Strengthening Our Commitment to the Next Generation News Release NCapeling 9 November 2020

Panel of Young Advisers and Queen Elizabeth II Academy Ambassadors underscore our drive to reach, engage and inspire young people to change their world.

New Strategic Partnership with the Robert Bosch Stiftung News Release jon.wallace 23 November 2020

The Robert Bosch Stiftung becomes a founding donor to Chatham House’s second century.

New Chatham House History Examines our Defining Moments News Release NCapeling 18 January 2021

'A History of Chatham House: its People and Influence from the 1920s to the 2020s' will examine the impact on policymaking of our first 100 years.

Supporting Next Generation of Leaders in Sustainability News Release NCapeling 28 January 2021

A new programme offering paid internships for young people who are passionate about social, economic, and environmental sustainability has been launched.

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Private Sector 23 September 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism.

A healthy civic space is vital for an enabling business environment. In recognition of this, a growing number of private sector actors are challenging, publicly or otherwise, the deteriorating environment for civic freedoms.

However, this corporate activism is often limited and largely ad hoc. It remains confined to a small cluster of multinationals leaving potential routes for effective coordination and collaboration with other actors underexplored.

This roundtable brings together a diverse and international group of business actors, civil society actors and foreign policy experts to exchange perspectives and experiences on how the private sector can be involved in issues around civic space.

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and discuss practical strategies for the business community.

This meeting is the first of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space. 

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Tech Sector 13 October 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

This event brings together a diverse and international group of stakeholders to exchange perspectives and experiences on the role that tech actors can play in supporting civic space.

In a deteriorating environment for civic freedoms, tech sector actors are increasingly engaging, publicly or otherwise, on issues of civic space.

In the US, for example, a number of tech companies have cancelled contracts with the Pentagon and stopped censoring search results in China as a result of protests by employees. The Asia Internet Coalition recently wrote to Pakistan’s Prime Minister expressing human rights concerns about new rules regulating social media.

While we have recently seen technology companies show support for the social movements, including through substantial pledges, in some cases these have elicited criticism of hypocrisy, and the interventions of social media platforms on freedom of expression and privacy issues have been closely linked to the preservation of their own business models.

The COVID-19 crisis has also posed new dilemmas for the tech sector with the pervasiveness of disinformation, as well as new tools for tracking individuals which raise privacy issues.

This roundtable provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of (and barriers to) corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and routes to effective collaboration with other actors, and discuss practical strategies that could be adopted by the tech community.

It is the second of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space.

Deplatforming Trump puts big tech under fresh scrutiny Expert comment NCapeling 22 January 2021

The response of digital platforms to the US Capitol riots raises questions about online content governance. The EU and UK are starting to come up with answers.

The ‘deplatforming’ of Donald Trump – including Twitter’s announcement that it has permanently banned him due to ‘the risk of further incitement of violence’ after the riots in the US – shows once more not only the sheer power of online platforms but also the lack of a coherent and consistent framework for online content governance.

Taking the megaphone away from Trump during the Capitol riots seems sensible, but was it necessary or proportionate to ban him from the platform permanently? Or consistent with the treatment of other ‘strongmen’ world leaders such as Modi, Duterte and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who have overseen nationalistic violence but whose accounts remain intact?

Such complex decisions on online expression should not made unilaterally by powerful and unregulated tech actors, but instead should be subject to democratic oversight and grounded in the obligations of states and responsibilities of companies under international human rights law.

The speed and scale of digital information has left governments across the world struggling with how to tackle online harms such as hate speech, extremist content and disinformation since the emergence of mass social media 15 years ago.

The US’s hallowed approach to the First Amendment, under which speech on public issues – even hate speech – occupies the highest rank and is entitled to special protection, has contributed to a reluctance to regulate Silicon Valley’s digital platforms. But the irony is that by not regulating them, the government harmed freedom of expression by leaving complex speech decisions in the hands of private actors.

Meanwhile at the other extreme is the growing number of illiberal and authoritarian governments using a combination of vague laws, censorship, propaganda, and internet blackouts to severely restrict online freedom of expression, control the narrative and, in some cases, incite atrocities.

Regulation is on the way

The happy medium – flexible online content regulation providing clarity, predictability, transparency, and accountability – has until now been elusive. But even before the deplatforming of Trump, 2021 was set to be the year when this approach finally gained some traction, at least in Europe.

The EU’s recently-published draft Digital Services Act puts obligations on dominant social media platforms to manage ‘systemic risks’, for example through requirements for greater transparency about their content decisions, algorithms used for recommendations, and online advertising systems.

The UK will shortly publish its Online Safety Bill, which will establish a new regulatory framework for tackling online harms, including the imposition of a duty of care and codes of conduct on Big Tech, to be overseen by an independent regulator (Ofcom).

Both proposals are based on a ‘co-regulatory’ model under which the regulator sets out a framework substantiated with rules by the private sector, with the regulator performing a monitoring function to ensure the rules are complied with.

Both also draw on international human rights standards and the work of civil society in applying these standards in relation to the online public square, with the aim of increasing control for users over what they see online, requiring transparency about tech companies’ policies in a number of areas, and strengthening the accountability of platforms when they fall foul of the regulation.

The procedure for both proposals has also been inclusive, involving extensive multi-stakeholder consultations with civil society organizations and Big Tech, and the proposals will be subject to scrutiny in 2021, notably from the EU and UK parliaments.

Both proposals are at an early stage, and it remains to be seen whether they go far enough – or indeed will have a chilling effect on online platforms. But as an attempt to initiate a dialogue on globally coherent principles, they are positive first steps. They also provide food for thought for the new Joe Biden administration in the US as it turns its attention to the regulation of Big Tech.

For some time civil society – most prominently David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion – have called for content regulation to be informed by universal international human rights law standards.

The EU and UK are peculiarly well-placed to take the lead in this area because European countries have for decades been on the receiving end of judgments from the European Court of Human Rights on the appropriate limits to freedom of expression in cases brought under the European Convention on Human Rights.

In deciding these cases, the court has to balance the right to freedom of expression against the restrictions imposed – for example in the context of incitement to violence, political debate, and satire. Deciding where to draw the line on what can and cannot be expressed in a civilised society which prizes freedom of expression is inevitably a difficult exercise.

International human rights law provides a methodology that inquires whether the interference to freedom of expression was prescribed by law and pursues a legitimate aim, and also whether it was necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims – including whether the interference was necessary and proportionate (as for example in Delfi AS v Estonia, which involved a news portal failing to take down unlawful hate speech).

To be effective, online content regulation has to bite on tech companies, which is a challenge given the internet is global but domestic law normally applies territorially. The EU’s proposals have an extraterritorial element as they apply to any online platforms providing services in the EU regardless of where the platform is headquartered.

Further, both the EU and UK want to give the regulator strong enforcement powers – it is proposed for example that Ofcom will have powers to fine platforms up to ten per cent of their turnover for breaches.

Although the proposals would not apply directly to the deplatforming of Trump which occurred in the US, the philosophy behind the EU and UK approach is likely to have an impact beyond European shores in promoting a co-regulatory model that some of the bigger tech companies have been inviting for some time, reluctant as they are to ‘play God’ on content moderation decisions without reference to any regulatory framework.

