Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
Research

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology

Eiji Kinoshita
Apr 1, 2006; 5:749-757
Technology

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.

HIV Type 1 (HIV-1) and simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) display differential replication kinetics in macrophages. This is because high expression levels of the active host deoxynucleotide triphosphohydrolase sterile α motif domain and histidine-aspartate domain–containing protein 1 (SAMHD1) deplete intracellular dNTPs, which restrict HIV-1 reverse transcription, and result in a restrictive infection in this myeloid cell type. Some SIVs overcome SAMHD1 restriction using viral protein X (Vpx), a viral accessory protein that induces proteasomal degradation of SAMHD1, increasing cellular dNTP concentrations and enabling efficient proviral DNA synthesis. We previously reported that SAMHD1-noncounteracting lentiviruses may have evolved to harbor RT proteins that efficiently polymerize DNA, even at low dNTP concentrations, to circumvent SAMHD1 restriction. Here we investigated whether RTs from SIVmac239 virus lacking a Vpx protein evolve during in vivo infection to more efficiently synthesize DNA at the low dNTP concentrations found in macrophages. Sequence analysis of RTs cloned from Vpx (+) and Vpx (−) SIVmac239–infected animals revealed that Vpx (−) RTs contained more extensive mutations than Vpx (+) RTs. Although the amino acid substitutions were dispersed indiscriminately across the protein, steady-state and pre-steady-state analysis demonstrated that selected SIVmac239 Vpx (−) RTs are characterized by higher catalytic efficiency and incorporation efficiency values than RTs cloned from SIVmac239 Vpx (+) infections. Overall, this study supports the possibility that the loss of Vpx may generate in vivo SIVmac239 RT variants that can counteract the limited availability of dNTP substrate in macrophages.

Candida albicans and Aspergillus fumigatus are dangerous fungal pathogens with high morbidity and mortality, particularly in immunocompromised patients. Innate immune-mediated programmed cell death (pyroptosis, apoptosis, necroptosis) is an integral part of host defense against pathogens. Inflammasomes, which are canonically formed upstream of pyroptosis, have been characterized as key mediators of fungal sensing and drivers of proinflammatory responses. However, the specific cell death pathways and key upstream sensors activated in the context of Candida and Aspergillus infections are unknown. Here, we report that C. albicans and A. fumigatus infection induced inflammatory programmed cell death in the form of pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis (PANoptosis). Further, we identified the innate immune sensor Z-DNA binding protein 1 (ZBP1) as the apical sensor of fungal infection responsible for activating the inflammasome/pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis. The Zα2 domain of ZBP1 was required to promote this inflammasome activation and PANoptosis. Overall, our results demonstrate that C. albicans and A. fumigatus induce PANoptosis and that ZBP1 plays a vital role in inflammasome activation and PANoptosis in response to fungal pathogens.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Warfare and military are an integral part of much of ancient and medieval fantasy. This is no surprise: warfare was a key element in development of society and of history, and much of mythology is also about it. As such, it is difficult for fantasy writers and readers alike to avoid war and military matters in general. And if you are going to do something, try to do it well. Army does not spring from the ground like the spartoi of Jason.

Environment and Geography

Environmental conditions include terrain, climate and resources. All three influence how an army will fight and which weapons it will use.

Terrain can be highly varied, but I will divide it into three categories: mountainous, rolling hills and flat. Mountains and forests – and especially forested mountains – are conductive to infantry warfare. Depending on other conditions (such as society, climate etc.), this can mean either light infantry with focus on ambushes, raiding and guerilla warfare; or heavy infantry, with focus on direct confrontation. Both of these were, at different points, in evidence in Spain and Greece.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Environment & Society at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Strategy and Enemies

The structure of an army will depend on the strategy, as strategy will determine the army’s role and tasks. A state which carries out expansion through outright territorial conquest will have large numbers of heavy infantry, combat engineers and artillery, and possibly some heavy cavalry as well (e.g. Roman Empire, 10th century Byzantine Empire). If conquest is done by slowly destroying an opponent’s economic and social structures through constant raiding (such as chevauchee or razzia / ghazw), then majority of the army will be light cavalry, with some heavy cavalry support (e.g. Seljuk and Ottoman Empires), and light infantry will be used if terrain is unsuitable for cavalry. If a state is defending against cavalry raids, then light cavalry will be dominant (e.g. 15th century Hungary), whereas heavy cavalry will predominate if enemy raiders are primarily infantry. If enemy armies are too powerful to face in the field, light and heavy cavalry will be used to harass the invading army and cut off its supplies and foraging. In terrain unsuitable for cavalry operations, heavy infantry will be used instead.

Raiding — as a strategy — is generally preferred against a peer opponent, especially if a state cannot have a developed logistical support system.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Strategy & Organization at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Recruitment and Numbers

The most basic style of recruitment is that of a local militia – rural or urban – where a portion or all of the free men take up arms. Militiamen are usually not highly trained, but they make up for lack of training with motivation: fleeing not only carries social stigma, but is also harshly punished. As such, militias were more effective than what would be expected of “civilians in arms”. Militias almost always depended on relatively cheap and easy to use weapons, though urban militias might have access to more expensive weapons – such as hoplite panoply or crossbows. Tribal militias typically used weapons that were also used for hunting and sport. Peasant levy however was only ever used in a support and harassment role, and often had weapons modified from agricultural implements. Only urban militias could have heavy equipment. A common disadvantage of militia armies is the inability to deploy over long distances and time-frames due to soldiers having a day job; thus, focus on long-term warfare (be it conquest or defence) typically brings about the professionalization of the army. This also means that militias are best used in cases with high political fragmentation – such as city-states.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Recruitment & Logistics at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

In Antiquity and early the Middle Ages, the main weapon was the spear. Only a few exceptions appeared: Roman legions, which used javelins instead, and Macedonian pike phalanx with its sarissa. In the later Middle Ages, the main weapon could be a pike or a polearm (such as polehammer, poleaxe, halberd etc.), before the pike made its return in early modernity. Ranged weapons were not used to cause casualties, but rather to inconvenience the enemies and break up their formation.

