetings in Beijing and Shanghai with his keynote on " A New Millennium in Multiphysics System Analysis ." This thought-provoking keynote is expected to provide attendees with a glimpse into the future of engineering simulation and analysis. What sets the BETA CAE Systems Open Meetings apart is not just the high caliber of speakers but also the hands-on training sessions designed to enhance your technical expertise with the BETA CAE software suite. Whether you are an inexperienced individual seeking to acquire fundamental knowledge or an accomplished professional endeavoring to hone your expertise, these training sessions following the open meetings are meticulously tailored to meet your needs. Join Us at the BETA CAE Systems Open Meeting in Beijing The BETA CAE Systems Open Meeting in Beijing will feature a keynote speech by Peng Qiao , Senior Engineer at Great Wall Motors Co., Ltd, on Multidisciplinary Optimization Techniques for Automotive Control Arms . ( View detailed agenda for Beijing. ) When: November 5, 2024 Where: Grand Metropark Hotel Beijing If this sounds interesting, register today for the BETA CAE Systems Beijing Open Meeting by clicking the button below. Don't Miss Out on the BETA CAE Systems Open Meeting in Shanghai After the BETA CAE Systems Open Meeting in Beijing, the next meeting in China will be in Shanghai. During this event, Liu Deping, CAE Engineer from Zhejiang Geely Automobile Research Institute Co., Ltd, will deliver a keynote speech on the Application of ANSA in the Simulation Development Cycle . ( View detailed agenda for Shanghai. ) When: November 7, 2024 Where: InterContinental Shanghai Jing'an Following the open meeting on November 7 will be an exclusive training day on November 8. This session will provide attendees with practical experience using the BETA CAE software to improve their technical skills and provide hands-on knowledge of the software. If you find this intriguing, register now for the BETA CAE Systems Shanghai Open Meeting by clicking the button below. Why Attend? Gain firsthand insights into the latest developments in simulation technology Learn from real-world applications and success stories from various industries Connect and exchange ideas with experts in a collaborative environment Mark your calendars for this unparalleled opportunity to explore the forefront of simulation technology. Whether you're aiming to broaden your knowledge, enhance your technical skills, or connect with industry leaders, the BETA CAE Systems Open Meetings are your gateway to the future of engineering. Join us and be part of shaping the next wave of innovation in the simulation world.

AstraZeneca will set up a R&D centre and an AI innovation centre in Shanghai, as well as create a $1bn fund that would invest in healthcare start-ups.

German chemical giant BASF has begun construction of its $10bn mega project in southern China, which will be the country’s first wholly foreign-owned chemical complex. 

Up to 18 countries across Latin America have joined China’s new Belt and Road Initiative, hoping to boost their infrastructure development and investment.  

FDI project numbers from China into the EU are on a downward trend, but Europe is still a popular destination for Chinese investment.

The Australian Government welcomes today’s announcement by China to re-register two of Australia’s important barley exporters.

Ten years ago I was posted to South Korea to cover news.

THIS year marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Hungary, with both nations elevating their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership. As the Guest Country of Honor at

CHINA yesterday urged the United States to stop attacking and slandering the country, following the release of a US presidential memorandum that identified China as one of the major drug transit or illicit

CHINA’S first domestically built luxury cruise ship, the “Adora Magic City,” will set sail from the Shanghai Wusongkou International Cruise Liner Terminal on January 1, 2024. Passengers can make reservations