In the absence of regulation, the standards of tech platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have already evolved over time in response to pressure from civil rights groups, users, and advertisers, including updated policies on protecting civic conversation and hate speech.

Facebook has also set up an independent Oversight Board, whose members include leading human rights lawyers, to review decisions on content including – at its own request – the decision to indefinitely suspend Trump from Facebook and Instagram. Decisions on the Board’s first tranche of cases are expected imminently.

Gatekeeper status is key

Online content regulation also needs to address the role of Big Tech as the ‘digital gatekeepers’, because their monopoly power extends not just to editorial control of the news and information we consume, but also to market access.

The decision of Apple, Google, and Amazon to stop hosting right-wing social network Parler after it refused to combat calls for violence during the US Capitol riots was understandable in the circumstances, but also underlined the unilateral ability of Big Tech to decide the rules of the market.

Again, it is Europe where efforts are underway to tackle this issue: the EU’s draft Digital Market Act imposes obligations on online gatekeepers to avoid certain unfair practices, and the UK’s new Digital Markets Unit will have powers to write and enforce a new code of practice on those technology companies with ‘substantial and enduring’ market power.

In the US, Biden’s team will be following these developments with interest, given the growing bipartisan support for strengthening US antitrust rules and reviving antitrust enforcement. The EU’s recently published proposals for an EU-US tech agenda include a transatlantic dialogue on the responsibility of tech platforms and strengthened cooperation between antitrust authorities on digital markets.

Ultimately a consistent – and global – approach to online content is needed instead of fragmented approaches by different companies and governments. It is also important the framework is flexible so that it is capable of applying not only to major democracies but also to countries where too often sweeping state regulation has been used as a pretext to curtail online expression online.

The pursuit of a pluralistic framework tailored to different political and cultural contexts is challenging, and international human rights law cannot provide all the answers but, as a universal framework, it is a good place to start. The raft of regulatory measures from the EU and UK means that, regardless of whether Trump regains his online megaphone, 2021 is set to be a year of reckoning for Big Tech.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Insights from Climate Policy: Engaging Subnational Governments in Global Platforms 10 June 2020 — 2:45PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

How have subnational governments shaped the global agenda and created momentum on climate change where national and international governance processes could not?

Can these advances be converted into meaningful collaboration channels for policy development? What works, or does not, when it comes to engagement with multilateral negotiation processes? What ingredients are necessary for success? What are the broader implications of these trends for inclusivity and innovation in international governance?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Innovating Governance: Examples from the Digital Arena 25 February 2020 TO 26 February 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Chatham House

The Inclusive Governance Initiative is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The Inclusive Governance Initiative, a centenary project which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world, is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The event brings together a diverse and multidisciplinary group of leading experts to consider where and how early initiatives around governance of the digital sphere have succeeded – or not – and how they are evolving today.

The conversation will include the debate between multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches, the opportunities and challenges of collective non-binding commitments, and converting civil society collaboration into policy contribution.

The Implication of Greater Use of Investment Screening 26 June 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 February 2021 Online

What is driving the trend towards greater use of investment screening by nation states and regional economic groupings?

• How is the COVID-19 crisis affecting this trend?
• What will the economic implications be?
• Will this help or hinder inclusivity and transparency in investment governance?
• Is there a role for international safeguards and/or international coordination of national/regional approaches to investment screening?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Persuasion or manipulation? Limiting campaigning online Expert comment NCapeling 15 February 2021

To tackle online disinformation and manipulation effectively, regulators must clarify the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate campaign practices.

Democracy is at risk, not only from disinformation but from systemic manipulation of public debate online. Evidence shows social media drives control of narratives, polarization, and division on issues of politics and identity. We are now seeing regulators turn their attention to protecting democracy from disinformation and manipulation. But how should they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate online information practices, between persuasive and manipulative campaigning?

Unregulated, the tactics of disinformation and manipulation have spread far and wide. They are no longer the preserve merely of disaffected individuals, hostile international actors, and authoritarian regimes. Facebook’s periodic reporting on coordinated inauthentic behaviour and Twitter’s on foreign information operations reveal that militaries, governments, and political campaigners in a wide range of countries, including parts of Europe and America, have engaged in manipulative or deceptive information campaigns.

For example, in September 2019, Twitter removed 259 accounts it says were ‘falsely boosting’ public sentiment online that it found to be operated by Spain’s conservative and Christian-democratic political party Partido Popular. In October 2020, Facebook removed accounts with around 400,000 followers linked to Rally Forge, a US marketing firm which Facebook claims was working on behalf of right-wing organisations Turning Point USA and Inclusive Conservation Group. And in December 2020, Facebook took down a network of accounts with more than 6,000 followers, targeting audiences in Francophone Africa and focusing on France’s policies there, finding it linked with individuals associated with the French military.

Public influence on a global scale

Even more revealingly, in its 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation, the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) found that in 81 countries, government agencies and/or political parties are using ‘computational propaganda’ in social media to shape public attitudes.

These 81 countries span the world and include not only authoritarian and less democratic regimes but also developed democracies such as many EU member states. OII found that countries with the largest capacity for computational propaganda – which include the UK, US, and Australia – have permanent teams devoted to shaping the online space overseas and at home.

OII categorizes computational propaganda as four types of communication strategy – the creation of disinformation or manipulated content such as doctored images and videos; the use of personal data to target specific segments of the population with disinformation or other false narratives; trolling, doxing or online harassment of political opponents, activists or journalists; and mass-reporting of content or accounts posted or run by opponents as part of gaming the platforms’ automated flagging, demotion, and take-down systems.

Doubtless some of the governments included within OII’s statistics argue their behaviour is legitimate and appropriate, either to disseminate information important to the public interest or to wrestle control of the narrative away from hostile actors. Similarly, no doubt some political campaigners removed by the platforms for alleged engagement in ‘inauthentic behaviour’ or ‘manipulation’ would defend the legitimacy of their conduct.

The fact is that clear limits of acceptable propaganda and information influence operations online do not exist. Platforms still share little information overall about what information operations they see being conducted online. Applicable legal principles such as international human rights law have not yet crystallised into clear rules. As information operations are rarely exposed to public view – with notable exceptions such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal – there is relatively little constraint in media and public scrutiny or censure.

OII’s annual reports and the platforms’ periodic reports demonstrate a continual expansion of deceptive and manipulative practices since 2016, and increasing involvement of private commercial companies in their deployment. Given the power of political influence as a driver, this absence of clear limits may result in ever more sophisticated techniques being deployed in the search for maximal influence.

Ambiguity over reasonable limits on manipulation plays into the hands of governments which regulate ostensibly in the name of combating disinformation, but actually in the interests of maintaining their own control of the narrative and in disregard of the human right to freedom of expression. Following Singapore’s 2019 prohibition of online untruths, 17 governments ranging from Bolivia to Vietnam to Hungary passed regulations during 2020 criminalising ‘fake news’ on COVID-19 while many other governments are alleged to censor opposition arguments or criticisms of official state narratives.

Clear limits are needed. Facebook itself has been calling for societal discussion about the limits of acceptable online behaviour for some time and has issued recommendations of its own.

The European Democracy Action Plan: Aiming to protect pluralism and vigour in democracy

The European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP), which complements the European Commission’s Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act proposals, is a welcome step. It is ground-breaking in its efforts to protect the pluralism and vigour of European democracies by tackling all forms of online manipulation, while respecting human rights.