Weapons and tactics will adapt to each other, as well as to the terrain and the enemies faced – but adaptations will be done within the boundaries of the society. A society without a significant tradition of horse archery will not counter horse archers with their own, but rather with foot archers. Horse archery was important for nomadic societies, because they could not afford the casualties which resulted from the shock and attrition tactics of the settled societies.

Weapons and armour likewise have a relationship, but since armour is the more difficult to produce of the two, it is developments in armour which typically drive the adaptation of weapons, rather than the other way around.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Weapons & Tactics at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Emma Lammers.

Author’s note: neurodivergent is term used to refer to people whose neurological functions differ from the norm because of an innate or acquired condition. Examples of these conditions include autism, learning disabilities, mood disorders, traumatic brain injuries, and more. People who do not have any neurodivergent conditions are considered neurotypical.

To the delight of many readers, more characters in fantasy literature reflect aspects of real-world people than ever before. Today’s heroes can be people of colour, people of any gender or sexual identity, people of nearly any age. Writers are answering the call for more diversity in their work, and oftentimes they do it well, portraying realistic, nuanced characters from marginalized communities.

Some people, however, aren’t as likely to see themselves accurately reflected in the pages of a fantasy story. I’ve searched long and hard to find literary characters who experience autism, anxiety, and sensory processing disorder as I do, and very few of these characters show up in fantasy – a detriment to my favourite genre. Villainous characters are often portrayed as neurodivergent because writers think that this will make them scarier, and you will encounter the occasional hero with post-traumatic stress disorder, but  these depictions tend to lack accuracy, diversity, and consideration for the people who actually have the conditions used in the story.

Continue reading Writing Neurodivergent Characters in Fantasy at Mythic Scribes.

It sounds like an oxymoron: “How to keep blood-sports interesting?” You’ve got blood and you’ve got sports, the term does its own advertising! And yet, fighting promotions rise and fall, where Pride and Strikeforce once reigned, now stand One and Bellator, but one promotion stands above all its competitors. The world of MMA knows one promotion which has clawed its way to the international top and established itself as the gold standard upon whose hallowed surface skulls are crushed and blood is poured. I’m talking about none other than the UFC.

Having established itself over the years as a beacon of both quality matches and consistent drama, the UFC attracts the lion’s share of international talent in the MMA world, and with it the eyes and ears of MMA fans everywhere. Having well and truly stroked the ego of the promotion, you might be wondering what on earth any of this has to do with writing or fantasy?

Well, does your world happen to feature prizefighting, ritual combat, or the eternally popular fantasy fixture called the gladiatorial arena? If so, there are a lot of writing and worldbuilding lessons you can learn from observing the biggest promotion in the biggest modern blood-sport of the world.

Continue reading Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting at Mythic Scribes.

Wisdom to my mind is a bit of a paradox. It is subjective and context-dependent, but inherently universal. I say this, because for something to be wise it ought to be applicable across time and space, yet whether the claims are appraised as being “wise” hinges on the perception of a past, present or future audience. It is beyond the self, yet dependent upon the self. So that then begs the fantasy writing question: What if the self is not human? If culture already morphs the form and substance of wisdom, what effect might a different state of being have on it?

That would be terribly dull to prescribe, but I can help get some readers’ creativity going. Below I have listed relevant questions with examples you might consider when building your setting, so you may merrily thread into your fantastic realms to shape oddities rich and strange.

I would advise readers of this article to try and let go of their own presumptions on what is wise for the sake of worldbuilding. There are few cultures in our modern, human world whose philosophers deem obtuse narcissists dressed in mink robes as being wise, but why wouldn’t a race of bobcat-folk?

Continue reading Questions for Worldbuilding the Concept of Wisdom at Mythic Scribes.

The aftermath: Navigating a Taliban-led Afghanistan Expert comment NCapeling 20 August 2021

In the coming weeks, governments and international organizations must work through an approach to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. It will not be simple.

A failure to acknowledge that the legitimate, elected representatives of Afghanistan are no longer in control of territory or institutions, and to refuse to deal with those that are, will only make for further misery for a population which has already endured decades of violence and poverty.

But to recognize the Taliban risks condemning tens of thousands of Afghan women, children, and men to brutal repression and, for some, potential death, as well as mocking the human rights and rule of law which the US and its allies sought to promote in Afghanistan, and globally, as cornerstones of values-based foreign policies.

The dilemma western governments find themselves in is one they have studiously sought to avoid despite mounting evidence that, without a negotiated deal, a Taliban takeover was only a matter of time. As late as 6 August, the UN Security Council refused to countenance appeals by the UN mission and Afghan civil society activists to press the Taliban and the government to negotiate a ceasefire.

The US reiterated its refrain that it ‘will not accept a military takeover of Afghanistan’ and the UK stressed the Taliban’s only route to power was through meaningful engagement in a peace process. Meanwhile, not until 11 August did Germany and the Netherlands stop deporting Afghan migrants despite the pleas of Afghan authorities and refugee organizations that the country was on the brink of crisis.

Delaying the inevitable

Belief that a military takeover was still some months away may have led diplomats to view dealing with the Taliban as a distant task. The unilateral nature of the US deal with the Taliban and the resistance of the Ghani government to any suggestion of power-sharing arrangements compounded a lack of international coordination and planning on what the conditions for engagement might be.

It cannot be delayed further. The scale of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is daunting, with more than half a million displaced by fighting in 2021 alone, almost 17 million facing crisis levels of food insecurity, and nearly half of all children under five malnourished as a consequence of drought and the COVID-19 pandemic.