While the EDAP tackles disinformation, it also condemns two categories of online manipulation – information influence operations which EDAP describes as ‘coordinated efforts by either domestic or foreign actors to influence a target audience using a range of deceptive means’ and foreign interference, described as ‘coercive and deceptive efforts to disrupt the free formation and expression of individuals’ political will by a foreign state actor or its agents’. These categories include influence operations such as harnessing fake accounts or gaming algorithms, and the suppression of independent information sources through censorship or mass reporting.

But the categories are so broad they risk capturing disinformation practices not only of rogue actors, but also of governments and political campaigners both outside and within the EU. The European Commission plans to work towards refined definitions. Its discussions with member states and other stakeholders should start to determine which practices ought to be tackled as manipulative, and which ought to be tolerated as legitimate campaigning or public information practices.

The extent of the EDAP proposals on disinformation demonstrates the EU’s determination to tackle online manipulation. The EDAP calls for improved practical measures building on the Commission’s 2020 acceleration of effort in the face of COVID-19 disinformation. The Commission is considering how best to impose costs on perpetrators of disinformation, such as by disrupting financial incentives or even imposing sanctions for repeated offences.

Beyond the regulatory and risk management framework proposed by the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Commission says it will issue guidance for platforms and other stakeholders to strengthen their measures against disinformation, building on the existing EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and eventually leading to a strengthened Code with more robust monitoring requirements. These are elements of a broader package of measures in the EDAP to preserve democracy in Europe.

Until there are clear limits, manipulative practices will continue to develop and to spread. More actors will resort to them in order not to be outgunned by opponents. It is hoped forthcoming European discussions – involving EU member state governments, the European Parliament, civil society, academia and the online platforms – will begin to shape at least a European and maybe a global consensus on the limits of information influence, publicly condemning unacceptable practices while safeguarding freedom of expression.

Most importantly, following the example of the EDAP, the preservation of democracy and human rights – rather than the promotion of political or commercial interest – should be the lodestar for those discussions.

Battle lines being drawn over online freedoms in Asia Expert comment NCapeling 22 March 2021

Social media giants are increasingly clashing with Asian governments over free expression and censorship as the region lurches towards digital authoritarianism.

Freedom of expression was subject to significant restrictions in Asia even before the pandemic, with several governments having enacted laws that stifle online debate. But since COVID-19, restrictions have increased even further due to a rash of so-called ‘emergency measures’ introduced by governments across the region.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam have all put new laws into place, and many restrictions are already being applied in a draconian fashion, such as in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

As outlined in a new Chatham House research paper, one inspiration behind this trend is China, home to the world’s most sophisticated and restrictive system of internet control. The Chinese government’s restrictive online regime, which has tightened further under COVID-19, relies on a combination of legal regulations, technical controls, and proactive manipulation of online debates.

This model was an inspiration for Vietnam’s cybersecurity law, as well as Myanmar’s new draft cybersecurity bill, proposed by the Military-run State Administration Council in the wake of the military coup last month, which would give the military there extensive powers to access individuals’ data, restrict, or suspend access to the internet.

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model of internet governance is also gaining impetus through China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative, under which the Chinese government is exporting both its technology – such as through the establishment of smart cities, the installation of AI, and surveillance technology – and its vision of how the internet should be governed.

In November 2020, Xi Jinping pledged to further deepen cooperation with ASEAN through the Digital Silk Road, and the pandemic has expanded the appeal of Chinese surveillance technologies and data collection platforms to governments both in Asia and beyond. China’s Health Silk Road, which aims to promote global health cooperation, is centered on the Chinese government’s high-tech model under which civic freedoms are sacrificed in the name of public health.

An alternative model

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model is increasingly at odds with the more ‘human-centric’ model of tech governance favoured by many democratic states, Western social media companies, and international institutions, especially the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU).

Although this emerging model also involves regulation, it is regulation which aims to be inclusive, risk-based, and proportionate – balancing the need for protection against online harms with the need to preserve freedom of expression. It is a multi-stakeholder, rights-based approach which brings together not just governments but also representatives of the private sector, civil society, and academia. The EU’s draft Digital Services Act and the UK’s proposals for an Online Safety Bill are both reflective of this approach.

Western social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter have recently introduced new policies which seek to identify and mitigate online harms, such as hate speech and disinformation. Industry bodies such as the Global Network Initiative, independent oversight bodies such as the Oversight Board established by Facebook, and civil society advocacy and initiatives such as the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation are also an important part of the picture.

Admittedly, these various digital governance initiatives are in some cases embryonic, and are by no means a silver bullet solution to the complex problem of online content moderation, which continues to be hotly debated in democratic societies. But they are at least underpinned by the same philosophy – that international human rights law standards must continue to apply even during emergencies such as COVID-19. With the Biden administration in the US prioritizing tech governance in its policy agenda, there is added momentum to the international leadership behind this model.

A clash of ideology

These conflicting philosophies are playing out in debates on technology governance at the UN, with one group of countries led by China and Russia advocating for greater government control of the internet, and many Western democracies emphasizing the need for an open, global internet that protects human rights.

These differing ideologies are also creating tensions between Western social media companies operating in Asia and the various governments in that region which have increased restrictions on online expression. And the gulf between the two appears to be widening.

In 2017, the Thailand government threatened Facebook with legal action unless it agreed to remove content critical of Thailand’s royal family and, in 2020, Facebook announced it had been ‘forced to block’ such material. Also in 2020, the Vietnam government pressured state-owned telecom companies to throttle internet traffic to Facebook, effectively restricting access to the platform, until Facebook agreed to take down content the government deemed to be anti-state.

Platforms refuse to silence legitimate criticism

However, Silicon Valley’s social media companies have also been pushing back. Facebook restricted the accounts of Myanmar’s military on the basis of ‘spreading misinformation’ in the wake of the military’s imposition of an internet shutdown that blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. And Twitter resisted requests by the Indian government to block accounts involved in protests by farmers.

Twitter stated that while it would block any accounts which it felt incited violence, it would not take action on accounts belonging to news media entities, journalists, activists, and politicians because it believed that would ‘violate the fundamental right to free expression under the Indian law’. The Indian government responded by fast-tracking stringent new social media regulations heavily criticized by rights groups for increasing government power over content on social media platforms, including online news.

So how can social media companies find avenues for operating in Asia and beyond without being co-opted into the lurch towards digital authoritarianism? There are no easy answers here, but collaboration is key. Cooperation between tech companies and local civil society partners can help companies better understand risks to human rights in the country concerned and how they might be mitigated. And tech companies are more effective in alliance with each other than acting on their own, such as the refusal by Facebook, Google, Telegram, and Twitter to hand over data on protestors to the Hong Kong police.

The fact that in many countries in Asia there are no alternatives to Western social media companies – unlike China, where platforms such as WeChat are part of the government’s internet control apparatus – gives the companies concerned some leverage. In February 2020, Facebook, Google, and Twitter together – through the Asia Internet Coalition – threatened to leave Pakistan in response to the government’s draconian proposals to regulate social media. Along with pressure and lawsuits from civil society, this forced the government into retreat, although the tussle over the new rules, introduced in November, continues.

At a time when illiberalism was already on the rise in Asia (including in democracies – Freedom House has just downgraded India’s status from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’), COVID-19 has made tighter state control of online freedom of expression even more attractive to many governments. As it seems increasingly unlikely that restrictions enacted under the guise of pandemic-related emergency measures will be repealed once the COVID-19 crisis ends, it is even more important that tech companies work with civil society on the ground to minimize the censorship of citizen voices.

Rebuilding trust is central to the UN’s future Expert comment NCapeling 25 March 2021

António Guterres is under scrutiny as he prepares to report on the future of the United Nations, with a renewed focus on trust, resilience and prevention.

The United Nations Secretary-General’s inbox is full as his organization celebrates its 75th anniversary. Trust must be rebuilt amid increased geo-political rivalry, North-South divisions, and sceptical citizens left behind by globalization. The international community has manifestly underinvested in institutional resilience and prevention. Better partnerships are needed with the private sector, and innovative forms of cross-regional cooperation fostered.

There are positive signs UN member states want things to change. They unanimously agreed a Political Declaration last September strongly reaffirming multilateralism, and they gave António Guterres one year to present a roadmap on how to respond, ‘building back better’ in the face of climate change and COVID-19.

A key challenge is to steer mandates and resources towards prevention. The World Bank-WHO Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which eerily predicted the pandemic in its inaugural report in September 2019, reminds us successful prevention rests not on warning alone, but on aligned incentives for early action.

Geopolitical tensions persist

China has invested significantly in the multilateral system over the last decade, both in formal organizations such as the UN and the African Union, and in fostering a set of China-centred ‘mini-lateral’ fora such as the SCO, BRICS and BRI. It has also deepened its ties with Russia in the UN Security Council. Western countries both begrudgingly admire and deeply distrust China’s nimbleness in advancing its interests and values in this way but are divided on how to respond.

The Biden administration has recommitted itself to multilateral processes but US bilateral relations are likely to remain the main foreign policy driver. The UK has sought to convert the G7 into an enlarged summit-level meeting for democracies but Europe is divided over the wisdom of formalizing a group which may increase divisions with China, and some major democracies – India for example – have divergent approaches on issues such as trade protection.

An increase in cross-regional informal caucusing within the UN system to advance norms and progress around specific common objectives is likely. Guterres can encourage smaller powers to become ‘bridge builders’ sitting in the middle of a ‘Venn diagram’ of such new member state constellations at the UN.

Guterres can also build on the recent Abraham Accords to encourage cross-regional cultural, political and security relationships on the back of trade and investment, and map practical opportunities for strategic cooperation between China and the West in health and food security, climate and biodiversity, and global macroeconomic management, while fostering new normative frameworks to manage strategic competition in artificial intelligence (AI), big data, cyber resilience, gene-editing, and automation.

North-South mistrust

Realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate objectives rests in part in mobilizing the expertise and resources of sub-state actors such as business and city and regional authorities. However, developing countries remain wary of granting the UN Secretary-General a greater role in fostering partnerships with the private sector and mobilizing private finance, out of fear this may overshadow the global North’s promises to provide aid and create fairer trade and debt conditions.

In addition, African governments are expressing growing frustration at their continued lack of ‘agency’ in UN decision-making, the reneging of promises on climate financing by the global North, and the slow rollout of the COVAX facility to developing countries.

Progress may lie in two areas. First, developing country leadership of initiatives – such as the Friends Group on SDG financing established by the Jamaican and Canadian ambassadors to the UN – can help build trust and allay concerns, which is vital to incentivise transformative investment by sovereign wealth, pension, and insurance funds in pro-poor low carbon infrastructure in developing countries.

The second area is curating multi-stakeholder initiatives outside the UN framework and then linking them back to the organization once they have proven to be beneficial to both developed and developing countries. Successful initiatives such as the Vaccine Alliance can be a model of how to do this while not detracting from state obligations.

Scepticism among citizens

Trust in governance also needs rebuilding at the level of the individual citizen. Mobilized by populist movements and ‘fake news’ online, individuals left behind by the uneven economic benefits of globalization view governments and international organizations as unaccountable and lacking their interests at heart.

Guterres has called for a new ‘social contract’ between governments and their citizens, and for ‘Multilateralism 2.0’ to demonstrate a practical ‘hard interest’ as well as a ‘values’ case for why international cooperation inclusively benefits individuals as well as states. And technological innovation can also help citizens hold governments to account. As the first Secretary-General with a science and engineering background, Guterres has championed how technology enhances UN delivery of its objectives.

The pairing of artificial intelligence (AI) with satellites and drones for geospatial insight has been pioneered by both the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to help communities preserve ecosystems and agricultural productivity. The resultant data, accessible on smart phones and computers, enables civil society to measure governments’ promises against real-time progress, through monitoring greenhouse gas emissions from power stations.

Alongside trust and accountability, fostering inclusiveness is likely to be central to Guterres’ report as he navigates how the UN can legitimize multi-stakeholder partnerships, enhance transparency, and bring coherence to diverse ‘mini-lateral’ initiatives.

These themes are explored further in the forthcoming synthesis paper ‘Reflections on building more inclusive global governance: Ten insights into emerging practice’

Building trust in trade deals – is human rights monitoring the answer? 27 May 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 May 2021 Online

Exploring the arguments in favour of more robust human rights monitoring systems and why effective monitoring mechanisms have proved so difficult to get up and running.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

The recent signing of the EU-China Investment Agreement has reignited arguments about trade and human rights. While many trade agreements envisage human rights monitoring in some shape or form, the monitoring systems that have emerged so far are not especially coherent, systematic or impactful. 

Are the human rights commitments in trade agreements more than just window-dressing?  If so, what kind of monitoring is needed to ensure they are lived up to? 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, participants explore the arguments in favour of more robust human rights monitoring systems and why effective monitoring mechanisms have proved so difficult to get up and running in this context. 

• What factors are presently holding governments back, and where is innovation and investment most needed?
• What are the political, economic and structural conditions for fair and effective human rights monitoring of trade agreements? 
• Is human rights monitoring best done unilaterally – or should more effort be put into developing joint approaches? 
• What role might human rights monitoring have to play in governments’ strategies to ‘build back better’ from the COVID-19 pandemic?

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Geopolitical shifts and evolving social challenges – what role for human rights? 29 June 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

Speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

Shifts in geopolitical power and the rise of authoritarianism are disrupting the dynamics for making progress on human rights globally.

At the same time, the relevance of the global human rights framework is being called into question by some of our most acute social challenges – rapidly evolving technology, deepening inequality and the climate crisis.

Chatham House’s Human Rights Pathways project is exploring how alliances, strategies and institutions are adapting, and will need to evolve, to strengthen human rights protection in this increasingly contested and complex global environment.

At this panel event speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights, including the long-term impacts of the pandemic, the place of human rights diplomacy in the new geopolitics, the relevance of human rights to social movements, and the potential of human rights law to galvanise efforts on urgent challenges such as the climate crisis.

Why the next generation is key to protecting human rights Expert comment LToremark 23 June 2021

Strengthening youth participation in public affairs is essential to building inclusive and democratic societies that respect human rights.

Young people have always been drivers of social and economic reform, and today’s global youth population is more numerous and interconnected than ever before. While they have been at the forefront of civic rights movements in recent years, young people are largely excluded from discussions around human rights norms and how to monitor their protection and defence.