With one of the highest global refugee populations and an estimated up 20-30,000 Afghans fleeing the country weekly – even before the government collapsed – Afghanistan evokes still raw memories of the 2015 Syria migrant crisis for Europe. Pakistan and Turkey, home to some of the largest Afghan refugee communities, have already closed their borders to more.

The ongoing chaos at Kabul airport highlights the challenges ahead. But there is a small window – before the UN Security Council is scheduled to review the mandate of the UN mission in Afghanistan by 17 September – for the US and its allies to craft an approach to dealing with the Taliban.

Formal recognition of a Taliban-led government is simply not an option, even for those maintaining a diplomatic presence in Kabul such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. Technically the Afghan republic has not yet dissolved with vice-president Amrullah Saleh, reportedly in hiding in the Panjshir valley, claiming he is the country’s ‘caretaker’ president.

Conditions for international acceptance

Afghanistan’s ‘enduring partners’ must now focus on building a consensus around five conditions for international acceptance of a Taliban-administered Afghanistan and prevent the Taliban again reaping the benefits of international divisions. The G7 began to articulate some of these conditions but they need to be set out and negotiated with Afghanistan’s neighbours before being formally articulated by the UN Security Council.

1. Adherence to Afghanistan’s human rights obligations. This must specify the rights of women and girls to education and work, the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, and safe passage for all Afghans and internationals leaving the country.
2. Amnesty for all individuals who worked for the Afghan government or international embassies, forces, or aid organizations since 2001.
3. No harbouring of terrorist groups. This has been the central condition for the US deal with the Taliban, and the overriding concern for both China and Russia.
4. Non-lethal public order. The provision of public order to enable supply routes to open, evacuations to continue, and aid to be delivered, is essential and one that Russia has made as a condition for its future relations.
5. Negotiation of inclusive political arrangements with Afghanistan’s political and ethnic factions.

The UN mission in Afghanistan, including its human rights component, and the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team should be mandated with reporting monthly on the progress toward these five conditions. Their assessments should form the basis for any reconsideration of the Taliban’s status as a terrorist organization. And a negotiated political settlement must be a precondition to the release of the government’s foreign reserves, estimated to be $9.5 billion.

Before this, the humanitarian and development aid on which Afghanistan is almost completely reliant must be recalibrated to flow through international agencies. Models such as Hamas-run Gaza, Assad’s Syria, or Aristide’s Haiti, show that while far from effective, it is possible to provide urgent assistance outside government channels.

This is one of the reasons why the Taliban has sought to retain a strong UN presence across Afghanistan and why the UN must be given a more significant political mandate and resources. The World Bank-administered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund should remain the principal channel for international funds.

It is difficult in the short-term to see the US leading this collective effort, given its defensive and domestic-focused position. It could be a moment for the UK and EU to demonstrate their multilateral commitments and forge a coordinated conditions-based approach to a Taliban-administered Afghanistan at the UN.

Going beyond handwringing or gesture politics will be difficult and messy and, ultimately, Afghanistan’s future must be decided by Afghans. Until that day, however, this will save lives.

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

G20's lack of progress highlights challenge for COP26 Expert comment NCapeling 1 November 2021

A positive outcome from the G20 summit was committing to end international financing for coal projects but, on other issues, the communique was ultimately weak.

Success at Glasgow depends on bridging fault lines

Renata Dwan

The G20 summit’s lack of progress on climate highlights the scale of the challenge – and the stakes – for COP26.  The countries responsible for 80 per cent of global emissions recognized but failed to agree concrete action to limit global warming to 1.5C.

The leaders’ gathering reveals multilateralism’s fault lines. One is the tension between domestic politics and international priorities, reflected in the lack of ambition to reduce coal dependency.  The second is the tension between industrialized and developing states over responsibility for delivering global goods.

The G20 failed to endorse the G7’s pledge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or to accelerate the mobilization of previously agreed climate financing. Success at Glasgow – and beyond – will depend on the extent to which these fault lines can be bridged.

Communique’s language was weak

Professor Tim Benton

A positive outcome on climate from the G20 summit was the commitment to end international financing for coal projects by the end of 2021. This is a win for the climate and for the G20-host, Italy.

The references to 1.5 degrees and the commitment to taking further action this decade were also important, and help lay the groundwork for COP26. On the downside, the communique’s language on phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and coal domestically was very weak.

The G20 summit should be regarded as the next step – it is crucial world leaders accelerate their efforts at COP26 in Glasgow to avert climate catastrophe and keep 1.5 degrees alive.

Platitudes and vague plans on pandemic preparedness

Robert Yates

As G20 leaders head to Glasgow to tackle the evolving climate crisis, they leave Rome having failed, yet again, to take serious action to end the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

Despite the obvious urgency to achieve universal vaccine coverage, their communique contains little more than platitudes and vague plans to prepare better for future pandemics. It is not as if they had not been briefed. 

In the run up to the G20, the leaders of the WHO, WTO, IMF, World Bank, former world leaders, Nobel laureates and the Pope, all highlighted the costs of ongoing vaccine inequity: five million deaths next year and $5.3 trillion dollars in lost economic output by 2026.

The ask was also straightforward: launch a massive airlift of unneeded vaccines from rich countries through COVAX, ramp up financing of the multilateral response and accelerate technology transfers to developing countries.

But on all these issues the wording of the communique is weak, with no numbers on vaccines or funding, no hard timescales and no urgency. This does not augur well for the COP-26 summit.

G20 communique is a launching pad

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

The G20 might seem disappointing to some, but a lot will depend on expectations. If your starting point is a pandemic that has so far taken five million lives and driven a global economic crisis, and that both these crises are marked by deep inequality, then the measures adopted are bound to look insufficient. But if your starting point is 16 years of democracy in decline, rampant disinformation on issues of climate and public health, four years of failed international leadership during the Donald Trump presidency and, especially today, heightened tensions between the US and China, the world’s two greatest powers, then the fact that the G20 communique achieved as much as it has is remarkable.