Young people are consistently underrepresented in intergovernmental mechanisms and national dialogues, which not only squanders their potential to contribute to effective solutions but also risks disengagement and disillusionment with multilateralism more broadly, at a time when many are already warning of the fraying of the international liberal order. Although there are actors and initiatives working to lift barriers to youth participation in governance – such as the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Jayathma Wickramanayake, or the UN 2016 Not Too Young To Run campaign – these efforts tend to fall short in effecting real change and rarely translate into institutionalized procedures.

While ‘the youth’ is a heterogenous group, comprising different ages, ethnicities, national identities and interests, their participation in realizing human rights is essential to addressing the current challenges and possibilities of human rights for future generations. This will help foster more effective solutions to rights-related challenges, re-build trust in the international human rights framework among younger demographics and broaden and deepen commitments to human rights across generations.

Human rights policies and the online environment

Young people tend to be more technologically literate than their predecessors and also represent the majority of internet users and social media consumers in many countries. They can therefore play a key role in innovating and imagining rights-based solutions to emerging problems for the human rights framework, such as illegitimate collection of data by governments and companies, microtargeting by online platforms, and the sharing of harmful content online. In many cases, international human rights practices have failed to keep pace with these changes and the challenges they bring.

Younger demographics may also approach these novel human rights issues from different starting points. For example, a UK study found that 30 per cent of 18-24 year-olds were ‘unconcerned’ about data privacy compared with only 12 per cent of those aged 55-64, and it has been shown that younger people tend to be more discerning of fake news compared to older generations. There may be a need for human rights institutions and practitioners to acknowledge and bridge these gaps in perspective and understanding to ensure long-term support for proposed solutions.

International cooperation for human rights protection

It has been suggested that young people have reaped the benefits of previous human rights-based policy reforms and have a strong sense of what rights they are entitled to and why these need to be protected through an international framework. Young people are also generally more supportive of multilateralism compared to their older counterparts, as demonstrated by a 2020 survey by Pew Research Center on global attitudes, which showed that 72 per cent of respondents aged 18-29 stated they have a favourable view of the UN, compared with 58 per cent of respondents aged 50 and older.

At a recent Chatham House workshop, young participants from countries as diverse as Lebanon, Kenya and the United States expressed concern that growing hostility towards globalization threatens to undo progress in human rights standards and multilateralism more broadly, progress that they have seen and benefitted from. The rise of nationalist and populist parties has also seen countries shift their attention inwards, as evidenced by former president Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement on climate change, and threats by Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, to follow suit.

Engaging more actively with younger individuals on global human rights reform will help ensure the long-term relevance of multilateral cooperation as well as domestic buy-in of human rights commitments.

Awareness of the interconnectivity of global problems

Young people’s proficiency on online platforms has enabled greater coordination and knowledge sharing without geographical constraints, allowing young activists – like Greta Thunberg – to inspire global movements and foster online discussions about intersectional solutions to modern-day challenges.

This intersectional and transnational lens will be a vital component of building solutions to politically or historically complex issues and can be leveraged to foster better understanding of competing human rights claims relating to issues such as land re-distribution in South Africa or limitations on freedom of movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. These democratic forums and platforms will ultimately help build a global community committed to and engaged with human rights.

Capturing the next generation’s potential

With these concerns and areas of potential in mind, how can human rights institutions and mechanisms create more meaningful avenues for youth input? 

Recent Chatham House research has suggested that multilateral institutions’ efforts to engage youth has often taken the form of ‘superficial listening’, for example inviting a high-profile youth actor to a one-off event or appointing youth delegates who are not able to participate in formal discussions or mainstream governance forums. While encouraging youth participation in meetings focused on human rights can lead to positive change, tokenism can discourage future engagement and dilute the effectiveness of the forums in question.

Capitalizing on the potential of the next generation can be achieved through integrating youth councils and advisers into national and international human rights policy processes, as well as human rights institutions. A few replicable models are already operational, such as the Y7 and the Y20 delegations – the official youth engagement groups for the G7 and G20 – that advance evidence-based proposals to world leaders ahead of the G7 and G20 summits.

At the domestic level, grassroots youth-led movements can help bridge the gap between local constituencies and international policymakers, with youth activists on the ground helping to implement human rights standards and fighting against the spread of misinformation. Strong local networks and civic spaces are essential for pushing back against human rights abuses, and youth activists should be mobilized to connect the efforts of domestic and international bodies to the real issues on the ground; for example, canvassing grassroots youth networks on domestic and traditional customs before implementing development agendas around women’s rights.

As well as providing insertion points for youth policy actors, human rights institutions must communicate their goals more effectively to younger generations and promote intergenerational and inclusive dialogue, for example by holding virtual consultations that  give access to individuals from different backgrounds. Similarly, they should ask young people about their priorities for human rights reform using regular and accessible surveys or by sharing information on online platforms regularly used by this demographic. This will ensure lasting buy-in from the next generation, essential for the relevance and sustainability of the human rights framework in the years to come.

This piece draws upon insights gathered at a workshop hosted by Chatham House in March 2021, which brought together the Institute’s networks of next generation groups including representatives of the QEII Academy Ambassadors, the Panel of Young Advisers, and the Common Futures Conversations community, as well as young members from the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Strengthening Transatlantic Digital Cooperation

This project explores opportunities for increased cooperation via the transatlantic ‘tech triangle’ of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States.

This project serves as a cross-house initiative (involving the US and Americas Programme, the Europe Programme, the International Law Programme, the Digital Society Initiative and the International Security Programme).

Its long-term goal is to support the emergence of a global vision for technology governance: a vision drawing on democratic values and human rights principles. The project aims to extend the application of these principles to the digital space.

The first phase centres around a knowledge-exchange series, with findings and recommendations disseminated around targeted multilateral events such as G7, the United Nations General Assembly and the 2021 Internet Governance Forum.

Building on this exchange, the second phase will shift its focus to other democratic states and broaden digital cooperation dialogues from like-minded countries in the OECD, in addition to non-Western democracies and under-represented stakeholders from developing countries.

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.

Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world Explainer Video NCapeling 19 November 2021

Short animation examining why protecting and defending human rights ensures an equitable response to humanitarian crises and addresses economic inequality.

Human rights are not policies that can be overturned, they are not granted by governments. They belong to everyone as human beings.

For the most part, states are meeting their commitments to defend and protect universal human rights. But increasingly some governments are beginning to shy away from their obligations, and some are even actively seeking to subvert human rights.

And the regional and international bodies created and charged with defending these rights are being challenged by the rise of new powers and political movements.

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future.

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Challenges of AI Explainer jon.wallace 22 March 2022

What are the practical, legal and ethical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) and how can regulation help meet these challenges?

This article explains the challenges associated with the funding, development, supply and regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). It deals with narrow AI, that is systems and applications that are task-specific.

The article is not concerned with the concept of artificial general intelligence, or AGI, that is an AI which could meet and exceed the full capabilities of the human mind in the future.

Definition of AI

There is no universally accepted definition of AI, but in the UK’s Industrial Strategy White Paper, AI is defined as ‘technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence’. 

AI makes decisions using algorithms that either follow rules or, in the case of machine learning, review large quantities of data to identify and follow patterns. Because machine learning consists of multiple layers, and machines develop their own learning and patterns, it is opaque compared to traditional rule-following computing.

Today AI applications are common in many economic activities including online shopping and advertising, web search, digital personal assistants, language translation, smart homes and infrastructure, health, transport and manufacturing. 

Risks and benefits of AI

AI has the potential to bring huge advantages, for example in medical science, education, food and aid distribution, more efficient public transport and in tackling climate change. 

Used well, it could help humanity meet the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and make many processes swifter, fairer and more efficient. It is a technology which is likely to be as transformative to human history as was the Industrial Revolution.

However, there are serious ethical, safety and societal risks associated with the rapid growth of AI technologies. 

Will AI be a tool that makes rich people richer? Will it exaggerate bias and discrimination? Will AI decision-making create a less compassionate society? Should there be limits to what decisions an AI system can take autonomously, from overtaking a car on the motorway to firing a weapon?

And if AI goes wrong – for example if a self-driving car has an accident – who should be liable? 

To ensure AI is used safely and fairly, up-to-date and rigorous regulation is needed. 

Regulation of AI

AI creates serious regulatory challenges due to the way it is funded, researched and developed.  

The private sector drives progress in AI, and governments mostly rely on big tech companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and achieve AI breakthroughs. In many respects this is a reflection of the world we live in, as big tech firms have the resources and expertise required.

However, without government oversight the future application of AI’s extraordinary potential will be effectively outsourced to commercial interests. That outcome provides little incentive to use AI to address the world’s greatest challenges, from poverty and hunger to climate change.

Government policy on AI

Currently governments are playing catch-up as AI applications are developed and rolled out. Despite the transnational nature of this technology, there is no unified policy approach to AI regulation, or to the use of data. 

It is vital that governments provide ‘guardrails’ for private sector development through effective regulation. But this is not yet in place, either in the US (where the largest amount of development is taking place) or in most other parts of the world. This regulation ‘vacuum’ has significant ethical and safety implications for AI. 

Some governments fear that imposing stringent regulations will discourage investment and innovation in their countries and lose them a competitive advantage. This attitude risks a ‘race to the bottom’, where countries compete to minimize regulation in order to lure big tech investment. 

The EU and UK governments are beginning to discuss regulation but plans are still at an early stage. Probably the most promising approach to government policy on AI is the EU’s proposed risk-based approach. It would ban the most problematic uses of AI, such as AI that distorts human behaviour or manipulates citizens through subliminal techniques. 

And it would require risk management and human oversight of AI that poses high risk to safety or human rights, such as AI used in critical infrastructure, credit checks, recruitment, criminal justice, and asylum applications.

Meanwhile, the UK is keen to see the establishment of an AI assurance industry that would provide kitemarks (or the equivalent) for AI that meets safety and ethical standards.

Despite these policy developments, there remain fundamental questions about how to categorize and apply risk assessments, what an AI rights-based approach could look like, and the lack of inclusivity and diversity in AI.

AI ethical issues

AI has serious ethical implications. Because AI develops its own learning, those implications may not be evident until it is deployed. The story of AI is littered with ethical failings: with privacy breaches, with bias, and with AI decision-making that could not be challenged.

It’s therefore important to identify and mitigate ethical risks while AI is being designed and developed, and on an ongoing basis once it is in use. 

But many AI designers work in a competitive, profit-driven context where speed and efficiency are prized and delay (of the kind implied by regulation and ethical review) is viewed as costly and therefore undesirable. 

Designers may also not have the training, tools or capacity to identify and mitigate ethical issues. The majority are from an engineering or computing background, and do not reflect the diversity in society.

Shareholders and senior management will also naturally be hostile to criticism which could affect profits.

Once an AI application has been designed, it is often sold to companies to fulfil a task (for example, sifting employment applicants) without the buyer being able to understand how it works or what risks may come with it.

Ethical frameworks for AI

Some international bodies have made efforts to create an ethical framework for AI development, including UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, and the IEEE’s Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. And some companies have developed their own ethical initiatives.

But each of these proposals naturally overlaps, is slightly different and is voluntary. They set out principles for creating ethical AI, but provide no accountability in the event that an AI goes wrong.

Ethical roles in the AI industry are a potentially important new profession, but the field is underfunded and under resourced. There is widespread agreement that ethics is important, but a lack of consensus on how it should be enforced.

Government use of AI

It’s equally important that the way governments use AI is understood, consensual and ethical, complying with human rights obligations. Opaque practices by governments may feed the perception of AI as a tool of oppression. 

China has some of the clearest regulation of AI private industry in the world, but the way the government has deployed AI tools in the surveillance of its citizens has serious civil liberties implications.

China’s exports of AI to other countries are increasing the prevalence of government surveillance internationally.

Privacy and AI

Probably the greatest challenge facing the AI industry is the need to reconcile AI’s need for large amounts of structured or standardized data with the human right to privacy. 

AI’s ‘hunger’ for large data sets is in direct tension with current privacy legislation and culture. Current law, in the UK and Europe limits both the potential for sharing data sets and the scope of automated decision-making. These restrictions are limiting the capacity of AI. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were concerns that it would not be possible to use AI to determine priority allocation of vaccines. (These concerns were allayed on the basis that GPs provided oversight on the decision-making process.)

More broadly, some AI designers said they were unable to contribute to the COVID-19 response due to regulations that barred them from accessing large health data sets. It is at least feasible that such data could have allowed AI to offer more informed decisions about the use of control measures like lockdowns and the most effective global distribution of vaccines.

Better data access and sharing are compatible with privacy, but require changes to our regulation. The EU and UK are considering what adjustments to their data protection laws are needed to facilitate AI while protecting privacy.

What is happening in Sri Lanka? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 15 July 2022

Chanu Peiris reflects on the unfolding political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka and its impact on human rights.

What is happening in Sri Lanka?

Sri Lanka has been a leader in South Asia on many human development indicators including health and education. Until recently, it was considered an upper middle-income country. Its GDP, when adjusted for purchasing power, was on par with South Africa’s.  

But the country is now experiencing economic collapse. The crisis has its roots in economic mismanagement by multiple governments. This was made worse by global market disruptions and by internal security emergencies including the 2019 Easter bombings.  

What rights are being impacted?   

The current situation is impacting the full range of human rights for people in Sri Lanka. According to the World Food Programme, over a third of people are now facing moderate to severe hunger.

Shortages of other essentials including cooking gas, fuel and lifesaving medicines are disrupting the normal functioning of society and causing loss of life, enormous hardship, mental distress and social unrest.

There are serious concerns about the long-term impacts to the more vulnerable members of Sri Lanka society – including children, whose development due to lack of proper nutrition and disruptions to schools will be affected.  

The global human rights community has called attention to rights violations by the government, which has been seen to be slow to take the necessary steps to rectify the economic situation. It has also used lethal force and social media blackouts in response to protests. 

What are the broader human rights implications? 

The country is seeing the most widespread and diverse mass demonstrations in its history. So far they have led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the cabinet. They have also resulted in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa leaving the country. 

The scale of the protests signals an important shift in the social contract. The crisis has united people who were previously divided and there are demands for the abolition of the executive presidency.   

It is also significant that people are calling for more than the economic issues to be addressed. They are focusing on the need for systemic changes, including accountability and transparency within a government which has long resisted both.