Any written document that requires agreement between the US, UK, China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and the EU is necessarily going to be watered down.

But the principles are in the document, and mostly everyone turned up – if some by video. That is a good outcome for this kind of multilateralism in 2021. The G20 communique is a floor not a ceiling, and it’s a launching pad for activism and mobilisation by individual states, but also by corporates, civil society, and subnational actors. 

Now we need to hope that those on the right side of progress, whether on climate, health, or development, will use this language to drive forward concrete actions towards net zero, climate finance, vaccine distribution, and debt relief.

Specifics are for the most part missing

Creon Butler

This year’s G20 leaders’ summit marks a stark contrast with the past four years when much of the group’s energy was exhausted simply trying to maintain a consensus – in the face of opposition by a President Trump-led United States – on such issues as the importance of tackling climate change, the benefits of the rules-based multilateral trade system and the centrality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the global financial safety net. 

By contrast, today’s G20 Rome Leaders’ declaration early on underlines ‘the crucial role of multilateralism in finding shared, effective solutions’. In two critical areas for the world economy – the global boost to liquidity from the general allocation of $650bn in Special Drawing Rights and the global tax deal focused on addressing challenges arising from digitalisation – this outlook has been translated into very substantial and concrete achievements announced earlier in the year.

Saturday Club introduces young people to international affairs News release jon.wallace 24 February 2022

Clubs will help 13-16 year-olds learn more about the forces that are shaping the world and discover how young people can influence the future.

National Saturday Club and Chatham House are delighted to announce the launch of the Society&Change Saturday Club. This new programme creates opportunities for UK 13–16-year-olds to develop a global mindset and build awareness of trends that will shape the world in the coming decades.

Three pilot Society&Change Clubs will be hosted by the University of Sussex, Manchester Metropolitan University, and the University of Huddersfield. Chatham House will provide speakers and generate ideas for the clubs.

National Saturday Club gives 13–16-year-olds across the country the opportunity to study subjects they love at their local university, college or cultural institution, for free.

Society&Change Club members will be introduced to a wide range of careers including policy making and diplomacy, advocacy, media and journalism, international trade and business, and the international development and humanitarian sector.

Weekly classes will be led by led by professional tutors from the host institutions. Club members will also take part in masterclasses with industry professionals, as well as an end of year summer show and graduation ceremonies.

Lucy Kennedy, Chief Executive of the Saturday Club Trust said:

‘We are delighted to be partnering with Chatham House to launch the Society&Change Saturday Club, the sixth subject within the National Saturday Club programme. Over the past 12 years, working nationally with 13–16-year-olds, we have seen that young people are eager to share their hopes and ideas for the future and address the issues the world faces.

‘We hope this new Saturday Club will empower them to shape their own futures and will bring the urgent voice of young people to international debate.’

Rose Abdollahzadeh, Managing Director for Research Partnerships at Chatham House said:

‘We are really excited about the potential for this partnership to encourage young people across the UK to explore their role in the world. The National Saturday Club network will also give Chatham House opportunities to harness the energy, ideas and passion of young people towards positive change.

‘By introducing Club members to contemporary debates on global issues and a range of professions in foreign policy and international relations, our hope is that some Club members will choose to follow a career path into this sector.’

Learn more about the Society&Change Saturday Club.

How the world has changed on my watch The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

As Robin Niblett steps down from his role as Director of Chatham House he reflects on the past 15 years of international affairs

International relations had resumed a steadier rhythm in January 2007 when I became Director of Chatham House. The aftershock of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the Bush administration’s contentious responses in Iraq and its ‘global war on terror’ had settled down somewhat.

That year President George W Bush’s second administration was mending fences with its European allies. China’s GDP growth hit a three-decade peak of 14 per cent, and the idea that this could drive a ‘win-win’ economic cycle did not yet grate. Financial regulators had not woken up to the credit crisis that they had enabled. And the European Union was still obsessed with ‘widening versus deepening’, while Britain tried to have its cake and eat it on the sidelines.

With hindsight, 2007 acted as the fulcrum between a cautiously optimistic post-Cold War world and the contested environment we live in today. Russian President Vladimir Putin chose that year’s Munich Security Conference to deliver a tirade against the injustices of a US-led world, with arguments that presaged this year’s invasion of Ukraine.

By the start of 2008, Alan Greenspan’s belief in the rationality of financial markets turned out to be a fallacy as US and European banks imploded. The subsequent economic turmoil, followed by monetary easing and fiscal austerity, sowed the seeds for the populist politics that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, world leaders did not give up on the promise of international cooperation. The global financial crisis led to the elevation of the G20 as the premier forum for coordinating global economic policy between the world’s major economies.

By 2015, with Barack Obama in the White House, two landmark deals were reached: the Paris Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an example of truly global cooperation between all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The next year, China’s first female chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, Fu Ying, pointed to a ‘decentralization of world power’ that might lead to a more inclusive world order.

But this sense of relative optimism about the future masked two fundamental changes. The first was the erosion of the cohesion of democratic societies under the pressures of globalization and the aftershocks of the financial crisis.

Instant access to unintermediated and often manipulated information ended up stimulating and polarizing societies in equal measure, deepening the divide between those searching for the certainties of the past and those open to the uncertainties of a more globalized future.

The second change is the end of the global hierarchy that followed the Second World War, in which the US and the West remained at the top, even with the advent of a more polycentric world. This change is driven by several factors, above all the growing economic and technological parity between China and the US, and by America’s schizophrenic response.

The Obama administration sought to restore a more inclusive form of global leadership, but it unwittingly revealed the limits of US power by breaking its red lines over Bashir al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria and by turning a blind eye to China’s takeover of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Donald Trump’s America First policies then flipped the US into an overbearing version of other self-interested powers. After this zigzagging by the US, leaders in the Middle East have developed their own assertive foreign policies, while two nascent democracies in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Myanmar, are again ruled by military juntas.