In other words, what we are seeing is a clear assertion from the streets of the indivisibility of human rights – that access to food, water, and electricity rely on the safeguarding of civil and political rights and proper accountability.

They are making a powerful argument in favour of human rights-sensitive governance – something that has been in short supply around the world. 

Geopolitical corporate responsibility can drive change Expert comment NCapeling 26 July 2022

Russia’s long invasion of Ukraine is testing the commitment of business, but this could see the emergence of a new pillar of support for the rules-based international order.

The massive exit of more than 1,000 international companies from Russia has surpassed – by a factor of nearly ten in merely four months – the number which pulled out of apartheid-led South Africa over an entire decade.

These company exits extend beyond those industries targeted for sanctions – oil and gas, banks and financial services, aerospace, and certain technology sectors – to include hundreds in consumer products ranging from Levi’s and H&M clothing to Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Many of these companies may wish to return to a post-conflict – or post-Putin – Russia, while a few have already sold their Russian operations, as McDonald’s has to an existing Siberian licensee.

Both reputational and operational factors are driving the huge exodus: reputational as companies have chosen to disassociate themselves from Putin’s regime; operational as transportation routes and supply chains have been interrupted.

Few of these companies have made explicit the principles at stake, while many still face ‘tricky legal, operational and ethical considerations’ and some have kept operations in place. But the collective impact of the exit in response to Russia’s affront to international law has sent shockwaves around the world.

Current issues and future implications

Minds now turn to whether this exodus sets a blueprint for the future, and how companies having to make complex and sensitive risk assessments and global business planning decisions can address both current issues as well as similar future challenges.

The new Declaration from the Business for Ukraine Coalition – an international civil society initiative of organizations and individuals – encourages companies to reinforce ‘responsible exit’ from Russia ‘in response to its unprovoked, full-scale war on Ukraine’.

The declaration’s objective is to ‘block access to the economic and financial resources enabling Russian aggression’ and it urgently calls on companies that have terminated or suspended their business operations and relationships to ‘stand by those commitments until the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders is restored.’

It also states companies yet to terminate or suspend operations in Russia should do so unless they can demonstrate through due diligence that their provision of ‘essential’ services or products – such as medicines – meet critical humanitarian needs.

The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report: The Geopolitical Business suggests Ukraine represents an inflection point posing ‘a new test’ for business. According to an online survey of 14,000 respondents in 14 countries, including employees, NGOs, and other stakeholders, there is a ‘rising call’ for business to be more engaged in geopolitics, with CEOs ‘expected to shape policy’ on societal and geopolitical issues.

Such expectations have been intensifying with the impetus of the combined stakeholder capitalism and corporate purpose agenda, even as a political backlash in the US against the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) movement linking institutional investors and multinational corporations gains momentum.

The emergence of corporate activism is a further development – partly driven by employees and accelerated during the pandemic – on issues of economic inequality, racial injustice, and gender equality, as well as the climate crisis.

When considering what broader purpose should drive this corporate geopolitical engagement, the Business for Ukraine Declaration offers an answer, calling Russia’s aggression ‘an attack on the rules-based international order which must be protected to ‘safeguard the international community and the global economy.’

This points to broader interests and values at stake in the Russian war on Ukraine because supporting the rules-based international order can become the basis of a new geopolitical corporate responsibility. Business, especially multinational corporations and institutional investors, fundamentally depend on and have enormously benefitted from this order.

Economic development needs a stable rules-based international order

Trade and investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation – the sinews of economic development – depend on predictable, rational behaviour by states at home and abroad. Individual companies and entire industries share a stake in upholding this order at a time when its stability and even legitimacy is undergoing a severe challenge.

The rules-based international order has evolved since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the establishment of the standards, norms and institutions that reflect and reinforce these lodestars. It defines the international community, the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights within nations. It also supports national self-determination, sovereignty, and the disavowal of the use of force to alter borders among nations, and it provides accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Business has a fundamental stake in the international order as the framework for stability, prosperity, open societies, and markets.

A new geopolitical corporate responsibility does not need to become a doctrine but can instead be an agenda to support the international rules-based order under stress. Such an agenda may help multinationals deal with expectations they already face, such as:

Avoiding situations where they cause, contribute, or are directly linked to human rights abuses. This objective is enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and companies can be further informed by the new UN Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts.

Committing to the ‘shared space’ of the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights. These are both the enablers of civil society and the underpinning of sustainable and profitable business and investment environments. The Chatham House synthesis paper The role of the private sector in protecting civic space sets forth the rationale for companies to defend these vital elements.

Supporting peace, justice, and strong institutions both within nations and across the international community as set forth by UN Sustainable Development Goal 16. The SDG 16 Business Framework: Inspiring Transformational Governance shows how companies, as well as national governments and international institutions, can contribute to these building blocks of stability and prosperity.

Demonstrating corporate responsibility at the national and geopolitical levels to enhance equity, transparency, and accountability. Multinationals are already challenged to accept minimum corporate taxation within and across jurisdictions, curb excessive executive compensation, endorse mandatory disclosure of environmental and human rights due diligence, and strengthen corporate governance of ESG risks and responsibilities, including with respect to human rights.

Diminishing inequality by tackling poverty and ensuring sustainability by arresting the climate crisis. Alongside governments and international institutions, the business community already faces increasing pressure to improve its efforts in these areas.

Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions Expert comment LJefferson 20 December 2022

The UN Security Council has adopted a cross-cutting exception for humanitarian action in UN sanctions. What does it cover? What must happen next?

The UN Security Council has removed an obstacle to humanitarian work. On 9 December 2022, it adopted a resolution establishing a cross-cutting exception to existing – and future – UN financial sanctions for funds or assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. In a coup for multilateralism, the council has been able to act, even when the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused paralysis in other areas.

Resolution 2664 – introduced by Ireland and the US, co-sponsored by 53 states, and adopted by 14 votes in favour, with India abstaining – is the culmination of a decade of engagement between humanitarian organizations and states to find ways of avoiding the adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable: people relying on humanitarian action for survival.

A reminder of the problem

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this. UN financial sanctions prohibit making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to designated persons or entities. Without adequate safeguards, incidental payments made during humanitarian operations, or relief consignments that are diverted and end up in the hands of such persons or entities can violate this prohibition.

Exceptions in Afghanistan and Haiti sanctions pave the way

Humanitarian actors have been decrying and documenting the impact of sanctions on their operations for years. Ensuring that sanctions did not hinder the COVID-19 response was a turning point in states’ willingness to address the issue.

Movement at Security Council level was gradual, starting off with demands in the renewals of certain country-specific sanctions that measures taken by member states to give effect to them comply with international law. The return to power of the Taliban called for a more radical approach.

In December 2021, the Council adopted a broad exception to the Afghanistan financial sanctions, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exception was adopted – almost unnoticed – in October 2022 in the newly-established Haiti sanctions.

These developments, coupled with the determination of elected Council member Ireland to find solutions, paved the way for the adoption of SCR 2664.

The scope of the humanitarian exception

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action. The exception expressly refers to the different ways in which funds or assets are allowed to reach designated persons or entities: by the provision of goods or payment of funds by humanitarian actors themselves; by the processing of funds by financial institutions; and by the provision of goods and services by other commercial actors whose services are necessary for humanitarian action such as insurers and freight companies.