EU leaders became obsessed with the idea of strategic autonomy. And, although Joe Biden’s election was welcomed across most of Europe, it could not assuage concerns about the potentially transitory nature of his claim that ‘America is back’.

Putin has seized on this moment of transatlantic uncertainty and post-Covid navel-gazing to try to create a personal legacy as the leader who reunited a greater Russia out of the rubble of the Soviet Union. Instead, he has united Ukrainians and reunited the world’s liberal democracies in opposition to his brutal invasion and blatant rupture of international law. His actions have also drawn the contours of a new, trilateral international system.

Some 40 democracies across North America, Europe and the Indo-Pacific now see Putin and Xi Jinping – given China’s rhetorical support for Putin’s invasion – as interconnected threats to their long-term security. They are organizing to resist, using a re-energized Nato, new structures for Indo-Pacific cooperation and cross-linkages between these two spheres. For their part, Putin and Xi, though not formal allies, are tied together by each one’s need that the other survives and prospers while they are in confrontation with the liberal democracies.

The third, largest and most diverse group of countries are the newly non-aligned. India stands proudly in the foreground, but other major democracies such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, and non-democracies such as Egypt and Vietnam, are triangulating strategically between the world’s dominant democratic and authoritarian poles. Multilateral institutions will be weaker as a result.

Does this more divided world presage major conflict between the great powers? Hopefully not; after all, nuclear weapons remain a potent deterrent. Does global division herald the end of economic globalization and of the international cooperation needed to manage shared global challenges? Not necessarily.

While Russia will be excluded from liberal democratic markets for as long as Putin is in the Kremlin, China’s reliance on global markets and the importance of its market to the world make it unlikely that we will return to a new Cold War. Global supply chains and foreign investment will be more tightly circumscribed than today, but they will persist. And international cooperation to combat climate change and manage the environment will continue.

Meanwhile, technological innovation will accelerate, opening new prospects for sustainable development and employment, even as it sharpens the facets of geopolitical competition. And we may soon cross the tipping point at which women hold a critical mass of positions of political and community leadership in many parts of the world. Given that male leaders are, once again, the instigators of the latest spasms of violence, a more gender-balanced approach to leadership holds the prospect of greater political stability and more inclusive and sustainable development.

As I step down as Chatham House Director, I find myself torn between fury at the senseless human tragedy of a drawn-out war in Ukraine and the way its spillover effects are devastating the welfare of hundreds of millions across the globe, and hope that human courage, resilience and ingenuity will nevertheless sustain us on the path to a better future.

I am reassured in this by the knowledge that Chatham House’s researchers, professional staff and increasingly diverse membership mean that it is well placed to help decision-makers and societies navigate this complex world.

SNF Dialogues: Social media, social movements and political change 6 July 2022 — 2:30PM TO 3:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 June 2022 Online

Experts and activists explore how the digital world has changed the nature of social movements and the impact this has on policymaking.

From Extinction Rebellion to Black Lives Matter, social movements are increasingly harnessing social media to project their calls for action. This event, convened in partnership with the SNF Dialogues series, will reflect on the value of social media to social movements and the effects of such digital movements on policymakers. Experts and activists from around the world will explore whether social media is an effective tool for social movements or a distraction, the extent to which digital forms of protest incite social change, and finally if this change has an impact on policy decisions.

The SNF Dialogues, an initiative of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF), are a series of monthly discussions whose goal is to foster the exchange of ideas, inspire a new way of thinking and acting, and encourage and elevate public discourse across geographic boundaries. The Dialogues discussions are free and open to the public, aiming to bring to light timely questions and developments, share informed reflections and concerns, highlight new data and angles, and present fascinating people, projects and ideas.

The Dialogues are curated and moderated by Anna-Kynthia Bousdoukou and are facilitated by the non-profit journalism organization iMEdD (incubator for Media Education and Development).

The discussion will be conducted in English with simultaneous interpretation into Greek. If you wish to watch the discussion in Greek, tune in here.

Independent Thinking: War in Ukraine, Congress in China Audio NCapeling 21 October 2022

The inaugural episode of our new podcast examines the latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  

Bronwen is joined by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House, and Dr Yu Jie, senior research fellow in Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific programme.

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Rishi Sunak and the UK, John Kerry on COP27 Audio NCapeling 28 October 2022

The second episode of our new podcast examines the changes in the UK government as Rishi Sunak become prime minister and looks ahead to COP27 with John Kerry.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests discuss the arrival in Number 10 of Rishi Sunak, the UK’s youngest prime minister of modern times as well as its third of 2022, alongside analysing the Chatham House event with US Special Presidential Envoy on Climate John Kerry. 

Bronwen’s guests from Chatham House are John Kampfner, executive director of the UK in the World Initiative, Hans Kundani, associate fellow with the Europe programme, and Anna Åberg, research associate with the Environment and Society programme.

They are joined by Sir Simon Fraser, formerly of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Chatham House’s deputy chairman. 

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Lula wins in Brazil, US midterms Audio NCapeling 4 November 2022

The third episode of our new podcast analyses the results from the Brazil presidential election, and looks ahead to the crucial midterm elections in the US next week.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine the tight election result from Brazil and its impact on both the country and the region, and preview the US midterm elections being held on 8 November and the start of COP27.

In Brazil, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva beat incumbent Jair Bolsonaro by the narrowest of margins. Meanwhile in the US, the Democrats are fighting to retain the House and Senate from a resurgent Republican Party still enamoured with Donald Trump.

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of Chatham House’s US and Americas programme, Christopher Sabatini, senior fellow on Latin America in the same programme, and Ana Yang, executive director of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator.

Independent Thinking: US midterms surprise, COP27 begins Audio NCapeling 11 November 2022

The fourth episode of our new podcast analyses early results from the US midterm elections and brings the latest insights from a crucial COP27.

The US midterm elections threw up some surprising results with the anticipated Republican ‘red wave’ failing to materialize. Meanwhile at COP27 in Egypt, world leaders met in the first week of the summit. What did their presence achieve?

To find out, returning to the podcast this week with Bronwen Maddox are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the Chatham House US and Americas programme who was in Atlanta Georgia for the midterms, and Anna Aberg, research associate in the Environment and Society programme who is on the ground at COP27.

Joining them are Peter Trubowitz, professor of international relations and director of the Phelan US Centre at the London School of Economics and Antony Froggart, deputy director and senior research fellow in the Environment and Society programme.

Independent Thinking: Iran protests, Iraq's invasion legacy Audio NCapeling 17 November 2022

Episode five of our new weekly podcast has a Middle East focus with insights into what is driving the ongoing protests in Iran, and the progress of Iraq in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Since September, Iran has been swept by thousands of women-led protests, demanding an end to the morality police and the even calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile at Chatham House this week saw our Iraq Initiative conference 2022, which delved heavily into the multiple challenges facing Iraq two decades on from the invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week are the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil and senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour, who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative. They are joined by Sanya Burgess, digital investigations journalist with Sky News.

Independent Thinking: China protests, North Korea missile tests Audio NCapeling 1 December 2022

Episode seven of our new weekly podcast examines the civil unrest in China and the ongoing development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Anti-lockdown protests are sweeping the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. What does the unrest say about China’s response to COVID-19? How serious a challenge is it to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy so soon after the Party Congress?

Meanwhile, 2022 has been a record year for Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches. How far has North Korea’s nuclear programme and its missile systems developed, and what does it mean for the country’s neighbours?

Joining Bronwen Maddox in the studio this week from the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme are its director Ben Bland and senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie. Joining the panel is special guest Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor-at-large for The Diplomat magazine.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Reporting Putin’s wars Audio NCapeling 8 December 2022

Episode eight of our new weekly podcast reflects on almost one year of war in Ukraine, and 12 years of war in Syria.

In the studio with Bronwen Maddox is special guest Oz Katerji, a war correspondent and freelance journalist who in the early stages of the Syrian uprising reported on the brutality of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its impact on neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey.

Having written extensively on Syria and the Middle East, in January 2022 he journeyed to Ukraine and was in Kyiv on 24 February as Russia began its invasion. He has reported extensively on the battle for Ukraine’s capital, and later the Donbas, in Foreign Policy magazine, the New Statesman and Rolling Stone.

Joining Bronwen and Oz to discuss the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria from Chatham House are James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme, and Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: The UK tilts to the Indo-Pacific Audio NCapeling 14 December 2022

Episode nine discusses the UK’s foreign policy ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific and whether its desire to be a strategic player in the region is sustainable.

The past 18 months has seen the deployment of a Royal Navy carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the AUKUS partnership, talk of closer diplomatic ties with India and ASEAN and, in the context of Brexit, the UK potentially joining the CPTPP pan-Pacific trade deal.

But just how sustainable is a UK presence in the Indo-Pacific? And what are the UK’s strategic objectives in the region?

Joining Bronwen Maddox to discuss the UK’s high ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, and Veerle Nouwens, senior research fellow at RUSI and the co-author of a recent Chatham House report on transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.

Independent Thinking: Western tanks head for Ukraine Audio NCapeling 26 January 2023

Episode 12 of our weekly podcast analyses the deployment of international battle tanks to Ukraine and the contentious diplomacy putting pressure on Germany.

The panel examines what kind of capabilities will new weapons give to Ukraine amid fears of a new Russian offensive looming in the spring, and the intense pressure Olaf Scholz’s German government has been under since the invasion of Ukraine started.

How has Germany’s standing changed over the past 12 months, and what are the challenges facing the country in its relations with Russia as a long and cold winter sets in?   

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week from Chatham House are Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum, and Marion Messmer, senior research fellow in the International Security programme, along with Jeremy Cliffe, writer-at-large for The New Statesman magazine, and Ed Arnold, research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Myanmar, the coup two years on Audio NCapeling 2 February 2023

Episode 13 of our weekly podcast focuses on the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, marking the two-year anniversary of the coup there by the Tatmadaw armed forces.

In February 2021 the Tatmadaw overthrew the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar and, since then, the country has descended into a brutal and complex civil war.

Our panel analyses the state of the country and its people two years on. Can Myanmar hold together, can democracy ever be restored? And is the world ignoring a major humanitarian crisis in the making?

With Bronwen Maddox to discuss the issues are two journalists who have both covered Myanmar extensively. Sebastian Strangio is an author and the Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat, and Ali Fowle is a freelance journalist with Al Jazeera and the BBC.

Joining them in the studio from Chatham House are Ben Bland, director of our Asia-Pacific programme, and Rashmin Sagoo, director of our International Law programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Biden and the Republicans, AUKUS Audio NCapeling 9 February 2023

Episode 14 of our weekly podcast examines the Chinese balloon saga, the State of the Union address, and updates on the AUKUS deal 18 months after it was signed.

This week saw US president Joe Biden address an unruly joint session of Congress, during which he discussed America’s place in the world, China, Ukraine, and the state of the US economy.

As a new presidential cycle begins at the mid-point of Biden’s presidency, the panel analyses how Biden is doing and the challenges that lie ahead for him.

Also it is now 18 months since the announcement of the AUKUS partnership between the UK, US and Australia to develop nuclear hunter killer submarines. What does AUKUS mean for Australia, non-proliferation, and the Indo-Pacific more broadly?

Finally, the panel discusses China’s balloon over Montana in the US. Was it a signal from Beijing and what was it trying to photograph?