The exception is broad in terms of the excluded activities: the provision of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. The UN Somalia sanctions – the first, and for a decade the only, regime to include an express exception – exclude funds necessary for ‘humanitarian assistance’.

SCR 2615 on Afghanistan added the expression ‘activities to meet basic human needs’.  These go beyond humanitarian assistance, and have been interpreted as including activities necessary to sustain essential social services such as health and education, preserve essential community systems, and promote livelihoods and social cohesion.  These are essentially development programmes.  ‘Activities that support basic needs’ should be understood in a similar manner in SCR 2664.

SCR 2664 is not, however, a ‘blanket’ exception.  It only applies to financial sanctions.  These are not the only type of restriction in UN sanctions that can hinder humanitarian action. For example, organizations that send commodities into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must still go through the notoriously slow procedure of authorization by the sanctions committee.  Similarly, authorizations are still required for import of demining materials that fall within the scope of arms embargoes.

Opportunities for further engagement and additional safeguards

Recognizing that additional challenges remain, SCR 2664 requests the UN Secretary-General to draft a report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of all types of restrictions in UN sanctions. He is asked to include recommendations for minimizing and such unintended consequences, including by the adoption of additional cross-cutting exceptions.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council. It is not the end of the road. Other restrictions raise problems, and the Council has left the door open to finding ways of addressing them.

Humanitarian actors should seize this opportunity to provide information, identifying the problematic types of restrictions and their consequences on their operations as specifically as possible.

What happens next?

It is UN member states that implement UN sanctions. For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that even in situations when significant safeguards exist, key actors may be unaware of them or unclear as to their precise scope. Financial institutions in particular are fast to de-risk when sanctions are imposed, and remain wary of conducting transactions that they perceive as high-risk even though exceptions permit this.

OFAC – the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury – has issued extensive guidance on the Afghanistan sanctions in the form of frequently asked questions.  These have played an extremely important role in ensuring full advantage is taken of the exceptions.

States should follow this example, and adopt guidance to raise awareness of the exception in SCR 2664 and to clarify its scope.

A valuable precedent for autonomous sanctions

SCR 2664 only applies to sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It does not extend to autonomous sanctions adopted by states or relevant international organizations such as the EU.

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The UK must not sleepwalk into leaving the ECHR Expert comment NCapeling 17 March 2023

Talk of the UK leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) keeps rearing its head with little thought for the real impact.

Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has not been firmly ruled out as a potential UK government policy option to allow easier implementation of its controversial new measures to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda. This, in the context of a UK general election looming and tackling the ‘small boats problem’ being one of the five priorities of UK prime minister Rishi Sunak.

In recent months, ECHR withdrawal has come up in relation to the UK’s controversial draft Illegal Migration Bill, the (now shelved) bill of rights, and – perhaps most significantly – the Northern Ireland Protocol deal with implications for the Good Friday Agreement. But leaving the ECHR – and likely the Council of Europe – would be counterproductive for the UK’s global leadership.

UK values and priorities will be undermined

The only other countries in the region outside of the Council of Europe, Russia and Belarus, both had sanctions imposed on them by the UK for their human rights record. Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in 2022 due to its aggression in Ukraine and, although the UK would be deciding to remove itself from Europe’s oldest and largest intergovernmental human rights body, the optics would not be good.

This is especially true considering the UK’s vocal support for Ukraine in international forums, including its intervention in Ukraine’s case against Russia before the International Court of Justice and, potentially, in a separate case against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights itself.

More significantly and closer to home, the ECHR is a fundamental part of the Good Friday Agreement. It is difficult to argue UK withdrawal would not breach the agreement. As well as risking damage to intercommunal relations, such a breach is likely to significantly harm strategic relations with the US – and President Biden is set to visit Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to mark the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement.

It would also damage relations with the UK’s closest neighbours, Ireland, and the European Union (EU), with whom the prime minister has only recently scored credits for securing the Northern Ireland Protocol deal. If the UK withdraws from the ECHR, the EU would be entitled to terminate important provisions concerning international law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal justice matters under Article 692 of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement, further isolating the UK from allies who share its legal and other values.

Withdrawal would be in the name of sovereignty but with little thought to the practical implications on rights and few perceived gains from doing so. But the idea could easily gain traction by erroneously conflating the Strasbourg court and Council of Europe (of which the UK is a member) with the European Union (which the UK has left).

This means leaving the ECHR could easily be confused as a post-Brexit ‘tidy up’ exercise of taking back control from the EU when the reality is the UK would be withdrawing from a completely different regional body.

It would also be at odds with the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh which, reassuringly, contains references to the UK’s commitment to the rule of law, ‘respect for the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law’, and ‘universal human rights that underpins our democracy’. This would make the UK far less able to champion international law and influence states with long records of human rights violations, and run contrary to UK strategic priorities such as tackling aggression from Russia and China, its support for multilateralism, and its global legal leadership.

All this loss would come for little gain. Before going down this path, there must be a clearer understanding about exactly what concerns there are about the ECHR, and whether they stand up to scrutiny. Are they about UK sovereignty, specific issues about the European Court of Human Rights, or about the rights and obligations contained in the Convention?

The latter would raise a far bigger question on the UK’s commitment to other international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, as many ECHR obligations also exist elsewhere in both common law and international law.

The need for cool heads and a long-term view

The significant concerns surrounding proposals in the Illegal Migration bill have been well-documented, including in relation to obligations under the ECHR and UN Refugee Convention.

There are many reasons beyond simply human rights concerns which are preventing migrants being deported to Rwanda, including the fact there are insufficient countries with which the UK has agreements to allow for deportation.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

Evolving evidence suggests that nicotine may contribute to impaired asthma control by stimulating expression of nerve growth factor (NGF), a neurotrophin associated with airway remodeling and airway hyperresponsiveness. We explored the hypothesis that nicotine increases NGF by reducing lung fibroblast (LF) microRNA-98 (miR-98) and PPARγ levels, thus promoting airway remodeling. Levels of NGF, miR-98, PPARγ, fibronectin 1 (FN1), endothelin-1 (EDN1, herein referred to as ET-1), and collagen (COL1A1 and COL3A1) were measured in human LFs isolated from smoking donors, in mouse primary LFs exposed to nicotine (50 μg/ml), and in whole lung homogenates from mice chronically exposed to nicotine (100 μg/ml) in the drinking water. In selected studies, these pathways were manipulated in LFs with miR-98 inhibitor (anti-miR-98), miR-98 overexpression (miR-98 mimic), or the PPARγ agonist rosiglitazone. Compared with unexposed controls, nicotine increased NGF, FN1, ET-1, COL1A1, and COL3A1 expression in human and mouse LFs and mouse lung homogenates. In contrast, nicotine reduced miR-98 levels in LFs in vitro and in lung homogenates in vivo. Treatment with anti-miR-98 alone was sufficient to recapitulate increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1, whereas treatment with a miR-98 mimic significantly suppressed luciferase expression in cells transfected with a luciferase reporter linked to the putative seed sequence in the NGF 3'UTR and also abrogated nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1 in LFs. Similarly, rosiglitazone increased miR-98 and reversed nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that nicotine-induced increases in NGF and other markers of airway remodeling are negatively regulated by miR-98.

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