Joining guest host John Kampfner this week from Chatham House are Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and the Americas programme and Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme. They are joined by Dr Euan Graham, Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for defence and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Humanitarian disaster in Syria and Turkey Audio NCapeling 16 February 2023

Episode 15 of our weekly podcast examines the far-reaching consequences of the earthquakes which struck Turkey and Syria on the region’s fragile geopolitics.

With thousands killed and international aid flooding in, what hope is there for the many thousands of people in Syria and Turkey caught between the groups and governments involved in conflict for more than a decade.

The panel aslo discusses the political impact within Turkey, as fears grow that President Recep Tyap Erdogan may postpone the upcoming election amid outcries over corruption and the devastating loss of life.

Joining Bronwen this week is Lina Sinjab, Syrian filmmaker and BBC journalist covering the Middle East, Charles Lister, senior fellow and director of the Syria programme at the Middle East Institute, and Ziya Meral, senior associate fellow on Turkey at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Nigeria votes, Northern Ireland deal Audio NCapeling 2 March 2023

Episode 17 of our weekly podcast examines the outcome of Nigeria’s presidential election and the new deal for Northern Ireland negotiated by the UK and EU.

On 24 February, millions of Nigerians went to the polls in an election widely seen as crucial for the direction of the country, with the winner Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared the new president-elect. The panel discusses the state of Nigeria’s democracy and what lies ahead for the new administration.

In addition, UK prime minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced a new deal for Northern Ireland with implications for all the UK. Three years after the UK formally left the European Union (EU), has Rishi Sunak now got Brexit done?

Joining Bronwen Maddox are Leena Koni Hoffman, associate fellow with the Chatham House Africa programme, Aanu Adeoye, West African correspondent for the Financial Times and an academy associate at Chatham House, and Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: India, International Women's Day Audio NCapeling 9 March 2023

Episode 18 of our weekly podcast examines issues for women working in international affairs, and tackles India’s domestic politics and international standing.

Our panel this week discuss their experiences working professionally in global affairs and what advice they have for other women wanting to work in public policy.

India is also under discussion as Chatham House hosted Rahul Gandhi, leading Indian politician and former president of the Indian National Congress (INC). The panel considers his remarks about India’s internal quandaries and international perceptions of the country, almost a decade on from the 2014 election which brought Narendra Modi and the BJP to power.

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House are Rashmin Sagoo, director of the International Law programme, Anna Aberg from the Environment and Society programme, Armida van Rij from the International Security programme, and Isabella Wilkinson, research associate on cybersecurity. They are joined by Dr Mukulika Banerjee, who was until recently the director of the LSE South Asia Centre.

Independent Thinking: UK Integrated Review, Georgia protests Audio NCapeling 16 March 2023

Episode 19 of our weekly podcast examines the AUKUS deal, UK defence priorities, and the state of Georgia’s democracy following anti-government protests.

The UK and Australia will soon be building nuclear submarines together, but is the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific sustainable? Two years on from the last Integrated Review, has the UK finally clarified its foreign policy priorities on Russia, China, and on defence? And is the money there to do it all?

Also on the show, the panel discusses Georgia following recent anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Following the Rose revolution in 2003, Georgia seemed to be on a path towards closer ties with NATO and the European Union (EU). But the country’s government has recently moved closer to Russia and Vladimir Putin. What is the state of Georgia’s democracy and where is the country heading?

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House is Creon Butler, director of our Global Economy and Finance programme, Professor Andrew Dorman, editor of the International Affairs journal, and Alice Billon-Galland, research fellow in our Europe Programme.

They are joined by Natia Seskuria, associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Arthur Snell, former diplomat and host of the podcast Doomsday Watch.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

How modular renewables can reduce the costs of relying on carbon capture Expert comment LToremark 10 October 2024

COP29 must raise countries’ ambitions to deploy vastly more low-cost modular renewable technologies to help meet the tripling of renewables target set at COP28 and reduce our reliance on expensive carbon capture systems.

The most important international climate conference is around the corner. COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan will be especially important because next year countries will submit their five-yearly national climate plans – or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – as set out under the Paris Agreement.

At COP28 in Dubai last year, the final text was heralded as a last-minute success as – somewhat surprisingly – it was the first ever COP to commit to ‘transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner’. To support this, over 200 countries also committed to triple renewable capacity by 2030.

Under current NDCs, even if all countries achieve their most ambitious decarbonization plans, the world would still fall 30 per cent short of tripling renewable capacity by 2030. 

At COP29 in November, hosted by a petrostate, additional agreement is needed to operationalize the removal of fossil fuels from the global energy system and set the ambition for those crucial NDCs in 2025. Failing to do so means the opportunity to triple renewables by 2030 will slip away. But the actions of oil producing nations, international oil companies, their associated supply chains and networks of lobbyists have in recent years done their best to disrupt and slow down the energy transition and water down key negotiations during COPs and elsewhere. 

During the final days of COP28, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent private letters to its 13 members – including COP28 host the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – urging them to ‘proactively reject any text or formula that targets energy, i.e. fossil fuels, rather than emissions’. OPEC members own 80 per cent of global oil reserves.

Due to the startling decline in the cost of renewables and electric vehicles, fossil fuel producers are increasingly concerned. To fight back they are turning to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and carbon removal options, which would enable the continued burning of fossil fuels – and protect their assets and business models.

A key battle ground for oil and gas producers is the difference between abated and unabated fossil fuels.

Abatement is the process of capturing CO₂ as fossil fuels are burnt to prevent a proportion of those CO₂ emissions from entering the atmosphere, either by using that CO₂ in products or storing it in geological formations deep underground in near perpetuity, commonly referred to as CCS.

After COP28 there was optimism that the final agreement was significant and covered all fossil fuels without ambiguity around whether they are unabated or abated. 

But the definition of unabated has not actually been agreed within the COP process. During the 2021 COP26 summit, the Glasgow Climate Pact mentioned unabated in reference to coal. Could a gas power station capturing 51 per cent of the emitted CO₂ be considered abated?

And what about the so-called downstream emissions? Downstream emissions from cars, planes, tanker ships and diesel generators etc make up 50–80 per cent of the total emissions from oil – and there are no plans to attach mini-CCS systems to cars.

CCS and engineered carbon removals are also likely to be expensive. Analysis by the Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment has shown that high CCS pathways to net zero emissions in 2050 would cost at least $30 trillion more than a low CCS pathway with more renewables – roughly $1 trillion more per year.

The costs of CCS have also remained the same for the past 40 years, while the costs of renewables like solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries have dropped radically. Solar costs have declined by 90 per cent in the last decade. 

The rapid cost reductions of solar, wind and batteries are due to their modular nature. Around 70 billion solar cells will be manufactured this year, the majority in China. It is the repetitive modular manufacturing process that has led to rapid efficiency improvements and cost reductions. Each Tesla has around 7,000 lithium-ion battery cells, and the price of these modular batteries fell 14 per cent between 2022 and 2023 alone. 

The modular criteria can help define the technology winners of the future, technologies we should selectively support and accelerate over the coming years. 

While huge industrial power stations, oil rigs and refineries have their benefits, they are not modular in the same way. Their economy of scale is in the large size of each asset. CCS is bolted on to fossil fuel infrastructure but there are less than 50,000 fossil fuel producing assets globally. By contrast, there were 1.5 billion solar panels produced in 2022. The cost of deploying CCS is therefore unlikely to benefit from the rapid cost reductions of modular renewables. Nuclear even less so. There are 440 nuclear power stations in operation today, they take many years to build and remain hugely expensive. 

Grassroots to global: Young changemakers against violence 24 October 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2024 Chatham House

As part of Black History Month, this event will look at how youth activism against violence can influence change.

To address the alarming increase knife crime, a 10% rise in knife-related homicides between April 2022 and March 2023, the UK government launched a coalition of community leaders, campaigners and policy makers to tackle this tragic loss of life.

With people under 25 disproportionately affected, the ‘knife crime epidemic’ represents an example of how youth activist groups are central to tackling the problem. Organisations for and operated by young people form a key part of the strategy to ensure people are better protected from violent crime.

Around the world, a network of youth groups are similarly striving to make a difference and build a better life for future generations. Operating in different political and economic conditions, there are learnings to be found in groups working across the world.

This session will discuss how grassroot activism and youth organisations can influence governments to prevent young people falling into crime, the role of race and religion, and whether organisations are improving in their effectiveness around the world.

This event is a collaboration with Integrate UK.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

Moldova and Georgia face crucial elections – and diverging paths Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2024

The two countries face unusually consequential elections where their populations must choose between moving unambiguously towards the West – or towards closer ties with Russia.

Moldova and Georgia both go to the polls at the end of October; Moldova for presidential elections on the 20^th and Georgia for parliamentary elections on the 26^th. The two countries share a number of similarities – beyond their justified reputation as world-class wine producers. They are both small, low- to middle-income countries that have struggled to consolidate their democracies and have experienced oligarchic political influence. Both are candidate countries for EU membership, with Moldova a step ahead having been invited to start negotiations. 

For both countries these elections represent a fork in the road: either move unambiguously into the Western world, or step back from it and become more closely tied to Russia again and its way of governance. However, the second option has caused yet-to-be-resolved territorial conflicts in both countries – Transnistria for Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia.

Some would say it should not be such a ‘zero sum’ choice. Why must a nation choose between Russia and the West? While that may be a fair statement for countries like India or South Africa, it does not work for Russia’s former colonies, which Moscow wishes to control. 

Moldova and Georgia’s final similarity is that they face Russian interference and attempts to manipulate votes in their elections. In Moldova this has been especially brazen with the uncovering in September of a $15 million vote-buying scheme, including instructions on who to vote for distributed to over 130,000 citizens. Russian interference in Georgia’s election is less overt but at the same time more endemic considering its government has in effect been captured by pro-Russia forces.

Diverging paths

But this is where the similarities end and the contrasts become clear.

Moldova has a young, pro-Western and equality-conscious government, and 44 of the 100 MPs in its parliament are women. In this election, Maia Sandu is seeking her second and final term as president. The election is combined with a referendum asking the people if they wish to embed Moldova’s EU aspirations into the country’s constitution. The results of both the presidential election and the EU referendum will be close, reflecting a genuine split in attitudes (and debate) in the country. 

Georgia’s EU aspirations, meanwhile, are already embedded in its constitution – but that has not prevented Tbilisi from pivoting away from the West. Polls show   that around 80 per cent of Georgia’s population desires EU (and NATO) membership – rising to 90 per cent among the under 30s – but its government seems determined to deny them that future. 

Its new ‘foreign agents’ law is seemingly copy-pasted from Russia – and incompatible with EU membership. The election can be seen as a de facto referendum on the EU too. Georgia’s accession is suspended until its political crisis is resolved. 

Georgia faces other challenges to its democracy. Due to the country’s limited presidential powers, Georgia is in effect run by the unelected Bidzina Ivanishvili – founder of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party – whose relationship with Russia is murky at best. Judging by his recent speeches, Ivanishvili now blames the Western world not just for igniting the war in Ukraine, but also for the war in Georgia 16 years ago which resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory at the hands of Russia. This extraordinary position is both factually incorrect and out of step with the Georgian people.

Both countries are now at a critical point. Whatever the outcome in Moldova, the election will pass off peacefully and competently. Its problems (Russia aside) are demographic and economic, and the country’s pro-Russian opposition is relatively weak.

Georgia’s election looks like it is going to be messy. Ivanishvili’s party will likely manipulate the election to a win. There is still a chance that Georgia’s pro-Western but also weak opposition will regain power and return the country to its European path. But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised. 

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.